Interrogating the ‘emotional turn’:
Making connections with Foucault and Deleuze

Maria Tamboukou
Centre for Narrative Research, University of East London

Address for correspondence
Maria Tamboukou
Centre for Narrative Research in the Social Sciences
School of Social Sciences
University of East London
Longbridge Road, Dagenham, Essex RM8 2AS
tel. 020 8223 2783
fax. 020 8223 2808
Interrogating the ‘emotional turn’:
Making connections with Foucault and Deleuze

Abstract: In this paper I use theoretical insights from Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari to explore what I have called ‘the emotional turn’ in education. In following trails of the pedagogical repercussions of the Foucauldian notion of the care of the self, I trace various ways that it has been used and transformed, in discourses of progressive pedagogy. The Foucauldian conceptualization of the care of the self is further making connections with the Deleuzian notion of desire and affect. What I suggest is that revisiting education as a site of intense power relations at play, but also as a plane for the production of intense flows of desire and affect can perhaps create moments for thinking critically about the possible dangers of current discourses about emotional learning.
Interrogating the ‘emotional turn’:  
Making connections with Foucault and Deleuze

When I think about my life as a student, I can remember vividly the faces, gestures, habits of being of all the individual teachers who nurtured and guided me, who offered me an opportunity to experience joy in learning, who made the classroom a space of critical thinking, who made the exchange of information and ideas a kind of ecstasy. (hooks, 1994:202)

I chose this extract from bell hooks because I thought it was exemplary in opening up space to interrogate current discourses revolving around the importance of emotional learning, in a plane of thinking where Foucauldian and Deleuzian lines of thought can make connections. I was particularly intrigued by how bell hooks highlights the experience of joy and ecstasy in teaching and learning and points to the pleasures of teaching as both an act of resistance and performance, ‘countering the overwhelming boredom, uninterest and apathy ... of the teaching and learning experience [...] offering space for change, invention, spontaneous shifts’ (1994, pp.10-11). In such a context pleasure, joy, love, pathos and ecstasy form an emotional platform for the communication of differences and social solidarity. I further suggest that within such a conceptual framework there is an attention to strong emotions as sources for what Foucault would theorize as resistance and Deleuze as deterritorialization, or lines of flight.

Hook’s political insistence on the importance of ecstasy and joy in teaching and learning is an exemplary case of what Megan Boler (1999) has identified as the current colonization of emotion-as-knowledge within feminism. In her book, Feeling Power: emotions in education, Boler explores how emotions have been disciplined, suppressed or ignored at all levels of education and educational theory. In tracing the development of progressive pedagogies from civil rights and women’s liberation movements to recent studies of ‘emotional intelligence’ and ‘emotional literacy’ (See Goleman, 1996, 2003), Boler discusses how the once deterritorialized plane of emotional learning is currently used as a source of training within a regime of increased control and governance of emotions. Boler particularly points out to how the above mentioned concepts of ‘emotional intelligence’ and ‘emotional literacy’ have become catchwords in contemporary discourses, aligned with global capital needs and the continuing commodification of education. In the same vein, Erika McWilliam (1999) has shown how current ‘progressive’ pedagogical concepts and norms—including emotional learning—are discursive effects of historical contingencies, how pedagogical moral imperatives are imposed and how pedagogical pleasures are themselves historically constituted and learnt:

In recent times, the call to free the child through learning has been recuperated from its more visionary connotations by the call to expressiveness originating outside, rather than from within, the professional development literature and the educational disciplines. (McWilliam, 1999, p.67)
McWilliam has further commented on how texts from the archives of the ‘emotional literature’ (See, Goleman, 1996, 2003) construct the emotional individual as a particular type of person, a Foucauldian ‘case study’ and how certain emotional behaviours become measurable and consequent indicators of what has been defined as ‘emotional literacy’ (Goleman, 1996).

In this paper I want to rethink the stage of emotional learning through the lenses of Foucauldian and Deleuzian analytics. What I suggest is that their theoretical projects can radically problematize ‘the emotional turn in education’ and can open up planes where improbable affective connections can be made. In following this line I am reflecting on a rather well known Foucauldian warning: ‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.’ (Foucault, 1983, p.231) Following Foucault, what I suggest is that ‘the emotional turn’ is indeed a dangerous discourse— albeit not necessarily a bad one—and since in the same extract Foucault urges us to do something about it, I am turning to the Foucauldian ‘care of the self’—a theme that has forcefully emerged in his genealogies of the desiring subject, and the Deleuzian concept of the affect—exploring its connections with emotions. In turning to Foucault’s and Deleuze’s analytics, I follow theorists who have already identified the need for culturally specific histories—I would call them genealogies—of particular emotions to be written. (See, Boler, 1997).

Neither Foucault, nor Deleuze have dealt directly with emotions. Indeed if you have a look at any book or article written by Foucault or Deleuze, you will not find emotions as an entry in any of their indexes. Why is that so? They would both refuse to produce a generic theory about emotions, since they refuse any universal or primordial notion of the human essence as such—both being persistent anti-humanist thinkers. As Stephanie Brown has written,

> The anti-humanist examines the many processes by which the human becomes meaningful through the production of difference, looking, for example, at how the ‘discovery’ of the abnormal, the insane, criminal, the primitive, the child, the pervert—and all the cases which loom at the edges of the human—are part of ideological projects which produce difference and power by producing the human. (Brown, 2003, p.69)

In the light of his anti-humanism, for Foucault, emotions are nominal concepts historically and culturally constituted in the process of the emergence of ‘the man’ as an object of psycho-scientific discourses and knowledges. In his later work on the genealogy of the subject, however, Foucault has focused his interest on the theme of ‘the care of the self’ and its instrumental role in the deployment of certain cultural practices through which individuals have historically developed knowledges about themselves—what he called, technologies of the self (1988). In a Foucauldian framework therefore, emotions can only be discussed as an effect of intense power/knowledge relations at play within a specific political, socio-historical and cultural context. Deleuze’s theoretical work (1988) considers affects rather than emotions. While emotions are embedded within dominant linguistic codes and highly territorialized social practices and institutions, affects follow ‘lines of flight’, escaping planes of consistency and following unpredictable directions—they are forces of deterritorialization par excellence (See, Masumi, 1996). In following the project of rethinking
‘the emotional turn’, it is therefore to the attempt of making connections between the care of the self and the affect that I will now turn.

Care through Foucauldian lenses

‘The Care of the Self’ is one of the final themes in Foucault’s work that rather remained unfinished, given his unexpected death. It was developed within his wider project of writing a genealogy of the desiring subject, more widely known as his ‘History of Sexuality’ (Foucault, 1976, 1983). Starting from the recognition that our human nature is not a hidden reality to be discovered through self-analysis, but the aggregate of the forms we have chosen to provide public definitions of who we are, Foucault’s project was to write genealogies of the different ways human beings used to constitute themselves as subjects.

In Foucault’s thought, the cultivation of the self is rooted in the Hellenistic and Roman world, a period of ‘intensification of the relation to oneself’ (Foucault, 1990b, p.41). In this philosophical male tradition, the cultivation of the self was related to two important interrelated themes, the knowledge of the self, an epistemological technology, and the care of the self, an ontological technology. Education and particularly the pedagogic relation has been central to the development of the care of the self from its very beginning. Knowledge of the self and care of the self did not always sit together unproblematically: ‘there is the problem of the relationship between concern for oneself and the knowledge of oneself’ (Foucault, 1988, p.26). In the Greek and Roman texts, it was assumed that the need to take care of oneself, created the need to know yourself, in Foucault’s analysis, there was a subordination of knowledge to care. However this relationship of care with knowledge has been reversed: ‘In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle’ (1988, p.22).

The relationship between care of the self and pedagogy is also problematical. In classical antiquity, care of the self was considered essential for the preparation of young men to enter the public life, to their becoming citizens. However in the Hellenistic and Roman world, the necessity of the care of the self, was expanded throughout the whole life span. The problematic relationship between care of the self and pedagogy, exposes another issue, ‘the problem of the relation between being occupied with oneself and political activity’ (1988, p.26). A young man, preparing to enter the political arena was expected to be trained in how to take care of himself. It was his duty to know how to govern himself, so as to become able to govern others. In the later Hellenistic and imperial periods however, abandoning political activity, offered an individual the time and space to take care of [him]self. In Foucault’s reading, care of the self begins as a duty of a young man, but later becomes a permanent duty of one’s whole life. While political activity is considered as a motivation for the care of the self in classical antiquity, it later becomes a hindrance to the cultivation of the self. The difference between the two eras mirrors the fact that while the classical Greek ethics were independent from knowledge, they were heavily politically invested and directly involved in political relations. In the Hellenistic era the ethical practices became more and more self-reflexive, but at the same time more knowledge related and began cultivating an awareness of the universality of needs and values.
Finally Foucault’s discussion has revealed one more problematic relationship, that ‘between the care of the self and philosophical love, or the relation to a master’ (1988, p.26). This relation to a ‘master’ was complicated, since it was not simply spiritual, but it most often involved sexual intercourse and in that light it was arranged upon highly hierarchical structures of power between the active and passive agents of these relationships. Being passive was not a problem for a boy, but to become a man, it was necessary that one should become active and this reversion had its own implications upon the development of the spiritual relation to the master, and the ultimate relation to knowledge and truth: ‘Into the lover’s game where different dominations confronted one another, […] Socrates introduces another type of domination: that which is exercised by the master of truth and for which he is qualified by the dominion he exercises over himself’ (Foucault, 1987, p.242).

Thus, there are four issues that have arisen in Foucault’s analysis from the problematic relation between care of the self, on the one side and knowledge of the self, pedagogy, political activity and philosophical love on the other:

- knowledge of the self
- Pedagogy
- care of the self
- political activity
- philosophical love

What is important to point here, is that in Foucault’s analysis, the care of the self is not an abstract principle. It is an extensive activity that is diffused into various practices, types of attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of living that Foucault has described as technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies, and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being so as to transform themselves, in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality. (Foucault, 1988, p.18)

The development of care in these sets of practices requires time and effort. These technologies, revolving around the theme of the care of the self, constitute an art, the art of living, while their common goal is conversion to self, and consequently relation to self, through an ethics of control. This relation to the self is conceived first in juridical and political terms, ‘one is his own master’ (Foucault 1988:65) and second as a concrete relationship invoking pleasure: ‘Learn how to feel joy’ (Seneca cited in Foucault, 1988, p.66). In such a theoretical configuration ethics and aesthetics are closely interrelated in the cultivation of the technologies of the self. Therefore, Foucault’s analyses of care and the technologies of the self are not deployed in a void. The technologies of the self are part of an assemblage of power relations, knowledges, and social practices. It is I suggest tracing the genealogy of ‘the care of the self’ and the shifting discourses and practices with which it has been invested, that contemporary discussions about the role of emotions in education should be charted. In such a context the focus should be on the complex interweaving of power relations in how discourses about emotions in education are formed and mobilized, but also on the political consequences of such formations. It is within this context that I have initially raised the ‘danger question’ in the exploration of emotions. Why is it now that emotions have become so central in the
educational literature and practice? Clearly there have been times when emotions were largely excluded from the agenda of educational discourses and practices. As Boler (1997) has shown, historically emotions have been discussed on three interrelated levels: first, the rationalistic level—wherein they have either been dismissed as irrelevant, explained as a biological phenomenon or tied to cognition; second, the linguistic level, addressing questions of how emotions have been or can be articulated in discourse; and third the subjective/idiosyncratic level, wherein emotions seem to defy language altogether (1997, p.259). It is therefore within the rationalistic level and the cognitive model in particular, that emotions have been theorised as practices that can be evaluated, taught and learnt in the current literature of ‘emotional intelligence’ and ‘emotional literacy’ (Goleman, 1996). As Goleman argues, ‘emotional literacy expands our vision of the task of schools themselves, making them more explicitly society’s agent for seeing that children learn these essential lessons for life’ (p. 280). In this vein, educational institutions can become places ‘where students feel respected, cared about, and bonded to classmates, teachers and the school itself’ (p. 280). Clearly a genealogical analysis can trace here current transformations of the Foucauldian practice of ‘the care of the self’: the subordination of care to knowledge and its instrumentalization as a social practice aiming to both control and invoke pleasure to the pedagogical subjects involved in its emotional matrix. Seen from Foucauldian lenses, ‘emotionally literate’ teachers will be exercising their caring—and therefore emotionally impossible to be resisted—power over their ‘emotionally learning’ students and will therefore become much more efficient in influencing and guiding them ‘giving them lessons for life’, ultimately rendering them emotionally intelligent subjects. As Goleman argues, teachers have to be trained to become emotionally literate and it is by developing their emotional intelligence, that they will become successful transmitters of emotional intelligence (1996, p.279). Translated in Foucauldian terms, the teacher will have to learn how to govern herself emotionally, so as to become able to govern others in doing the same. Obviously, pedagogic relations interwoven with emotional intensities can very well follow lines of flight to unknown territories beyond regimes of emotional control and governance. As will further discussed, the Platonic theme of the pedagogical eros, or the relation of the care of the self to philosophical love as Foucault has delineated it, is a line of flight par excellence. What is notable for the discussion at this point is that the four aforementioned problematic relations of the care of the self to knowledge, pedagogy, political activity and philosophical love seem to be reenacted—albeit significantly transformed—in current discourses of the emotional literature.

Despite the particularly useful genealogical insights that the Foucauldian conceptualization of power and the care of the self can offer in the understanding of the historical deployment of emotions, there is little space indeed about following lines of thought that can go beyond ‘the danger effect’ and trace possible transgressive possibilities that a theory of emotions could possibly offer. As already noted Deleuze’s philosophy has not contributed to the theorization of emotions. However, it has meticulously dealt with the concept of the affect and it is at this point that a notable difference between Foucault’s and Deleuze’s conceptualization of the self is being brought forward: while the Foucauldian genealogy conceives the self as an effect of the interweaving of certain historical and cultural practices or technologies which are to be analysed and deconstructed from within, for Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities’ (1984,
There is a void here that instead of creating a deficiency as Foucault would say (1970, p.342), opens up space for the concept of the affect to be further discussed.

**Affect, and the machine**

In theorising affects Deleuze has opted for a non-regulatory analytics. Unlike the predictability of emotions, affects have been conceptualized as forces of desire continuously flowing and making connections within and between machines. Clearly, there are conceptually critical differences between emotions and affects, although the two concepts seem to overlap in certain parts of the literature and have been occasionally used as synonyms. However, as Massumi has noted, ‘emotion and affect follow different logics and pertain to different orders’ (1996, p.221). Within Massumi’s conceptual framework, ‘an emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal’, it is subsequently ‘owned and recognized’. On a different order, affects—conceptualized as intensities of movement, rhythm, gesture, and energy—are ‘unqualified’, ‘not ownable or recognizable’ and ‘resistant to critique’ (1996, p.221-2). And although Massumi asserts that affects have not been recorded in current cultural and theoretical vocabularies, he nonetheless traces the difference between affect and emotion in the philosophy of Spinoza.

In Deleuze’s thought, affects as bodily forces, temporally and spatially specific, keep moving outside bounded territories, following lines of flight. As Massumi has noted affects are autonomous: although they are embodied, they cannot be confined within a particular body, they are on the contrary open and ready to escape ownership, definition and closure (1996, p.228). In this light, Boler has noted, affects are not only part of how we understand one another—as the emotional literature would have it—they are continually proactive in making unpredictable connections between bodies and forces (1997, p.265). Thus, the notion of the affect as a deterriorializing force should be mapped within the conceptual configuration of the machines, which—unlike closed organisms and fixed identities—are assemblages without any organising centre and can only function as they connect with other machines in a constant process of becoming. In this light, machines allow for the possibility of open configurations, continuous connections and intense relations, incessantly transforming life (See, Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). But, the question comes, how could the Deleuzian conceptualization of the affect rewrite emotions in current educational discourses and practices? I will leave the answer to Boler’s passionate suggestion:

For education this means first that we begin to take stock of the systematic neglect of emotion in scholarly discourses [...] Second, we can begin to ask such questions as: How do we experience our affective privileges as well as our lack of affective resources? [...] To call for pedagogies that do not privilege rationality, and to decide when and how affects can and should be articulated is truly problematic and challenging. [...] But if we follow these lines of flight, away from stagnant habits and towards collaborative affective inquiry, we open affective territories that promise passionate educational exploration not yet colonized in the economies of mind (Boler, 1997, pp. 268-9).
In thus proposing the care of the self as line of tracing a genealogy of the emotional subject and the concept of the affect as a theoretical tool to annihilate possible dangers inherent in a cognitive approach to the theorization of emotions, the discussion of the paper is now led to the consideration of power and desire as planes on which care and affect should deploy their differences and possibly make connections.

On Power and Desire

Commenting on Deleuze and Guattari’s work in relation to Foucault’s, Paul Patton (2000) has seen them as ‘engaged in parallel but complementary projects’ (p.53) particularly in their analysis of power and desire. In Deleuze’s analyses, desire is regarded as an autonomous and productive force shaping the social rather than being determined by it. Instead of being ideological, desire is the real material thing: ‘desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology: desire is in production, just as production is in desire as desiring-production.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 348). In the same vein, power is for Foucault a material entity of relations at play. As Deleuze stresses, power for Foucault, ‘isn’t just the relation of a force to a being or an object, but corresponds to the relation of a force to the other forces it affects, or even to forces that affect it (Deleuze, 1990, p.117). According to Patton, this affective dimension of power in Foucault forms rhizomes with the Deleuzian notion of desire and becoming (2000, p.53). As it has been suggested ‘power for Foucault, like desire for Deleuze and Guattari, permeates all social relations and penetrates the body.’ (Bogue, 2000, p.73) We can therefore have the following assemblage of power and desire:

```
   desire
      |   power
      | produce reality
      | saturate bodies
```

As Deleuze and Guattari have put it: ‘If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality.’ (1994, p.26). Furthermore in his theorization of power as a cluster of relations, Foucault has considered the functioning of these relations as ‘an economy of power’:

I would like to suggest another way to go further towards a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point of application and the methods used. Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies. Foucault, (1982, pp.210-11)

In the same vein, Deleuze has theorized multiple ways in the flowing of desire through machinic assemblages and have stated that ‘desiring-machines are the fundamental category of the economy of desire’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p.32) So Foucault has been
concerned with ‘an economy of power’, while ‘an economy of desire’ has been an analogous theoretical configuration in Deleuze and Guattari’s analyses. What I want to suggest here is that emotional learning in education is a field par excellence for the study of how economies of power and economies of desire produce realities and segmentarities, but also incite deterritorializations and allow lines of flight, irrespective of the fact that they will also allow grounds for reterritorializations to occur. As Deleuze and Guattari warn us: ‘You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject’ (1988, p.9). Again here we can trace connections with how Foucault has theorised resistance as an effect of power and has designated power and resistance as a continuous cycle of interaction. In this conceptualization, resisting power always includes the danger of reinstalling it on another plane, a Foucauldian line of thought which runs in parallel with Deleuze and Guattari’s warning about reterritorialization, particularly when they most provocatively suggest that ‘it is always on the most deterritorialized element that reterritorialization takes place’ (1988, p.221). Therefore as Patton puts it, Deleuze and Guattari offer a machinic theory of desire, desire producing reality, while Foucault offers an analysis of a panoptic power as a machine for the production of normalised individuals, a productive power again (2000, p. 73). Moreover, as Foucault has commented in his introduction to the Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari have influentially theorized technologies of desire. (1984, p xii ). Here we can trace another explicit parallelism between Foucault’s theorisation of power and the subject as sets of technologies as they were deployed in his later work: we can therefore see technologies of power and technologies of desire making connections in Foucault’s and Deleuze’s work. In both cases it is ‘the how’ of the process that is of interest and not ‘the why this or that’ (Foucault, 1984, p xii).

However, there is also an important point of tension in the thought of Foucault and Deleuze emerging with reference to their analytics of power and desire in the way that Deleuze prioritizes the lines of flight to conflicts and battles which are so central in the Foucauldian conceptualization of power: ‘a social field is defined less by its conflicts and contradictions than by the lines of flight running through it.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.90) Should this statement further lead to an assumption that desire should be prioritized in relation to power? And it is in this light that Patton asks: ‘what do we have here? […] a negative force of power, versus a positive force of desire? Furthermore, where is the theoretical priority: on power or desire?’ (2003, p.74). Perhaps, I am suggesting we need to get rid of binarisms: power versus desire or vice versa, perhaps we can feel the rhythm of a dance, a ‘pas de deux’ as Conway has put it (1999), between power and desire. What I suggest is that instead of searching for generalized theoretical configurations bringing together power and desire, an interesting contour could perhaps be to explore these connections in specific contexts and see how the discursive field of emotional learning can provide the grounds for desire and power to dance together in the production of affects. It is staging such encounters that I now turn.

Desire in education

In what has become a most frequently quoted passage, Elaine Marks has suggested that ‘desire is the central force in teaching, a force that can be dangerous if it is not recognized and controlled but without which the language and literature classroom is a dry and boring
place.’ (MLA Newsletter 25, 1993, pp. 3-4). Drawing on her own experiences, both as a student and as a teacher, bell hooks (1994) has suggested that eros and eroticism in the classroom has been a central tenet of critical feminist pedagogy. In its encounter with the Nietzschean notion of power as further elaborated by Foucault, the power/desire couplet could perhaps unfold itself as a set of forces suffusing and unsettling pedagogic relationships making trouble to long held hierarchies of knowledge regimes. However, while there has been work on how pedagogical eros has been dramatised in literature and film (see Bareka and Morse, 1997) there are few explorations of actual contemporary classroom experiences. Jane Gallop’s approach has been pivotal, albeit controversial in this area. In her book Feminist Accused of Sexual Harassment, which was a response to a law-suit against her, Gallop writes: ‘I learned that desire, even desire unacted upon, can make you feel very powerful. And the space where I learnt desire -where it filled me with energy and drive- I call feminism […] for me feminism always names the force that freed me to desire and to learn.’ (1997, pp.5, 6). It is worth noting that Patton has drawn on Gallop’s experience to consider ‘a pedagogic encounter giving rise to an experience of erotic intensity, […] desire arising within the scene of pedagogy (2000, p.76). Patton draws on Gallop’s paper ‘Knot a Love Story’, where she recounts how an intense tutorial with a graduate student over a poorly marked paper created the conditions of possibility for sexual desire to emerge, (as cited in Patton, 2000, p.76) to further explore relations between power and desire. In Patton’s analysis, although the student at the end of the session ‘is left bowed and vulnerable’ (2000, p.76) with regard to the quality of his academic work, he nevertheless, leaves the pedagogical scene having been empowered by his confrontation with his teacher. Clearly the teacher’s intellectual power having been successfully exercised over the student ends up in ultimately enhancing the student’s own power. The power game between the student and the teacher incited intense feelings of desire, at least for the teacher, and ended up in enhancing the capacity of both to affect and to be affected. As Patton lucidly puts it:

Gallop’s experience shows how the feeling of power obtained by contributing to the power of others may be indistinguishable from an intense experience of desire and vice versa. If this is so, then it matters little whether we speak of desire or the feeling of power. What matters is the manner in which we act upon the actions of others, and the kinds of assemblages in which and through which we desire. (Patton, 2000, p.77)

In commenting on Gallop’s experimentation with desire, knowledge and power as well as on Patton’s analysis of it, Braidotti takes a distance from Gallop’s pedagogical practices, fully embracing however, the point that ‘the feminist pursuit of knowledge mobilizes the whole of the woman’s self - body as well as mind […] knowledge and/as pleasure becoming all one.’ (2002, p.30). The Deleuzian notion of becoming according to Patton forcefully concentrates the power/desire couplet. Bodies in their analyses are defined in terms of the relations into which they can enter with the powers of other bodies. In using Gallop’s pedagogical encounter again, Patton shows how this event involved processes of becoming: a becoming-student on the part of the teacher, to the extent that her assessment criteria were tested and interrogated and a becoming-teacher on the part of the student to the extent that he had to assert his scholarly self.[83] (Patton, 2000:79).

By way of conclusion
In exploring Foucauldian and Deleuzian lines of thought, what I have suggested is that their analytics of power and desire can illuminate some of the dangers that are inherent in current discourses around emotions in education. Hook’s *Teaching to transgress* has functioned as the material matrix, within which desire and power have been used as a tool to interrogate ‘the emotional turn’. Currently, education on a global level is being heavily invested by discourses and practices that attempt to construct it as an apparatus of economic competitiveness in the global market, and as a social matrix within which new forms of social exclusion are being legitimised. Historically however, education has always functioned as a site where counter discourses have emerged and strong battles of power relations have been staged; education has always been constituted as a significant locus of resistance, a smooth space for forces of deterritorialization to be released. What I therefore propose is that revisiting education as a site of intense power relations at play, but also as a plane for the production of intense flows of desire can perhaps create moments for thinking differently about our actuality, about the risks we run resting upon unproblematized segmentarities of the emotional literature, but most importantly about imagining possibilities of following lines of flight, becoming other.

REFERENCES


---

1 See Masumi’s critique of Grossberg’s analysis, (1996, p.237)