FOR THE PAST YET TO COME: UTOPIAN CONCEPTIONS OF TIME AND BECOMING

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Relevant Disciplines
This article will be of interest in the fields of political theory, philosophy, critical theory and social movement studies.
Abstract

This article examines a number of critical-theoretical, utopian alternatives to the dominant temporal conception of 'homogeneous empty time'. It explores the ways in which difference is theorised within the field of time, and the ways in which relations to the past and future can be constructed non-sequentially. It focuses on four related theories. Nietzsche's theory of eternal return is shown to be inspired by a critique of backward-looking views of time and an orientation to an abundance of the present. Benjamin's theory of messianic time combines the immediacy of 'now-time' with a non-successive connection to past and future times. Deleuze's Bergsonian view of time suggests the simultaneity of the past with the present, and the possibility of constructing connections between different zones of time and actualising these zones in the present. Agamben's theory of temporal play focuses on immediacy, the redemption of the past, and the abandonment of the mastery of history. Each of these theories is discussed in terms of its own conception of time, its difference from dominant conceptions of time, and its relationship to utopia. While offering four distinct alternatives, the theorists all critique alienated and objectivist views of time, and offer different varieties of temporal rhizomatics and polyphony. The juxtaposition of these theories provides the underpinnings for temporal utopianism as a new field of study. The idea of temporal utopianism demonstrates that utopia can be a temporal as well as a spatial phenomenon, and that the experience of time characteristic of capitalist modernity is contingent rather than necessary. It thus points towards a rupture with the sense of closure generated by dominant conceptions of time, creating temporal zones in which utopian spaces can be actualised.
Introduction

The ordinary experience of time under capitalism has frequently been subject to criticism, yet the multiple alternative possibilities have rarely been explored within a coherent framework of analysis. The basic thesis of this paper is that the mainstream approach to time is not the only way of conceiving or experiencing time, and that the function of utopia can be applied to time whilst temporal theory can have a utopian function. Early utopias were situated in the present though dislocated in space (More, 2004 [1516]), yet increasingly time has come to have an important role to play in thinking about utopias, which are usually conceived to exist in the future and sometimes in the past, in formulations such as the Golden Age, Eden and Arcadia (Kumar, 1991: 18; Goodwin and Taylor, 2009 [1982]: 12). Contemporary utopian theory tends to view utopia as something that can be materialized in the present, and often has a critical and prefigurative function (Petersen, 2010: 17). Whilst the utopian function has frequently been applied to a wide range of social practices including architecture (Tafuri, 1976; Borsi, 1997; Coleman 2005), art (Bloch, 1986 [1959]), literature (Bloch, 1986 [1859]; Moylan, 1986; Sargisson, 2006), intentional communities (Kanter, 1972; Veysey, 1978; Pepper, 1991; Sargisson, 2000) and social theory (Levitas, 1990; Goodwin and Taylor, 2009 [1982]) it has not often been applied to time itself.

This paper is an exercise in critical utopianism, looking in particular at the construction of alterity in relation to experiences of time and temporality. According to this approach, utopianism should be established at the level of the critical function of a practice in mobilising hope or desire (Levitas, 1990: 189). Considering utopia in terms of function
is particularly useful, since it allows one to examine the effects that utopias have upon the world whilst not limiting the form and content of articulations of desire. The assumption is that possibility should not be limited to the present frame. McManus argues that: ‘The utopian challenge to knowledge is precisely the imperative to "think differently": to feel and know the world in ways that "venture beyond" the given, that are not captured and contained by the exigencies of the present order of things’ (McManus, 2007). Thus rather than seeing utopia as dislocated in time, one might conceive that it fundamentally alters the relationship between past, present and future. This utopian approach is similar to yet differs from that taken by Barbara Adam (1990, 2004), who seeks commonalities between different views of time. Adam seeks to identify aspects such as synchronisation, pursuit of immortality, finitude and time-regulation which are taken to be universal to all views of time in spite of differences in how these things are done (Adam, 2004: 123). This underlying universalism is counterposed to our argument for open-ended transgressions implied in utopian views of time, which often reject one or more of these supposed universals.

Contemporary theorists elaborate that utopia is not necessarily deferred or prefigurative but rather experimental, experiential and subjective. A distinction can therefore be drawn between fixed utopias, or utopias of form, and those utopias which are propulsive and immanent, and reject the idea of rupture between present and future (Bonanno, 1988; Anon, 1999; Anon, 2001; Robinson and Tormey, 2009). It is the latter case which expresses utopianism as a transformative and desire-affirmative phenomenon. As such, our approach does not conceive that there should be a single and correct counter-temporality, rather alternative ways of experiencing time that affirm difference are
multiple and possibly even contradictory. There is a need to retrospectively reconstruct a literature on alternative ways of conceiving time; a task that we attempt to begin in this essay by selecting a small sample of critical theorists who do not limit their theory of time to present experience but rather seek to alter the relationship between past, present and future in non-foundational ways. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the field of temporal utopianism is not limited to these thinkers nor to social theory more generally, and our conclusion will signal to further possibilities. First, though, it is important to outline what we take to be the mainstream or conventional approach to time in order to later compare those theorists we take to transcend its limitations.

Mainstream conceptions of time

The mainstream or dominant conception of time, typified by Benjamin as 'homogeneous empty time' and sometimes referred to as 'linear' or 'clock' time, is an antagonist of the theorists discussed herein. This standard view takes time to be 'a line, infinitely divisible and infinitely extended' (May, 2005: 41), striated in a time-grid and viewed as invariable at any moment (Adam, 1990: 106-7). It views time as a succession of psychological states or instants of consciousness, existing in a linear and irreversible progression (al-Saji, 2004: 204). These moments are commodified, controlled, colonised and compressed in a process rendered invisible by its pervasiveness (Adam, 2004: 124-5). It is embodied in phenomenological views of time, and stems from the identification of reality with presence (al-Saji, 2004: 204). In the dominant conception, the present is the central moment of time, and defines pasts and futures (as former or later presents). Mainstream time is an eternal present, defined permanently by an instrumental or
'sensory-motor' schema from a particular point of view. It is distinct from lived durations. Bloch argues that clock time proceeds in equal periods by numerical progression, and as a result, is indifferent to its contents. It is abstracted from lived time (Bloch, 1970: 125) and clashes sharply with ecological and cultural temporalities (Adam, 1998: 9).

Homogeneous empty time is associated with the rise of capitalism. The 'use of time as resource and commodity [is] a recent phenomenon of western, industrialised nations' (Adam, 1990: 102). It is theorised as empty in contrast to filled or fulfilled time (Leslie, 2000: 198). This type of time is homogeneous because it is composed of identical, equivalent and interchangeable units, expressible in representations such as clocks and calendars. It is empty because it is not given meaning in special moments; time simply passes, and is neutral to the meaningful content with which people fill it. For Benjamin, it suggests humanity is condemned to a cycle of reproducing survival in a closed system of fate and guilt (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 51). In many respects, this is a conservative view of time, because sameness tends to return: new temporal moments reproduce older ones through their structural isomorphism. It operates as a kind of 'transcendental conformism' (Hamacher, 2005: 47). Benjamin argues that homogeneous empty time is rooted in capitalism, and closely connected to the exchangeability and equivalence of commodities and the repetitive cycles of consumerist fashion through which the system varies its contents but remains formally the same. It is linked to boredom, the dominant affect of the capitalist era (Benjamin, 1999 [1930-5]: 104) and the repetition of the 'always-the-same' (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 48). We are bored, argues Benjamin, because we don't know what we're waiting for (Benjamin, 1994 [1930-5]): 105).
Negri similarly views mainstream time as constructed from labour-time, as quantifiable into durations and divisible into units such as hours and days. Such a construction of time is the nexus of equivalence. 'Time does not only measure labour, but reduces it to homogeneous substance' (Negri, 2005: 23). It is imagined, in fact, as atemporal. Capitalist utopia imagines circulation without time or process (Negri, 2005: 50, 53, 57). In subsumption, synchronic and diachronic moments are unified (Negri, 2005: 80). Such time 'seems to lack all distinction', and reduces complexity to articulation (Negri, 2005: 49). Capitalist time rests on an appearance of the equivalence of temporal moments. For Negri, however, '[t]he form of equivalence is simply an effect of coercion' (Negri, 2005: 28). Linear time becomes circular (Negri, 2005: 52). The representation of multiple times (or becomings) in a single frame rests in practice on their disciplining or reduction to sameness (Negri, 2005: 67). The uniformity of the flow of time depends on the ability to destroy exceptions (Negri, 2005: 68). Hence, time is posed for capital as command (Negri, 2005: 107). Since it is grounded in a Schmittian decision, capitalist time ultimately becomes the zero-time of destruction and disintegration (Negri, 2005: 46), the annihilation of living temporal being (Negri, 2005: 123).

Marxists have criticised dominant experiences of time as shaped by the work-process and its segmentation and alienation of life, a disciplining of time established early in capitalist history (Thompson, 1967). According to Deleuze, capitalism is the only history which can record history on a commensurable time-line (Lampert, 2006: 123). In its latest incarnation, as precarious time, the dominant conception subordinates time to availability and communicability. According to precarity activist Alex Foti, precarity
is 'being unable to plan one\'s time' because of being on call, on a timeframe 'determined by external forces' (cited in Neilson and Rossiter, n.d.). Negri sees it as becoming groundless in the process, asking, [w]hen the entire time of life has become the time of production, who measures whom?' (Negri, 2005: 29). Homogeneous empty time is haunted by aporias around, for instance, its dependence on an external referent it cannot provide, eliminating the possibility of measurement (Negri, 2005: 24, 42). Barbara Adam similarly observes that mainstream time is 'oriented to the collective beat of machine time' (Adam, 1990: 106): it effectively subordinates people to clocks and machines. 'Clock time is based on the principle of repetition without change. Distinct from the variable rhythm and contextual differences of living systems, it recasts time in an atemporal form' (Adam, 1998: 14).

In what follows we will outline a series of critical theorists whom we take to put forward desire-affirmative and immanentist approaches to temporality. For each theorist, we will outline the theory of time put forward, we will compare the theory to the mainstream in order to highlight the ways in which each author moves beyond the limits and alienating aspects of dominant theory, and we will also re-conceptualise each theory as ‘utopian’.

A point should be made about our selection of authors. The specifically capitalist form of time has not persisted throughout history. It differs, for instance, from cyclical and seasonal views of time related to the cycles of nature, and mythical conceptions of time in which the time of infinity constantly impinges on historical time. One can also contrast temporal experiences of marginality, which are characterised by temporalities
of discontinuity and rupture (Henry, 1972). Time is also imagined differently in science-fiction works such as Doctor Who (Bell, 2009). In this vast field, we have chosen to focus on critical theories of time, but the significance of cultural and everyday alternatives must also be borne in mind. In addition, there are certain critical theories of time that we have not included here due to their endorsement of something akin to the dominant conception. For Kant, linear succession is a necessary characteristic time must have for knowledge to be possible (Moulard, 2002: 328). Time is also important for authors such as Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida, but for reasons which are arguably tragic, rather than utopian: time brings irreversibility, finitude, deferral (which is not to say that these authors neglect utopia entirely). Homogeneous empty time also underpins orthodox Marxist views of progress. Benjamin further adds that '[t]he concept of humankind's historical progress cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time' (Benjamin 1940: Thesis XIII). Hence, while they are important critical theories of time, these approaches fall outside utopian temporality.

We have also not attempted to engage with Marxists who move beyond teleological conceptions of history, such as Bloch and Negri. While such authors clearly fall within utopian temporality, their relationship to the broader history of Marxism's complicities with homogeneous empty time places them beyond the scope of this article.

**Nietzsche’s conception of time as eternal return**

*The conception*

Nietzsche’s theory of time finds articulation in his concept of ‘the eternal return’. We feel that the utopian framework put forward in this article aids a particular
understanding of the concept. A simple interpretation is that the cosmos literally repeats, and each person's life is lived identically, an infinite number of times: ‘all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same series and sequence .... The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!’ (Nietzsche, 2006 [1882]: 152). Some thinkers have argued that even though this is unlikely to be a cosmological phenomenon, the argument would be deprived of its existential and affective force were it not read literally (Hatab, 2005: 91; Heidegger, 1991 [1961]), indeed Nietzsche appears to encourage such a reading in the above quote. However, Zarathustra later affirms the role of chance in this philosophy: ‘there is no eternal reason-spider and reason-cobweb – That thou art to me a dancing-floor for divine chances, that thou art to me a table of the Gods, for divine dice and dice-players’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1883]: 163). These readings are incompatible, since the latter would suggest an ethical doctrine relying on a concept of free will whilst the former would suggest predetermination.

Following Deleuze, we favour interpretations of eternal recurrence as the eternal return of active forces, and the affirmation of becoming. Such an understanding overcomes accusations of fatalism in Nietzsche’s doctrine: ‘Returning is everything but everything is affirmed in a single moment’ (Deleuze, 2006 [1986]: 67). This interpretation overcomes contradictions between hypothetical and cosmological interpretations: ‘Eternal return as a physical doctrine, affirms the being of becoming. But as a selective ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the ‘self-affirming’ of becoming-active’ (Deleuze, 2006: 67). This echoes Nietzsche’s assertion that the eternal return should not be taken ‘too lightly’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 154). Whilst the dwarf puts forward a
similar theory of cyclical time (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 152-3) is unrefined since it takes a disinterested and transcendental (God-like) view of the passage of time: ‘thou knowest not mine abysmal thought! It – couldst thou not endure’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 154). Zarathustra’s perspective takes itself and the present moment to be the focal point of all past and future where the two eternities meet and are actualised (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 154).

**Difference and critique**

The eternal return explicitly challenges the Christian view of time, which has a backward-looking relationship to temporality (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 138). Moral notions of sin and redemption, or justice and punishment, rely on atoning for what has already been done and promote a ‘spirit of revenge’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 138) which is psychologically damaging because one cannot change the past – ‘time doth not run backward’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 138). Nietzsche also refutes progressivism and the linear and cumulative nature of homogeneous empty time - each moment is a new throw of the dice (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 212). Eternal recurrence is an immanent philosophy – recurrence occurs entirely in this world - there is no better world (heaven) or worse world (hell), and eternity does not negate the moment but affirms it: “if becoming could resolve itself into being or into nothingness ... then this state must have been reached’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 549).

**Nietzsche’s utopianism**

The eternal return simultaneously criticises backward-looking ontology (we would not will the return of bad conscience) and offers an alternative in the form of the present-
affirming and forward-looking ‘creating Will’ which says ‘But thus I would have it’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 139). Affirming the Moment also means affirming the past: ‘Said ye ever Yea to one joy? O my friends, then said ye Yea also unto all woe. All things are enlinked, enlaced and enamoured’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 312). This signals to the utopian corollary to eternal return; the ‘will to power’, which is indeed life itself (Nietzsche, 1968: 550) and gives one the ability to affirm life and endure the eternal recurrence. Those who prove strongest are those who ‘not only concede but love a fair amount accidents and nonsense; those who can think of man with a considerable reduction of his value without becoming small and weak on that account’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 38). One might ask, however, whether this means a slave cannot attain this state, and whether the underprivileged are destined to remain so?

Our interpretation of Nietzsche’s utopia is one of abundance. Zarathustra is frequently cited as ‘abundant’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 331; Nietzsche, 1997 [1883]: 103-4) and his abundance resides not in riches or in power as normally conceived, but in his wisdom, creativity and ability to affirm all of life and also to teach affirmation; that is, he also achieves abundance through his social (and environmental) bonds. Thus, reading Nietzsche as an individualist misinterprets his concept of becoming, which insists on self-redefinition, the absorption of the opponent, and the processual nature of identity (Nietzsche, 1968: 331), affirming the whole of life to the exclusion of blueprints and progressivism. Thus while the concept of the ‘Superman’ has been misread and misappropriated in various ways as a totalising/hegemonic utopia, including the association of his work with volkish ideology (for example by Young, 2006), it is important to note that Nietzsche himself did not defer his utopia to the future nor did he
view the Superman as a fixed and static goal: ‘Can we remove the idea of a goal from
the process and then affirm the process in spite of this? – This would be the case if
something were attained at every moment within this process – and always the same’
(Nietzsche, 1968: 36).

**Benjamin’s conception of messianic time**

*The conception*

Time is central to Benjamin's view of the difference between the historical and
messianic moments. Benjamin pioneered the critique of homogeneous empty time
previously described, arguing that it is a social construct arising from capitalist
constructions of experience. His account of messianic time is specifically counterposed
to the homogeneous empty time of capitalist experience. Messianic time, or “now-time”
(*jetzt-zeit*), interrupts homogeneous empty time because of its immediacy, and the
connections it creates between points disconnected in homogeneous empty time (for
instance, between past and present revolutions). Now-times are 'unique visions of
transcendence that grace the continuum of history' (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 48) and form
monadic sites in which reconciled life is compressed (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 58). Now-
time brings dialectics to a 'standstill' in a 'messianic cessation of happening', interrupting
the smooth progression of history (Benjamin, 1970 [1955]: 263).

Messianic time, not homogeneous empty time, is the site of historical agency. ‘History
is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous empty time, but time filled
with the presence of the now’ (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XIV). In German, the 'now' as
immediate (jetzt) is distinct from the present as something lived as already actualised and thus in a sense past (erlebnis). 'Now' is thus something more than simply presence, connoting a rupture between an immediate moment and the temporal sequence. Messianic time is experienced as fully immediate, not as a flow; it is lived intensely, rather than through the anaesthetising effects of linear time; it is connected to eternity; it is ruptural; and it is associated with the affect of rausch or intoxification. Its condition of 'specific recognizability' (Benjamin, 1999 [1930-5]: 463) contrasts with emptiness and homogeneity. Optimism arises, not from what history brings, but from what arises in its ruin (Wolin, 1994: 60).

**Difference and critique**

Benjamin's theory of history reverses the usual narrative of progress, suggesting that Hell is not a feared future but is the continuation of the present (Benjamin, 1985). The perspective of the angel of history views not a chain of events but an accumulation of wreckage and a storm propelling into the future while fixated on the past (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis IX). History is thus akin to a speeding train with broken brakes, and revolution pulls the escape cord. Instead of revolution being the continuation of progress which disaster interrupts, it is an interruption of the ongoing disaster, not going with the flow but going against it from a radically exterior standpoint. Hence, the Messiah, or the classless society, is not the end of a process but its interruption (Benjamin, 2006: 402).

The irruption of messianic time is an emergence of novelty in history. It replaces the new as return of the same in capitalism with a sense of radical newness. It blasts an era
out of homogeneous empty time, turning it into a monad (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XVII). It requires a different kind of memory, which 'redeem[s]' the past and recalls past generations and lost paradise, not by portraying it as it really was, but by seizing hold of memories connected to intense moments’ (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis VI). Montage, the connection of dissimilar elements, is central to messianic time (Taussig, 1984: 89). Past moments thereby become active and present in contemporary events, as an emotional force. Messianic time has been analysed as overcoming the binary between linear and cyclical time (Gibbs, 2005: 198), instead connecting time between points (Gibbs, 2005: 214). Possibilities missed in the past remain possibilities for the future, and call on the present for actualisation (Hamacher, 2005: 40-1). This stance of transformation by radical rupture rather than linear transition or progression (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XVI) is uniquely the stance of the excluded, or revolutionary classes (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XV). It is through such ruptures that the continuity of future times with the past victories of oppressors can be broken.

*Benjamin's utopian moments*

Benjamin's messianism is part of utopian theory as an expression of future-oriented energies of hope and desire. It draws explicitly on 'the critical power of utopian images' (Jacobs, 1999: 97). The goal of his theory of messianic time is to make something leap out from its context, so the thing and its context escape one another (Nägele, 1988: 22). In Benjamin's vocabulary, this is known as redemption (or revolution), the moment when messianic time enters and overcomes homogeneous empty time. Whether it is socially transformative is debated in the literature, with some authors viewing Benjamin as deeply pessimistic and nihilistic (Corngold and Jennings, 1984: 359-60; Wolin, 1994
or as expressing an underlying structure of history as necessarily contingent, split and in crisis (Hamacher, 2005). We here side with Leslie in reading Benjamin's theory as more than supplementary. One redeems knowledge of the past in order to act in the present (Leslie, 2005: 200). Benjamin's is an 'idea of redemption and revolution as instants of a mystical messianic now which interrupt linear historical time and form “constellations” with images of the past' (Handelman, 1991: 148), but in which the future utopia cannot be grasped concretely (Handelman, 1991: 159), so great is its distance from the present. History is rewritten to produce 'purgative and redemptive political action' (Jennings, 1987: 51), with the historian 'redeeming the past to unstick the present from its seemingly necessary future' (Gibbs, 2005: 214). The memory of the past, the stance of avenger and redeemer, is therefore necessary to provide a revolutionary spirit to movements (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XII).

Redemption is not solely a subjective experience, but also transforms everyday life as hope in the past (Szondi, 1978). Redemption is conceived as temporal transubstantiation, in which messianic time reconfigures a space constructed in homogeneous empty time. It is not completely outside the space it reconfigures, but rather, is a line of flight within it. It reveals a reverse side which is otherwise invisible, a subterranean history coexisting with the surface history (Handelman, 1991: 162-3). It requires a confrontation with the path-dependencies built into the dominant social logic; escaping this dynamic restores the ability to reconstruct. The standpoint of battling against the flow of history creates urgency and an emphasis on agency which are lacking in progressivist conceptions. For Benjamin, revolution redeems the past as well as the present, and in contrast, even the dead are not safe from the enemy (Benjamin,
1970 [1955]: 255), since pasts survive only as recognisable to a present which redeems them (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis V). Only in a fulfilled humanity is the entire past legible (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis III). Transformative agency thus stems from intensities connected to messianic time. There is a similarity between Benjamin's conception and the immanent, immediate intensity connected with the formation of activist subjectivities in moments of action and emotive ritual (Peterson, 2001; Juris, 2008; Sullivan, 2006). He is sometimes said to have uncovered 'the temporal structure of political affect' (Hamacher, 2005: 38). Such affect emerges in a temporal breach which creates a rhizome with other moments in time, bursting open the closure of the present.

**Deleuze’s theory of time**

*The conception*

In Deleuze's theory, time refers to the entire field of inner experience and its connection to underlying ontologies. Whereas space is the form of outer sense, time is a kind of inner sense. Deleuze describes time as 'auto-affection' (Deleuze, 1992 [1988]): 114-5), the production of affects within the self. The concept of temporal regimes in Deleuze and Guattari thus carries the implications of different spirits, rhythms, or logics of different forms of life. Each entity has its own rhythm of duration, revealed in the process of its transformation, such as sugar dissolving (Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 32).

According to Deleuze, the *past* needs to be theorised radically differently from the usual view of it as a former present. The past is divided into different zones. It contains 'an infinite number of temporal structures' (Lampert, 2006: 44). The 'pure' past is the virtual
The pure past coexists with the present (Deleuze, 2004 [1968]: 108-15). The past becomes visible to thought by means of the virtual image, which is expressed for instance in the formation of concepts. In the virtual image, the past is not defined relative to a new present, but relative to an actual present of which it is the virtual aspect (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 77). Memory and history are affected by different views of time. Deleuze seeks a type of history which gets between points in time 'by way of an anti-memory that deterritorializes what happened in between' (Lampert, 2006: 10). It constructs a type of memory which is non-representational (al-Saji, 2004: 203).

The present is primarily sensory-motor, and spatial, exercising a choice of particular memories from the past, within its own duration (al-Saji, 2004: 214). A 'present' refers here to a particular perspective, conditioned by 'attention to life' from a particular zone of sensory experience or practical concern (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 98). These different presents move at different speeds but are 'bound into the same universe', sometimes becoming antagonistic (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 99). The present is also internally split, because of the relations into which it enters with the past and future (Lampert, 2006: 34; al-Saji, 2004: 209; Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 118). The future is the dimension which brings specific desires into the field of the past, searching and selecting among its zones. 'The past, to be past... must be searchable, explorable, problematizable, penetrable, and livable' (Lampert, 2006: 51). The future is conceived as a search engine enabling one to navigate the co-existing zones of the past (Lampert, 2006: 51).

Difference and critique
For Deleuze, the construction of time autonomously from space is a major difference between his own Bergsonian view of time and the mainstream view. For Deleuze, linear time is a surface effect of temporal multiplicities which produces an illusion of identity (Widder, 2006: 412). The standard view is criticised for confusing degree with kind, positing an addition of successive elements instead of qualitative 'jumps' and 'changes of level' among affects, and the reworking of systems of thought (Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 23, 61-2). 'It is thus necessary to substitute for the old notion of time, the notion of multiple duration' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984 [1972]: 279).

An aspect of Deleuzian time that differs from the mainstream is the replacement of succession with synchronicity: different times exist at once. The past and present are not successive but coexistent (Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 59). Each present is connected by a vertical line to its own past, and also to the pasts of other presents, which form together a single coexistence and contemporaneity (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 89). Historical figures or zones are subjective states through which a subject can pass (Lampert, 2006: 2; Deleuze and Guattari, 1984 [1972]: 28). Since different zones of time can exist simultaneously, time is recomposed as a rhizome rather than a straight line. In Deleuze's view of time, 'the threads that weave time are no longer mere horizontal lines of succession. Rather, they involve vertical transmissions within a duration that passes only because it also coexists with itself in the depths of Bergson's cone of memory' (al-Saji, 2004: 205). Time is a web which forks, embracing every possibility (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 47). It can be folded and unfolded in ways which create different combinations, each an 'age' in its own right, with a coexistence of sheets or continuums of different ages (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 115).
Deleuze views mainstream conceptions as part of an instrumental, 'sensorimotor' fixation to which his image of time provides an expressive, dialogical alternative (al-Saji, 2004: 225-6). Similarly, when comparing events, each is defined by the transversals, or passages between different worlds (or multiplicities), needed to pass from one to the other (al-Saji, 2004: 93). Time is thus a network, but one in which degrees, kinds and trajectories of affinity create distances.

Deleuze’s utopianism

Deleuze's conception of time is utopian insofar as it opens possibilities for thinking about transformation. Utopia for Deleuze is temporal because it involves an untimely mode of thinking, out of sorts with its social context. It is 'an experimental struggle with the past, taking place in the context of the present... for the sake of the future', creating new concepts, peoples and earths (Parr, 2008: 48). The new people and new earth for which Deleuze writes (rather than seeking to represent existing people) is a figure of the future. Deleuze's temporal theory leads to an unusual view of social change. For Deleuze, a revolution is not something new, but rather, is tucked between the temporal levels of history (Lampert, 2006: 171). It necessarily pairs past and future as simultaneous temporal displacements (Lampert, 2006: 139). Revolutionary occasions occur through a moment of time, Kairos, in which singular points are condensed in a particular moment (Deleuze, 2004 [1968]: 190). Ways of relating to the past can also be divided into dominant and utopian approaches. Imitating the past, copying its models, does not relate authentically to the past as a virtual field. A schizorevolutionary, in contrast, repeats the past as virtuality (Lampert, 2006: 93-4).
Agamben: time and play

The conception

Whilst Agamben is best renowned for his critical works (1998, 2005) his works also contain an often ignored affirmative vision (Prozorov, 2009: 525; Negri, 2003) found principally in his messianic theory of time (Agamben, 2007 [1978], 1999, 2000, 2005 [2000]). This temporal theory originates in a theory of language. Agamben makes the onto-anthropological claim that the defining feature of humans is language use (Agamben, 1999a: 51). Reading Benjamin, he argues that language and history are intertwined, yet marked by a fracture within language itself - between the meaning that language articulates and ‘the “pure life of feeling”’ which has no supplementary meaning (Agamben, 1999a: 51). This fracture seeks to resolve itself in the ‘historical becoming of all languages’ (Agamben, 1999a: 54).

Through the concept of infancy, Agamben draws a connection between ‘play’ and ‘ritual’ of ‘both correspondence and opposition’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 77). Play destroys calendar time, transforming diachrony to synchrony, whereas ritual fixes and structures it, transforming synchrony into diachrony (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 77-8; 83). Life oscillates between these two temporal poles. He argues that play replaces closed structures with events (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 79-80). Ritual and sacrifice conversely transform events (such as birth and death) into structures (Ibid: 82). Nonetheless the transformation is never complete and both ritual and play produce a ‘stumbling block’ or ‘residue’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 86). Examples are children (who are not fully
adults) and ghosts – the residual image of the dead – neither of whom are perceived in society to be fully alive or fully dead. The contemporary age is thus marked by the destruction or loss of experience, in which the banality of everyday life cannot be experienced; an unhealthy link caused by the split between the subject of experience and of knowledge that it entails. Children and Ghosts are ‘the bearers of disorder and subversion’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 95). Thus ‘Playland and the land of ghosts set out a utopian typology of historyland, which has no site except in a signifying difference between diachrony and synchrony’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 93).

**Difference and critique**

Whilst Agamben sees in language and humanity a fracture that seeks to be resolved, the movement from this world into the messianic world should not be viewed in traditional terms of historical progress. He criticises progressivism for separating ideals from experience (Agamben, 1999a: 56). Messianic redemption must be able to redeem all of the past and history, not just the end of history (Agamben, 1999c: 152). Western theories of time, whether linear or circular, invariably focus on the instant, or precise moment as the dominating feature, and thus the passage of time is seen as a succession of points (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 110). When the present is thus divided into an infinite and continuous series of quantifiable homogeneous instants, time is felt to be unreal and experience itself becomes ‘waiting and deferral’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111). This prevents human existence from ‘taking possession of itself as something full and singular’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111).

Agamben argues that redemption resides in destruction and rupture; ‘what is at issue is
an interruption of tradition in which the past is fulfilled and thereby brought to its end once and for all’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 153). The historical dialectic cannot be fulfilled by the state; rather we should think of ‘the end of the state and the end of history at one and the same time’ (Agamben, 2000: 111) in order to mobilise one against the other. Thus the ‘coming community’ (Agamben, 1993 [1990]) will not arise from a struggle between states but from a struggle between the state and humanity itself.

Agamben’s utopianism

Whilst Agamben is critical of Western conceptions of time, including the linear, the circular, and the teleological, he argues that ‘the elements for a different conception of time lie scattered among the folds and shadows of the Western cultural tradition’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 110). One source is Gnosticism, which negates the Christian impulse towards linear time and redemption, secularised as progress in post-enlightenment societies (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 106). The utopia – Redemption – has ‘already taken place’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 110) so resides not in some distant or impossible future; rather it is a spiritual experience that can be seized in the present through an alteration in perception: ‘The time of Gnosticism, therefore, is an incoherent and unhomogeneous time, whose truth is in the moment of abrupt interruption, when man, in a sudden act of consciousness, takes possession of his own condition of being resurrected’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111). Such a conception of time is revolutionary, since it ‘refuses the past, whilst valuing in it, through an exemplary sense of the present, precisely what was condemned as negative ... and expecting nothing from the future’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111).
Agamben links (utopian) images of the revolutionary subject taken from Benjamin, Kafka, Heidegger and the Stoics to the Marxist idea of praxis (which is irreducible to a project or goal) and argues that there is an immediate and available experience, essential to humans, from which one can draw the foundations of such a concept of time: pleasure, which does not at all correspond to quantified time (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 114). Contrary to Hegel, ‘it is only at the source and site of happiness that history can have a meaning for man [sic]’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 115). Thus accessing utopian time through the condition of happiness involves constructing one’s own freedom and autonomy in the present (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 115).

Central to Agamben’s view of messianic time – and the means of resistance by which it is simultaneously composed – is the idea of the ‘inoperative’ (Agamben, 2005 [2000]: 54-5; 111). This idea is counterposed to the mastery of history through the end of history (Prozorov, 2009: 527). Agamben’s utopia interrupts the process of history and ushers in the messianic moment, residing in the disruptive subjectivity of the ‘whatever singularity’ (Agamben, 1993 [1990]: 1). Bringing together the threads in Agamben’s thought, the ‘Whatever singularity’ is a utopian being that plays, that can exist in community without presupposing identity or commonality, that uses language without meaning and which is a means without end. Such a being is the principle enemy of the state: ‘Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear’ (Agamben, 1993 [1990]: 86).

**Conclusion**
In the above article, we have attempted to retrospectively construct a body of temporal utopianism. By temporal utopianism, we have meant theories and practices that signal to something beyond the ordinary experience of time under capitalism. Just as utopian geography signals to other spaces, so temporal utopianism signals to other possible ways of experiencing time. Temporal utopianism is both critical and creative. By creating estranged ontological viewpoints from which the 'obvious' comes to seem problematic and contestable, these theories highlight oppressive aspects of mainstream understandings of time, whilst also signalling to possibilities for resistance at both psychological and social levels. They suggest ways in which relations could be rearranged to produce different experiences of time, constructing different lifeworlds.

In classifying the theorists together as temporal utopians, we emphasise the similarity in the critical function of their theories of time. They have in common a tendency to point to modes of time which actualise hopes and desires, in distinction to dominant conceptions. For Benjamin, this takes the form of irruptions of messianic time which connect moments of different time-series together, rupturing the continuum of homogeneous empty time and creating a different experience of non-serial immediacy. Deleuze replaces consecutive time with continuous time which is constantly 'folded' and reconnected to form different temporal zones. His thesis of the ontological distinctiveness of past, present and future breaks with the dominant conception and points towards a novel theory of social change. He also emphasises the need to transcend the 'sensory-motor' present in experiences open to multiple durations and the holistic field of time. Nietzsche uses the idea of eternal return, and the resultant fusion of past, present and future, to critique theories of deferral, instead constructing an
experience of existence/becoming as abundant. Agamben points towards an experience of immediacy and fullness, in which play and diachrony break down the separations created in linear time. Each theory, in a different way, escapes and transcends dominant conceptions of time and points towards a different experience of time.

Due to the constraints of space and format, we have limited our essay to seminal and fairly contemporary philosophical thought. However, our approach could be expanded to include activist theories (Bonanno, 1988; Robinson and Tormey, 2009; Zerzan, n.d.), indigenous conceptions (Whorf, 1956: 63; Anderson, 1991: 23-5; Munn, 1992; Meucke, 2004; Telbun, 1998; Fausto and Heckenberger, 2007; Nandy, 2001; Rigby, 1995), practices in alternative communities (Stephenson, 2009), cultural practices such as retrofuturism and steampunk (Onions, 2008; Bell, 2009) and literature (Bakhtin, 1984 [1929]; Moylan, 1986; Sargisson, 2006; Bell, 2009). The field of temporal utopianism is much broader than this article has expressed.

There are certain similarities in the critiques. Firstly, they are all opposed to alienated time, and the objectivist ontology it entails. This is due to our criteria of selection. Secondly, they all tend towards a view of temporal rhizomatics, in which moments in time can be connected in ways irreducible to a sequential progression, much as points are connected in the Deleuzian theory of the rhizome. How such moments of time are conceived and how they connect varies between the theories. Thirdly, all the theories tend to construct a view of time as expressive, rather than instrumental. They focus on the subjective experience of time and ways in which this subjective experience can express forces of becoming. Fourthly, all the theories contain some element of
polyvocality in their conception of time. They suggest that different constructions of time lead to different experiences, rather than relying on a single, transcendent model taken to encompass all experiences of time.

Perhaps related to this final point, the theories we considered also exhibit many differences. These include the relative importance of individual and collective constructions of time, the extent to which teleology and deferral are embraced or rejected, the closed or open nature of temporal circularities, and the extent to which time is viewed as holistic or rather, as a radically open future where anything and everything can be created. There are substantial disagreements among the authors. Benjamin is largely critical of Nietzsche. He views eternal return as continuous with homogeneous empty time, intensifying the capitalist experience in an apocalyptic leap, but ultimately preserving it (Benjamin, 1999 [1930-5]: 116, 119). Benjamin's critique of 'mere' life would also put him at odds with Agamben, his influence on the latter notwithstanding. Deleuze is broadly sympathetic to Nietzsche, but on the basis of a particular reading in which eternal return is taken to repeat, not particular experiences, but difference as such (Deleuze, 2006 [1962]: 24). Agamben draws heavily on Nietzsche and Benjamin in constructing a view of recognition among whatever-singularities which constructs social relations on the basis of difference. We have not sought in this paper to assess these disputes and mutual borrowings, instead suggesting the various theories as alternatives to be drawn on in imagining other temporalities.

A further word might be said about the use value of our approach, and any ethical or political imperatives that issue from it. Our primary argument is that a sufficient theory
of utopia should take into account time as well as space. In saying this, we do not mean to say that other theorists of utopia do not have a theory of time. Rather, we question the extent to which utopias drawing on teleological or progressive conceptions of time, or assuming an underlying experience of time as finitude and lack, can escape homogeneous empty time and construct different experiences. It is not simply a matter of positing different futures or pasts within a temporal sequence which remains the same. Rather, a sufficient approach to utopia must reconsider the nature of time itself, and fundamentally reconstruct the relationship between past, present and future. This is not just an exercise in abstract philosophy and has implications for social transformation, in particular, the need to move towards immanent or prefigurative approaches instead of approaches based on deferral. We would also propose temporal utopianism as a research tool. The approach has relevance for writing utopian histories of marginal groups such as social movements, indigenous groups, alternative communities, travelling and nomadic communities, counter-cultural movements and so on, particularly where these movements are themselves prefigurative or immanentist, or have alternative conceptions of time.

Through an engagement with four seminal thinkers, we have shown the existence of a field of temporal utopianism which is so far under-theorised and in need of greater recognition within utopian studies. It has been suggested that alternative experiences of time are crucial in reconstructing utopian experiences of becoming, prefiguration and immediacy. By situating utopianism in relation to experiences of time, one can conceive how the dominant experience has constructed utopia as impossible through the establishment of temporal closure. This article has sought to rupture this experience of
closure, enhancing the power of utopianism to actualise other worlds.

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