‘EUROPEANITY’, THE ‘OTHER’ AND THE DISCOURSE OF FEAR:
THE CENTRALITY OF THE FORCED MIGRANT AS ‘GLOBAL ALIEN’ TO
AN EMERGING EUROPEAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Ph.D.
2012
Abstract

The forced migrant, driven into the global circuits of ‘survival migration’, and subject to an increasingly securitised European asylum and immigration system, is fashioned at the Europe Union’s distended and de-territorialised external borders as a figure of fear. This thesis seeks to demonstrate how this operation goes far beyond the quotidian social production of marginal and excluded figures: it argues that the forced migrant has become a key ideological resource in the attempt to de-historicise, universalise and naturalise the neoliberal system of global capitalism. Based on secondary literature, but using primary sources where necessary to validate its arguments, the thesis investigates the way Europe’s core nation-states attempt to displace their contradictions and conflicts – inherent in their nature as centres of and conduits for global capitalism – through the manipulation of deeply embedded nationalist narratives of inclusion/exclusion. The national border is key to the discursive definition of the forced migrant as a threatening ‘global illegal’. The thesis argues, however, that the concept of the European border has expanded from its everyday construct into a normative global instrument that not only assigns identity, but is summoned into being by the supposed inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it, wherever they may be. The creation of racial stereotypes has become one of the foremost tools of this form of identity management: the research reveals that the racialisation of the figure of the ‘absolute alien’ plays a fundamental role in the construction of an overarching sense of ‘European-ness’. The war on terror, by summoning up the racialised figure of the ‘global jihadi’, which is discursively linked to the image of the forced migrant as a threatening global ‘illegal alien’, has enabled the creation of a European asylum-security nexus. The way the figure of the forced migrant has been fashioned into the natural subject of a politics of (in)security has become an essential component in the construction of a hyper-national ‘European identity’. The thesis concludes that the forced migrant, fashioned out of national materials as the ultimate ‘global alien’, is the ideological pivot for the normalisation of a global system of exploitation as manifest in its national form, and gains an even more exaggerated importance when economic and political crisis presents an overwhelming need to promote the idea of ‘European-ness’.
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Acknowledgements:
I wish to thank my director of studies Prof. Philip Marfleet, and my supervisors Prof. Yosefa Loshitzky and Dr. Ashwami Sharma, without whom this thesis would not have been possible.
I am also very grateful that I was enabled to undertake this research by the award of a grant from the AHRC.

* Elements of this research has been published in chapter form in the following books:


Chapter One

Introduction

The research question

The figure of the forced migrant today commands a heightened sense of awareness not witnessed in Europe since the 1930s – it is encountered as a key concern in current political rhetoric and policy measures (both European and national) and academic discourse alike. The presence at the external borders of the European Union of individuals who have been forced into what Ghosh (cited in Marfleet, 2006, p.93) calls the ‘survival circuits’ of global migration is testimony to the many millions displaced by the continual round of wars, internal repression, economic upheaval and environmental disasters that capitalist globalisation has left in its wake in the Global South. The numbers arriving at Europe’s borders represent but a fraction of the massive population displacements taking place across the world yet they have become an unprecedented focus of concern, placed under the spotlight of an increasingly international system of high-tech surveillance, registration and interdiction. As Agamben (2005, p.184) notes, the figure of the forced migrant is in a continuous relationship with power, ‘at every instant exposed to it’, and thus ‘no life is more political’. This was the starting point of my investigation: how and why, at this particular historical juncture in the most economically and politically powerful countries of Europe, has a deliberately marginalised and depoliticised figure been endowed with such an exceptional visibility and political importance, apparently far beyond anything justified by its bearers’ corporeal presence?

This relates to a further question: what is the significance of the fact that such agitation is happening at a time when the nation-state itself is challenged by the centrifugal, albeit uneven, processes of economic globalisation that are fast eroding any distinction between the domestic and the global market? This economic transformation has also had profound social consequences: mega-cities are spreading throughout the world, sucking in millions of workers, and their populations – especially in the metropolitan sites of capital accumulation – are becoming increasingly racially, culturally and linguistically diverse. But at the same time, we are witnessing the retrenchment of national and regional borders. It is at these borders that policies of national inclusion/exclusion are manifested through daily processes that identify, mark
and exclude the ‘external’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘alien’. What is the relationship of the forced migrant to the dynamics of globalisation and to its apparent antithesis, the national/regional border, and how and why has this figure come to be so integral to an inflated discourse of nationalism apparently so obsessed with the ‘integrity’ of a European identity?

Aspects of this question have, of course, been a focal point for much intellectual enquiry. Soguk (1999) has provided one of the most cogent analyses of the phenomenon, and his theories have subsequently been reinforced and expanded by other scholars. He argues that representations of the forced migrant have been discursively orchestrated to reaffirm the ‘relations, institutions and identities of territorial, citizenship-based liberal democracies’ (Ibid., p.210) and recruited into the service of the nation-state in an attempt to recoup its centrality in a world increasingly defined by global, extra-territorial economic powers. The figure of the forced migrant is constructed as the absolute embodiment of alterity through processes of marginalisation and exclusion that have, as a consequence, become critical to state affirmation. The delineation of a national identity whose existence is premised on the fact that those included in its embrace can only be defined by reference to those who must be excluded ensures that the ‘excluded’ figure plays a foundational role in the (re)constitution of state power. The political managers of the nation-state have found new purpose in the regulation, management and disciplining of those marked as ‘belonging’ to its sovereign, territorial domain, aided by the identification, marginalisation and criminalisation of those who are not.

A further question arises: if this is the case, how and why has this figure, evoked for national purposes within Europe, become a new global subject? The attempt to harness a revived and belligerent nationalism is framed by an overriding emphasis on ‘security’, which appears to be driving governments into more coercive mode and easing a new military discourse into common usage by way of the spectre of global ‘Islamic terrorism’. Those dispossessed and displaced by the capitalist system’s relentless spread and systemic convulsions are forced, in hope of survival or a life beyond mere survival, to follow its threads back to its origins in the wealthy and powerful nation-states. Control over and/or denial of the freedom to undertake this journey has been invested with far more significance than the mere management of marginal groups of people would appear to warrant. It has become one of the main rationales for the expansion of a multi-billion-dollar security business, whose full power and influence within the
European Union was unleashed by the ‘global war on terror’. The legacy of the war on terror is a (re)entrenchment of the ‘politics of fear’ as a credible mechanism of government, laying the basis for the seemingly endless expansion of a vast ‘security-industrial complex’ and the ‘securitisation’ of a common European asylum and immigration process. Indeed, the new discourse of terror appears to have woven terrorism, transnational crime and forced migration/asylum into a tight nexus of security concerns.

The discourse of political fear relies upon the identification of the object of fear, which comes to dominate the political agenda and necessitate permanent vigilance. However, when the discourse of terror began to infect European asylum rhetoric, legislation and policies it entered ‘an already heavily prestructured domain of insecurity’ (Huysmans, 2006, p.63): as the figure of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ emerged centre-stage, it slipped into a template already occupied by the forced migrant, while the image of the terrorist intensified the perception of the threatening nature of the ‘alien’ at Europe’s borders. The external border, which is increasingly located far beyond its initial geographical limits, is perceived as a dangerous zone of crime, terror and illegality. It is, in fact, a zone outside the law: it represents a space where governments and their (public and private) agents operate beyond public oversight, outside the strictures of national law and skirting the (state-centric) system of international refugee and human rights legislation. Those denied the right to cross, meanwhile, carry the mark of inhabitants of this zone, and are systematically criminalised, dehumanised and endowed with the identity of ‘global alien’.

This begs the question of why it is the forced migrant (increasingly characterised as an ‘illegal’ border-crosser) who has become the global personification of ‘illegality’, paradigmatic of the ‘global enemy’ at the national border. De Genova and Peutz (2010, pp.26-7) have argued that the figure of the forced migrant has become an urgent site of struggles around ‘the global socio-political production of space, and the freedom of movement that remains … as one of the very foundations of any conception of human freedom’. The attempt to control such mobility (to enforce the ‘global management of migration’), and thus to control and manage the wider movement of labour, whose exploitation ensures the reproduction of the capitalist system, entails that the forced migrant be denied the rights and protections accruing to national citizens. They are increasingly situated (through an implied correlation with transnational criminal and terrorist networks) in an ‘anarchic’, ‘illegal’ space outside the global system of nation-
states. A general sense of insecurity, channelled and focused by the war on terror, can then be displaced with apparent ease onto those individuals categorised as ‘alien’: they are not only available (and thus readily embodied) but, most importantly, they are also rendered vulnerable – displaced, stripped of resources, ‘silenced’ and easily presented as a screen onto which such collective anxieties can be projected.

The central pivot of my research, therefore, is the question of how this global figure, seemingly the focus of an unrelenting drive to the ‘securitisation’ of the control of global movement (and increasingly of wider European society), relates to the privileging of the tropes of nationalism that appear so central to the European Union’s attempts to create and naturalise an enhanced pan-European identity. How does asylum policy, merged with internal security concerns, figure in the creation and management of a European state infrastructure designed to meet the need for defining who is and who is not ‘European’? The construction of the figure of the forced migrant as the ubiquitous ‘global alien’, embodying not only the potential threat of extremist violence but presented more generally as presaging social disruption, deepening economic and cultural rifts, and the dissolution of the bonds of national/European norms and morality, appears to have become a vital ideological tool for European capitalism’s neoliberal global orientation. Analysis of this process, therefore, demands that we question the relationship of the forced migrant to the neoliberal ideology that infuses the project of the European Union – a bloc that revolves around a powerful core, but whose nation-state members are locked into mutually beneficial yet deeply conflictual and contradictory relationships – and informs its political dynamics, particularly at a time when acute financial and economic crisis appears to be driving its constituent countries apart.

The novelty of the research

By weaving together the threads of disciplinary theories that foreground the phenomenon of forced migration as a subject of academic focus, my research aims to help further understanding of forced migration as central to an analysis of the ideological impulses of global capitalism. I situate my research within the domain of the European Union, in order to shed new light on the attempted construction of a European identity: I seek to demonstrate how this operation connects to the requirement of the global capitalist system to both obscure and naturalise its nature as an historically
constructed economic process (one that is inherently exploitative, alienating and crisis-ridden) and a profoundly unnatural system of social relations. I intend to discover how and why the figure of the forced migrant, an extreme manifestation of the impacts of these processes on human lives, has been shaped from national materials into a representation of the ultimate ‘global alien’ – and, as such, whether it can lay claim to be the crucial ideological hinge between a European identity in its ‘hyper-national’ form and the role of Europe’s core nation-states as essential regional conduits of global capitalism and purveyors of the ideological ballast for its global regime. Although this thesis travels the path carved out by many researchers and theorists from different disciplines, I believe my presentation of the question in terms of the crucial ideological importance of the forced migrant to the identity of Europe and its relationship to global capitalism is a novel way of constructing the problematic.

**Methodological considerations**

I investigate these questions by consulting both primary and secondary textual sources. The primary sources comprised a selection of relevant papers produced by European Union bodies concerned with terrorism, security, border control, and ‘migration management’ and asylum procedures. These included policy proposals, policy documents, research reports, and summaries of both agreements with ‘third countries’ and of appropriate legislation. Apart from the problem of restricted access (many of the most fateful decisions relating to security, and therefore migration policy, are taken behind closed doors, often by the highly secretive and powerful group of bodies known as the Coreper committeesii), the main obstacle was ascertaining what should be considered essential to consult. I frequently turned for guidance to the independent monitoring agency, Statewatch, which provides a regular forensic analysis of the most current European debates, proposals and legislation concerned with issues of security, asylum and civil liberties. Besides providing a critical overview, the Statewatch website posts links to hundreds of relevant documents. I also examined information garnered from the websites of related organisations with connections to the European Union, companies in the security industry, and national governments, in order to check factsiii. I further consulted many of the reports and research papers emanating from a number of agencies concerned with forced migration into Europe.

Topicality can enrich and drive forward an analysis. It can also, however, complicate
efforts to develop a historical perspective. At worst, it could result in a fractured and incoherent analysis. At best, however, I believe it can help to highlight the contradictions that constantly appear in the real world. Sometimes reality breaks free of the initial interpretation of the problematic – and it is essential to monitor and respond with flexibility when this situation occurs. Therefore, throughout my research, I reread, revisited, re-situated and sometimes reinterpreted my work, and attempted through this procedure to avoid placing it in the exclusive framework of the national and regional political debates of the day, while allowing an awareness of their direction to shape my understanding of the subject.

Secondary sources ranged over a number of disciplines, due to the fact that my research, although concerned with the representation of the forced migrant, is located within an interdisciplinary tradition. The decision to take an interdisciplinary approach was initially motivated by the argument current within the field of refugee studies that just as the complexity of the globalised world is increasingly reflected in the ‘holistic experience’ that is modern migration, so the remit of refugee studies has to be extended if it is to take account of the full complexity of forced migration – as a geographical, cultural, physical, social, political, legal and psychosocial phenomenon, affecting individuals, groups, communities, networks and institutions, including nation-states. Castles (2003, p.27), for example, calls for a ‘sociology of forced migration’ – situated as a fundamental part of ‘a global sociology’ – which starts from the paradigm of ‘forced migration as a pivotal aspect… of the new political economy’, and links research into forced migration to ‘broader theories of social relations, structures and change’.

For this reason, my research draws on contributions from scholars working in several different disciplines, including refugee studies, political economy, international relations, sociology, race theory, critical security studies, political geography and citizenship studies. Their analyses have helped expand and deepen my investigation into the construction of the figure of the forced migrant and its relationship to contemporary global processes. Although I incorporate into my work various theories developed by leading proponents in these different fields, I worked with these ideas critically, using their insights to help interpret my subject, rather than necessarily fully endorsing their trajectory or conclusions. My aim has been to critically rearticulate these insights in light of my research objectives to allow their perspectives to influence the direction of my research where appropriate, rather than borrow from them in an eclectic fashion to
reinforce my arguments. The freedom that interdisciplinarity grants has meant I was able to base my research on what I consider to be some of the most crucial theoretical developments on the subject to have emerged out of diverse academic fields (as I point out in the section on the disciplinary context of the thesis, below).

My decision to place myself within the tradition of interdisciplinary scholarship was not only driven by the complexity of the subject and its relevance as a problematic to a number of disciplines, but also by an understanding that the different perspectives on, and arguments around, the subject are not mutually exclusive – each can be relevant, if not vital, to an analysis of the ideological importance of the figure of the forced migrant. The ever-present danger is that interdisciplinarity degenerates into eclecticism. Having said that, however, the rewards an interdisciplinary approach can offer can be rich. As Harvey (2006, p.76) points out, the necessity to explore the interplay of themes in a relational way implies a recognition that certain processes may be independent of one another but together can form ‘a dynamic field of interaction’ – and I believe that an appreciation of this relationality can go some way towards helping avoid the potential dangers.

Relationality is, however, not necessarily co-terminous with relativism. In this context, Bigo’s (2008) understanding of interdisciplinarity is relevant. He believes that the ‘deconstruction’ of the boundaries between different disciplines can allow a more coherent field of analysis to emerge, but warns that relativism is not an option for the social sciences. The dangers of relativism can be seen, I believe, in the example of the tendency of postmodern cultural theory to collapse material space into socially constructed space – when it comes to my research, although working with abstract issues (or precisely because I am doing so), I have found it essential to continually bear in mind that I am dealing with ideological abstractions that attempt to re-interpret and re-present the material realities that face individuals. When forced migrants travel across global space, for example, the actual physical distance they move or are forced to move matters, as do the physical borders that act as separation barriers and help define what counts as ‘acceptable’ movement across a world politically constructed as a mass of territorial nation-states. I have, therefore, tried to bear Bigo’s warning in mind throughout the research process.

Bigo (2008) further stresses, however, that it is essential to investigate how a ‘semantic security continuum’ is constructed, with the war against terror at one end and the figure of the forced migrant at the other. It was fundamental to my own research to
understand, and hence deconstruct, this semantic continuum, addressing areas that relate to migration and security, both of which range over many different theoretical landscapes. Migration is most obviously situated within the framework of economic and political analysis, as well as anthropology, and sociological and psychosocial investigations, but it equally involves an understanding of the migration-security nexus and its contribution to the normative framing of migration, as well as a critique of the ways that ‘belonging’ and exclusion are embedded in the structure of social consciousness, and this calls in turn for an awareness of the power relations which underlie official migration/security discourses. De Genova and Peutz (2010, p.26), for example, speak of the necessity for an ‘elaboration of a socio-political problematic … across several interdisciplinary fields, in multiple academic contexts … on the fundamental relation between [migration] and the complex intersection of state sovereignty, citizenship, national identity, and the social productions of (nation)-state spaces’.

Many of the theorists studying forced migration from different disciplinary vantage points express the need for cross-fertilisation among the different disciplines concerned, the better to develop a more responsive vocabulary and create new theoretical tools (cf. Guild, 2009). Although many of the aspects of forced migration have traditionally been treated as distinct sectors of research, they increasingly demand to be ‘grasped and explained together, in their mutual imbrications’ (Wacquant, 2008, p.14). This thesis, therefore, follows in the steps of those from many different fields of study who have considered it vital to challenge and deconstruct the framing of the current political debate around migration, asylum and security, in line with Dillon’s (1996, p.29) injunction to confound the ‘neoliberal common sense that “naturalises” the current state of affairs … through a … critique of the categories and topics which [together] weave the fabric of the dominant discourse’. Due to the complexity of the way these ‘categories and topics’ ‘weave’ together, I believe such a deconstruction calls for the use of a wide selection of theoretical tools.

One further point I wish to draw attention to is the fact that I use the term ‘forced migrant’ rather than ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘migrant’. I have deliberately chosen to do this because, although these terms have distinct legal definitions, they have been increasingly abused and distorted by a political discourse that has loaded them with negative connotations. My embrace of the term ‘forced migrant’ also indicates that I do not draw a distinction between those forced by political circumstances (such as state
repression, civil war, invasion or an atmosphere of generalised violence) into seeking safety elsewhere and those forced into seeking out an environment which offers the chance of a release from extreme poverty. In both cases, I believe, when such individuals decide to undertake what is often a dangerous, arduous, financially costly and increasingly ‘illegal’ global journey, their decision is framed by parameters that permit little choice, and must be regarded as taken under compulsion (a subject I return to more fully below). In addition, the confluence of reasons for forced migration cannot be easily disentangled; violence or repression, whether quotidian or exceptional, state-directed or random, is usually inherent in an environment structured by government repression, neglect or corruption, social breakdown, the absence of a welfare infrastructure, high levels of poverty, structural decay, environmental degradation and ‘natural’ disasters.

The disciplinary context

Forced migration, then, occupies a key position in Europe, discursively, politically and ideologically: the subject dominates the European Union at a number of interlinked (‘superstructural’) levels, providing the rationale for a whole mass of government apparatuses. In seeking to understand why this is so, I have taken my lead from Soguk’s (1999) theory that the figure of the forced migrant is fundamental to the social (re)construction of the nation-state and the (re)constitution of its power and sovereignty. However, I have attempted to develop this into an investigation of the role that the forced migrant (as a ‘global’ figure of absolute ‘otherness’) plays in the attempt to embed among Europe’s populations the sense of an overarching European identity. This entails an analysis of the relationship between an increasingly securitised region to a global environment that, on the one hand, appears to be structured on every level by the processes of capitalist globalisation, but on the other remains geographically and geopolitically ordered as an international system of nation-states.

In order to do so, I have situated my work within a Marxist framework, but claimed the freedom within this to explore the insights not just of contemporary Marxist interpreters, such as Callinicos (2009), Harman (2006, 2009); Harvey (2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010); Mészáros (1989); and Thomas (2009), but also of those working outside these parameters. For example, I have taken ‘globalisation’ and ‘neoliberalism’ as givens in my analysis, but as they continue to be contested yet often vaguely defined
terms, I believe it is important to point out which understanding of these terms I am working with. For example, I employ Harvey’s (2006) interpretation of ‘globalisation’ as the spread of ‘global capitalism’, with its systemic imbalances and its tendency to crisis. As it has spread it has left no place or person immune, and has multiplied the experience of alienation, exclusion and marginalisation throughout the world. Meanwhile, Sparke (2008), in his description of ‘neoliberalism’ captures, to some extent, the contradiction between its ideological and rhetorical face and its pragmatic political adaptations. He describes neoliberalism as a ‘contextually contingent articulation of free market governmental practices with varied and often quite illiberal forms of social and political rule…’ (Ibid., p.135, italics in original). Thus, neoliberalism in ideology appears to contradict neoliberalism in practice, which leads to coercive re-regulation, not of financial markets but of social relations, including the intensification of a system of border security. However, the practices of neoliberalism also contradict its free-market ideology in further ways, the most glaring example being the state bailout of global financial institutions, as well as the creation of vast transnational monopolies and cartels. I prefer to adopt Harvey’s (2005) interpretation of ‘neoliberalism’ as both a political ideology and a form of capitalist rule that do not necessarily form a coherent politico-economic programme but the effects of which have profoundly altered daily lives (through the policies of privatisation, financial deregulation, fiscal and economic austerity, welfare ‘reform’ and the punitive policing of those most disadvantaged by global capitalism).

Underpinning an understanding of both these terms lies Harvey’s (2007) recapitulation of capitalism as a social relation that internalises its tensions and contradictions, and conceals its concrete form as a system based on the appropriation and exploitation of the free, creative labour power of individuals. Individuals are thus subordinated to the mandates of capital accumulation, which assumes the form of an objective, all-embracing power. I believe that such an understanding of the functional and ideological attributes of capitalism and the way they are manifest is fundamental to my thesis – as Harvey (2007, p.450) says, it is necessary to have a framework for understanding, a conceptual apparatus, ‘with which to grasp the most significant relationships at work within the intricate dynamics of social transformation’.

In specific instances, I have also turned to concepts used in other areas of study related to the objectives of this thesis. For example, I have referenced the concept of ‘biopolitics’ (which developed from Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’) when dealing
with the securitisation of Europe’s asylum and immigration regime. I have found it a
useful analytical tool when considering the role biometric technology plays in the
identification, classification, surveillance and control of forced migrants as objectified,
‘illegal’ ‘mobile bodies’. It particularly encapsulates the way the technology’s
algorithmic reduction of individual identities into a mass of mathematically measurable
body parts has enabled and defined the European Union’s pursuit of its avowed goal of
‘global migration management’. However, elsewhere, I have tried to use the term with
care, heeding Thomas (2009, p.225) when he claims that the Gramscian notion of a
‘hegemonic apparatus’ renders a fuller and more complex sense of the meaning the term
‘biopolitics’ attempts to convey. This ‘hegemonic apparatus’ is defined as a complex set
of ideologies, practices, institutions and agents forming ‘an intricate network of social
relationships’ that only comprises a unity through its purpose as an elite class project
that seeks to integrate its class ‘antagonists’. The more recent concept of ‘biopolitics’,
Thomas argues, suffers in comparison by evacuating from its description the specific
nature of class power that is so essential to Gramsci’s theory. I have not delved into all
the arguments around the interpretation of biopolitics as a concept; instead, I have used
the term in those contexts where it helps shed light on specific practices, but in the sense
that Thomas describes as pertaining to Gramsci’s ‘hegemonic apparatus’.

Similarly, I have used the concept of ‘securitisation’ (commonplace among critical
security theorists) in the sense of an extreme politicisation of a subject (for example, the
forced migrant) that enables the use of extraordinary measures to be deployed in the
name of ‘security’. Securitisation involves ‘the mass manufacture of global danger …
mundanely engineered by our forms of political life, and routinely deployed by their
ordering regimes … as strategies integral to the technologised political production and
pursuit of community, identity, interests and rights’ (Dillon 1996, p.170). Securitisation,
therefore, necessarily comprises a network of interrelated discourses, institutions,
architectural structures (such as detention centres), laws (including anti-terrorist
legislation and laws criminalising ‘illegal entry’), and administrative measures (such as
detention or deportation) – in essence, what Bigo (2008, p.35) describes as a ‘Ban-
optic’ (cf. chapter five). Thus the securitisation of the common European asylum and
immigration regime contains a political purpose: the targeting of certain individuals and
groups of people in the interests of normalising a discourse of fear directed towards
forced migration. This procedure is a collaborative European venture, one that is
pursued beyond the region into extra-territorial and virtual global spaces. However, in
order to marry the apparently contradictory notions of the extreme * politicisation* of a subject through securitisation with that of its radical * depoliticisation* through technological security procedures, I found it necessary to engage with Agamben’s theories (I turn to the arguments that have arisen in this respect in detail later in this section) and with the Marxist concept of dialectics (as described below).

Ideas and approaches such as these, I believe, can add to a fuller understanding of the theoretical problem, one that weds an analysis of material processes to the variable capacity of the state to produce a distorted form of ‘social reality’. However, to try and ensure that the use of such concepts or terminology from varied intellectual traditions does not threaten to compromise the theoretical integrity of my work, I have used as a grounding a number of long-established paradigms. I use Foucault’s (1977 [1972]) theory of discourse as a totalising and self-referential system, comprising the classification and distribution of meanings and interpretations, which permeates all aspects of social, academic, political and popular thought. As Soguk (1999, p.48) explains, a particular discursive statement or practice never stands alone but is always related to others; it is woven into ‘a discursive space’, where statements or discursive practices imply or cross-reference one another, supporting ‘a common institutional and political pattern’ which privileges and promotes a specific imagination of the world as self-evident and natural. I have also drawn on the concept of Orientalism, as analysed by Said (1991 [1978], 1987) as a description of a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the ‘other’ (‘non-Europeans’) and ‘we Europeans’; as well as Anderson’s (1991 [1983]) seminal theory of ‘imagined communities’ and identity formation and Cohen’s (1972) paradigm of ‘moral panics’.

My broad framework mobilises notions of ‘ideology’ and ‘dialectics’ grounded in Gramsci (1971, 1988), primarily as interpreted by Thomas (2009), although with reference to his key texts, and Lukács, as expounded by Mészáros (1989), but with selected reference to Lukács (1971 [1923]). A Marxist understanding of the role of ideology clarifies the process of ‘objectification’ that is central to the construction of the figure of the forced migrant as a productive force in the political creation of a securitised nation-state. It further establishes how such conceptions become naturalised and embedded in everyday social life. As Harvey (2006) explains:

*Given the … opacities that mask the processes of capital circulation and accumulation, we cannot expect anything other than*
‘commonsense’ conceptions of the world to regulate the conduct of everyday life. …[T]he activities of capital circulation and accumulation are refracted through actual discursive practices, understandings and behaviours… (Harvey, 2006, p.83)

Underpinning the conduct of my research has been an understanding of the dialectical method of analysis. This has been based on Harvey’s (2006) and Thomas’s (2009) exposition of a Gramscian theory of dialectics as expressing the inner (not direct causal) relations of capitalism as a complex social, political and economic system. Such a theory presents a means by which to capture the system’s fluidity and dynamics. Dialectics, by its very nature, deconstructs the ideological reification of capitalism: it reveals it to be not a thing but a social relation or process, which is perpetually changing. A dialectical method, therefore, does not seek to discover a coherent linear progression, and goes deeper than an analysis of its structure in order to understand the system’s dialectical character in a way that incorporates the contradictory and fragmentary outcomes of this process as they manifest themselves in everyday life. As Harvey (2006, p.79) says, ‘Theory should be understood … as an evolving structure of argument, sensitive to encounters with the complex ways in which social processes are materially embedded in the web of life’.

These theoretical insights lead me to highlight two arguments that have been central to my research. In order to avoid the obvious intrusion of these arguments into the main body of the work, I have rehearsed them here at some length.

**Agency versus abstraction**

As Soguk (1999) reminds us, there is no intrinsic paradigmatic refugee. Mezzadra (2004), for example, in upholding the individual’s absolute ‘right to escape’ via the ‘illegalised’ circuits of global migration clearly maintains a refusal to accept the disappearance of the individual forced migrant into an abstract, undifferentiated ‘flow’ of people. He calls for a revision of the field of research and theoretical debate, with migrants as the subjects not the objects of academic discourse. In fact, the discipline of refugee studies has produced a vast number of detailed, focused and invaluable studies with forced migrants – and migrant and diaspora communities – as the subjects of their own trajectories and narratives, including research undertaken by those who have experienced forced migration themselves. Mezzadra’s criticism, however, is directed at the social sciences, which he claims have tended to reduce migration to purely objective
causes; as well as those critiques of neoliberalism where ‘migrants are seen as objects overwhelmed by capitalist globalisation’, sections of cultural studies that have portrayed the migrant as a ‘paradigmatic figure of the rootless and “hybrid” character of the postmodern subject … free to cross nomadically the boundaries between cultures and identities’ (Ibid., p.271), and ‘more general interpretative schemes derived from demography’, where migrations as objective processes, abstracted from the actions and decisions of individual subjects, are posited as the necessary outcome of economic imbalances (Ibid., p.269).

Mezzadra emphasises that it is through migration that millions of individuals have ‘materially organised their own existence, their own social relations, their own production and reproduction … and constructed new “transnational social spaces”’ (Ibid., p.272). Mobility, redefined as subjective movements of escape, he claims, is ‘one of the denied motors of radical transformation’; ‘[d]iscovering the power and immanently political character of mobility’, therefore, can be a ‘theoretical step for articulating a critique of capitalism’ (Ibid., p.275). To enable such a critique, Mezzadra believes it is necessary for research to focus on the ‘plurality of positions and problems that define the figure of migrant’ (Ibid., p.268).

As Mezzadra has stressed, when analysing any aspect of forced migration it has to be continuously borne in mind that such movements do not represent an autonomous, abstract phenomenon. The concept of ‘forced migration’ is itself an abstraction imposed on the ‘fluidity of a thousand faces’ (Soguk, 1999, p.176) which obscures the fact that it comprises many thousands of individual daily choices and journeys. Such decisions, however, are often made in circumstances where the term ‘choice’ is a tragic misnomer. Forced displacement obviously does not represent a choice. Neither does the decision to cross one or many borders from one country or region into another that appears to offer greater security from poverty, repression or violence seem any more of a choice if the only other it can be weighed against (albeit one that is forced on many millions) is to remain in a difficult, hostile or dangerous environment. This may be especially so if to remain means spending an indefinite period, perhaps even a lifetime, in a vast, overcrowded refugee camp situated in an isolated, desolate area or on a sprawling urban perimeter. As Davis (2006, p.47) points out: ‘Some of the Third World’s huge refugee camps have evolved into edge cities in their own right’. Massive warehouses for the victims of drought, famine and imperialist war, these urban edges have become a new ‘zone of exile’.
The decision to migrate will also be related to the unique life circumstances of each individual: whether they take, and follow through, this momentous decision will depend not only on the depth of their need to do so or that of their families, but on access to essential resources such as money or credit, information, and smuggling and diaspora networks, as well as unquantifiable psychological and emotional resources. This is not to imply that individuals are autonomous subjects; people are embedded in social and family networks, with a deep investment in their home environment, which they are forced to abandon at great psychological cost. As Harvey (2005, p.167) emphasises, ‘individuals embedded in networks of social relations … have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as “human capital”) and tastes (sometimes referred to as “cultural capital”) and, as living beings, [are] endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts and fears’. However, a common experience in the Global South that adds to the compulsion to flee is fact that the implementation of extreme neoliberal policies not only robs the individual of security from poverty and violence, but can also strip away this protective covering of social and cultural relationships, leaving them exposed to ‘acute social dislocation’ (Ibid., p.167). In this context, Boal et al. (2005, pp.193-4) cite Polyani as saying, ‘Capitalism is rooted in a continual disembedding of basic elements of the species’ life-world from the extraordinary matrix of social relations… This disembedding is an atrocity, and will continue to be felt as such by those who experience it’.

Having taken all this account, I have, however, decided to directly engage with the processes of abstraction that objectify, dehumanise and homogenise the forced migrant, rather than concentrate on the individual lives that lie beneath. In Kelly’s (2008, p.134) study of Foucault’s work he emphasises the claim that critique should be used as an instrument by those who ‘resist and refuse what is’ in order to challenge what is deemed self-evident and necessary. As the figure of the forced migrant is subject to continuous daily (re)invention, it is only by interrogating the relationship of this consistent objectification to the processes of global capitalism that a critique can begin to ‘question and disrupt the self-evidentiality of the refugee category’ (Soguk 1999, p.259).

The portrayal of forced migration as a purely objective phenomenon is most clearly evident in the security discourse that increasingly drives European governments’ asylum and immigration policy and practices. This elite, professional discourse helps shape everyday commonsense perceptions; it is woven into the social context in which daily life is experienced and is implicit in the explanatory narratives which feed both a
common perception of the world ‘as it really is’ and the actions that flow from these understandings. It is through such discursive practices that the very real insecurities and anxieties manufactured by the market – which is understood as if it were an abstract, autonomous force – are transmuted into fears over ‘threats’ to personal security, national identity, cultural coherence and economic wellbeing, and focused on the objectified figure of the ‘alien’. It is essential, then, in a study such as this, to directly address the objectification of the forced migrant and the social consciousness of which it is a constituent ingredient. Discourse cannot ever be entirely free of intention: it produces practical effects and holds profound implications for the lives of the individuals caught up within it and objectified by it. It is only by seeking to unravel the discourse that obscures the ‘thousand faces’ and their personal trajectories that constitute what Papastergiadis (2000) calls the ‘turbulence of migration’, that an attempt can be made to reveal the ruling ideological abstractions beneath the dominant ‘discursive pattern’ and the commonsense perceptions it promotes, and to discover in turn the underlying forces that generate such abstractions (cf. Harvey 2000, p.85).

Castles (2003) suggests that such an approach can help us relate the complex individual narratives of forced migrants to their wider social, economic and political context. More particularly, when seeking to subject the increasingly hostile and securitised characterisation of the forced migrant to critical analysis in order to assess its relative weight within the dense matrix of neoliberal discourse, as this study attempts to do, it is essential (while keeping the individual who is forced to inhabit this figure in focus) to deal in its currency and operate in this sphere of abstraction – the better to deconstruct the ideology that both sustains and obscures the workings of the system that fuels forced migration.

Moreover, as Mészáros (1989, p.3) argues, ‘everything is soaked in ideology’. But although ideology seeks to be both universalising and naturalising, part of the effects of its ‘routine operations’ (the way it is anchored in the everyday social workings of the system) is the ‘unavoidable dislocation between appearance and reality’ (Eagleton, 1994, p.4). Commonsense is necessarily fragmented and incoherent due to the fact that ‘society is expressed as discrete, isolated entities whose connections and dynamic totality are hidden’ (Ibid., p.2). This apparent non-correspondence between ideas and reality is structural: everyday discourses betray in their contradictions the imprint of real material contradictions and conflicts. It is here, where the individual living within the system of global capitalism comes up against the fractures, inconsistencies and
contradictions in the ideological abstractions – the current given (neoliberal) worldview – that the forces behind them begin to come into focus. The forced migrant may be objectified through nationalist tropes but this very objectification highlights the dissonance of a picture of the world of ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ mobility, set within national boundaries, with the reality of a constantly changing, fast-moving global economic environment, structured by intense competition, which demands the constant supply of highly exploitable and expendable labour. In fact, Mezzadra (2004, p.271) himself asserts that if the condition of the forced migrant has any paradigmatic characteristics it is that it represents instances where the contradictions between a radical reclaiming of liberty and ‘the functioning of old and new mechanisms of domination, exploitation [and exclusion]’ become ‘strained’. Isin (2002, pp.275-6) concurs: the figure of the forced migrant can ‘summon up that moment when the naturalness of the dominant virtues is called into question and their arbitrariness revealed’. By seeking out the fault-lines in the neoliberal ideology that suffuses the discourse of forced migration we can expose the limits of its way of presenting the world as these are ‘the inscription within it of certain limits in historical reality itself’ (Eagleton 2004, p.13).

As both Mezzadra (2004) and Isin (2002) suggest, one of these fault-lines lies within the phenomenon of forced migration itself. In the major economies of Europe, for example, the forced migrant is presented as a marginal figure, to be swept out of sight into detention centres and refugee camps beyond the border, yet at the same time the discursive visibility of the figure of the forced migrant in these countries is magnified far beyond their actual physical presence. The contradictions that are a constituent part of these ideological processes exemplify the fractures and conflicts that lie at the heart of the system itself, and the contradictions the forced migrant brings to these manufactured discourses always threaten to reveal the reality beneath the abstractions. The promotion of the idea of an unproblematic global mobility and the international potential (of educational and cultural intercourse, travel and tourism, economic growth and lucrative investment opportunities) that globalisation holds is already losing its patina with the onset of economic crisis, but its misfit with reality is most forcefully represented by the situation of the forced migrant, forced into mobility while forbidden to move. The attempts to recoup some semblance of rhetorical coherence have resulted in warnings about globalisation’s dark ‘underside’ of organised crime,
trafficking/‘people smuggling’, global ‘Islamic terrorism’, and the threat posed by the ubiquitous ‘global alien’ to the essential integrity of national cultures.

The contradictions such a discourse attempts to cover can be encountered in practice on any day at any European port. Nordstrom (2007) describes, for example, how the flow of international trade and the immense profits it represents can in no way afford to be disrupted by systematic checks, systematically enforced regulations or effective barriers to smuggling and/or ‘illegal migration’ – and in reality there is little attempt to do so. The complex meshing of the ‘illegal’ with the legal economy is accepted, if not openly acknowledged, as integral to a system of global trade and financial transactions and transfers. Only when the illegal element of the ‘legal’ economy threatens to subvert the system from within and precipitate financial and economic crisis, potentially undermining its ideological ballast, is the spectral ‘underside’ fleetingly glimpsed as an integral part, even a true reflection, of the whole system. The discourse of global mobility is but a distorted reflection of the reality of a system driven by the compulsions of competition and profit that lie behind the constant global traffic of (il)legal goods, financial transactions and labour power.

I have endeavoured to keep in mind throughout the course of my research the fact that although such ideological practices appear to constitute a form of ‘social reality’, the description of thousands of individual movements as a singular objective force obscures a whole multitude of different individual decisions, actions and experiences that cannot be reduced to an abstraction without also reducing the humanity of those whose lives this research is really about. In order to advance my theory, however, it has been necessary to work at the level of abstraction, the better to deconstruct it, and in the process, assist in the labour of revealing how human beings are buried beneath its discursive weight.

Agamben and the paradigmatic ‘refugee’

On an individual level, the forced migrant’s struggles to find security and freedom from danger and poverty could also be described as an example of an attempt ‘to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity’ (Marx cited in Jameson 2005 [1981], p.4) – one small instance ‘in a vast unfinished plot’ for collective liberation from the compulsions of the system. It is perhaps due to this that the forced migrant (or more specifically, the figure of the ‘refugee’) has also become a paradigmatic figure for many
social theorists involved in the critique of neoliberalism and capitalist globalisation (cf. Bauman, 1998, 2004; Giroux, 2004; Wacquant, 1999, to cite just a few).

But it is the use of the refugee as a paradigm in Agamben’s radical philosophy that has caught the imagination of many of those dedicated to a critical study of migration, from social sciences and critical security studies to citizenship studies. Within refugee studies, Agamben appears to have become as essential to the analytical framework of certain theoretical studies as Arendt or Foucault. This is not surprising: Agamben’s (1998, 2005) concepts of the ‘state of exception’ and ‘bare life’ appear to furnish a close analogy with the current situation of the forced migrant – particularly in the context of the security discourse that defines European asylum and immigration policies and that increasingly appears to influence the polities of European nation-states themselves. In fact, Agamben (1994) specifically singles out the ‘refugee’ as the exemplar of his theory, a figure who is thus of prime political importance.

For this reason, I began my work much attracted by Agamben’s theories. However, I came to question the wisdom of using all his concepts as a basis for my own work. Although they appear to speak to the experience of the forced migrant, and although his philosophy is a radical critique of the political condition of the citizens of the liberal-democratic state, the way in which Agamben presents the figure of the refugee (or forced migrant) as paradigmatic of this condition is, to some extent, problematic – and, as critics of Agamben’s theoretical stance (for example, Bull, 2004, 2007; Owens, 2008, 2009; Huysmans, 2008; Rancière, 2004; Squire, 2009) argue, could in fact be said to encourage the depoliticisation of the individual behind the abstraction. Of course, it is not essential to utilise these complex philosophical concepts in order to analyse the contemporary experience of forced migration. As Sparke (2008, p.151) says: ‘…while Agamben’s account of “sovereign power” and “bare life” certainly seems to map on to the totalitarian sovereignty exercised over asylum seekers … we do not have to turn to his abstract invocation of homo sacer in order to come to biopolitical terms with the denial of civil rights to those expedited into the removal system…’.

However, I felt it was essential to engage with some of Agamben’s concepts as many of the theorists whose work I call upon base their ideas on a sophisticated understanding of his philosophy. As Agamben’s insights are often quoted, I believe it is important to explain my hesitation by working through a number of the critiques of his conclusions. As Owens (2009, p.2) explains, for Agamben, the refugee is ‘the symbolic representative of social and political reality’; ‘…the ultimate “biopolitical” subject …
who can be regulated and governed ... in a permanent “state of exception” outside the normal legal framework…’. Agamben (2005, pp.3-4) stresses the biopolitical significance of the ‘state of exception’ (or state of emergency), which he asserts has become one of the essential political practices of the contemporary state. Indefinite detention, for example, by erasing the legal status of the individual, produces ‘a legally unclassifiable being’ who becomes solely an ‘object of pure de facto rule’. The detainee, no longer a victim of the state’s legal system, as ‘every fiction of a nexus between violence and law disappears’, enters a ‘a zone of anomie, in which a violence without any juridical form acts’ (Ibid, p.59). The refugee camp bears a direct relationship to the Nazi death camp (Agamben, 1998, p.166) and is therefore the ‘hidden matrix of modern political space’ – it becomes a new juridical paradigm in which ‘the norm is the exception’, where the concepts of legal rights and protection no longer make any sense. Agamben identifies the camp as the ‘absolute biopolitical space’ (Ibid., p.171). Hence, the refugee or forced migrant, the inmate of such camps (which range from airport ‘zones d’attente’ or holding centres to detention centres) becomes for him the absolute biopolitical figure, representative of his concept of the ‘homo sacer’ – that is, a human being reduced to ‘bare life’ (‘a life lacking every political value’), ‘stripped of every right and forced into perpetual flight’ (Ibid., p.183).

Such a description often accords with the experience of forced migrants. Once they reach a European ‘country of asylum’ they appear to enter a world within a world, one that goes unnoticed or unacknowledged by the majority of ordinary citizens, where Arendt’s (1976 [1948]) fundamental ‘right to have rights’ appears to be arbitrary or even non-existent. This is frequently a zone of anxiety and fear, of legal liminality and indeterminate identity, as well as one of poverty and sometimes destitution; a zone characterised by the extreme distortion of time, as the forced migrant endures the endless wait for the results of an asylum claim or an appeal against a negative decision, unable to restart (and often legally prevented from restarting) a ruptured life. At the same time, they live from moment to moment under threat of deportation and the early morning raid.

Agamben’s theoretical construction, however, appears to lead to demobilising conclusions for the forced migrant. He incorporates and develops Foucault’s theory of the disciplinary control of ‘biopower’ and Arendt’s conception of the concentration camp and totalitarian state as ‘exemplary spaces of modern biopolitics’ (Agamben, 1988, p.4). Both these accounts have supplied vital tools for analysis of the situation of
the forced migrant (cf. Donà, 2007; Owens, 2008, 2009). Agamben (2005), however, marries these concepts with Schmitt’s exposition of the political utility of the ‘state of exception’ to authoritarian rule, although he goes on to depict the ‘state of exception’ where the refugee/forced migrant dwells as a ‘zone of anomie’ (a zone of lawlessness) that betrays the real character of all liberal-democratic societies as ones where the exception has become the norm. Huysmans (2008, p.172) declares that Agamben’s perspective is a yet more radical, totalising conception than any of his influences: he collapses the ‘dialectic between norm and exception’, detaching violence from law – violence (and thus politics), he asserts, no longer need the justification of the law.

This approach runs the risk of underestimating the power (including biopolitical power) held by the liberal-democratic state in its juridical armoury of repression, particularly vis-à-vis the forced migrant. The state still holds the monopoly of violence, which it deploys through its legal, juridical and administrative infrastructure. As Bull (2004, p.5) says, under the law, the individual’s vulnerability is ‘truly terrifying’. What is done legally in the name of the nation-state (or regional bloc of nation-states) can often be equally violent (including the routinely dehumanising processes of surveillance, incarceration and deportation to sometimes certain torture or death) as that which occurs within the ‘space of exception’ (as witnessed in the ‘rendition’ of ‘enemy aliens’ to so-called ‘black sites’ in the war on terror) without the need to analyse it as a ‘zone of anomie’.

Moreover, the ‘state of exception’ is usually employed as a formal device, used for the most part by the ruling political elite to combat the collective power manifest in mass strikes, social unrest or insurrection that carries with it a challenge to the state’s monopoly of power and violence. Bull (2004, p.6) believes that the ‘state of exception’ is deployed to try to close up the space torn in the fabric of the state’s legal, political and ideological infrastructure by such manifestations of working-class power until it can function in a more ‘democratic’ fashion once again, with the use of what Chomsky (1998) famously characterised as ‘manufactured consent’. Furthermore, the contemporary use of exceptionalism by European politicians to insert into domestic law extraordinary powers to deal with terrorism is more of an exemplary tactic as terrorism is sporadic and ineffectual – its power lies in its symbolism. As Hobsbawm (2007) says: ‘It is a symptom, not an agent’. The danger of terrorist attacks to the regimes of stable nation-states is negligible. However devastating they may be for the individual victims, they ‘hardly disrupt the operational capacity of a big city for more than a few hours’
The attacks of 9/11, for example, left the power of the US and the international structures it monopolises wholly intact.

The constant imposition of ‘states of exception’ can, however, as Agamben (2005) asserts, weaken the liberal-democratic state machine and allow for authoritarian forms of governance to become embedded within it, creating an opening which totalitarian or fascist forces may be able to exploit – as in his example of the Weimar Republic:

[T]he last years of the Weimar Republic passed entirely under a regime of the state of exception … [and] clearly demonstrates that… a ‘protected democracy’ is not a democracy at all, and … functions instead as a transitional phase that leads … to the establishment of a totalitarian regime. (Agamben, 2005, p.15)

When state power is removed from public accountability, accompanied by rigid, racially-based exclusions from national citizenship and a discourse of security with a ‘Manichean division of the world into modalities of good and evil’, an entry point is created for fascist tendencies (Giroux, 2004, p.6). These are able to adopt familiar forms of ‘nativist’ discourse that in times of crisis can resonate with popular emotions. This gradual introduction of authoritarian measures, as exceptional cases that are then assumed into the norms of governance, holds the potential for an extremely dangerous outcome. However, it should be recalled that fascism has historically come to full political power in Europe under very specific and extreme circumstances, in times of acute economic, social and ideological crisis and stark political polarisation, where the state has faced down a fundamental challenge from below but sections of the ruling elite no longer have faith in liberal-democracy’s ability to contain a further full-scale social and political crisis. The use of exceptionalism as part of the day-to-day running of the liberal-democratic state, on the other hand, most often represents, as Huysmans (2008, p.180) points out, an attempt to ‘marginalise or erase’ social and collective action so as to allow the state to recoup and strengthen its juridical use of force and its monopoly of violence.

Exceptionalism, therefore, combines with liberalism, and with the routinised technologies of control and surveillance, as the key to the functioning of the liberal democratic state. As Harvey (2005) says, neoliberal policies and ideology can only be maintained, in the final analysis, through a constant resort to such authoritarian measures (as seen, for example, in the welter of ever-more stringent and exclusionary
asylum and immigration laws emanating from the European Union). The imbalances and contradictions of the capitalist system continually lead to crises, which in a globalised economic environment carry with them the seeds of a contagion that could generate a far wider and deeper structural crisis, threatening to destabilise the whole system and its ideological buttressing. Harvey (2005, p.37) maintains that ‘the only way the liberal utopian image is sustained is by force’, even more so as crisis begins to undermine its ideological narrative of a self-equilibrating free market and its promises of peace, order and prosperity: the ruling elites turn to ‘authoritarian, hierarchical, even militaristic means of maintaining law and order’. The current trend towards intense social control through mass surveillance, the criminalising of social problems and incarceration of ‘disposable populations’ (cf. Bauman, 2004; Giroux, 2004), including the mass detention of forced migrants, and the political manipulation of a climate of anxiety and hostility focused on imagined threats all illustrate Harvey’s thesis. However, such authoritarian impulses are integrated with, and rely for their acceptance on, more subtle cultural and social means of ensuring consent, which are always underpinned by Marx’s (1867 [1976], p.899) ‘silent compulsion of economic relations’.

Agamben (2008), however, breaks into new territory by linking the use of exceptionalism with the creation of the ‘homo sacer’. In his writings, the ‘homo sacer’ is the ultimate creation of biopolitics, and the ultimate ‘homo sacer’ is the ‘refugee’. Huysmans (2008) argues that, for Agamben, the refugee/forced migrant is paradigmatic of all citizens living within liberal-democratic states. Although forced beyond the margins of the political state into a liminal existence outside the law, the refugee/forced migrant as the paradigmatic ‘homo sacer’ is, therefore, in his view, not a marginal but a central political figure. Agamben (2005) believes that as the totalitarian structure of the modern democratic state is exposed through its espousal of exceptionalism as a governmental norm – especially when it directly unites power with ‘bare life’ in the camp – so the figure of the refugee/forced migrant calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state.

There is a problem here with Agamben’s use of the term ‘political’. The figure of the refugee or forced migrant is, as this study argues, a crucial ideological component in the discourse of neoliberalism. It is true that this figure is profoundly political – as the quotation from Agamben (2005, p.184) in my initial paragraph testifies, ‘no life is more political’ – but both Owens (2009) and Huysmans (2008) argue that the particular way Agamben elevates the refugee/forced migrant to a pole political position is, ironically,
fundamentally depoliticising. In Agamben’s theory, naked life displaces all other socio-economic and political categories of being, ‘turning biopolitics into a struggle between the direct enactment of power upon bare life and the anomic excesses of life that “resist” it’ (Huysmans, 2008, p.180). Thus, the only political choice left to those who wish to resist this fate is the choice between the camps and embracing ‘anomie’. The key example here is that of refugee detainees on hunger strike sewing up their lips and eyes – in the absence of access to any other form of resistance – to protest their treatment (their debasement to existence as ‘bare life’). Yet, as Huysmans (2008, p.179) points out, resistance that purely focuses on the bodily resistance of the ‘biologised’ individual cannot hope to be effective without the wider mobilisations of collective solidarity that are so crucial to the politicisation of such protests.

If, as Agamben (2005) says, the refugee/forced migrant as the ultimate biopolitical subject governed in a state of exception is the symbolic representative of our current social and political reality, then the refugee/forced migrant equally illustrates new ways of ‘political belonging’ (Owens, 2009). As Owens says, Agamben’s portrayal of the refugee as paradigmatic of the condition of the populations of liberal-democratic states is not simply a diagnosis of the current situation of the forced migrant but ‘a particular conception of the political’ (Ibid., p.13). Agamben (2004, p.3) believes that it is only through embracing the biological destiny of the forced migrant that a radical new political order can come about: ‘If in the system of nation states the refugee represents such a disquieting presence, it is above all because by breaking up the identity between man and citizen … the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty’.

The argument of this thesis is fully in accordance with the idea expressed in this quotation. However, as Huysmans (2008) points out, the problem lies with the conclusion that Agamben’s theory appears to lead to: if the only way to undermine the reality of the nation-state system, and its exclusionary and dehumanising practices, is to embrace ‘bare life’ – in order to expose the violent lawlessness of the Western liberal-democratic political order – then this form of ‘political belonging’ is a ‘radically denuded’ one.

This prescription for resistance equally depoliticises state power and repression by placing them in the ‘sphere of exception’, an anthropological – not political – sphere (Rancière 2004). This means that the refugee/forced migrant (and, by extension, all who live under the yoke of neoliberalism in this sphere of exception) have an ‘ontological destiny’ that allows only resistance of a purely atomised and ‘biological’ type (Ibid.,
This conception is in danger of closing down the potential to not only affect the political process – for the forced migrant, the prospect of reclaiming the right to exist and act as a political being (Ibid., 305) – but of any form of collective challenge to the system as a whole. Huysmans (2008, p.175) even goes so far as to state that Agamben’s theory does not simply depoliticise socio-political struggles but ‘ontologically erases them’.

The danger with pursuing Agamben’s theory into the sphere of refugee studies, therefore, lies not only in the potential depoliticisation of the forced migrant, which flows from an acceptance of their extreme objectification as the ultimate ‘homo sacer’, but also in the fact that its theme of a biopolitical destiny that can only be resisted through embracing this destiny and thus laying bare its foundations, helps occlude a reality that is far more complex, contradictory and vulnerable to challenge. The processes, practices and discourses of capitalist globalisation in all their dehumanising aspects, including the objectification of the forced migrant, are frequently contested in a myriad of ways throughout the world. If, as Squire (2009) urges, we take resistance as a starting point rather than ‘sovereign biopower’, we can see that forms of resistance always exist – even in the way Bigo (2008, p.46) suggests, as ‘hidden transcripts that mock power even where it seems to apply itself in a unilateral manner’. Indeed, the ability of forced migrants themselves to resist, including from within the forbiddingly restrictive environments of detention centres, crucially when coupled with the potential for the sparks to fan out into wider society, igniting both individual acts of solidarity and more collective protests, has been one of the motivations behind the decision to manage forced migration from a location ‘upstream’, through the co-option of ‘third states’ and ‘countries of origin’ and by ‘an anticipatory knowledge of the future’ (Ibid., p.46) supplied by surveillance and biometric technology.

De Genova and Peutz (2010) argue, on the other hand, that Agamben’s concepts have too often been reduced to analogies of more common tropes – for example, ‘bare life’ has become used as an exemplar of mere ‘exclusion’. Agamben’s formulation, they argue, is more subtle: he is positing the politicisation of bare life as ‘the defining “threshold” where the relation between … (human) being and socio-political order [is] substantiated, and where the sovereign state power presumes to … inscribe the humanity of living men and women within its normative order” (Ibid., p.7). This incorporation of ‘bare life’ into the political realm constitutes the original nucleus of sovereign power. The ‘illegalised’ figure of the forced migrant makes manifest the fact
that the foundation of state sovereignty lies in its attempts to assert its power over individual freedom of movement (the ‘precondition of human freedom’) \(\text{(Ibid., p.7)}\). As Agamben (1994, p.134) says, the figure of the refugee, therefore, represents ‘a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state’. Such a reading of Agamben can encompass both the depoliticisation of the figure and its extreme politicisation as representative of the way the sovereignty of the nation-state is manifest – and, as such, is invested (as a concept) with the power to overturn the whole established order. Agamben (1994) believes that an understanding of this fundamental relationship is the lever that could prize open the way to a radical new perception of the world, with revolutionary consequences: ‘It is only in a land where the spaces of states will have been perforated and topologically deformed, and the citizen will have learned to acknowledge the refugee that he himself is, that man’s political survival today is imaginable’.

As I illustrate above, the use of Agamben’s theories can prove both productive and problematic. As Agamben’s ideas lie at the heart of some of the analyses I have used throughout my research, and as they have enabled a more radical analysis of contemporary attempts to control mobility, they do appear in my work – for example, I have used the elements of de Genova’s (2010) analysis of Agamben outlined above. I have, nonetheless, attempted to bear in mind the criticisms of some of his contentions.

**The structure of the thesis**

This thesis, therefore, foregrounds the forced migrant, the ‘global alien’, as pivotal to the ideological practices of neoliberal governance. The emphasis on this figure arises from the ways in which the capitalist process is integrated into the very structures of social being. There are contradictory outcomes: processes of exploitation and dispossession bring inequality and alienation, driving some individuals in regions most exposed to its extreme economic and social impacts to attempt to escape their fatal constraints. They travel thousands of miles across multiple borders in the hope of transforming their situations. The same compulsions drive those who benefit from or manage this system to attempt to project the image that they can (and must) enforce control over this form of extra-territorial movement – to (at least discursively) isolate its stream from the vast ebb and flow of an ocean of global movements of financial transactions, goods and people – by declaring their movement to be ‘illegal’. In the
process, they attempt to incorporate into their ideological agenda a nationalist representation of these criminalised ‘border-crossers’ as representatives of a racialised, alien global threat. In Europe, this can be seen in its recruitment as a motivating force in the inflation of a sense of national identity into a specific pan-European one. The political managers of Europe’s nation-states seek to shore up their national and regional power through displacing the social fall-out of the operations of a globally extensive system, with its recurrent tendency to plunge into cycles of crisis and reconstruction, onto those labelled ‘alien’ and rendered most vulnerable. This represents a key tactic in their struggle to contain the potential for social unrest.

The figure of the forced migrant has become a key ideological resource within Europe. This, I argue, is a consequence of its crucial ideological significance, standing at the intersection of the seemingly contradictory ideological currents of ‘nationalism’ and ‘globalisation’. The formation of such a figure arises from the relationship between different facets of an ideology that operates on many different levels. In chapter two, therefore, I discuss aspects of the production of the ‘global enemy’ out of a discourse of national identity: how the nation-state intersects with the neoliberal forms of capitalist globalisation to produce a form of ‘hyper-nationalism’. I investigate the way Europe’s core nation-states attempt to displace their contradictions and conflicts through the manipulation of deeply embedded nationalist narratives of inclusion/exclusion (creating the perception of a unified cultural entity by endowing the forced migrant with the threatening identity of the ultimate alien, the ‘global illegal’), and how this discourse of ‘global illegality’ is related to the complex of discourses that strives to naturalise the exploitative and divisive system of global capitalism.

The national border is the key to the discursive definition of the forced migrant as the ‘global alien’, through the criminalisation of attempts to cross Europe’s external borders. As the border is presented as the inscription in linear, geographic space of the distinction between one national entity and another, it has become the iconic representation of ‘national security’. In chapter three I explore the contradictions inherent in this definition: the European Union’s border controls stretch far beyond its geographical limits – into other continents, far out at sea and even into cyberspace (through the introduction of ‘e-borders’), as well as deep into the region itself. The concept of the border, then, must be expanded from its everyday construct (while bearing in mind that its physical manifestation undoubtedly matters to those who come up against it) into a description of a normative instrument that not only assigns identity,
but is summoned into being by the supposed inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it. The excluded carry the border within their persons as part of their ascribed identity as ontologically, globally ‘alien’ wherever they may happen to be.

The creation of racial stereotypes has become one of the foremost and most lethal tools of this form of ‘identity management’. In chapter four I discuss how the racialisation of the figure of the forced migrant is manifest. The projection of an homogenous, immutable, ‘alien’ ‘cultural essence’ onto the forced migrant has been amplified by the advent of the war on terror. This has left as its legacy both the structural edifice of a politics of securitisation and a resurgence of Islamophobia, which has in turn served to heighten the ‘xeno-racism’ directed against the forced migrant. Islamophobia has been instrumental in the naturalisation in Europe of a racism in ‘cultural’ disguise, what Balibar (1991a) calls a ‘racism without race’, that is then focused on the forced migrant as the global embodiment of an ‘alien’ threat to the cohesion of an equally essentialised and universalised European identity and culture. The racialisation of the figure of the ‘absolute alien’ plays a fundamental role in the construction of an overarching sense of ‘European-ness’ purportedly embedded in a specifically European culture and character, whose attributes are deemed as universal as those of the ‘alien’ to which they are opposed.

The war on terror has also enabled the creation of a European asylum-security nexus that has allowed the introduction of securitisation into the political framework of Europe. Chapter five explores the relationship between the figure of the forced migrant and an emerging European ‘security state’ by interrogating the relationship between techniques of governance, the construction of a national (or ‘hyper-national’) identity, and the discourses, practices and technologies of security. The way the figure of the forced migrant has been inscribed with fear and fashioned into the natural subject of a politics of security is an essential component in the construction of a ‘European identity’. Its ideological function as the negative substrate of ‘European-ness’ entails that it must be visibly controlled and rejected: individual forced migrants are caught in a relentless focus, monitored and tracked by a vast network of surveillance and intelligence gathering and processing technologies, which feed into the militarised policing of the border.

The ideological creation of the forced migrant as a ‘global alien’ is thus infused with state power and placed on the stage of national political discourse; it becomes an ideological pivot for the normalisation of a global system of exploitation as manifest in
its national form, and gains an even more exaggerated importance when economic and political crisis presents an overwhelming need to prevent the disintegration of the idea of ‘European-ness’. In the process of displacing anxiety and the sense of profound alienation produced by daily existence within a capitalist society, the forced migrant is highlighted in ways that, I contest, go beyond the quotidian social production of marginal and excluded figures that is a norm for ideological systems of national rule. Indeed, the forced migrant has become an even more essential element in the constant attempt to de-historicise, universalise and naturalise a global system that, as it enters crisis, threatens to reveal to its subjects that is none of these things.
Chapter Two

A World in Crisis: The ‘Illegalisation’ of the Forced Migrant

Introduction
There is no such thing as a continuous ‘refugee’ figure that can be tracked through Europe’s historical record. Although those forced by political persecution, war or poverty into seeking refuge in Europe have been a continuous presence since the early modern era (cf. Soguk, 1999; Marfleet, 2006), the representations of such individuals have been mutable, changing according to the political requirements of the time. In today’s context, the way the figure of the forced migrant is fashioned reflects the relationship between the phenomenon of forced migration and the current ideological agenda of the political managers of the major European economies.

Individuals are compelled – by the dispossession and displacement that arise from the globally extensive demands of capital accumulation – into undertaking often arduous and life-threatening journeys to the borders of Europe. Due to the European Union’s securitised asylum and immigration policies and practices (the policing of its external borders) they are driven into the global circuits of ‘survival migration’, their journeys facilitated, for the most part, by agents working within the illicit, shadow economy. If they attain the borders of Europe’s nation-states, once within these borders they are subsumed into the underside of the ‘legal’ economy as part of a highly exploitable, because they are highly vulnerable, irregular workforce: the criminalisation of those caught up in this process ensures they are endowed with the identity of ‘illegal migrant’, leaving them open to the threat of detention and deportation, with increasingly little scope for having the stain of ‘illegality’ dissolved through the granting of refugee status.

The enforced marginality of the forced migrant (in terms of their presence and their political ‘voice’) is both ideologically and economically productive for the core national/regional hubs of the global capitalist system. On the one hand, the forced migrant – as an ‘illegal migrant’, ‘sans-papier’ or ‘failed asylum seeker’ driven underground – is an easily exploited and profitable resource, an important cog in the service, catering, construction, agriculture and food processing sectors of these countries’ economies (cf. Shelley, 2007). On the other hand, for the political elite, the forced migrant represents a potential disruption to the perceived ‘normality’ of the
system it manages and benefits from. It attempts to recoup the semblance of stability by deploying discourses that frame the forced migrant as a dangerous, because ‘illegal’, ‘alien’ presence, creating a ‘spectre’ at the border onto which can be displaced the anxiety and confusion provoked by an exploitative global system that appears to operate beyond human control. In a seemingly contradictory process, even as forced migrants are silently and invisibly incorporated into the national economy, their portrayal as figures of putative criminality and danger – to be identified, tracked down, incarcerated and expelled – magnifies their rhetorical visibility and political importance far beyond their physical presence.

This magnification comprises a crucial element in the (re)construction of the nation-state (cf. Soguk, 1999), and more fundamentally in the stabilisation of the overarching ideological practices that attempt to naturalise, and thereby disguise, the exploitative and divisive nature of the system as a whole. However, as the ideological process of shoring up the system is not self-equilibrating, the discourses of ‘national belonging’ the political elite employ have to be continually reconstructed, refashioned and rhetorically emphasised in order to meet these new centrifugal challenges that confront a nation-state (or regional bloc of nation-states) locked into a global economic system. In an attempt to displace the inherent contradictions, conflicts and challenges, currently sharpened by the onset of global economic crisis, national politicians and their ideologues endow the forced migrant with the threatening identity of ‘global illegal’ by means of the manipulation of deeply embedded nationalist narratives of inclusion/exclusion. This discourse of ‘global illegality’ is interwoven with the complex of discourses that obscure and sustain the system of global capitalism.

This thesis argues that the figure of the forced migrant, standing at the intersection of nationalism and globalisation, functions as a crucial ideological hinge in the articulation of the ‘identity’ of Europe with the reality of its contradictory relationship to global capitalism.

**Global capitalism and forced migration**

*Globalisation, dispossession and displacement*

The acceleration of the global reach of capitalism’s processes of intense exploitation, coupled with dispossession, has created the circumstances whereby individuals are forced through displacement into the international circuits of migration, amplifying the
global circumstances of what may at first appear to be local crises. The situation of the forced migrant is currently made even starker by the intensification of the global system’s structural instability and inequality by financial and economic crisis. Many individual decisions to migrate, therefore, are made under the extreme pressures that neoliberal policies and practices visit on those living within the regions that lie on the margins of the world’s economic system, outside the central nodes of global wealth, power and privilege. In this sense, forced migration as a term is not easy to delimit: it lies on a continuum, where chronic unemployment, poverty and the drastic curtailment of life-chances shade into political persecution, ethnic violence, and the devastation of war and mass displacement. What Davis (2006, p.174) terms the ‘brutal tectonics of globalisation’ – the ‘epochal’ transfer of power and resources from the Global South to the command centres of global capitalism – have propelled many millions into motion across the globe, turning many into ‘survival migrants’. This world of perpetual movement is one particular manifestation of ‘[t]he incessant tearing apart of old patterns of the economic and social by capitalism as it restructures itself on a world scale…’ (Harman, 2009, p.343). The phase of global restructuring which began in response to the economic crisis of the late 1970s is most visible in the policies and programmes implemented by the IMF and the World Bank, which, even as the current crisis threatens to throw their ideological underpinning into question, continue to carry out what Davis (2006, p.199) calls ‘the late capitalist triage of humanity’.

The neoliberal deregulation of global finance forced open countries in the Global South to wave after wave of speculative finance, destabilising local currencies and even whole economies. Direct foreign investments, however, have continued to flow almost exclusively between the key regions of capital accumulation, drawn by the powerful centripetal force exerted by these major centres of production, finance and commerce, with less than a third seeking out the Global South (and then principally those regions producing raw materials such as oil and gas) (cf. Callinicos, 2009, p.204). Meanwhile, most of the Global South is locked out of the lucrative flows of trade by complex barriers of tariffs, pricing structures, subsidies and patents. As their governments have been forced into countless rounds of borrowing, initially to finance state expenditure, then escalating interest payments, the ratio of debt to GNP in the economically most vulnerable countries (known as the ‘highly indebted poor countries’ or HIPCs) has reached far beyond sustainable limits. Continued dependence on World Bank and IMF-directed austerity programmes – access to credit is wedded to their adoption – has
further intensified the crisis in agriculture and industrial output, with increased
deforestation, desertification and other markers of environmental degradation, over-
reliance on food imports, and declining terms of trade and capital flight. Often the only
resort for individuals attempting to avoid destitution is, as Zolberg (2001) says, to
physically ‘exit the state’.

Austerity measures have locked many of the countries in the Global South into
wholesale privatisations of public services and the erosion or complete collapse of the
last vestiges of state welfare and subsidies over the last three decades have left the
majority of their citizens exposed to unemployment, poverty and environmentally toxic
habitats, and, as a consequence, rendered them vulnerable to the rapid spread of disease
and epidemics, and to ‘natural’ disasters. In some areas deep poverty helps breed an
environment where primitive forms of exploitation can flourish: domestic servitude that
is on a par with slavery, child labour and prostitution, and the farming of human organs
(what Davis (2006, p.198) calls an ‘existential ground zero’). Almost inevitably, such
circumstances lead to violence, as economic and political crisis intensifies conflict at
every level. Under the pressure of neoliberal austerity programmes, fragile state
structures fragment, and as power and the monopoly of violence disperse away from
their centralised source, social unrest (under the direction of political demagogues)
frequently transmutes into ethnic, religious and racial conflict, threatening to ignite civil
war.

Some already vulnerable areas have been further devastated by the military
invasions of the US and allied NATO powers, carried out by a combination of national
armies, equipped with high-tech surveillance equipment and weaponry, and vast
mercenary organisations based in the West – an illustration of the neoliberal drive to
privatise even the conduct of war itself (cf. Klein, 2007). Such companies – one of the
most visible and powerful being the US-based Blackwater (now rebranded as Xe
Services), whose influence, reach and revenues rival that of many nation-states (cf.
Scahill, 2007) – have been deployed by Western governments in Iraq and Afghanistan
(in the war against terror) and in Columbia (in the ‘war against drugs’). There are even
plans to deploy such private armies along state borders in the ‘war against illegal
migration’ (for example, along the US-Mexico border) (Ibid., 2007). The fact that these
private security companies operate in a culture of impunity, lawlessness and
corruption, allied to the elevation of Western foreign policy into a permanent state of
pre-emptive war, helps ratchet up the sense of chaos and threat in many areas – especially when the rhetoric of the war on terror is used by local regimes as a cover for intensified repression.

The economic hegemony of the US may be fatally compromised by its status as the world’s biggest debtor economy, and challenged by China’s surging growth rate and newfound geopolitical assertiveness, but it still retains its global military supremacy, and its military presence continues to structure the lived environment of many millions. Throughout the world there are 737 officially recognised US bases (*cf.* Johnson, 2007), not to mention secret installations and de facto facilities under flags of convenience. Thus the experiential world of many in the Global South is one distorted by the ever-present shadow of military conflict, whether conducted by state armies, mercenary groups or militias. Whoever prosecutes the war, it is civilians who comprise the overwhelming majority of casualties and fatalities – and who are often the main target – and it is they who are driven by war beyond the borders of these zones of conflict in search of safety.

The ripples of war spread out from the epicentres of invasion and conflict into unstable border areas (for example, from Afghanistan to the North-Western ‘tribal regions’ of Pakistan, or, in the case of Russia’s brutal war in Chechnya, into the neighbouring Caucasus states) and begin to infect whole regions. The corrosive influence of the economy of war, with its corrupt and violent black-market relationships, becomes networked far and wide throughout these regions, both benefiting from and fuelling the rapid growth of informal labour and the shadow economic system – which also provides the informal circuits of migration for those desperate to escape. Among the many examples (such as the Horn of Africa and Iraq), the war in Kosovo has left the economy of the region devastated and in the hands of various Balkan mafias (*cf.* Boal *et al*., 2005, p.106; Glenny, 2008), a conduit for organised smuggling and/or trafficking operations, while Afghanistan is once again locked into the opium economy under the control of competing warlords and their militias.

In large pockets of many regions, therefore, arbitrary violence – and the ever-present fear of it – has become normalised. That millions continue to survive and even build and maintain communities in the interstices of such unstable societies is a testament to their resilience and resourcefulness, but life in such environments is at best inherently fragile and at worst traumatic. Random warfare waged by armed bands of
soldiers outside state control, endemic civil war or state-directed terror has become the
default condition of many societies, where ‘the loss of even the fiction of a national
economy leaves the cultural field as one in which fantasies of purity, authenticity … and
security [in the name of collective ethnic identities] are enacted: the nation-state is
reduced to the fiction of its ethnos’ (Appadurai, 2006, p.23). In circumstances such as
these, where daily life is characterised by the banal ‘everydayness’ of physical violence,
conflict and brutality, the vestiges of a routine and predictable order are increasingly
organised around the prospect and fact of violence, even as ‘a quotidian war is waged
[that] destabilise[s] the idea of an everyday outside world’ (Ibid., pp.31-2). ‘[Such]
societies of terror drive forced migration’ (Ibid., p.30).

Meanwhile, in the course of expanding and restructuring at a breathtaking pace,
global capitalism has generated the growth of mega-cities (over half the world’s
population are now designated as urban-dwellers). Some, most notably in the region
now known as Asean + 3 (South-East Asia plus China, Japan and South Korea), are
situated in areas characterised by the rapid rise of new global centres of capital
accumulation – spectacularly so in China, which is making its presence felt on the
international stage as a potential economic and even geopolitical rival to the US and
Europe (cf. Callinicos, 2009). Others have spread their footprint across regions in Latin
America, Africa and South Asia, reflecting the complex, unequal patterns of change
driven by a constantly evolving yet crisis-prone economic system. These mega-cities
sprawl for many hundreds of miles, encompassing smaller cities, towns, villages and
semi-rural areas, and are home to millions of migrants from the impoverished rural
hinterlands, who settle in the vast ‘mega-slums’ so graphically described by Davis
(2006). These become simulacri of cities themselves, despite lacking even the most
basic infrastructure essential for a functioning urban environment.

As Zeilig (2008) and Harman (2009) point out, the social topography of these
‘slum cities’ is dense, complex and differentiated, encompassing a wide variety of
social experiences, forms of housing, and formal and informal employment, self-
employment and unemployment, with a vital cross-fertilisation of ideas and cultural
practices. Such areas can indeed boast self-sufficient communities that continue to
survive amidst the deprivation, casual violence (often emanating from official sources),
constant displacements and toxic environment. However, at the same time, many of
their inhabitants would no doubt recognise Boal et al’s (2005, p.162) description of
these mega-slums as ‘urban archipelagos of destitution and disenfranchisement’. They are localised evidence of the vast imbalances that characterise neoliberal globalisation.

Global imbalances are replicated within regions. Most countries throughout the world have witnessed over the last decade the growth of a yawning chasm between the wealth of a small elite at one end of the scale and extreme poverty at the other. Indeed, the characteristics of cities in the advanced economies are similar in many ways to those in the Global South in their degree of economic, social and spatial polarisation (cf. King, 1995). However, in the poor countries of the South, the fragmentation, incoherence and alienation experienced by so many urban-dwellers is magnified; the chasm between rich and poor creates near-surreal spectacles of vast wealth nestled alongside desperate impoverishment, with slums and favelas neighbouring gated compounds, skyscrapers, shopping malls and five-star hotels. Such regions have played host to the swift rise of a narrow class of super-rich, who have benefited from the privatisations, speculation and corruption, and who continue to profit from the current crisis. The members of this elite are the local beneficiaries of globalisation, but equally they are the true ‘global nomads/citizens’ belonging to Seabrook’s ‘superterrestrial topography of money’ (cited in Davis, 2006, p.120); they are divorced from the social fabric of their home countries by their widespread international connections, financial transactions and peripatetic lifestyles, and protected in their fortified, gated ‘off-worlds’ against the violence provoked by the economic and social exclusion they represent.

Global imbalances and the stratified access to mobility

When such imbalances are mapped on a global scale between regions, they reflect the fact that although all regions may be caught in the net of neoliberal globalisation, they are differentially vulnerable to its effects. Some locations, such as the ‘global city’ of London, host the command centres of capital and, as such, are a crucial node in the production of an increasingly unequal world. From the axis of a city such as London, New York, Paris or Tokyo a ‘vast geography of dependencies, relations and effects’ spreads out around globe (Massey, 2007, p.13): their footprints are globally extensive. As Massey points out, maps of ‘global implication’ could be drawn up for the global city and its multitude of sectors and activities: its presence impacts on many millions far beyond its region’s borders, with its urgent need for energy and mineral resources, its appetite for markets for speculative financial activity and, often, for highly lucrative arms deals, and its dependence on an array of workers drawn from the rest of the world.
for its daily social reproduction. Those subsumed into the dynamics of Europe’s urban economy and society, for example, are a part of a web of connections that stretch around planet\textsuperscript{xv}. As Massey asks, where does the global city end? Thus, it is possible to place the deprivation and violence suffered in the major part of the world firmly within the radius of these centres of global power and wealth through a locally sourced and locally displayed global inequality.

So it is that billions are forced to the very periphery of this world system. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are written off as ‘marginal’, apart from local enclaves of raw materials, most especially oil, which have sparked a new ‘scramble for Africa’ – China is the latest entrant on the list of those industrialised and industrialising countries competing voraciously for fresh supplies of energy resources. Even in such enclaves, however, attempts at even basic development have been abandoned in favour of global ‘poverty relief’ and riot control\textsuperscript{xvi}. Millions are forcibly displaced within their countries or regions\textsuperscript{xvii}. And a further tiny percentage of people are driven to embark on arduous, dangerous, often fatal journeys\textsuperscript{xviii} across deserts, oceans and fortified borders towards the richer, safer countries of the West. As Sassen (2003, p.265) says: ‘It is in this context – marked by unemployment, poverty, bankruptcies … and shrinking state resources to meet social needs – that alternative circuits of survival [that is, the circuits of migration] emerge, and it is to these conditions that such circuits are articulated’.

The immiseration of populations – and the violence and repression that often accompanies this – promotes forced migration; this takes place within an environment structured by the dynamics of the fluctuating demand for highly exploitable labour in the global cities of the West (and increasingly in the East). Forced migration then articulates with a global infrastructure that facilitates the crossborder flows that take place within both the legal and the illicit, shadow economy, which are networked together in necessarily opaque ways. There are in effect, as Bauman (1998, p.88) says, two worlds: the first is the one of the globally mobile; the second is the one of the locally tied who are banned from moving – for them, ‘real space is closing up’, they have to travel illegally, under threat of arrest and deportation. Through the enforcement of this highly stratified access to global mobility, the ‘circuits of survival’ forced migrants are compelled to use are criminalised and driven underground, often into the hands of mafia networks – and forced migrants themselves are transformed into global transgressors.
The global system and the nation-state

The discourse of globalisation

As any ideological discourse is part of a materially structured and sustained social consciousness, if it failed to reflect back to the individual their experience of the world – albeit in a distorted, fragmentary and contradictory way – its social and political utility would be nullified. Thus, the alienating, sometimes devastating, effects of capitalist globalisation are often experienced as if they were the outcome of the workings of impersonal forces; they are frequently experienced as if they were a natural part of the given, lived environment, conveying what Jameson (cited by Kunkel, 2010, p.14) calls ‘the sense of a locked social geology so massive that no visions of modification seem possible’. A discourse of globalisation reflecting this sense can indeed have some purchase. If a critical analysis is to break open the ideological carapace within which the forced migrant is imprisoned, then one of its principle tasks must be to deconstruct the ruling ideological narratives that de-historicise the structural parameters of the given world and elevate capitalist globalisation into an abstract force, naturalising its uneven and contradictory processes.

These processes, although springing from the compulsions inherent in a now-global economic system driven by profit-seeking and competition, are grounded in the constant flow of many millions upon millions of individual actions and interactions, which are then fashioned into a substance that is abstracted and alienated from its source in human life and labour. Analysing how and why the figure of the forced migrant has become such a vital component in this process of ideological abstraction necessitates tracing the origins of the discourses that surround forced migration back to their source in the nation-state itself and in the narrative threads of nationalism from which the figure of the ‘alien outsider’ is woven. This involves, in the first instance, an interrogation of the picture presented by globalisation theories of the imminent demise of the nation-state itself and an analysis of the relationship of the nation-state to the process of globalisation.

The discourse of globalisation portrays it as a ‘placeless’ force, but the global is grounded in the local; global capitalism is reproduced through concrete, locally situated processes in areas of highly concentrated forms of power – it is the provenance of this power that lies hidden behind the neoliberal discourse of an abstract, frictionless, integrated global system. Transactions, products and peoples are sucked into the force-field of the capitalist core, but the majority of trade and investment continues to flow
primarily between the advanced economies that make up this core, and it is this flow that remains the dynamo of the world economy – a process Callinicos (2009, p.183) calls ‘ostracising imperialism’. The global system, therefore, is best described as a hybrid one, comprising a system of unevenly developed states and regions, with the apex dominated by the core North American, European and South East Asian and Pacific rim regions, all locked into highly competitive yet interdependent relationships. These regions have been recently joined by new centres of capital accumulation, such as China and to a lesser extent India, complicating the global hierarchy of economic and geopolitical power. However, this only helps to emphasise that globalisation is more accurately termed ‘regionalisation’ – a globalised system of capitalist states and regional blocs of states whose competitive and conflictual interdependence adds up to ‘a dangerous, unbalanced world [of] shifting … social and political, national and international tectonic plates’ (Hobsbawm, 2007, p.48), an increasingly multipolar world of stark global asymmetries and regional disparities.

Capitalism is structured fundamentally as a system of nation-states: the state is the ‘nodal point’ in capitalism’s global nervous system around which capitals cluster (cf. Harman, 1991). Those specific nodes that lie at the core of the economic system continue to play a crucial role in promoting the global processes of capitalism: they create the infrastructure for the concrete, locally situated processes that make up capitalist globalisation. To facilitate the most recent round of global restructuring, under the ideological banner of neoliberalism – and under the cover of global economic crisis – the local nation-state has been fundamental in rolling back regulatory frameworks, implementing cutbacks in the social wage, initiating privatisations and providing massive financial bailouts (at the risk of undermining as it does so the long-term viability of the neoliberal doctrine itself) to try to prevent it spinning out of control. It will continue to be crucial to future attempts to restore profitability to the system by attempting to transfer the vast burden of its debt onto the shoulders of its national populations, deploying its monopoly of force (administrative, judicial, legal and, in the final analysis, military) and its vast, hegemonic (but never uncontested) ideological resources in order to secure some measure of consent.

This is not to deny that the nation-state itself is a product of historical circumstances and cultural constructs, a changing and inherently unstable phenomenon. Challenges to its shape and form emerge from within the capitalist system itself, not least from the application of neoliberal policies that ‘seek to delegate the state’s
managerial functions to [unaccountable] international organisations and [to] privatise “public” power’ (Opello and Rostow, 1999, p.246), as well as from the conflicting interests of the different strands of capital as they consolidate into national, regional or global blocs. However, as Harvey (2006, p. xvii) says, ‘if something like states didn’t exist, capitalists would be forced to invent them’. Precisely because it functions in an increasingly hybrid, interconnected world, capital cannot entirely float free of its geographical moorings; its operations and financial relationships may be spread globally but capital and the state system are still locked into an interdependent relationship. The competition between the various blocs of capital, if unregulated, could lead to a contagious financial and economic crisis that, due to the global nature of the economic system, holds the threat of annihilation over even the most globally spread of transnational behemoths. The crisis that is currently unfolding could still be beyond national political intervention due to the sheer scale of the integration of national economies, yet there is no other solution but for the nation-state to intervene to try to contain the fall-out and to shift the burden of the cost of the local economic and social consequences of crisis-containment onto the backs of its populations. This process, of course, carries with it the risk of sustaining even greater damage by provoking profound social unrest (which again the state is expected to confront and control), and this is one reason why neoliberalism now carries with it a sense of ideological crisis as it openly moves to state intervention, contravening its neoliberal free-market discourse.

This is not the only role of the nation-state: it is more than simply a ‘power container’; as McNevin (2006) shows, it can also be characterised as an ‘assemblage’ of forces and disciplinary practices through which identities are constructed, and cannot be analysed in isolation from the social relationships it encapsulates. The constant tension between the arid, alienating realities of a system based on profit-seeking and what Harvey (2007, p.xvii) calls the ‘lived lives of those producing the profits’ (with their ‘richness of variegated cultures’) demands some sort of resolution if society is to have a measure of social stability, particularly at the point where ‘far-flung [global] connections and countervailing influences of extraordinary complexity send reverbrations through … communities which threaten to rock the foundations of civil society’. The most powerful nation-states continue to possess the necessary heft and ideological resources to attempt to contain and sublimate these tensions, sustaining allegiance to the capitalist system in its local forms. The nation-state naturalises the system of exploitation of which it is a structural part, not least through its reproduction
of ideological narratives of national and cultural belonging with their (racialised) definitions of inclusion and exclusion.

*The contradictions of global capitalism in its nation-state form*

The survival of locally or regionally based capitals in an internationally hybrid world of instability, regional conflicts and economic convulsions demands, therefore, an inherently ideological operation to postulate a unitary set of interests in order to naturalise and legitimate relations of dominance, construct identities and displace class antagonisms. Capitalism, in the process of its constant reinvention, continues to release forces that undermine its account of the world: the uneven processes of globalisation have begun to erode the distinction between the domestic and the global market.

Nation-state allegiances with sources of transnational capital are not without historical precedent, but the trend strengthening these complex global relationships has been accelerated dramatically by the neoliberal policies of liberalisation and deregulation. External actors, such as unaccountable intergovernmental and regional institutions (for example, the European Commission, which Anderson (2007, p.17) calls ‘the EU’s unelected executive’), credit rating agencies, international financial markets, currency speculators and transnational industries, employ great powers of discipline within and upon the nation-states of Europe. As the distinction between the domestic and the global economy is now difficult to maintain, the power of the political managers of the nation-state is becoming increasingly concentrated in their ability to assert control through the ‘management’ and policing of their national populations.

Meanwhile, the reality of the ever-widening chasm between rich and poor, within and between regions, has to be disguised behind an appearance of inevitability. The egregious global inequalities that were previously distanced from the central core of imperialist states, locked within the borders of the colonies (which de Genova (2010, p.54) describes as ‘vast de facto prison labour camps’), now confront the citizens in the Western metropolitan centres ‘on an unprecedented scale and ever more ubiquitously within the same spaces of practical everyday life’ (Balibar cited in de Genova, 2010, p.54). The individual anxieties of the national citizens of these core states find an echo in the spectacle of global casualties at the border attesting to the ruthless nature of the capitalist economic order. At the same time, identities are leaking: as global mega-cities spread across continents, sucking in millions of workers from within and beyond national and regional borders, they are becoming increasingly racially, culturally and
linguistically diverse. This has even led Appadurai (1998, p.22) so far as to predict that ‘diasporic public spheres...are [becoming] crucibles of a postnationalist political order’—although to what extent they can do so is not clear because, as they are nested within the system of nation-states itself, this is hardly a smooth or inevitable process.

However, it is evident that, as the ideological process of shoring up the system is not self-equilibrating, the discourses of national belonging have to be continually reconstructed and refashioned to meet the centrifugal challenges that confront the nation-state (and regional blocs of states) locked into the global system. Lukács (1971 [1923], p.9) describes how such discourses obscure ‘the historical, transitory nature of capitalist society’, so that ‘its determinants take on the appearance of timeless, eternal categories valid for all social formations’. This is especially vital during a period of dramatic change, instability or crisis. One of the core elements of this ideological process is nationalism, which appears as an expression of a timeless ethnic essence, contained within and expressed by the nation-state. Nationalism’s ideological role is to offer ‘solutions’ to the complex of ideological, structural and psychological needs precipitated by capitalism’s ceaseless processes of change, but its application is increasingly calibrated by the global parameters within which it operates. The task of the nationally based political elite of cementing ever-more global modes of distinguishing ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ cannot be disembedded from the nation-state to which it owes its sustenance and to which it must secure allegiance.

The nation-state and the forced migrant

The discourses of the nation-state

The nation-state (or regional bloc of nation-states) may be a crucial node in the system of capitalist globalisation, necessary for its processes, but it is also a construct and therefore depends on untold millions of daily activities to create its ‘reality’. Huysmans (2006, p.85) argues that, when analysing these activities, too strong an emphasis on symbolic and discursive practices carries with it the danger of dismissing Foucault’s understanding of how expert knowledge, technologies and inherited governmental techniques (‘the institutionalisation and enactment of procedures, routines and regulations’) dictate the form and direction of a discourse as powerfully as does its ideological framework. A problem arises with a Foucauldian interpretation of discourse, however, which claims that discourse itself is ambivalent: the same discourse may be
endlessly reappropriated, modified and ‘performed’ in various contexts by different actors. In this view, the discourse(s) embedded in the application of expert knowledge and techniques of government can become autonomous and self-referential, open to adoption by various political forces. Huysmans (2006), for example, contends that this plethora of routinised governmental activities and legal instruments (such as those deployed in national asylum and immigration regimes) is driven by an internal logic – they maintain their own power bases and knowledge systems – which is equally as significant as underlying ideological abstractions in forming an understanding of the nation-state (with its ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’).

However, I believe that such an interpretation begs the question to what extent such activities are able to float free of the whole ideological structure of the nation-state of which they are such a crucial component. For example, Soguk (1999) shows how the problematisation of certain individuals as ‘refugees’ results in a normative ‘refugee discourse’, and it can be argued that it is this that informs their treatment at the border of the nation-state (or regional bloc of states such as the European Union).

Undoubtedly, the generation and application of immigration and asylum laws, the dissemination of technical knowledge by security ‘experts’, the routine activities of immigration officials, the degrading and often brutal bureaucratic processes of separating privileged ‘insiders’ from unwanted ‘outsiders’, and the sophisticated technologies of surveillance and border policing all play a crucial role in this problematisation, particularly at a biopolitical level – marking, controlling and segregating individual bodies. However, as Gramsci (1971, p.333) explains, a discourse is not just a particular attitude held by certain individuals or specific sets of institutions but is part of the whole web of ‘social knowledge’ that is woven into the ‘collective certainty’ of a society, passed on in the socialisation process and normalised as a self-evident ‘truth’.

Once a particular official discourse is in everyday circulation it acquires through mass dissemination, constant repetition and implicit self-reference, and through its application in the context of a given understanding of the world, the patina of everyday commonsense; it becomes hegemonic, with the ability to inhibit the formation and dissemination of other explanations of lived reality. (This discursive power, naturally, is sourced in other, more material forms of political and economic power.) This process produces what Harvey (2005, p.114) describes as a sort of ‘cognitive locking’ – the inability to think outside the given explanations. A hegemonic discourse, such as the
commonsense understanding of what it means to be a citizen of a specific nation-state, is therefore a social discourse – one of exclusion and separation: the negative identification of who is not a citizen. An understanding of how expert knowledge and governmental techniques, technologies and activities are entangled in a complex process in which they are both driven by and help structure the social environment in which those who construct and carry out these policies, procedures and activities are immersed, and of how this process relates to the capitalist state’s trajectory, can help reveal the systemic compulsions that lie beneath its hegemonic discourses. As Jameson (cited in Kunkel, 2010) explains, ‘social life’ is…

…a seamless web, a single inconceivable and transindividual process, in which there is no need to invent ways of linking language events and social upheavals or economic contradictions because on that level they were never separate from one another. (Jameson cited in Kunkel, 2010, p.13)

Political and institutional discourse, conveying a hegemonic, commonsense notion of a unitary identification with the nation-state, is generally conducted in the language and form of nationalism. The connection between nationalism and the capitalist system (even in its global form) is all-embracing: the system generates nationalism as the condition of its continued existence. The value of nationalism to politicians and ideologues alike lies partly in the fact that it can be offered as a salve for the psychic needs created by the very system it arises from – the alienation generated by the form that its economic processes take, and by the complex ways of social being that are finely tuned to its profit-driven rhythm of exploitation, is meant to be dissolved through a sense of belonging to a ‘national community’. As nationalism is therefore embedded within capitalism’s ideological processes, implanted in the web of social consciousness, it is linked to, and implies, other narratives, such as security and the immanence of existential dangers, which help affirm its state-oriented imagination of the world. It is through such narratives that, as Soguk (1999, p.32) says, ‘the specific vocabularies, significations and classifications [are developed] through which refugee stories are written, circulated and incorporated into images of “normality” ’, and forced migrants are attributed specific cultural, political and legal identities as ‘outsiders’, posited in opposition to the meanings and identities of national citizens or ‘insiders’.
However, because national identities (as ideological creations) are forms of social life, historically specific forms of consciousness, the fashioning of identity is itself an ongoing socio-historical process, one that is routine and invisible, creating – for the most part below the conscious radar – a complex pattern of discourse. What Billig (1995, p.6) calls ‘banal nationalism’ is in fact a whole interconnected array of ‘ideological habits’ which enable the nation-states of Europe, for example, to be daily reproduced and continually (re)constructed as core components of a global state system. The repetition of the practices, routines and symbols of a familiar social world help preserve ‘a collective unconscious memory’; they become ‘second nature’ and as such are stitched into a wider commonsense understanding of this world (Ibid., p.42). The ‘nation’, therefore, could be described as a set of discourses and banal practices that help structure perception, thought and experience, and inform political actions. Nationalism, the ideological conduit for these ‘habits’ of knowledge, is a ‘heterogeneous set of “nation”-oriented idioms, practices and possibilities that are continually available or “endemic” in modern cultural and political life’ (Brubaker, 1996, p.10), reifying a conception of nations as real communities and structuring their citizens’ frame of perception and interpretation.

National ‘culture’, as a cognitive structure, is embedded in the everyday narrative of social life, and takes on quasi-biological overtones: people appear to be born with a cultural identity. This suppresses the reality of the complexities of social being through its essentialised understanding of national identity, formed in opposition to the essentialised characteristics of those who fall outside the national frame. The national citizen (the ‘we’ of banal, day-to-day discourse) inhabits an environment structured by the quasi-biological language of nationalism. ‘We’ are encouraged to see ourselves in a distorting mirror through the manufacture of ‘alien/other’ identities. As Kristeva (1991, p.96) says: ‘the only modern, acceptable, clear definition of foreignness’ is that the ‘foreigner is one who does not belong to the state we are in’. Furthermore, ‘we’ represent normality as opposed to ‘their’ deviations from it.

National identity and the ‘disruptive’ forced migrant

Culture, however, is in reality fluid and flexible, encompassing a multitude of different features, and open to contestation and change. It is due to this fatal flaw that nationalism’s hegemonic discourse has to be constantly reinforced against competing explanations of lived experience: the given nature of the nation-state needs to be
ceaselessly validated and revalidated through physical spectacle, political rhetoric and the day-to-day activities of government, precisely because it masks practices that are primarily concerned with the maintenance class power. Capitalist globalisation itself, with its local cultural and social impacts, unleashes forces that challenge the exclusive claims of the nation-state over the images and discourses of these realities of life, but such forces simultaneously offer the nation-state new resources in the form of the forced migrant. As Soguk (1999, p.15) says, the figure of the forced migrant has ‘paradoxical implications for the practices of state sovereignty’: it is ‘both disruptive and recuperative’, a ‘problem’ to be addressed and a ‘resource’ to be used ‘in the service of the discursive … social and political practices of representation’ that naturalise the nation-state.

The realities of the life of the forced migrant cut across what Soguk (1999, p.54) calls ‘the cartographic logic of the territorial state and its privileged sites of identity’, and challenge this particular hegemonic discourse. Their very mobility blurs the boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, destroys the notion of an impermeable barrier between the security of ‘here’ and the apparently dangerous and volatile world ‘out there’, and threatens to fragment the commonsense partial and disconnected view of a world separated into chunks of national territory, chipping away at the national narrative. As Appadurai (2006) says:

Their movements threaten the policing of borders. Their financial transactions blur the lines between national economies and between the legal and the criminal. Their languages exacerbate concern about national and cultural coherence … (Appadurai, 2006, p.45)

‘The body of the historically produced minority’ is fashioned into the ‘embodiment of fears of the global’ (Ibid., p.47) (cf: chapter five). Through its insertion into the pattern of neoliberal discourse and into the banal narratives of national belonging that underpin the commonsense understanding of the world, the figure of the forced migrant can be recruited to serve the ideological needs of the core nation-states and regional blocs of nation-states even as it threatens to disrupt them.

*The forced migrant and the construction of the nation-state*
Although construed as marginal, the figure of the forced migrant is therefore a vital component in the process of inclusion and exclusion – that is, in the practice of making
and remaking the nation-state and the national citizen. Bhabha (1990) speaks of the process of ‘people production’ through ‘narrating the nation’; the citizen is not a natural or even self-evident presence but must be repeatedly produced. The nation-state secures its coherence – its sovereignty and its right to exist – only insofar as it can successfully claim to represent and defend its citizens, its domestic ‘national community’, from existential dangers. The daily practices of statecraft must therefore ‘incite popular and institutional discourses of problems and dangers … and regiment them in terms that privilege a statist imagination of world’ (Soguk, 1999, p.40). The presence of the forced migrant is problematised to privilege the national citizen and thus the identity and very reality of the nation-state itself. And equally, as citizenship is a shorthand for legitimacy, it is only through reference to the nation-state and its national citizens as concrete, territorialised identities that the concept of irregular/‘illegal’ migration is constructed.

New forms of exclusion, such as the increasingly frequent denial of a legal identity (or any form of identity vis-à-vis the nation-state bar that of ‘illegal alien’) to those forced migrants who manage to circumvent the barriers to entry into the core European nation-states creates a ‘voiceless’ and stateless figure within the national space itself. The very ontology of the nation-state is informed by these insider/outsider, citizen/non-citizen dynamics. Citizenship, therefore, embeds, and is in turn driven by, the naturalisation of a binary discourse of national belonging versus marginality or exclusion. It is precisely through this ideological process that the forced migrant, conceived through the logic of exclusionary national identities, becomes open to re-inscription as the excluded ‘alien’ (cf. chapter four).

The marginality of the forced migrant within the political and economic global system, however, is more than discursive; it is a very concrete marginality, created by the forces that first impact on individuals’ lives to such an extent that they are forced into flight and then deny them both political subjectivity (a ‘voice’) and the power to alter their lives except in extreme and disadvantageous, sometimes lethal, circumstances. In the process, forced migrants lose their faces, names and personal histories and are subsumed into an anonymous mass, obscuring the fact that, as Soguk (1999, p.4) says, there is no ‘intrinsic paradigmatic refugee’ and there is no commonality to their experience, save the experience of displacement, as there are as many reasons for moving as there are forced migrants. The fact that each forced migrant has an individual story, formed in particular circumstances, was to a certain extent
recognised by the terms of the Refugee Convention of 1951, in which the individual circumstances of the asylum seeker was laid down as the litmus test for national decisions over granting refugee status. Until the end of the 1990s and the inception of the war on terror, lip service was still paid to the Convention. However, by the time the war on terror was made manifest in a security regime that included the ‘rendition’ of putative ‘Islamic terrorists’ (many of whom were forced migrants) to regimes of torture and terror, or their deportation back to the dangerous situations they had originally fled, it had already been hollowed out by the declarations of European politicians that it was ‘outdated’, and all but abandoned in practice.

Soguk (1999) points out, however, that the Convention itself was part of an international regime of ‘refugee problematisation’, linked to a fundamentally territorial definition of the world as a jigsaw of nation-states with inviolable geographical boundaries, whereby the displaced were recast as ‘refugees’ to be regimented and contained. The ‘true’ were separated out from the ‘false’ refugees according to the Convention’s definition. However, within these restrictive terms, it did offer a certain practical, legal security to those that it deemed to fall within its definition (for example, the ban on ‘refoulement’ or forcible return to a country of danger, as well as a path to the relative security of some form of legal ‘belonging’ to a powerful and ordered Western nation-state). This particular international refugee definition, however, has been, for the most part, fundamentally transformed both on the ground and in official policy statements, in line with the changing needs of the global state system. National and regional asylum regimes are becoming increasingly, and overwhelmingly, driven by a global discourse of national and international security (cf. chapter five).

These changes to asylum and immigration regimes have to be viewed in a wider historical perspective. Soguk (1999, p.51) believes that the various discourses of the refugee or forced migrant as the ‘alien’/‘outsider’ are a ‘permanent fixture of statecraft’: ‘refugees come and go but refugee regimentations remain constant’. However, specific accounts of the forced migrant in circulation at a specific time acquire a self-referential power that allows for their widespread dissemination and acceptance, and these accounts structure both much of the policy-driven academic analysis of forced migration and the official responses imposed on the ‘fluidity of a thousand faces’. Today, current problematisations of the forced migrant are instrumental to the rearticulation of state-oriented notions of national and international security, leading to an overall ‘securitisation of asylum’ (cf. Bigo 2008; Huysmans 2006; Squire 2009).
The figure of the forced migrant is therefore a politically produced figure: the ‘voicelessness’ and marginality that Malkki (1996) speaks of is the effect of a discourse that first effaces the forced migrant by evacuating their complex experiences of any political content, and then reconstructs them as a figure solely defined by the vocabulary and imagery of securitisation. They become the ideological prism through which the ‘reality’ of the nation-state – its internal coherence and identity – is reflected. This enforced and constructed marginality, therefore, is a vitally productive resource: the marginal has become a central feature in the constant work of (re)validating and (re)constructing the nation-state.

**European nationalism, citizenship, and the ‘illegalisation’ of the forced migrant**

*The creation of a European ‘national’ identity*

As the nation-state is moulded into new shapes by global capitalism’s processes of transformation, the definition of the forced migrant as the ‘outsider’/‘alien’ at the border has also become increasingly functional to the development of a ‘European identity’ at a time when it appears more fractured than ever. As the core European nation-states face the effects of the current widespread economic crisis, the capitalist elite and its political ideologues strive to obscure the historical, transitory nature of the capitalist system and its systemic tendency to crisis by turning to an increased reliance on the timeless and habitual categories of nationalism. Despite the obvious contradictions in a regional cluster of nation-states adopting a strategy tailored to the individual nation-state itself, the nationalist template is employed by political ideologues in the attempt to invest ‘Europe’ (a region riven by inequalities and competing capitals) with an emotional legitimacy – a ‘felt’ understanding of its populations of themselves as ‘European’. This entails its daily reproduction through multiple acts of exclusion and marginalisation.

The formation of the European Union as a regional alliance of nation-states has been driven by certain identities of interest among its nationally based capitals – the desire for mutually supportive economic growth in order to compete successfully on the global economic stage, partially through the introduction of neoliberal policies into its constituent national economies under the disciplinary tutelage of an unaccountable European Central Bank. The pressures of the globalised financial markets and the emergence of new, globally competitive economic powers, such as China and India, have continued to focus sections of the region’s elite on the need for Europe to evolve
into a quasi-territorial unit. However, despite these external pressures, the recent financial and economic crisis has exposed the reality of its increasingly amorphous and incoherent character. The crisis has, instead, illustrated the importance of the nation-state. Only the nation-state has the democratic authority to tax, borrow and spend, and it is the nation-states that have been crucial so far to preventing financial and economic crisis sucking the world into a global 1930s-style depression. The European Union, by comparison, has limited fiscal powers, and this is connected to its fundamental lack of any genuine democratic or popular legitimacy or moral authority. It is, therefore, an elite-driven project, but one far from the vision of an all-encompassing federal unity. The pressing need of many of its national capitals for a European ‘superstate’, and its reality as a conflicted, hierarchical entity, highlight the inherent contradictions lying at the heart of the European project.

Even the global forces that underlie the move towards regionality simultaneously undermine it: uneven capital and labour flows between the nation-states lead to uneven development; competitive international pressures generated by the global economic system have helped forge a hierarchy of nation-states within the regional bloc, undermining political coherence; local class struggles can threaten to spread across the region with greater velocity; and global financial and economic crisis, which differentially affects its constituent nation-states, has precipitated dissension amongst the various national political elites as to how best prevent its European ramifications from undermining their legitimacy with their own populations. In fact, disputes about state spending were already rife throughout Europe before the onset of crisis, with increasing friction between the wealthy centres and their national hinterlands. What Traynor (2007) calls ‘the rich peoples’ rebellion’ spread to a pan-European level as the expansion of the European Union from fifteen states to twenty-seven widened disparities in wealth. With the European Union now comprising over 500 million people, the wealth gap is greater than ever, with the richest corner (inner London) generating over three times the wealth of the EU national average, in comparison to north-eastern Romania, which produces barely a quarter (Ibid.). Meanwhile, the crisis in the Eurozone itself (with the potential for national default fanning out among the weaker economies) has impelled a centralised ‘rescue plan’, under the pressure of the global stockmarkets, entailing draconian European Union-imposed austerity measures – bringing in its train the potential for the spread of social unrest throughout the region.
The European Union, as a regional alliance, has become just as fractured and riven with conflicts as its component states.

Europe, therefore, faces an even deeper crisis of representation than its individual member nation-states. The coherence of the European Union partially rests on its ability to legitimise its existence among its various groups of national citizens, who are divided by the chronically unequal effects of neoliberal policies – exacerbated by the current crisis-driven implementation of austerity programmes – and the ongoing (re)validation of competing national narratives. The idea of ‘European-ness’ is generally regarded by many as an abstraction of dubious authenticity and appears to carry little in the way of a coherent social, cultural and historical narrative. Therefore, the political ideologues of the European Union have turned to what Anderson (1983, p.175) calls the tried-and-tested ‘political-biographical narrative of the realm’, enlarged to encompass the idea of a European identity. The nation-state’s initial formation out of vast ‘polyglot’ empires entailed the engineering of profound changes of consciousness through the construction of ‘a narrative of identity’ (Ibid.). Equally, crisis today calls forth a frenzied reiteration of national narratives – a sort of ‘hyper-nationalism’ – but this time placed within the global context of a naked redistribution of privilege and deprivation, of wealth and poverty, of power and impotence, in a word: ‘glocalisation’. One result is that the process of reconstructing discourses of both European and national belonging (with their narratives of inclusion and exclusion) must be constantly recalibrated at an even higher pitch.

As a part of this ‘hyper-nationalism’, the region’s internal conflicts and divisions have been translated into a discourse of opposition between the concepts of ‘cultural unity’ and ‘cultural heterogeneity’ – what Balibar (2004, p.12) calls, ‘code for the idea that, on the margins, “European” cultures are permeated and overlap with “non-European” influences, which could [place] obstacle[s in the way of] the process of the “Europeanisation of Europe” ’. The reality of Europe, however, is of a region within which languages, religions and cultures coexist and mix. As Balibar insists, Europe as a region is a ‘series of assembled peripheries’ – ‘each region of Europe is made of overlapping peripheries, each of them open to influences from other parts of Europe and from the whole world’ – so the nature of a unified ‘Europe’ can only be one of constructed identities (Ibid., p.12). It is this further contradiction inherent in the European project that helps bring to the fore the multiple other fractures and contradictions that threaten to expose the ideological nature of its drive to a European
identity. This propels the sense of urgency behind the incessant (re)construction of a commonsense supranational narrative through daily rituals of inclusion and exclusion: the making of citizens through the creation of ‘aliens’.

**European citizenship and the ‘illegal alien’**

The construction of a European identity manifest in a European citizenship, however, is in many ways problematic: as it can only be created through nationalist tropes, it can also militate against a commonsense perception of cultural unity. As Dauvergne (2007, p.506) says, each move to make supranational European citizenship more meaningful inscribes increased sovereign power to the states: thus, ‘formal citizenship … sheds its geographies while shoring up the embattled sovereignty of nations beleaguered by the onslaught of globalisation’. European citizenship is derivative: no-one is solely a citizen of the European Union as European identity is based on citizenship of one of its constituent nation-states. The European member states are the ‘gatekeepers’ to citizenship of the entire European Union (*Ibid.*, p.504). While these contradictory elements of a European identity come to the fore in the figure of the privileged citizen/‘insider’, the non-citizen (most particularly the stateless individual dwelling within the European borders), whose designation as the ‘alien’/‘outsider’ is marshalled to endow European citizenship with a more unified identity, is conjured up as a coherent global presence.

Thus it appears that as European citizenship is becoming more flexible (more nation-states now tolerate dual citizenship and the requirements for citizenship are increasingly less onerous), for those already outside the narrative of national belonging, citizenship law is becoming increasingly exclusionary (*cf.* Dauvergne, 2007). In combination with the erosion of *jus soli* (citizenship by virtue of birth within the territory of the nation-state), many nation-states are emphasising citizenship’s link to a hereditary ethnic ‘national community’ with the unspoken reassertion of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by ‘blood’, that is, through the possession of an ancestor of that nationality). This, as Dauvergne (2007, p.507) shows, means ‘illegal’ status, and all the deprivations and injustices this entails, will be passed down the generations – ‘children may inherit a status of legal transgressor at birth’. It allows a migration of inclusion/exclusion away from the national/regional border and into the heart of Europe itself by labelling part of Europe’s population as ‘illegal’ and ontologically ‘alien’, complementing the shift of border policing far beyond the physical borders into other
countries and regions as part of an increasingly unified global migration/security regime (cf. chapters three and five).

Underlying the emergence of the European citizen as a new historic figure lies the introduction of what Balibar (2004) calls the concept of ‘security-identity’:

The material constitution of Europe … oscillates … between … a violent process of exclusion whose main instrument … is the quasi-military enforcement of ‘security borders’, which recreates the figure of the stranger as political enemy, pushing the European construction … into the language of culture wars and clashes of civilisations, … [and] a ‘civil’ process of elaboration of differences, which involves … issues concerning … Europe’s ‘identity’ and ‘community’. (Balibar, 2004, p.14, italics in original)

This shows the complexity of the multiple activities that go into problematisations of the forced migrant. The encoded signifier in this discourse is ‘cultural compatibility’. The dissemination of a sense that the national identity in Europe (and its ‘inherently’ democratic values) is under siege from the ‘alien’ values of non-European ‘outsiders’, most especially ‘outsiders’ from Muslim cultures, entails taking the necessary measures to secure its survival. Hence, the extraordinary rigour with which the nature of the regional borders is reinforced through enhanced exclusionary activities, accompanied by a banal discourse of cultural difference (in effect, a coded racialised discourse) (cf. chapter four).

The European Union’s securitised asylum and immigration process helps validate a belief in the integrity of its external borders as boundary and defence of an essential, specifically European national identity. Its legal and administrative policies, administrative measures, surveillance technologies, border policing, publicised deportation statistics and ever-expanding estate of detention centres disseminates an ideological narrative in which ‘culturally alien’ ‘outsiders’ attempting to enter Europe ‘illegally’ constitute a grave threat to ‘national security’. This is particularly so when, in economically straitened times, each nation-state within the regional bloc needs to secure its role as a guarantor that much-reduced (and, in some cases, near-non-existent) public services and increasingly marginal opportunities for employment will only be granted to those who are included within its definition of ‘the nation’ (or even within ‘the European nation’, although this is a conception that reveals its own contradictions when hostility is directed towards migrants to the wealthier economies from the poorer
European nation-states). Such harsh ‘security’ measures are justified by criminalising the presence of the forced migrant, labelling their very existence as ‘illegal’. This helps feed the creation of a normative European identity that recognises itself as a rational, moral, universal exemplar, applicable to all humanity. Beneath the image of a besieged ‘Fortress Europe’, therefore, lies the projection of normatively hegemonic Europe (cf. Loshitzky, 2006).

The manufacture of the ‘global alien’

Nationalism and globalisation

Neoliberal globalisation is the site for the work of this national/regional (re)construction. Capitalism’s socio-economic order is intelligible only in global terms, even as it continues to take the shape of the nation-state/regional bloc of nation-states. As Meszaros (1989, p.40) says, “[I]ts operative model [as a system of nation-states] is imposed by the capitalist [system] itself”, under the strictures of intense competition. Its ideological narrative, however, must be continually refined and restructured to mirror the constant systemic changes within global capitalism and the local manifestation of these changes within society. This narrative must attempt to reconcile the contradictions arising from the fact that, despite the increasing global integration of the financial and economic system, there is no mechanism of global governance; instead there is only a system of nation-states (and regional blocs of states) locked into an interdependent but competitive and frequently antagonistic relationship. In less turbulent times these contradictions are more easily hidden, folded into the system’s structural crevices, but under the spotlight of crisis, the key nation-states that represent the local sources of global wealth and power must ideologically negotiate their global context. As they do so, they turn those individuals displaced by the processes of global capitalism into a rhetorical ‘global enemy’. Paradoxically, the ideological mobilisations used to form this global figure can only be those of nationalism, with its legitimising and hegemonic discourses of inclusion/exclusion.

However, nationalism itself already incorporates what appears be its opposing concept: internationalism/globalisation. As it uses the syntax of hegemony it can come to be perceived (in the Western nations) as an ‘identity of identities’, representing universal, ‘civilisational’ values. At the same time, a ‘nation-state’ is also a comparative concept: no one nation-state’s history makes sense except in a global optic.
Nationalism, despite its provenance as the ideological expression of the nation-state, is also an international narrative, carrying the universal codes of ‘nationhood’ and ‘citizenship’; it assumes a global context as it implies an overarching global order of nation-states, and a world made up of ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’, of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

The central paradox the nation-state faces in a global system is that it is confronted with the need to assert new forms of legitimacy: global economic and political interests, not to mention those of an increasingly global working class, are often in contradiction with those of the nation-state, so its sources of legitimation are increasingly grounded in the assertion of its control of its populations, and of their defence against existential ‘threats’. The local beneficiaries and political managers of global capitalism, therefore, use the most vulnerable (and seemingly disposable) objects of its economic regime to construct a discourse that naturalises the figure of the forced migrant as a threat, not only to their specific nation-states, but one that is simultaneously immanent throughout the (Western) heartlands of capitalism (cf. chapter five). The figure of the forced migrant is made to stand as a global representative of menace, conveying an alien world ‘out there’, one portrayed as a kind of alien, backward hinterland, the site of anarchic wars, violence, terrorism and scarcity (cf. Kaplan, 1994).

The underlying content of Kaplan’s 1994 article, ‘The Coming Anarchy’ (later published as a book), subtitled ‘How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet’, was and continues to be influential in security and policy circles in both the US and Europe – alongside Huntington’s theses (1998, 2004) – and this is reflected in recent policy discourses. Carr (2010, p.13) describes how a new genre of dystopian military/security futurology has emerged that sees threats to the European (or more widely, Western) way of life as emanating ‘not only from rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, but also from … conflicts over dwindling resources, migration, disease, organised crime, abrupt climate change and the emergence of “failed cities” where social disorder is rife’. The idea of an ‘arc of instability’ from North Africa to South-East Asia which threatens to disintegrate into an ‘arc of chaos’, precipitating the ‘collapse of governing authority, migrations, societal collapse and social disorder’ (Ibid, p.19), has generated an emphasis on ‘asymmetric’ warfare across what is increasingly portrayed in military terms as the ‘global battlespace’. And as asylum policy has now become expressed almost solely in
terms of security, this discourse has infected the way the figure of the forced migrant is constructed. Kaplan (1994), indeed, portrays the forced migrant as carrying the ‘virus’ of this anarchic world to the very borders, and even into the heart, of the core (Western) nation-states:

[A]s refugee flows increase … national borders will mean less … the real borders are the most tangible and intractable ones: those of culture and tribe. …. Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash official borders, bringing their passions with them, meaning that Europe and the United States will be weakened by cultural disputes. (Kaplan, 2004, p.7).

The contradictions of globalisation

It is not surprising then that at a time of financial, economic, social and potentially ideological crisis the forced migrant faces a climate of intensified nationalism, with its exclusionary racialised categories. But such a conjectural crisis also highlights sharp contradictions in rhetoric and practice. For example, the existence of the need for the ‘global illegal’ as a key ideological resource, once mobilised, calls into being the rhetoric, policies, administrative structures, technologies, personnel and powerful industrial interests that cohere around ‘internal security’ and border control, and endows them with a self-generating momentum. This cluster of practices and technologies constitute a part of the everyday discourse of forced migration/security. However, this discourse must operate alongside a less visible appetite for irregular migrants as an essential (and desirable because disposable) economic resource that, to be economically viable, has to be kept in a state of ‘deportability’ (cf. Bacon 2010; de Genova 2009) through not only the rhetoric of security, but also the selective use of draconian asylum and immigration policies – selective because, as national employers must also be able access this resource, individual forced migrants/irregular migrants must also be able to circumvent the border controls of the ‘migration management’ regime.

The tensions these parallel necessities generate are evident in the treatment of irregular or ‘illegal’ forced migrants. On the one hand, national discourses and practices represent forced migrants as ‘illegitimate outsiders’ – each time a forced migrant is incarcerated and deported, this reinforces the account of national belonging from which the state gains its legitimacy. However, the neoliberal policy environment in which this discourse takes place presents a very different picture: one of the main purposes of the
nation-state is to facilitate the global regime of capital accumulation, and the management of the global flow of a highly exploitable irregular workforce is part of this function. ‘Illegal’ forced migrants (and irregular migrants) work in key centres of the global economy (cf. Anderson and Rogaly, 2005; Andreas and Synder, 2000; Bhattacharyya, 2005; Shelley, 2007; Sassen, 2003). They are therefore incorporated into the political community as economic participants but endowed with the status of ‘global outsiders’. Their creation (due to a structural demand for cheap migrant labour and the growth of a transnational industry in clandestine migration, driven by an increasingly militarised policing of the border, which compels forced migrants to enter nation-states ‘illegally’) shows how the core national governments are continually forced to make political compromises and risk contradiction with their nationalist security rhetoric in order to sustain their economic legitimacy.

The processes of capitalist globalisation, therefore, set in train movements of peoples across cultural and national boundaries into the vast global cities of the central regions of global capitalism, where multiple allegiances and modes of identity threaten to unravel the nationalist narrative. The global context that nation-states are forced to operate in brings into being multiple dimensions of belonging. To neutralise the impact of this, the carriers of these potentially alternative identities and modes of belonging are then ideologically mobilised for national political purposes. The concepts of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are constructed in new ways: ‘illegal’ forced migrants (and irregular migrants) are policed as ‘outsiders’ even though they are economically incorporated through informal labour markets. As McNevin (2006, p.136) notes, ‘Their ambiguous position reflects the incorporation of states and individuals into the global political economy and its patterns of privilege and marginalisation’.

Simultaneously, particularly at times of economic and social stress, the discourse of national identity intensifies, as national politicians and ideologues strive to recoup a comprehensive explanation that can anchor inequality (as the natural outcome of living in a globalised environment) into the day-to-day running of their national systems (cf. chapter four). This carries with it a resurgence of symbolic struggles around racialised classifications, assuming the cloak of variations on the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse that translate nationalism into a global phenomenon. Those excluded from the narrative of ‘national belonging’ are criminalised by means of the nationalist tropes of inclusion/exclusion but in fundamentally global terms, universally cast outside the law, regardless of which nation they enter or try to enter. As Dauvergne (2004) shows, the
‘migration law-national identity’ relationship has evolved, creating the novel concept of the forced migrant as somehow being ‘illegal’ and the increasingly ubiquitous use of the term “illegal” as an identity:

The migration law-national identity coupling is not new… [However], what is emerging at the outset of the 21st century in response to the growing forces of globalisation is a new twist on this relationship, the nub of which is encapsulated by the idea of people ‘being illegal’. (Dauvergne, 2004, p.87)

Forced migrants, who are compelled to cross the borders of the rich economies through the now-criminalised circuits of migration, are endowed with this identity, as though the term ‘illegal’ has ‘a fixed meaning’ and is not simply ‘an adjectival description’. ‘The label ‘illegal’ is empty of content: illegals are transgressors, and nothing else, by definition’ (Ibid., p.87). The legal understanding and identity of the refugee/forced migrant has been increasingly subsumed by that of the ‘illegal’. This process helps engineer a global understanding of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

**Conclusion**

The relentless spread of global capitalism has fashioned, on the one hand, a new global elite, citizens with global entitlements, including the unconditional freedom to move around the world (‘global insiders’), and on the other, its extreme mirror image: stateless ‘global outsiders’, whose movements are condemned as ‘illegal’ and threatening. As the entitlements of citizenship of these nation-states become increasingly standardised, the exclusions of illegal status are equally homogenised and universalised. Their presence (as an army of super-exploitable ‘illegal workers’) within the borders of the core European nation-states, crucial regional nodes of global capitalism, is rhetorically magnified and condemned. This identity of ‘illegal’ creates the figure of the forced migrant as a blank slate onto which can be inscribed whatever image of threat is required by the political exigencies of the nation-state/regional bloc of states. The use of the rhetoric of a ‘global enemy’, manufactured out of national legal terms (national citizens versus ‘illegal migrants’) is invested with a global menace (from drugs and transnational crime to terrorism and ‘illegal’ migration). The idea of a global threat from beyond national borders displaces the responsibility for systemic failures and crises onto those carrying its visible marks; individuals forced to flee the
consequences of violence and wrecked or dismembered national economies are branded as the ‘global enemy’, ‘global alien’, ‘global illegal’ – with the forced migrant portrayed as the carrier of ubiquitous, global threats to national identity and cultural integrity, and to national and international security.
Chapter Three

Europe’s Global Borders: the Site of the Production of the ‘Global Alien’

Introduction

Some of the most crucial activities that create, define and maintain the nation-state take place at its borders: here its ideology is born and its discourses normalised; here, as Anderson (1991 [1983]) so cogently argued, an abstraction traced on a map is ‘imagined’ as a concrete symbol of internal coherence and identity; and it is here that, driven by its own exclusionary logic (and the contradictions this brings to an avowedly ‘autonomous’ entity that is simultaneously a conduit for the global economy), the nation-state begins to mutate into a ‘security state’. It is at the borders of such powerful loci of globalisation as the European Union that we find the work of constructing and reconstructing, through a complex array of physical, discursive and biopolitical instruments, a national and racial discourse that assigns the forced migrant an identity that is inherently and ubiquitously ‘alien’. The forced migrant has been progressively transformed from ‘refugee’, the object of a discourse of human rights, into criminalised ‘economic migrant’ and transgressive border-crosser, and from thence into a racialised global threat to national/international security. Their deterrence and control appears to have become the primary rationale of a common European immigration and asylum regime that is based upon practices that rationalise and normalise these identities, embedding them in social consciousness. Such policies, practices and technologies are both driven by and help produce, naturalise and augment a commonsense perception of the inherent alterity of the forced migrant. The relationship between the concrete and the abstract, between governmental policies and activities and their normative discourses, manifest in the production of the ‘global alien’, is therefore at its most visible at the border.

As national security within the European bloc of nation-states has become informed by racial categorisations (most notably in relation to ‘Islamic’ terrorism, and by inference to all Muslim communities outside and inside Europe), the ‘politics of fear’ is woven into the very conception of the border (cf. chapters four and five). Those forced migrants driven to cross into the territory it demarcates, but lacking the appropriate privileged national identity that will allow them unproblematic access, are marked as inherently transgressive and dangerous, a threat to social stability and
security. European immigration and asylum policies have consequently been securitised and realigned as a form of deterrent ‘border policing’, informed by racialised themes of ‘national security’ and avowedly targeted at the detection, detention and deportation of the ‘illegal migrant’. As national border policies have increasingly become articulations of a wider system of ‘global migration control’, they have endowed the ‘illegal alien’ with a threatening global identity. Thus, the border has become a normative instrument that assigns a given identity to the forced migrant.

However, the border itself is also effectively summoned into being by the supposedly inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it ‘illegally’. With the help of the latest biometric and surveillance border technology, dedicated to tracking the ‘illegal’ forced migrant throughout global space, the ‘illegalised’ forced migrant is inscribed with the border and carries it within them as an immutable part of their identity wherever they may go. In turn, I argue, an exclusionary sense of ‘European-ness’ is manufactured through its binary opposition to the forced migrant as the paradigmatic ‘illegal alien’. European identity is, in this sense, delivered through coercive, securitised asylum and immigration discourses and practices, and is born at the border.

**Alternative ways of analysing the border**

*The border: reality or spectacle?*

The national border is traditionally the site where the sovereignty of the nation and the security of its citizens, and their ability to continue to enjoy their national political and social rights, is assured. However, as its operations increasingly take place within the context of the uneven processes of economic and financial globalisation, Europe’s external border no longer appears to be a defence against incursions by other nation-states but more a bulwark against the global movements of the dispossessed and displaced. Yet even as its remit changes, the national border remains a synecdoche for the security and integrity of the ‘nation’. As Favell (2008, p.275) says, the nation-state remains ‘the world’s great disciplining device’; autonomous migration across its borders is regarded as ‘one of the key anomalies in a world divided up into more or less fixed population containers, which is why the state politically takes its challenges so seriously’.
The border, however, claims to demarcate and defend the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’ at a time when such distinctions seem increasingly tenuous, in a world where interior and exterior – and legal and illegal practices – are not so easily separable (cf. chapter two). Such contradictions are especially critical in Balibar’s (2004) ‘borderland Europe’ of overlapping, open regions. National border policies can often appear to be little more than the performance of a security response, aimed at deflecting the danger of internal social and political unrest – caused by the impoverishment and radical inequality entrenched by neoliberal policies – by turning the focus onto external ‘threats’. As such, they appear to function as a crucial discursive barrier, helping create a besieged sense of national belonging and integrity constantly under threat from ‘without’.

However, the application of border policies or ‘border policing’ as a mode of separation of those who belong from those who do not in (implicitly racialised) nationalist terms holds a very concrete force. The discursive and rhetorical border is wedded to an underlying material structure of exclusion and control, and this relationship can be usefully analysed in biopolitical terms. Indeed, the border has been problematised as both a political spectacle (Boal et al., 2005) and, through the extension and elaboration of Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’, as a concentration of biopolitical techniques and governmental security activities fashioned to control and discipline global migratory movements (cf. Agamben, 1994, 1998, 2004; Aradau, 2008; Bigo, 2002, 2008; Guild, 2009; Huysmans, 2006; de Genova, 2007, 2008, 2010).

The discourse of spatiality and the ‘biopolitical border’

A further contradiction is exposed when we attempt to map the border according to where these mechanisms of migration control are deployed. The European Union’s external border stretches much further than its geographical confines: it is policed far into other continents (at ports, airports, embassies, detention centres and camps, and through the co-option of ‘countries of transit’ and countries of ‘migrant-producing regions’ as Europe’s ‘immigration police’ (cf. Kundnani, 2007)); into the seas around Southern Europe (policed by joint naval patrols); and even into global cyberspace, with the concept of European ‘e-borders’ (cf. chapter five). The European Union’s external border appears to have become a crucial link in a global ‘cordon sanitaire’ thrown around a core of rich capitalist states, guarding against the internationally mobile
‘illegal migrant’/‘illegal alien’ as part of the global management of market-driven forced migration.

To begin to understand the nature of the border, therefore, and its relationship to both the nation-state and the global economy of which the nation-state is a constituent part, it is crucial – following in the steps of Massey (2007) – to question the dominant interpretation of the concept of spatiality and analyse how this is related to the neoliberal ideology that prevails throughout most of Europe. In so doing, we can widen the scope of research into what the border represents. The definition of the nation-state was only possible through the creation of borders: their territorialisation of space was the precondition for the emergence of modern nationalist politics. As a fundamental prerequisite for the nation-state, the concept of the border as a spatial marker has become normalised through the dominant understanding of a territorial geography that helps obscure the historically specific political and administrative processes that help create and maintain it. The border continues to appear as natural and self-evident even as it becomes dislocated from its territorial base.

When attempting to unsettle this spatial naturalisation, the interdisciplinary attention given to the discursive biopolitical aspects of the activity of ‘bordering’ (marking boundaries of inclusion and exclusion onto the very persons of its subjects through a conception of identity that is bound up with national culture and race) can prove an invaluable key to deconstructing the concept of the border and thus to investigating the origins of the figure of the ‘global illegal’ – an identity that, counterintuitively, owes its life to the idea of the national border. As Soguk (1999, p.225) emphasises, the discourse presenting individuals as an ‘alien’ threat to national security is not a marginal, subsidiary one but a primary ‘boundary-producing’ discourse, instrumental to the task of ‘producing and stabilising’ the boundaries of sovereign statehood and citizenship. In order to present the dominant idea of the nation as if it were ‘an inherent, timeless attribute of humanity’ (Ibid., p.186), the figure of the forced migrant is crafted through complex sets of narratives and practices to become an essential element in the construction of ‘identity walls’ that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’, citizen from non-citizen, and security from danger. As Soguk (1999, p.219) says, ‘[T]he “writing” of the notion of territorially bounded space’ is made possible by the representation of those excluded from this space as threats to the culture, identity, economic security and even bodily safety of those included within it, and this makes possible ‘the “writing” of a community of citizens…as the perceptual infrastructure of
the modern state’ (*Ibid.*: p.219). It is at the border that the ‘excluded’/‘alien’ is ceaselessly (re)produced and the ‘intrinsic’ attributes of this endowed identity grafted onto individuals as if they were an inherent part of their being. The conditions of this imposed identity are then experienced as social realities, with all the devastating consequences this entails for the individuals concerned. Bearing the mark of exclusion within them, the forced migrant becomes the literal embodiment of the border.

**The border as site of a global racial definition**

The line drawn between the ‘included’ and the ‘excluded’ at the border, however, has shifted over the last decade to embrace a far wider global division. This is due in part to the global economic system’s competitive nature, driving nation-states to cohere into larger regional blocs (*cf.* chapter two). The European Union’s border has continued to increase its scope since its inception, embracing more of Europe’s populations within its definition of European citizenship. This entails that the exclusion of the ‘other’, non-European, against which this image of Europe as a regional unity is measured, must similarly increase. Here Said’s (1991 [1978], p. 207) description of the discursive practices of Orientalism is equally applicable to the processes (enacted at the enlarged border) by which this globalised figure of the ‘alien’ is manufactured: ‘[They] are rarely seen or looked at; they are seen through; analysed not as citizens or even people but as problems to be confined… The point is that [their] very designation … involved an already pronounced evaluative judgement … [and] an implicit programme of action’.

Through the border policies and practices of categorisation, segregation, incarceration and expulsion, the construction of the forced migrant as ‘illegal alien’ is ceaselessly reinvigorated on a global scale. While impediments to the free movement of commercial and finance capital and those who control or benefit from these processes melt away, other barriers are created or retrenched, imprisoning behind them those who inhabit an unacknowledged zone of exile from, and within, the nodes of global wealth-creation and power. These barriers demarcate what Davis (2006, p.138) calls ‘two existential humanities’ – global insiders and outsiders, the included and the excluded.

The forced migrant, dispossessed and displaced by the processes of globalisation, is inscribed with the image of the imagined global ‘outsider’. Fekete (2009, p.19) maintains that a ‘xeno-racism’ infuses the biopolitical activities and practices that turn the forced migrant into the paradigmatic ‘illegal alien’ – practices that are redolent of all racialisation processes: homogenisation, dehumanisation, segregation and exclusion. He
detects the origins of xeno-racism in the point where the tropes of racism, ethnicism and nationalism meet and are reinvigorated by translating economic disparities and social antagonisms into the language of culture wars (Ibid.). Xeno-racism is first and foremost directed against the forced migrant. As such, it is a crucial element of what has been defined as the ‘new racism’ (cf. Balibar, 1991a; Goldberg, 2002; Kundnani, 2007; Seymour, 2010), where culture (most recently entangled with religion) takes the place of a discredited biological discourse, helping annul the charge of institutional racism by implicitly recruiting its techniques into the service of an apparently logical and ‘race-free’ anti-immigration discourse (and also more recently and specifically an anti-Muslim discourse), framed by commonsense nationalist tropes (as further discussed in chapter four). The national/European border, therefore, has become the site of a global racial definition; it is where the ‘global alien’ is produced and endowed with universal, intrinsic, homogenised qualities by a racialised discourse. Meanwhile, the transgressive border-crosser is discursively linked to international criminal networks (through the processes of human trafficking/smuggling) and, particularly if they come from Muslim-majority countries, to a globally extensive ‘Islamic terrorism’. The rhetoric of racialisation, which assumes the character of universality, is complicit in the creation of national fears of the ‘outsider’ at the border, exploiting a popular xenophobia – often referred to as an inherently human phenomenon and therefore more excusable than racism (cf. chapter four).

Physical and spatial borders: the geography of exclusion

Geographical imaginaries

The formal physical structures of national borders and their attendant national security policies represent a politics that is framed by a territorial imagination. The border is associated with closure, cultural unity, and the evocation of external enemies; it becomes a representation of the commonsense assumption that the world is by nature divided into sometimes antagonistic, always ‘different’, states and regions. As Massey (2007) says, this represents…

…an almost moral geography, imagining regions and countries as autonomous entities [and]… constructing coherent place identities to cover over [internal] conflicting interests … These are the unequal binary geographies of self and other, us and them. … Lying behind [these] political
mobilisations … are more general geographical imaginations and implicit conceptualisations of space [that are] part of a wider world-view in which identities are autonomous, pre-formed before they come into relation with each other. (Massey, 2007, p.20)

Geographical imaginations are most often implicit, seemingly self-evident, and undetected as one of the framing assumptions of our perception of the world. They are integral to ‘everyday’ understandings and help legitimate political activities, lying buried in the most mundane governmental activities. Territorialised space is construed as flat, almost one-dimensional, and this enables the inhabitants of certain parcels of this geographic space to be privileged in such a way that other individuals, such as forced migrants, who fall outside the territorial frame, can be designated as peripheral or threatening to the territorial order.

Massey (2007, p.23) argues that by obscuring the fact that space is ‘relational’, a more complex and dialectical understanding of the interdependence of and interaction between peoples and between their cultures, histories and economic activities is erased: ‘…the contemporaneous multiplicities of space are denied, and “history” is reduced to the singular linearity of “there is no alternative”’. The geography of the world is projected through a prism that strives to entrench this disconnect in social consciousness and to further obscure the intimate connections between economics and politics, and between inequality, class and power. Space itself, therefore, is inscribed with political meaning: freedom of movement across the territorialised space of the globe is crucial to the ability of those who lack power or wealth in order to transform their objective circumstances, taking with them what is often their only asset – their labour power (cf. de Genova, 2008, 2010). The border – the symbol of this spatial territorial ideology – is etched with the ceaseless struggle to direct, control, circumscribe, and where necessary prevent this movement in the interests of global capital.

It is difficult to see how, in an age of transnational movement, global capital could attempt to do this without enlisting the services of such a ‘great disciplining device’ as the boundary-defined nation-state. As Torpey (2000, p.5) reminds us, a critical aspect of the process of disciplining and controlling movement is the fact that populations are ‘dependent on the nation-state for the possession of an “identity” from which they can escape only with difficulty and which significantly shapes their access to various spaces’. The nation-state, with its crucial ability to confer identities, along with its legal systems, border technologies and bureaucracies, security and policing practices, and
ideological master narratives of national culture and national security, remains an essential component of global capitalism, even as its political imperatives appear to clash with the compulsions of a global economic system that is predicated on movement (cf. chapter two).

Rebuilding walls

Although the border of the nation-state may be an abstract grid placed over contiguous territory and peoples, informed by an ideological spatial imagination, to those it excludes it looms as a concrete, physical barrier – the symbolic and exclusionary aspects of the border are made manifest in the literal. With the ascendancy of neoliberal logic, physical walls and barriers have been reinforced or newly created across the world, with the sole purpose of exclusion. As Borger (2007) comments, ‘The new age of the wall has begun’. They are once again in the ascendant, erected or reinforced to allay perceived fears of ‘outsiders’. The most infamous example is the Israeli state’s ‘security barrier’ in the West Bank (complementing the electronic fence sealing in the population of Gaza); each concrete slab symbolises the physical exclusion of Palestinians from their land. Including the fence, fitted with advanced surveillance equipment, the Israeli government is constructing along part of its border with Egypt to exclude ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘illegal workers’ from the African continent (cf. McCarthy, 2010; Greenberg, 2011), these barriers mean that Israel will soon become the ultimate ‘gated country’.

In a wider context, Green and Grewcock (2002) identify three major ‘zones of exclusion’: the US/Mexico border, the Australian/South East Asian rim and the European Union or ‘Fortress Europe’. These zones mirror the major trading blocs and global spheres of economic, political and military influence, and the erection of physical barriers map the traditional territorial patterns of these sites of power and wealth. Those displaced or set adrift by the ceaseless practices of global capitalism as it hollows out local economies, cultures and social networks in the Global South (setting in train poverty, violence, environmental disasters and civil wars) face unprecedented barriers to emigration to the zones of power and influence: a ‘great wall’ of high-tech border enforcement disrupts their flight (cf. chapter five).

The walls along the territorial borders of the world’s core nation-states are, therefore, walls of separation that mirror a globalised economic exclusion: they attempt to segregate the desperately poor from the relatively rich. They could be seen as a
physical allegory of global capitalism, constructed as they are as barriers against those forced into flight by its ceaseless uprooting of peoples – a dislocation and dispossession begun in an earlier phase of capitalist globalisation and now updated to neoliberal times, just as the walls themselves have been fortified by the very latest in security technology. As Berger (2007) says, since the poor are a majority everywhere, building physical barriers to safeguard privileged access to wealth and security has become the ubiquitous activity of the global elite. There are more than 40,000km of closed borders throughout the world and nearly 18,000km of these are walled (Migreurop 2009). Many of those that are strung around the richer areas of the world are indistinguishable from front-lines, with armed guards, checkpoints, razor wire, minefields and electronic sensors: all the military equipment of a ‘security state’ on full alert against the ‘threat’ of the dispossessed.

Restructuring space

Davis (2006), Massey (2007) and Harvey (2010) all argue that the neoliberal (re)structuring of space across the world has become an increasingly politicised exercise in enclosure and exclusion. According to Harvey’s (2010) thesis, these acts of dispossession bear witness to a further round of ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital, extending and completing the first great upheavals that initiated the ceaseless search for profit that drives the capitalist system – one that is further impelled by the recurrent economic crises that mount in intensity alongside its global spread:

‘[A]ccumulation by dispossession’ continues to play a role in assembling the initial money power. Both legal as well as illegal means – such as violence, criminality, fraud and predatory practices of the sort that have been uncovered in recent times in the subprime mortgage market… – are deployed. (Harvey, 2010, pp.48-9)

With the turn to neoliberalism in vast swathes of the world during the 1980s, a wave of ‘financialisation’ swept the globe and the credit system became ‘the major modern lever for the extraction of wealth’, promoting ‘levels of debt incumbency that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage…’ (Ibid., p.245).

The most fundamental dispossession, however, is the one that the whole profit system rests on: divesting the individual of control over their own creative labour power by means of their insertion into the capitalist economic process – and as a corollary of
this, the system’s political managers must also ensure they alone possess the means to control and direct the movement of those who represent this fundamental source of profit. Harvey (2010, p.242) reminds us that alongside this formative process of dispossession there lies a continuing history of the plunder of assets from the economically and politically powerless – divesting them of their means of ‘life, history, culture and forms of sociality in order to make space (sometimes quite literally) for capital accumulation’. Common rights to land are converted into private property rights, for example, as land itself becomes a commodity. Across the globe, property developers are ceaselessly expropriating the living spaces of the poor for urban redevelopment by expelling poorer populations from potential prime real estate locations by legal (that is, state-backed) and illegal means, with the consequent disruption of social networks and local communities. ‘It seems sometimes as if there is a systematic plan to expel low-income and unwanted populations from the face of the earth’ (Ibid., p.245). The scale of contemporary population removal is immense, to the extent that Davis (2006, p.98) characterises the urban poor of the Global South as ‘transients in a perpetual state of relocation’.

This ceaseless social war is evident not only in the continuous mass uprooting of the poor and slum dwellers by politicians and property developers, entailing the constant redrawing of spatial boundaries and dislocation of the powerless, and in the privatisation of public spaces and their expropriation by the forces of commercialisation, but also in the exponential growth of ‘penal warehouses’ (prison complexes and detention centres) to contain those who are thus dispossessed and uprooted (cf. Bauman, 1998; Giroux, 2004). This situation is compounded by the flight of the mega-rich, and in some areas the middle classes, to fortified networks of gated communities, in an obsessive quest for personal security and social isolation. In a similar fashion, previous class barriers between the rich and powerful and the poor and powerless were structurally and demographically etched onto national landscapes – for example, with the introduction of ‘spatial zoning’ during the colonial era in the cities of the Indian subcontinent, a policy the apartheid system in South Africa then took to its extreme. Now such spatial zoning exists on a global scale.

The outcome is an ‘architecture of fear’, writ large in ‘Fortress Europe’, in which Fekete (2009, p.190) describes ‘a tale of two Europes’, with a new ‘underclass’ of stateless, rightless, ‘illegal’ forced migrants subsisting in ‘shanty towns and makeshift camps on the margins of many European towns and cities’. It is also apparent in
microcosm everywhere gated communities spring up, surrounded by walls, and in many cases, CCTV cameras and uniformed – sometimes armed – private security guards. This is a geography openly moulded by class. It entails a vast reorganisation of urban space and the ‘drastic diminution of intersections between the lives of the rich and the poor … the disembedding of elite activities from local territorial contexts’ (Davis, 2006, p.119).

The insistent quest for security against those disadvantaged or impoverished by globalisation elicits an inevitable response from the burgeoning security industry – meeting the demand for ‘privatised emergency responses’ has become a key sector of venture capitalism. Alongside the demand of the fearful rich for personal security, however, this sector finds its most lucrative market in the ‘fortressing’ of Europe and North America (cf. Klein, 2007). In turn, the global heft of this industry ensures its profit-driven rationale invests the search for both private and national security with an inflated urgency, adding to a sense of ubiquitous danger.

The carving up of social space, drawing physical boundaries between wealth and poverty, both within and around the nation-state or bloc of nation-states, has meant that those on the wrong side of such borders have become the subject of intense scrutiny. This is particularly the case with the European Union as the logic of security begins to permeate its border policies, infusing them with discourses more attuned to military and intelligence activities, and fuelling the growth of a vast, integrated, multinational system of surveillance and ‘pre-emption’ (cf. chapter five). As the harmonised asylum and immigration regimes of the European region become increasingly securitised, so the very space across which so many thousands are forced to traverse by globalisation’s waves of disembedding and displacement has also become increasingly fortified, sensitive to the movements of any individuals lacking the requisite ‘security clearance’ – that is, a privileged national identity.

**The ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘externalisation’ of the European border**

*Projecting Europe’s external border into global space*

For some time now, European governments have deployed techniques such as identity or citizenship documentation to ensure that the forced migrant is immobilised at the external border, where the full force of nationalist rhetoric reinforces their image as irrevocably ‘alien’. They are not only immobilised at their home country’s or Europe’s territorial borders but in global space as the border itself disengages from its territorial
confines. Even as this space continues to be conceived of as a solely geographic, stable and linear dimension, European borders have migrated deep inside the region’s nation-states, marking out part of their population as ‘illegal’, and in a parallel move, have stretched far beyond their geopolitical frontiers. As the notional boundaries between border enforcement and domestic policy, and between immigration policy and ‘national security’, fast disappear, borders themselves become elastic and mobile in an attempt to combat their increasingly porous nature. Along the ‘frontline’ between Europe and Africa, for example, physical walls only exist at a few of the European Union’s ‘entry points’, such as Cueta and Melilla on North Africa’s Mediterranean coast; driven by their global security remit, European border controls have become increasingly ‘dematerialised and externalised’ (cf. Migreurop, 2009). Through the extension of the processes of detection, detention and deportation into the global arena, forced migrants find themselves predefined as ‘illegal’, their movements criminalised, long before they reach the physical territorial border.

The sheer breadth and scale of Europe’s immigration and asylum regime necessitates the formation of bi-national, pan-European and international alliances; the key European nation-states engage in a process of what Lahav (2004) calls ‘remote-control’ policy-making through outsourcing to private, transnational and ‘third-country’ actors. The national security-influenced paradigm of a privatised, ‘externalised’ process of ‘global migration control’ has gained considerable traction within Europe, and various discrete operations informed by these principles are often up and running well before any formal political decisions are registered (cf. Amnesty/ECRE, 2010). Private contractors are hired by national governments to build, administer and police the expanding number of detention centres; private ‘visa facilitation agents’ are recruited; private security officers are delegated to take part in intelligence gathering and security operations at border and offshore ‘control zones’ and empowered to make decisions on the admission or detention and deportation of forced migrants; and private security guards are employed to undertake their deportation.

As the European nation-states continue to both ‘harmonise’ and simultaneously outsource their asylum and immigration operations to private contractors and multinational corporations involved in the lucrative security/surveillance sector (such as EADS, Finmeccanica, Sagem Sécurité and Geogroup), these companies’ staff are almost inevitably to be found participating in the European Union’s special immigration advisory committees (cf. Cassarino, 2010) (see chapter five for a fuller analysis). As
they do so, not only the agenda but the whole ethos of the European asylum regime is distorted to fit a security framework, one in which the forced migrant becomes subject to a process of de facto criminalisation. They are transformed into a global threat, no longer perceived as individual human beings but more as dangerous objects to be quietly, efficiently and effectively removed.

This ethos informs the series of bilateral agreements drawn up by the core European nation-states – sometimes under the flag of the European Union, sometimes as independent actors – delegating border policing to neighbouring countries. These agreements are empowered by the intergovernmental policy bargains made between member states – for example, over the ever-widening latitude of what constitutes a ‘manifestly unfounded claim’ (by means of which an asylum seeker can be transformed through legal mechanisms into an ‘illegal migrant’) or of the designation of ‘safe third countries’ to which they can then be deported. The effect has been to criminalise emigration from a wide range of regions in the Global South. North African countries such as Morocco, Algeria or Libya\textsuperscript{xxvii} are recruited through bilateral and European Union-brokered agreements containing ‘returns and readmission’ clauses into playing the role of buffer zone, filtering out unwanted migrants. In this, they complement the role of countries on Europe’s eastern periphery, the location of its ‘Electronic Curtain’\textsuperscript{xxviii} (cf. Cassarino, 2010). This is despite the fact that countries such as Libya have repeatedly been exposed as the site of migrant camps and detention centres notorious for their inhumane conditions, routine police brutality, and the deaths and ‘disappearances’ of ‘illegal migrants’\textsuperscript{xxix}. Significantly, the bilateral agreements do not contain any criteria demanding the adoption of asylum procedures, respect for the rights of non-discrimination and ‘non-refoulement’ (the Refugee Convention forbids the return of asylum seekers to countries where they would be in danger of death or inhumane treatment), or safeguards against unlawful and arbitrary detention (cf. Amnesty/ECRE, 2010).

The policy of ‘joint removals’ (the deportation of ‘illegal migrants’ by several co-operating European nation-states on European Union-chartered aircraft, which takes place for the most part under the public radar, with the migrants themselves policed by private security staff) is facilitated by such readmission agreements with third countries\textsuperscript{xxx}. In this respect, the returns and readmission programmes that increasingly comprise a central plank of the European asylum regime are a form of routine (racialised) categorisation and expulsion. The vast web of agreements, which has
acquired formidable dimensions\textsuperscript{xxxi}, is grafted onto seemingly unrelated policies, helping disguise their importance: placed within the broader framework of more general aid and development policies, ‘memoranda of understanding’, economic pacts and police co-operation agreements, they become difficult to detect and even more so to monitor (Cassarino, 2010, pp.9-10). As such operations take place within a climate informed by the discourse of security, the day-to-day implementation of detection and expulsion – and the abuses and human rights violations that inevitably result – becomes increasingly mundane and acceptable, buttressed by a ‘subtle denial of moral principles … [and] the prioritisation of [the most] operable means of implementation at all costs’ (Ibid., p.24).

The European Union and ‘global border management’

In pursuit of this agenda, the European Union constantly invests in new loci of control, the most recent being the construction of a ‘virtual’ or ‘digital’ border, comprising a vast, integrated data system (upgrading the Schengen Information System or SIS network) (cf. chapter five). By its very nature, this ‘virtual border’ will have the potential to span the globe. The European Commission (2004) declares that its e-border will be the basis for a new ‘security procedure’ (PROSECUR), enabling the ‘permanent’ exchange and processing of information between the various border control agencies so that checks and surveillance can be carried out in a more ‘harmonised’ fashion at ‘external borders’. The security procedure itself is intended as the foundation for a common system of border patrols, enforced by a corps of ‘European Border Guards’, who will be delegated to handle surveillance, check individuals’ identities, and interdict incoming boats suspected of carrying ‘illegal aliens’ as part of an ‘integrated border management system’, with Frontex (the European agency responsible for ‘external border security’) as its keystone.

The remit of Frontex, according to its 2010 report, is quite openly declared to be ‘the dismantling of illegal immigration networks [through] surveillance and intelligence gathering (particularly on increased migration from Muslim countries); joint returns operations; contracts with third countries; … [and] the collection, evaluation and transfer of information’ (Frontex, 2010b, my italics). As the agency operates in the opaque world of global security, there is no regulation, staff accountability or democratic oversight by the European Parliament or European Court, far less by national parliaments. Amnesty and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles
(ECRE) (2010) report that its ‘joint operations and pilot projects create a gap in accountability and permit member states to engage in border management with impunity’, and that it implements its ‘technical assistance projects’ with third countries through diverting funds intended for humanitarian and development aid to border control. They further maintain that the European Union uses Frontex to circumvent international obligations to human rights (preventing forced migrants from gaining access to international protection or asylum procedures) through relying on the bilateral agreements it appears to have carte blanche to draw up in its own name with third countries (Ibid.). Although its powers are bestowed by the European Union, the agency’s border operations take place in a global zone that appears divested of legal constraints – and it transforms the forced migrant intercepted at this ‘dematerialised/deterritorialised’ border into a parallel figure of extra- legality, one cast outside the world of legal rights and redress. (I analyse this process in more detail in chapter five.)

This ‘illegalisation’ of the forced migrant on a global scale also means, as de Genova (2007) points out, that the core European nation-states can, whenever they need to do so, exploit for their own economic ends the inherent vulnerability and ‘deportability’ of those who manage to cross Europe’s external border – although this can at times conflict with the populist political rhetoric of ‘national security’ and the security industry’s own commercial impulses and professional discourses that carry such weight in government policy circles. Jensen (2000) claims that the border zones, therefore, rather than representing seamless, impregnable boundaries, resemble more of a ‘cushion’, varying in size according to the changing security and immigration policies, economic needs and political priorities of Europe’s nation-states. I contest, however, that although such transactions may be formally enacted at the discretion of individual governments, according to their economic or political needs, Europe’s dislocated, privately policed, extended borders more tellingly reveal the way its asylum and immigration policies and practices mesh with a wider ‘global migration management’ agenda.

Cuttitta (2010) appears to concur with Jensen when he argues that the European Union has no ‘master plan’ regarding asylum and immigration policy, stressing that actions on the ground by both individual member states and the European Union itself have frequently been ad-hoc, with migration objectives buried in bi-national agreements, or with the introduction of discrete pilot projects that appear to turn into
common policy purely by default. However, the fact is, these seemingly haphazard activities have recently cohered into a more politically legible and unified policy and programme of action: the European Union has adopted what it calls ‘the Global Approach to Migration’ as the basis for its Stockholm Programme in 2009 (a five-year plan for European ‘justice, freedom and security’ running from 2010 through to 2015) (European Commission, 2009) (cf. chapter five). This is openly premised on the policies of ‘global border management’, including co-operation over returns and the crafting of readmission agreements – such as that between the European Union and Libya\textsuperscript{xxxii}, and the decision that Turkey’s pre-admission criteria should include the acceptance of a bilateral readmission agreement (sweetened by the promise of financial support)\textsuperscript{xxxiii}. This is one strand of evidence that the ‘global migration management’ agenda has turned the policy of detection, detention and deportation, and the launch of Europe’s external border into global space (with the consequent manufacture of the forced migrant as a global figure of illegality whichever national border they cross and wherever they might be), into a matter of prime political importance for Europe.

**Global movement versus national borders**

* A ‘world without borders’?  

Andreas (2000) argues that although Europe has witnessed the deterritorialisation of its borders, the enduring ‘myth’ of border control continues to be essential to sustain the legitimacy of the European Union. The characterisation of border control as ‘myth’, however, raises the question of whether the integrity of the national border has indeed been fatally undermined or whether it continues to have a concrete function beyond the merely rhetorical. The answer to this is of fundamental importance to the way we analyse border controls and their formative relationship to the figure of the forced migrant as ‘global illegal’. It also links to the question raised in chapter two as to the relationship of the nation-state to the processes of globalisation. The issue of border control, therefore, demands an analysis that involves a dialectical understanding of the way the global economy apparently negates yet simultaneously reinforces the application and experience of border control in both its discursive and biopolitical forms.

When viewed from the perspective of the predominantly global character of many economic processes, national borders do appear to be becoming increasingly irrelevant.
As Nordstrom (2007) shows in her work on the globalisation of the extra-legal economy, geopolitical frontiers lie both within and outside the law. The accumulation and circulation of wealth often appears to have little respect for borders. Extra-legal economic networks that operate both within territories and across frontiers are, she maintains, a ‘series of [invisible] power grids shaping the fundamental econo[mic]-political dynamics of the world today’ (Ibid., p.xvii). They have the ability to affect the markets, politics and financial stability of entire countries, even continents, while operating outside national and international regulation and control. This is because, in the global economy, the terms ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ are muddied; they cannot be divided into clear categories – the ‘legal’ economy shades into the ‘irregular’ and the ‘irregular’ into the ‘illegal’. ‘Two-thirds of all trade moves outside of legal channels… The unregulated – the illicit and the smuggled – is fundamental to the world of business, economics and politics as we know them’ (Ibid., p.162).

The intersections of legality and illegality are to be found along a continuum that spans criminal networks, multinational economic organisations and global commodity centres. A large share of globally mobile capital, for example, makes use of tax havens – they are central to the operation of global financial markets. These havens, however, are not necessarily located ‘offshore’: hidden billions are siphoned off through the system of international banking activities headquartered in the regional and national financial centres of the major economic players. Such financial activities have since erupted into public awareness with the onset of financial crisis. However, as national politicians are constrained by the neoliberal political agenda of deregulation embraced by the European Union, as well as their dependence on and intimate relationship with the financial markets (especially in the case of the UK), they are unable/unwilling to curb this activity despite its destabilising consequences. Indeed, dubious semi-legal (and extra-legal) ‘borderless’ transactions also involve the world of national politics: national governments seek foreign exchange and access to international economic and financial markets through duty-free zones, economic processing or free-trade zones, and complex trade and financial deals – these vital nodes of economic and financial activity are devoted to the unhindered flow of goods, speculative investment and profits across the globe. At every point in this process, the legal, semi-legal and illegal intersect in hundreds of ways that are both mundane and opaque. ‘This system of state/extra-state transactions moves out internationally, through wildcat profiteers, powerful international businesses, multinational enterprises and [national] governments.’
(Nordstrom, 2007, p.62). Once money enters the system anywhere it can be
instantaneously transferred around world and just as instantaneously washed clean of
any trace of its origins. What Nordstrom calls the ‘dance of the il/legal’ dilutes physical
frontiers; it is a graphic illustration of the contradictions inherent in the drive of the
capitalist system to generate a world without spatial barriers, creating an uncomfortable
disjuncture with the dominant geographical configuration of territorialised space.

On the other hand, border security exists as an industry in its own right,
generating vast profits and maintaining a costly physical infrastructure and bureaucracy,
with the remit of focusing on illegal aberrations. Even this particular objective,
however, can appear conceptually flawed when viewed through the prism of the global
il/legal economy: the most commonly smuggled items, and most commonly used routes
for such items, pass through ‘clean’ corporations. The truth behind global financial
structures, for example, with their arcane and semi-legal (and often illegal) practices,
which appear to take place in a world above and beyond state legislation or international
regulation, was laid bare by the latest financial and economic crisis (cf. Shaxson, 2011);
however, the rapid return of financial institutions to business as usual, continuing their
opaque and deliberately obscure practices, illustrates how the wedding of ‘legality’ and
‘illegality’ is a fundamental part of the modern capitalist process itself. A radical shift in
this relationship could undermine the whole complex, inherently fragile financial
structure that continues to oil the wheels of the economic system even as it floats
dangerously free of its moorings in the real economy. The conclusion that Nordstrom
(2007, p.201) draws is that security manifests itself in the ‘abstract proclamations of
policy directives’ but is ‘forged on the frontlines [at the border controls], with people …
who constantly navigate a fine line between balancing security with the necessities of
trade’.

Nordstrom (2007) implies, like Andreas (2000), that border controls for the most
part constitute a ‘security performance’ that is mounted for its spectacular value. The
‘politics of spectacle’, as defined by Boal et al. (2005), manifests itself in a very
distinctive form in neoliberal times: an obsessive attempt to monopolise everyday
discourse through the creation, management and manipulation of selective ‘securitised’
images that help instill a ‘politics of fear’ (cf. chapter five). These images are insistently
driven home through their widespread dissemination by the mass media and through
populist political rhetoric. In one sense, I concede that this appears a watertight
argument: national governments often use the border for symbolic displays of prowess –
the intermittent reports of the arrest, detention and deportation of ‘illegal entrants’, for example, could be viewed as a tool to carry a message of [in]security to the national population. The unregulated movement of money, goods and people (particularly those who struggle to take the power to change their individual circumstances into their own hands through migration), although an inherent part of the global economic system, simultaneously threatens to undermine trust in the viability of that system – precisely because it is constructed on an infrastructure of nation-states and regional blocs of nation-states. It is of the utmost necessity to keep in circulation the narrative of a world focused on place, with autonomous territorial entities controlling and safeguarding their specific economies, polities and populations; meanwhile, the reality of incessant extra-legal movement within and across these spaces, in a world that does not accord to such spatial categories, must remain unacknowledged or assigned to the role of the ‘underside’ of globalisation (cf. chapter five). The intensity with which this territorial/national narrative is reiterated in times of crisis shows the fear of looming illegitimacy that seizes political elites when the current ideology they have espoused to keep the fundamental relations that structure the global system deliberately opaque threatens to start unravelling.

However, I maintain, these actions are not only displays mounted to secure popular legitimacy, they possess a material force which further reinforces the social processes of identification, segregation and exclusion effected through the application of border-control technologies. As Bauman (1998, p.126) says, the whole legal, judicial, administrative and policing process dedicated to population control is ‘one long structured ritual of symbolic rejection and physical exclusion…’ (my italics). A closer look at the border and its mechanisms of control reveals the complexity of geographical determinations that comprise the global system of capital in all its manifestations:

On the one hand, capitalists cannot abide geographical barriers of any sort – neither spatial nor environmental – and are engaged in a perpetual struggle to circumvent or transcend them. On the other hand, capitalists actively construct new geographies and geographical barriers in the form of physical built environments embodying vast quantities of fixed and immovable capital that must be fully used if their value is not to be lost. They also create regional divisions of labour which assemble around them all manner of supportive functions that then constrain the geographical mobility of both capital and labour. (Harvey, 2010, p.213)
The leading nation-states that contain and manage such built environments and police the divisions of regional labour through their administrative, legal and technological apparatuses create borders in ways that attempt to limit and control movement within the wider global context of countervailing impulses. The border is also a form of concrete state control. While the spectacle of the struggle over the border is enacted in order to project an image of national (in)security, it reflects at a deeper level the real struggle taking place on a daily basis over the social body – that is, as de Genova (2010, pp.57-8) puts it, over the definition and composition of, and the relations of power within, the population of the ‘national’ space (in this case, of European space). It is part of ‘the larger struggle to subordinate labour to the requirements of capital accumulation’ (Ibid., pp.57-8). The border becomes a crucial element in the struggle to maintain social power.

The idea of a clear, defining border, encircling and defending the integrity of a national territorial space and keeping transparently ‘illegal’ incursions into this space at bay, is therefore illusory on one level, yet its practices and technologies are neither illusory nor simply mere ‘spectacle’: the reality of the border is far more complex. Political space has always been historically transient, constantly changing, and national borders have continually been subject to transgression and just as continually resurrected or reconfigured. In the context of an uneven economic globalisation they play an even more decisive role in disciplining the national labour force, securing its place as part of a wider international division of labour. This takes place partly on the discursive level, with the interweaving of nationalism (with its insider/outsider tropes) with the discourse of security, but the border also has a material function that is increasingly focused on ‘migration control’ – that is, on physical exclusion and the threat of physical exclusion that renders those thus targeted subject to a form of ‘exclusionary’ existence, beyond legal parameters, whether they are outside or within the borders of the nation-state.

*The informal economy and the invisible workforce*

The extra-territorialisation of national border controls, with their extension and gradual transformation into a system of ‘global migration control’, contributes to the maintenance of a flexible labour market that can be supplemented by a supply of ‘illegal’ migrants – individuals who are thrown into a state of ‘illegality’ by the application of border controls. Today, the sheer number of people who are driven to toil
in unprotected, low-wage, informal jobs in the service, construction, and agricultural and food-processing industries within Europe is part of a truly global phenomenon. The embedded relationships between the formal and informal economies are apparent in the incorporation of ‘informal workers’ (often ‘illegal migrants’) into key global industries. As Davis (2006, p.178) shows, they add up to a global informal working class about one billion strong, without recognition or rights; a ‘stealth workforce for the formal economy’, linked into it through a web of subcontracting networks. This is the case in countries throughout the world. Irregular workers are employed in ‘backstreet sweatshops, in the domestic services or in the service sector more generally [or] … in the production of space and of the built environment ... in the trenches … of urban capitalism’ (Harvey, 2010, pp.242-3).

The phenomenon is most dramatic in the Global South, where the growth of informal labour is exponential, but it can also be found in the country that has increasingly become the Eastern locus of global capitalism, China (where the informal workforce comprises internal migrants), and in the command centres of global capital in the West, such as the European Union, where workers in the ‘informal economy’ are by and large ‘illegal’ forced migrants. They have become ever more of a presence in Europe over the last thirty yearsxxxiv, partly due to the changing nature of employment enforced by neoliberal corporate restructuring and deindustrialisation, and the enactment of policies introducing ‘flexible working practices’. The notion of labour market ‘flexibility’ in European governments’ policies plays an important role in the extreme exploitation of ‘illegal’ migrant and undocumented workers (often refused asylum seekers); they structure the precarious nature of their work and their often dangerous working environments.

However, it is the nature of the border controls introduced by the European asylum and immigration system that has most effectively enabled these practices:

Reworking the Fortress Europe policies of the 1990s, the development of a framework of managed migration [according to labour market needs] is indicative of an emerging global architecture with ever more punitive outcomes. For at the same time as mechanisms are put in place to funnel and order migration according to specific needs and desires, these same instruments underpin new and emerging measures of expulsion and criminalization. (Burnett and Whyte, 2010, p.7)
The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, the international legal norm applied to all signatory countries of asylum, appears to have been all but abandoned in Europe: at least since the 1990s the majority of forced migrants have increasingly found themselves defined as ‘economic migrants’. As such, they can be inserted into the ‘undocumented economy’ as a cheap, disposable workforce at the same time as the new Europe-wide adoption of a securitised global agenda of ‘managed migration’ institutionalises this unheralded but dramatic change in the modus operandi of immigration and asylum policies. The double-bind that afflicts forced migrants is clearly illustrated by the European Parliament’s 2008 ruling that any ‘irregular migrant’ found working should face a period of up to 18 months imprisonment (cf. European Parliament, 2008). Those forced migrants who apply for asylum but whose applications are rejected are left destitute, with no resource but to attempt to find work in the ‘informal economy’, yet by working ‘illegally’ they risk imprisonment and deportation. This criminalisation acts as a ‘disciplinary mechanism that reaches into all aspects of the labour process: the enforcement of low wages, long working hours and poor safety conditions’ (Burnett and Whyte, 2010, p.33). The ‘illegal’ status of the forced migrant coerced into taking irregular employment locks them into a form of ‘perennial servitude’, often experienced as something akin to slave labour (Ibid.). Whether this situation is part of a deliberate political strategy or simply, as is more likely, the advantageous meshing of different policy mechanisms pursuing their own specific political or economic ends, the vulnerability (particularly the inherent ‘deportability’ and disposable nature of ‘illegal migrants’) is structured by a combination of labour market regulation and border controls, rendering such individuals open to severe economic exploitation.

Once they have managed to negotiate the European outposts of a global regime of ‘migration control’, however, the forced migrant’s role as an economic participant must be obscured. Their presence as part of the nation-state’s economic and social composition must be denied public recognition – hiding the fact that they are an integral part of the population and, in many cases, of a national working class which is linked (through its fundamental relationship to the exploitative processes of a global economic system) to a global working class to which the forced migrant equally belongs. It could be further argued that, in some senses, such ‘illegal’ workers are symptomatic of a set of very specific relations of production that have become one of the defining features of the neoliberal character of capitalism within the various European countries. A
significant section of Europe’s workforce are subject to differing degrees and forms of fragmented and precarious labour that is often temporary, ‘flexible’, without the normal benefits and rights, and low-paid. The fact that the ‘illegal migrant’ worker lies at the extreme end of this continuum means that they are forced to work under correspondingly extreme conditions of exploitation.

The mobility, dispersal and conditions of personal insecurity of ‘illegal’ migrant workers, added to their criminalisation, can make it difficult and often dangerous for them to construct class solidarities and organisations that reflect these, without the instances of collective mobilisations of support among national workers that can be mobilised when such conditions are publicised. This is despite the fact that, as Harvey (2010, p.243) says, ‘they are fully conscious of their conditions of exploitation and are deeply alienated by their precarious existence and antagonistic to the often brutal policing of … state power’. The very fact of their ‘illegal’ status, however, makes it all the easier for the political elite and the employers who benefit to obscure the salience of the relationship between the conditions of exploitation suffered by ‘legal’ workers with those of their so-called ‘illegal’ counterparts that cuts across national divisions. They effect this by the designation of the forced migrant as ‘illegal’ through very concrete border-control processes, marking them out as ‘aberrations’, guilty of self-generated, spontaneous movement in a global system of the otherwise orderly, ‘legal’ movements of labour, as well as through the manipulation of nascent conflicts over the ‘control’ of space (in the sense of the citizen’s manufactured feeling of belonging to and ownership of the national territory and polity, and the rights and benefits that accrue to citizenship, with all its accompanying racial connotations).

At the same time as the forced migrant’s participation in and contribution to the ‘legal’ global economic set-up is hidden, their ‘illegality’ is rhetorically emphasised in the interests of national/local labour discipline through exaggerating their numbers and the ‘threat’ of their presence as ‘rogue’ elements within the labour force (accused of driving down wages and conditions or taking the place of ‘native’ workers) and as culturally ‘alien’ intruders amongst the population at large. This rhetoric is framed by a banal nationalist discourse that is posed in implicitly (and sometimes overtly) racialised terms. They are, therefore, incorporated into strategic economic sectors in Europe’s ‘global cities’ under conditions that render them invisible as productive elements of the national economy yet rhetorically highly visible as ‘alien’ ‘illegal migrants’. In this
task, the material practices of border control elide with the rhetorical in the interests of social control.

As access to social rights is dependent on political rights (gained via citizenship or some form of legal temporary status), such ‘illegal migrants’, although they may be formally free and globally mobile, find they are immobilised, fettered by a lack of rights or legal identity. They are cast into a state of the utmost vulnerability that Torpey (2000) characterises as a radically denuded form of ‘denizenship’. At the same time as the practical exploitation of such ‘denizens’ helps strengthen the neoliberal practices of labour ‘flexibility’ and the general dismantling of workplace rights and social welfare, the neoliberal discourse of national security is directly attuned to their ideological exploitation. As Favell (2008, p.273) points out, in a globally porous world, ‘the modern nation-state’s sharp ability to designate and recognise what spatial movers are foreigners is a remarkable political achievement’. It is at the border that this continuing power is manifest. The border technologies of identity documentation, for example, are a distillation of the heft that membership of a powerful, wealthy nation-state or region, such as the European Union, carries in an era of markedly differential access to global mobility. As Arendt (1976 [1948]) remarks, the loss of citizenship deprives people of a clearly established, officially recognised identity, and casts them outside a world composed of clearly defined and documented nationalities. The ‘illegalised’ forced migrant is simultaneously incorporated into the transnational political economy and marginalised by the discourse of national belonging that underpins citizenship.

‘Global borders’ and ‘global apartheid’

The relative privilege of national citizens (‘insiders’) within Europe, however, is under threat not from the presence of such ‘alien outsiders’ but from the imposition of region-wide austerity measures and privatisation programmes (and the erosion of social welfare) by its national governments in response to global competitive pressures and economic crisis. But however relative this privileged status may be, it remains a right that the logic of the national border stresses must be guarded jealously in a world of dramatic inequality – and this is made possible by the global practices of privilege and marginalisation that structure the territorial spaces of the global political and economic system. The real world of the global economy in which the marginalised and criminalised forced migrant is compelled to seek personal safety and some sort of livelihood is a world without borders, yet because the identities with which they are
endowed are located in the radically contrasting and unequal processes of global capitalism, their access to and the terms under which they enter those nation-states/regions that comprise the core centres of the global economy are determined at the national border. The borders of such areas therefore symbolise the more elusive boundaries of global privilege and lack of privilege, power and lack of power, wealth and poverty that comprise a system of what Richmond (cited in Davis, 2006) calls ‘global apartheid’.

National or regional borders, therefore, must be continually redefined and resurrected in response to the evolving ‘spatial configurations of belonging’ created by both state agencies as they refine the practices of border control (safeguarding the nation-state’s ‘sovereignty’ or its access to global privilege in ever more draconian fashion) and by the forced migrants themselves as they struggle to resist these technologies of exclusion in their attempt to escape the often fatal constraints of global inequality (cf. McNevin, 2006). This process of retrenchment through transformation is exemplified by Europe’s external border; in its extended, de-territorialised form it is becoming a sort of global border. It is here, I would argue, that we can discern the outlines of how the ‘global alien’ is produced and how the meaning of being an ‘outsider’ is transformed into that of being an ‘absolute alien’. Balibar (2004) sees in this paradigmatic shift a resurgence of traditional colonial, and therefore racial, patterns of exclusion, but one that is translated into a system of global concentric borders, radiating far beyond and deep within the European nation-state itself.

**Biopolitical borders and the manufacture of an ‘alien’ identity**

*The border technologies of exclusion*

Despite the global sweep of Europe’s border controls, therefore, they remain the means whereby its nation-states are constructed, maintained and secured as seemingly coherent, autonomous entities. As Favell (2008, p.272) says, ‘The nation-state … constitutes itself in the very act of recognising, classifying and then sanctioning or not (that is, governing) physical movements … across its self-defined borders’ – whether that movement is distinguished as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ is arbitrary and ‘defined wholly by conventions imposed by the nation-state’. As they are conventions, such definitions of movement can vary over space and time in response to the economic and political needs of the nation-state and to the challenges it faces in its continual contest with those who
lay claim to the basic right of free movement (and therefore self-definition). Torpey (2000, p.5) maintains that the invention of the passport was a crucial moment in the formation of the modern nation-state, giving it a key technology with which to control mobile or ‘ambiguously defined’ populations: ‘the state system [does not] effectively control all movements of persons, but it has monopolised the authority to restrict movement’ (italics in original) through the creation and control of technologies of identification.

Europe’s current security discourse – one that helps produce the figure of the ‘illegal alien’ and is in turn empowered by this creation – is embedded deep within such technologies of identification and control:

The capacity of security discourse to shape government is not simply the symbolic capacity of defining dangers but also the technological and bureaucratic capacity of structuring social relations through the implementation of specific technological devices (closed circuit TV, electronic walls, passports, visas, fingerprints) in the context of specific government programmes. (Huysmans, 2006, p.85)

The texts, images and metaphors deployed by a dominant discourse such as this, therefore, do not exist in isolation but are part of a wider complex of techniques and instruments of government. Although Said (1991 [1978], p.3), in his seminal work on Orientalism, primarily portrays it as a created body of theory which he deconstructs through interrogating various historical texts, he goes on to make clear his adoption of Foucault’s belief that discourse is a ‘systematic discipline … to manage – and even produce – [an object] politically, sociologically, ideologically, militarily, scientifically and imaginatively’. As such, discourse is related to a whole complex, self-referential system that, while it is theoretical, imaginative, textual and visual, is also to be found in the application of the political, legal, administrative and technological instruments of power. If we apply this understanding to an analysis of the European border and its relationship to the creation and deployment of a racially informed process of exclusion, the securitised, exclusionary discourse directed at the forced migrant also includes the political instruments and technologies of border control. Together they comprise what could be termed a powerful ‘border discourse’ (cf. chapter five).

Movement across the borders is managed through such border technologies as mass databases and surveillance equipment. Border controls themselves are sophisticated techniques for identifying and categorising ‘illegal’ activities and
individuals by reference to a nexus of transnational external dangers (‘illegal’ migration, human trafficking, global crime syndicates, ‘Islamic terrorism’) that are presented as threatening to overwhelm the integrity of European nation-states’ economies, social norms, welfare systems, and very culture and way of life. The discourse of security, therefore, is a multidimensional process. The way this discourse is forged at the border through the application of these technologies is fundamental to its direction – and, equally, the part they play in the formation of a securitised immigration and asylum discourse means they articulate certain political choices that are integral to the overarching neoliberal perspective. The technologies deployed at the border of the European Union reinforce and normalise the processes of categorisation, segregation and exclusion (the identification of the ‘illegal’ and the ‘alien’) that is their raison d’être, while the discourse of security rationalises such exclusionary processes through reference to the key trope of national identity – who belongs and who does not.

*A normative European identity built on exclusion*

The exclusionary impulse witnessed in the national governments of Europe’s major economies that lies embedded in these technologies is a response to what Davis (2006, p.205) calls ‘the delusionary dialectic of securitised versus demonic’ spaces – spaces that lie beyond the borders of the Western world. They are organised according to a geographical imagination that divides global space into sovereign territorial entities, containing discrete economies, polities and populations that are separated by ethnic composition, language, culture, traditions and mores. They pursue their own agendas, according to their specific cultural, political and economic needs; they act on one another and react to one another but have no intrinsically fundamental relationship. However, Giroux (2004), Bauman (1998, 2004) and Harvey (2005, 2006, 2010) all argue that, contrary to this narrative, the fiction of territorial autonomy has become stretched to the limit. The global nature of capital accumulation means that the nation-state can no longer control the financial and only partially influence the economic processes taking place within its borders and has ceded much of its power over these processes to transnational corporations (the global representatives of capital accumulation), unaccountable regional financial institutions (such as the European Central Bank), and international agents of the still-powerful Washington Consensus (the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation).
The current economic crisis, which has propelled nation-states to step in to bail out the financiers, has shown the extent to which the nation-state and global capital are intertwined, both institutionally and personally. As Harvey (2010: 219) remarks, ‘the [global] ruling class, rather than the [national] political class that acts as its surrogate, is now actually seen to rule’. In Europe, therefore, many of the political managers of the still powerful but economically weakened nation-states have rejected the social model of governance, whereby they provided a measure of welfare and social security for their national citizens, in favour of the introduction of what Bauman (2004, p.67) calls the ‘penal, crime-control, exclusionary model’, in order to bolster control of their populations and facilitate global capital’s room for manoeuvre and ability to make profits within their borders. Neoliberal ideology attempts to disguise this process, and through doing so to naturalise it.

One of the leitmotifs of neoliberal ideology is the idea that the market should be the organising principle not just for economic decisions but for all political and social policies (although this is contradicted in practice by the inevitable advent of vast monopolies and the necessity for state or regional ‘supra-state’ institutions to underwrite the failed projects of finance capital). This produces a discourse of individual responsibility and personal security that emphasises individuals must seek ‘their own biographical solutions to systemic contradictions’ (Bauman, 2004, p.51). At the same time as state provision of welfare is reduced and privatised, the idea of the market as the sole arbiter of success puts the blame for personal failure onto the individual victim, no matter how limited or non-existent their choices; inequality and marginality are portrayed as personal and individual disasters. Such a narrative reifies the political production of differences, in a process whereby ethnicity, race and religion are brought to the fore and made interchangeable, eliminating the overwhelming power of class and political domination (including the history of colonialism and imperialism) from the story.

This is a process of depoliticisation through the neoliberal ethos of individualism and what Brown (2006, p.14) calls the ‘culturalisation’ of politics. Anyone identified as ‘alien’, whose presence might give a presentiment of the wider economic and political forces at work, must be kept at a distance, and a commonsense reason for this segregation is supplied by stigmatising them through daily administrative processes as representing a ‘lesser’ humanity, their identities stained by violence, poverty and inequality. ‘Poverty, violence and dependency are seen as what asylum seekers
necessarily are rather than symptoms of the crimes done to their countries’ (Kundnani, 2007, pp.3-4). Meanwhile, the forced migrant is placed in a double bind: the discourse of individual responsibility makes them responsible for their own often untenable and life-threatening situation, and at the same time, by depoliticising the causes of their dislocation, as well as the political processes by which they are singled out as dangerous to the body politic, disarms them and attempts to render them powerless to change their conferred identity. ‘The way back to those meaningful places where socially legible meanings are forged daily are blocked’ (Bauman, 2004, p.78).

It is partly through the insistent promotion of this exclusionary discourse, in which the technologies of border control play such a key role, that the designation of ‘global alien’ reveals its importance to neoliberal ideology. For just as the role of the forced migrant in the global economy and their ideological importance must be rendered invisible, so too must the extraterritorial nature of class power (the fundamental source of decision-making and policy implementation), and its effects made to appear natural and inevitable. One answer to this preoccupation is to deflect attention by creating an unprecedented feeling of anxiety around the figure of the global elite’s extraterritorial mirror image, the ‘outsider’ or ‘alien’, which renders them, as Soguk (1999, p.210) says, ‘visible beyond their real, corporeal presence’. This extravisibility, particularly when displayed at the border, is crucial to the workings of the nation-state. The ‘outsider’ of course has frequently provided governments with an irresistible strategy, helping turn the anxiety and anger their policies threaten to provoke towards a manufactured link between the ‘alien’ and crime. In its latest manifestation, this link is resurrected through symbolising (particularly through intensive media campaigns) the attempt to cross the border ‘illegally’ as proof of innate criminality, emphasising the forced migrant’s ‘different’ and dangerous identity. The artificial nature of the border means that its maintenance entails constant vigilance in order to daily instill the difference between the admitted and the rejected, the included and the excluded.

**Conclusion**

Exclusion, therefore, is more than simply a rhetorical spectacle, but something that is concretely ‘done’ to individuals through the discourses and practices of ‘national security’. As a crucial element in the construction of national identity, it is manifested
through a continual reaffirmation of the decision as to the location of the national border (the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’). As Kyambi (2004, p.34) says, ‘The boundary must always be a decision, not a simple declaration’. This decision is reaffirmed through the administrative assignment of identities and consequent segregation of those who are gifted the right to exist within the border (‘national citizens’ and others inhabiting a defined hierarchy of varying degrees of temporary status) from those who are not.

The border-security technologies and tiers of routine measures administered by the nation-state’s vast securitised immigration and asylum apparatuses are imbued with an unquestioned perception of the reality of the border as manifest in the person of the forced migrant, and this makes these border decisions appear to those involved in their making, as well as to a wider audience, as simply the automatic result of the application of expert knowledge and techniques to the task of identifying ‘illegal aliens’. The legal instruments of criminalisation that empower these techniques and technologies, however, are created as grids of perception and evaluation, so that officials can manage the way in which the form and content of being ‘excluded’/‘alien’ are then circulated in everyday life (Kristeva, 1991, p.96).

The external border of the European Union has become a normative instrument that not only assigns identity but is, in effect, summoned into being by the supposedly inherent qualities of the individual who attempts to cross it. The excluded carry the border within their persons as part of their given identity as ontologically ‘alien’ (cf. chapter five). According to Balibar (1991b), Europe’s border represents:

…a new world which is formally organised into equivalent nation-states … but traversed by a constantly shifting frontier … between two humanities. … In the space of the world economy, the division … is a structural but violently unstable one. (Balibar, 1991b, p.44)

Both in its more common national boundary sense and in its biopolitical sense as racially inscribed in the identity of the forced migrant, the border is at one and the same time local and global, concrete and ideological, inside and outside. Although defining localised political spaces, borders reflect a global regime, and as such they confer a universal meaning on those forced migrants who attempt to cross them. This thesis argues that Europe’s external border is imbued with political content: as access to the national space is predicated on national belonging, the question of national identity (and
consequently the struggle to define and embed a ‘hyper-national’ European identity) is an ineradicable part of its constitution. Its cross-referential instruments of border control acquire the authority to determine the boundaries of legitimacy – and, in so doing, it has become midwife to the birth of a European identity that is manufactured out of its binary opposition to the forced migrant, the representative of an ‘alien’ culture and way of life.
Chapter Four

Racism, Islamophobia and the Forced Migrant: the ‘Culture Wars’

Introduction
The discursive boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ may be constructed according to the logic of nationalism, but the ‘hyper-nationalist’ discourse prevalent in Europe masks an even deeper global division; in practice, they are stretched far beyond national borders to encompass global identities, summoning up older, more deeply entrenched ideological boundaries of race in the process. As Passavant (2004, p.153) says, this discourse is ‘hegemonising the field across national boundaries … [and] to the extent that governing practices are superseding national state sovereignty, they are functioning according to the biopolitical logic of race’. Indeed, the figure of the ‘global alien’, initially identified as the Jewish immigrant, has a long historical track record, dating from the aggressive, outward push of European nation-states in the first wave of globalisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This racialised image of the ‘global alien’ has resurfaced time and again (finding its most focused and virulent form in the extreme political project of Nazism); it may develop new attributes over the years, and be less visible at some times than at others, but the tropes are embedded in the structure of Europe’s nation-states. As the onset of recession promotes the reassertion of an openly nationalist agenda in both economic and socio-political contexts, these tropes lie close to hand, ready to play their part in the attempted naturalisation of a deepening (systemic) inequality.

In their most current form, these tropes are manifest in ‘cultural’ disguise, a ‘racism without race’ (Balibar, 1991a) that is focused on the forced migrant as the global embodiment of an ‘alien’ threat to national identity and cultural cohesion. But as this form of racism now operates in an environment shaped by the Europe-wide security agenda unleashed by the war on terror, it has become intertwined with an increasingly overt current of institutional and popular Islamophobia. The mainstreaming of the ideas expressed by the concept of ‘Eurabia’ (the myth that a culturally homogenous and aggressive Muslim minority is threatening to submerge an equally essentialised and universalised European identity and culture) illustrates how the figure of the ‘absolute other’ plays a fundamental role in the construction of an overarching sense of ‘European-ness’. My argument is that the insertion of Islamophobia into the
institutional structures of European society, with the image of Islam now framed by a discourse of existential danger, has resulted in the naturalisation of an agenda of securitisation (cf. chapter five), which is seen at its most aggressive when applied to legislation concerning forced migrants. Forced migrants can now be portrayed as not only disrupting national/regional cohesion and cultural unity, but also, most particularly when identified as coming from Muslim-majority countries, as a potential *global* threat to ‘national security’.

**The nation-state and the discursive production of a racialised ‘illegal alien’**

*The binary typology of race*

Driven by the logic of a ‘securitised’ nationalism, the exclusion that takes place at Europe’s globalised borders helps instrumentalise and thus naturalise the idea of ‘difference’ in a way that appears to naturally adopt the characteristics of racialisation (currently in the guise of a neutral and apolitical discourse of ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’). An incessant border activity of identification, categorisation and surveillance entails a constant focus on the ‘alien’ not as an individual but as representative of a generic type, and, as Said (1991 [1978]) reminds us, to make another human being an object of study is the very essence of racism. The administrative practices of border control are therefore steeped in the wider discourse of race, one that is able to draw on roots buried so deep that it can appear to be an a-historical phenomenon.

As discourses themselves are forms of meaning-making, they help provide the material for our collective sense of reality (our commonsense understanding of the politically conceived and economically structured social relations we inhabit). However, given the nature of their raison d’être and the profoundly political contexts in which they operate, such forms of discourse can lay little claim to neutrality. The very language a discourse employs to structure and disseminate its content naturally becomes the conduit for ideological practices and is therefore imbued with political import:

Conceived in this ‘instrumental’ sense, as an ‘apparatus’ for the transmission and diffusion of knowledge, language becomes one of the primary fronts in the struggle between hegemonies. Struggles over meanings within language, its concrete deployment as a social organisation in particular, is thus not secondary to the properly ‘political’ … its capacity for unification and division becomes the paradigm or ‘terrain’ of the political itself. (Thomas, 2009, pp.431-2)
The interaction between discourse and social practice is, of course, a complex one. However, discourses, and their dialectical relationship to social structures and social activity, evolve within specific political and economic historical environments. As particular conceptual systems encode within them certain values that help shape thought and action, they cannot help but be privileged as the predominant collective explanations of the material circumstances of the era in which they arise. As such, certain dominant discourses ‘reflect the material relations that render them dominant …[and] articulate these relations, conceptualise them [and] give them form’ (Goldberg, 1993, p.9). The values they promote will necessarily reflect the ideological needs of those who hold economic and political power. This is not to say that such ideas are not continually contested, do not co-exist alongside contradictory notions within the mind of the same individual, or do not themselves co-opt and incorporate oppositional ideas or morph into new forms according to circumstances. Despite this caveat, however, a dominant discourse is able to acquire, through constant, banal usage, ‘mass, density and referential power’ (Said 1991 [1978], p.20). Due to their prominence, such discourses become grids for filtering the dominant values, ideology or worldview they articulate into day-to-day thinking, influencing relationships within society at large.

Various discourses of race, for example, have accompanied the growth of a capitalist economic system founded on systemic, organised exploitation; they have historically served as a fundamental explanatory adjunct to its divisive political and social structures. Although such discourses change in appearance or focus, they are able to implicitly refer to each other in a closed circuit of self-validation at the same time as taking on the appearance of morally neutral scientific truths, validated by external reality. In such a fashion, although the themes associated with the biological basis of racial inequality may have long been discredited, its binary typology of advanced and less advanced (or even backward) cultures and societies, when evoked against the backdrop of a transparent global inequality, appears to remain as part of a bedrock of essential ‘truths’.

The overt ‘scientific racism’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (a racism that drew its credentials from scientific and pseudo-scientific ideas of biological destiny) was a social construct, and like other social constructs, it must renew itself as society develops (cf. Kohn, 1996). Because scientific racism’s claim to provide the objective ‘truth’ about human society is rehearsed by modern currents of racialisation,
old biological themes can find their way into ‘new containers’ (*Ibid.*). It can then adapt
to new demands on its explanatory powers, adopting the ‘objective’ language of the
most amenable theories of the day – particularly those bearing the imprimatur that
sophisticated new scientific techniques bestow – in order to naturalise current social
circumstances:

The social developments of recent years include the onward marches
of genetic determinism and evolutionary accounts of human
behaviour, the explosive growth of ethnocentric nationalism, and an
isolationist mood among affluent whites, who may well be inclined to
rationalise their reluctance to share resources and space … by
adopting scientific claims of innate … inferiority (of certain, generally
poor, generally black, subjects). (Kohn, 1996, p.6)

This binary typology can therefore provide potent images and vocabulary that rely on
agreed but unspoken codes of understanding, which then adhere to the articulation of
‘difference’ when it is expressed by the powerful when referencing the powerless in the
context of an exclusionary and deeply unequal global environment.

We can see this clearly displayed in Europe when we turn to the rhetorical
polarisation between different cultures, traditions and societies – with so-called
‘Western values’ (portrayed as overwhelmingly rational, secular, liberal and logical)
posed as a sort of universal fulcrum around which all other societies turn, the
furthestmost away being the most benighted. Such a discourse appears to speak to a
‘known’ reality, and was promoted as such by US policy intellectuals Huntington
(1998) and Kaplan (1994). Kaplan, for example, speaks of an ‘era driven by
environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and
refugee migrations’ (*Ibid.*, p.51), and elaborates this thesis by stressing that ‘disease,
overpopulation, unprecedented crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the
erosion of nation-states and international borders’ (*Ibid.*, p.45) increasingly characterise
the world beyond the borders of the Western nation-state, a large part of which looks set
to collapse into ‘ungovernable chaos’ – a world he characterises as belonging to
‘reprimitivized man’ (*Ibid.*, p.55). ‘Difference’ here is defined as embedded not only
within the value-systems and ways of life of these ‘other’ cultures, but as comprising
the very essence of those human beings who belong to them. The apparent disjuncture
between the values and culture of the ‘West and the Rest’ (Huntington 1998) naturally
becomes the precursor to conflict. Borders are portrayed as battlefronts; the ‘fault lines’
between cultures that delineate the boundaries where inevitable future conflicts will erupt, taking us to the edge of the next global war.

Such attitudes, essentialising other peoples and cultures, and stripping them of humanity, enter the popular bloodstream through a banal, daily ritual of reference and allusion that ensures that, after time, they gain a normative force and sink into the sediment of European societies as a sort of ‘cultural knowledge’. Through the use of emotionally charged metaphors, political elites are able to influence or even direct intellectual and emotional responses, precisely because ‘metaphor draws on the unconscious emotional association of words, the values of which are rooted in cultural knowledge’ (Charteris-Black cited in Bleasdale, 2008, p.5). However, the highly political context in which this knowledge – and the values that lie embedded within it – is produced remains obscured; the emotions evoked by reference to ‘cultural values’ are silently divorced from their political origins.

The nation-state and the exclusionary discourse of race
The resulting discourse helps define the modern nation-state (which Goldberg (2002) describes as the naturalised expression of an imposed order) through classifying schema that order and set apart through continual acts of inclusion and exclusion. The subsequent categories help foster the impression of ‘a circumscribed space in which likeness dwells’ (Shelin cited in Goldberg, 2002, p.259); this pre-defined cultural and national ‘likeness’ is prized as it is made to appear the prime ingredient of unity and collective power – as opposed to other more fundamental relationships that radically cut across such manufactured boundaries (particularly relationships of class). Due to its constructed nature, however, this artificial but seemingly self-evident ‘likeness’ – and its assumed integrity – can only be ensured through the exclusion of those classified as different/‘alien’. The ceaseless process of separation and segregation that takes place at Europe’s regional/national borders involves fixing identities through bureaucratic procedures which dehumanise as they separate, taking individuals with unique, complex social and affective histories and erasing all individuality. Those to be excluded are marked by the homogenous label ‘illegal migrant’ – a term which is freighted with very real consequences for its subjects.

It is impossible when speaking of such radical exclusion not to imply the involvement of racism, particularly as it often forms an insidious undercurrent within nationalist discourse – a discourse that relies at base on the classification of individual
subjects into the binary categories of citizens (‘insiders’) and non-citizens/’aliens’ (‘outsiders’) in order to construct the sense of a natural ‘national’ cohesion that cuts across any wider allegiances and identities that might challenge its assumption of dominance. Any system of classification operates through categories – which are by nature reductive and must contain an internal logic to sustain their coherence. When classifying forced migrants, for example, the categories employed have to compress identities into a shape that will conform to this mode in order to fully enclose within them a multitude of individuals inhabiting innumerable identities formed through varied life experiences and social, familial, cultural and emotional histories and relationships. If they do not, they risk multiplying the categories beyond functionality. Thus, individuals are reduced to ‘ruthless cultural and racial essences’ (Said 1991 [1978], p.36) – the human being becomes no longer a unique individual but representative of a singular, given identity. A basically ideological portrayal of an abstract and uniform systemic ‘difference’ imprisons the individual in an identity from which there is little chance of escape, and ‘force[s] vision away from the common, as well as plural, human realities … forcing attention instead in … the direction of immutable origins’ (Ibid., p.233). As the act of classification is fundamental to the objectification of individual human beings, and as viewing certain human beings through a set of static, reductive categories as if they were objects is a fundamentally racial act, this naturally opens the way to the formation of racialised categories.

These categories, with their themes of inclusion and exclusion, are sewn into the very social fabric of the nation-state, and consequently racism is able to silently penetrate everyday life. The classifications turn into social structures and develop into a seemingly natural and a-historical system of dominance; they become inherent in the hegemonic discourses and the nation-state’s hegemonic apparatus (its institutions, practices, social forms and ideology) that are used to keep its imposed order intact – naturalising the unnatural. Although, as Harvey (2010, p.258) emphasises, capitalism as it is currently constituted can in principle survive without this form of discrimination and oppression (that is, racism), ‘its political ability to do so [would] be severely curtailed, if not mortally wounded, in the face of a more unified class force’.

Race can be readily mobilised as a controlling mechanism because the social structure and political economy of the European nation-states have already been racially conceived and shaped. This took place historically through the processes of global dispossession and plunder that funded their rise. The social and political practices
through which these processes were made manifest (slavery, colonialism and imperialism – each armed with a justifying racial discourse) shaped the nation-state and forged the most economically powerful into the standard bearers of the capitalist project. As they launched into the maelstrom of competition, rivalry and conflict that defines a world structured by capitalism, ideologies of race became crucial. The long-gestated normalisation of the European nation-state as the naturally given context of its citizens’ day-to-day lives means it is able to portray the ‘fetish’ of national identity as similarly timeless and unchangeable, ascribing to it markers of ethnicity which have become ‘coterminous with the concept of the nation’: ‘race and nation are defined in terms of each other’ (Goldberg, 2002, p.10).

The nation-state is versatile in inventing national identities in the struggle to impose socialisation and control, finding the materials for their construction in various scientific, pseudo-scientific, cultural and legal sources, incorporating elements from prevailing discourses. However, although the ‘seams of the social fabric’ are therefore ‘identifiable through race’, their origins appear either invisible or shrouded in time (Goldberg, 2002, p.9). Ideology, as Said (1991 [1978], p.230) says, ‘ascribes reality to objects of its own making …; it conceals its own origins as well as those of what it describes’, making cultural, ethnic or racial differences seem to matter more than socio-economic or political ones by using ‘a vocabulary and epistemological instruments designed … to avoid the distractions of circumstance or experience … obliterat[ing] … ordinary human reality’. As the nation-state is founded not just on these ‘differences’ but on their internalisation, the state apparatus is able to incorporate and naturalise the exclusion of ‘difference’ as part of its social fabric. As a result, nationalism as a technique of ideological control rarely functions without resource to some form of racialised social exclusion, be it marginalisation, segregation or expulsion.

Bourdieu’s insight (cited in Weiss, 2006) that classifications turn into social structures as they become habitual helps clarify how racism (the assignment of criteria of ‘difference’) is able to develop into a system of domination, how racialised classifications play a leading role in the objective structure of society, and how race becomes part of a ‘hidden knowledge’ that can be disinterred and brought to the surface when necessary, ready to be manipulated in whatever form fits the political situation. It is because racial ‘difference’ is not merely present in the discourse of nationalism, but is embedded in the very structure of the nation-state, that it becomes hard to connect historical racial configurations to contemporary formations when expressed through
other forms of discourse targeting different subjects, and to discern any continuity. Racism can be disconnected from its overall historical and social context and displaced to the ‘private’ sphere, understood either as an individual (or group) psychological aberration or a natural xenophobic reaction, the inevitable result of the ‘clash’ of different cultures.

Thus, when applied to the forced migrant at the European border, racism need not speak its name. The threat of the external, the unknown, the ‘outside’ beyond the border is, however, racially conceived – while, conversely, being named racially in such a context means to be characterised as a threat. This objectification allows the substitution of racial reference with coded terms, such as ‘immigration’, ‘criminality’ and ‘illegal entry’, which lead, as Goldberg (2002, p.2) argues, ‘not to the end of racism but of its charge’; it enables ‘a theoretical silence concerning the implication of the nation-state’, concealing the ideological narratives that inform its political and administrative apparatus and technologies.

**The ‘new racism’ and ‘xeno-racism’**

*Racism and the concept of ‘cultural difference’*

As recent theorists of race (cf. Balibar, 1991; Cohen, 1999, 2006; Macedo and Gounari, 2006; Kundnani, 2007; Seymour, 2010, among others) stress, there is no generic racism: it is historically specific in its form, articulation and objects of reference. However, as a state-directed system of social control it uses some fundamental ideological techniques in order to reify structural inequality – classifying, objectifying and stigmatising its victims, ascribing to them an inherent homogeneous essence. If there is a consistent feature, it is the trope of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where race is employed as a marker of identity. It is also able, when necessary, to raid the store of images, vocabulary and rationalisations provided by the previous forms of racialisation to which it is organically linked.

It may appear that racism, as manifest in a previously dominant guise, has been banished from open use (for example, the European anti-Semitism of the late twentieth/early twenty-first centuries – although, as analysed later in this chapter, Islamophobia has since adopted many of its themes), but racism as a form of exclusion is resilient and has the capacity to continually reinvent itself. The history of the modern capitalist system has left a legacy of racial beliefs scattered in its wake; these represent
the raw materials employed by those with power and resources to normalise a profoundly unequal economic and political order. Countless earlier episodes of institutional racism, many of them enacted in national laws, have provided a repertoire of racisms that can be actively mobilised in different contexts at times of social and political instability, tension and conflict. There is, as Balibar (1991a) says, not a single racism but a spectrum of racisms, and as they are politically and socially constituted, their character and articulation can shift according to the requirements of the situation.

What has been termed the ‘new racism’, therefore, is an adaptive move towards the use of culture as a marker of difference, a ‘cultural turn’ first pioneered by the far right in Europe. “[A] notion of race and racial purity and exclusivity” … has been “transposed, sublimated and sanitised” into a notion of culture’ (Al-Azmeh cited in Williamson and Khiabany, 2010, p.86), isolating racism from its wider historical trajectory. It represents the attempt to remove the question of inequality from the structure of society by reframing it as an ideological narrative of cultural identity in order to legitimate a deeply divided global order, where, as Kundnani (2007, p.1) puts it, ‘great wells of human despair, rooted in poverty and powerlessness, can no longer be contained with national boundaries’. As these ‘wells of despair’ spill over into richer countries around the globe through forced migration, cultural racism is at hand to ‘explain’ the phenomenon and disguise its fundamental causes.

The use of culture and ethnicity as the basis for racialised exclusion is not a novel tactic, due to the fact of the historically relatively common phenomenon of heterogeneous populations living within the circumscribed borders of nation-states. However, now more than ever, nation-states are composed of people of various ethnicities and cultures, who have many different forms of allegiance and ways of understanding their identity, making it increasingly difficult to sustain the myth of the naturally and immutably homogenous nature of the nation-state. Globalisation is creating metropolitan spaces or ‘global cities’ where millions of individuals, all subject to the compulsions of the global market, come into daily contact. As they do so, it becomes pressing for the ruling elites to deflect a potentially coherent experience of exploitation and sense of growing socio-economic and political disenfranchisement that increasingly spans cultural, ethnic and national divides.

In late twentieth-century Europe, the political managers of the key nation-states, such as the UK, sought an answer to this perceived problem in the adoption of a state-defined ‘multiculturalism’, which Goldberg (2002, p.224) defines as ‘a retreat to a
neutral universalism evasive of racial reference and racial histories’. A state-co-opted ‘multiculturalist’ discourse echoed the lived reality of its population but attempted to depoliticise it and (re)present it as a superficial cultural recognition, a celebration of diversity devoid of any mention of the underlying context of a deep and abiding institutionalised inequality. The fight against racism was redefined solely as the fight for ethnic recognition, as if it were conducted on a level social, political and economic playing field. Fekete (2006), in fact, believes the term ‘multiculturalism’ in this context is a misnomer: it should rightly be called ‘culturalism’. Multiculturalism refers to a pluralist society that strives for ‘unity in diversity’ whereas ‘culturalism’ ‘envisages society as a conglomeration of ethnic enclaves, separate and ostensibly equal’ (Ibid., p.11). As such, when the time came for the political adherents of neoliberalism to mount an attack on multiculturalism (primarily because it was seen to be a policy that represented, in however weak a fashion, a move towards an acceptance of diversity), it turned out to be an attack on a straw opponent. As it had failed to deliver any fundamental change, it was all the more ripe for demolition by a similarly state-promoted ideological backlash. The ensuing rhetoric has become a code for the underlying motive: an attack on culturally diverse societies and the potential threat they represent to the neoliberal agenda.

In distinction to the multiculturalist approach, the new racism works to cement the conception that not only is social solidarity only possible among groups of individuals who share the same language, value system and understanding of the world, but that these attributes are overwhelmingly defined by an individual’s ‘cultural identity’. Thus differential access to national (and international) economic and social goods is defined as a natural system of social organisation. Racialisation is currently employed to translate economic and social inequalities into the language of conflicting cultures – and in so doing reveals itself to be a powerful political structure of oppression. An ideology such as this, however, cannot simply be imposed through a top-down process; these ideas must give some (however distorted) explanation of how, for example, Europe’s populations experience a world that is structured by competition for scarce resources. Cultural paradigms are used to ‘explain’ inequality in all its concrete manifestations: unemployment, poverty and marginalisation.

Meanwhile, this differential cultural racism has been lent a theoretical respectability and aura of scientific neutrality by borrowing selected themes from the disciplines of sociobiology, ethnology and psychology, which are then used, in their
turn, to ‘explain’ the phenomena of popular racism and racial violence that it has itself provoked. Balibar (1991a) believes that, in this sense, cultural racism has become a ‘meta-racism’, which presents itself as a politically operative theoretical explanation of the underlying causes of racist aggression. As the new racism clothes itself in the mantle of such scientifically ‘neutral’ theoretical discourses to present the notion of cultural identity as an immutable and determining essence, racial reference need have no explicit recourse to biological reference (although, as argued earlier, cultural racism carries biological essentialism as an undercurrent within it\textsuperscript{xxxvii}). As overt biological racism, alongside anti-Semitism, are now held to be the only forms in which racism exhibits itself, the nation-state, by espousing essentialist ideas about culture, can evacuate itself of the charge of racism, even as it is reconfigured beneath the skin of everyday life.

‘Race-free’ anti-asylum discourse

Thus, racism appears to have abandoned the notion of a fixed, quasi-biological essence in preference for the idea of ethnicity and culture – seemingly a more permeable account of identities, but one that is equally essentialised and reified – in a move that Fekete (2006) describes as ‘cultural fundamentalism’. The mechanisms are the same, but this time the practices of objectification, dehumanisation and exclusion employ seemingly ‘race-free’ cultural terms. As cultural racism has become an increasingly hegemonic and unified discourse, its oft-repeated concepts are embedded in and through populist political narratives, and are fast developing into technologies of social control. This is manifest, for example, in the way that ‘criminality’ and ‘illegality’ are measured and defined by ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ cognitive, socio-psychological and statistical techniques, and then transferred onto their cultural avatars: in the first instance, forced migrants, closely followed by members of Muslim communities in Europe, then by a so-called ‘feral underclass’, addicted to ‘gang culture’ – for example, black inner-city youth in Britain or youth of North African origin in the banlieues of France. This is not to forget the eternal ‘outsiders’ of every country throughout Europe: the Roma and Irish traveller populations. As culture is reified, those subjected to this discourse are equally objectified and divested of individual identity.

The new racism appears to have arisen primarily as a justification for ‘government strategies for managing minorities, managing migration for capital accumulation, and depoliticising racism to accommodate neoliberal ideology’ (Seymour, 2010, p.90), legitimating inequality and exclusion as rationally acceptable by using immigration as a
substitute for the idea of race. Indeed, since the 1980s, the focus of ‘race relations’ in European countries has been on immigration and the ‘integration’ of ethnic (and migrant) communities. The new racism has been embedded through the mechanisms of asylum and immigration laws and border controls – an acceptable, clinical form of institutionalised racism focused on the forced migrant. Racism, therefore, is now directed at those perceived as culturally ‘alien’, and as it operates by allusion and conflation, adopting and reconstructing elements of national, religious and ethnic stereotypes, the same ideological, technological and administrative mechanisms that have been focused on the forced migrant can be equally deployed against the European Muslim.

This is a process that is characterised by Fekete (2009, p.19) as ‘xeno-racism’ directed at the forced migrant, a racism that objectifies the individual as ‘alien’ before segregating them from society and/or expelling them. As the European harmonisation of migration control coalesces into a system of ‘global migration management’ (moving towards a de facto near-abolition of the right to claim asylum within Europe), the ‘xeno-racist’ discourse supplies an ideological response to global dislocation and dispossession, using a mixture of ‘neutral’ managerial language and emotive imagery. It dehumanises the individual by viewing them through the prism of ‘objective’ numerical projections and statistical reports, and these are then co-opted and disseminated by a populist rhetoric that is deeply imbued with cultural determinism. Thus, the European immigration and asylum regime is able to formalise racial difference through its exclusionary processes without recourse to articulating overtly racist themes.

**Cultural racism and national belonging**

*The ‘national identity’ debate*

The idea of cultures as unchanging, closed totalities is crystallised in the idea of an inherent national identity. ‘Identity’ is a malleable concept and is vulnerable to being shaped by ideas central to the dominant ideology: national identity, Goldberg (2002, pp.117-8) maintains, is simply ‘the (informal) codification of the cultural characteristics and values of a dominant or majority group whose definition is state related or directed’. By enclosing all the identities of individuals dwelling within the national space in one reductive category, it attempts to translate the artifice of a racial (and class)
homogeneity – one that is no longer tenable as it so transparently does not accord with reality – into a cultural homogeneity.

This reductive definition of identity has led to a closer alignment between the themes of national belonging and shared values and the right to be a part of the group of national ‘insiders’, partaking in the privileges of citizenship – employment, welfare and personal security being prized as the foremost benefits, the more so at times of high unemployment and rising poverty, when the security net of welfare is under threat from neoliberal governments intent on reducing its scope, promoting a radical sense of personal insecurity. An individual who possesses a certain dominant national identity (‘belonging’ to a European nation-state, for example) is portrayed as inherently imbued with a set of superior social and moral norms, giving them a sense of entitlement, and thus rationalising and naturalising the differential access to social goods at both a national and a global level. As such, national culture and national identity as the bearers of entitlement have become key themes in the transmission of a neoliberal ideology – an ideology that attempts to displace discontent at rising unemployment, the dismantling of essential public services and the ever-widening gulf between wealth and poverty.

The codification of national identity in citizenship laws is an example of the way in which privilege and marginalisation are constructed and normalised as they are sutured into the social fabric. The racial politics of inclusion and exclusion, translated into a cultural narrative of national belonging, naturalises the binary relationship of insider/citizen and outsider/’alien’. The individual is relegated to one or the other category ‘not according to what one does or what one believes, but on a “common sense” basis, on account of who one “is” ’ (McNevin, 2006, p.137). In each European country the national identity debate has taken on nationally specific themes, defining more exclusively what it means to be a citizen, thus reinforcing the identity of the ‘alien’ and the idea that such individuals carry within them a threat to core ‘European values’ – representing, at the very least, the danger of cultural dilution. These racialised discourses animate, and are disseminated through, the administrative technologies of citizenship reforms, integration policies, cultural codes of conduct, and securitised asylum and immigration laws. For example, the 2002 UK White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Havens, with its introduction of citizenship tests, language tests and oaths of allegiance, intended to inculcate a ‘shared sense of belonging and identity’ and ‘cultural cohesion’, heralded the definitive break with an official tolerance of cultural diversity (or ‘multiculturalism’) (Seymour, 2010, p.81). This was reinforced by the appeals of so-
called liberal commentators for the privileging of nationalism and ‘British values’ and the demand for integration xxxviii.

Throughout Europe, such demands have continued to be reinforced by a succession of punitive measures. Fekete (2004) details how those who refuse to take or who fail such ‘integration’ tests are threatened with expulsion (Austria), with fines and having their social security payments cut (the Netherlands), or their residence rights removed or curtailed (France). As early as 2004, former Dutch immigration/integration minister Rita Verdunk felt empowered enough by the mainstreaming of the ideology of a superior ‘European culture’ to float the idea of ‘integration badges’ (although this was a step too far for the majority of her fellow politicians: it was too redolent of the Nazi’s introduction of the yellow star for European Jews) xxxix; while the current French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, raised the proposal, when interior minister in 2005, that immigrant women ‘trapped at home’, who do not speak the national language, should be divested of their right of residence (Fekete, 2009, p.85).

More recently, in keeping with the mood of resurgent, exclusivist nationalist rhetoric and policies, the European Commission issued a directive to the European Parliament in 2011, entitled ‘The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’, that called for ‘more efficient and effective integration policies’ and introduced ‘a flexible European toolbox … allowing Member States to choose the measures which are most likely to prove effective in their context’ (European Commission, 2011). The force behind this injunction may be veiled in neutral official language, but given the context in which it is deployed and the heightened sense of nationalist feeling that the very term ‘integration’ is imbued with, it could scarcely fail to be taken as an endorsement of the adoption of punitive measures against those who are deemed to fall short of the radically unequal standards of ‘national belonging’, and who are therefore characterised as unwilling to ‘integrate’ into the ‘national community’. Indeed, in Germany, a new word ‘Integrationsverweigerer’ has entered the racially inflected lexicon of negative descriptions of migrant ‘identity’ – it means ‘one who refuses integration’.

Language and ‘integration’

The issue of language as the touchstone of cultural homogeneity has become a recurring theme in Europe over the past few years. In relation to migrants and migrant communities, the debate about language is couched in terms of a ‘language deficit’, and
this particular aspect of ‘cultural identity’ has found a new level of urgency in the rhetoric of leading national politicians – at a time when governments, facing the impact of global economic crisis on their countries’ fortunes, are administering deep cuts to public welfare, including the near-uniform withdrawal of funding for provision of precisely the sort of language courses the Commission appears to recommend. That language has become a tool in the ongoing process of marginalisation is clearly illustrated by recent examples from Germany and Austria. At the same time as the Association for German Languages was attempting to insert an acknowledgement of the primacy of the German language into the German constitution itself, across the border the Austrian government was introducing ‘pre-entry integration language requirements’ and proposing legislation that would decree the deportation of those migrants already living in the country whose German does not attain a certain level of competence within their first few years of residence (cf. Fekete, 2011).

The defining motif of such policies and pronouncements is that of the border (cf. chapter three). It arises in this context with the concept of ‘identity gatekeepers’, in the dual shape of those delegated to maintain European border controls against ‘culturally alien’ ‘outsiders’ and those mandated to police the increasingly exclusionary citizenship criteria. In Younge’s (2010, p.105) words, ‘The gatekeepers adjust the rules of entry according to the political, economic and social demands of the time, even as they insist they are authenticating a timeless truth’. The creation of a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity in France symbolises this intimate connection between securitised borders and cultural assimilation policies, mobilising through its very name a set of racialised images and stereotypes. Identities, however, for all they have become ideological tools, remain rooted in material circumstances – for the forced migrant, grounding access to citizenship (and consequently to an approved and nationally recognised official identity) in racialised cultural criteria can mean the difference not only between citizenship and statelessness, and between a measure of material security and absolute poverty, but even between life and death. Between them, the material function of globally extensive border controls and the ideological function of internal ‘identity borders’ perform a triangulation of the forced migrant, trapping them in the no-man’s land of a seemingly inherent ‘alien’ status.
Islamophobia and cultural racism

The new Orientalism

The securitisation of the asylum process (cf. chapter five), which drives both the incessant (re)construction and ‘strengthening’ of border controls and the creation of ‘identity borders’ in the form of immigration and asylum, residency and citizenship laws, has contributed to the development of cultural racism and, at the same time, been defined by its assumptions. However, cultural racism, in the form of a xeno-racism directed towards the forced migrant, which is portrayed as an objective, ‘raceless’ form of governance, has been further wedded to (and complicated by) a new form of Orientalism. In Said’s (1991 [1978]) seminal description, Orientalism was created as a tool for hegemony – a body of theory and practice that seeks to provide an ontological explanation that obliterates ordinary human reality. Islamic societies (and those individuals who comprise them) are thus confined within a set of static, reductive categories. A web of social and cultural stereotypes act as ‘an accepted grid for filtering the Orient into Western consciousness’ (Ibid., p.6). Said further points to the ‘redoubtable durability’ of Orientalist discourse; it appears to contain the capacity to be continually reproduced from one era to another. Today, however, its subjects are no longer confined to a specific geographical area, located beyond European borders, but are to be found within Europe itself. Davis (2006, p.205) believes this is the highest stage of Orientalism, the ‘culmination of a long history of defining the West by opposing it to a hallucinatory Eastern other’. Under the aegis of the war on terror, the re-emergence of the discourse of an embattled Western civilisation opposing a ‘backward’, ubiquitous ‘barbarism’ (most specifically, a fundamentalism that is inferred to be inherent in Islam) has provided a near-hegemonic analytical structure that retrieves old explanations of difference in cultural (and implicitly biological) terms. That is, it has adopted a fundamentally racialised discourse.

As many analysts of race have shown, Orientalism also reproduces the classic features of anti-Semitism. The transmutation of the former Jewish enemies into Muslim ones has been a smooth, silent process because they essentially represent the same figure: ‘Islam’ as a social and religious prototype is equally an ideological portrayal, primed for political use through the deployment of the same dogmas and the same sense of absolute and systemic ‘difference’. Both deal in abstractions, creating – by means of a systematic and generalised vocabulary – a uniform template that forces individuals into the same immutable shape. As in the anti-Jewish conspiracy theories of the first
half of the twentieth century, the figures thus created are to be despised and feared in equal measure, and consequently must be controlled or expelled. In the Britain of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the media-led campaigns that were so obsessed with the ‘problem of the alien’ were directed against East European Jewish refugees seeking shelter from the pogroms raging in the Russian empire. A similar politics of fear as the one we are witness to today was threaded through the rhetoric of the day: not only fear of ‘Jewish anarchist terror’, but of potential cultural and racial ‘extinction’. This apocalyptic discourse spoke in the scientific language of a particularly virulent strand of social Darwinism, what Carr (2006) calls ‘racial Darwinism’. Thus, when the common supremacist trope of the threat of being ‘outbred’ and ‘overrun’ by a culturally ‘alien’ and hostile population is rehearsed in modern form, as when the feted British author Martin Amis (2006) refers to European Muslims in such terms, it cannot be simply dismissed as anachronistic. This theme has remained a fertile source for racially motivated verbal attacks, and its use by such an established literary figure means that, despite its genocidal history, it is making its way once again into mainstream discourse. This time round, however, such ‘liberal’ commentators appear to believe they have immunised the trope against the charge of racism by disconnecting it from its historical victims and applying it to new ones, and by clothing their rhetoric in the garb of ‘cultural difference’. In fact, Balibar (1991a) describes anti-Semitism – the very essence of a ‘racism without race’ – as the prototype of today’s cultural racism.

‘Cultural identity’ and ‘cultural difference’

I would further argue that an influential strand of ‘cultural’ academic discourse, with its conscious retreat from ideas of class and ‘grand narratives’ of resistance, especially collective struggles, has provided the necessary sociological language in which the new cultural racism can be expressed by such cultural commentators. An understanding of the multiplicity of different identities co-existing within one nationally defined geographical space and increasingly across ‘mobile borders’ has led to celebration of the birth of a new ‘hybrid subject’ (cf. Bhabha, 1994). However, an analysis based on the idea of identity as defined solely by its cultural attributes cannot fully interrogate the stark realities of neoliberal ideology and policies that structure the world such ‘hybrid subjects’ inhabit. As Sharma (2006) shows, Hardt and Negri theorised this danger: postcolonial theory, they claimed, had deconstructed racial binaries but replaced them
with the concepts of ‘hybridity’ and ‘difference’; the early discourse of ‘cultural difference’ thus occluded the reality of an institutionalised differential inclusion/segregation and exclusion. Minimising the complex, dialectical relationship of knowledge and power, culture and ideology to a class-based, globally operative system of exploitation that produces extremes of power and powerlessness, means that such concepts as ‘cultural identity’ and ‘difference’ can then be mobilised as ideological tools of racialisation.

By drawing on this privileging of ‘cultural identity’ above all else, such ‘liberal’ commentators as Goodhart (2007) are able to claim that European politics has been eclipsed by the new ‘culture wars’ – code for the idea of Islam as an alien and monolithic cultural bloc, the very antithesis of ‘European cultural values’. This is despite the overwhelmingly obvious fact that, as Carr (2010a) points out, in France alone, the Muslim population hails from over fifty-three countries and speaks twenty-one different languages, and therefore can hardly be described as homogenous. The differentiation within the Muslim world, with its complex interrelationships of ethnicities, cultures, and economic, sociological and political histories, renders the idea of a single Muslim/Islamic ‘culture’ meaningless. As Ahmad (2007) explains:

For most, being a Muslim mainly signifies the fact of birth in a Muslim family, at best a Muslim subculture within a wider national culture (Egyptian, Nigerian, Lebanese or whatever); while religion … is always one of the many ingredients in one’s complex social identity, which is always specific, and hence deeply tied to language, region, customs and class, and so on... [R]eligious observance, if any, remains largely local and personal. This subcultural Muslimness itself is contextual, deeply shaped by history, geography, politics, the larger multi-religious milieu [and] myriad rhythms of material life...

(Ahmed, 2007, p.1)

As Ahmad (2007, p.2) illustrates, it is totally misleading to ‘ascribe to some inherent Islamic-ness of the polity or the culture as such’ as this obscures the many different forms that Muslim societies take, and posits instead a sort of ‘hyper-Islamicity’. It resurrects the idea that ‘religion is the constitutive element of a culture, and hence also of its social existence and political destiny’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, Islam itself, as a theological rather than cultural expression, encompasses an equally wide variety of theoretical and political positions, which are also shaped by internal currents of class and ethnicity. In fact, religion is itself historically constructed, and the way it develops
shows that the demarcation between religion and non-religion is neither trans-historical nor transnational – it is an expression of the ongoing struggle over the way individuals insert themselves into a specific society that has been shaped by forces that appear to be beyond their ability to change (cf. Vakil, 2010).

A sense of alterity has been formed by a globalised world shaped by Western cultural, financial and military institutions: the neoliberal vision of prosperity until recently expounded by Western ideologues and endlessly portrayed by the media as a realisable aspiration is no more than a deception for billions of people – the more so as economic crisis and radical austerity measures dismantle the basis for this myth. This is compounded in Europe by racial stereotyping, poverty and the singling out of Muslim and migrant communities by security measures and targeted legislation. Such measures are used to further essentialise Muslims, whereby signs of cultural difference, such as wearing a niqab or even a headscarf, are interpreted as symbolic of subversive intent. It is of little surprise that many young European Muslims react by using such symbols, in a political gesture of defiance, as signs of a common, universal religious identity.

Meanwhile, the idea of Islamic societies, and therefore Muslim populations, as homogenised ‘unrelenting enemies’ of the ‘European values’ of human rights, democracy and freedom of the individual (cf. Huntington, 1998) continues to thrive – and this is seemingly validated by the reactive political appropriation of the myth of a ‘universal’ Islam.

The new Orientalism, therefore, homogenises, racialises and dehumanises those it categorises, but as it is posed in cultural (as well as security) terms, its racial implications are denied. Yet expressions of anti-Islamic sentiment have become the leitmotif of contemporary racism, one that facilitates the passage of older racisms into the mainstream. The representation of Muslim communities as a ‘demographic timebomb’ at the heart of Europe, for example, not only uses military terminology to enhance the sense of threat, but harks back to earlier colonial themes of ‘mongrelisation’ and ‘degeneration’. This time, however, the racism is based on religious belonging as the primary marker of ‘cultural’/racial difference (as was its precursor, anti-Semitism).
National identity and the discourse of ‘Eurabia’

The role of the ‘intellectual elite’

To be fully functional, any form of institutional racism must reproduce itself at different levels of society: a complex web of public actors and governmental processes help embed it in everyday language and social structures. Anti-terrorist and anti-asylum legislation ensure the gradual normalisation of Islamophobia and the new racism within Europe by legitimising a commonsense anti-alien/anti-Muslim discourse that, in turn, justifies the implementation of increasingly targeted authoritarian policies. At the same time, the populist press is aided by media commentators and/or academics (such as Caldwell, Cohen, Amis, Hitchens, Goodhart, Anthony and Ferguson in the UK; Henry-Levy and Bruckner in France; Scheffer in the Netherlands; Storhaug in Denmark; and Sarazin and Schwarzer in Germany) in drawing the parameters of this discourse and directing its flow along well-worn, highly racialised channels.

Throughout its history, the nation-state has frequently harnessed the power of intellectuals (academics, advisers, expert commentators) and bent it to the task of framing, directing and authorising popular prejudices, lending them a semi-scientific veneer. Such discourses, of course, are never merely ‘neutral’ analyses but evaluative interpretations, and, as they are deployed in a climate of heightened racialisation that they themselves help establish, they are intensely political – although the actual political function of ‘disinterested humanists’ is mediated through a complex dialectical process (one that Gramsci analysed at length (cf. Thomas, 2009)) and it is not necessarily apparent. However, through the theoretical and discursive construction of Europe’s formative ‘other’ as representing a distinctly different culture, European citizens have historically been encouraged to view Islam, and Muslim communities, through a well-honed imperialist prism of ethnocentrism and racism. As this discourse now takes place in a ‘cultural’ framework, it can be evacuated of its political and historical context and rendered as a morally neutral and objective viewpoint, cleansed of the taint of politicisation.

Armed with this depoliticising ‘sociological’ discourse, the figure of the Muslim, as in previous phases of Orientalism, can be reduced to a few simple phrases, images and concepts. Different forms of vocabulary may be employed – ‘immigration’, ‘integration’, ‘citizenship’, ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ – according to the context, but these coded expressions all have one consistent referent: the Muslim/alien. Although at first sight the overtly Islamophobic rhetoric of far-right members of national
parliaments in Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands, as well as that of politicians in the more centrist parties, may appear to bear little relationship to the (sometimes) more measured arguments of ‘cultural’ commentators and researchers, in both cases the language is highly organised and encoded; it trades on agreed codes of understanding. The dominant framework is the absolute demarcation between East and West, which has been centuries in the making. Earlier traditions of cultural racism have provided a rich store of vocabulary, imagery and generalisations, which lend the polarisation between different cultures and societies the status of a generally accepted, commonsense ‘truth’. An interlocking system of specific modes of expression and intellectual currents of thought transform superiority/inferiority and inclusion/exclusion into seemingly natural phenomena (cf. Brennan, 2007).

Within such an environment, the argument espoused by Caldwell (2009), for example, that large-scale immigration (in particular, Muslim immigration) is transforming a weak, ageing, unconfident Europe, loosening the bonds of national allegiance and chipping away its social cement, appears to be gaining the status of orthodoxy amongst European politicians. And as it does so, its essentialist assumptions move from the political margins into the mainstream, as the mostly uncritical reception of Caldwell’s work testified. The rehearsal of such themes as the demographic advance of an antagonist Muslim culture in Europe through migration and high fertility rates has taken on a new, hard-edged, aggressive expression among a certain intellectual milieu. The historian Niall Ferguson (2004), for example, speaks of a ‘youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the Mediterranean’ poised to colonise a ‘senescent’ Europe, and warns of the ‘creeping Islamicisation of a decadent Christendom’.

In time-honoured Orientalist mode, the ‘intellectual elite’ disseminate their version of the received notion of ‘Muslim rage’, whereby ‘radicalisation’ is only explicable in psychological or cultural terms. For example, Harold Evans (2006), an influential commentator on both sides of the Atlantic, claims the drive towards ‘a new Salafist totalitarianism’ is fast becoming a fundamental part of the ‘identity’ and psychological makeup of young European Muslims. Meanwhile, Amis (2006) openly espouses all the racialised tropes of Islamophobia: a Muslim belief in one Islamic continuum, where there is ‘no individual, only the umma’, that threatens Europe’s Enlightenment tenet of the sacred status of individual freedom; the ‘tyranny, corruption, absence of civil rights and civil society’ – an ‘institutionalised irrationalism’ – endemic in Muslim societies; and the birth of a ‘millennial Islam’, ‘an ideology superimposed on
a religion’. ‘Islamicism’, Amis claims, is ‘not just a violent tendency, violence is all there is’, and he further describes ‘Islamicism’ as a ‘barbarism’ more invidious than German fascism (Ibid.). Indeed, the term ‘Islamofascism’ is fast becoming common currency.

As Mishra (2007) says, such discourses are unable to acknowledge the political and ideological beliefs upheld by some Muslims as a ‘social and emotional reality in the world’ that cannot be reduced to individual rage and envy or to a certain form of religious observance or interpretation of religious edicts. Yet the conflation of the terms ‘Islamicist’ or ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islam’ means that such concepts can be used to intensify a sense of impending catastrophe and to predict the end of secular society in Europe. The continent, it is claimed, has not only become criss-crossed by ‘no-go areas’, created by ‘self-segregating’ Muslim communities, but is now a base for jihadist operations across the globe. The danger is that ideologues do not operate in a political vacuum, and the vocabulary they use can gain a popular purchase when societies face real economic and social crises. In this context, Mishra (2007) quotes Reinhold Neibhur in the 1920s: ‘men of culture’ give ‘the hysteria of wars and imbecilities of national politics more plausible excuses than the average man is capable of inventing’.

Cultural racism and European identity

It can be politically convenient for the national managers of capitalism in its neoliberal guise to attribute to a religion (Islam) questions that are fundamentally political. By further stressing the psychopathology of ‘Islamicism’, the real causes of disaffection within Muslim societies, that lie rooted in the experiences of imperialism, war, oppression and racism, can be depoliticised. The current slew of government-backed research, conducted throughout the core countries of the European Union, into issues such as that of the ‘problem’ of ‘Muslim integration’, helps construct such a psychologically inflected ‘sociology of Islamic radicalisation’ (cf. Dornhof, 2009). By denying the necessity for political analysis and framing its debate in purely ‘sociological’ terms, such research serves a crucial ideological function. It is dialectically related to the racialised ideology that it helps succour, being both embedded in and giving credence to the political discourse of Islamophobia. For the most part, such research fails to interrogate the accepted idea that a lack of ‘integration’ is due to a certain Muslim ‘attitude’ (which is then related to specific cultural characteristics) that represents an intractable social problem. Based on a set of
normatively loaded concepts and reductive assumptions, it traffics in a reality of its own making. Such research provides intellectual support for the policies of targeting and controlling already marginalised minority populations.

Equally, the spread of agenda-driven think-tanks, focused on the question of ‘Islam in Europe’, plays a crucial role in disseminating and naturalising Islamophobia and the new racism by popularising the idea of a new existential threat. Kundnani (2008a) shows how, in the UK, Policy Exchange speaks in terms of ‘alienated ghettos’ and ‘Islamic fascism’, and calls for the curtailment of civil liberties; the Social Affairs Unit calls for the dismantling of ‘state multiculturalism’, the withdrawal from European human rights law, deportations, and the surveillance of Muslim students in British universities; while the Centre for Social Cohesion (formerly Civitas) recommends a ban on ‘Muslim immigration’. The reports emanating from these organisations conflate the idea of extremism and British Muslims, buttressing an ideological atmosphere that normalises ‘attacks on multiculturalism, the restriction of civil liberties, the suppression of Muslim voices, [and the] downplaying of international issues’, moulding them into an ‘acceptable common political agenda’ (Ibid.). These key themes are employed by politicians time and again in the ‘national identity debate’ – for example, translating social exclusion into a failure of Muslims to ‘integrate’ into society, and condemning multicultural policies as the source of the erosion of collective norms, core values and a sense of ‘community cohesion’.

Britain is not alone in propounding the idea that multiculturalism has been used as a cover for reactionary cultural practices; this sentiment has been echoed in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Germany – in fact, throughout most of Europe. Incorporated into the agendas of Europe’s mainstream political parties, particularly in countries where openly Islamophobic parties hold the balance of power in coalition governments or collaborate with mainstream parties at a regional or local level, and where increasingly vocal neo-fascist and ultra-right wing nationalist parties mobilise a high share of the popular vote, the political manipulation of such a highly racialised discourse provides a dangerous precedent.

The image of Islam as incompatible with ‘European-ness’, added to a racialised discourse that presents Muslim communities as a threat to European national integrity (culturally, by virtue of their ‘alien’ culture, founded upon ‘backward’ and hierarchial religious ideas, and demographically, through migration and high birth rates) has spawned the concept of ‘Eurabia’. This apocalyptic vision of a Europe dominated by its
Muslim presence is deployed as part of a political project: the quest for a pan-European identity. Orientalism, of course, as Said (1991 [1978], p.7) says, ‘has never been far from the idea of Europe’. It is used to cement a collective notion of ‘us’ Europeans through the identification of the ‘other’ non-Europeans – the sense of an overarching European identity is thus derived negatively. By converting individuals into the ideological bearers of a region’s values, ideas and culture, the European identity is discursively produced through projecting a sense of absolute ‘difference’. ‘Europe’ is defined in the shadow of the threat of a supposed Islamic ‘hyper-identity’. Taking their cue from Huntington’s (1998) idea that the ‘cultural wars’ of Europe presage a Fourth World War (he describes the Cold War as the third global conflict) which will usher in an ‘era of barbarism’, proponents of the idea of ‘Eurabia’ view Europe as the new front line in a battle to decide the future of its identity, and of the continent itself.

The war on terror, the military discourse of race, and the securitisation of asylum

The institutionalisation of anti-Muslim racism

Although these themes have been rehearsed many times over recent decades, especially since the end of the Cold War, the war on terror appears to have been the catalyst for their projection into mainstream visibility and their embedding in European society. The war on terror itself follows a racist logic: anti-terror legislation adopted throughout Europe, but especially in the UK, has institutionalised anti-Muslim racism. The debate on the limitations of cultural diversity, the attack on multiculturalism, and the construction of ‘Islam’ and the figure of the ‘Muslim’ as objects to be studied and categorised in traditional Orientalist fashion, cannot be divorced from the global franchising of the war on terror. I argue that his has resulted in the naturalisation of the securitisation of legislation concerning forced migrants, who are now portrayed as an ‘alien’ threat not only to social and cultural cohesion but also to national security – especially if they originate from Muslim-majority countries (cf. chapter five).

The war on terror has, indeed, added a further dimension to the neoliberal pan-European project, providing it with a military discourse, imbuing the structures of national security – which are inextricably connected to Europe’s ‘global asylum regime’ – with the politics of fear and a culture of xenophobia and Islamophobia. The call for a ‘new crusade’, in the form of an aggressive reassertion of ‘liberal’ values and national identity, has taken hold – one that presents itself as both a cultural and ideological
response to the imminent threat to an essential ‘European-ness’. This is interpreted, in Kundnani’s (2008b) words, as ‘the first phase in a new Cold War’. In this scenario, little if any distinction is made between the term ‘Muslim’ and the term ‘Islamicist’ (or ‘Islamic terrorist’); either already ‘radicalised’ or ‘at risk of radicalisation’, due to the very nature of their religious belief or ‘identity’, European Muslims are presented as a sort of fifth column or Trojan Horse, infiltrating the core countries of the European Union. But whether they be established communities in Europe, forced migrants from Muslim-majority countries, or the populations of these countries themselves, particularly those in North Africa, at the edges of Europe, Muslims are seen as an apocalyptic threat, representing the implantation of an ‘alien culture’ in the heart of Europe – one that threatens to engulf the continent demographically, culturally and politically (cf. Carr, 2009b).

Many so-called liberal commentators openly deploy all the elements of a narrative of fear. For example, Caldwell’s (2009) analysis of what he perceives to be the moral, ‘spiritual’ and social crisis wracking Europe, and of its impending cultural demise (his account was written before the spread of a more earth-bound economic crisis in the Eurozone countries), employs the themes of European decadence and Islamic resurgence, comparing Europe’s ageing population and faltering birth rates with a youthful and fertile Muslim one. Caldwell believes that ‘multiculturalism’ has led to the establishment in cities throughout Europe of ‘parallel societies’ and ‘ethnic colonies’ that harbour crime and backward cultural practices, and represent potential seedbeds for a ‘home-grown’ ‘Islamic terrorism’ (Ibid.).

In distinction to such emotive rhetoric, however, the reality is that in the European Union Muslims constitute no more than 20 million out of a 540 million-strong population (Council of Foreign Relations, 2009); many are underprivileged and marginalised, ‘internal outsiders’, struggling against racism and a lack of opportunity and access to civil rights. Many more live with an increasing sense of existing in a state of siege, subject to both a rising level of verbal and physical violence and intimidation, and the disciplinary tactics of state ‘biopower’ in the form of profiling and invasive surveillance. The Muslim youth, for example, who live on the high-rise estates that ring the outskirts of French cities, zones of deprivation and exclusion, are subject to military-style policing and locked into a cycle of discrimination and criminalisation (cf. chapter five). In particular, forced migrants, who also happen to be Muslim, often find
themselves living a precarious existence. Yet the concept of ‘Eurabia’ completely reverses this dynamic.

*The European security agenda: the Muslim ‘other’ and the forced migrant*

The ideological mobilisation of ‘identity’ in such a context can only lead to further sedimentation of the already extreme relations of power and marginality manifest in the policies dictated by a near-uniform European security agenda that appears to have even national legislation in its grip. An institutionalised anti-Muslim racism is displayed in both the criminal justice systems and the citizenship laws of the core European nations. Citizenship entry requirements have been redrafted to include ‘codes of conduct’ (as outlined earlier) in country after country: speaking a minority language or cleaving to a minority cultural background is portrayed as representing not only a threat to national coherence and the integrity of the national culture, but also a potential security risk. Meanwhile, the roll call of anti-Muslim legislation has grown increasing long, from the calling of referendums to authorise a ban on the construction of mosques with minarets in Switzerland and Italy, and the monitoring of places of Muslim worship and their imams in Denmark, to the criminalisation of Muslim women who wear the veil in public in France\(^{xliii}\), Belgium and Switzerland. Meanwhile, a system of disciplinary surveillance, religious profiling, control orders, curfews, exemplary arrests and detention (the policies vary according to the country), ushered in by the war on terror, naturalises the image of Muslims as a suspect ‘nation within a nation’\(^{xliv}\). This has helped provoke an exaggerated sense of fear among the general population, directed towards their Muslim neighbours.

In the UK, a shadow criminal justice system appears to have emerged, one that mimics the already established lineaments of a separate system of justice for asylum applicants. This has opened the way for the deportation of foreign nationals who are deemed to be a ‘security risk’ back to situations of extreme personal danger (in flagrant contradiction of the government’s professed adherence to the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ as laid down in the Refugee Convention). Due to the already established definition of forced migrants as inherently ‘illegal’ and ‘alien’ and consequently falling outside the norms of national (and even international) justice, the use of immigration and asylum legislation as a template for anti-terrorist measures has lent an aura of legal impunity to the avoidance of the customary checks and balances of the judicial process. These political operations are therefore premised on the racialised stereotypes and
culture of suspicion endemic in an emerging ‘security state’. This new strain of anti-Muslim racism has, in its turn, further legitimised the securitisation of the European asylum regime (cf. chapter five). The security agenda has linked anti-terrorist measures into the asylum process: its victims are for the most part not ‘Islamic terrorists’ but forced migrants. Raids against undocumented migrants and arrests for the infringement of alien/immigration laws, justified by recourse to the discourse of security, criminalise the struggle by ‘illegal migrants’ to survive. As they are ‘vulnerable to the awesome power of the European state and to the repressive reach of their countries of origin’ and marginalised by poverty and a lack of rights, forced migrants are easy targets (Fekete, 2004, pp.16-17).

In many ways, therefore, the characterisation of the forced migrant as the ‘illegal’ ‘global alien’ has melded with the construction of the figure of a demonised Muslim ‘other’. This particular racial stereotype has become politically operational throughout a Europe obsessed with, on the one hand, its destiny as the carrier of universal ideals of individual freedom and democracy, and on the other, with its sense of itself as a waning global influence (particularly vis-à-vis China), with its ageing, apparently morally ambivalent and often fractious populations, who are seemingly infected with a faltering sense of national identity and increasing feeling of disenfranchisement from the political process. This latter concern has frequently surfaced in the ‘European identity’ debate, despite the fact that, as Anderson (2011) argues, the development of the European Union has not cleaved to any original concept of it as a democratic federation. It has instead proceeded over the decades along distinctly Hayekian lines, becoming an elite, financially driven project, with little or no democratic accountability, subject only to the constraints of the market. This mixture of grand visions and dystopian views has been further compounded by a very real economic crisis, presaging the return of a full-scale global recession. With the stalling of its neoliberal motor, Europe faces the possibility of the implosion of the Eurozone, a potential retraction of the European Union itself, and the threat that popular protests against the neoliberal doctrine of austerity could ignite a more generalised social upheaval.

Huntington (1998), some time before the onset of crisis, gave expression to this fear of a Europe cut loose from its moorings in a sea of warring cultures and forced to cede its role as the universal arbiter of human values. Even as he claimed the West to be the very source of the modern notion of a benign universal civilisation, informed by its inherent liberal, democratic, Enlightenment values, he warned that in future there will
be no universal civilisations, but a world of different civilisations. Elements of Huntington’s thesis, however discredited it may have since become in academic circles, appears to remain an attractive recourse for European politicians and their security establishments. For many years since the end of the Cold War, these organisations and their political managers have been preoccupied with the ‘problems’ of immigration and asylum, that is, with the ‘threat’ posed by the non-European forced migrant. Now the focus has also turned to the ubiquitous, abstract, global threat of a ‘radical Islam’ (and, by conflation, of Islam itself) – a threat that is believed to be carried into the heart of Europe by migrants from Muslim-majority countries, thus combining the twin security preoccupations in one. This image of an embattled but universal European essence, challenged by overwhelmingly youthful, ultra-religious and profoundly illiberal Islamic societies beyond its borders, has gained power and coherence by virtue of placing Europe’s perceived antithesis, the ‘Islamic enemy’, in a similar ‘trans-temporal, trans-racial category’, producing, as Said (1991 [1978], p.155) puts it, a coercive framework that reduces human plurality into ‘two terminal, collective abstractions’.

**Conclusion**

Although the figure of the Muslim ‘outsider’/‘enemy’ has been forged out of racially specific Orientalist assumptions and nationalist tropes, the forced migrant (whether Muslim or not) has equally shared in the demonisation. As related above, the forced migrant has become the most vulnerable victim of a securitised system of control and exclusion – ostensibly targeted at the putative ‘Islamic terrorist’ – that now openly defines Europe’s global regime of asylum and immigration. Both figures are abstract constructions of the universal ‘other’/the eternal ‘alien’ in modern form: although the cultural racism that fashions these figures and drives the asylum regime appears rooted in national concepts, it is not bounded by national borders, but has become a ‘spatialised’ politics of identity (cf. de Genova, 2010). The ideological and material production of the ‘alien’ is stripped of social location; the quality of being ‘alien’ is sourced solely in the cultural essence of the forced migrant, a quality they carry around with them whichever borders they cross. At the same time, the individual thus represented is dispossessed not only of their own social and familial world, but divested of the very identity born out of this world. Meanwhile, the national border where this racial identification is materialised has become the site of a global racialised
(re)definition of human lives: a multitude of individuals are divided into two mutually exclusive identities – global ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The border no longer lies between states but is, in a sense, a demarcation that separates the world of destitution from that of consumption, a division that is structural but inherently unstable, and therefore in need of constant reassertion and reinforcement. For this reason, Balibar (1991a) calls the new racism, the ‘racism of globalisation’: a binary global division of humanity that is profoundly exclusionary.

This division conceals the fact that highly concentrated forms of power are spatially located. Each territorial space is a specific articulation of a system that functions through global connections and relationships (cf. chapter two). Some places, such as the major economies of the European Union, wield control and influence (particularly in relation to the stateless, rights-less individual), others are more or less powerless. Those forced migrants who flee to one from the other also possess spatial locations, as well as identities that are formed by their relationships with, and within, these locations, and where they come from on the global territorial map has a profound impact on which side of the global binary division they fall. By contrast, racist configurations appear to have no fixed frontiers. Racism, in fact, disguises itself in the form of a ‘supranationalism’ in a way that accords neatly with the concept of ‘European-ness’ in its sense as the bearer of an overarching, universal canon of Enlightenment values. However, ‘supranationalism’ is based on the assumed integrity of the nation – what it defines as superior racial or cultural (and therefore ‘universal’) qualities are ‘concentrate[s] of qualities that belong to [certain] nationals “as their own”’ (Balibar, 1991b, p.59).

This paradoxical universality is an essential attribute of the idealisation of the ‘European nation’ in racial terms – the theme of universality that lies within nationalism imposes a ‘European’ conception of culture on humanity at large. At the same time, however, for the culture to be pure, the nation-state must expel the ‘cosmopolitan’ (leading to the racialisation of ‘alien’ groups and individuals, branding them with the mark of ‘impurity’). Racism within Europe, as Marfleet (2006) points out, is thus given not merely a continental but a global dimension as inward national coherence is based on a culture of global exclusion. Hence, the racial and cultural identity of those designated as ‘alien’ is at one and the same time represented as a danger to a society’s national cultural coherence and identity and to its universal civilisational attributes.
Neoliberalism propounds the idea that politics, economics and culture are autonomous, and that its value system lies in a yet further abstract realm beyond all three, yet its racialised instruments of border control – which, Brown (2006, p.23) characterises as ‘tool[s] for managing … culturalised identity claims’ – are very concrete manifestations of its political and economic policies and their ideological underpinning. The insistence on universality lends the legal and administrative application of ‘global migration control’ the appearance of an instrument that, while responding to the everyday concerns of national citizens, exists in a realm guided solely by abstract principles, above and beyond the taint of everyday, nationally specific political demands. The forced migrant can therefore be dehumanised and reduced to a legal abstraction through the imposition of a universally applicable ‘alien’ identity. The global order that promotes migration and creates forced migrants even as it criminalises them is therefore a world that appears only marginally connected to its structural socio-economic inequality. By elevating racial consciousness to a universal, a-historical given (at the same time as depoliticising and naturalising the coercive realities that lie behind the phenomenon of forced migration, the circumstances the forced migrant confronts and their ideological translation into the ‘illegal alien’), the ideologues and political managers of this global system are able to obscure the racial objectification of the forced migrant and turn them into a parallel universal, a-historical figure – the ‘global alien’. This is compounded by the implicit interweaving of the forced migration discourse with an Islamophobic discourse concerning a supposedly ‘homogeneous’ and ‘universal’ Islamic culture, and through the application of the security agenda, which has been amplified and advanced by the war on terror directed against the global ‘Islamic terrorist’ (or potential terrorist infiltrating Europe in the guise of a forced migrant).

The global figure of the forced migrant, I argue, is the essential hidden component in the construction of a European identity – its recessive twin. Its ideological function as the negative substrate of the idea of ‘European-ness’, however, entails that the forced migrant must be visibly identified and rejected, and so they are caught in a relentless political focus. This is particularly so at times of crisis, when the need to prevent the discourse of ‘European-ness’ from disintegrating into incoherence becomes overwhelming. The new racism, therefore, includes through its strategy of exclusion. The ideological creation of the forced migrant as a ‘global alien’, contrary to the abstract universality espoused by the system that fashions this racialised figure, is
infused with state power and pushed onto the central stage of national politics; it becomes the ideological pivot for the normalisation of a global system of exploitation as it is manifest in its national form.
Chapter Five

The Politics of Fear and the Securitisation of Forced Migration

Introduction
As the borders of Europe become increasingly elastic, they are further mutating into securitised ‘technological borders’, and the discourse of security that frames this development is fast becoming one of the definitive political discourses of the region. Created and normalised first and foremost at the edges of the nation-state, it is described by Bauman (2004) as a ‘rhetoric of borders’. This is a rhetoric charged with the amplified sense of external danger that the concept of the border (delineating and protecting ‘inside’ from ‘outside’) provokes, creating a ‘theoretical grid of moral panic’ (Welch and Schuster, 2005, p.399). I argue here, therefore, that the language and instruments of security have become pivotal to the process through which the figure of the ‘illegal’ border-crosser is produced as a primary object of external danger, one that is woven into a contextual framework in which all manner of diffuse anxieties find common cause. General feelings of apprehension and anxiety among the populations of the European Union’s core member states are fused with the discourses of nationalism and race to create an existential fear of the ‘external’ and ‘alien’. This is ratcheted up on a regular basis to achieve a heightened sense of insecurity through rhetorical reiteration, allied with public displays of border policing that help confirm this narrative of external danger as the only way of perceiving an insecure and volatile world.

Europe’s borders have come to symbolise both a porous membrane through which leak elements of acute threat and a site where the bloc of wealthier nation-states can demonstrate its power to protect against such danger – a power that is on daily display in its security guards, visa checks, pre-emptive arrests, places of detention and ubiquitous surveillance targeted at the ‘global alien’. ‘Islamic terrorists’, transnational ‘people trafficking/smuggling’ syndicates and ‘illegal immigrants’ all fall within its security remit and are treated as an undifferentiated global threat. Energised by the war on terror, this twenty-first century ‘politics of fear’ has helped transform Europe’s ‘global asylum regime’ into first and foremost a security issue, thus elevating the forced migrant into a figure of paramount political value for the neoliberal ideological arsenal. In their turn, the increasingly integrated administrative procedures and networked
technologies of a securitised asylum and immigration system help ease national societies into neoliberal ‘security-state’ mode.

In seemingly paradoxical fashion, even as border security consistently fails in its declared aim of sealing the borders against illegalised forced migrants\(^{xlv}\), a politics of fear focused on the figure of the forced migrant retains its ideological salience for Europe’s neoliberal regime – and continues to hold economic and political benefits for those involved in devising, marketing and deploying the technological infrastructure of a putative ‘security state’. Indeed, politically induced fear represents the means whereby the construct of a national/European identity is naturalised through its distinction with its binary opposite, the ‘global alien’. To keep this figure of global danger – both rationale for and part-creation of its security technologies – in circulation it must be reconstituted daily in the attempt to fill the vacuum of a tenuous European identity with content. My key point is that by using the bodies of forced migrants as sources of essentialised digital information, these procedures and technologies ensure their translation into the embodiment of external danger – the very foundation of a fundamental European/‘alien’ dichotomy.

**Europe and the ‘politics of fear’**

*The depoliticisation of the object of fear*

The mechanisms by which the figure of the forced migrant is elevated to its prime political position are obscured through a process of *depoliticisation*. The political creation or manipulation of fear relies on the arousal of inchoate emotions (which are presumed to be sub-primal and therefore malleable) by taking the object of fear and placing it outside the ‘rationality’ of the political sphere, denying its political origins and designating it as the progenitor of culturally based psychic insecurities (*cf.* Robin, 2004a). In order to have real impact, however, fear cannot remain an abstraction but needs to be suffused with the material threat of violence in some form, whether indeterminate or specific. It is at this point that its primary utility to the capitalist system stands revealed. The presence of *objective* violence – a violence that is foundational to the radically dehumanising processes of dispossession and exploitation that oil the wheels of the global economic system – must be rendered abstract, and its perpetrators and beneficiaries invisible, if the system is to continue functioning without major disruption. The *subjective*, individualised violence that arises when this systemic violence imbués society with unfocused fear and anger can then be portrayed as ‘a
perturbation of the “normal”, peaceful state of things’ (Zizek, 2009, p.2). It is this subjective violence that is privileged as the true danger and source of fear. The unrelenting focus on the potential for the eruption of subjective violence – ‘that violence which is enacted by social agents, evil individuals’ – distracts attention from the ‘true locus of trouble’ (Ibid., p.9).

The reality of the systemic violence inherent in the economic and political system that shapes Europe’s societies has surfaced most visibly (and perhaps most dangerously for those whose wealth and power depends on obscuring its functioning) in the austerity plans whereby its political managers attempt to shift the full burden of economic crisis onto their populations. The attempt to deflect the outbreaks of collective protest in those countries most affected, and prevent its spread across the region, has entailed a struggle to present the effects of mass unemployment, sharpening poverty, and the erosion of the welfare safety-net as the unavoidable outcome of global economic crisis – as if it were a natural disaster. The abstraction of violence from its source in the workings of the capitalist system mirrors the ‘abstraction’ of capital itself (the ‘hidden hand of the market’), which, as Zizek (2009, p.10) points out, is neither an objective nor anonymous process but is itself ‘real’ in that it determines the ‘structure of material social processes’ and ‘the fate of whole strata of the population and sometimes of whole countries’:

Certain features, attitudes, norms of life … appear neutral, non-ideological, natural …a spontaneously accepted background. [This is] ideology at its purest and most effective. […] [It] appears as its opposite, as non-ideology. [T]he same holds for violence. Social-symbolic violence at its purest appears as its opposite, as the spontaneity of the milieu in which we dwell… (Zizek, 2009, p.31)

This ideological operation, which veils the basis of subjective violence, is an act of displacement, whose ultimate purpose is to ensure the survival of the capitalist order itself. It takes place, however, at an almost subterranean level, in an ongoing, banal process, daily translating unfocused unease into politically directed fear. The way this is accomplished has been an academic preoccupation for many decades. In modern, psychologised definitions of emotional states, ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ are defined as related but separate terms. Fear is related to an immediate and specific, usually external threat, while anxiety refers to an anticipated subjective threat – it denotes a more unformed, generalised state that is seen to originate from within the individual. As Bourke (2005,
p.189) says, ‘The difference between fear and anxiety oscillates wildly … [but] anxiety is easily converted into fear’. Thus, the current process of converting anxiety into fear could be described as the function of a range of ‘security professionals’, whose influence on government policy throughout Europe is formidable (as discussed later in this chapter). Their unspoken political remit is to legitimate control over the description of the object of fear, obscuring the reality that fear is generated by the violent effects of the capitalist system.

The experience of unease must be given a specific focus, and this requires that the designated source of anxiety be interpreted and elaborated in such a way that it can be structured into social consciousness as a constant presence that entails the unremitting vigilance of security and political professionals alike. At the same time, any link to the wider, less visible causes and creators of fear must be severed: the figure of fear can have no function or reason beyond that of embodying potential danger. Once shorn of its political rationale, there is no longer ‘any realistic way of calculating the seriousness of [the] threat, [and] the disjuncture between the risk and the degree of fear widens’ (Ibid., p.367), in much the same way as Cohen (1972) described in his seminal work on ‘moral panics’.

According to Cohen (1972), it is marginalised ‘outsiders’ who are most frequently given the role of ‘folk devils’ or objects of fear. A global capitalism, grounded in systemic exploitation, cannot help but forge the social conditions that create excluded individuals, such as forced migrants (cf. chapter two). Their resulting social and economic vulnerability means they can be easily selected as a screen for the projection of the many, varied anxieties of a population already sensitised and daily guided in this direction by the rhetoric of politicians and the mass media. The forced migrant becomes, on the one hand, a focal point of a system of control over global mobility, and on the other, is materialised as an object of profound unease. This unease may not only stem from the portrayal of forced migrants as embodiments of existential danger and harbingers of social disturbance, but also from the fact that they display (through their need to escape extreme poverty, protracted civil wars, invasions, persecution and/or the breakdown of their societies) the marks of the hidden, disavowed violence of the capitalist system itself. The sense that they are imbued with the potential to detonate violent social disruption is compounded by their provenance in an apparently ‘anarchic’ world beyond Europe’s borders. As surrogate figures of fear they can then be used to denote an ever-present existential danger that only security experts, with their forensic
analysis, relentless attention and state-of-the-art technology, and politicians, with their administrative measures and legal instruments, can hope to identify and deflect.

Political fear, however, as Fekete (2004) points out, also relies heavily on the non-specific, diffuse nature of the threat it evokes (as in the ‘global’, vaguely specified nature of terrorism or organised crime). Hence, the symbolic use of the abstract notion of ‘national security’. But when it is necessary to gain consent for specific, exceptional forms of security measures, which through repeated exposure can be gradually transformed into the norm (for example, mass surveillance, the introduction of biometric identity documents, the building of a vast detention estate for those claiming asylum, the use of a parallel judicial system for certain non-nationals that flouts accepted legal standards, or the increasing identification of immigration and asylum legislation with anti-terrorist measures), the threat must be embodied. The ambient sense of existential insecurity the system engenders has, from the 1990s on, been focused most consistently on the ‘alien’ figure of the forced migrant. Effectively denied any ‘legal’ route into Europe’s nation-states, they are, as a consequence, criminalised in their attempts to reach or cross the border and are designated ‘illegal entrants’. In this way, their identity is now elided with that of other figures operating beyond the law, ‘Islamic terrorists’ and members of the organised criminal networks that have supposedly enabled the forced migrant’s journey to the border; they assume the sense of threat such figures carry and enter the list of global dangers.

So it is we see the paradox of spectacle allied to secrecy: the idea of ‘national security’ creates exaggerated, indefinable fears, and this is vital to governments and their institutions which have ‘an inherent desire to act in secrecy and hide the materials from which national decisions are made from scrutiny’ (Peirce cited in Fekete 2004, p.7). At the same time, this fear must be both stoked and assuaged by providing a very visible symbol of danger. The figure of the forced migrant, now discursively related to ‘transnational criminality’ or ‘global terrorism’, is imbued with a sense of subjective violence and their condition depoliticised. This is made possible by the slow accretion of a commonsense, depoliticised lexicon of crime, deviance and alterity – reaffirmed by periodic moral panics – which not only provides the vocabulary and images by which the target can be singled out and interpreted, but also enables politicians and their ideologues to map together anything that can be described as a threat to the stability of society.
The emotive use of such a commonplace term as ‘illegal’, for example, as if it were ‘a noun, a force in the world, rather than an adjective describing certain acts’, represents a ‘retreat from evidence-based thinking’ into the reliance on ‘instinctive’ responses (Keen, 2006, p.7) (cf. chapter two). A mainstay of right-wing political rhetoric which rapidly entered mainstream European political discourse with the advent of the war on terror, the elevation of ‘instinct’ as a benchmark for policy decisions helps justify the punitive effects of this verbal distortion. The privileging of instinct and emotion further allows for the ‘diversion of economic and social discontent into anger over diverse “moral issues” ’ (Ibid., p.119), including the newly minted crime of attempting to cross European borders without the correct documentation.

Furthermore, the eruption of so-called ‘moral panics’, by means of which such an embodiment of threat is reproduced on a continual basis, although ephemeral in nature, are therefore productive: they leave legacies and create material effects. One subsequent effect of the fear they arouse – analysed by many in this sphere of the social sciences (Cohen, 2001; Garland, 2007; and Hall, 2007, for example) – is an expansion of the reach of state control over a far wider section of society than that involved in the initial ‘event’ that precipitated the moral panic. To facilitate and justify the increasing securitisation of society, political fear must be first narrowed down to a particular target. The measures introduced to isolate and control the so-called immediate ‘danger’, however, are then equally available for the management of a potentially more accurately focused, generalised unrest against the system’s effects.

‘Cultural fear’ as a political tool

Fear is an well-used political tool of class rule: those who are invested in the unimpeded continuation of the capitalist system define the object of fear and decide what/who is worthy of attention. In the process, they use (and further refine) the distorting ideological lens through which we are encouraged to view the world around us. Although national or regional politicians struggle to manage a system that is global in reach, their primary constituency comprises those who inhabit the nation-state to which their local power is tied, and it is here that the historically tried-and-tested tropes of nationalism lie ready to be deployed in their efforts to keep the system afloat (cf. chapter two).

Keen (2006, p.5) takes issue, however, with what he sees as the simplistic idea that the security-driven nationalist discourse that defines the object of fear is merely ‘a
smokescreen for power’, and quotes Miller as saying, ‘members of the elite …unable to break free of the operating assumptions of the system… come to believe that the world seen through the distorting lens of their own self interest is how [it] really is’. Taking a Foucauldian perspective, Keen points out that politicians, for example, are trapped within systems of language and thought that are part of a shared culture (in Bourdieu’s (1986) terminology, their ‘habitus’) – one that is, of course, partly of their own making. He concedes that there are practical political and economic benefits that a dysfunctional system that propagates its own (‘fallacious’) internal logic can yield to individual members of the capitalist elite, but holds that the politicians and the highly placed officials/bureaucrats responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the system are unknowingly complicit.

This understanding undeniably conveys a sense of the complexity of how ideology itself is systematised – how the discourses, policies and practices of government and the activities of daily social life coalesce into a common pattern that promotes a perception of the world as it is presently constructed as self-evident and natural, one that becomes part of the everyday environment in which individuals and institutions operate. Yet, there is a danger that Keen’s analysis could lead to the assumption that political fear arises automatically out of this ‘dysfunctional system’. This, I believe, is due to Keen’s reliance on Foucault’s definition of power. Foucault abstracts power from its source by stressing its omnipresence (it appears to rise from everywhere), and takes no account of the actual structure of power relations within a class society. As de Genova and Peutz (2010, p.12) comment, ‘the play of power seems relentless… [Foucault’s] emphasis on the multiplicity, relationality and restlessness of power … turns out to be tantamount to (re)essentialisation’. In distinction to Keen’s thesis, the very term ‘political fear’ implies direction. It may be a cultural product, but in order to become intelligible it has to be interpreted, embodied and disseminated by those with an interest in maintaining the culture that produces it. Furthermore, if it is to be normalised and given logical coherence it must take its place within the ordering ‘political pattern’, both deriving its legitimacy from and helping legitimise the dominant worldview (such as that of the ‘natural’ character of a world system comprising nation-states and national citizens).

Moreover, the system’s ‘operating assumptions’ that Keen refers to can never be relied upon to circulate free of challenge in a society whose limitations in fulfilling the majority of individuals’ needs are always apparent – at times, glaringly so. The
hegemonic world-view used to frame the objects of fear does not go uncontested, and this is especially the case at times of political and economic crisis, when apprehension of the causes of the physical and psychological violence it implicitly endorses threatens to reach a critical mass. Likewise, although political fear helps determine the social existence of the interpreted subjects, it ‘does not affect them in the very core of their being, and consequently … they can (and do) resist as free autonomous agents…’ (Zizek, 2009, p.62). It cannot be taken for granted, therefore, that the ‘operating assumptions’ will remain as the solid foundations of a widespread (manufactured) consensus about how the world is structured; they must be continually renewed and reasserted, and certain conscious decisions must be taken as to the best way to organise and disseminate discourses and practices that will help stabilise them. Imposing a certain reading of the world involves relations of authority. In this context, it can be seen that the discourse of fear provides ‘a direct ontological grounding to the social relations of domination’ (Ibid., p.60).

Fear is manipulated by those with a stake in creating fear while promising to eradicate it. The most recent attempt to obscure the way ‘difference’ is conditioned by inequality or economic exploitation – processes which are politically governed – depoliticises and naturalises the true nature of such divisive outcomes by interpreting them as immutable ‘cultural differences’: a more or less effective attempt at what Zizek (2009) refers to as the ‘culturalisation of politics’. Prominent intellectuals who promote what Robin (2004a) calls ‘the liberalism of fear’ perform a vital role for the capitalist elite by diverting anger and/or anxiety into the channel of cultural fear. The ‘clash of civilisations’ framework has provided such ideologues, think-tanks and security experts with a seemingly inexhaustible resource that can be built on and refined according to the current political moment. Huntington’s (1998, 2004) warnings of ‘cultural contamination’, particularly through immigration from Islamic countries into Europe, have proven particularly viral (although it has yet to be seen how such a neo-Orientalist mindset will attempt to accommodate the recent popular uprisings for democracy in Muslim countries throughout North Africa and the Middle East).

The current ‘liberalism of fear’, therefore, manifests itself in ‘identity politics’ (cf. chapter four). The most pressing political problems are presented not as concerning the deeply unequal distribution of power, wealth and resources, but the issue of national membership and exclusion, and is manifest in a manufactured anxiety over the coherence of borders: who is included and who excluded. These preoccupations are then
drained of political content. Michael Ignatieff, for example, propounds an increasingly common trope, first aired by Huntington: as globalisation destroys old identity boundaries, we react by clinging to ‘the margins of difference’ (cited in Robin 2004a). As Robin (2004b) shows, Ignatieff defines the transformation of anxiety into national chauvinism (and often overt racism) as the ‘natural’ psychological response of individuals to the disruptions caused by an impersonal global force, standing over and above politics, that cannot be gainsaid:

By painting fear as an eruption from the psyche and culture, Huntington and Ignatieff, and writers like Robert Kaplan, fulfilled the imperative that made fear such an ideal political foundation in the first place. Fear, in their hands, remained an intrusion into politics. It did not emerge from the requirements of politics or from the conflicts that politics so often generates; it stood outside of politics. (Robin, 2004b, p.927)

The ‘cultural turn’ in politics, therefore, with the emphasis on a renewed spirit of national pride in cultural and historical identity, was a deliberate political manoeuvre that helped to both depoliticise the object of fear and racialise it (while divesting its progenitors of the charge of racism) (cf. chapter four). It is no accident that it accompanied the rationalisation of an anti-immigration politics that has overtly entered the mainstream. The mainstream political parties of Europe ‘cut the umbilical cord [attaching this theme] to the far-right [and fascist] fringe parties’ and openly adopted their rhetoric and rationale (Zizek, 2009, p.35). The inherent violence of the language of national culture when used as a tool of social control is seen not only in its concrete outcomes – in the rise in racist attacks, for example – but also in its ability to strip individuals down to an abstract ‘cultural essence’. As Zizek (2009, p.57) comments, ‘verbal violence is not a secondary distortion … the image overdetermines the way I experience real [people]’, and guides and justifies the actions that flow from this experience. It ‘inserts [the designated object of fear] into a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it’ (Ibid., p.52).

This ‘field of meaning’ is delineated by the discourse of security. Although there may be no logical connection between the object of fear (the forced migrant) and the proposed solution (the creation of an integrated European ‘security state’, whose overt rationale is as a defence against ‘global terrorism’), this disconnect is obscured. Through the language and instruments of an increasingly dominant security discourse,
they are made to function as emotionally coherent, and as Bourke (2005, p.181) points out, this allows ‘[t]he ranks of the demonised … [to] expand rapidly as the irrationality of the original persecution [leads] to a determination to defend it as rational and reasonable’. The definition of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is thus situated on a continuum, and the security measures are able to stretch out along the continuum to include not only members of European Muslim communities and forced migrants from Muslim majority countries, but forced migrants per se.

However, my contention is that the underlying drive behind the discourse of national security has little connection to either terrorism or ‘illegal migration’ – it is to be found in the need to secure control over the global mobility of labour in the interests of the economic system (both in its global and local, European manifestations), while simultaneously attempting to ensure legitimacy for an increasingly violent and unstable (neoliberal) political system through allegiance to global capital’s national or regional form by infusing its populations with a sense of ‘belonging’ to a common national or European ‘community’.xlviii It has to be borne mind, however, that although such global and local needs may be co-dependent in the larger perspective, they do not necessarily work smoothly in tandem – they are as often in conflict as in agreement, particularly as they also encompass all the various contradictory interests and ambitions of the mass of competing powerbrokers variously situated in the economic and political structures of the capitalist state system and its ‘glocal’ economies.

The backdrop of the war on terror

The current wave of political fear has been given form and power by the war on terror. Although it has now fallen into official disuse as an operational term in the US and in Europe, the practices associated with the war on terror (such as extraordinary rendition, targeted assassinations by ‘drones’, the use of torture and secret prisons, indefinite detention and unauthorised surveillance) are still in use, and, even without recourse to the term ‘war on terror’, the doctrine of ‘national security’ continues to be deployed to conceal these practices from public view. National security has indeed become entrenched as an acceptable and necessary framework for the day-to-day functioning of Europe’s neoliberal system – as it has elsewhere in the world. This is partly due to the fact that, despite the rhetoric, 9/11 was not in itself a sudden turning point: the ‘liberalism of fear’ had already set the interpretive framework. Sections of the capitalist elite (and their ideologues) had not abandoned the idea of the promotion of fear as a
productive source of national coherence with the ending of the Cold War, although a
dramatic, fear-inducing event was needed for it to regain legitimacy as a workable tactic
type of governance. Indeed, this event presaged the rise to prominence of a spate of new
political discourses of ‘disaster’, an ideological aspect of what Klein (2007a) coins
‘disaster capitalism’. Thus, the ideological justifications were in place, the exceptional
security measures were at hand, and the sophisticated security technology was already
in trial or under development (although doubtless the security industries had not
anticipated such a spectacular loosening of government purse-strings). What 9/11
represented was a unique opportunity to unleash these instruments.

The ideological tactics, of course, did not arise without historical precedent. They
built on a feeling which has frequently appeared as the accompaniment of capitalist
upheaval and change – that we live in an age of ubiquitous fear. In fact, in hindsight,
there seems to have been little respite: the international fundamentalist terrorist of the
twenty-first century came hard on the heels of the Red Menace of the twentieth.
Looking further back to nineteenth century Europe, during an earlier era of capitalist
globalisation, with its seismic processes of dispossession and forced migrations, the
transformation of the sense of foreboding and anxiety induced by such upheavals into
fear of an external, powerful and unpredictable enemy appeared as a constant leitmotif
of capitalist rule. Bourke (2005, p.364), for example, quotes a member of the British
police force in 1898 as proclaiming that terrorists at the end of the nineteenth century
‘are more dangerous, …are served by the more terrible weapons offered by modern
science, and the world nowadays is threatened by new forces which, if recklessly
unchained, may some day wreak universal destruction…’. Such sentiments appear to
mirror more recent rhetoric, whereby a fear of extremism is fused with anxiety over
Europe’s fast waning influence in an unstable world that appears to be shifting on its
axis towards the East.

‘Globalisation’, in this context, reveals itself to be neither a ‘meta-process’ nor
simply a ‘structural backdrop’, but a neopolitical imaginaryxix (Larner, 2008, p.47) –
one that normalises the turbulence of the prevailing economic and political
environment. In the attempt to naturalise the processes of capitalist expansion and
deflect the anger that arises from its deeply unequal outcomes, the ruling class of the
time enlists in its service such ideological narratives, whether they be those of empire,
colonialism or globalisation (imaginaries that have so far emanated from the currently
dominant countries of the West). The discourse of security that accompanies these
imaginaries animates and compels an intense focus on the ‘outsider’, the criminalised representative of capitalism’s ‘underbelly’, by means of spatial segregation, disciplinary surveillance and pre-emptive profiling and monitoring, and the use of ever more sophisticated forms of ‘security knowledge’ and control. Today, this impulse is manifest in the increasingly global deployment of networked technologies of surveillance and biometrics, which have taken such measures to an unprecedented depth and intensity. These processes are driven by the ultimate vision of the seamless global management of national populations in the form of a ‘smart, specific, side-effects free, information-driven utopia of governance’ (de Goede 2008, p.119) – the elusive goal of ‘Total Information Awareness’ (TIA) proselytised by the ‘experts’ of global security.

Therefore, despite the evidence provided by two devastating world wars that the potential for global destruction lies with the major national players themselves, it is often the most ‘alien’, marginalised figures of presumed subjective violence and evil intent and/or disruptive potential that continue to be used as the triggers of existential fear, justifying the concentrated political focus and the vast financial resources poured into the development of technologies of control. Although the end of the Cold War drained the threat of global communism of much of its ideological charge, the transfer of its power to the threat of Islamic terrorism was facilitated by the fact that the tropes used to resurrect a global Islamic enemy lay already entrenched in European society. The creation of a sense of dread over the reputed spread of Islam had been a lingering presence for decades, with Arabs frequently portrayed in European discourse as ‘radicalised, marginalised and often violent […], at war with modernity’ (Bourke, 2005, p.373). Most recently, to emphasise the gravity of the threat, Islamic fundamentalism has been equated with fascism (cf. chapter four). Such inflammatory rhetoric, however, must remain on an abstract level unless it is concentrated in the concrete figure of the ‘dangerous outsider’.

The means by which this could be effected, and the way such a discourse could be popularised and disseminated throughout society were already in use before 9/11. The demonising rhetoric of the war on terror was closely allied to forerunners such as the ‘war on drugs’ and the ‘war on crime’, both of which attempted to construct what Davis (2006, p.202) calls ‘epistemological walls’ in order to ‘disable honest debate about the daily violence of economic exclusion’, and both of which summoned up a suitably representative enemy: the disaffected, racially identifiable member of the ‘dangerous’ ‘underclass’ (cf. Wacquant 1999, 2008, 2009). This discourse of ‘war’ is capacious, and
can be expanded to embrace other ‘threats’, analogous to those it initially summoned up. In France, for example, a so-called ‘underclass’ of young men of Arab origin (who have grown up in the ghetto conditions of the impoverished banlieues, subject to violent, military-style policing) are identified with their Muslim heritage and the migrant status of earlier generations. This has meant they can be discursively demoted as French citizens (particularly after the 2005 riots) and given a rhetorical status of alterity – in a similar way as has happened with migrant or ethnic minority communities of Muslim background throughout Europe. As the nature of the relationship between a politics of fear and the management of the global system of production changes, necessitating a transformation in the characterisation of the ‘threat’, this can be accommodated through the ever-creative capacity of the state to sew new categories into the web of its dominant self-referential discursive imaginary. The discourse of war, and the institutions and policies it infuses, are therefore able to shape the representatives of fear to fit a norm – one that reflects in a fragmented, distorted fashion the nature of the (neoliberal) capitalist world we live in. As Zizek (2009, p.84) claims, this rhetoric of ‘war’, and the demonisation of ‘enemy-outsiders’ that it propounds, represents the ‘true dialectics of globalisation’, as ‘segregation is the reality of economic globalisation’, although it hides the real divide – that between those included in the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it. Consequently, ‘it is about those on the other side of [this] wall that we fantasise: more and more they live in another world, in a blank zone that offers itself as a screen for the projection of our fears…’ (Ibid., p.88).

The discourse of the war on terror was, of course, premised on the reality of the bloody and destructive wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the fashion in which its rhetoric was deployed within Europe shows that its discourse was not conceived in the way that the conventional discourse of war is: in distinction to the conventional military goals abroad, failure appears inbuilt. The European Union’s official definition of ‘terrorism’, for example, is both wide-ranging and vague, a gradual accumulation of offences, added to year by year. In addition to the European Union and UN definitions, many member states have also adopted their own domestic blacklists, expanding the remit of the war on terror yet further, helping transform migrant and diaspora communities in Europe into ‘suspect communities’. ‘Refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’, visitors on visas, even third-generation Muslim nationals are all now to be regarded as potential terrorists or ‘supporters of terrorism’, their international movements recorded by a centralised regional visa database, and asylum applications...
scrutinised for any connection with alleged terrorists, no matter how banal or distant. In 2001 the EU Common Positions on combating terrorism, for example, instructed member states to vet all those seeking asylum to determine whether they have even the remotest connection to terrorism, including ‘passive’ support (the European Council cited in Fekete, 2004). This ensures that as the list grows more expansive, the apparent threat posed by those it draws into its net becomes ever more intangible.

However, it is precisely in this way that the failure to banish the alleged threat can be accommodated – by continually redefining both objectives and targets. In fact, the war on terror’s very utility lies in its obvious failure to remove the ambient sense of insecurity it instils: it actively stimulates a demand for more security and reinforces calls for an increase in the scope of its security measures and technologies, and for a further widening of the definition of those it encompasses. As it continually runs the risk of losing its purchase through overuse, the war on terror must be as continually revivified. In this sense, it is not a ‘war’ as such at all, but a social practice that brings in its train political and economic benefits – benefits that can only be assured as long as its rationale remains operative. Keen (2006, p.4) takes this further: he describes the war on terror as not merely a social practice but a system in and of itself, with all the ‘hidden political, economic and psychological functions of indiscriminate counter-terror’. Given this, it has been all the easier to allow the actual term ‘war on terror’ to fall into abeyance, while the system it describes continues to thrive and grow. Indeed, its self-reinforcing, circular logic ensures that it endures. As Keen (2006, p.68) says: ‘How can all this [security expenditure] be justified in the context of massive world poverty and the high and growing levels of poverty…? …through continued conflict’.

As a result of its ever-widening remit, the doctrine of ‘endless war’ has a tendency to seep into other spheres – an aspect of the ideological drive that has animated the war on terror from its inception. Thus neoliberal politicians have been able to turn to the discourse of security in an attempt to intensify and direct collective anxiety towards the forced migrant. By contrast with ‘the tangible daily experience of insecurity manufactured by the markets’, the politics of fear is openly used to engender a preoccupation with personal safety, which has been ‘inflated and overloaded with meanings beyond its capacity’ (Bauman, 1998, p.119) (cf. chapter four). And as ‘Islamic terrorists’ are not a discrete or isolated group, they can be situated on a continuum, enabling the targeting of those more accessible enemies – forced migrants. What Keen (2006, p.81) calls the ‘schizophrenic official discourse’, whereby ‘we are
invited to believe that this is simultaneously a war and not a war’, has been aided by the
delegitimisation of terrorist violence as ‘criminal’, while state violence is legitimised as
‘war’ – a common tactic in state counter-terrorism – and this in turn has enabled the
retrospective justification of the creeping securitisation of European asylum and
immigration procedures, in train since the 1990s. This process of securitisation has been
brought out into the open and rapidly accelerated by the doctrine of the war on terror.
As the criminalisation of the forced migrant through a process of ‘illegalisation’ has
meant that their exposure to harsh security measures can appear to be reasonable,
logical and unavoidable, the punitive treatment meted out to them at the borders or
within Europe itself is often taken as evidence of guilt (what is termed as ‘just world
thinking’). In such a way, the forced migrant can begin to resemble, in the public
perception, their pre-ordained image as dangerous and alien, and their ascribed identity
becomes imbued with the similarly depoliticised and criminalised attributes of the
terrorist ‘outlaw’.

The dispossessed and global insecurity

Turning those targeted as the object of fear into their preconceived, negative image
shows that dehumanisation is not a mere side effect of the war on terror but a
fundamental part of the politics of fear it has promoted. In this context, Keen (2006)
aptly quotes Hannah Arendt on how this technique was materially effected by the Nazis
in the 1930s:

‘The official SS newspaper, the Schwarze Korps, stated explicitly in
1938 that if the world was not yet convinced that the Jews were the
scum of the earth, it soon would be when unidentifiable beggars,
without nationality, without money, and without passports crossed
their frontiers…’ A circular letter from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to all German authorities abroad … [in] 1938 [also] stated,
‘The emigration movement of only about 100,000 Jews has already
sufficed to awaken the interest of many countries to the Jewish
danger… [T]he influx … forms the best propaganda for German
Jewish policy’. (Arendt cited in Keen, 2006, p.140)

Fear of being ‘swamped’ by large numbers of Jewish refugees/impoverished ‘outsiders’
was indeed a common theme of the right-wing press and politicians during the 1930s in
Britain, and was taken up – if less vociferously – by the mainstream. The fear generated
by the potential social disruption these refugees supposedly represented was even more
potent as they were, as the *Schwarze Korps* noted, dispossessed and stateless. Refining the doctrine of the war on terror in 2002, Bush’s National Security Strategy also used ‘statelessness’ as a condition that condemned its bearers to lives as dangerous ‘aliens’: it described the ‘terrorist enemy’ as an ‘outsider’ whose ‘most potent protection is statelessness’ (Keen, 2006, pp.85-6). Statelessness signifies that an individual has fallen outside the international state system that defines the world – it appears to depict an existence in some sort of twilight zone, beyond the reach of recognisable legal and cultural norms, and those condemned to this zone can therefore be assumed to be ‘outlaws’, carriers of the potential anarchic disintegration of the ordered system of nation-states. Political fear thus endows those classified as stateless with an ‘alien’ power. Once their citizenship has been erased or downgraded (as with those fleeing such states of conflict and social and political disintegration as Somalia) or their right to acquire another, more privileged one denied, their identities can be simultaneously emptied of content and endowed with ideological meaning and power as purely objects of fear.

This betrays the fact that fear is a social enactment: it does indeed concern power, but in the sense of the actual relations and distribution of power within society. Fear is a constituent element of the relationship between the powerful and the powerless. It could hardly be otherwise. Those who have the least power obviously have the most to fear. As Foucault (2002 [1969]) famously put it, power shapes knowledge and vice versa. Those with power are endowed with the right to speak what counts as the ‘truth’, and through the language and definitions they adopt, and the instruments of governance they wield, can shape the identities of those with the least power, whose voices are muffled, interpretations disqualified, and individuality suppressed. The practical consequences for such individuals can be grave. But fear of those without power (in the final analysis, fear of a global working class: fear of their numbers and collective strength, of their suppressed, unrealised, *concrete* power as the creators of the system’s economic wealth, and of their lack of any true stake in the economic and political system that dispossesses them of this power) also keeps the powerful aware that, if other ways of sewing the national representatives of this class firmly into the warp and weft of the system prove too costly or ineffective, promoting fear of the ‘anarchic’ consequences of its breakdown is a historically proven strategy. The ‘world of order’ is opposed to a ‘world of disorder’ – located primarily in the Global South – that threatens to overwhelm it. Kaplan’s (1994, 2001) ‘world of disorder’, for example, is constituted by the global
threats of ‘overpopulation, drugs, disease and refugees’, which he presents as poised to overrun and infect the rational, stable world of American and European societies (cf. chapter two).

Thus a picture of a world appears, one that is on the brink of chaos. It has resonance as it approximates in a distorted way to reality (the potential for global economic breakdown, environmental disaster or the outbreak and uncontrollable spread of war, and the daily possibility of individual loss, is written into the operating code of global capitalism), but it manipulates this reality, transposing it onto other, manufactured ‘threats’, and thus deflects attention away from the true source of danger. Yet, as argued earlier, the threat of anarchic breakdown can appear too abstract and its causes too diffuse to label and locate, and it is liable to become diluted and muddied by the immediate, short-term needs of daily life. The personification and identification of a clearly defined source of anxiety/fear that can be somehow linked to this potential anarchy, as well as to more mundane daily problems, is therefore of paramount importance – even more so when the system is under strain. ‘[T]he ‘them and us’ certainties … gained in allure as a result of conditions of extreme economic and social uncertainty and inequality, [and personal] misfortunes’ (Keen, 2006, p.92).

The fear that hovers round the powerful/powerless equation can be displaced onto those close at hand, those most vulnerable and ‘available’ for victimisation. And as Arendt showed (above), these chosen objects of fear (delineated not simply by rhetoric but through targeted legal and administrative measures) can come to resemble the distorted figure they are claimed to be, and the naturalisation of this figure as an immediately recognisable image from a known lexicon of threats is assured as the predictions are apparently shown to be ‘accurate’. Although the majority of forced migrants do not, in reality, pose any conceivable terrorist threat, the fact that they are denied national rights and protections enables governments to use security measures against them, such as administrative detention or deportation, while the rule of law lends a patina of legitimacy to their treatment. The very extremity of the response to their presence can then be taken as evidence of the extremity of the target’s guilt – the fact that governments are willing to employ such punitive measures against these ‘outsiders’ can go some way towards convincing their citizens of the threat they pose. Thus, as Robin (2004a) shows, the manipulation or creation of fear does not need the application of overt coercion to society at large: it bleeds into the fabric of everyday
life, and this effect is at its most potent when the target belongs to a vulnerable group that can be labelled as ‘alien’.

The birth of a European ‘security state’

*The discourse of ‘difference’ and ‘authoritarian democracy’*

As it depends on the creation and propagation of a sense of ontological danger, the politics of fear entails recourse to a source of protection – hence, in the twentieth-first century it has become synonymous with a ‘politics of security’. However, as argued above, except when portraying the immediate physical threat of annihilation through a terrorist attack (a level of fear that would be difficult to sustain psychologically on a daily basis), the danger appears in more complex, less direct ways. It is fashioned to represent a threat to the security of our social and cultural identity – that is, to that part of our sense of self that is formed through unconscious negotiations with, and adaptations to, the capitalist milieu in which we exist, specifically through a sense of our place as national citizens in a shifting and unstable world.

This is a world where millions are daily on the move across global space (mobility, forced or otherwise, being a common human condition in an uncertain world), but one that is at the same time politically ordered into a seemingly static, hierarchical patchwork of boundaried nation-states. In a global environment shaped by systemic inequality, the difference between being a national citizen of a more privileged state against that of a state on the margins of the global economy, and the difference between living as a citizen and of existing without the status of full citizenship or without status at all, can be crucial to physical safety and well-being. The fear of ‘difference’ becomes inherent to our sense of ontological security, and can appear to be integral to who we are and to a commonsense understanding of what identity means.

As Dillon (1996, p.36) notes, security creates a political order in which ‘we’ are constructed by ‘teaching us what to fear’ – fear, in this way, can be directed to flow along well-worn channels towards an embodiment of ‘difference’. This is particularly so in those societies where the neoliberal doctrine of ‘rights and responsibilities’ holds sway. Here, despite the rhetoric extolling the importance of a culturally cohesive community, the individual self is extracted from society, privileged above it, then left exposed to the vagaries of a profit-driven economic system and made to bear full responsibility for its impact on their life. The alienation that capitalism imposes on its
subjects through the forcible dispossession of their creative labour is characterised as personal autonomy/freedom, and this is sharpened by a neoliberal political agenda that includes the wholesale privatisation of social goods. The resulting sense of fragmentation that can assail the individual who is thus disembedded from society must be countered by the idea of belonging to a ‘national community’, by virtue of possessing a common, immutable ‘cultural identity’. However, as this ‘identity’ is not an essential substance but a highly artificial one, it can only be maintained through a (now-intensified) sense of difference. The constructed, horizontal, ‘cultural community’ – which flattens out the increasingly stark divisions of class, wealth and power – and the sense of identity it gives rise to, can only be given meaning by reference to those deemed to fall outside it, due to their irreconcilable difference. In this way, security and subjectivity become inextricably linked – identity is ‘secured’ through a definition based on differentiation. However, this process itself compounds the sense of alienation, in ways that could potentially impact the semblance of social cohesion so vital to systemic order:

[T]he more unity, uniformity and immutability is demanded of the self, the more ethical dissolution and irresolution is produced; and the more the self is fragmented into competing egotistical solipsisms, incarcerated within equally fragmented and dessicated worlds. (Dillon, 1996, p.200)

This enhanced sense of alienation, therefore, demands a yet more intensive focus on identifying and expelling those characterised as different and ‘alien’, in an attempt to displace an obscured, underlying psychic discomfort or distress onto those designated as agents of the fragmentation of a notional national community and the sense of identity wedded to its supposed coherence.

As the neoliberal version of national security relies on the construction of this very specific sense of personal identity, it becomes the site of a ‘politics of difference’. Connolly (cited in Dillon, 1995, p.169) is attuned to the dangers that such a political condition, when taken to its logical conclusion in the explicit endorsement of a politics of fear, holds for a system of liberal democracy. He predicts the result will be that ‘state mechanisms for electoral accountability [become] reduced to conduits for the production of others against whom to wage moral war’ (Ibid., p.169). Bunyan (2009) believes this scenario is already taking form within Europe, with the drift towards more authoritarian and militarised societies – what he terms ‘democratic authoritarianism’.
The attempt to privilege and ring-fence an unaccountable executive power, alongside the normalisation of exceptional measures, has been formalised in the European Union’s Stockholm Programme, the latest five-year plan for ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, adopted in December 2009 (cf. the Council of Europe, 2009; Bunyan, 2009; Wicht, 2010), and the 2010 Treaty of Lisbon (cf. Europa, 2009). The latter, in particular, betrays its underlying purpose in its actual construction. It involved a sleight of hand: through its formulation as a series of amendments to already existing treaties, the political managers of the European Union were able to impose, without democratic debate, a near-identical version of the constitutional-style treaty roundly rejected by those populations allowed to vote on its adoption. Meanwhile, in an attempt to manage the economic crisis threatening the very existence of the Eurozone, the core economies created a centralised ‘fiscal union’ in 2011 that entrenches their power to enforce a pan-European austerity programme on populations across the region.

What these moves point to is the silent, gradual transformation of power relations taking place within Europe’s core nation-states – although not in the way the apologists of globalisation celebrated with the idea of the waning of nation-state power, the dissolution of borders, and the release of the individual from the restrictions of a singular national identity with the creation of mobile, cosmopolitan ‘global citizens’. The managers of the nation-state must, of course, increasingly operate according to a ‘global agenda’ – shaping policies to fit the demands of a global economic system and its transnational agents who wield unprecedented influence inside their national borders – but they have not abandoned the nation-state form (cf. chapter two). Far from it, the state itself has become increasingly centralised, and while its power to determine economic strategy has radically diminished, it has further strengthened its authority over its citizens’ mobility (and thus identity) under the guise of ‘e-government’; the centralisation and consolidation of an unaccountable state power is seen most visibly in the collection, processing and sharing of personal information for the purposes of ‘population management’ (cf. Talbot Rice, 2009). This, of course, is a technique of government with a long history, but as technological developments hold out the goal of an exponential deepening and widening of state access and control, this strategy appears to be facilitating the growth of Bunyan’s ‘authoritarian democracy’. Indeed, Hayes (2009a) takes this scenario further with the belief that the securitisation of European societies is mutating into a fundamentally new form of governance. He claims that profound structural changes are taking place: ‘…the word “security” now serves to
justify a range of policies and practices… [It is now] a byword for the state to deal coercively with all risks, real and imagined’ (Ibid., p.1).

It could be argued, however, that the European Union has from the first displayed the contours of a ‘security state’, one that is primarily focused on the ‘alien’/’outsider’. Transnational and intergovernmental fora, the Trevi Accords (1975) and the Schengen Agreement (1985) all incorporated migration into its constitutional structure, and European policies were first and foremost focused on its borders. The subsequent 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement, which signalled the dissolution of its internal borders, specifically linked immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and the control of Europe’s external borders. Schengen unleashed a host of surveillance systems to track, monitor and control those deemed to be ‘alien’ (including the creation of a Europe-wide database, the Schengen Information System – now known as SIS II). The Dublin agreement (2004), in its turn, introduced Eurodac, a central register of fingerprints of all who claim asylum at the borders of member states, which has since been updated into a vast database recording and storing biometric details. The 1995 Barcelona Conference signalled a further key moment in the interpenetration of security and migration, and the outward reach of Europe’s security agenda. The conference was convened as a meeting between all the European Union foreign ministers and those of the nation-states of North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) with the purpose of drawing up ‘development initiatives’ tied to agreements concerning the militarisation of these states’ borders against the forced migration of their nationals to Europe. The agreement was cemented at a time when the neurosis over the rise of Islamic movements, particularly in Algeria, was beginning to take European leaders in its grip (cf. Marfleet, 2000). The war on terror has subsequently reinforced this whole security framework and fine-tuned its activities to the point where forced migrants, particularly those from majority Muslim countries, can be conflated with so-called ‘Islamic terrorists’. This perception is now embedded in everyday discourse through the activities of a vastly expanded security apparatus.

Even when the most recent technological developments in the field of security and their application in the service of a ‘global regime of migration management’ are taken into account, it can be seen that the intertwining of security with migration management, evidenced in the common asylum and immigration regime that accompanied Schengen’s opening of Europe’s internal borders, is not necessarily the outlier of a novel political structure. On the contrary, although its economic structure
looks increasingly precarious, the global reach of its securitisation agenda and the extension of its influence over the direction of Europe’s societies is perhaps a sign that the elite project that is the European Union is in fact reaching its apogee in a way that was already inscribed in its undemocratic, unaccountable and secretive decision-making processes.

The pre-emptive and ‘predictive’ technologies of securitisation, however, have significantly enhanced the appearance of state control of mobility, shifting state power to a more coercive level, and reaffirming its sovereignty. In the ‘defence’ of a so-called enlightened, liberal culture, the much-vaulted rights and freedoms presumed to be the essential elements of a European identity have been, as Dillon (1996, p.29) remarks, ‘reduced to determinants of security’, while the sovereignty of the state has become increasingly synonymous with the production of identities based on a securitised politics of difference – as Connolly predicted (op. cit.). This has conferred increased power to Europe’s ‘global migration management’ regime to open, limit or deny access to national and transnational labour markets. Such an attempt to assert control over individual mobility necessarily entails the coercive suppression not only of the freedoms and rights believed to inhere in liberal democracy, but of one of the most fundamental attributes of humanity itself – the freedom of movement:

[H]uman life, in its socially undifferentiated or unqualified (animal) sense, is inseparable from the uninhibited capacity for movement which is a necessary premise for the free and purposeful exercise of creative and productive powers. The exercise of these vital powers is … the foundation for all properly social life. Thus freedom of movement is inseparable from that still more basic human power which is generative of the very possibility of social life, namely, labour – the capacity to creatively transform our objective circumstances. (De Genova and Peutz, 2010, p.9)

As de Genova and Peutz (2010, p.2) show, the resulting ‘production and reconfiguration of political subjectivities’ (according to a differential template marked at either end by extremes of global mobility and immobility) means that that the ‘national community’ itself has become a site where the ‘expansive and punitive ramifications’ of the techniques of mobility management, such as interdiction, detection, detention and deportation, and the security technologies that ensure that the ‘alien outsider’ is ‘illegalised’, ‘insinuate the inequalities and excesses of state power and sovereignty into the everyday production of social space and the disciplining of
mundane social relations’. Those who manage global capitalism’s European nodes of wealth and power have seized the opportunity for the untrammelled exercise of power over those they attempt to condemn to a coercive immobility but who are simultaneously forced by this very economic system into the global circuits of ‘survival migration’. In the process, they are able to introduce the disciplinary mechanisms of security into the governance of their national citizenry, while obscuring this process through the consequent ‘reconfiguration of subjectivities’ according a calculus of ‘difference’.

Huysmans (2006) contends that a new understanding of political community has thus emerged within Europe, one that is designed to achieve the creation of ‘outsiders’, against whom the regional bloc of nation-states (organised in its current form as the European Union) can constitute itself as a unity. In order to instrumentalise this political understanding, a discourse of ‘hyper-nationalism’ is required to reify the sense of a European cultural unity (cf. chapter three). In seemingly contradictory fashion, because ‘difference’ is integral to cementing this definition of ‘European-ness’ within its divergent and increasingly restless societies, it has to be constantly summoned into existence, even as its actual presence is rhetorically condemned as threatening cultural cohesion. The sense of a specific cultural identity, so crucial to the popular legitimation of the neoliberal European project, is placed in the ‘domain’ of (in)security – which is delineated by ‘Islamic terrorism’, organised crime and ‘illegal’ immigration. Widely differing forms of unease are melded together according to a security template, and sealed in place by the codified agreements, institutional practices and policy decisions that help constitute the political identity of the European Union.

**The construction of a European securitisation process**

Both the physical and imagined space of the European Union is, therefore, discursively structured by security terms that find their source – their vocabulary, images and narratives – in already well-entrenched ideological imaginaries of the world. The political and economic developments of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Western-based capitalism that precipitated the first wave of globalisation gave birth to a corresponding ‘globalisation of the language, forms and practices of the policy of security on which [the European state system] is based’ (Dillon, 1995, p.165). These practices have continued to be ‘fundamental to that axiomatic privileging of security upon which a Western understanding of the political relies’ (Dillon, 1996, p.27). Dillon
further asserts, however, that ‘[t]he same period also witnessed the exhaustion of the European State system’s modern metaphysical resolution of the question of the political – its profoundly ambiguous and deeply problematic inauguration as both a State of emergency and a certain kind of democratic project...’ (Ibid., p.27). Yet, arguably, these tropes have remained a core part of the rationale for the neoliberal project of the European Union.

In an earlier era, such nationalist discourses, expressed in colonial and overtly racial terminology, reflected and supported the violent inscription of ‘the limits of political community, political identity and political rights’ that accompanied capitalism’s spread (Ibid., p.170, my italics). Violence, therefore, is historically inherent in the practices of capitalist globalisation. The reification of the uneven and unequal processes of global capitalism as a unified, autonomous, ‘natural’ force entails that the violence these processes betray must be accounted for and therefore personalised. Hence, globalisation discourses are fashioned to fit the (in)security model through an emphasis on its so-called ‘dark side’, located primarily in the Global South. This is said to comprise the hidden undercurrent of crime, terrorism and lawlessness, including ‘illegal immigration’, that globalisation has unwittingly unleashed. The image of those who make up this ‘dark side’ is necessarily structured in terms of ‘difference’: they are ‘alien’ forces hijacking the otherwise ‘beneficial’ global spread of neoliberalism.

The construction of a domain of security that can both interpret and, by implication, contain these forces by enabling the securitised control of global mobility, is a central activity of those who manage and benefit from neoliberal globalisation. It activates an entire theoretical apparatus. The word ‘security’, in and of itself, is described by Dillon (1996) as a ‘floating signifier’ – an abstract, unquantifiable term, with powerful emotive connotations, that can attach to any discourse and become invested with a plurality of meanings. To be of specific political use, it must be defined, given substance and grounded in a theoretical apparatus – one that is dominated by ‘security professionals’ (academics, officials with oversight of national security concerns, and those who control or manage the security industry). These professionals, by virtue of their expertise in the field, are endowed with the power to specify what is to be feared. They are able to impose definitions of security (that is, definitions of what should be identified as jeopardising it). In the course of this pursuit, they mobilise previously assembled conceptual and narrative resources, and further create and order expert knowledge to which the ordinary person has little access. In this way, the equally
abstract figure of the forced migrant can be problematised as a security preoccupation
and embedded in ‘a discursive structure … of knowledge already accumulated in that
field’ (Aradau, 2008, p.15). The forced migrant enters a space ‘structured and
categorised in security terms … by [both] discourses and institutional practices’ (Ibid.,
p.20) that are well adapted to creating forms of exclusion in the name of ‘order’ and
‘security’.

The role of ‘security professionals’ – whom Bigo (2006) describes as
‘professionals of the management of unease’ – in delineating this discursive space is
linked to the increasing physical transformation of Europe into a space structured and
controlled by what Hayes (2009a) terms, a ‘security-industrial complex’, with the
private sector at is heart. The privatisation of state violence marks Europe’s security
system as the child of neoliberal capitalism. Contracting out much of its practices to
nationally based transnational defence/security industries and third-party states confers
the benefits of ‘deniability’ on the political managers of Europe’s nation-states, while
awarding the security conglomerates a vast profits bonanza. Hence, a mutually
beneficial relationship has developed between the defence industry and European
government officials. Former EU Commissioner Franco Frattini (2007) confirmed this
policy of privatisation and outsourcing as central to European Union philosophy:
‘Security is no longer a monopoly that belongs to public administrations, but a common
good, for which responsibility and implementation should be shared by public and
private bodies’.

A plethora of private security organisations and representatives of the powerful
multi-billion-dollar global security industry (as well as representatives of the national
security industries of certain privileged non-European nation-states, significantly the US
and Israel) are now incorporated in various ways into the core of the European Union’s
security/migration apparatus: sitting on its committees; operating its think-tanks,
producing directional papers and organising its conferences; designing its security
research; providing its technology and the personnel to direct and operate it; and helping
draw up the content of its security policies – basically, assembling Europe’s security
apparatus and shaping its structure according to a profit-based agenda. In so doing, they
are transforming their so-called ‘security knowledge’ into the theoretical bedrock of a
form of privatised political governance of mobility, untroubled by democratic
accountability. This expert knowledge has introduced a terminology specifically geared
towards integrating the national security technology of each member state into one
seamless security apparatus stretching across the region: the terms ‘the principle of availability’ and ‘interoperability’, alongside the more generally operative mantra of ‘public-private partnerships’, are to be found liberally scattered throughout the more recent European Union documents (cf. Hayes, 2009b). This terminology forms a semantic continuum, linking together the common interests and forms of expert knowledge of all areas of security, and thereby disguising the slippage of the military approach from the war on terror to border control and the management of migration, and allowing for the ever-expanding scope of the definition of existential threats (cf. Carr, 2010a).

What is most disturbing, of course, is the way the security paradigm is manifest in the ‘technological revolution’ of border control; the professed aim of a seamless integration of national police forces, customs and immigration services into an international intelligence and law enforcement system lies embedded in its semantic and theoretical construction. The technological systems developed to further this aim include networked surveillance and profiling technologies, automated targeting systems, and a range of satellite and space-based surveillance applications (cf. Hayes 2009b). Prominent multinational corporations have played a central role in the development of Galileo (the European Union’s GPS and satellite tracking system), for example, and have ensured that the remit of Korpenicus (its ‘earth observation system’) has been extended to cover law enforcement, including garnering ‘intelligence’ on the global movement of forced migrants. The European Union has also funded a covert programme introducing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’), remotely piloted military aircraft adapted for border-control purposes, in anticipation that the current ban on their use in European airspace will soon be overturned (cf. Hayes, 2009b).

Indeed, the discourse of security (premised on the ‘interoperability’ of its dedicated technologies) infects all areas of security policy research, even those seeking to control ‘threats’ far into the future: a 2008 European Council paper outlining the European Union’s ‘Climate Change and International Security Strategy’ predicts that environmental disasters will trigger mass migration in the direction of European borders, which must be stymied at source (Council of the European Union, 2008). This, of course, is a continuation of the programme in operation from the 1990s of preventing forced migrants leaving areas of devastation, and outsourcing the policing of Europe’s increasingly de-territorialised borders to the Global South (cf. the Barcelona Conference referred to above; Marfleet, 2000). However, although the transformation of an asylum
regime based on the 1951 Refugee Convention into a regime of ‘global migration management’ dedicated to pre-emptive prevention and control has been taking place beneath a surface of lip-service to its precepts for a number of decades, it is now openly accepted as formal European policy. It has become so as a result of being embedded in an increasingly normalised discourse of security and the expansion of the ‘security-industrial complex’.

The European Union’s security policy is thus coalescing around a security-industry defined high-tech blueprint. Its model envisages a future world of what Klein (2007a) terms ‘red zones and green zones’. Its external borders are to be controlled by military force, with passport checks and immigration controls replaced by security fences; centrally operated and specifically adapted military robots\(^{li}\); ‘sprawling e-borders’ enabled by biometric technology and satellite surveillance; rapid reaction forces, such as the ‘rapid border intervention teams’ (RABITS) controlled by Frontex \((cf.\ Frontex\ 2008;\ 2010a;\ 2010b;\ 2011)\); interdiction in international waters\(^{lvii}\); and a seamless system of forced removals and readmission agreements with ‘third countries’. Meanwhile, its internal borders will be policed by a network of physical and virtual security checkpoints, linked to dedicated border police, personnel seconded from private security firms, and high-tech surveillance and intelligence systems (Hayes, 2009b, p.5). The fact is, however, this blueprint remains a dystopian vision and is far from being effected. Its technology is being introduced in a far more haphazard and ineffectual way than at first appears when reading its ambitious policy and planning documents, which are couched in the language of the security industry advisors who help pen them. It must be continually borne in mind that such security experts have a vested economic interest in the mystification of technology and its portrayal as endowed with a potentially omniscient and omnipresent, near-autonomous power.

However, whatever the ineffectuality on the ground, the introduction of what Amoore, Marmura and Salter (2008) call ‘smart borders’, predicated on this new paradigm of control through ‘total surveillance’, are having a real impact not only on those individuals immobilised by them, but also, crucially, on the discourse defining the figure of the forced migrant. Smart borders have been promoted as an attempt to combat the ‘fragmentation and displacement of the [European] border’ \((cf.\ chapter\ three)\) through control of the mobile body of the forced migrant by tracking their movement through the grid of a continuously monitored global space until they are materialised and immobilised at networked, ‘de-territorialised nodal points of information exchange’
The ‘smart border’, therefore, is diffuse, it extends both far beyond and deep inside its geopolitical location and involves ‘a multiplicity of sites for the surveillance of movement’ (Ibid., p.99), where the supposed existential ‘threat’ to national citizens is managed by the automatic separation and segregation of ‘illegal’ from ‘legal’ ‘mobile bodies’.

The form this surveillance takes is characterised by Bigo’s (2006) concept of the ‘Ban-opticon’. This adapts Foucault’s seminal theory of the ‘Panopticon’, the image of a society controlled through surveillance at a distance, to fit the political environment of twenty-first century Europe, where the strategic function of the ‘panoptical gaze’ has been transformed – despite the rhetorical aim of ‘Total Information Awareness’ – from the focus on a whole population to that of the selective surveillance of smaller numbers, overwhelmingly comprising racially defined forced migrants, especially those from Muslim majority countries, who are ‘trapped in the imperative of mobility’ (Ibid., p.35).

This ‘ban-optical’ process relies on the concepts of ‘hyper-control’ and ‘social sorting’ through the categorisation of individuals according to surveillance-based data. The targeted violence this entails, as witnessed in its outcomes, is displaced onto its subjects – those who are forced into the most vulnerable and marginalised condition. This reveals that behind the rhetoric of ‘total control’ over migration lies a starker reality: these technologies facilitate the inclusion into European member states of a highly vulnerable, highly exploitable, hidden workforce, labouring under the threat of exposure and deportation. The ability to effect this is enhanced by the fact that such technologies of security, driven by a politics of fear, are becoming detached from the national polity itself and from the constraints of territorially based legal regulation (cf. Wilson and Weber, 2008). Any residual logic of legal rights or enshrined liberties (or even simple humanity) is finally evacuated at these ‘biometric borders’.

Biometrics, therefore, are arguably becoming the new border – ubiquitous and mobile. As physical borders are never impermeable, and can be and are frequently transgressed, those individuals selected as the focus of surveillance are to be monitored and tracked by a network of transnational and deterritorialised security agencies and bureaucracies. Amoore (2006, pp.347-8) believes that the actual bodies of such targeted individuals appear to those who wish to control their movement as the ‘sites of encoded boundaries’: individuals carry the border within them wherever they go as part of their given identity as ‘illegal aliens’. The new biometric technologies reduce them to collections of numerical algorithms. Their identity is hostage to a suite of interrelated
security systems, programmed to collect, process, store and disseminate the information produced by that most fundamental of all alienating and objectifying practices – the reduction of an individual human being to an assemblage of digitalised body parts. The disaggregated, dehumanised individual is woven into an intricate web of digital information, integrated into permanent databases and stored in vast ‘data warehouses’, and their ‘patterns of behaviour’ are constructed by ‘data mining’ the movements and activities of the digitalised collections of information they have now become. They can then be identified at the physical border by comparing their ‘data shadow’ with its live representation.

The outcome of this insistent drive towards a technologically enabled European ‘security state’, even as it fails to deliver the rhetorical dream of a seamless, integrated management of global mobility, is already having devastating consequences on those individual forced migrants caught in its net. The technologies of exclusion rolled out across Europe, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS II), Eurodac, or the Visa Information System (VIS)\textsuperscript{lviii}, all rely on searchable databases. The stereotype of the ‘illegal alien’ is fed into the data-mining systems, giving them both content and rationale. As Lyon (2003, p.22) shows, these ‘increasingly automated discriminatory mechanisms for risk profiling and social categorising represent the key means for reproducing and reinforcing social, economic and cultural divisions’ – and this ‘categorical suspicion has consequences for anyone … caught in its gaze’. The punitive character of this politically driven security agenda, however, is hidden beneath a routine administrative visage – the inherent violence of its selection and segregation operations (pre-emptive exclusion, detention and deportation, and the creation of an invisible, vulnerable informal workforce) is obscured by the ‘neutral’ character of the technologies it employs. ‘[B]iometric technologies mask the often discriminatory character of this exclusionary move behind its objective, technological and scientific discourse’ (Ceyhan, 2008, p.113). A seemingly impersonal, ‘value-free’ technological apparatus is mobilised to impose a definition of (in)security upon the selected object of fear, helping to simultaneously confirm and create the discursive operation that invests this apparatus with purpose and power.

Furthermore, the development of a framework for the implementation of these biometric identification systems is effectively being outsourced to companies and lobby groups promoting the technological infrastructure of mobility control. European Union legislation mandating the collection, storage and inclusion of biometric data in travel
documents, for example, is now supported by a number of security research projects (cf. Hayes, 2009a, 2009b), under the tutelage of the security industry. (Among the main beneficiaries is the European Biometrics Forum, an umbrella group of suppliers.) Thus the process of identifying and criminalising the forced migrant/’illegal’ border-crosser – that is, the construction of their identity – has been privatised. As Epstein (2008, p.185) says, their body is ‘scrutinised and controlled in intimate detail’, dehumanised and objectified, by anonymous private organisations. Alienation appears to have reached its ultimate neoliberal form.

*The security system: discourses, practices and technologies*

These cross-referential instruments of security determine the boundaries of legitimacy, and in so doing, help generate a normative European identity, one that derives from the idea of the necessity to banish ‘difference’ and exclude those who embody it. In the attempt to ‘secure’ this coercive sense of identity, ‘security’ has become an insistent preoccupation within Europe. However, as Dillon (1996, p.158) notes, in this context ‘security’ is not a descriptive noun but exists as a ‘principle of formation that does things’: the creation of the figure of the forced migrant as the dangerous antithesis of a stable, cohesive European identity requires the ‘securitisation’ of the asylum and immigration system, and this demands far more than simply a discourse of security. In fact, it is a process, and as such is multidimensional. The security regime comprises what Aradau (2007) calls a ‘plural, interlocking system’ of co-dependent institutions, technological systems and discursive practices.

Aradau’s analysis of the formation and function of the security system is one that is reflected in many of the studies emanating from the critical security field. Cehyan (2008, p.103), for example, characterises the system as a ‘security assemblage’, using Foucault’s depiction of an ‘assemblage’ as a process in which heterogeneous elements are linked together with governmental ‘procedures, regulations, institutions, discourses and perceptions’. However, by emphasising ‘the social, symbolic, organisational and juridical aspects of technology’, and its formative contribution to ‘the profiling and control of individual and social behaviours’ (*Ibid.*, p.103), Cehyan leans towards Bigo’s (2006) analysis of securitisation. Bigo appears to extrapolate the technology of government from this ‘interlocking system’ in order to emphasise its significance to the creation of a security regime. He tends toward a Foucauldian privileging of the discrete areas of social power that arise from the administrative and technological practices of
government: the ‘field of forces’, of which these technologies are part, constitutes various ‘institutional archipelagos’ in which professional managers cooperate and compete in overseeing the technologies of control and surveillance that construct a biopolitical image of the ‘alien enemy’. Although he sees discourse as essential in that it provides the rationale for the practices that propel the process of securitisation, Bigo (2006, p.8) claims that it flows from the creation of a security regime of ‘transnational truth’ that is sourced in the statistics, biometrics and sociological profiles generated by technological processes. This appears to infer that how these security technologies operate, and the specific ways in which they process information, dictates their application and gives form to the objects of their scrutiny and control. Bigo, therefore, believes that the security frame ‘derives from practices that are embedded in organisations and institutions…’ (Ibid., p.30).

Although a cogent depiction of the way the development of security technologies and their application can transform outcomes on the ground, such an analysis leaves little room for the dialectical relationship between such an operation and the political form its animating security discourse takes. Such a discourse both implicitly confirms a particular ideological picture of the world and helps embed the political and administrative practices and procedures, and their technological applications, within its (currently neoliberal) imaginary – an imaginary that not only endows them with rationale and direction, but helps shape the form in which they develop, the way they are applied and, most importantly, to whom they are applied. Unless we remain attuned to the constant dialectical interweaving of often dissonant impulses within the attempted naturalisation of the system, we come up against a seeming disconnect between the routine, technological governance of mobility – a process whose unnatural and alienating nature demands that it must be normalised if it is to be integrated into the accepted day-to-day management of society – and the manifestation of the ‘alien’ subject of a politics of fear. This runs the risk of promoting a tendency to privilege one over the other, negating the complex interconnections within the ‘interlocking’ political, administrative and technological machinery of this system of security.

The capitalist system relies on control of the flow of living labour (and of the mobility of its bearers and of the spaces through which they move) in order to control the process by which their labour is appropriated and transformed into an essential unit of production and its value extracted and expropriated for the purposes of capital accumulation and profit. This process requires a machinery of management that will
circumscribe the freedom of movement that is ‘an ontological condition of human life’ (de Genova and Peutz, 2010, p.8). In the attempt, the technological and managerial tools thus deployed help to bring into being the figure of the ‘global illegal’, the ‘border-crosser’ who attempts to evade this regime of global mobility management. Conversely, however, the ideological creation of this figure lies embedded in the security discourse that animates and directs these technologies of control. This digitalised embodiment of capitalist alienation, therefore, is also their motor and rationale, as well as their part-creation. The contradictions revealed in the changing nature of the relationship of the politics of fear (and its political and social enactment in an enhanced security regime) to the fluctuating needs of a national/global economic system of production can only be accommodated by what Wacquant (2008, p.13) calls ‘the capacity of the state to produce reality through the inculcation of categories and classifications’. Institutions, practices and discourses, therefore, ‘shoulder both tasks at once, simultaneously acting to enforce hierarchy and control contentious categories’ by ‘communicating norms and shaping collective representations and subjectivities’ (Ibid., p.13).

As Harvey (2007 [1982]) points out, capitalism is a social relation that internalises the relationship between its tensions and contradictions, a relationship that is then played out in everyday life. The struggle by the different nationally based managers of the global system to control to their advantage the qualitative changes in this dynamic, expansive and disruptive economic system (changes that continually throw up such contradictions), includes the attempt to manage or direct the movement of peoples across the globe. ‘Therefore, abstract market movements in practice mean highly exclusionary measures against groups of people’ (Ibid., p.450). At the same time, the attempt to naturalise the eruption of the contradictory manifestations of a profit-driven system into everyday social existence requires that such practices segue with an ideological worldview that is already buried deep in social consciousness as a given, commonsense understanding of the world – one that must be daily adapted or reconfigured to answer the need to address immediate concerns.

It is no surprise that this practice in itself raises yet further tensions and contradictions, as the attempt to present a unified conception of the world that naturalises a system that is profoundly unnatural and conflicted will itself be fragmentary and incoherent. The attempt to impose a violent system of capital accumulation on social life as ‘a set of abstractions or [narrative] fictions’ (Harvey, 2006, pp.81-2) is therefore part of a process, one that is composed of dialectical
movement. As capitalism is a social relation or process that is constantly changing, the interplay between the various techniques, technologies and discourses of government, and between these and the different processes of a market-driven economy, although independent of one another are at the same time drawn together in a ‘dynamic field of interaction’ (Ibid., p.76).

Ideology, therefore, operates on several, often divergent and seemingly unrelated levels. However, in its security guise, it represents an attempt to control mobility and to displace the social antagonisms that arise from the activities of dispossession and exploitation that the control of movement attempts to facilitate. These imperatives do not always sit easily together, and they are also frequently undercut by the more immediate, competing interests of all those involved in, or standing to benefit from, the operation of such a security programme – as well as by ensuing consequences as its targeted violence spills out into society at large. The fundamental purpose of the ideological operation that frames the discourse of security and informs the creation of the security apparatus, however, is to disguise and thus undermine the potential power of a now-global working class that carries within it the risk of the radical destabilisation of the capitalist order itself. Hence, the signal importance of the representation of the forced migrant as the ‘global alien’ to neoliberalism’s ideological toolkit.

Conclusion
The ‘security knowledge’ that invests the technological and managerial apparatus of Europe’s security regime with power and direction is, therefore, inherently political: it creates and sustains a specific political imaginary that defines and reifies the ‘national community’, and its strategic deployment is an ‘analytical and normative choice’ (Huysmans, 2006, p.145). The framing of forced migration by a security discourse – the ‘securitisation’ of the asylum and immigration system – undoubtedly involves more than symbolic narrative. However, although this process includes the use of expert knowledge, security technologies and administrative techniques, the profoundly political question of European identity is knitted into all of these. As Huysmans (2006, p.145) reminds us, ‘security knowledge is political [because] it creates and sustains particular images of the place and nature of a political community’. An increasingly global asylum and immigration regime is thus enmeshed at an institutional level with internal security concerns, creating a European state infrastructure designed to define
who is and who is not ‘European’, the better to both control global mobility and to effect the conversion of the forced migrant into an ‘illegal’ presence. The figure of the ‘global alien’, ripe for ideological (and economic) exploitation, arises from the attempt to manage an inherently unstable and uncontrollable system.

The objectification and dehumanisation of the forced migrant into a figure of ‘illegality’ justifies, in turn, the continual stream of border legislation, fast-track development of surveillance and policing technologies, and expanding number of places of detention. These militarised administrative technologies and punitive legislative processes help keep in circulation a narrative of security that validates a belief in the essential integrity of Europe’s external borders as boundary and defence of an inherent national/European culture and identity – and the threat posed to these by ‘culturally alien’ ‘outsiders’ seeking to cross into Europe’s core nation-states ‘illegally’. However, its displaced, de-territorialised and increasingly virtual borders, extending into global space, cannot be guarded through administrative and military border policing alone, but also calls for biopolitical technologies for identifying, categorising and intercepting such ‘illegal’ individuals. The figure of the forced migrant as ‘global illegal’ is thus framed by the discourse of security that suffuses the European Union’s integrated asylum and immigration policies – a discourse that is embedded in its increasingly digitalised technologies of mobility control.

My contention is, therefore, that the figure of the forced migrant is recruited as a key ideological component (in the European Union there have been few subjects more intensively discussed than ‘illegal immigration’ in the attempt to create and secure amongst the region’s disparate populations the sense of a unified European cultural identity. This is particularly the case at a time when Europe’s political managers face fears that the current crisis will unravel its putative coherence, expose its inherent contradictions, and render its national governments and their hegemonic narratives vulnerable to the spread and generalisation of social unrest.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

The historical context
From the 1880s to the beginning of the First World War, the nation-state form was globalised and generalised into a fully international system as, under the banner of imperialism, each of the leading European economies entered the competition to stake their claim to a share of the world’s resources, or wrest control over them from their competitors (leading, in turn, to the first truly global conflagration). It was in this context of imperialist economic and geopolitical competition that the idea of a threatening, ‘cosmopolitan’, racial ‘alien’ (identified in Europe as the Eastern European or Russian Jewish migrant) came to the fore. Although defined by nationalist tropes, it emerged as the accompaniment to the theme of global domination. The creation of a figure representing an absolute alterity – an ‘otherness’ that indicated a supposedly ubiquitous and inimical global presence – implicitly complemented the national drive to economic and geopolitical global expansion. This figure has been propelled to the forefront of the ideological agenda, albeit in alternative guise, at different times since (finding its most deadly manifestation in the Nazi era) but always as an ideological companion to the global outward push and restructuring of the capitalist system, a process that inevitably involves displacement and dispossession across the globe, precipitating mass upheaval and migratory movements. The shifting of the geopolitical tectonic plates, under the pressures of a globalising system of capital accumulation, engenders a generalised sense of the mutability, volatility and insecurity of the world. Thus, this figure of the ‘global alien’ has re-emerged most recently in Europe in the context of the most far-reaching spread of capitalism yet and its transformation into a truly global system – one that is now on the verge of experiencing an equally global economic crisis that could well leave no country untouched.

My research has shown that this trope of the ‘global alien’ has been developed, refined and enlarged over the last thirty years, ready to resurface in a virulently racial form as the world enters recession, as a consequence of the resurgence and reassertion of an openly nationalist agenda in the major European nation-states. However, despite the turn to nationalism, and the crisis threatening the very existence of the Eurozone, the project of a unified regional European bloc is far from being abandoned. The need to
compete in a world economy structured by global markets impels not only fierce
competition between the nation-states, but also their cooperation in some semblance of
regional unity, however truncated the European Union may become in the future. The
resulting tension between these contradictory impulses has produced a sort of ‘hyper-
nationalism’. The political elite within the European Union’s member states are
engaged in a struggle to both reassert their hegemony within their national domains
(reassembling and re-emphasising a specific national identity) and to project this
identity upwards into an ‘identity of identities’, a sense of ‘European-ness’. They are
compelled to take this ideological course by the divisive and disruptive tendencies of a
global capitalism, characterised by endless circulation, transience and insecurity, that
articulates with their national economies and with their projected image as spaces of
immobility and security in an inherently mobile world.

It is within the context of this contradictory and conflictual climate within Europe,
that this thesis investigates, and proposes some answers to, the question of how the
figure of the ‘alien’ is given its current power as a ubiquitous, global threat – and why
its mantle has fallen upon those individuals forced by dispossession and displacement
into the criminalised global circuits of ‘survival migration’, who are rendered the most
vulnerable and marginal. However, if a critical analysis is to dismantle the ideological
prism through which the forced migrant is viewed, it must first deconstruct the
hegemonic discourses that both seek to naturalise and de-historicise the commonsense
imaginaries that imprison social consciousness within their ideological boundaries and
elevate capitalist globalisation into an abstract force, masking its reality as a radically
unequal, exploitative and historically situated process. Analysing how and why the
figure of the forced migrant has become such a vital resource in this process of
abstraction has entailed tracing the origins of the discourses that turn the individual
forced migrant into a generic figure of alterity back to their source in the narrative
threads of nationalism from which it is woven.

In order to do this, I structured this problematic by using the tools provided by
previous research in various disciplinary fields and melding together their insights into
an interdisciplinary perspective. I then approached its analysis by placing it in the
context of the struggle amongst sections of the European political elite to establish a
normative pan-European identity. I argue that it is within this context – a globalised one
of upheaval, crisis and reconstruction – that the figure of the ‘global alien’, created from
the materials supplied by nationalism and its racialised discourse, and refined by the
securitisation agenda that the war on terror has introduced into European politics, has emerged as a key ideological trope. I believe, by so doing, my thesis presents a different avenue by which to approach the question of the forced migrant as both a national and global embodiment of the ‘other’.

**Discourses of nationalism, race and security: the creation of the ‘global alien’**

Capitalism’s socio-economic order can only be understood in global terms, even as it continues to take the shape of the nation-state/regional bloc of nation-states. However, its ideological narratives must be continually restructured to mirror the social manifestations of its systemic changes. In the attempt to negate the vision that economic crisis generates of a complex, conflicted and crisis-ridden system, the figure of the forced migrant stands ready primed as the ultimate paradigm of those global criminal/‘illegal’ forces apparently threatening to tilt a fragile world system into chaos. However, although this figure may be a vital resource in the attempted stabilisation of the given ideological sense of a world that obscures its basis of exploitation, competition and profit, the forced migrant simultaneously threatens to highlight its very real fractures and contradictions.

The spontaneous journeys of forced migrants (albeit under the compulsion of flight from untenable circumstances) undermine border regimes and the attempt to enforce ‘global migration control’ – the management of the mobility of labour. Moreover, forced migrants through their enforced mobility create networks that span the globe, from their countries of origin, through their countries of transit, to those European countries whose borders they seek to cross. These networks constitute communities that exceed the territorial frame of the nation-state, being for the most part situated in global spaces beyond the nation-state’s remit or in the interstices of the nation-state itself. Inherent in the forced migrant’s unregulated movement, therefore, is a challenge to the exclusionary politics of asylum and immigration control, and to the differential inclusions of a territorialising order.

This challenge is lent an even graver import by the contradictions that arise from the nature of the global economic order itself. The impact of restructuring a global system that displaces one crisis at the risk of precipitating another (cf. Harvey, 2010) has engendered for the first time in history a truly global working class. Although, admittedly working under radically altered conditions and with different profiles and
immediate interests, this transnational class has an increasingly universal experience of exploitation, inequality and social injustice. So it is that, as the mega-metropolises at the heart of the system increasingly become the setting for an intermingling of cultures, languages and ways of understanding the world, the forced migrant equally becomes the representative of this potentially fatal threat to the global system; their presence disturbs its surface appearance as a unified, autonomous force of nature, and disrupts its normalising narratives of national cross-class allegiance. At the same time, due to the reality of their situation of intense vulnerability imposed on them by all the ideological, political and administrative means at the disposal of the most economically and politically powerful nation-states, the forced migrant provides an ideal ideological resource in these states’ attempts to circumvent such a scenario. It is for this reason that the figure of the forced migrant has become imbued with such political power. As a deliberately depoliticised and marginalised figure, they have become a vital political tool, included in the ideological lexicon of the major European economies as the essential discursive connection between these nation-states’ inherently contradictory integration into the global economy and their national attempts to establish a sense of a (paradoxically) immutable yet vulnerable pan-European identity – in the face of the threat of its disintegration into the sense of a far wider collective identity that the global economy unwittingly generates.

Given such circumstances, the ideological mobilisations used to form this global figure of threat out of the forced migrant can only be fashioned from the timeless and habitual categories of nationalism, with its legitimising and hegemonic discourse of inclusion/exclusion. As the nation-state is moulded into new shapes by the demands of the global economy and the capitalist system’s ceaseless processes of transformation and reconstruction, the definition of the forced migrant as the ‘alien’ at the border has become increasingly functional to the construction of a European identity. The nationalist template is employed by political ideologues in the attempt to invest the idea of Europe with an emotional legitimacy, at a time when it is fracturing under the weight of crisis-induced austerity measures differentially imposed by governments responding to the edicts of the global financial markets. This entails the daily reproduction of a sense of ‘European-ness’ through a banal rhetorical reiteration of nationalist themes and multiple daily acts of exclusion and marginalisation.

Europe, in fact, faces an even deeper crisis of representation than do its individual member nation-states. The coherence of the European Union partially rests on its ability
to legitimise its existence among the national populations of its member nation-states, who are equally subjected to the ongoing (re)validation of competing national narratives. The idea of ‘European-ness’ has often appeared as an abstract formulation, with little coherence or authenticity, especially when coupled with the sense of the European Union as home to an elite, undemocratic, secretive centre of government. This, I argue, is particularly the case in the current situation, with the attempts at a fiscal unity (under the disciplinary supervision of an opaque European Central Bank) which depend on the authoritarian imposition of region-wide austerity measures entailing mass unemployment, the radical reduction of systems of welfare, and deepening poverty. Hence the turn to a nationalist narrative of identity, enlarged to encompass the idea of a European identity. A sense of ‘European-ness’, therefore, can only be engineered through a recalibration of national narratives of belonging – a ‘hyper-nationalism’ rooted in the identification of the global ‘alien outsider’ against whom it is measured, and whose provenance lies in the supposedly chaotic and threatening world beyond the common European border.

The nationalist tropes of inclusion/exclusion that underpin this sense of European identity are nested in the long-rehearsed theme of a European culture based in the rationality, individual freedom and inherent sense of morality attributed to the espousal of ‘universal’ Enlightenment values. The racialisation of those who stand beyond the nationalist European template, and thus lend it its internal coherence, is therefore manifest in ‘cultural’ disguise. This has become the form in which the racial code of this exclusionary nationalism is expressed – what Balibar (1991a) calls a ‘racism without race’ is focused on the forced migrant as the global embodiment of the threat to national identity and cultural cohesion carried by those portrayed as imbued with a hostile ‘alien’ culture.

As this form of racism now operates in an environment shaped by the Europe-wide security agenda unleashed by the ‘global war on terror’ it has become intertwined with an increasingly overt current of institutional and popular Islamophobia. The figure of the ‘absolute other’, invested with global characteristics by the universalising and dehumanising tropes of racism, is set in opposition to an equally universalised and essentialised European cultural identity. This figure then plays a fundamental role in the construction of an overarching sense of ‘European-ness’. The insertion of Islamophobia into the institutional structures of European society, with the image of Islam already framed by a discourse of existential danger, has resulted in the naturalisation of an
agenda of securitisation, which is equally employed to frame the figure of the forced migrant. Forced migrants can now be portrayed as not only disrupting national/regional cohesion and cultural unity, but also – especially when identified as coming from Muslim majority countries – as a potential global threat to ‘national security’. Through their insertion into the security agenda, the forced migrant is criminalised and driven into the ‘illegal’ spaces carved out by the necessities for global mobility, and into the ‘illegal’ interstices of Europe’s national economies, making them even more vulnerable to being re-inscribed as the ‘global enemy’, representative of all dangerous illegal practices.

This procedure forces to the surface the tensions and contradictions evident in the treatment of those who fall into the category of ‘irregular migrants’ or ‘illegal’ forced migrants. Europe’s racialised, ‘hyper-national’ discourse presents forced migrants as ‘illegitimate outsiders’, reinforcing the narrative of ‘national belonging’ through selective administrative processes of interdiction, incarceration and deportation. However, the global economic environment in which the major European economies operate reveals the contradictory basis of this discourse. One of the main purposes of the nation-state is to facilitate a global regime of capital accumulation, and the management of the flow of a highly exploitable irregular workforce is part of this function. ‘Illegal’ forced migrants (and irregular migrants) are part of a vast global web of illegalised labour. As they are highly exploitable, precisely because they are rendered highly vulnerable by their inherent ‘deportability’ (cf. de Genova, 2007, 2008, 2010) they are highly attractive to employers in certain sectors of the European economy. However, as my thesis has concentrated on the ideological development of the figure of the ‘global alien’ and its formation through the processes of securitisation, I have only been able to give glancing reference to this theme, which is developed far more comprehensively elsewhere (cf. Anderson and Rogaly, 2005; Andreas and Synder, 2000; Bhattacharyya, 2005; Shelley, 2007; Sassen, 2003).

That said, the creation of this ‘illegal’ figure is intimately related to a structural demand in the global economy for cheap, exploitable migrant labour, coupled with the growth of a transnational industry in clandestine migration, which seized the economic opportunities presented by an increasingly security-driven agenda of border control that compels forced migrants to enter nation-states ‘illegally’. The fact is that as part of the ‘shadow economy’, the ‘illegalised’ forced migrant is invisibly incorporated into the political community as an economic participant and, simultaneously, very visibly
endowed with the status of immanent ‘global outsider’. This illustrates the
contradictions between the struggle of Europe’s political elite for economic legitimacy
in a competitive global marketplace and its rhetoric of ‘national security’ that places the
forced migrant within the framework of a politics of fear and endows them with the
identity of a global existential threat – a threat that its rhetoric demands must be kept at
bay if Europe is to sustain the stability and coherence of its cultural identity, as well as
the security of its national populations.

The language and instruments of security have become pivotal to the process
through which the figure of the ‘illegal’ border-crossover is produced as a primary object
of external danger. With the inception of the war on terror, this figure was placed on a
‘security continuum’, alongside the global ‘jihadist’ and internationally organised
criminal networks, thus allowing the apprehension and anxiety (induced by the feelings
of personal insecurity that arise from the experience of living in an alienating, volatile
world structured by inequality and competition) to fuse with the discourses of
nationalism and race to create an existential fear of the ‘external’ and ‘alien’. This fear
is then woven into the social fabric through the banal, daily rituals of nationalism,
whose racialised tropes are buried so deep they often need only an allusory reference to
activate them. However, it is also emphasised on a regular basis in order to achieve a
heightened sense of insecurity through rhetorical reiteration, bolstered by the enactment
of security measures and displays of border policing (security guards, visa checks, pre-
emptive arrests, detention facilities, and a ubiquitous surveillance network) that help
confirm the ‘danger’ posed to society by the ‘illegal’ ‘global alien’. Energised by the
war on terror, a ‘politics of fear’ focused on the forced migrant has helped transform the
Europe Union’s ‘global asylum regime’ into a primary issue of security, elevating the
forced migrant into a figure of paramount political value for the ideological arsenal of
their neoliberal regimes. In their turn, the increasingly integrated administrative
procedures and networked technologies of a securitised asylum and immigration system
help transform European societies into an increasingly convincing semblance of a
‘security state’. In distinction to the rhetoric, however, as its major economies are a
crucial node in a global economy that thrives on the migration of ‘illegalised’ labour,
Europe’s system of border security must in reality consistently fall short of its declared
aim of sealing the border. Despite this, a politics of fear focused on the figure of the
forced migrant retains its ideological salience, and continues to hold economic and
political benefits for those involved in creating the structural edifice of a ‘security state’
– and the discourse of global threat continues to represent the means whereby the construct of a national/European identity is naturalised through its distinction with its binary opposite, the ‘global alien’.

**The human consequences of a securitised asylum regime**

As a consequence of this securitisation agenda, whose avowed aim is to ensure the security of Europe’s populations, those caught up in its asylum regime are confronted with a security process that threatens them with a very radical form of *insecurity* – they are subject to a form of spatial and social segregation that can have profound consequences for their lives. Since the inception of the nation-state, the most powerful example of spatial segregation has been the construction and maintenance of the borders used to carve geographical space into national and regional parcels. The core European nation-states, driven by neoliberal ideological imperatives, now condemn those excluded from their privileged territorial spaces to an existence in a liminal zone: a global no-man’s-land both inside and beyond their borders. The condition of many forced migrants can be described as liminal not least because their spatial segregation within Europe itself as an ‘illegal’ figure, either incarcerated or forced into the ‘informal economy’ and living under the threat of deportation, corresponds to a temporal segregation. In a sense, they are condemned to living in an eternal present, confined in a sort of space/time prison, unable to anticipate the future without fear as they are forced to wait from day to day for the results of an asylum claim, or for a summons or dawn raid.

Equally, the attempt to control global mobility has resulted in a global circumscription of the ‘legal’ space through which the forced migrant can travel, and they are forced into the so-called ‘illegal’ spaces in the interstices of the nation-state order. Their designation as ‘illegal’ border-crossers justifies the intensity of the surveillance trained on them and their technological inscription as the ubiquitous ‘global alien’. Bauman (2004, p.75), for example, traces the trajectories of those who flee countries torn apart by the neoliberal deregulation of both wars and national economies. They traverse ‘illegal’ corridors across continents, in the ‘frontier-land conditions in the “interstate” global space’ – where they find themselves without rights or ‘legal’ identity and exposed to constant danger – in order to reach the borders of Europe’s privileged sites of capital.
Europe’s securitised asylum and immigration regime may have to negotiate internal contradictions, such as that thrown up by the need to ensure the circulation of a sufficient number of ‘deportable’ and thus highly exploitable migrants, without legal status, to satisfy fluctuating economic demands, but its struggle to control this situation propels, and relies on, what Mezzadra (2004) refers to as the ‘border wars of Europe’ – wars that are waged in what could be characterised as hidden ‘spaces of death’ scattered around the globe. These one-sided conflicts leave in their wake an unnumbered, anonymous but ever-increasing roll call of fatalities in the ‘sensitive’ areas of Europe’s ‘periphery’, such as the Gibraltar Straits, stretches of the Mediterranean and Adriatic, and passages of the Alps and the Carpathian mountains. The violent security policies outsourced to Europe’s ‘gatekeeper’ countries, such as Morocco or Libya, under the aegis of the European Union or its individual member states, and financed by dedicated European Union funding, also realise a concrete function: not only to repel migrants but to install those who reach the core European states in a condition of permanent insecurity (cf. de Genova, 2008). As Bibler Coutin (2008) illustrates, the production of illegality means that those with so-called ‘hybrid identities’, who defy the grids of classification, occupy a position of great danger. Their inscription as different/‘alien’ and therefore dangerous, and the ‘illegalised’ spaces they are forced to occupy, both subjectively and geographically, ensure they live with the constant possibility of violence and even death (cf. UNITED 2011).

The other potential hazard the forced migrant faces is being intercepted and warehoused in one of the dangerous, overcrowded and brutalising camps of a so-called ‘transit country’ – camps that are for the most part situated in desolate, isolated areas, surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by armed guards. Bauman (2004, p.80) describes them as ‘nowhere places’ (equivalent in this respect to the infamous ‘black sites’ of the war on terror); they do not appear on the maps used by ‘ordinary human beings’, with privileged national identities, on their travels. Thus, ‘they flee from one lawless place to another’ (Ibid., p.75) – ‘lawless’ because inhabitants of these spaces find that national or international human rights/refugee law lie beyond their reach. This is the case even when such camps are constructed on European national territory, such as Sicily, the Canary Islands or Croatia. The overriding laws here are those of immobilisation or often violently enforced radical mobility in the form of deportation. In such zones of ‘lawlessness’, individuals become defined by the nature of the spaces they are forced to inhabit.
Imprisonment is the most radical form of spatial confinement, immobilisation and social segregation. Refugee camps, holding camps, processing camps, detention centres, the ‘zones d’attente’ at French airports – all are names for legally administered incarceration. Although such forms of imprisonment are not labelled as such, they are as restrictive and punitive – even more so, as the terms of incarceration are vague, without the normal rationale, rights or time restrictions bounding the punishment of ‘national offenders’. These places of incarceration are specifically created for the global ‘outlaw’ or ‘illegal’. The ‘alien’ therefore has their alienation from society emphasised by a coercive and punitive containment; they are made to bear the mark of criminality/‘illegality’. The exponential increase during the last decade in the number of detention centres constructed throughout the continent for those ‘illegal migrants’ who have managed to cross the European Union’s external borders (cf. Jesuit Refugee Service, 2004; Migreurop, 2010), and the incarceration of ‘illegals’ on its behalf by countries lying beyond them, with little or no public scrutiny or democratic oversight, betrays a political objective: that of installing the whole immigration and asylum system within the security paradigm (cf. Schuster, 2005). The violence of this process, however, is both camouflaged and normalised by the constant reiteration of a commonsense discourse promoting the idea that this is the only rational recourse for overwhelmed national governments facing an unmanageable ‘stream’ of ‘illegal entrants’. Through the gradual adjustment of the asylum discourse in Europe over the past decade, its securitisation thus appears not only acceptable but also inevitable. With such exceptional measures now the norm, the security-immigration nexus that has defined the structure of the European Union from the outset is entrenched as part of a near-hegemonic security imaginary that invests Europe’s governments and societies.

Detention is a formidable way of achieving this objective as, arguably, its core function is, as Bauman (1998) declares, ‘to reduce ‘the view of the other’. As ‘individual qualities and circumstances are brought into sight through the accumulated experience of daily intercourse’ (Ibid., p.106), the outcome of enforced exclusion from the opportunity of such social intercourse is that the individual can be subsumed by a mass identity and disappear from view, only to be replaced by the figure of the ‘global illegal’. This figure has become such a common reference point in the rhetoric of politicians, their ideologues and the mass media alike, that it can be immediately recognised and accepted as ‘real’. In fact, the legal apparatus that helps provide this characterisation of the forced migrant with its socially legible meaning is central to the
creation of what Tuitt (2004, p.44) describes as a new global ‘hybrid category’ of individuals (that is, both person and object). Europe’s asylum and immigration laws create the conditions under which individuals can be dehumanised and identified ‘in ways that call attention to their non-autonomous nature’ (Ibid., p.44). Their existence is problematised: they are ‘marked’ by legal judgements or administrative decisions, and the bearers of that mark are associated with activities that are deemed non-human – the smuggling/trafficking of human beings across borders, for example, is equated with the trafficking of drugs or arms. Equally, the intensive surveillance, monitoring and tracking focused on the forced migrant, their detention/incarceration as ‘illegal migrants’, and their removal en masse from European space in chartered planes, both feeds into and is driven by a biopolitical discourse that portrays the forced imprisonment and banishment of individual human beings as equivalent to the removal of dangerous objects in as discrete and efficient a way as possible. The biometric sealing of their individual identity into a set of algorithmic calculations by the application of the most recent border security technology may be but the latest aspect of this process of objectification, yet it represents the ultimate reductive biopolitical process.

The objectification and dehumanisation of the forced migrant into a figure of ‘illegality’ justifies, in turn, the continuous expansion of border legislation, surveillance and policing technologies, and detention facilities. These militarised administrative technologies and punitive legislative processes help keep in circulation a narrative of security that validates a belief in the essential integrity of the European Union’s external border as boundary and defence of an inherent national/European culture and identity – and the threat posed to these by ‘culturally alien’ ‘outsiders’ seeking to cross into Europe’s core nation-states ‘illegally’. Europe’s displaced, de-territorialised and increasingly virtual borders, extending into global space, however, cannot be guarded through administrative and military border policing alone, but also calls for technologies to identify, categorise and intercept such ‘illegal’ individuals. The figure of the forced migrant as ‘global illegal’ is thus framed by the discourse of security that suffuses the European Union’s integrated asylum and immigration policies – a discourse that is embedded in its increasingly digitalised technologies of mobility control.

Biometrics, therefore, is arguably fast becoming the new border: individuals are transformed into the sites of ‘encoded boundaries’ (cf. Amoore, 2006, 2008a, 2008b):
they carry the border within them as their ontological identity. The new biometric technologies reduce the forced migrant to collections of numerical algorithms, an assemblage of digitalised body parts. The disaggregated, dehumanised individual is then woven into an intricate web of digital information. The technologies used for this task, such as European databases and biometric systems, are increasingly making use of the bodies of migrants as an essential code-book for discriminatory security ‘intelligence’. By using their bodies as sources of essentialised digital information, these procedures and technologies intensify the depiction of the forced migrant as the embodiment of an utterly objectified external danger – the very foundation of a fundamental European/‘alien’ dichotomy. The subtle introduction of such a discourse, however, carries with it ominous reminders for Europe of the spread of an earlier, now-discredited biological discourse of difference – although, Kohn (1996), in fact, suggests that racial eugenics is reappearing in an updated, ‘acceptable’ form. This discourse was equally reinforced and finessed by the implementation of bureaucratic techniques of objectification through categorising, marking, segregating and incarcetering.

**Into the future**

In contradiction, therefore, to the ‘hyper-national’ picture of a culturally coherent Europe under threat from its Muslim minorities and forced migrants from beyond its borders, the reality is one of a region struggling against relative decline in what has been coined ‘the Asian century’; a region that is, furthermore, now facing a potentially critical economic crisis that threatens to unravel the whole neoliberal project of the European Union that was created to counter that decline. The sense of crisis is compounded by the increasingly open expression of social discontent – in reaction to the neoliberal answer to the problem by the imposition of ever-harsher austerity measures – which holds the potential of creating a more widespread rejection of the forms that its ideological mystifications take. Such a situation can only intensify the reliance of Europe’s national political managers on the ideological support provided by a nationalism premised on the spectre of an immanent global threat. In societies polarised by crisis, if such movements against austerity are successfully suppressed, the danger is always present that an even more virulent and politically effective expression of the racism contained in the nationalist narratives directed against the forced migrant will rise to the surface. As a consequence, the abstract, supranational tropes of racism
(manifest in earlier times in its older form of anti-Semitism) that are used to summon up the figure of the universal ‘global alien’ could take on an ever more hysterical edge.

This thesis, therefore, presents an analysis that can hopefully help to illuminate a small part of the complex and dialectically related structural and ideological mechanisms of a global system that depends for its ideological functioning on the pivotal figure of the forced migrant, particularly in reference to the attempt by the core economies of the Europe Union to inculcate their populations with the sense of a unified European identity. By showing how such ideologies can become part of the very structure of the forms of society that arise within such a global economic system, my hope is to help expose the appalling human consequences of such ideologies (and therefore of such a system that requires them in order to function), as well as to put down a marker for potential further research into this subject.
NOTES

Chapter One

1 Just one example of this is the massive internal migration of many millions of people (an estimated 20 million) from inland rural areas in China to its booming mega-cities – probably the largest migration in human history (a figure quoted in IBIS, 2010).

2 Anderson (2011, p.61) describes the Coreper committee (Comité des représentants permanents or Committee of Permanent Representatives) thus: ‘At the centre of the maze lies the obscure zone in which the rival law-making instances of the Council and the Commission interlock, more impenetrable than any other feature of the Union. The nexus of “Coreper” committees in Brussels, where emissaries of the former confer behind closed doors with functionaries of the latter, generates the avalanche of legally binding directives … Here is the effective point of concentration of everything summed up in the phrase … “democratic deficit”…’

3 I have only listed in the bibliography those official documents that I have referenced in the text; the bulk of those I consulted provided contextual background to my research.

4 Wacquant (2008) here is speaking in the context of a study into the rise of the ‘penal state’, but in many ways this area of research is intimately linked to the criminalisation of, and punitive measures against, the forced migrant, and he therefore pinpoints a common need.

5 According to Save the Children (2011), the average stay for refugees in camps is now 18 years. Less than 1% of those driven to live in such camps are resettled in another country.

vi “[“Commonsense” is] a conception of the world [that is] uncritically absorbed by the social and cultural environments in which moral individuality is developed’ (Gramsci cited in Harvey, 2000, p.83).

vii ‘The most sophisticated ports in the world can inspect a maximum of only 5% of the cargo passing through customs… 1% of the cargo is stopped at random. …95% of all shipments pass uninspected’ (Nordstrom, 2007, p.118).

viii One example is coltan: this highly profitable mineral is extracted from mines in the war-riven Democratic Republic of Congo by war profiteers using virtual slave labour, smuggled to Azerbaijan (a desperately poor economy) to be purified, and then exported on to Finland where it becomes the staple of the massive mobile phone industry. Along the way vast profits and stockmarket killings are made, and the money and the product are duly washed clean and enter the legal economy.

ix One recent example of this was the spectacle of one of the leading and most powerful global financial institutions, Goldman Sachs, standing accused of fraud by the US financial regulator (the Securities and Exchange Commission) in April 2010 (BBC, 2010).
In 2001, David Blunkett, then-UK Home Secretary, declared a ‘state of emergency’, stressing it was a technicality to enable the government to opt out of Article Five of the European Convention on Human Rights in order to pass its Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.

Chapter Two

Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes, or PRSPs, have essentially taken the place of Structural Adjustment Programmes or SAPs, but their content has turned out to be remarkably similar: the banks and financial institutions, and the countries that fund them, still dictate the debtor countries’ policy-making processes, and the demands for privatisation, deregulation and austerity are the same.

As Davis (2006, p.125) points out, the vulnerability of the poor, forced to make their homes in high-risk areas of pollution and danger, is so extreme that earthquakes in such areas are now known as ‘classquakes’, to characterise the biased pattern of destruction.

Blackwater or Xe Services – now infamous for its conduct in Iraq – was even expelled in 2007 from International Peace Operations (the trade organisation for the burgeoning private military industry – or the ‘stability operations industry’ as it prefers to term itself).

According UNHCR (2009) statistics, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Russian Federation and China were the five most important ‘source’ countries and regions for asylum seekers in 44 industrialised countries throughout the world in 2008/9. Afghanistan again became the main country of origin of asylum-seekers in industrialised countries in 2009.

For example, the migration of health workers into the UK health system from Ghana indicates that by rights the two health systems should be thought of as one system (cf. Massey, 2007, p.191).

This in line with the neoliberal shift in ‘development’ policy discourse: aid or loans to the poor South are no longer focused on building up industrial infrastructure and production processes but merely on so-called ‘poverty-alleviation’ programmes.

The UNHCR (2010) estimates that 44 million people were displaced in 2009/2010, although these figures may well be an underestimate. However, 80% of the displaced remain in the Global South.

‘For years a proper war has been going on around these and other “global borders”, which has caused (and continues to cause) the deaths of thousands of refugees and migrants in their attempt at bypassing them’ (Mezzadra, 2004, p.272).

Former UK Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair outlined in 2001 his intentions to ‘reform’ the Refugee Convention, following a speech by the former Home Secretary Jack Straw to the Institute for Public Policy Research in 2000, in which he stated that the Convention needed to be ‘modernised’. More recently, in 2009, Phil Woolas, then-immigration minister, proclaimed he wanted to restart the debate about the Convention
and its enshrinement of the individual’s right to asylum from state persecution (*The Guardian*, 10 January 2009).

**Chapter Three**

The term ‘xeno-racism’ is a conflation of xenophobia (traditionally defined as fear of the ‘stranger’ or foreigner) and racism. It is, in effect, a racism focused on the immigrant or forced migrant. It can be termed ‘racism’ as ‘[x]eno-racism denigrates and reifies people before segregating and expelling them … it is racist in substance and xeno in form’ (Sivanandan cited in Fekete 2009, p.19).

The Greek government – currently struggling with the local effects of the global economic crisis and the social conflicts precipitated by IMF-EU dictated austerity measures – is the latest European government to turn to populist anti-immigrant rhetoric and bow to the pressure of the EU’s strategy of ‘migration control’: it plans to build a 12.5km wall along part of its 200km-long border with Turkey to ‘deter illegal immigrants and asylum seekers’ (Papaconstantinou, 2011).

In 2010 Prime Minister Netanyahu claimed: ‘We cannot let thousands of illegal workers … inundate our country …’ Meanwhile, armed Egyptian police patrol the desert borders at Israel’s behest, killing at least 17 migrants in 2009 (McCarthy, 2010).

Harvey (2010, p.246) believes that crises themselves are a ‘massive phase of dispossession of assets (cultural as well as tangible). … Devalued capital assets left over from bankruptcies and collapses can be bought up at fire-sale prices … and profitably recycled back into circulation. Surplus capital thus finds a new and fertile terrain for renewed accumulation. Crises may be, for this reason, orchestrated, managed and controlled to rationalise the irrational system… This is what state-administered austerity programmes, making use of the key levers of interest rates and the credit system, are often all about.’

Younge (2010, p.8) relates how in 2009 more than 100 immigrants, roughly a quarter of them children, were found living in a sewer system under Rome’s railway station.

In the US, for example, Halliburton has been contracted to build a string of detention centres and Boeing to construct a ‘virtual border’ of biometric ID cards (cf. Klein, 2007).

The European Union, for example, has fine-tuned its Surveillance System for the Straits, dedicated to preventing migrants from the African continent from entering European territory through the interdiction of boats carrying or suspected of carrying migrants in the Mediterranean, and further afield (in contravention of peacetime international maritime law) on the high seas and even in African waters themselves (cf. Migreurop, 2009).

At the time of writing, the impact of the political crisis and revolutionary upheaval in Libya (and the rest of North Africa and the Middle East) on its border agreements
with Europe has yet to be fully assessed.

xxviii The candidate countries will soon be responsible for security at the Union's future external borders, the management of which will play a central role in developing relations with the future neighbouring countries, namely Belarus and Ukraine’ (European Commission, 2002).

xxix See Amnesty International’s 2010 report, ‘Seeking Safety, Finding Fear: Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in Libya and Malta’. Malcolm Smart, director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, comments, ‘In Libya, foreign nationals, including refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, are particularly vulnerable and live in constant fear of being arrested and held for long periods, tortured or otherwise abused. Moreover, many are in fear of being returned to their countries of origin, with no regard to the real risk of persecution they face there’ (Amnesty International, 2010).

xxx The death in 2010 of Jimmy Mubenga, an Angolan asylum seeker, while being deported from Britain by private security firm G4S on a routine passenger flight, resulted in an investigation and the firm’s loss of its multimillion-pound contract with the Home Office to forcibly deport foreign nationals. G4S has faced numerous allegations over several years and is subject to other ongoing investigations (Lewis and Taylor, 2010). Meanwhile, information on the exact number of deaths and severe injuries of those thus deported throughout Europe, particularly on privately contracted flights out of the view of the ordinary public, is difficult to gather.

xxxi Denmark, Germany and Switzerland have returns and readmission agreements with Eastern European and Balkan states, while Italy, Spain, Greece and France have similar arrangements with a number of Mediterranean and African countries (cf. Cassarino, 2010).

xxxii The thinking behind such agreements was revealed by Frontex in its 2010 report. In June 2010 Libya expelled the UNHCR. Frontex subsequently established that there were 9,000 refugees and 4,000 asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Libya; however, the conclusion it drew was not voiced as a humanitarian concern but framed in the language of security and the need for deterrence as, it claimed, these refugees ‘may now attempt entry to the EU’ (Frontex, 2010).

xxxiii See Point 26 of the 25-26 February 2010 European Council report on Turkey, in which it says it wishes ‘to welcome the constructive resumption of the formal negotiations on a EU/Turkey readmission agreement, which makes provision for the return of third-country nationals … and to stress that adequate implementation of already existing bilateral readmission agreements remains a priority. … The Council invites the Commission, the member states, and Turkey to further develop cooperation on migration, internal protection and mobility issues … [and] to explore possibilities to provide adequate financial means to improve Turkish capacity to tackle illegal immigration’ (Council of the European Union, 2010).

xxxiv The very nature of informal or irregular work means there can be no valid estimates of the number of irregular migrants in the world, but various reports and studies all
indicate their number is increasing. In 2004 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (cited in Burnett and Whyte, 2010) suggested that up to 15% of migrants were irregular. According to these authors, ‘By 2005 this number had increased to 190 million (UN 2006). … Using the ILO estimate, this would suggest that, in 2005, there were up to 30 million irregular migrants across the globe. … [T]he UK Home Office research suggested [in 2005] that irregular migrants made up to a maximum of one in every 100 of the population’ (Ibid., p.8). The Greater London Authority further estimated in 2009 that approximately 618,000 irregular migrants were living in the UK (Gordon et al., 2009).

xxxv Macklin (2007, p.365) comments that a person most likely to lack access to citizenship documents today is not the denationalised citizen of Arendt’s time but the citizen of a so-called ‘failed state’, such as Somalia, that lacks the infrastructure to generate official identity documents. But it is even more the case that when fleeing from state violence or civil war, for example, the forced migrant will be unable or unwilling for obvious reasons to claim identity documents from the state authorities (a fact recognised by the Refugee Convention but rarely acknowledged by countries of asylum).

xxxvi Goodhart (2007) in an article for The Observer, for example, claims, ‘There is a tipping point between the UK’s minority population and the US’s 30 per cent that creates a wholly different society with sharp ethnic divisions, a weak welfare state and low political participation … People from the poor parts of the developing world have little experience of urbanisation, secularism, Western values …’ The integrity of the British welfare system, he argues, can only be maintained if it becomes more ‘overtly conditional’; basically, a two-tier system that will cater in differential ways for national citizens and non-citizens, especially migrants (Goodhart, 2007).

Chapter Four

xxxvii Balibar (1991a) detects the return of the biological theme in the very framework of cultural racism since the difference between cultures refers to structural differences. This leads him to question whether the ‘new racism’ is not, in reality, a transitional ideological formation.

xxxviii For example, David Goodhart, editor of Prospect, and Trevor Philips, head of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (now the Equality and Human Rights Commission), have written at length in the media on the theme of ‘British values’, the dangers of ‘unregulated immigration’, and the ‘divisive’ effect of ‘multiculturalist policies’, with Philips famously pronouncing that Britain ‘is sleepwalking into segregation’. Meanwhile, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, has called immigration ‘a threat to the DNA of the nation’ and its liberal-democratic tradition (cf. Seymour 2010, p.82).

xxxix This is emblematic of how the demands of the far right and neo-fascists can now be openly aired in mainstream political discourse. For example, Marfleet (2006, p.158) details a similar move in Italy in 1998, when a government campaign to arrest and deport asylum seekers was accompanied by demands from the Northern League that all immigrants should be tattooed with identification codes.
Mishra (2006) argues that ‘a loose network of fanatics and criminals hunted everywhere around the Islamic world little resembles the modern nation-state that in less than six years caused the deaths of tens of millions of people across Europe’.

Kundnani (2008b, p.54) comments that ‘Islamist’ has become a term that ‘denigrates any political appropriation of Islamic concepts as dangerous, effectively silencing most democratic forms of Muslim politics’.

In a recent report for the Policy Exchange, Mirza, Senthikumaran and Ja’far (2007) (researchers at the think-tank) call for a change to the official approach towards Muslims of emphasising difference and religious identity, but lay the blame for this tendency firmly on ‘multiculturalism’. They argue: ‘The emergence of a strong Muslim identity in Britain is, in part, a result of multicultural policies … which have emphasized difference at the expense of shared national identity and divided people along ethnic, religious and cultural lines… Islamist groups [have played] the politics of identity … [and] exaggerated the problem of Islamophobia, which has fuelled a sense of victimhood…” (Ibid., p.6).

France was the first country in the world to forbid veils anywhere in public, despite the fact that out of the country’s five million Muslims, fewer than 400 women are believed to wear a face veil (an investigation carried out by the French police in 2010 found that there were 367 women in France who wore the burqa or niqab – 0.015% of the population). However, ‘anyone wearing the niqab or burqa in public could now face [arrest and] a fine of 150 euros, or lessons in French citizenship’ (Chrisafis, 2011).

The term ‘nation within a nation’ was a common anti-Semitic Nazi trope – Jews were portrayed as traitors to the German nation.

Chapter Five

Borders are never impermeable (and arguably never meant to be so). It is implied that the sophisticated technology deployed at the border provides a comprehensive blanket of security. However, on the ground, the story is far different: a recent investigative analysis of border controls in the UK revealed how austerity measures resulted in the axing of 5,000 border control and customs posts in 2011. These were supposed to be seamlessly replaced by technology. Yet the fabled ‘e-gates’ at Heathrow (the programme is being rolled out at a cost of £1 billion) continually broke down, the software was not integrated between departments, and ‘essential information’ was handed to officials on scraps of paper. Meanwhile, the necessity to ensure the smooth flow of millions of travellers and goods gives the lie to the rhetoric of total coverage. On the English Channel’s ‘front line’ at Cherbourg, there is no border control presence, while freight checks at Calais have been halved and trucks allowed through unchecked on certain days. Other entry points to Britain, such as Stranraer, have no UK Border Agency (UKBA) presence at all (BBC, 2011).

Christopher Caldwell (2009) is one of a number of intellectuals and commentators who have recently expanded Huntington's observations about ‘the frictions between Islam and every single culture with which it is in contact’. In Reflections on the
Revolution In Europe, Caldwell enlarged on Huntington’s comments concerning Islam as distinguished by the ‘penury, servitude, violence and mediocrity of Muslim societies worldwide’, arguing that these ‘insights’ are becoming increasingly relevant in a twenty-first century Europe facing the twin threats of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘mass migration’ from Muslim-majority countries (cf. Sardar, 2010).

This refers to the adoption by mainstream European politicians of the rhetoric of the far right. Extremist politicians had been using this type of ‘cultural’ discourse in their anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic drive since the 1970s. In the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the language became a convenient alibi for the politicians of mainstream parties. Its adoption signified their accommodation to the anti-immigrant demands of the far right. Thus, the political agenda of the European Union, in many respects, became contaminated by the radical nationalism of local politicians of the extreme right – this was particularly so as many of these became part of local and national administrations (for example, in Italy and the Netherlands).

In 2011, following the Arab Spring and the uprisings in North African countries, the governments of Italy and France announced that they were unilaterally withdrawing from the system of common European Union immigration controls in order to police their own borders against the upsurge of North African forced migrants, emphasising the inviolable sovereign nature of their borders. This announcement was aimed at their domestic constituency.

I adopt here Larner’s (2008, p.44) definition of an ‘imaginary’ as referring to a ‘framing of economic, political and social spaces’.

Somalia is now also characterised not only as a source of piracy, threatening international trade, but as home to ‘Islamic terrorists’ in the shape of Al Shabab, described as affiliated to Al-Qaeda.

Of course, the way our subjectivity is arrived at is more complex; the understanding of how the ‘self’ is constituted is the subject of ongoing theoretical and practical research and debate. It appears to be reliant on the interaction of a wealth of psychological, environmental, genetic and social factors, including the physiological structure of each individual brain at a microbiological level and the way this responds to, interprets and is shaped by its environment. The sense of self is therefore mutable and subject to development and change. However, for the purposes of a study of political manipulation based on a discourse of ontological security, the element of identity formation singled out here is the most salient feature.

Bunyan (2009) believes that a European State was in the making from 1991, and has now been cemented in the Stockholm Programme and Lisbon Treaty. On the level of economic policy, EU laws are enacted at the national level, but this is also the case at the less scrutinised second and third levels of foreign and security policy, which constitute the core of the state. Under Stockholm, state-building is called the ‘convergence programme’: all the databases in the EU must now have the same software, hardware, platforms and readers, under one mega-contract with one or possibly two multinationals. Bunyan believes that, as a consequence, such multinationals now have a role in setting the European security agenda as great as that...
of the officials of national member state governments, alongside the national law enforcement agencies.

It is arguable that the control of mobility is not the main purpose of the securitisation of the asylum and immigration regime. As de Genova (2007, 2008, 2010) points out, the security agenda has facilitated installing those forced migrants working ‘illegally’ in the economies of the core nation-states in a position of extreme vulnerability. Hence, they have become ‘super-exploitable’.

I am taking ‘domain’ here to mean a field of theory, discourse and action.

José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, spoke of ‘the dark side of globalisation’ in these terms, in a speech entitled ‘The European Union and the Emerging World Order – Perceptions and Strategies’ at the 7th ECSA (European Community Studies Association) World Conference in Brussels in 2004 (Barroso, 2004).

One area of EU security research is dedicated to adapting combat robots that can intercept individuals crossing borders ‘illegally’. The remit of the 20-million-euro TALOS project is to develop and field test ‘a mobile, modular, scalable, autonomous, adaptive system for protecting EU borders’, comprising aerial and ground unmanned vehicles, supervised by a central ‘command and control centre’. It will field specifically adapted robots able to ‘stop illegal action almost autonomously with the supervision of border guard officers’ (European Commission, 2011b).

The term ‘interdiction’ is never used in official discourse concerning Frontex, as this would leave it open to the charge of transgressing international maritime law that forbids such activity by nation-states in international waters. Instead, the term ‘interception’ is used (cf. Watson, 2009).

The technology that enables the collection of personal data of ‘unwanted’ third-country nationals in the SIS II database was extended to visas in 2007: VIS stores the biometric fingerprints of all those who apply for visas to Europe.

As early as 1993 there were already 10 intergovernmental bodies in the European Union concerned with security, immigration and asylum, not to mention the many hundreds of meetings convened on the topic.
LIST OF REFERENCES


