ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, AND REPRESENTATION: THE FRAMING OF THE BRITISH ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVIST MOVEMENT

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Ph.D.

2013
Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between environmental activism, environmental politics and the mainstream media. In exploring the power relations between government, activists and the media, this work draws on Foucauldian theories of governmentality, power and space (heterotopia). The central hypothesis is that environmental politics has witnessed a shift in power away from activism and towards environmental governance and free-market economics, nestled in a media discourse that has depoliticised many environmental activist movements. Foucault’s theories on power, biopower and governmentality are combined with a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of newspaper reports and original empirical research derived from a focus group with environmental activists. The empirical data and analysis provides original knowledge on relations between environmental activists and journalists. The premise that economics has become the dominant solution to the detriment of environmental activism movements is argued through a historical analysis of advanced liberal governments’ role in creating new green markets and instruments (‘green governmentality’ in Luke’s terms). The shift towards green governmentality has been accompanied by an increased application of state measures, from legislation and surveillance, to conflating environmental activism with terrorism, and the neologism of eco-terrorism. Journalists reaffirm such governance, and the critical discourse analysis charts the shift from positive to negative reporting in the mainstream media. However, activists also contest such power relations through social and new media, alongside traditional repertoires of protest within the space of activism, to challenge such advanced liberal discourse, and bypass traditional media practices.

As neoliberalism has increasingly become the main position in environmental politics, it places activism into a discourse of deviance. The activists’ movement counters this measure through new media, liminoid practices and repertoires of protest.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAA</td>
<td>British Airports Authority</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>British (Beyond) Petroleum</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>CFCs</td>
<td>Chlorofluorocarbons</td>
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<td>CJA</td>
<td>Criminal Justice Act</td>
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<td>CJB</td>
<td>Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Counterspin Collective</td>
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<td>CSD</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs</td>
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<td>DoE</td>
<td>Department of Environment</td>
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<td>EMSs</td>
<td>Environmental Management Systems</td>
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<td>EMT</td>
<td>Ecological Modernisation Theory</td>
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<td>ENGOs</td>
<td>Environmental Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>EU ETS</td>
<td>European Union Emissions Trading Scheme</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GEG</td>
<td>Global Environmental Governance</td>
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<td>HACAN</td>
<td>Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>KACAN</td>
<td>Kew Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise</td>
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<td>LARC</td>
<td>London Action Resource Centre</td>
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<td>MAFF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (now DEFRA)</td>
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<td>MEAs</td>
<td>Multilateral environmental agreements</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NECTU</td>
<td>National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>NEPI</td>
<td>New Environmental Policy Instruments</td>
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<td>NFU</td>
<td>National Farmers Union</td>
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<td>NOTRAG</td>
<td>No Third Runway Action Group (Heathrow Airport)</td>
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<td>NPOIU</td>
<td>National Police Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Press Complaints Commission</td>
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<td>PPPs</td>
<td>Public and Private Partnerships</td>
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<td>RIPA</td>
<td>Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act</td>
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<td>SMOs</td>
<td>Social Movement Organisations</td>
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<td>SOCPA</td>
<td>Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAZ</td>
<td>Temporary Autonomous Zone</td>
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<td>TNR</td>
<td>Trans Northern Companies</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework on Conventions on Climate Change</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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This thesis owes an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my supervisors, Dr Erika Cudworth and Dr Stephen Hobden. Erika and Steve have offered advice, support and restored my confidence in completing the thesis. Thanks also to Dr Abel Ugba for unwavering confidence, and to Dr Libby Lester for reading through earlier versions and providing support and guidance. I would also like to acknowledge the earlier help of Professor Heather Nunn and the present help of the E16 Cocktail Club.

This research has benefited from the numerous activists and individuals I have met over the years. Special note goes to John Jordan, Dan Glass, John Stewart, Martin, Mike, Steve, Nim, Des Kay and all the other activists who have broadened my knowledge. The data is at the heart of this thesis. Their time, thoughts, disagreements and insights brought this work alive. This thesis is a small contribution to documenting the UK environmental activist movement.

Lastly, but never least, my wholehearted thanks to my family and tribe. To Anna, Nick, Digger and Otto Kerridge, Si and the Wallace-Cobbs, Joey, Simon, and the Parsons – thanks for asking when writing was going well, and staying quiet through the difficult times. My family, Alan and Mo Spender, Bill and Ann Newlands, your quiet encouragement has been a constant source of support. For my parents – Mum – although Dad never lived to see this, without the free spirit, question everything, do-no-harm attitude you both instilled in me, this thesis would never exist. Blessed Be.

For Stephen, thank you for opening my eyes, being there, and being my soul-mate.
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Chapter One: Introduction

In the ongoing struggle over economic competitiveness, environmental resistance can even be recast as a type of civil disobedience, which endangers national security, expresses unpatriotic sentiments, or embodies treasonous acts (Luke, 1999: 125).

In terms of media, it’s clear for movements in general, all social movements, we need a massive increase in the quality and quantity of citizen media; we need to saturate the airwaves. (Interview with activist Richard Herring)

Introduction

“#Rio+20 was a rescue mission, but not for the planet. Its objective was the salvation of the neoliberal model” (#OccupyNeolibs Tweet). And so, the global plan to address climate change is summarised in less than 140 characters. This thesis is about the numerous nuances epitomised in this single tweet. The role of governance and environmental politics is seen in the #Rio+20. Rio + 20 was the United Nations (UN) conference on sustainable development. The conference marked twenty years since the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), and ten years since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. As the term neoliberal signifies, and the above quote by Luke also highlights, economic competitiveness through neoliberal concepts is increasingly seen as a solution to environmental problems. Whilst analysing why neoliberal models have become increasingly central to environmental politics, this thesis will examine what consequences this has for environmental politics and grassroots activism.
Global calls to address environmental problems were, until the mid 1990s, predominantly the province of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Green parties, grass-roots and activists’ networks. The growth of environmental governance, along with technological developments in communication, has provided a wider platform for diverse voices. In the UK, mainstream party political co-optation of environmental politics has created diametrically opposed views between politicians, the media, environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), green parties, climate deniers, climate sceptics, multinational corporations, institutions, social movement organisations (SMOs) and radical activists’ movements, the latter being the focus of this thesis. Importantly, the opening-up of alternative media and political platforms has also created new fields of study, and opportunities for new contributions to existing academic fields. Relations between the fields of media, radical environmental activism and the state are the focus of this study, whilst acknowledging the other elements listed above. At the same time, this thesis is about the relationship between journalists and radical environmental activists. To clarify terms of reference, ‘radical environmental activists’ refers to non-hierarchical collectives, sometimes referred to as “horizontal networks” (such as Reclaim the Streets or Plane Stupid in the UK). The thesis will examine this relationship to find out why newspapers report radical environmental activism in certain terms.

On 24 May 2007, the London Evening Standard newspaper led with a front-page headline “Eco warriors to hit Heathrow” (Rosser, 2007). Three months later, on 13 August, the same newspaper’s front page declared “Militants in plot to paralyse Heathrow; extremists to hijack climate change demo” (Mendick, 2007). Both headlines were referring to the Camp for Climate Action, more commonly known as
the Climate Camp, an environmental activist protest against the proposed expansion of London’s Heathrow Airport. The owners of Heathrow Airport (the British Airports Authority – BAA) were seeking government planning permission to build a third runway. A collection of different environmental groups (Climate Rush, So We Stand, Rising Tide, Camp for Climate Action) and NGOs (including HACAN,¹ NOTRAG² and FTF³), along with local residents from Sipson and Harlington villages (whose homes were to be demolished), converged to protest against the plans, culminating in a week-long environmental camp against the proposal.

The articles encapsulate themes and concepts connecting the action with earlier protests. There are references to a “Greenham-style protest camp”, a nod to the anti-nuclear protest at the Greenham US airbase in the 1980s (Mendick, 2007), the anti-car collective Reclaim the Streets as “hardcore protesters”, and veterans of “clashes at the G8 summits”, referring to the protests at the meeting of the world’s top eight countries in Scotland two years earlier in 2005. The drawing on earlier protest camps (such as Greenham Common Peace Camp) is indicative of the news practices and concepts identified in this thesis, which tend to conflate environmental activism with fear and acts of terrorism. Journalists define some activists as “extremists” who will “hijack” the camp (Mendick, 2007). Mendick outlines how activists plan to “infiltrate the terminal buildings by posing as passengers”; echoing the language of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. The sub-headline reads “Hoax packages to cause security alerts”, as activists plan an “assault on airport fences and shops” (Mendick, 2007). Activists are defined as “militant”, “eco-warriors” and “anarchists” (Rosser, 2007). A third article, “Eco-protesters

¹ Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise – Clear Skies. HACAN – Clear Skies began in the 1960s as HACAN. Its aim is to represent the concerns of residents under flight paths. For more information, see HACAN (2011).
² No Third Runway Action Group – Heathrow Airport. For more information, see NOTRAG (2011).
³ Fight the Flights.
target school-run mothers” (Rosser, 2008: 17) makes claims that protesters plan to “deflate tyres of 4×4s in areas such as Kensington and Chelsea, by jamming the valves open with mung beans” (Rosser, 2008: 17), a claim challenged by the Camp for Climate Action.

The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) found that neither Mendick nor Rosser had any basis for either the headlines or the stories, on the grounds that Mendick’s story was based on the journalist overhearing a group of four people when “a man in his late 20s” said “We need to make people sit up and take notice. Leave some packages around Heathrow. That’ll make them take notice” (PCC, 2008). This quote, from an unnamed source, was the basis for the front-page headline.

The London Evening Standard example is not unique; the Daily Telegraph and The Sun newspapers applied similar language: “Anarchists plotting to disrupt flights” proclaims the Daily Telegraph (Milward, 2007: 1) by “disguising themselves as holiday makers to cause havoc”, “planning bomb hoaxes”, “assaulting Heathrow’s perimeter fence”, and “boarding planes and then refusing to take their seats” (Milward, 2007). The Sun headline “Camp Crustie” (Francis, 2007: 20) defines activists as “irate”, “hippy crusties” and “strangers to soap”. Readers are told “The worst thing you can do is make eye contact with one – they’ll have you doing jobs in no time”. One activist is described as “Claire, but who looked more like a rainbow or babbling brook” (Francis, 2007: 20). These examples highlight how contemporary news reports link activism with acts of terrorism, equate modern protest camps with earlier protest camps, and show why journalists remove activists from debates on governance and economics (such as the Rio+20 tweet). How and why journalists
label environmental activists in such terms and portray them as deviants is the focus of this thesis.

“Deviancy” is difficult to define, because there is never a consensus of opinion in society – there are various levels of “acceptable” morality. It could be said that deviance is “nothing less or more than it has always been: rule breaking” (Box, 1981: 9). Political deviancy is understood as anything outside the political electoral system, which does not make a contribution to party politics or is not “governed by procedural norms”, and is by definition “deviant with respect to politics” (Hall, 1971: 2). But Hall’s explanation does not give a clear definition of deviancy. Another way is to differentiate between political minorities and political deviancy. The difference between political minorities and deviant groups is “organisations and no structure” (Lembert cited in Hall, 1971: 3) and, as this thesis will show, for Hall, it is the lack of top-down hierarchical political structure which makes social movements such as environmental activism politically deviant. This is reaffirmed by the state criminalising activism through legislative measures (see Chapter Four). However, activists have developed strategies, tactics and skills to counter this (see Chapter Six) and, in the process, have created the politicisation of deviant subcultures. The issue of how the state applies regulations and laws that prevent and restrict activism is examined through an analysis of governmentality (see Chapter Three) and Chapter Six examines how the various environmental activist movements have developed a series of strategies of counter-governmentality approaches.

The emergence of political deviancy is linked to “movements involving students and young people” who engage in political acts such as protests and demonstrations (Hall, 1971: 9), often expressed through lifestyle and social attitudes that exclude
“normative” behaviour. These attitudes are often formed as a response to a set of circumstances and a reaction to a “specific stage of evolution of modern capitalism” (Hall, 1971: 15). The politically deviant are placed in opposition to capitalism:

consensus politics...is the form in which elite class power manages the consent of ‘masses’ in socially stratified, differentiated, so-called pluralist societies. In the ideology and rhetoric of consensus politics, the ‘national’ interest is represented as transcending all other collective social interests. (Hall, 1971: 14)

This may be an unintentional consequence of prioritising national interest over individuals, but the effect becomes a “determinate negation” of a movement towards the institutionalised life and management of advanced capitalist societies (Hall, 1971: 16). As Chapter Four will show, this increasing institutionalisation of advanced capitalism reinforces the deviant character of activism as being outside normative behaviour. Through Foucault’s notion of biopower this thesis understands that any group or individual whose behaviour is deemed deviant or delinquent is defined as “abnormal”. This work links deviancy to environmentalism, by drawing on Luke’s interpretation of governmentality through a green lens. The conscious decisions of some environmental activists to remain “outside” of society and the criminalisation of some types of activism, as Nealon (1984) notes, places such individuals outside of normative behaviour. People outside (through choice or state regulation) are (via biopower) identified as abnormal (see Chapter Three). This thesis will argue that media representation, along with some activists’ practices, places environmental activism into a discourse of political deviancy (see Chapter Five). This binary position between abnormal/normal and deviant behaviour is iterated by the media’s setting of boundaries to what is “acceptable and what is not” (Halloran, 1978: 299). The media’s framing of political deviance can sometimes act a tool to
Journalists’ coverage of deviant behaviour is often a way to clarify and “legitimate power to shape and define a political reality” (Hall, 1971: 20). News production practices reaffirm and legitimise actions by governments to maintain the status quo of power, by “managing conflict and dissent in the interest of the establishment” (Halloran, 1978: 299). Journalists’ articulation of state (or establishment, to use Halloran’s term) rhetoric filters down to individual activists, who, once labelled as politically deviant, apply this to a “fixed point of evil, external to the self, they [people] use this as a scapegoat, which helps them maintain their own particular view of self and society” (Halloran, 1978: 288). There are two points to raise here in relation to the observations above.

Firstly, although Hall’s and Halloran’s definitions of political deviancy relate to the media, they emerged at a time when their hypotheses were yet to be tested. As this thesis will show, many of these ideas can be applied to the representation of environmental activism today. At the time of Hall’s and Halloran’s writings, advanced capitalism had less of a global hold on world economics, and environmentalism was a fledgling term (McCormick, 1991). However, through the theoretical work of Luke on green governmentality, which draws on Foucault’s conception, this thesis will show how through the lens of media representation, environmental activism is understood as an act of political deviancy. Secondly, as the reporting in the London Evening Standard and other newspapers indicates, media reporting of environmental activism has increasingly been framed as politically and
socially deviant and defined in terms of acts of terror and anarchy, and a depoliticisation of activism.

To find out if environmental activism is placed into a framework of political deviancy, this thesis will examine numerous examples of environmental activism protests since the 1970s, mapping out how the UK environmental activist movement has evolved. Charting each “moment”, or evolution, of environmentalism can reveal wider issues which result in environmental activists being identified as “extremists”, “militants” and “anarchists”, regardless of their individual or collective status. In doing so, this thesis will address four research questions:

1. How do the mainstream media frame environmental activism?
2. Are there nuances and linguistic traits specific to the journalistic practice of report environmental protest?
3. Are environmental protests contextualised within wider political discourses, when reporters construct narratives around environmental activism in the mainstream media?
4. Is there any relationship between environmental activism and mainstream politics?

The main argument of this thesis is that a shift in power has occurred between environmental activists and mainstream political parties. This is reflected in how journalists report environmental protest. Each of these questions will be explored in detail, but before dissecting them and their relevant theoretical perspectives, it is important to establish what is meant by the terms “environmental activism”, “environmental politics” and “representation” as set out in the title.
Environmental Activism

The term “environmental activism” is central to distinguishing what form of environmentalism is being referred to. “Environmentalism” became a political battleground in the late 1960s. Prior to this time, environmentalism often focused on conservation, with the creation of national parks. (The Peak District became Britain’s first national park in 1951, while Yellowstone Park in the U.S., created in 1872, is “dedicated and set apart as a public park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people” (Benton and Short, 2000: 99). Yellowstone is the world’s oldest national park with an emphasis on ecology over a socio-ecology position (Robbins, 2004). National Parks signalled the first move towards taming the wilderness, before “we abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us” (Leopold, 1994: 75). The relationship between people and the planet was changing, no more so than with the Earthrise image.

Earthrise was the first view of the Earth from space, taken by the 1969 Apollo space mission. This image of the Earth is believed by many to have changed how the human race perceived the Earth, nature and man’s relationship to the planet (Dryzek, 1997; Doyle, 2007; Gore, 2007; Lester, 2010). The effect of Earthrise saw a shift in the concept of “environmental issues” from “the environment” (as in conservation) to “the environment” as a social issue (Hansen, 2010). “Environmentalism” came to mean a politics which raised problems around the “intersection of ecosystems and human social systems” (Dryzek, 1997: 8), in other words, a politics which problematised how humans relate to nature.
When referring to “environmentalism” as a social issue, this thesis agrees with the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that the Earth’s climate is changing. Increases in global temperature are affecting the atmosphere as a result of anthropogenic high-carbon industrialisation of natural resources. We are living in a society founded on high carbon production. The increase in consumption means that “increases in energy use, the transportation of goods, the heating of houses, the powering of industries, and so on” all call into question our use and abuse of fossil fuels (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 14). The fourth IPCC report clearly lays the blame for climate change and global warming on anthropocentric industrialisation, noting that “most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations” (Solomon et al., 2007: 10). The IPCC and other large organisations are accepting that mass production on a global scale has led to an increase in greenhouse gases that affect the global climate.

Environmentalism is viewed as light green, shallow, as opposed to deep ecology (Naess, 1989; Porritt, 1984) and it refers to a reformist, managerial approach to conservation, with a focus on green consumption (see, for example, Elkington and Hailes, 1988). Shallow ecology is an anthropocentric approach that places human needs at the forefront of engagement with nature, whereas deep ecology (Naess, 1989) is the reverse, putting the case for nature, animals and “all that supports life” first (Wall, 1994: 67) and anthropocentric needs second. Deep ecology calls for radical measures to counter problems of vast consumption, especially in the Western world, and increasingly in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS countries). However, decreasing capitalist-led population and human growth would
place less strain on natural resources. An ecological movement could create a “harmonious balance with nature” (Torgerson, 1999: 29).

The effect of a high-carbon economy and an increase in global temperature has been described as causing climate change, global warming, greenhouse effects, acid rain, ozone depletion, deforestation, desertification, pollution and even nuclear winter (Hansen, 2010). The term “climate change” has many labels and there is considerable ambiguity as to whether it refers to the actual phenomenon of rising global temperature, the scientific thesis, or the discourse that constitutes our political understanding. Those who challenge whether an increase in temperature is connected to human-led industrialisation are commonly termed either “climate sceptics” – someone who “seeks the truth but who has yet to be convinced that the available scientific evidence supports a particular claim or hypothesis” – or “climate deniers” – who will “ignore or undermine scientific evidence for political ends” (Humphreys, 2006: 83).

According to Dryzek (1997), environmental activists can be categorised as “realos” and “fundis”. The German Green party, Die Grünen, was divided into these two main factions. Realos are activists who believe in action through the political system, “organisations” that combine direct action with political lobbying (such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and many of the global charities), while fundis are those groups which are a social movement rather than a political party, where direct action is a political tool (Dryzek, 2000: 174). The latter form of environmental activism is central to this thesis. Dave Foreman, founder of the environmental

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4 The German Green Party (c. 1972) is often credited as being the first green political party. However, the United Tasmanian and New Zealand’s Values parties also began around the same period. Die Grünen is the largest green party (Dryzek, 1997: 173).
activist movement Earth First!, says that all too often “political movements become more debating societies where the participants engage in philosophical masturbation and never get down to the vital business at hand” (Foreman, 2005: 352). In contrast, “activism means action” (McKay, 1998: 5). Moreover, part of the activist movement is in reaction to the “professionalization of environmentalism” (Foreman, 2009). Professionalism is one dividing line between the “radical” activists (fundis) and the environmental NGOs (realos), a theme discussed further in Chapter Six.

The difference between the two forms can be explained through their organisational structures. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and those that influence environmental policy are top-down hierarchical bodies, some with charitable status. For the purpose of this thesis, these groups will be referred to as professional environmental activists. The focus of this thesis is on activist collectives that are made up of individuals at a grass-roots level, which “operate under a variety of organisational (and disorganisation) banners depending on the action concerned” (Anderson, 2004: 107). The second form is represented by non-hierarchical, horizontal collectives of like-minded individuals that form together either ontologically to create new activist movements, or as part of the wider environmental activist movement as a whole. For the purpose of this thesis these groups will be referred to as radical environmental activists. This form of environmental activism focuses around “personal responsibility for political action and personalised ‘ecocentric’ values” (O’Riordan quoted in Anderson, 2004: 107). It is about being part of a society, but making your own guidelines, taking responsibility for your own actions – without leadership, negotiation or regulation by other human beings. What connects the two, hierarchical and non-hierarchical, is environmentalism or, more precisely, environmental politics; the second term in the title.
Environmental Politics

Dryzek and Schlosberg’s (2009) opening salvo in *Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader* defines environmental politics as “how humanity organises itself to relate to the nature that sustains it” (2009: 1) and this will be the context in which the term is used in this thesis. Moreover, environmental politics are defined in terms of relations between people, the natural environment and economic governance in a highly industrialised society.

Governance is not government or the art of government but “governance and government are often regarded not as discrete entities but two poles on a continuum of different governing types” (Finer, 1970). Pierre and Peters (2000) note “the term governance derives from its capacity – unlike that of the narrower term – government – to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing” (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito, 2005: 478). The word “governance” is not a neologism, but has increasingly grown in usage since the 1990s (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Bevir and Rhodes (2003: 45) observe that “governance is a change in the nature or meaning of government”, and this is expanded in Stoker’s definition (1998: 17) that governance refers to the emergence of “governing styles in which the boundaries between the public and private sectors are blurred”. Rhodes calls such governing styles a “new operating code” (1996: 47) that works as a “self-organising and co-ordinating network of societal actors” (Schout and Jordan, 2005 in Jordan, Wurzel and Zito, 2005: 480). Despite these varying definitions, Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito (2005), echoing Schout and Jordan, offer a useful interpretation of governance that it is “synonymous with a change in the meaning of government, a new process
of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule, or a new method by which society is governed” (2005: 477). This thesis argues that how governments have co-opted a environmental governance through biopower, (see Chapter Three) by introducing an economic approach, to include entrepreneurial discourse, to aid market-driven interests into environmental discourse.

This has been achieved through “steering (setting policy goals) and rowing (delivering steering goals through use of instruments) societal actors, individuals and collectives of people” (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992 cited in Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito, 2005: 480) as techniques or technologies of self. The self, the individual is guided to act in certain ways that benefit the collective or societal whole. As Luke mentions, any rejection of such codes, rules, or policy is administrated through stronger direct legislative measures such as new laws, restrictive measures and, in some cases, incarceration. For example, HACAN Chairman, John Stewart was refused entry in the United States of America (September 2011) because of his association with anti-aviation collective Plane Stupid (Lydall, 2011).

Emerging at the same time as the activist movements, economic and political environmentalism developed in reaction to a “more accelerated industrial development” (Finger, 2008: 44). An increased concern about green issues, environmental problems and the social and economic impact of environmental disasters (such as floods and famine) began to be defined and discussed in two meaningful ways – at institutional level and through activism.

The environmental movement rapidly took shape following the first Earth Day in 1970, and within the emergence of a green political discourse (Torgerson, 1999). The
early 1970s saw the first environmental activism, when Rex Hunter along with fellow academics and journalists formed Greenpeace. Having chartered a boat from Vancouver, they attempted to sail into a nuclear-testing zone off the coast of Alaska. Although this direct action failed when the USA tested the bomb ahead of the scheduled time, it created a media frenzy (Hunter, 2004). The controlled and calculated release of information to the press by journalists aboard the Phyllis McCormack meant they maximised the amount of coverage. Each journalist on board the boat was assigned a specific role to gain the most exposure:

Cummings would file his stuff with Vancouver’s underground paper, The Georgia Straight, which would pass it on to all the underground papers in Canada, the US, and Europe via the Liberation News Service. I would pump out a daily column in the Vancouver Sun. Fineberg would get stories out to papers in Alaska. (Hunter, 2004: 43)

Hunter et al. reinforced their media message with the support of the students’ movement (Hunter, 2004). Linking with the student movement guaranteed coverage, as the New York Times newspaper declared “Students protest A Test” (Reuters, 1971: 55). The small article notes that:

Nearly 9,000 elementary and high school students gathered at the United States Consulate…in peaceful protest against the planned nuclear test …no serious incidents occurred at the demonstration, although the police said that a few youths tried to remove an American flag. (Anon, 1971: 55)

The article raises some of the themes that this thesis will examine – the students are referred to as “youths”; there is a clear statement that no disturbances occurred, but the journalist felt it necessary to note the removal of a flag. As this thesis will show, this language pattern can be identified from the 1970s to recent protests.

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5 Robert (Bob) Hunter was a journalist with the Vancouver Sun and, influenced by media commentator Marshall McLuhan, he understood how important media coverage was in raising awareness of eco-political issues. The boat was later renamed Greenpeace.
However, Greenpeace’s mistake over the Brent Spar oil rig debate, led many journalists to question the relationship between journalists and activists. Although the Brent Spar protest by Greenpeace is rejected as a sample of CDA, or for the focus group, it has importance, in highlighting relations between NGOs and journalist. Up until the mid-1990s, Greenpeace continued to spoon feed journalists ready-made new packages (Anderson, 1997), and many television executives were seduced by Greenpeace’s media set-up, until the Brent Spar campaign. Royal Dutch Shell planned to sink a decommissioned oil rig in the Atlantic Ocean. Greenpeace argued that sinking the rig would cause greater environmental damage than dismantle the rig. The protest began an international event, as activist from “six North Sea countries staged an on-site protest with Greenpeace offices around the worlds publicising the event from their respective home countries” (Wapner, 2002: 44). Greenpeace supplied journalists with images from Greenpeace ships who “circled the rig with photographers producing images of the occupation that were sent out electronically to media sources throughout the world” (Wapner, 2002: 44). The protest led to debates in Parliament. The media campaign put pressure on BP and the Conservative government to support the dismantling of the rig on land, over BP’s plans to sink the ring in the North Sea (Anderson, 2003:123). Ironically, the journalist showed little interest in “the proposed deep-sea dumping of the derelict North Sea Brent Spar oil terminal (until Greenpeace’s action), it was a non-issue as far as the British news media were concerned’ (Hansen: 2000: 58). Yet, with a constant stream of news ready footage, journalists took “films of its direct action” that were immediately relayed by satellite telephone to newsrooms across northern Europe” (Rose, 1998) from Greenpeace’s new hub. Greenpeace’s aim was to “guide inter-state behaviour with regard to environmental issues” as many “NGOs try to
shape the quality of these regimes” (Wapner, 2002: 41). The continuing direct action, media pressure and international pressure from Germany (which has the highest percentage of Greenpeace members worldwide) (Rootes, 2003) led to a u-turn by the Prime Minister and the backing of Greenpeace; which led to the “abandonment of plans to sink a redundant oil installation in the Atlantic Ocean” (Anderson, 2003: 123). Shell issued a press statement announcing that due to a lack of “wider government support… it had abandoned deep-sea disposal” (Rose, 1998: 120).

The *Daily Mirror* newspaper claimed victory and the news-reading public (rightly or wrongly) interpreted the combined protest of media pressure and direct action as having achieved political change. Rose (1998) attributes the changes to a sympathetic European press, xenophobic reporting by British journalists and a ‘public campaign had created the largest environmental issue for years… [and] it touched a raw anti-European sore spot in the British body politic and the ‘Spar got ‘cross over, awakening views and opinions that had very little to do with the environment – and everything to do with politics, even identity of Britain as a nation’ (Rose: 1998: 138).

A consequence of mixing environmental politics with poor media practice was that journalists failed to question Greenpeace, the protest or the environmental harm or benefits of either dumping or dismantling the rig.

When Greenpeace admitted it had “made wrong claims about toxic waste” allegedly encased in the rig, they apologised to “Shell, the Government and, on 16 June, the UK media’ (Rose 1998: 144). *The Times* newspaper editorial led with “Grow Up, Greenpeace: a little more responsibility is now required” (1995: 21); as the *Daily
Mail newspaper ran with “Red-faced Greens admit: We got it wrong” (Hughes and Norris, 1995: 11). Head of BBC newsgathering, Richard Sambrook told the Edinburgh Television Festival, “It was our own fault, the media’s fault. We never put enough distance between ourselves and the participants. I’m left feeling Greenpeace was pulling us by the nose” (Rose 1998: 159). Greenpeace retorted by claiming the media were to blame, “The media got drunk on the drama of the Brent Spar story and now they blame us for the hangover’ (The Independent cited in Rose 1998: 161). Moreover, as Glasgow Media School academic, Greg Philo notes:

TV News Executives are apparently horrified that Greenpeace supplied video material to them on their campaign over the Brent Spar. But for years now defence contractors, drug companies and other vested interests have supplied video news releases directly to television news… Her Majesty’s Government had also dipped its toe in the waters of achieving favourable media coverage by spending money. In the 1980s it became the biggest spender on advertising in the country…All this passed without mention by TV executive until Greenpeace and the Brent Spar (Philo, cited in Rose 1998:162)

Journalist struck out at Greenpeace’s mistake, and the backlash led to a break down in trust between NGOs, activists and journalists. Rose singles out the BBC as failing to “testing any claim Greenpeace makes, it tends to raise the issue of the Spar to cast any doubt on a claim or a statement without testing it. It is as if the BBC feels it has to make up for transmitting the footage of the Spar campaign by repeatedly attacking Greenpeace for it” (Rose 1998:164-5).

Whilst eco-activists and social movements were grabbing the headlines for the wrong reasons, governments and global institutions’ nascent steps towards biopolitical policies were emerging in the form of green capitalism. The period from mid 1970s
to early 1980s, is generally accepted as the time of social movement development (Anderson, 1997) within environmental discourse. The era was marked by the increased politicization of the environmental lobby, as mass media, youth culture and large scale consumption aided the civil rights, feminist and environmental movements. At the same time, the global economy underwent a series of major restructuring processes meant “by the 1970’s the environment had to a large extent becomes institutionalised” (McCormick, 1989: 81).

Since the end of World War II, global environmental governance, has been “governed by what academics and policy makers called the Bretton Woods system” (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 18). The Bretton Woods system (founded in July 1944) comprises of two financial organisations – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which later became part of the World Bank. Wall (2010) argues that “neoliberal globalisation such as the International Monetary Fund and World Trade organisations” increases corporate-led globalisation, which “pushes countries into adopting policies which hurt the poor and wreck the environment” (77).

The 1970’s oil crisis (1973-1974, and the Iran revolution, 1979) provided an “impetus to changes in energy policy, [and] had a significant impact on the global economy” (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 19). The oil crisis made a significant impact on global environmental governance as Newell and Paterson (2010) notes as

…the ideological fixation with markets, the dominance of finance, the widening global economic inequalities, and the focus on networks as means of organising- have all combines to shape the character of responses to climate change (23-24)
The World Bank was originally set up as a “development institute, not a crisis fighter [whose] focus on project leading and structural reforms enhance long running development and poverty elimination” (Stiglitz in Chang, 2001: 191). By the mid 1990s the World Bank, alongside the launch of the World Trade Organization (1995), meant that “neoliberal economic reforms were well underway in many developing and ex-communist economies” (Chang, 2001: 2). The effect was a recognition of new markets and a need for new policies, including environmental and educational policies to ensure the elimination of poverty and environmental problems. Moreover, the effect of a “neo-liberal world order” was that it produced a set of “attitudes that begin to dominate the world stage after the fall of Keynesianism in the developed countries in the 1970s and the collapse of the state-led industrialisation models in developing countries” (Stiglitz in Chang, 2001: 2), no more so than in environmental policy and governance.

A series of key global summits produced a series of codes, rules and forms of conducts for both states and individuals. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972)- that included a “call from a ‘loyalty to the earth…the adoption of global (as opposed to national) responses to environmental problems, and massive changes in over-consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy” (Bernstein, 2002: 3). By the 1980s, sustainability became a buzz-word for environmental discourse, propelled with the ratification of the Montreal Protocol. Montreal Protocol of 1987 banning the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The next significant summit, leading to Agenda 21, was ratified at the Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. Agenda 21 sets out for the UN “the first draft of the ‘Earth Charter’, a vision for an environmentally sustainable planet” (Cox, 2010: 78). Agenda 21 charter placed international pressure upon large organisations to adopt an
environmental policy. At the Rio Earth Summit, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) passed a motion to ratify Agenda 21, which “propelled and justified the terms sustainable development into common currency” (Buckingham and Turner, 2008: 50).

Bernstein notes, by the time Rio had occurred there emerged view which supported the “view that liberalisation in trade and finance is consistent with, and even necessary for, international environmental protection” (2002:4). Increasingly, this view led to the “promotion of global free trade and open markets on the economic side, and the polluter pays principle” (2002: 4). Agenda 21 signalled the emergence of neoliberal capitalism within environmental discourse. The objectives of Agenda 21 were to “promote market instruments an the integration of environment and development in decision making related action programmes” (Bernstein, 2002: 7)

Thus, the environment became “not only an additional investment opportunity, but also an opportunity for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and governments to offset some of their environmental wrongdoings” (Finger, 2008: 51). The UK government’s development of alternative energy markets, including carbon and emissions trading schemes, was introduced with little regulation by the state. With limited government regulation, an “advanced liberal government” (Rose, 1993) enabled market forces to move into a leading role. Supported by Western governments and institutions, at the same time successive UK governments were introducing legislation that prevented and curtailed the use of protest and direct action. By focusing on economic as the key solution to climate change, diminished the public voice of environmental activists, and increasingly placed it into a politics of deviance, as the opening quote of this introduction indicates, repeated here:
the ongoing struggle over economic competitiveness, environmental resistance can even be recast as a type of civil disobedience, which endangers national security, expresses unpatriotic sentiments, or embodies treasonous acts. (Luke, 1999: 125)

Luke’s analysis looks at American environmental politics, with a close reading of former Vice President Al Gore’s and President Clinton’s attempts to create a “green” global Marshall plan, but his observations can be applied to the current and historical specificities of the UK environmental activist movements. This work considers that a similar pattern emerged in the UK media’s representation of environmental activism. Applying Luke’s concepts to an analysis of the environmental activists and journalists at this “specific stage of evolution of modern capitalism” (Hall, 1971: 15) reveals a stigmatisation of activists by placing them into a framework of deviance. This discursive challenge over environmental politics creates a new language that “produces both explanations and justification” (Hall, 1971: 18). In Foucauldian terms, the discursive challenge led to a form of truth (“Regime of Truth”) (Rabinow, 1984), where discourse may not be “true”, but will nevertheless have consequences for the subject in the discourse (Hall, 1997: 49). As Chapter Three will argue, advanced liberal government juxtaposed environmental solutions with an increased curtailing and restriction of environmental protest. The use of language shows how media discourse frames activists as delinquent deviants. Thus, referring to “environmental politics” in the title of this thesis focuses on the relationship between state and activists in the public domain. The third term in the title, “representation”, in this context, stands for discourse.
**Representation as Discourse**

Language gives us the tools to understand how a topic is constructed and reasoned with, to give meaning (Hall, 1997), where “meaning depends on the relationship between things in the world” (Hall 1997: 18). “Language provides the tools for discourse as a system of representation” (Hall, 1997: 44). Foucault claims that language is a way of constructing meaning through a group of interrelated statements which collectively constitute a discourse (Foucault, 1972). Each statement constitutes a meaning or knowledge about a topic or subject. The function of “discourse” is to produce knowledge through language, and how that language is constructed is how knowledge is formed. Thus, discourse is a group of statements that provide a language in which to represent knowledge about a particular historical moment (Hall, 1992); and it is “about the production of knowledge through language” (Hall, 1984: 291). A semiotic approach could help us to understand how journalists denote meaning in the representation of eco-activism, but revealing how language constructs or imposes meaning neither contextualises it nor gives any historical context. Foucault (1972, 1977, 1991, 1997), however, focuses on how meaning is produced ("discourse"), which will go some way in answering the research questions of the thesis.

To unravel how meaning is produced through a Foucauldian lens means adopting a more historically grounded approach. Doing so will help reveal relationships between discourse, power relations and how journalists use language to produce meaning (Chapter Five). This work argues that it is necessary to examine historical periods in order to contextualise the present. A historically grounded approach will also reveal how power relations shift over time, from environmental activists
attaining positive news coverage (positive to a certain degree) to being framed as a negative representation.

**Media and Protest Power Relations**

This thesis will explore how changes in media discourse have provided some opportunities for social movements that have traditionally been denied. Traditional media practice has relied on a one-to-many model. The one-to-many is led by journalists, editors, media houses and broadcasting companies. Originally newspapers were “gatekeepers of information” – David White coined the term “gatekeeping” to mean the series of people and processes (in the media) that information passes through before becoming public knowledge. White notes that before an event is given news value “a story is transmitted from one gatekeeper after another in the chain of communications. From reporter to rewrite man…the process of choosing and discarding is continuously taking place” (Dexter and White, 1964: 163). In relation to state and the media, Becker terms this gatekeeping as a “hierarchy of credibility…In any system of ranked groups, participants take it as given that members of the highest group have the right to define the way things really are” (1967: 241). Thus news production becomes a top-down stream of information, from one to the many, passing from one gate through to another. That was the dominant model until the internet, which changed the top-down, one-to-many, to horizontal one-to-one.

The internet was initially created as a communication tool by the American military; it has subsequently aided the advance of both capital accumulation and global communication. Creating new forms of communication and developing new
technologies as part of “capital’s dream of superfast networks that will spread consumerism across the planet” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 65), the internet and later the world wide web (in the 1990s) gave new opportunities for wider communications, greater networks and organisational structures – not just for capitalists but also for protest movements. The internet changed modes of communication, from one-to-one (such as the telephone), one-to-many through print and broadcasting media, to many-to-many (Gilmore, 2006).

The relationship between the web and mainstream media practice led to an increased interaction between media houses and the general public. Consumers could now react quickly to a story or news event. More co-operations emerged, and there was less suspicion between the general public and the media. The web also shifted the way news is consumed. With the development of smart phones, tablets, and the internet, news can be consumed 24 hours a day, from anywhere in the world. No longer do consumers have to wait for the six o’clock headlines or next day’s newspaper to gain information. The result is that the “internet meant journalism became an old practice in a new context – a synthesis of tradition and innovation” (Kawamoto, 2003: 4). Technologies enabled consumers to access news at any time. Moreover, the internet makes journalists out of everyone. As well as consuming the news, the web and internet enables citizen journalism (through blogs, video-apps, and smart phones), but often at the cost of diminishing the authority of traditional journalism in ways that are not always desirable (Newlands, 2010).

In addition, it must be acknowledged that, as Gilmore (2003) notes, “the development of the personal computer may have empowered the individual, but there were distinct limits” (2003: 16). Such limits are defined by the concept of “digital
divide”. Digital divide is a term that emerged in the mid 1990s. It refers to the inequality between those who have “ever”, and those who have “never” had access to the internet. This inequality can be polarised through educational opportunity, wealth, age, urban/rural location, and physical ability. The internet also brings with it divides in democracy. As Norris notes, the internet creates a “divide between those who do and do not use the multiple political resources available on the internet for civic engagement” (2001: 12). Moreover, although journalism may have been opened up, it was still regulated and moderated by the organisations and individuals that had access to their websites. However, one group that has heavily utilised the internet for civic engagement is the new social movement associated with environmental activism.

The growth of the internet has worked to the benefit of new social movements, by expanding their numbers and aiding the easier co-ordination of tactics and skills. The year 1999 saw the explosion of technologically led social movements across the globe. Following protest outside the World Trade Organization meeting (on 1 December), the world awoke to media images of protesters and rioters clashing on the streets of Seattle, USA. Newspaper images of handcuffed activists, tear gas clouds and police standing over protesters were already familiar in the UK. Six months earlier a similar event had taken place in London, with the Global Justice Movement’s J18 protest, Carnival of Capital. Seattle and London were united by what appeared to be a spontaneous anti-capitalist protest that emerged from nowhere. In reality, the two events were a highly organised protest as a “result of clear sets of mathematical principles and processes that govern a highly connected network” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 68). The protest had been co-ordinated through a network of internet sites, emails and websites.
New social movements and users of cyberspace involve interactions between like-minded people, with shared interests, often operating in non-hierarchical ways. Indeed, as Jenny Pickerill notes, “cyberspace has been likened to that of a rhizome” (2003: 24), in that a “rhizomatic structure provides multiple entryways, facilitating potential participants’ entry into environmental activism through connections to their rhizomatic online networks” (Pickerill, 2003: 24). The hypertextual architecture (Kahn and Kelner, 2003) of the internet has been referred to as a non-hierarchical “rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 7). Such non-linear networks connects any point to another point, understood in terms of a non-signifying system that is neither singled down to one aspect or multiple aspects (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). The rhizome has been defined as:

[A] multiplicity that has no coherent and bounded whole, no beginning or end, only middle from where it expands and overspills. Any point of the rhizome is connected to any other. It has no fixed points to anchor thought, only lines; magnitudes, dimensions, plateaus, and they are always in motion. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996: 377)

This rhizomatic approach helps us understand why the internet might be an appropriate communication tool for protest movements, as it is not hierarchically structured nor organised, mirroring the make-up of radical protest movements. The term ‘radical protest movements’ refers to protest collectives that exist outside of NGOs, single-issue protest movements or lobbyists, such as the vertical network of Greenpeace. Vertical networks, which favour linear developments, are not often found in new social movement organisations and environmental activist collectives. Rather, protest movements are often characterised by horizontality. Actions are arranged through consensus politics, which is why the term “rhizome” is useful in
understanding how technology is used by activist movements. Emails, blogs and forums are all used in the decision-making process, alongside face-to-face meetings. So, the internet echoes the rhizomatic networks that shape the environmental protest movements, making it an attractive technology for protest. In addition, new technological developments in modes of communication narrow the division between mainstream and alternative media forms. The effect is that activists have a new platform through which they can bypass traditional media, with its often unsympathetic messages, and produce their own websites, blogs and media. It also means they are able to produce their own media on a global scale – important examples here include indymedia.org.uk or SchNews.org.uk.

Furthermore, by bypassing traditional media, activist media is free of the “order of discourse” that favours state over activists, and in which activism and protest reportage is often unfavourable to protest movements. The creation of alternative media (such as Indymedia) means that activists can be both producers and consumers of news. The symbiotic relationship between activists and the internet shifts any action from local event to, potentially, global news. Websites enable activists to provide information direct to journalists, and document protests themselves and post their own coverage. ELZN’s application of internet as a tool for bypassing state regulations, for Castells, informed global networks, as messages about protest generated by Indymedia, “numerous hacklabs, temporary or stable, populated the movement and used the superior technological savvy of the new generation to build an advantage in the communication battle against their elders in the mainstream media” (Castells, 2009: 344).
This has led to new techniques that draw on the notion of “cyberlibertarianism” and the ability to develop “electronically mediated forms of living with radical libertarian ideas about the proper definition of freedom, economics and community” (Heath and Potter, 2004: 301). However, while the creation of the internet was a facilitating device for consumer capitalism, it also meant that activists could flourish in the “public part of cyberspace” (Lovink, 2002: 254). This growth in communication meant activists’ networks in the UK could learn from other activists’ movements around the world, as “global networks of power and counter-power landed simultaneously to confront each other in the spotlight of the media” (Castells, 2009: 340). The most notable example is the Zapatista movement, which partly inspired the Global Justice Movement. Briefly, the Zapatista movement emerged when Canadian, Mexican and American governments drew up the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), framing it as an opportunity to lower trade barriers. However, it led to lower subsidies to the indigenous populations, whilst opening up opportunities for large corporations. To appease their indigenous population, the Mexican government agreed to an amendment to the Treaty, and when newly elected President Fox sent the Indigenous Rights Bill to be passed in 2001, the Zapatista army (a group of farmers) travelled the 2,000 miles to the capital to address Congress. When they reached Mexico City they were greeted by 100,000 people. Bringing thousands of people together through the internet showed the potential organising possibilities of the world wide web. By 2001, details of the Zapatista’s protest against NAFTA had spread around the world via email, websites and blogs. The Zapatista movement is significant for its use of news lists and homepages to mobilise support (Krøvel, 2011). News lists and web pages are increasingly key sources for many activism movements. Such new technology is, as Krøvel notes, laying:
The foundation for global networks undermining much of the Mexican state’s formal and informal control over production and distribution of information. Slowly, radio, newspapers and television also became less inclined to simply repeat official information. (2011: 131)

For the Zapatista, technology and the internet provided one way to disseminating information outside the hierarchy of credibility and gatekeeping practices. The Zapatista movement was effective for its combining of “broad-based, local and national networks, run by communities, and linked internationally, by the Internet, have proved themselves capable of bringing together very large groups of people in very short spaces of time” (Kingsnorth, 2003: 75).

Castells argues a growth in communication technology founded on Internet tools meant collective such as the Zapatistas benefited when “global networks of power and counter-power landed simultaneously to confront each other in the spotlight of the media” (Castells, 2009: 340). Castell’s cites the Zapatista movement as an example of the internet providing a platform to challenge international policies.

Castell, (2009), Collier and Collier, (2007) and Klein (2002) believe the internet provide the platform for the EZLN social movement to shift power away from journalists and into the hands of activist. Klein argues that “Marcos himself was a one-man web: he is a compulsive communicator, constantly reaching out, drawing connections between different issues and struggles” (2002: 217). Naomi Klein echoes Castell’s romanticises the Chiapas “the strategic victory of the Zapatistas was to change the terms: to insist that what was going on in Chiapas could not be written off as a narrow ethnic struggle, that is was both specific and universal” (Klein, 2002: 217).
In contrast, Krøvel asks, why then do we need journalists if power relations shifts to
the point society is based on a network of information that “participants themselves
can distribute…directly to their audiences without the mediation of journalists”
(Krøvel, 2011: 135). Yet, as Krøvel (2011) notes, it was not the network of
information and independent journalism that challenged the government’s position,
but the physical ‘caravan’ that travelled from Chipas to Mexico City, traversing
from state to state, with “journalists from dozens of countries following the caravan”
(Krøvel, 2011: 136). When the caravan reached Mexico City some “200,000 people”
greeted the numerous Nobel Prize winners, authors, artists and musicians that had
travelled with the EZLN. Thus, Castell’s interpretation of the ELZN as largely
successful due to its virtual presence could be seen as romanticising new technology
roles within social movements. The ELZN media event occurred due to the physical
procession, which garnered media attention over the networks of information. The
Internet did play an important supporting role, to disseminate information “so that
speeches and announcements could be published almost without delay” (Krøvel,

However, critiques Berger, (2001), Chandler, (2004) and Krøvel,(2011) argue there
were several other factors that bough the ELZN into the world’s spotlight. Whilsts,
ELZN activists relied on a listserv method (Chipas-L) to disseminate information.
What was problematic with listserv Chipas-L was EZLN found it more useful
“when trying to gather information to correct or repudiate claims in the mainstream
media” than to disseminate information to supporters and the press. (Krøvel, 2011:
133). Activists learnt the Internet often provided a breeding ground for “spreading
unsubstantiated rumours” and that is was “of great importance that the information” put out via the Chipas-L listserves was “trustworthy” (Krøvel, 2011: 133).

Castells argues that “EZLN’s success was founded upon their information strategy” and that along with Cleaver, Castells had “tried to show that information technology” provides a platform to “alter fundamental power relations in society” (Krøvel, 2011: 135).

Chandler argues such power relations emerge from a series of local protest that links together the various other national or domestic protest across the globe. In sharing similar characteristics that challenge power- whereby power is “conceptual shorthand for capitalism and its enforcers at a global and national level” (Baker, cited in Chandler, 2004: 327), local protest are able to “transgress traditional political boundaries, whether conceptual or spatial” (Chandler, 2004: 328). Moreover, Graeber notes “more and more, activists have been trying to draw attention to the fact that the neoliberal vision of ‘globalization’ is pretty much limited to the movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases barriers against the free flow of people, information and ideas—the size of the US border guard has almost tripled since the signing of NAFTA” (2002, 65) . Not until the global justice movement protest in Seattle, that followed the J18 and N30 protests in London as the most noted example of global civil society globalisation from below was the Zapatista, whose use of the internet to promote their struggle over land rights was picked up by Western academics, who turned the limited success of the Chiapas rising into a revolutionary ‘postmodern social movement (Chandler, 2004: 326).
Chandler draws on Klein’s interpretation of the Chiapas rising as “rather than political leadership, the Zapatistas argue they offer a mirror reflecting the struggles of others…the message is that subaltern subjects should celebrate difference rather than seek integration on the terms of power” (Chandler, 2004: 326). Chandler goes on to say, “the Zapatista understood that an attempt at changing power relations was “their weakness vis-à-vis the state and, instead of challenging governing power, follow the less ambitious project of creating autonomous counter-publics” (Chandler, 2004: 327).

Despite journalists from around the globe covering the caravan, a “large number of news outlets [were] also in tow, producing relatively independent and reliable information” (Krøvel, 2011: 137), then power relations remained the same between activists and the mainstream media. Journalists were no longer reliant on the listserves or government rhetoric for information, and could produce their own version of events, meaning “there was less need for the production of alternative news” (Krøvel, 2011: 137). Moreover, the listserv were reliant on mainstream media reports, with every fourth article cut and paste from mainstream media outlets. Power structures remain the same between activists and journalists, but the internet did enable ELZN to challenge the earlier press releases by the state, to help develop “robust modes of independent and critical journalism with the traditional institutions of profession news production” (Krøvel, 2011: 137).

Moreover, Castells and Klein overlook several influential factors that contribute to the global phenomenon of the Zapatista and their impact on other social movements and protest collectives. Although the internet aided the flow of information to

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6 The notion of social movements acting as mirrors to society is explored through Foucault’s concept of heterotopia in Chapter six.
journalists and fellow activists around the globe, the post-modern discourse of the Chiapas, their engagements with NGO’s, indigenous discourse, and women’s rights, along with a lack of desire to seek state power and significantly the actions of the Zapatista was reflective of resistance towards global neo-liberal political shift moving placing local issues onto the global stage, along with the internet shifts relations of power between journalists and Chiapas. Networks of activist movements develop over the internet because there is a symbiotic relationship in the organisational structures and networks of both the internet and established protest movements. Thus there are some advantages of Internet, but it is dangerous to romantises the Internet as the solution to power relations between activists and the state.

Thus activists have utilised the rhizomatic, horizontal architecture of the internet, new technologies, smart phones and Web 2.0, in order to organise their protests there is a necessity for both virtual and physical networks. The internet has become a pivotal tool for organising protests, informing the media or voicing opinion, and has become a “key ingredient of the environmental movement in the global network society” (Castells, 2009: 316). The World Wide Web provides the tools to enable the activist movements to develop their own media and political strategies, and has extraordinarily “improved the campaigning ability of environmental groups and increased international collaboration” (Castells, 2009: 316). Activists are now able to use a new “global communications infrastructure for something completely different, to become more autonomous” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 65). The capacity of new technologies to support and sustain dispersed coalitions of protestors and new forms of political organisation has been witnessed in the anti-capitalism protests (J18 and Seattle in 1999, the May Day protests between 2000 and 2004) and similar “summit sieges” at the G8 Conference in 2005 and G20 Conference in 2009.
The G8 meeting was targeted as a media event by activists as it was “viewed as part of an ongoing series of international mobilisations which have been on the mainstream media radar since 1999” (McCurdy, 2009: 44). Some environmental activists movements echoed the early practices of the ELZN, namely the use of listserv as a way of communicating. At the G8 (2005) action, listserv served as a media strategy by the Dissent! network in order to communicate with journalists and other global justice movements. Dissent! Activists also developed media practices more commonly applied in the US and Australia eco-activisms movements. Listserv were useful for initiating action, by the Dissent! Network, as there was a slow realisation that Internet communication needed to be supported with a physical media space. Whereas Castell’s romantics the internet as the one-stop shop solution to bypassing mainstream media practices. For example, during the G8 camp, Scotland, activists created a media gazebo specifically placed outside the G8 Horizone camp, with an independent media centre inside the camp. The effect of placing activists inside, and traditional media outside was akin to “mainstream media front stage, radical allowed backstage” (McCurdy, 2010: 48).

Moreover, the G8 (2005) protest was part of a wider global movements, and the Zapatista encapsulated the wider, global discord, over the technological advances. Collier and Collier note “the Zapatistas have come to stand for radical challenges to globalisation…and have contributed to the critiques of global institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank” (2005: 451). Unlike Castell’s interpretation of technology and media activists, it wasn’t the internet that aided the Zapatista, but the timing as part of a new global agency. Chandler (2004) notes “the world is allegedly in revolt…for many commentators [Monbiot, 2004, Greaber,
this global revolution is different: its membership is found largely outside the West, and much of its politics and its techniques were first developed in the global South” (324). Chandler notes how other academics (Hardt and Negri, 2000, Shaw, 2000) observe such a “global revolution” has no collective conscious agency, but exists as a “new pluralists agency” which involves the radical redefining of the parameters of revolution. (Chandler, 2004: 325). Despite the localisation of protest such as the Chiapas, it connects with other local protest movements by a “universal character, in that they challenge facets of global capitalist domination” (Chandler, 2004: 325). For examples the Chiapas movement in contesting the NAFTA agreement aimed to “challenge the regional construction of world markets” (Chandler, 2004: 325). “if the Zapatista rebellion was caused by global restructuring in the 1980s, its course and prospects have been shaped by international discourse of democracy and the rule of law in the 1990s” (Collier and Collier, 2005: 451). Thus the Zapatista message over land rights was held at the global level. Moreover, the local protest Chandler outlines (LA Riots, 1992, the Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993) are organised through local level politics yet reflect global capitalists practice. Thus Castell’s argument of protest are a network of power can be challenged. Berger (2001) summarises the argument well “The world-historical trend towards neoliberalism has been characterized by both a shift in international power relations from nation-state to increasingly mobile types of capital and increasingly pronounced inequality in the distribution of wealth world wide” (160). The independent media centre provided internet access and computers for anyone wanting to blog or update Indymedia websites. Later, at the Camps for Climate Action, the media centre became the media tent and centre for workshops on citizen journalism (see Chapter Six).
However, in 2005, at the G8 protest camp, activists engaged in media relations realised that a lack of media strategy, with no formal hierarchical structure, meant there was no one to defend or challenge the media representation. The lack of a spokesperson, single representative, sound-bites or figurehead to speak on behalf of the activists meant that journalists could be libellous without any repercussions. The intentional rejection of engagement with journalists jarred with contemporary media practices. Journalists rely on simple, snapshot messages of information to turn into a story. The lack of any spokesperson or political objectives, as well as the presence of numerous different collectives, each with slightly differing objectives (such as Plane Stupid’s anti-aviation expansion and Rising Tide’s concern about increased global temperatures) made for a plurality of voices, and the irregular pattern of protest contrasted with contemporary journalistic practice. Given the incompatibility of journalists’ working practices with activism, it was easy for reporters to frame radical protest groups in terms that labelled them deviant. Coupled with competing discourses within the various movements, and a lack of engagement between the mainstream media and each cycle of protest, a media framework was formulated that relied on representation through a discourse of deviance and violence – at least, until recently. In a mediatised society, today’s protest collectives understood that a conscious lack of engagement with professional journalists was potentially detrimental to the representation of their own activism. The result was that “media movement[s]” (Lester, 2010) have come to accept that there needs to be a relationship between activists and journalists. This makes the “media-movement relationship a necessary, but uneasy one” (Lester, 2010: 110). As the Heathrow protest and many other examples show, how journalists frame environmental activism not only affects public perceptions, but gives power to those defining the terms of reference. How the language creates meaning, and how that meaning is
applied (discourse) to the reporting of environmental activism is the subject of Chapter Five.

**Theoretical Approaches**


Governmentality can be a concept that both facilities a way to describe a neoliberal or advanced liberal rule, and also as a framework or method that examines “mentalities or rationalities of government” (Death, (a): 12). Governmentality can be a specific form of power, held by the state over the populations. Governmentality can also be a way of analysing relations of power in general. In this thesis governmentality is applied a framework for analysing relations of power between the state, media discourse and environmental activists, and alludes to the role of neoliberal and advanced rule as a foundation. This thesis will draw on concepts linked to green governmentality literature, as an instrument in which to examine relations of power. In doing so, the thesis will not be a Foucauldian governmentality interpretation, such as Darier (1996) study of the Canadian governments ‘Green Plan’ for a sustainable nation.
Luke’s and Oels’ notion of green or eco-governmentality is combined with a critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995) of newspaper reports of environmental activism. This thesis chose to apply a critical discourse analysis over a straightforward media discourse analysis as the former provides analytical tools that contextualise theoretical positions. Media discourse analysis helps unpack how sentences structures (Van Dijk, 1988a), framing (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) and linguistic traits can produce discourse and meaning. In addition to this, CDA provides the intertextual tools to examine both the mechanics of meaning and the theoretical context in order to address the research questions. Therefore, Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is the preferred empirical research tool for analysing newspaper reports.

Power and biopower are understood in a Foucauldian sense, as being omnipresent. Foucault (1977), McNay (1994) and Nealon (2008) interpret power as a subtle process that is less about obvious and direct mechanisms and techniques used by governments to control the population, and more about persuasion and almost subliminal levels of power. Power creates “regimes of truth” to shape knowledge, and such knowledge can be used to “regulate the conduct of others” (Foucault, 1997: 27). This regulation is, in Foucauldian terms, biopower – the administration of the body (1976, 1977, 1982, 2002). Power relations between activists, the media and the state create truths – which may or may not be true (regimes of truth in Foucauldian terms). Power and biopower are “technologies” or “techniques” of governmentality to influence individual behaviour.

Governmentality is a means of examining power relations between governments and the individual. Individuals’ capacity for self-control and their ability to take control
can be influenced by government steps and suggestions (Lemke, 2000). The art of government is enacted through what Foucault terms technologies or techniques – regulatory modes of power. This work will examine shifts in power and the role of regulatory modes of power between environmental governance and activism. In unpacking the multifarious levels of power, the work will show that political policy criminalises elements of environmental activism, which influences the media discourse (see Chapters Four and Five).

Governmentality helps to examine how the state governs environmentalism. This thesis argues that successive governments’ interpretations of environmentalism has shifted focus away from relationships between people and the natural environment and towards a discourse that centres on the administration and regulation of life (biopower). The administration and regulation of the body emerges from government departments (such as the Department of the Environment), Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), environmental protocols (such as Basel, Montreal and Kyoto) and global institutions and organisations (such as the IPCC, UNEC) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCCP) to guide and direct the body towards individual responsibility for climate change. Foucault argues that the state can control individuals through coercion and persuasion (technology of the self) by “certain truths and their circulation via normalising and disciplining techniques, methods, discourses and practices…extend beyond the state and stretch across the social body” (Foucault, 1990, cited by Rutherford, 2007: 293). Those who challenge or question should be contained and controlled (technology of dominance) through legislation and regulation; and a technology of the self allows the state to encourage the individual to be green through individual consumer behaviour.
Luke (1999) terms this “green governmentality”, and this thesis draws on Luke’s work and applies it to the successive UK governments’ economic approaches to environmentalism (such as The Stern Report, the Conservative Party’s “Vote Blue, Go Green” election campaign and the Climate Change Bill). A consequence of such a green governmentality approach is an increase in legislative measures (technology of dominance) that restrict environmental activism, shifting it into a discourse of violence and deviance. At the most threatening level, eco-activism has been equated with pre-9/11 threats of terrorism. For example, the term “eco-terrorism” originated in the UK, from a link between animal liberation movements and environmental action, and, as Chapter Four will show, post-9/11 there is an increasing conflating of environmental activism with terrorism.

The theoretical approaches for this thesis combine Foucault’s notion of governmentality and biopower with media analytical theory critical discourse analysis (Chapter Five). In unravelling how journalists represent eco-activism, this work has chosen to concentrate on how activists, media and political discourses interrelate. The research reveals how discursive struggles over environmental discourse can be defined as falling between social or economic solutions. The result is a contestation between these social and economic discourses that is played out in the mainstream media. Governmentality is applied to these discursive struggles.

However, the development of the internet, new media and Web 2.0 provided new tools for activists to challenge the environmental discourse by inverting and subverting media practice. New and social media enable activists to invert media practice, such as “media eye” (Couldry, 2000). Moreover, through Foucault’s notion
of heterotopia, the thesis will explore how environmental activism continues to control its own space in order to remain a challenge to the political and media discourse. Within the space of protest camps a number of repertoires of protest and media practices have developed. This work will argue that the space is a heterotopia – the space of an alternative, not counter means of creating a society (Foucault, 1986). Activists might argue the space of protest is more a “temporary autonomous zone” (TAZ) (Bey, 1991). However, this work argues that in the space of environmental activism it is more appropriate to use the term “heterotopia”.

In examining the historical practices of environmental activists, there emerges a pattern of protest tactics and strategies that remains within the space of the camps and action. Borrowing from other protest movements in Australia and America, the UK activists movement has developed a series of liminoid social practices (see Hetherington, 1997) that enable activists to invert power relations between activists, politics and the media. For example, most camps are marked by a tripod at the entrance. The tripod is a three-piece scaffold placed to form a seating space at the top that works as a look-out but also as a demarcation tactic for the entrance of the camp. This is a tactic borrowed from the Australian movement, which also symbolises the “inside” of the camp and the “outside”. The concept of inside/outside is explored by Roseneil (1995) and will be examined in the context of the environmental activists’ movement (see Chapter Six) with reference to the way it frames the activists’ relationship with the media and state.

Combined with the physical space of an action is the use of the internet as a further method of disseminating information away from the media eye. The rhizomatic make-up (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996) of new media discourses and activism enables
counter-political discourses to challenge the dominant discursive position (Death, 2010b). However, as Castells (1999) notes, not all online activism is beneficial, and Chapter Six will explore how the internet aids the profile and transnational collaboration of many protests but still creates challenges in attempts to reverse power relations between activists and the government.

Method

The methodological innovations guiding this thesis are drawn from media discourse analysis. Chapter Two outlines the various theoretical and empirical methods this thesis will apply. For now, suffice to say there are two key points to mention. Firstly, due to the time-span of the examples, and in light of emerging technologies, newspaper reports will form the basis of the empirical research. The print media has been chosen as it is the most consistent form of media used since the early environmental activists’ protests. The reporting covers wide dimensions of environmental activism and environmental politics. In light of this, and to narrow down the empirical data being analysed, this thesis follows what Chilton (1987) terms “critical discourse moments”. Carvalho interprets critical discourse moments as events or moments which involve “specific happenings that can lead to challenges to the ‘established’ discursive position” (2000: 5). The second rationale is simple mathematics, looking at the examples which received the largest percentage of newspaper coverage (based on Nexis database searches). This allows the data analysis to answer the wider research questions by a “combination of comprehensive (exhaustive) analysis in selected periods with the analysis of ‘critical discourse moments’” (Carvalho, 2000: 4), in establishing the key themes and concepts drawn out of newspaper reports.
A second empirical method is the qualitative analysis technique of face-to-face interviews and a focus group. Interviews were conducted with individuals who had a direct dealing with the mainstream media and aimed to gain their personal insights. Two empirical research methods are used for this thesis – the qualitative analysis of interviews and a focus group. A focus group was chosen in order to judge the overall motivation of the activists and canvass their opinions on the movements’ relationships with the mainstream media.

The group was shown five newspaper clippings: “The green revolution” (Brown, Cornwell, and Gumbel The Independent, 2006), “Militants in plot to paralyse Heathrow” (Mendick, 2007), “Climate Camp gets a lesson in citizen journalism” (Lewis, 2009), “How do you glue Mr Brown” (Anon, Daily Mail, 2008) and “It’s BP party and we’ll protest if we want too” (Waller, Times, 2009). The objective in showing these articles was to establish (a) how activists involved in the direct action felt they were represented; (b) what kind of relationship they had with journalists; and (c) in what ways did they feel the narrative reflected the objectives of the camps.

**Contribution to the Field**

This thesis will differ from the current literature in the field by providing new knowledge about the UK environmental activist movement. It develops earlier work on the media and the environment, but unlike that other work, this thesis also explores the important role of the state between the media and environmental activists. This thesis explores how political discourse impacts on the media representation of environmental activism. The thesis also differs from the other work
in the field in focusing on radical environmental activists, on horizontal and not vertical environmental activism.

The thesis will develop the ideas from a handful of seminal texts that directly address the subject (Hansen, 1993; Anderson, 1997; Deluca 1999; Lester, 2007; Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Lester, 2010). Anderson’s *Media, Culture and the Environment* (1997) was the first significant contribution to the literature which examined how the media reports environmentalism. Anderson’s work offers an insight into the working practices of journalists, NGOs, and social movement organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, and draws on significant examples to show that environmentalism in the 1990s, although important to news agendas, often struggled to retain a place. Anderson applies Fowler’s (1991) studies to analyse how discourse shapes news by relying on taken-for-granted assumptions in news practice. Anderson unpacks the questions of ideology, objectivity and impartiality to ask if media practitioners can be impartial or independent when targeted by environmental pressure groups. Anderson’s empirical research consists of face-to-face interviews with leading environmental journalists to reveal the key characteristics of environmental news items. This thesis differs from Anderson’s method of content analysis by looking at discourse through CDA, with the addition of a Foucauldian theoretical approach. Unlike Anderson’s interviews with journalists, this thesis has chosen to conduct empirical research with activists. This rationale for focusing on activists was because Anderson’s work, and later works by Hansen (2010) and Lester, 2007 and 2010), have extensively interviewed journalists, whereas talking directly to activists about media relations has been limited (see McCurdy’s doctoral thesis (2009), Schlembach (2011) and Saunders and Price (2009)). Moreover, Anderson’s work focuses upon a period during the mid to late 1990s, when
environmental pressure groups had greater access to journalists. Since Anderson’s book there have been major environmental protests, both globally and domestically. The emergence of the internet has also changed relations and practice between journalists and activists. Therefore, this thesis offers new knowledge on activists’ movement relationship with social media as an organising tool, and its problematics in organising protest in the virtual world.

This thesis also develops Hansen’s reworking of his 1993 book, *Environment, Media and Communications* that offers new insight into the relationships between the media and environmentalism. Similarly to this thesis, Hansen looks at how media messages come to shape our knowledge of the environment, as well as how environmental problems are defined. Whereas this thesis focuses on the UK movement, Hansen draws upon the experience of different countries to reveal how different theoretical approaches can unravel the relationships between the meaning of the environment and the media. Both Anderson’s and Hansen’s works offer a good overview of journalistic practices in iterating environmental issues, as does Lester’s most recent work *Media and Environment* (2010). Here, Lester examines why environmental issues are often moved down or off the news agenda. The premise of Lester’s argument is it is easier to get the word “spondulicks” into a news story than it is to get an environmental story into the news agenda. Both Hansen and Lester offer valuable new knowledge about discursive changes in environmental discourse. Lester’s first work (2007) has similarities with this thesis in the exploration of relations between activists and the media, whereas her second book (2010) focuses more on journalistic practice and less on activists’ experience. Anderson, Hansen and Lester have focused on the media and environmentalists, without exploring how political discourse impacts on environmental news stories.
This thesis will provide a new way of understanding the relations of power between activists and political movements. Examining relations of power through a governmentality lens will show how the historical shift in power occurred to conflate activism with deviance. It will offer a new perspective on environmental activism by charting why environmental discourse is linked to advanced liberal government and market-led solutions to environmental issues. The CDA will show that journalism has moved from relatively sympathetic stories to conflating activism with militancy, fear and terrorism. Through the mechanism of CDA, the work will show how the shift in power is played out through media representations. Once the theoretical perspective is established, and reinforced through the CDA, the work will examine how the environmental activists’ movement has been able to challenge and contest environmental discourse. The final section will explore how activists built up a toolbox of tactics, both virtual and physical, to remain active. In doing so, this work will offer new knowledge on how Web 2.0 and social media impacts on power relations between political and media discourses. This thesis presents the data obtained by the focus group, which draws together a unique collection of people who have played important roles in the relationships between the radical environmental activist movements and journalists. However, this work will argue that activists must remain within a heterotopia, or, as the final section shows, there is a risk of conformity that removes all power from the movement.

**Outline of Chapters**

There are seven chapters in total. Following this Introduction, Chapter Two focus on methodological approaches of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and
original empirical data. Chapter Two then sets out what is meant by the term “discourse”, and why discourse analysis and CDA are suitable tools to establish how journalists report on environmental activism. This thesis is in effect drawing on media and political discourse to understand how and why journalists frame activists as deviant. Thus, Foucault’s notion of governmentality was chosen as a basis for the development of a broader theoretical approach.

Chapter Three explores Foucault’s concepts of power, biopower and governmentality. The chapter develops Luke’s notion of green governmentality to offer new analysis of the UK environmental discourse. The thesis explores the impact of environmental governance and shows how the development of market-led eco-schemes (such as doorstep recycling), eco-taxes, new environmental policy instruments (NEPI), carbon tax, emissions trading and global environmental governance, often financed through public–private partnerships alongside businesses development of “green” products, persuades individuals to be environmentally aware. In doing so, the thesis is using the tools Foucault provides to interpret state and media representation of environmental activism.

Chapter Four argues that technologies of dominance in the discursive struggle and the role of political policing is a mechanism through which radical environmental activism is placed in a discourse of deviancy. The chapter will provide a series of examples to highlight how state legislation through bio-political discourse criminalises some types of environmental activism. The chapter draws on Hall’s “signification spiral” (1978) to show that both political and media discourse place activists at the most extreme point as a homogenised position. It also explores relations of power through Foucault’s discussion on resistance and counter conducts.
Drawing on critical discourse analysis, Chapter Five examines newspaper reports of environmental activism and uses a series of examples to show how shifts in power are reflected in media discourse. This thesis has chosen CDA as a method because it is important to fully understand the socio-political context in which these reports are written. A textual analysis will reveal the linguistic traits a journalist applies, and a content analysis will show the difference between text and meaning, but this thesis argues that a CDA will reveal the social, cultural and political context in which journalists report on environmental activism. By analysing the discourses at play, this thesis aims to identify any patterns found in the representation of environmental activism.

Chapter Six, titled “Fighting Back: The Internet and Heterotopia”, charts how, through various liminoid practices, environmental activists are able to counter green governmentality. By understanding protest camps as heterotopic space (Foucault, 1986; Hetherington, 1996), contextualises them as alternative spaces. A heterotopia acts as an alternative, although not utopian, space. The chapter argues that the space of environmental activism (such as camps and social spaces/squats) has built up a repertoire of protest to challenge the dominant discourse. For many activists, the identifying of a site of protest is part of an ongoing acknowledgement of the historical importance of trying to create a heterotopic space. However, the identification and reinforcement of any temporary autonomous zone often, as Roseneil (1995) notes with reference to the women’s peace camp at Greenham Common (1982–2000), creates friction between those based permanently at the

7 The dates given are sourced from the National Archives, held at The Women’s Library, London Metropolitan University. Available at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/records.aspx?cat=106-5gcw&cids=1#1 (accessed Feb 2012).
camps (inside) and those who visit (outside). Protesting at the site of contestation not only shifts the media and political hierarchy, but also alters power relations between activists, the media and political discourse. By shifting journalists and politicians from their traditional space, it alters the relationships between dominant and minority political movements, hence giving greater power to the protesters.

The thesis concludes by summarising the central arguments and indicating the contribution to the field. The conclusion returns to the original research questions, to see how they have been addressed. It will bring together the key themes of the thesis in light of broader discussions of environmental discourse. The work will offer suggestions on what the future holds for the UK’s environmental activist movement in light of such shifts in power in environmental discourse.

Having introduced the research questions, topics and methodology, this thesis will now turn its attention to the notion of discourse. Exploring discourse will provide evidence of those journalistic traits that frame environmental activism, and the importance of gathering original empirical data to answer the research questions.
Chapter Two: Methodology

Introduction

In order to address the research questions that drive this thesis this chapter will explore three key fields – media, political and environmental discourse. What links these three fields of discourse is language and knowledge. Therefore this thesis will apply various types of discourse analysis. To explore the role of political discourse, this chapter draws from Foucault, Hall and Dryzek. The methodological innovations are supported by empirical research based on Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis and data from interviews and a focus group. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the various different discourse analysis techniques to address the research questions.

The chapter will examine how journalistic language shapes meaning and knowledge of the environmental activist movement. Understanding journalistic language is central to unpacking power relations in environmental discourse. It will do so by taking the theoretical standpoint of discourse as a methodological approach. The methodological innovation of this thesis is to examine the various and competing discourses that shape public understanding of environmentalism. As Chapters Three and Four will show, political discourse is central in analysing how political processes impact on the representation of environmental activism, whilst Chapter Five will apply Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (1995) to newspaper reports of environmental activism. The discourse analysis of political policy, and critical discourse analysis of newspaper reports will be supplemented with in-depth semi-structured interviews with activists in the movement. A focus group was used as a
further methodological approach to supplement the interviews and address criticisms of critical discourse analysis.

The chapter will begin with an interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of discourse. Given that this thesis will illustrate how political decision-making processes impact on the representation of environmental activism, this chapter will also examine relations between media and environmental discourse. This chapter will explore why language and discourse is important in unpacking how and why journalists report on environmental activism. Before unpacking the significance of language and discourse, it is necessary to unpack the different interpretations and meanings of the term discourse. Discourse can often be used to refer to language. Discourse is also a theoretical position that identifies codes, meanings, and rules about how we understand the world. Thus discourse can mean both language (in a linguistic sense) and the formation of socio-cultural knowledge. Discourse forms not just through the “order of language or representations”, but “it is a structuring principle which govern beliefs and practice, ‘words and things’, in such a way as to produce a certain network of material relations” (McNay, 1994: 69).

A discursive formation is the outcome of a set of rules that coalesce to form a discourse. The criteria for a discourse to form is a set of conditions which must have been jointly fulfilled at a precise moment of time, for it to have been possible for its objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options to have been formed. (Foucault, 1991: 54)

These conditions include internal/external factors; changes in the interpretation, meaning and generalisation of verbs and nouns; how words are attributed; and the
significance of how language can exclude or include a new system of representative signs. Each of these criteria coalesces to form a discourse, to “constitute the set of derivations characteristics of a discursive formation” (Foucault, 1991: 56). Thus analysing the different discourses between activists and journalists is a useful tool to unravel the relationships between the three objects.

The chapter will examine how systems of representation emerge to shape the knowledge of a subject. Once knowledge is formed then, as Foucault (1991) argues, power and knowledge can limit and expand how a topic is constructed. Foucault’s interpretation of discourse establishes how language and practice are built on historical “facts”. Foucault’s work is challenged by a number of cultural theorists (notably Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Derrida), and each of these challenges will be considered. The works of Darier (1999) and Dryzek (1997) are important as they explore how environmentalism as a set of political ideas becomes a discourse. This chapter will draw on Dryzek’s theories on green radicalism as a discourse, and propose an additional list that defines radical environmental activism as a discourse.

Journalists and activists have a somewhat symbiotic relationship in that each relies on the other for stories and publicity. Before radical political collectives embraced the internet, environmental activists’ engagement with the media worked at a very simplistic level. Some collectives released press releases, informally contacted journalists about planned direct action, offered invitations to “trusted” journalists to join protest camps (Barry, 2001), and gave the occasional interview to lifestyle magazines. Overall, although journalists and activists kept each other at arm’s length, when they did engage with each other, activists had to rely on journalists to turn their
press releases into news stories. Activists were, and to some extent remain, heavily dependent on journalists, often resulting in the detrimental reporting of events (Sobieraj, 2011). Activists rely on journalists to translate and frame environmental activism, and to shape public opinion. The reporter’s words paint a picture from a specific “angle” or hook that sets the theme of the story. What emerges is a set of linguistic codes and rules which shape a discourse (Hall, 1997), built on a relationship between environmental activists and journalists (from 1970 to the present).

The discussion of critical discourse analysis sets up the mechanism for the analysis that follows of newspaper reports (in Chapter Five). The importance of examining how journalists use language and linguistic metaphors is central to this chapter, so it will also unpack the different approaches to media discourse. Journalists’ tools are the words they use; how they place words together when creating a media discourse analysis is important in order to answer the research questions. Mills notes that any analysis of journalistic discourse shows that they do not literally translate reality into language, but rather “discourse should be seen as a system which structures the ways we perceive reality” (2004: 55). This chapter will first look at Foucault’s interpretation of discourse from his archaeological phase, before moving on to analysing different interpretations of discourse. The next section will contextualise the discursive themes that shape environmental discourse. Drawing on Dryzek (1997), it will examine the multifaceted aspects of environmental discourse. This thesis is exploring discourses from many angles – political, environmental and the media. Therefore it will explore media as a discourse, and why critical discourse analysis was chosen as a method (Fairclough, 1995). However, both Foucault’s interpretation of discourse and Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis have been
criticised for assuming cognitive knowledge. Therefore the final section of this chapter will explore ways of addressing these critiques through empirical research.

**Foucault, Discourse and his Archaeological Phase**

Foucault is less concerned with the linguistic construction of meaning and more interested in examining how meaning is recorded through language historically. Foucault situates this approach in his “archaeological” period, as he aims to unravel the past through codes, symbols and representations of a society. How ontological meaning of words, knowledge and historical influences creates knowledge is central to Foucault. As McNay notes, for Foucault, what comes “prior to language…is the origin of all meaning” (1994: 49). An archaeological approach is linguistic analysis of historical documentation, but also involves the “analysis of a series of heterogeneous elements: institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual organisations” (McNay, 1994: 69). In *The Order of Things* (1970), Foucault claims that the rules of discursive formation are never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in “widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological” (Foucault, 1970: xi). Foucault (1970) argues that language in the sovereign classical system of knowledge was a transparent form of representation – it gave signs and signifiers; but by the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was the immediate and spontaneous unfolding of representations; it was in that order in the first place that representations receive their primary signs, patterned and regrouped their common features. Language was a form of knowing and knowing was automatically discourse. (Foucault, 1970: 295)
Language becomes a form of primary signs to shape knowledge so that it “forms the locus of tradition, of the unspoken habits of thought, of what lies hidden in people’s mind; it accumulates an ineluctable memory which does not even know itself as memory” (Foucault, 1970: 297). For Foucault, language moves through history starting in a horizontal/transparent position and over time moves into a vertical/opaque position. The effect of this metaphorical shift is that language becomes a method of “understanding in general to a particular domain of objectivity” (Foucault, 1970: 296). Thus, Foucault’s observations raise the question whether language can provide objective, transparent discourses? Can there ever exist a genuine, “true” discourse?

For Foucault, the only way to find out if a discourse can be “true” is by looking at the historical processes that shape discourse through language – to establish a “manifestation of truth” (Foucault, 1991: 8). Examining discourses from historical empirical data can provide the mechanisms to unpack how rules, concepts and objects of study emerge by an examination of what constitutes knowledge and how that knowledge relates to the historical context from which it emerges (Howarth et al., 2000). Foucault sets out three “great systems of exclusion which forge discourse – the forbidden speech, the division of madness and the will to truth” (Foucault, in Young, 1981: 55). The “will to truth” is central to his interpretation of the orders of discourse, where will to truth “attempts to assimilate the others, both in order to modify them and to provide them with a foundation” (Foucault cited in Young, 1981: 56). Therefore, as Foucault notes

the will to truth has its own history, which is not that of constraining truths...this will to truth, like the other systems of exclusion rests on an institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by whole strata of practices, such as pedagogy, of course; and the system of books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories now. (Foucault in Young, 1981: 55)
The will to truth forms a system of exclusion, by way of “controlling and delimiting discourse” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 56) as a narrative that shapes society. Such narratives are “recounted, repeated and varied…[as] ritualised sets of discourse which are recited in well defined circumstances” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 56) so as to give rise to “new speech-acts which take them up, transform them or speak of them [discourses]” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 56). According to Foucault, these narratives are found in cultural systems presented in “religious or juridical texts” but also literary and “to a certain extent scientific texts” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 57). This thesis will expand this list to include media texts, such as newspaper and broadcast journalism.

How commentary works is central in establishing the relations between environmental activists and the media. Foucault sees the primary text as one which creates a truth, or knowledge, and secondary as the interpretation or reworking of a will to truth. For example, Homer’s *Odyssey* is the primary text, with Joyce’s *Ulysses* as the secondary (interpretative) text. Thus commentary is the:

> hierarchy between primary and secondary text plays two roles which are in solidarity with each other. On the one hand it allows the (endless) construction of new discourses: the dominance of the primary text, it’s permanence, its status as discourse which can always be reactualised, the multiple or hidden meaning with which it is credited, the essential reticence and richness which is attributed to it, all this is the basis or an open possibility of speaking. But on the other hand the commentary’s only role, whatever the techniques used, is to say at least what was silently articulated ‘beyond’, in the text. (Foucault, in Young, 1981: 57–58)
Meaning that emerges “beyond” the text can be also understood as an exclusionary measure. By repeating what has already been said, commentary “must say for the first time what had, nevertheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 58). Chapter Five will examine what commentary primary text (that is newspaper reports) produces between the state, activists and journalists. In doing so, the chapter will aim to establish if news journalists both define and interpret primary text. In other words, through critical discourse analysis this work will aim to establish if there is a primary meaning that creates an “infinite rippling of commentaries…worked from the inside [the state] by the dream of repetition in disguise” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 58). Is there a “will to truth”, a discursive narrative, about environmental activism that is repeated through secondary texts? Moreover, the critical discourse analysis will test Foucault’s theory that commentary acts as a system of exclusion that forges discourse. (Foucault in Young, 1981). Critical discourse analysis helps provide the tools to answer these question due to the similarities between Fairclough’s and Foucault’s understanding on the order of discourse.

Foucault believes that, in addition to the three great systems of exclusion, there is a “third group of procedures that permit the control of discourse” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 61), namely the “order of discourse”. The order of discourse is a means of control that excludes anyone who “does not satisfy certain requirements or is not, from the outset, qualified to do so” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 62). Who satisfies or even defines the requirements is, for Foucault, established through “ritual”, that is:

the qualification which must be possessed by individuals who speak (and who must occupy such-and-such a position and formulate such-and-such a type of statement, in the play of a dialogue, of interrogation and recitation); it defines the gestures, behaviour,
circumstances, and the whole set of signs which must accompany discourse. (Foucault in Young, 1981: 62)

For Foucault, political discourse is a ritual that shapes the order of discourse, as it “can scarcely be disassociated from this deployment of ritual which determines both the particular properties and the stipulated roles of the speaking subjects” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 62). This thesis will argue, through critical discourse analysis, that in a mediatised world, media discourse holds a similar position to Foucault’s interpretation of political discourse. Chapter Five will argue that journalists straddle political discourse to define environmental activists from a political “will to truth”, iterated through a media discursive narrative that iterates political discourse to exclude environmental activists as qualified to speak. Through a critical discourse analysis this thesis aims to establish who is determined as qualified, and how that shapes the order of discourse.

According to Foucault, discourse is:

not the system of its language, nor, in a general sense, its formal rules of construction…the questions I ask…[is] about events: the law of existence of statements, that which rendered them possible…their correlation with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or otherwise. (Foucault, 1991: 59)

Foucault interprets power, not as top-down practice, but diffused and practised through discourse, knowledge and regimes of truth “like discourse the conceptualisation of power is founded on an historical awareness of our present circumstances” (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 778). Thus, Foucault’s sees the term “truth” as defined, shaped and coded by those holding power:

each society has its regime of truth, its general politics or truth; that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as
true...the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true. (Foucault, 1980: 31)

Discourses place individuals into categories that frame cultural and social
understanding to create a “regime of truth”. Therefore, each society is founded on a
regime of truth that generates a “general politics of truth” (Foucault in Rabinow
1991: 32) and once these truisms are accepted by the majority of society, then they become

types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and
false statements, that means by which each is sanctioned. (Foucault in
Rabinow 1991: 131)

In analysing relationships between institutions, society, etc., one should “uncover the
expressive value or truth of a ‘document’ that is always referred back to a controlling
notion of consciousness” (McNay, 1994: 55). As Foucault notes:

History now organises the document, divides it up, distributes it,
orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between
what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unites
describes relations. (Foucault, 2008: 7)

The rules of discursive formations provide “the conditions of possibility of discourse
in a given period” (McNay, 1994: 52) (“episteme” in Foucauldian terms). Episteme
is “an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationship...not a slice of
history common to all the sciences; it is a simultaneous play of specific remanences”
(Foucault, 1991: 55). Here Foucault means that history is defined not as key points
on which to hang facts, but as a series of events that is both constant and
simultaneously generating knowledge. McNay (1994) interprets episteme as an “a
priori set of rules of formation that allow discourse to function, that allow different
objects and different themes to be spoken at one time but not at another” (1994: 52). In other words, discourses are formed from the situation and circumstances in which they emerge, and are independent of other discourses or events. Thus discourse produces knowledge relative to a historical period as a “historically specific, coherent configuration of how knowledge is organised” (Howarth et al., 2000: 4), and knowledge is more significant than how language produces meaning (Foucault, 1970). To reveal truths that shape knowledge, Foucault appropriates his archaeological method to “take a step beyond the creating consciousness in order to examine the formal relations that exist between apparently disparate and unrelated utterances or texts” (McNay, 1994: 55). The deciphering of documents or text will, for Foucault, indicate how discourses are formed and what their relationships are to each other.

However, critics (McNay, 1994; Hajer, 1995; Darier, 1999) find the archaeological approach problematic. A critique of the archaeological approach is the abandonment of a chronology whose aim is “advancing closer to the truth” (McNay, 1994: 54). Instead, the archaeological approach entails that any “theories of truth, any system of knowledge must be studied in terms of its own internal and relatively contingent rules of formation” (McNay, 1994: 54). Foucault might defend himself against such criticism by arguing that instead of ontologically charting the history of discourse he is writing “history from a radically different perspective” (McNay, 1994: 61), that is, the examination of historical documents from a non-chronological perspective. Foucault iterates the notion that an archaeological approach means the set of rules which at a given period and for a given society defines that society (Foucault, 1972). An archaeological approach to discourse identifies how individuals have access to a particular type of discourse, and importantly how struggles for control of discourses
are conducted between classes, nations, linguistic, cultural or ethnic collectives (Foucault, 1991). What emerges are discourses that define what it is possible to say and what is not; what limits and forms conversation, and “what utterances are put into conversation…what are repressed and censored” (Foucault, 1991: 60). Wherever possible, to define a set of rules, a discourse emerges (Foucault, 1991). The work described on this thesis supports Foucault’s approach and will apply a similar method to examine how struggles for control of environmental discourse can be charted through historical analysis (see Chapters Three and Four).

Thus, Foucault’s interpretation of discourse goes beyond how language creates meaning, to contextualise language from a historical position. How words are given meaning, and how that meaning is interpreted as a truth when language moves from clear, horizontal understanding to an opaque, vertical use, leads to meaning being blurred in favour of setting the rules of discourse. A discourse defines a given period, and that discourse changes or dissipates outside of that time. Foucault’s analysis of discourse shows that, without an understanding of the historical process that gives language meaning, discourses are formed from language that favours the hegemonic position. Others have drawn on Foucault’s archaeological base of discourse, and the next section examines how scholars (such as Derrida, and Laclau and Mouffe) interpret discourse theory through deconstruction and articulation.

**Different Interpretations of Discourse**

Derrida, and Laclau and Mouffe offer different approaches to understanding what constitutes a discourse. Discourse Theory is the study of how conceptual frameworks are built around “the primacy of political concepts, logistics such as hegemony,
antagonism and dislocation” (Howarth et al., 2000). Derrida and Foucault agree that “questioning the idea that a single meaning or subject or object can hold for all time” (Smith, 1998: 255) should be central when theorising how discourse creates meaning. Derrida’s claims are similar to those of Foucault, in that without “deconstructing” a language meaning is never fixed or true. The definition of “deconstruction” is the interrogation of a text in order to establish its organisation around certain binary oppositions, such as true/false, rationality/irrationality (Smith, 1998). To fully understand any meaning, language should be deconstructed because “language itself…articulates the difference of the moments, the ‘surrogate’ for something that perhaps does not exist (the phenomenon it points to), always differs with respect to the moment it names” (Hahn, 2002: 13). This is rather rigid. Discourse on the other hand, is more helpful for this project, being fluid, altering and challenging as new knowledge and new “truths” emerge. Moreover, as this thesis will show, the discursive challenge between activists and the greening of the state alters the context and meaning of discourse.

Laclau and Mouffe claim that language only shapes a discourse when juxtaposed with other language, so that meaning comes from the positioning of words in a text. For example, the word “father” is only given meaning when placed next to the words “son” or “family”. This is an “articulation”, which is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 105). Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of articulation is interesting, but, as this thesis will show in Chapter Five, how discourses are constructed is dependent on contestation between discourses and external elements. Discourse cannot contain everything, as external factors also influence meaning, despite Laclau and Mouffe’s belief that we only understand
events, depending on “the way the discursive field is structured” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 105). The idea that discourse is shaped through articulation, although articulation and meanings constantly change or are never set, shows that there is always a “differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 153). Thus, meaning comes from the articulation of words, and such articulation shapes normative behaviour, either consciously or unconsciously, to create discourses. Language creates discourses when words are juxtaposed with other words, and how words and grammar are articulated places everything into a discourse. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) believe that all discourses compete, and there is nothing outside of discourse. Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s articulation, discourse would be a language-centred deconstruction of the text, similar to Derrida’s. The articulation of language shapes a discourse, but lacks any analysis of what is missing in the text – which or whose voices are present or absent? What is, or is not, said? (“sayable/unsayable” in Foucauldian terms). As Chapter Five will show, the notion of sayable/unsayable is interpreted by Fairclough as having similar attributes to the order of discourse (Fairclough, 1995).

What is problematic about Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is the need to understand why the “unsayable” occurs – and this is occasionally a deliberate position of the activists’ movement. Some remain unconvinced by Laclau and Mouffe’s argument that everything is discourse, or that (according to Foucault) we need discourse to understand language. However, the view of everything as discourse is a humanocentric perspective that excludes nature. Laclau and Mouffe’s account only considers relations of power between humans, as a concept conceived by man about
man. Such a perception that man is understood as superior to nature is central to debates on industrialisation (see Chapter Three).

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Foucault (2007) hold the position that language reveals how discourse shapes social rules of conduct, while Foucault argues that we need discourse to understand language. Moreover, as well as negating any analysis of the voices excluded in a text (intentionally or not), Laclau and Mouffe’s position does not separate discourse from non-discursive dimensions, instead claiming that everything is discourse where “discourse itself is fully constitutive of our world” (Philips and Jørgensen, 2004: 19).

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Foucault (2007) are useful in understanding how political discourse shapes social practice, and how meaning is formed into institutional policy and agenda. However, this thesis leans more towards Foucault’s position over that of Laclau and Mouffe, in that actors and subjects exist outside of discourse. Yet, without discourse and language there are no tools to interpret what is outside of discourse. Despite these criticisms, examining environmentalism through different events from the environmental movement guides the understanding of environmentalism as a discourse. The argument to be developed here follows Dryzek’s (1997) contention that environmentalism is a discourse. The next section will examine how environmentalism and environmental activism became discourses, by expanding Dryzek’s (1997) definition of green radicalism in relation to the UK’s environmental activism movement. Having set out how discourses are formed through language, this chapter now sets out to show how environmentalism as a concept became a discourse.
Environmental Discourse

Drawing on Dryzek’s (1997) and Darier’s (1999) work on environmental discourse, discourse analysis reveals how language, codes, knowledge and meaning shape environmental discourse. Here, three key components will be identified: new social movements, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and grass-roots politics. Each component is differentiated by its organisational structures, yet they are unified by an urge to prioritise an environmentally just society over a high-carbon society.

Environmentalism as a social discourse emerged from the 1960s. The formation of knowledge around an environmental discourse includes defining environmental activism. As Wynne and Shackley (1994) note, the influence of politics, science and economics forms part of the wider discourse of science, the state, capitalism, economics, nature, industrialisation, high and low carbon, economics and sociology.

Environmental activism, as opposed to environmentalism through a conservation lens, emerged in the post-war economic boom, the former focusing on social values, and the latter on conservation. However, the label “environmental movement” is not a neologism, as Foucault notes:

> there has been an ecological movement – which is furthermore very ancient and is not only a twentieth century phenomenon – which has often been, in one sense, in hostile relationship with science or at least with a technological…in terms of truth [nature-endorsing]. However, in fact, ecology also spoke a language of truth. It was in the name of knowledge, concerning nature, the equilibrium of the processes of living things, and so forth, that no-one could level criticism. (Foucault cited in Darier, 1999: 4)

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8 For this thesis, the term environmental discourse also includes the nomenclature “climate change”. Climate change is a discourse founded on scientific language. Environmental discourse includes language from politics, the media, science and social science.
As the previous chapter mooted, the environmental activism movement took hold with the Earthrise image (1969). Images of the earth broadcast from space\(^9\) were “widely published in the news media, the images soon became the mainstay of advertising and publicity copy” (Lester, 2010: 141). Two years later, the inaugural Earth Day (1971) witnessed 20 million American people “lifting the status of environmental issues on to the world stage” (Castells, 2009: 322). Earth Day raised awareness of environmentalism as a social event, and helped instigate the creation of an environmental activist movement. Castell notes the “widespread rise in deep ecological awareness” that was quickly “seized by grassroots organisations, environmental NGOs and media activists and made into a major issue” (Castell, 2009: 322). Greenpeace sums up Castell’s observation, beginning as a grass-roots NGO when a group of journalist and activists attempted to halt Nixon’s nuclear plan, and signals environmental activism as a discourse.

Along with the Earthrise image, the seminal texts of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) and The Monkey Wrench Gang (Abbey, 1978) introduced new knowledge around environmentalism. Carson’s book looks at the consequences of using the chemical DDT\(^10\) in food production. Abbey’s work signals the beginning of tactics and strategies that were shaping the environmental activist movements. Earth Day, the Earthrise image, Greenpeace, Carson’s and Abbey’s text all introduced a new language around environmentalism and people’s relationship to the environment and activism. A new lexicon emerged through documents connected to these and other events that shaped environmental discourse. The term environmentalism no longer meant the single issue of conservation (see discussion on national parks in Chapter

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\(^9\) These first clear images of the earth were taken by the Apollo space mission (1969) and broadcast via television.

\(^10\) DDT – dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane – is a pesticide commonly used in food and agricultural practices.
One) but became a debate around the cost and consequences of maintaining a high-carbon economy.

A slow realisation that a post-war economy relied on nature to fuel the industrial boom (Stern and Romani, 2011) also meant an increase in language around industrialisation, economic growth, and market development. At the same time, environmental activism was juxtaposed with economic growth as anti-growth (Arnold, 1987). What emerged was a debate between acceptable and unacceptable environmental discourse. Thus, environmental activism, as revealed in its prominent discursive positions (that is, environmental justice and anti-nuclear debates) is pitted against discourse of capitalist nature – a highly industrialised discourse around human relations with nature in which “environmental discourse begins in industrial society”, which then positions “itself in the context of the long dominant discourse of industrial society, which we call industrialism” (Dryzek, 1997: 12). Environmental discourse is couched in terms of the resources needed for industry, such as minerals, fish stocks and wood. Dryzek sees this juxtaposition as what he terms a “prosaic departure”, an acceptance of a political-economy as a “truth”. And even those who call for a curb in growth often revert to a call for a central administration informed by scientific expertise – the same approach that industry applies to problem-solving. The result is that “environmental problems are seen mainly in terms of troubles encountered by the established industrial political economy. They require action, but they do not point to a new kind of society” (Dryzek, 1997: 13). Moreover, “environmental problems by definition are found at the intersection of ecosystems and human social systems” (Dryzek, 1997: 8). This is important to establish how the different discourses for this thesis, that is, problem-solving through technological and industrial advancements as opposed to environmentalism as justice and social
discourse, shape the knowledge or “regime of truth” about environmental activism. Two further issues that are factors in shaping environmental discourse are the role of institutions and the climate deniers or climate sceptics.

Global environmental governance, such as the Brundtland Report in 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1989, and the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, became an affirmation of a discourse that “rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that provide a basic term for analysis, debates, arguments, and disagreements, in the environmental area” (Dryzek, 1997: 8). This led to global environmental policies and practices that were founded on a “truth” that the global climate is changing because of human impact. So climate change aggregated by human industrialisation became a discourse based on a scientific truth, reinforced by government and institutional policies. This created new discourses that challenged the state’s acceptance of the causes of climate change. It was the emergence of a climate sceptic (see Lomborg, 2007; Lawson, 2009) discourse that challenged the science that climate change is man-made. Lomborg specifically argues that the climate change debate is a combination of hysteria and natural weather cycles.

The age-old media focus on bad news about the natural world received a strong revival when, by the 1960s, environmentalism could also display conflict and allocate guilt. This is perhaps most evident in the founding of environmentalism by Rachel Carson. (Lomborg, 2009: 184)

As well as associating Carson with “bad news”, Lomborg also argues that media hysteria has exacerbated environmental debate.
As a society we use large amounts of resources to regulate both health risks and environmental risks. But if media attention to small but highly hyped risk – like Carson’s poisons – makes us over focus on some issues, we end up underfocusing on other issues that attract less attention but where we could do more good…there is a real risk that with global warming we are moving down the same path of scary stories, outlining a conflict between fossil fuels and human survival, blaming big oil companies. (Lomborg, 2009: 187)

Discursive challenges by NGOs, activists, sceptics, climate deniers, institutions and economic positions jostle to hold power – and maintain a “regime of truth” – in environmental discourse. The state would argue that economic solutions are the only way to address climate change (as Chapters Three and Four will show), whereas activists would argue that it is economic and global industrialisation that has contributed to climate change. These challenges between solutions can be understood in Dryzek’s notion of environmental discourse. However, before turning to Dryzek, the next section will briefly look at the differences between discourses and concepts, before looking in detail at the mechanics of environmental discourse through an interpretation of Dryzek’s understanding of environmental discourse.

This thesis argues that discourse is about knowledge, and that concepts provide the tools and mechanisms with which to address discursive challenges. Different discourses apply different concepts to problem-solving solutions, such as capitalism, socialism, autonomy, anarchy. For example, economic discourse would apply capitalist concepts (such as hedge funds, capital gains), defined by Dryzek as problem-solving (Dryzek, 1997: 12), whereas environmental activism is often aligned to social and cultural solutions and seeks answers to climate change and environmental problems in eco-socialism or deep ecology concepts. Dryzek notes that environmental discourse emerges when “the environment is brought into the
heart of society and its cultural, moral, and economic system, rather than being seen as a source of difficulties standing outside of the system” (1997: 13).

Moreover, Dryzek (1997) lists “problem-solving”, “survivalism” (or reformism), “sustainability”, and “green radicalism” (or radical discourse) as “the four basic environmental discourses” (Dryzek, 1997: 15). Problem-solving requires a central administrative, political-economic approach. Survivalism is a discourse that emerged out of the Treaty of Rome (1951) and the Limits to Growth (1972) to include sustainability (the Brundtland Report of 1987) and ecological modernisation (Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). Ecological modernisation is an argument that solutions can be found between capitalism and sustainability.

The final category includes “realos” and fundis” under the rubric of green radical discourse. Hunold and Dryzek (2005) separate out the various categories from Dryzek’s earlier definition into state-based and non-state-based strategies for green activists by drawing on the German political debate of realos and fundis. Realos is a word used to describe those whose green activism is through “party politics and the institutions of governments”. In contrast, fundis follow a path of “grassroots organising, protest, and confrontation” (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005:75). This division can also be understood as vertical (Realos) or horizontal (Fundis) green politics. As in France, the student movement of the late 1960s had a strong influence on later political parties and social movements. Despite the student movement’s inability to make an “impact on formal political institutions…it definitely influenced the political culture and, more specifically inspired a subsequent wave of social movements” (Rucht, Teune and Yang, 2007: 159). Die Grünen (German for “the green”) emerged as a green political party that “coalesced around resistance to
nuclear power” (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005: 87). Die Grünen was “characterised by fierce battles over policy and elements of a radical and more moderately reformist agenda” (Cudworth, 2003: 85). Realos were focused on “mobilising a host of marginalised groups: women, gays, blacks, immigrant workers, homeless people, in addition to the working class…and argued the necessity of participating in formal politics due to the immediacy of the environmental crisis” (Cudworth, 2003: 87). The politics focused on parliamentary activism, lobbying, electioneering, and parliamentary representation that drew from “Marxist influenced eco-socialists and the pragmatic Realos” (Cudworth, 2003: 87). Fundis, in contrast, were a collective who favoured “ideological purity” (Cudworth, 2003: 87) over engagement with party politics. They consisted of grass-roots collectives that concentrated on “consciousness-raising through direct action and educational initiatives rather than electioneering” (Cudworth, 2003: 87).

However, in reality, it is not as simple as a division between realos versus fundis, because activists such as Greenpeace and other NGOs use tactics and strategies that straddle both approaches. For example, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and other hierarchical NGOs use lobbying and electioneering alongside direct action and activism. Indeed, although some horizontal collectives can be determined as fundis, there are also slippages in the interpretation. As Chapter Four will discuss, when the Metropolitan Police took court action to prevent the monthly Critical Mass cycle rides, activist Des Kay went to court to defend the collective with the backing of the Friends of the Earth legal team. Thus the boundaries between realos and fundis are often blurred and interwoven.
However, what connects realos and fundis is the various “green” politics of environmental discourse. Moreover, “green radicalism, problem-solving and survivalism are united through a determined rejection of industrialism, but all four engage with the discourse of industrialism – if only to distance themselves from it” (Dryzek, 1997: 15). Hence, problem-solving and green radicalism are important to this study, for they show the various positions between environmental activists and state-led environmental governance. Each of Dryzek’s categories helps us to understand relations within environmental discourse. On the one hand, governments have to perform a number of basic functions irrespective of any discourses. These include setting out policies for economic growth and protecting the environment (Dryzek, 1997: 11). In the Western capitalist countries, “the first task of governments, in environmental policy, and everything else is to keep actual and potential corporate investors happy” (Dryzek, 1997: 11). It is the relationship between these two discourses that is the focus of this work.

The role of agency is also important in understanding how “political agency is granted to a variety of actors” (Dryzek, 1997: 185), individuals and collectives. The significance of agents is that:

agents themselves are historical and political products whose identities are contingent upon their relation to other identities [and] social identities thus involve the drawing of boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and requires the construction of ‘others’ or ‘scapegoats’ that are presented as blocking the full constitution of an agent’s self-identity. (Howarth and Griggs, 1998: 55–56)

This thesis endorses Dryzek’s view that “the storyline of green radicalism points to multi-faceted social and ecological crisis which can only be resolved through radical political action and structural change” (Dryzek, 1997: 185). However, it also notes
that Dryzek focuses on NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth over the more radical, horizontal networks of radical environmental politics (fundis). Echoing Dryzek’s study, this thesis argues that the role of the media needs to be considered when examining environmental discourse. How realos, fundis, problem-solvers and survivalists communicate their values is central to understanding the shaping of Dryzek’s environmental discourse. The following section will unpack how the competing discourses work in tandem to influence media discourse.

The Language of Mediatised Environmental Discourse

Language does not define or, as Laclau and Mouffe claim, create a discourse, but instead it constructs a topic (Hall in Smith, 1998: 273) through “episteme” (to borrow a Foucauldian term). The grouping of discursive formations and the relationships between discourses at any one time (Mills, 2004: 62), is a way of interpreting and analysing the data. Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Dryzek (1997, 2000), Hall and Gieben (1994) and Foucault (2007) are all useful in unravelling how meaning is generated through discourse, but they may lack any method for analysing the important linguistic method of news reporting, or how “a particular framing of the discussion makes certain elements appear as fixed or appropriate while other elements appear problematic” (Hajer, 1995: 54). The framing, intonation, narrative and actors are all important in exploring meaning from newspaper texts. The works of Van Dijk (1988a), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Fairclough (1995) and Carvalho (2000) focus specifically on discourse analysis of media text and are useful in addressing the research questions.
Hall’s studies of discourse (1992, 1997) argue that language is constructed in such a way that it gives us a set of codes and rules in which to reason. The rules of any language provide meaning dependent on the relationship between things (Hall, 1997: 18). Codes provide a means to communicate. Codes are founded in a culture that constructs meaning and allows us to “communicate because we share broadly the same conceptual maps” (Hall, 1997: 18). Different cultures have varying sets of codes that denote meaning, and these meanings/codes define social norms. Language can also be a series of signs and signifiers that represent meaning, via “systems of representation”. The point is that each system constructs a set of codes to signal that “they belong to a culture” that is unified through “roughly the same conceptual or linguistic universe” (Hall, 1997: 22). Language gives meaning, and meaning emerges via “reflective” representations, whereby meaning lies within an object, person, idea or event (Hall, 1997).

How language is constructed, and consequently how knowledge is formed, is central to the “concept of discourse [which] is not about whether things exist but about where meaning comes from” (Hall, 1997: 45). How meaning emerges is not simply a case of “translating reality into language”, but “discourse should be seen as a system which structures the way we perceive reality” (Mills, 2004: 55), about “the production of knowledge through language” (Hall, 1984: 291). Discourse is also a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44). Thus by drawing on Foucauldian approaches around language and discourse, this chapter has thus far shown that language creates meaning. The next section will examine discourse in order to establish how journalists apply language to give meaning and knowledge of
environmental activists’ movements. This chapter will now explore media discourse by drawing on a Foucauldian approach that is similar to that used in earlier discussions. Just as Foucault argues that discourse should be explored historically as opposed to chronologically, so too will this work look at the different media discourses as a suitable method for this study.

**Media, Language and Discourse**

This section outlines the various approaches to media discourse analysis, and justifies this thesis’s use of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis as the central methodology. Before exploring the different media discourse analysis techniques, this section will begin by drawing on Stuart Hall’s interpretation of language and discourse. Hall’s work is important to this study, because language is the tool of journalists. Hall shows how language gives discourse meaning, hence journalists’ use of language provide a set of codes and knowledge about societal events. Hall’s interpretation of discourse analysis is the ability to examine how language constructs meaning (Smith, 1998; Howarth *et al.*, 2000; Hall, 2001; Philips and Jørgensen, 2004). Yet, discourse “never consists of one statement, one text, one action or one source” (Hall, 1992: 293), as it is part of a set of statements that is “characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any time” (Hall, 1992: 293). Language acts as a set of tools, codes and rules to represent an event, group or idea in a system of representation. It provides a group of statements which provide language for talking about something. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct a topic in a certain way (Hall, 2001: 291). Language works as a linking device between statements, while the function of discourse is to produce knowledge through language. Thus,
meaning comes from language, interpreted and restructured, to convey a specific set of norms for understanding the everyday, so the reader can “analyse empirical raw material [texts, speeches, reports, etc.] and information as discursive forms” (Howarth et al., 2000: 4). The practical application of discourse creates power, and consequently reflects power relations over the historical interpretation of linguistic frameworks. The following section explores how journalistic language shapes knowledge by looking at the significance of media discourse.

This chapter will now look at media as a discourse in order to explore the ways in which journalistic language shapes knowledge about environmental discourse. The work of key media theorist Van Dijk (1988a/b) centres on the structural nature of a text, while Gamson and Modigliani (1989) believe analysis of the frame reveals the discursive patterns (similar to Hall 2003). Carvalho (2000) addresses the issues of acknowledging the different voices in a media report (sayable/unsayable), while Fairclough (1995) offers a combined approach through his critical discourse analysis (CDA). Fairclough’s CDA is central to this thesis as a method of interpretation. CDA is useful in light of the theory of governmentality (see Chapters Three and Four) to analyse journalistic language and unpack the meaning behind the reporting. In drawing on critical discourse analysis, this thesis will illustrate its central argument by revealing how “commentary” and the “order of discourse” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 57–62), along with journalistic practice place environmental activism into a discourse of deviance (see Chapter Five). By examining the use of linguistic traits and characteristics, the examples will suggest that power relations between the state and activists can be seen in newspaper reporting over a historical period. In this, Fairclough’s CDA provides the tools to interpret media discourse, whilst contextualising the “methodological field of history” (Foucault, 2008: 12). However,
before focusing on CDA, this work will look at different media discourse analysis
techniques to show how journalistic practice creates meaning.

Van Dijk’s media discourse analysis (1988a) makes the “important transition from
text analysis to discourse analysis” (Fairclough, 1995: 29) by examining the structure
of the text and the “cognitive process involved in news production and decoding”
(Carvalho, 2000: 6). Van Dijk’s (1988a) work looks at the mechanics of news
models in shaping news production, by differentiating between macrostructures and
microstructures. Macrostructure concerns how a text is organised hierarchically,
whereas microstructures are “semantic mapping rules or transformations, which link
lower level propositions to higher level macro propositions” (Carvalho, 2000: 6). For
example, in news production, a journalist or editor who decides the process of
production and news comprehension and who sets the organisational structure of the
story sets the agenda. Van Dijk’s (1988a) macro-level approach has similarities with
the journalistic technique of the “inverted pyramid”. The inverted pyramid places
what are deemed the most important events first, and the least important last. In the
inverted pyramid model, a journalist would place a state representative (such as a
police officer), politician or local authority (councillor, local resident, etc.) at the top
of the story, with less important actors in the body of the story. In essence, the
inverted pyramid prioritises the key events not in chronological order, but in the
priority that the reporter believes to be the most significant. The “micro” element
focuses on individual words and sentences.

What Van Dijk’s (1988a) idea of macro- and microstructures reveals is how the
hegemonic discourse is prioritised over other discourses; and through microstructures
the hegemonic position is often reinforced. However, the discourse analysis of Van
Dijk (1988b), like that of Laclau and Mouffe (as discussed earlier), appears to limit the acknowledgement of other actors or subjects. Van Dijk (1988b) favours one side over the other. He offers a “one-sided emphasis to news making practices” (Fairclough, 1995: 30) and so those with greater access to the media – politicians, institutions and commerce – become the only voice (or the loudest voice) and hence the focus of the story. As well as providing information, how that information is “framed” has consequences for media discourse.

Gamson and Modigliani (1989) offer a series of tools to examine how meaning produces “frames” and how such frames may underlie a discourse. They term their frames “media packages” that “work as an overall interpretative principle in relation to the issue” (Carvalho, 2000: 9), but which suggest how the reader/viewer can think about an issue. Media packages take cultural codes or maps of meaning and place the event within a set of values that frame a discourse. The approach of Gamson and Modigliani echoes Hall’s earlier work (1978) on how meaning is mapped through news production.

The maps of meanings approach shows that meaning is gained from pre-supposed, pre-shaped cultural knowledge (Hall, 1978). Cultural codes shape our knowledge, which is expressed through language. When journalists apply a set language to news stories, or editors reaffirm a set of cultural codes in news production, they reinforce cultural codes and knowledge. These codes are defined, according to Gamson and Modigliani (1989), through frames. Each frame acts as a series of codes, which direct and guide the reader/viewer to interpret the information, and thus build a knowledge base in a set way. Framing devices are found through metaphors, exemplars (i.e. historical examples from which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, depictions and
visual images. Visual images are important because they act as reasoning devices (that justify what should be done about it).

The list drawn up by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) is useful, and they expand on the Van Dijk (1988) approach by offering a more detailed analysis, especially regarding the incorporation of visual imagery and media packages. However, the idea of the media package being a summary or “signature matrix that states the frame, the range of positions” (Carvalho, 2000: 9) still lacks any explanation for why journalists apply these techniques within a media frame. Gamson and Modigliani expand on the mechanics, but fail to contextualise the mechanisms of news production, whereas Carvalho’s approach offers a more in-depth set of analytical tools and aids contextualisation of the media discourse. Carvalho shows by “deconstruction and reconstruction of text [which] can give important indications about issues like the intentions of the author of a text or utterance” (2000: 3).

Carvalho’s (2000) interpretation of discourse analysis is a far more detailed unpacking of the text than the previous works by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and Van Dijk (1988). Carvalho’s emphasis on the mechanics and formulations of a text differentiates her work from other critical or media discourse analyses. Briefly, Carvalho identifies two forms of analysis, “textual” and “contextual”, by looking at six elements of the text. She argues that each of these elements needs to be addressed in any textual analysis: (1) surface depicters and structural organisations, (2) objects, (3) actors, (4) language and rhetoric, (5) discursive strategies and processes, and (6) ideological standpoints (Carvalho, 2000). Each of these six subheadings examines the different parts that construct a text. Carvalho first notes the importance of surface depicters and structural organisation (i.e. the page number and size of the
article, author, etc.). Secondly, she suggests that understanding how objects are defined (what the topics and themes of the article are) is equally important. In Carvalho’s study on the media reporting of climate change, she identifies objects in a text being the theme of “economics, government or nature, while more specific ones [topics] may be, for instance, climate change impacts on agriculture” (2000: 22). Language shapes the journalistic discourse so that persuasion is tied in with such issues as “truthfulness, plausibility, correctness, precision, or credibility” (Van Dijk, 1988: 83).

Extending other media discourse analysis studies, Carvalho suggests that identifying “who” the article mentions (the actors), the recognition of any “individuals and institutions” (2000: 24), alongside “social agents and characters” and their “perceived influence in shaping the overall meaning of the text” (Carvalho, 2000: 24) are all elements of discourses within a text. Moreover, the framing of an article is “a central organising principle that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols” (Gamson, 1992: 384). Labelling how an actor conveys “her/his view and position through the media, by having them represented by journalists either in the form of quotes or regular text” (Gamson, 1992: 384), is thus important in any textual analysis.

Carvalho suggests that a series of factors need to be considered when identifying the discursive patterns in news reports. These factors are based on the principle that journalists repeat:

[a] discursive re-construction of reality. Rarely do they witness events, or get to know reality, in a way that does not involve the mediation of others. A variety of social actors serves everyday as sources of
information for media professionals, in a direct or indirect way. (Carvalho, 2000: 19)

However, the nature of “action” means that journalists often witness events first-hand and these have greater news value than reports or conferences, which are often pushed down the news agenda while they are taking place, until a conclusion or decision is announced or a change in circumstances occurs. Carvalho’s discourse analysis is missing the difference between reconstructing a reality and how discourse shapes the reporting of live events. Protests are live events and, with the pressure of 24-hour news, journalists are often in situ during them. The No Third Runway (in 2007) and G20 Meltdown protests (in 2009) saw several journalists in different positions reporting on key events. When, on 15 January 2009, the then Transport Minister, Geoff Hoon, announced the granting of planning permission to build the third runway, Sky News had reporters placed at key points to capture reactions to the announcement. Their journalists reported from outside the Palace of Westminster, the two villages marked for demolition (Sipson and Harmondsworth) and Heathrow Airport (see Sky News report “Heathrow runway: residents react” for further details, 2009). The G20 Meltdown protest (April 2009) saw Sky News journalists all over London. Journalists reported from behind the police cordon (a tactic borrowed from the protest movement and explored later in this thesis), a boat on the River Thames (Sky boat), and from the route of the march to the Bank of England. Each report was backed up with a live camera feed from the Sky News helicopter (Skycopter) hovering over the protest, at the Bank of England (see Charlie Brooker’s interpretation of the G20 protests, 2009).

Although Carvalho’s work is useful in expanding the field of media discourse, the preferred method of analysis in this thesis is Fairclough’s CDA. Many of these
approaches, Van Dijk, Gamson and Modigliani, and to some extent Laclau and Mouffe, assume a passive/active relationship between the social actors in a discourse. Any minor actor becomes passive and the hegemonic position falls to the major actor. Just as Carvalho found that Gamson and Modigliani’s and Van Dijk’s approaches were too limited when accounting for the different actors and dialogues, so her work assumes that power relationships between dominant and all other actors shape discourses (i.e. what is sayable or unsayable). Fairclough’s approach, in contrast, unpacks the order of discourse to show all voices. What Carvalho, Gamson and Modigliani and Van Dijk all seem to miss is the deliberate decision by some actors to shape discourses through passive, non-confrontational action as a political tool.

Moreover, Fairclough’s idea of boundaries between discourse helps identify who is representing whom, whereas Carvalho’s approach lacks any acknowledgement of the external factors which shape both the discourse of language and discourse as a social and cultural definition. Therefore, by exploring discursive position in media text, Fairclough’s approach is useful in deciphering the numerous actors within competing discourses. Different levels of engagement with mainstream and alternative media are central to much of the representation of environmental activism, and this is a theme explored later in this thesis when examining how environmental activists counter the dominant media position. Van Dijk (1988b) focuses too closely on the text, to the exclusion of social relationships or news discourse, in examining not only how meaning is shaped but, importantly, why one such meaning is preferred over another. Van Dijk and Carvalho both focus on the text and, although Carvalho addresses discourse in her approach, she still lacks an analysis of how social and
cultural discourses, along with language, affect the position of news-making practices in relation to environmental activism.

Therefore, what is clear is that a straight media discourse analysis helps identify patterns in news production but fails to incorporate a theoretical position to unravel any social, political or cultural practices. This thesis understands discourse as a methodological approach to history, and this is a combination of the Foucauldian archaeological approach to discourse and the mechanics of media discourse analysis. Fairclough (1995) offers this in his notion of critical discourse analysis.

Having set out the many arguments that inform discourse analysis, this chapter will now turn its attention to the empirical research used in this study. There are three parts to this: (1) critical discourse analysis, (2) one-to-one interviews, and (3) a focus group. The data from this empirical research will form the last third of this thesis (see Chapters Five and Six). The next section will firstly explore critical discourse analysis and discuss how CDA will be applied in this study, outlining the criticisms of CDA (Widdowson, 2004; Stubbs, 1996; Wodak and Chilton, 2005). In addressing these criticisms, the chapter will then give an overview of the interviews and focus groups.

**Critical Discourse Analysis**

Fairclough examines the complexities involved in representing “communicative events”. As a post-structuralist, Fairclough sees discourse as a combination of language and knowledge, and this view has similarities to Hall’s work set out earlier in this chapter (linguistic discourse), whereby language use is “conceived as social
practice” (Fairclough, 2003: 3). Critical discourse analysis provides a method that combines discourse analysis in a social and historical context. Fairclough sees discourses as “semiotic systems such as language and images” (Philips and Jørgensen, 2004: 67), whereas Laclau and Mouffe (2001) see discourses as encompassing all social practice. CDA is significant for this study as it provides a set of tools that can be used to examine the historical and social context of media discourse. By unpacking the historical context of events, we can uncover the role of discursive practices and power relations. CDA is also useful as it offers a way of examining both textual and social factors to understand the links between “text, societal and cultural processes and structures” (Philips and Jørgensen, 2004: 65) in news reporting. CDA builds on Gamson and Modigliani’s analysis of the image, to establish how different images and linguistic characteristic are repeated in the reporting of different versions of a story (intertextual). Fairclough’s CDA combines the theory of how language shapes meaning alongside how language moves from linguistic traits to knowledge construction and power. In applying CDA, this thesis aims to illustrate how journalistic language (media discourse) constitutes environmental governance.

Fairclough proposes a similar understanding of media discourse to those already discussed. When a text (communicative event) is produced it passes through the discursive practice (language, historical factors, order of discourse, mediated quasi-interaction) to produce the knowledge of socio-cultural practice that emerges in the discourse of economics, politics and culture. Communicated events are “recontextualised differently depending upon the goals, values and priorities of the communication in which they are reconceptualised” (Fairclough, 1995: 41) and are dependent on the “goals, values and properties of the communication in which they
reconceptualise” (Fairclough, 1995: 41). Access to a communication event also influences which “categories of social agent get to write, speak and be seen” (Fairclough, 1995: 40). For example, a journalist will have access to official spokespersons (police, army, etc.), politicians, corporate or conglomerate press officers, as well as the general public. Yet the general public are often excluded from accessing such representatives. This one-way communicative event can define media discourse as “mediated quasi-interaction” (Thompson, 1990: 228). It is at this point that critical discourse analysis explores the “tension between these two sides” in the use of language to unpack the “socially shaped and socially constitutive” meaning (Fairclough, 1995: 55). Language becomes socially and historically constructed (echoing Foucault in Archaeology of Knowledge), and unpacking the language should reveal socio-cultural practice.

Where Fairclough’s CDA differs from other kinds of discourse analysis is in his idea of “intertextual analysis” that works as a bridging tool between text and discursive practice. Intertextual analysis provides the tools to “look at the text from the perspective of discursive practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 70), as opposed to media practice (as Gamson and Carvalho do, for example). Fairclough provides nine terms as a framework for reading the text in CDA. The categories are: heterogeneity, grammar, boundaries, metaphor, nominalisation, genre, glocalisation, order of discourse and image. The heterogeneity element of CDA (Fairclough, 1995: 15) reveals how a mixture of linguistic styles is used, from informal, colloquial language when activists are quoted, to formal, official language when quoting from official sources. Nominalisation is the use of noun-like terms to identify those involved (such as women, protesters, anarchists), while action refers to the use of adjectives to define the “action”; and image is also considered important for Fairclough.
Fairclough links the use of *metaphors* to his idea of intertextuality, along with transformation. The remaining four are all important because they raise the question of agency in environmental discourse. Agency is identified through the *order of discourse* (such as political, economic, environmental, radical politics); *glocalisation* from the local to global- in which context is discourse placed; *Boundaries* concerns who is represented, who are the journalists representing and which discourse is dominant. The last term is *grammar*, specifically the use of conjunctive terms. These last four are important and will now be looked at in greater detail.

Grammatical techniques include analysis of sentences, especially the use of conjunctives ("but", "however", "meanwhile") and presuppositions (implicit assumptions about events/ or the story) in news reports to establish “mechanisms for ordering voices” (Fairclough, 1995: 84). Conjunctives change the story, often working as “markers of the ordering of discourse” (Fairclough, 1995: 82). Using “however” or “but” can be applied to set up contrast between positive or negative sides. For example, a news report about a planned incinerator could contrast the official source of the local council (in favour), with an oppositional voice from local residents or businesses. Presuppositions add authority to a piece, whilst positioning the reader as “someone who is already familiar with the cultural and community depicted” (Fairclough, 1995: 107). For example, youth culture might be a “genre” identified through language of “hoodies”, “chavs” “yoofs”, “thugs”, “generation X”, etc. These terms help media discourse to organise one section of society, i.e. youth culture, into a genre. Other important variables in a text include the presence or “absences” and boundaries.
Boundaries are often defined through a text as being between those who are being represented, and those doing the representing, when “boundaries are maintained between the representing discourse and the represented discourse between the voices of the reporter and the person reported” (Fairclough, 1995: 81). Boundaries also aid the analysis of absences in a text to discover “things which might have been ‘there’ but ‘aren’t’” (Fairclough 1995: 106). Fairclough terms “nominalisations” as the “processes that have been turned into noun-like terms (nominals) which can themselves function as participants” (Fairclough, 1995: 112). Nominalisation is a type of “grammatical metaphor” (Fairclough, 2003: 220). This is similar to Hall’s signification or “amplification spiral” that “suggests an increasing of deviances” (Hall, 1978: 223) by labelling individuals under one generic noun “activists”, as opposed to distinguishing which collective or organisation the “activist” is connected to.

Genre can be “described in terms of organizational properties” (Fairclough 1995: 56) that are defined through analysis of the “language associated with and constituting parts of some particular practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 56). From this genre knowledge is formed. When one genre is placed next to another, then several discourses form a category. In very simplistic terms, this could be the genre of youth culture juxtaposed with crime discourse, equalling a category of youth crime. What is central to Fairclough’s approach is the deconstruction of language to unpack how a journalist’s use of language to create genres and categories (media discourse) affects the wider socio-cultural (media) practice.

An “order of discourse”, like the Foucauldian order of discourse, is a means of highlighting “the relationship between different types in such sets”, for instance, in a
school, the discursive types of the classroom and the playground (Fairclough, 1995: 55). By drawing on specific communicative events over the forty-year period of environmental activism in the UK, this study aims to illustrate how historically orders of discourse have been “routinely used within the media” and how this “plays a part in the reproduction of the media system” (Fairclough, 1995: 72), by analysing power relations between the state and environmental activists. Defining an order of discourse, combined with Foucault’s notion of commentary (see earlier discussions in this chapter), serves two purposes. Firstly, the order of discourse will show which actors (to borrow Dryzek’s interpretation) are represented, and secondly, whether over time actors are excluded or replaced by journalists and state. By developing Fairclough’s notion of order of discourse with other CDA mechanisms, will, unlike Carvalho’s study, (a) reveal which actors/voices are heard, and (b) show the power relations between actors. Other functions of the “order of discourse” are identification of “specific discursive practices of the text” (Philips and Jørgensen, 2004: 72). The combination of a communicative event with the order of discourse creates a dialectical position between language and social systems, with the journalist facilitating the conversation between activists, the state and general public. Philips and Jørgensen note that when a journalist draws on language “routinely used within the media, he or she also plays a part in the reproduction of the media system” (2004: 72). The reproduction of a media message is further enhanced through “mediated quasi-interaction”. The “order of discourse” allows for “one domain of potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert and maintain particular structure within and between them” (Fairclough, 1995: 56, in Philips and Jørgensen, 2004). Therefore identifying the order of discourse in a communicative event over a historical period, and taking on board the mediated quasi-interaction, is useful in unpacking media discourse.
The key aim in using CDA is to use newspaper reports of environmental activism, over a long period, to see how journalists’ reporting of environmental activism reflects the political shifts and discursive power relations between activists and the state. In other words, by undertaking a historical analysis of environmental reporting from the 1980s to the 2000s, the study will illustrate that as environmental governance increases in social and political discourse, so environmental activism is increasingly placed into a discourse of deviance. Only by charting key environmentalism-centred protests over a long period of time will this study be able to indicate whether there has been any shift in power relations and environmental discourse from, as Dryzek puts it, fundis to problem-solving. If this research was to just take a series of texts without a CDA, it would not be able to identify whether there are any repetitive linguistic traits or a reaffirmation of a discourse of deviance. To establish that media reporting of environmental activism reflects the political discourse, it must examine environmental activists, not necessarily chronologically, but through what Chilton terms “critical discourse moments” (1987). If a pattern can be identified, then it can be argued that this pattern is reflective of political shift, and therefore that the media discourse supports the political but not the environmental discourse. As Chapter Five will suggest, journalists often refer back to earlier environmental protests to contextualise contemporary protest.

The thesis will be focusing on empirical data drawn from what has been identified as “critical discourse moments” (Chilton, 1987). Critical discourse moments are events that bring issues into the forefront of public discourse, providing an opportunity to reassert existing frames or provide new frames to draw from. Critical discourse moments function as focal points in a discourse that “offers collective patterns of
orientation to the respective co-communicators (Chilton, 1987). Within an event, a journalist will look for a hook or peg, an element to frame the event. Carvalho (2000) defines critical discourse moments as “periods that involve specific happenings which may lead to a challenge to the established discursive positions” (34) and asks “did arguments change because of them? Did new alternative views arise?” (2000: 37).

Chapter Five will argue that expanding Fairclough’s CDA through a historical contextualisation of critical discourse moments will suggest that language “routinely used within the media” results in the journalist playing a “part in the reproduction of the media system” (Fairclough, 1995:72). The critical discourse moments that have been identified (and are examined in Chapter Five) are (a) the Greenham Common Peace Camp (1982–2000), (b) Swampy and the roads protest (1996–1997), and (c) the London May Day Global Justice Movement protest (2000–2002). The Camps for Climate Action (henceforth referred to as the climate camps) are discussed in Chapter Six with the focus group, and are therefore not included in the three samples. These three moments have been chosen because, as argued in this thesis, they were significant in the shaping of environmental activism within the environmental discourse.

The early environmental movement’s objectives overlapped with resistance to nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and the peace movement (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005: 86), and the Greenham Common Peace Camp was no different. The Greenham Common Peace Camp was the first long-term camp in the UK. Although the objective of the camp was to raise awareness of nuclear missiles being stored at the RAF Greenham base (adjacent to the camp), there was an acute awareness of nuclear
weapons and the link to environmental discourse. The peace camp was chosen because it shared similar environmental objectives to the very first environmental activism that created Greenpeace. Moreover, as Chapter Six will show, the liminoid (social) practices and tactics developed at Greenham have formed the foundation of media strategies and tactics in recent environmental activist camps (see Doherty, 1999 and Plows, 2006). A further reason for the choice is that these events show how journalists began to view the women at the camp as violent or deviant. Sasha Roseneil’s (1995) study of the peace camp identified the journalistic practice of placing women outside of society (see Chapter Six). The female protesters were metaphorically placed outside of family life and traditional matriarchal roles, as well as being physically outside the RAF base. This resulted in the use of a language that masculinised the women, or framed them as outside of society. Being outside of society, as Chapter Three’s discussions on biopower will show, reinforces activists in a position of deviancy through media discourse.

The rationale for the second and third examples is more closely linked to environmental discourse. Swampy become the poster boy for the road protest in the 1990s. As Mathew Paterson (2000) notes, Swampy became synonymous with the environmental activism movement and the media. Swampy, aka Daniel Hooper, garnered media coverage for digging a deep tunnel (deeper than any other) at the A30 road protest site. The media coverage was focused around Swampy as he remained in the tunnel the longest of all activists. The anti-road protest created a tempestuous relationship between journalists and activists, with some denying media discourse and others giving interviews and embracing media attention. The movement as a whole learnt valuable lessons from the road protest, which went on to influence the relationship between journalists and activists (see Chapter Six).
The third sample was chosen for the environmental objective that links the activist movement with wider, global justice movement protests. The first May Day protest, titled Guerrilla Gardening, was linked to the earlier protest against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Seattle, USA. This protest has been chosen for three reasons. Firstly, it combines UK environmental activism with a global anti-capitalist discourse; secondly, the May Day protest stretched pre- and post the 9/11 terrorism attack that led to increased labelling of environmental activists as eco-terrorists (see Chapter Four); and thirdly, it illustrates the clear demarcation of discourse between capitalism and anti-capitalism. The May Day protest changed the relationship between activists and the media in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but also led to the increased and open labelling of activists as deviant by the press. Although these three samples are chronologically aligned, they were mainly chosen for having significantly altered the relations between activist and media discourse. Critical discourse analysis will be applied to these critical discourse moments, through newspaper reports of each of these three events. However, other media forms, for example TV, online or audio, will not be entirely ignored.

The criteria by which newspaper reports were chosen were that they had to appear in the “news section” of a newspaper (rejected articles include editorials, letters or comment pieces). Articles could only be sourced from UK national newspapers.\(^\text{11}\) The final criterion ensured that the number of newspapers covering a

\(^{11}\) The first environmental activism that led to Greenpeace took place off the coast of Alaska will not be analysed because coverage occurred in North American newspapers (predominantly *The New York Times* and *Vancouver Sun*).
“communicative event” had to have been identified from academic sources or the nexis database. There were 61 articles identified from the nexis database search and the actual articles were sourced from the British newspaper library. It was important to source the articles over the text, to establish where they sit on the page, size of article, if they are positioned next to contrasting stories. The number and length of the articles determines the higher or lower news value assigned to the story by editors and owners. This is important, because the nexis database gives no indication of the size or the importance of a story – where on the page it appeared (for example, the weekly column by Swampy against the expansion of Manchester airport (1997) was often placed next to a large advert for cheap flights from Manchester airport). Another example is Paterson’s discussion (2000) on Swampy with the headline “The nation digs you, Swampy” (Ed. Op. 1997: 15). Although Paterson gives the piece much discussion, it is only a few lines long (seven) buried on page fifteen, thus given less prominence (2000: 15). These criteria aim to address potential problems of using newspaper coverage. However, there is wider criticism of CDA that this work will now address.

A Critique of Critical Discourse Analysis

Critics of CDA, such as Molina (2009), O’Halloran (2003), Wodak and Chilton, (2005), and Stubbs (1997) argue that Fairclough’s method is problematic for numerous reasons. Indeed, these observations echo similar critiques of Foucault, in

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12 Nexis newspaper database is provides full text access to all UK national newspapers, plus regional newspapers, international news providers and a number of trade journals and magazines. Most titles have a twenty year archive.

13 Rejected moments were the first environmental activism, because it occurred in Alaska (1971), not the UK. The Brent Spar (1995) incident was also rejected because it centred on Greenpeace action, and the focus of this study is radical non-hierarchical environmental activism.
that CDA as an analytical tool begins from an assumed, universally accepted position. Fairclough and Foucault are criticised for assuming that any analysis, whether historical or discursive, begins from a normative position. For example, the Western view of society is the normative position. Secondly, it assumes that language is clear and not opaque (Molina, 2009:185). Language is a complex series of relations that produces meaning, yet this is not necessarily a discourse. Thirdly, it lacks any definition as to whether discourse is finite or infinite, and if so at which point does language stop being discourse (Molina, 2009)

Wodak and Chilton argue that Fairclough’s CDA is “good at showing how particular language users establish exclusionary attitudes”, but it only truly works as a “descriptive job, not a theoretical job” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 24). Wodak and Chilton also find CDA problematic as a theoretical approach, predominantly because it lacks “acknowledgement of the role of cognitive knowledge in deciphering and interpretation” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 21), as it lacks “attention to the human mind” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 22). Not taking cognitive processes into account negates discourse as a social action (or “social practice’), ignores the fact that social action constructs social reality (objects, situations, identities, social relations) and may even deny that discourse can be defined as the use of language. For CDA to be a legitimate and constructive mechanism for examining language “construction can only be taking place in the minds of (interacting) individuals” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 23). However, this thesis would argue that Wodak and Chilton are ignoring how journalists give an event news value, because even if Fairclough is taking an assumed position, how the journalist selects a communicative event as news is also an assumed position.
Depending on the value that the journalist puts on the event, they will “re-tell/reconstruct” the story for public consumption. Thus some events have no “news value” whilst others have a high news value. The news value of any communicative event is determined by how journalists focus on the “extraordinary, dramatic, tragic to get their stories onto the news agenda” (Hall, 1978: 54). Some events are a “one-off”, whilst others that occur regularly become part of social practice. For example, when journalists cover familiar and regular events (e.g. an annual sporting event, parliamentary procedures such as the Queen’s Speech, Prime Minister’s Question Time, the Budget), they have already identified a “range of social and cultural identifications” through “maps of meanings” (Hall, 1978: 58). Thus Wodak and Chilton are critical of Fairclough, but fail to acknowledge the assumptions made by journalists.

Widdowson (2004) and Stubbs (1997) are less convinced that CDA even has the ability to do a descriptive job, because it lacks any “epistemological and ontological foundations” (Poole 2010: 138). Widdowson believes that “no matter how exhaustive the linguistic description of a text, the critical discourse analysis can never indisputably ‘reveal’ a particular discourse at work” (Widdowson cited in Poole, 2010: 147). Yet with any social science research there is an element of subjectivity, and it is hard to avoid this.

Stubbs (1997) and O’Halloran (2003) argue that there is one solution to this problem, “if CDA aims to show causal links between particular textual features…reader reactions or textual interpretations, then data is needed on readers’ thought processes…If language and thought are to be related, then one needs data and theory from both” (Stubbs in Poole, 2010: 148). Moreover, as Poole notes, in reading
Fairclough’s work, there is a “strong impression that it is actually his self-declared socialism – and the associated hostility to imperialism, neoliberalism, and global capitalism – rather than close linguistic analysis which is the well spring” (Poole, 2010: 146).

This thesis takes on board the criticisms of subjectivity, cognitive assumptions and the limited ability of CDA to provide “descriptive” analysis. However, the thesis has retained CDA as a method for three reasons. First, CDA provides a platform to contextualise media discourse within a historical framework, unlike media discourse analysis that takes one event and applies discourse analysis to an entire genre of reporting (see Carvalho, 2000). As earlier discussion show, what is problematic with media discourse analysis is that it only provides the tools with which to unpack journalistic language. Van Dijk, Gamson, Modigliana, and Carvalho all concentrate on the relationship between media discourse and meaning without contextualising such meaning. This thesis would argue that simple media discourse fails to take into account the source of journalistic language or the voice of all actors. Therefore, this thesis expands the media discourse analysis to include the role of the state, by charting the historical reporting of activism from three key critical discourse moments. A second rationale for continuing with CDA is that, unlike the other literature in the field, this thesis is also looking at the impact of political discourse on media and environmental discourse. Therefore, the intertextuality of CDA provides a platform on which to include political discourse in the analysis.

A third reason for retaining CDA is to apply Stubbs’s and O’Halloran’s suggestion that data is needed on the thought processes, production and consumption of media
To address the issues raised by Stubbs and O’Halloran, a second empirical method will be employed through interviews and a focus group.

The decision was made to hold a focus group with activists rather than journalists, NGO members or politicians. The rationale for choosing activists over journalist was (a) there is limited research speaking directly to activists (see Plows’ (2006) ethnographic study on environmental protest movements); (b) the focus of this research is on how activists are represented; and (c) to add new knowledge about why 2005 was a turning point for relations between activists and journalists in light of new and social media.

**Interviews and Focus Groups**

The focus group as a method is useful because, although commonly associated with PR and product research (Greenbaum, 1998), it also provides an opportunity to gain the views of a cross-section of the environmental movement in the UK. As Morgan (1998) notes, the “focus group is a group of interviews” (10), as opposed to one-to-one interviews with individuals, which tend to be used to “provide personal accounts about the unique experience” (Morgan, 1998: 33).

The focus group aimed to examine how the environmental activism movements that have recently emerged through the Camps for Climate Action (from 2006 to 2010) have shifted the political foundation of UK activist movements. The focus group aimed to explore whether the climate camps’ use of new media technologies was an attempt to challenge the “emptying out” of the environmental activists’ political endeavours by the mainstream press. Climate camps began to create “new hybrid forms of media consumption-production which challenge the entrenched division on labour (producer vs. consumer of media narratives) that is the essence of media
power” (Couldry, 2003: 45). The participants were chosen either because of their direct relationship with the media, or because of their role within the movement.

Participants were identified through a series of stages, beginning with newspaper clippings. Activists who were quoted either directly or indirectly (such as a group but no individual names) were categorised. For example, an article on Plane Stupid’s action may quote activist Leo Murray or Dan Glass – so the pattern was to identify the individuals.14 Initially, newspaper clippings were chosen from 2005 onwards as this is the turning point when activists began engaging with the mainstream media. In total, 187 articles were collected about environmental activism in the media. These included national daily and Sunday newspapers and London regional newspapers. Of these 187, a total of 101 were published after 2005. The largest collection came from The Guardian (30 articles) and the least from The Mirror (1) newspapers. These articles were whittled down to those articles linked to the seven participants and articles that were “critical discourse moments” or focused on environmental discourse as a whole. This narrowed the choice down to eighty-eight articles that identified forty-six potential participants. These forty-six were coded as either “A”, “B” or “A/B”. “A” stood for priority, “B” was coded for secondary and “A/B” represented a secondary person from the same collective that had already been identified. The coding revealed seventeen potential focus group participants (coded A), seven were coded “B” and eight were “A/B”. The seventeen were contacted and confirmation was received from six activists. This number of participants adheres to Greenbaum’s idea of a mini group that is “limited to 4–6…with the mini group; the

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14 The movement is relatively small, with many activists moving from one protest cause to another, or diverting off for a while to other issues (such as race, gender, anti-capitalism) only to return to environmental activism. Therefore the pool of people who have a history with the movement is fairly limited and so easier to identify.
time per person is doubled, thus theoretically enabling the moderator to get more
information from each individual” (Greenbaum, 1998: 3).15

The participants were chosen from news stories after 2005, as this is the point when
they made a conscious decision to engage with the media. During this period there
were four Camps for Climate Action, and also the emergence of the Rising Tide,
Climate Rush, So We Stand and Plane Stupid collectives. There were also the G8 (in
2005) and G20 (in 2009) meetings in the UK, at which a variety of activist
collectives attended and protested. It was also felt that personality-led participants
could detract from gaining an overview of the movement.

The articles were chosen because they either contained a direct quote from the
participants, involved activists, or were symbolic of wider movement discussions.
Five newspaper samples were chosen as external stimulus (Greenbaum, 1998) to
generate discussion and gather data on a) the motivation of activist, and b) their
understanding of how they are presented. The samples were divided into two parts.
Part one had two samples designed to give overviews of environmental discourse and
the reporting of direct action. Part two held three samples with direct quotes and
reference to the participants of the focus group. The first article “The Green
Revolution” was a front image divided by two images – one with former Prime
Minister Tony Blair, and former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger at a
BP press conference. This image was juxtaposed with a photograph of two female
activists jostling with police at the Drax Camp for Climate Action. These pictures
epitomise the key themes of this thesis: the political, market-led discourse in

15 The focus group was recorded with two dictaphones and a flash recorder on the table. Before the focus group
began, each participant was also ask to record on video a short brief about themselves. They were asked about
their background, specifically how they saw themselves in the environmental movement, and whether they are
connected to any specific collective.
governmentality, and the contestation between activists and the police. The second sample was the *London Evening Standard* headline “Militants in plot to hijack Heathrow” (13 August 2007: 1). Rosser’s article also signalled the first challenge of media discourse by the activists to the Press Complaints Committee (PCC).

Part two began with an article centred on new and social media at the Blackheath Climate Camp. The article carried quotes from Hamish and Richard and a photograph of the media tent. This sample was chosen because it was on page four of the *Guardian* newspaper. The remaining two pieces were “It’s BP party and we’ll protest if we want too” (*The Times*, 24 March 2009: 40) and the *Daily Mail* newspaper’s coverage of Plane Stupid action to superglue Dan Glass to the Prime Minister Gordon Brown “How do you glue, Mr Brown” (23 July 2008: 17). The last two articles were on pages 17 and 14 respectively and carried fewer than 250 words. Moreover, for the last two stories the activists provided press releases about the events. The objective of using these two samples was to ascertain how the activists felt they were represented and also to establish if the press releases reflected the coverage.

The focus group was held at Conway Hall, Central London, on 9 August 2011. The seven participants were Dan, Hamish, John, Nim, Michael, Richard and

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16 Dan became interested in activism from the rave scene, and is now with Plane Stupid and So We Stand.
17 A teenager at the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, Hamish has been involved with the “Undercurrents’ alternative news website, the roads protest movement, Reclaim the Streets, anti-GM protests, Visionon.tv, and has attended all five climate camps.
18 John is from the coalition against Heathrow’s third runway (HACAN). He works with Airport Watch and has also participated in roads protests.
19 Nim Ralph is an activist with So We Stand, who has been involved with the movement since 2005.
20 Michael was involved in the Poll Tax protests and the Miners’ Strike, and he also set up a horizontal group to stop building the Eurotunnel, has taken part in the People’s Global Action, the 1999 Intercontinental Caravan, G8 Koln, the 2010 Geneva Cop15, the 2011 Bangladesh Now, and Rising Tide. With Nim he is co-founder of So We Stand.
21 Richard is also from Visionon.tv and was involved with the Miners’ Strike during 1984–85. He was one of the first people filming and making films about environmental direct action in the early 1990s in the UK.
Steve. In addition, face-to-face interviews were also conducted with John Jordan, Des Kay, Dan Glass and Martin. The focus group’s purpose was to investigate the following questions:

1. Why are activists developing media strategies that negate earlier ideas around the media as a fourth estate?

2. Does a focus on the front page depoliticise a protest?

3. Why do activists continue to think in terms of traditional front-page media strategies?

4. Do new media open up opportunities for genuine knowledge exchange between environmental activists and the public?

Greenbaum notes that many focus groups are “conducted at 6 and 8 o’clock in the evening”, although there is an increasing “trend toward more use of daytime groups to accommodate both the needs of the respondents and the desire of many moderators” (1998: 36). This focus group adhered to the latter, and was held between two and five o’clock in the afternoon of 9 August 2011. As a consequence of the timing, the focus group ended up with 6:1 male:female ratio.

22 From Rising Tide, Steve was heavily involved with the early roads protest at Claremont Road (East London), along with activism with London Greenpeace (not corporate Greenpeace) and some activism with early Plane Stupid, mainly Rising Tide since. He has been involved with the climate camps from their first meetings and is now based at the London Action Resource Centre (LARC).

23 These names were given in good faith. In researching potential participants some were identified after being named in newspaper articles. It was only when they were contacted that they gave another name or their real name. Giving pseudonyms is common practice in the movement. For example, Alex Harvey, the name given to the PCC, was a pseudonym; the real Alex Harvey was a 1960s singer who died by electrocution in 1972. When contact was made with LARC for assistance, the two names given were pseudonyms associated with local football club West Ham United FC (Tony Cottee was one name). On the day, the names given were taken at face value.

24 John is involved with Reclaim the Streets and the climate camps, but now mainly focuses on the use of carnivalesque as a tactical political tool.

25 From Critical Mass (the autonomous cycling collective), Des was chosen because, with the help of Friends of the Earth, they successfully overturned a ban by the Metropolitan Police to prevent the monthly cycle rides.

26 From Plane Stupid, for his action of supergluing himself to the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown.

27 From the Whitechapel Anarchist and Class War, to gauge the views of the radical flank within the movement as a whole.

28 Food and drink were provided. Unlike some focus groups, there were no plans to “feed the participants before they enter the room” (Greenbaum, 1998: 44), but light snacks were available during the discussion. When
Two other issues need brief discussion: ethics and identity. Ethics clearance was gained through the University of East London. Identity and anonymity were issues that needed addressing. Many activists are cautious about trusting new people. To get round this the choice of location was important. It needed to be a neutral place, but not a sterile environment. London Conway Hall was chosen as an ideal place to hold the focus group, because of its central London location, and for its historical place within activists’ movements. It is the home of the Ethical Society, which aims to “foster freedom in moral and spiritual life and thought” (Conway Hall website).

Finally, identification of the activists was an issue. It was decided that pseudonyms would be used if an activist chose to do so. Approximately half the group used a pseudonym. Hence the focus group and samples are applied to address the criticism of CDA and provide original data. The findings from the focus group are built into the discussion on how activists challenge the political and media discourse (see Chapter Six).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has set out the methods used in this thesis that work with discourse, discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and focus groups with interviews. Central to this study is the method of critical discourse analysis to address the research questions that drive this thesis.

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29 The openness of the movement and lack of hierarchical structure leave it open to anyone joining. A recent case of an undercover police officer, PC Mark Stone (see Chapter Four for more discussion on Kennedy), having infiltrated the movement for seven years, gave a sense of mistrust in the movement. There is also a history of journalists working incognito, adding to the mistrust.

30 [http://www.conwayhall.org.uk/#About-us](http://www.conwayhall.org.uk/#About-us)
This chapter has shown how language shapes discourse, which in turn shapes knowledge. In expanding the ideas outlined in Chapter One on the emergence of environmentalism as a discourse, this thesis argues that the construction of language can create meaning. In addition, the different motivations (such as problem-solving, survivalism, realos and fundis) impact on discourse to create a discursive struggle.

Language also produces knowledge, and how that knowledge is conveyed can be unpacked through media discourse analysis. Media discourse analysis provides the tools and mechanisms to understand how journalists frame stories at both macro and micro levels. However, critical discourse analysis also helps to contextualise language from a theoretical position. It provides the mechanism to unravel how discourse creates meaning and to identify historical practices and patterns in media discourse. There are some criticisms of these approaches mainly that they take an assumptive cognitive position that can only be tested through empirical research. However, this thesis will retain CDA as a central method because, despite the critiques, CDA provides the tools to analyse the mechanisms whilst contextualising language. Unlike other media discourse analysis, CDA unpacks how knowledge shapes discourse. Once meaning is revealed, power relations can be explored. If media discourse is not contextualised, and only the mechanics of media discourse (such as sentence structures) are examined, unpacking why such power relations occur becomes difficult. However, this work takes on board the criticism, therefore a focus group is used to address the concerns that media discourse and CDA begin from a set point.

This project has chosen the focus group to aid in the analysis of the importance of changes in media discourse, such as social and new media. Significantly, activists’
engagement with media discourse, juxtaposed with mainstream party politics, increased the news value of environmental discourse. To establish why mainstream political parties took a greater involvement in shaping environmental discourse, the next chapter will draw on Foucault’s theory of governmentality to chart the historical practices that led to a neoliberal engagement with environmental discourse.
Chapter Three: Green Governmentality, Environmental Discourse and Governance

“Most environmentalist movements now operate as a basic manifestation of governmentality” (Luke, 1999: 122)

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to show how neoliberal concepts became incorporated into environmental discourse. The chapter examines what has shaped the environmental discourse for it to become, in Luke’s words, “an ongoing struggle over economic competitiveness”. Luke examines this division through what he terms a “green governmentality” – environmentalism through the lens of governmentality (Foucault 1977). Echoing Luke’s approach, this chapter will unpack Foucault’s idea of governmentality, and similar to Luke (who applies this to American politics), this work will apply Foucault’s governmentality approach to the UK political discourse around environmentalism, to examine whether environmental activism is framed as a politics of deviancy. This chapter will argue that environmental discourse began as an nascent process with activism in a dominant position to influence media discourse. Over time, the government’s introduction of neoliberal concepts has increasingly shifted power away from activists and onto the state. Thus, the chapter argues that since the early 1970s, there have been two forms of environmental discourse – activism and governance.

Whilst Hunter (see Chapter One) were gaining media coverage for their protest against nuclear testing off the Alaskan coast (1971), bubbling under the surface was an environmental discourse linked to global and local governance. The first Earth Day (1971) signalled the beginning of the development of a global environmental
discourse linked to economics and global environmental policies (such as the Brundtland Commission). By the 1980s and early 1990s, the emergence of neoliberalism as a new form of economics had penetrated the environmental discourse. As mainstream party politics, commerce and institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations) adapt to environmental crisis and increased public awareness, there was a shift in power away from activist collectives influencing media discourse and policy, to media images of politicians adopting environmental discourse into party politics. This chapter will focus on this shift in power. Chapter Four will look in more detail at how this power shift impacted on environmental activism in relation to environmental and media discourse.

In order to unpack why this shift in power emerged, this chapter will draw on the Foucauldian notion of power in relation to government, governance and governmentality (outlined in Chapter One). Applying Foucault’s theory of governmentality, it will chart the way environmental discourse is linked to neoliberalism. In order to do this, this chapter will first look at Foucault’s notions of power and biopower. These ideas will be followed by a discussion of the emergence of neoliberal economics in relation to environmental discourse. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, the chapter aims to show how power relations between activists, individuals and governance have persuaded many to find economic solutions to environmental problems, through the concept of “green capitalism”. Green capitalism is “sometimes associated with small enterprises that can directly implement green criteria by, for example, using renewable energy sources” (Wallis, 2010). This work will apply this notion of capitalism through a
green lens to examine the shifts in environmental discourse through a
governmentality approach.

Foucault’s notion of governmentality argues that through different mechanisms or
techniques individuals are persuaded to act in a set way by way of governance.
Individuals who reject or challenge these various forms of persuasion are labelled as
abnormal, and their actions are restricted by legislative measures, and ultimately
through penal law. How the UK government has gone about this is the focus of this
chapter. This chapter will examine these changes by developing a Foucauldian
approach (outlined in Chapter Two on discourse) of examining discourse through a
historical context. By exploring discourse in a historical context this chapter aims
to show how language shapes knowledge and discourse.

Drawing on examples from the UK Conservative Party policies, and those of the
other two main political parties, this chapter shows how neoliberalism has become
part of environmental discourse. In charting how environmental discourse moved
from advanced to neoliberalism, this chapter will argue that former Prime Ministers
Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, along with current Prime Minister David
Cameron, understood that applying economic solutions to environmental problems
would have the added bonus of creating new markets. For example, London is home
to the alternative energy markets and carbon-trading companies estimated to be
worth $170 billion per annum (PWC, 2011). This can be contextualised in light of
global initiatives in addressing climate change, to argue that, although party political
and global environmental governance may have begun as an underlying theme of

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31 The period from the 1970s to the present has been chosen as it reflects the period when environmentalism
increasingly centred on social and cultural relations.
environmental discourse, since the late 1980s it has slowly shifted power away from activists onto state governance.

**Was Foucault an Environmentalist?**

Although Foucault’s work lacks any specific reference to environmentalism, his thoughts in the *History of Sexuality* (1976) and the collection of essays on the “Birth of Biopolitics” (Foucault, 2008) provides the notion that environmental and political discourse are not two separate entities, but can be linked through biopower. In debating relations of power, Foucault draws on the example of the “atomic situation” (Foucault, 1976: 137), an issue closely related to the environmental activism movement. The analogy of a nuclear bomb allows Foucault to show how governments have the power to extinguish entire populations.

The power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence… it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. (Foucault, 1978: 137)

The “atomic situation” is a culmination, an ultimate show of the power of one person over another, with the ability to take the life of another – the ultimate form of control. In political terms, the analogy works to reveal an underlying principle (that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living) as “at stake is the biological existence of a population, this is not because of the recent return of the ancient right to kill” (Foucault, 1978: 137). In other words, Foucault’s drawing on the nuclear debate shows how politics and control over human life can be linked together. Foucault was aware of the “heated debate in environmentalism in terms not of epistemological options from which one has to choose, but, on the contrary, of
essential and necessary conditions for the emergence of an ecological/environmental movement in itself” (Darier, 1999: 4). Understanding the conditions in which environmental discourse emerges, Foucault divides the environmental realm into two separate but interpenetrating spheres – biological and historical. Biological dimensions are also seen as forces of nature, such as famine, disease, the dominance of human existence, death, reduced or eradicated through technological and agricultural development. Historically, the eradication or reduction of famine, disease, and so on meant a “development of the different fields of knowledge concerned with life in general…a relative control over life averted some of the imminent risks of death” (Foucault 1978: 142). The result was that “biological and historical became intertwined creating interlocking disciplinary expanses for the ‘environmental’” (Luke 1999: 143). Luke (1999) and Darier (1999) note that, although Foucault is relatively quiet on ecological and environmental discourse, he did understand that in order for politics to move away from a sovereign to a political form, then “environmental” issues such as population, health, death and disease had to become part of the political spectrum. This is epitomised in his notions of power and biopower.

Power for Foucault is neither a single entity, nor an overarching force. In *The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge: v. 1* (1978) Foucault argues that power is not a “group of institutions and mechanisms” (Foucault, 1978: 92); nor does he view power as “a mode of subjugation…a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body” (Foucault, 1978: 92). Instead Foucault views power as omnipotent, part of everything. Power neither holds a standalone position, nor is it something that is “produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in
every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1978: 93). Moreover, for Foucault, power is not something to be attained, achieved, shared, or held onto, but “exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non egalitarian and mobile relations” (Foucault, 1978: 94). Power is within everything, part of everything, yet it is neither measureable nor materialistic, and for Foucault it is certainly “not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with” (Foucault, 1978: 93).

Power is a “name that one attributes us to a complex strategically situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1978: 93). In other words, power could be understood as relations between situations, and how those relations work or resist each other could be labelled power. Power exists in the structures and strategies between relations. Shifts in power come when strategies and structures are altered, directly or indirectly. For Foucault, “the characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determined other men’s conduct – but never exhaustively or coercively” (Foucault, 2002: 324). In relation to this thesis, a shift in power is viewed as emerging when there is a restructuring of discourse between the state and activists as mainstream politics develops new environmental strategies.

Foucault does not reduce power to human agency as a property, rather it is the result of a constellation of discursive structures, knowledge and practice. These discursive structures then create rules and standards, which enable agents to exercise power over themselves and other agents. Conduct is central to how Foucault understands power, strategies and relations between individuals, and individuals and the state. However, there is no exercise of power “without a series of aims and objectives”
Foucault argued that, as the population grew, the aims and objectives of the sovereign became outmoded, as government and discipline became commonplace.

In *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and *Power: Essential Works of Foucault* (2002) Foucault outlines what he sees as three forms of power – sovereign, discipline and governmental. Carl Death (2010b) provides a useful definition of each form of power. Sovereign power is associated with the law (of the land); disciplinary power is associated with the “regulation of the actions of individual bodies in schools, barracks, and the institutions of an emerging state” (Death, 2010b: 17). The third category, governmental power, is associated with “techniques employed to achieve biopolitical government of the population…working through the conduct of conduct rather than ruling directly over territory and bodies” (Death, 2010b: 17).

Sovereign power emerged in the Middle Ages with an objective of sustaining land and land ownership of the crown. Power and rules were executed through the rule of law. According to Foucault, sovereign power “is managed through the law to shape the identity of individual’s through juridical subjects such as judges, administration of the law, and law in general” (Foucault, 1991: 95). As Kelly notes, “In the modern period, according to Foucault, sovereign power has been supplemented by two new technologies, namely *discipline* and *biopower*, the former micro-political, and the latter macro-political” (Kelly, 2009: 43). Technology in this respect refers to the mechanisms, techniques and strategies that shift power and which act as a “body of technical knowledge and practices, a raft of techniques” (Kelly, 2009: 44). Such technologies become prevalent when society moves away from sovereign power into
disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is the application of technologies that begin to control the individual body.

The discipline of the body “organizes an analytical space” (Foucault, 1991: 143) that acts as a parameter in which the individual is restricted in the area of their activities. Control of the body comes through the “art of government” (as a technique) to render possible the ability to “adjust the multiplicity of men and the multiplication of the apparatuses of production (and this means not only production in the strict sense), but also the production of knowledge and skills in the hospitals, the production of destructive force in the army” (Foucault, 1991: 219). These differing forms of power link into environmental discourse. Nealon notes, that:

discipline, as a mode of power is nearly ubiquitous: you wake up to the disciplinary family, consume a breakfast purchased from the efficiency-saturated shelves of the grocery store, and ride the state apparatus – the highway, bus, or train – to school or your job, which in turn is also sodden with the imperatives of discipline: appointments, meetings, tasks, breaks, lunch. (Nealon, 2008: 34–35)

Just as Nealon’s example shows how disciplinary power directs the everyday, this chapter argues that environmental discourse is connected to concepts of neoliberal economics and green capitalism. The chapter also links to the family and individuals’ behaviour to conduct themselves in an ecologically sound manner, almost living vicariously through environmental discourse. Household routines rotate around the individual responsibility to control their energy consumption. Low-energy light bulbs replace higher emitting bulbs, doorstep recycling schemes encourage individuals to reduce their carbon footprint. People are strongly encouraged to take public transport to work, school or shopping. If driving is the only option, there is a disciplinary measure that suggests the purchasing of a hybrid or smart car. These same
disciplinatory measures continue at work, such as recycling office paper, and once home again, via public transport and the supermarket, we take our bags and buy products in recycled packaging to earn green reward points. Moreover, wider, global governance extends discipline to the art of government (the third form of power).

The “art of government” also requires the establishment of a “continuity, in both an upwards and downwards direction” (Foucault, 1991: 91). An upwards direction dictates that those wanting to govern at state level must first establish the skills to govern themselves. A downwards direction requires the running of family and state to hold the same set of principles that “transmits individual behaviour and the running of the family [as] the same principles as the good government of the state…the central term of this continuity is the government of the family, termed economy” (Foucault, 1991: 91–92). This third element of governmentality is the “study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is linked to political rule and economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 4), and is used “to refer to the government of a specific historical era, namely one characterised by bio-power” (Oels, 2005: 189).

An example of biopower as an administrative tool comes from the governmental Department of Environment (DoE). The first mention of “environmentalism” in the Queen’s Speech took place in 1971 (McCormick, 1991) and the new government Department for the Environment was established in the same year as an outcome of the “Reorganising of Central Government” white paper (in November 1970) (DoE, 1971), signalling its emergence as an economic and social area of policy development. The creation of the DoE was not just part of a reorganising structure by central government, more significantly, it was a reaction to increasing public concern
around environmentalism. The new department symbolised the “advent of a new political awareness which recognised the socio-economic significance of environmental concerns” (Robinson, 1992: 11). The DoE’s remit was to be responsible for the “whole range of functions which affect people’s living environment”. Despite its name, the role of the DoE focused less on environmental matters (such as conservation, air pollution, clean water supplies etc.) and more on overseeing town planning, housing, inner-city issues, sport, recreation and royal parks (McCormick, 1991). The role of the DoE was to administrate and organise societal structures. Although environmentalism may have been a fledgling term, both in political and activist discourses, it was beginning to gain support as a social construct. There was the realisation that environmentalism could be a suitable narrative upon which to hang various discourses and disciplines. The establishment of the DoE provided the means of governing and administrating the subject, as biopolitics became more and more useful as a mechanism to introduce legislation and confer greater individual life choices. As Foucault notes:

Through biopower, governments attempt to rationalise the problems presented to governmental practices by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population. (Foucault in Rabinow, 1997: 73)

One solution to this, as Foucault observes, is the connection between biopower and capitalism, as:

Biopower without question is an indispensable element of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population into economics process… it had to have methods of power capable of optimising forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern. (Foucault, 1978: 41)
The effect is that biological existence is reflected both in economics, via production and consumption, and in political discourse, via the administration of life. However, Foucault already has an interpretation of deviancy/normative behaviour in his earlier work on madness, before exploring biopower and the administration of life.

Biopower leads to power being no longer reducible to dealing with legal subjects but with “living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them, would have to be applied at the level of life itself” (Foucault, 1978: 143). Such mastery over life identifies a secondary element of biopower, that is, the formation of the delinquent or abnormal in society. Whilst the concept and practices of biopower are useful in identifying how power relations work within environmental discourse, they are also useful in unpacking the shift in power relations between activists and mainstream politics. Biopower can also be applied to identifying and defining social norms in society, including environmental activists.

Foucault observes that once power is understood as less about investing in “regulating behaviour through panoptic, institutional based training exercise” (Foucault, 1977: 251–52), there can also be a distinction between the criminal and the delinquent. Thus, for the criminal it is the act of criminality “that is relevant in characterising him…the legal punishment bears upon the act; the punitive technique on a life” (Foucault, 1977: 251–52).

Kelly (2009) interprets Foucault’s approach to power as not being guided by the will of individual subjects, or about relations between people, but to “think of power as something autonomous from human subjects” (Kelly, 2009: 36). Power is decentred away from focusing on single individuals or classes of people, but has a
multidirectional meaning; it does not flow only from the more to the less powerful, but rather comes from below, as Foucault notes:

power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix. (1978: 94)

Manokha (2009) notes that, for Foucault, power has two principle characteristics. Firstly, it is not possessed by agents. When agents apply power they *mediate* the dominant view of what constitutes normality or deviance. Secondly, power is positive, it “produces” behaviour that is in conformity with the dominant standard of normality or acceptability:

this means that power may be exercised not only over others, but also over oneself, a situation in which the subject transforms himself or herself into an object of power and adopts a form of behaviour that are expected by the prevailing discourse and truth configurations. (Manokha, 2009: 430)

Foucault notes that those who abstain from normative behaviour are often defined as abnormal and/or delinquent. The delinquent is still understood as “abnormal” in society, when biopower links together

concepts and practices of potential guilt by its invention of a species or life lurking behind the acts of criminality, nevertheless these are subjects who may or may not have done anything illegal or transgressive, but their lives are nonetheless outside the slippery slope of biopolitical normativity…the disciplinary criminal is known through her transgressive deeds, while biopower's delinquent is known through his abnormal personality. (Nealon, 1984: 47)

Biopower identifies those in society who are deemed – “abnormal” or “delinquent” and whose existence and “whose conduct is most obviously saturated and explained
by his or her life” (Nealon, 1984: 47). By categorising what is the “norm”, it assumes an opposite existence of good/bad, abnormal/normal.

The concept of biopower and definitions of normative behaviour are useful for this study because they help identify themes and ideas that are transcribed in the reporting of environmental activism. This thesis applies the concept of biopower in order to unpack shifts in power relations between environmental activists and environmental governance. Moreover, in demonstrating that activists are often framed by a discourse of political deviance and delinquency, we will see whether this shift is reflected in the journalistic language that defines environmental activists. In analysing such relation of power through a biopolitical lens will aim to establish how state governance, nestled in media discourse, strengthens the state position within environmental discourse. In doing so, this thesis will argue that media discourse places radical environmental activism into a discourse of deviance, whist reinforcing the state position that economics are the only solution to climate change. Hence, the practice of biopower increases the practice of potential guilt of anyone outside of the political norm (see earlier discussions on political deviancy by Hall in chapter one). As mainstream party politics co-opts environmental discourse, this disciplines individuals through the administrative role of biopower in order to alter their behaviour (for instance, using low-carbon initiatives to make people more responsible for environmental damage).

Biopower as a form of discipline increases the positioning of activists as “outside” normative behaviour. Biopower, unlike discipline, is a form of power that works on entire populations, by targeting the lives of individuals. Biopower is a useful concept to allow us to unpack how environmental discourse has increasingly become about
administrating life. Government does not replace biopower, but forms a triangular power complex of sovereign–discipline–government or governmentality (McNay, 1994: 1). As McNay notes, a consequence of such triangulations is that “the truth of ‘individuals’ is no longer linked to the position they occupy in the universal order of things, as it is in traditional and hierarchical societies, but is constructed around a normalising notion of inner responsibility requiring an endless and thorough examination of the depths of their souls” (McNay, 1994: 28). As noted above, the individual is encouraged and persuaded to recycle, decrease their carbon footprint, and take responsibility for the environment via green capitalism.

Green capitalism is the key concept in charting how neoliberal concepts became central to environmental discourse. As Oels notes, “climate change as framed by biopower creates a basis for justifying far-ranging policy intervention and even the extension of state power in the name of survival of life on planet Earth” (2005: 201). Oels argues that the result is a shift from “biopower to advanced liberal government in the environmental field from the mid 1980s onwards” (2005: 193). It can also mean neoliberalism and has the market as its central mechanism. The objective of advanced liberal government is to remove itself from state governance (Stephan, 2010). The bio-political measures and instruments that dominated climate politics during the early and mid 1990s “moved to the background or became modified by advanced liberal government” (Stephan, 2010: 10). Market-driven environmental politics may have emerged in the 1970s (the same period as the activist movement), but over the subsequent 40 years, economics and environmentalism have coalesced in the formulation of a series of national and international policies (Agenda 21, Brundtland Commission, Kyoto Protocol). These polices have now become “embedded” in global industrial and institutional practices. The Kyoto Protocol sees
a shift towards advanced liberal government. The introduction of flexible mechanisms through the Kyoto Protocol, and market-led initiatives epitomise what Timothy Luke labels “green governmentality” (Luke, 1999) or “ecogovernmentality” (Oels, 2005). Although this thesis is concentrating on Luke and Oels application of a governmentality framework to examine environmental discourse led by neoliberal and advanced liberal rule, this is not the sole way of applying governmentality to examining environmental discourse in the UK.

The literature on green governmentality covers a wide range of approaches, from Luke interpretation of environmental discourse through neoliberal lens, to Darier’s (2007) debates on ‘environmental citizen’ as a form of green governmentality. Rydin (2007) offers an interesting perspective governmentality as the recasting of subjectivities to enable “government at a distance” (611); whilst Neuman and Sending (2010), along with Paterson and Stripple (2009) show that governmentality runs into difficulties when discussing re wider debates on global environmental governance.

What lies at its heart are relations of power, freedom and subjectivity. When freedom is “a condition of possibilities for, and a product of, human subjectivity” (Death (a)), then relations of power between state, media and activist are not clear cut. Although this thesis supports Luke and Oel’s application of a green governmentality framework that is not to say there is nothing but neoliberal or advanced liberal rule within environmental discourse. Individuals may be persuaded to support a green economy as a conduct to addressing climate change, yet they are not forced, regimented, or through acts of violence coerced into positive behaviour. Individuals can choose how to conduct themselves in relation to environmental discourse.
Freedom and violence are closely linked in relations of power, and the “presence of violence does not mean the absence of freedom, or the absence of government” (Death, (b))

For Foucault freedom as “A power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that the other (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognised and maintained to the very end as a person who act and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible invention may open up” (Foucault, 1982: 792). Moreover, freedom is the “ability to exercise one’s power autonomously….the process through which individuals seek to influence each other should not be seen as a face-to-face confrontation which paralyses both sides, but rather as an antagonistic struggle in which individuals seek to refuse imposed forms of identity and also communicate their differences or ‘otherness’ to each other” (McNay, 1994:128). Power works through practices of freedom, violence and coercion (Death, (b)). The state persuades the conduct of conduct through “unidirectional imposition of dominatory relations reliant on force and the horizontal direction of power that characterises relations between individuals” (McNay, 1994: 126), from individual to individual as a horizontal exercise of power. Violence emerges from the state through an “action upon an action” (McNay, 1994: 126) dichotomy. Violence “imposes itself directly on the body or things…violence allows no opposition to arise” (McNay, 1994: 126). A combination of freedom, coercion and violence by the state results in some individuals’ belief they have the freedom to embrace a neoliberal, whilst those that take ‘action upon an action’, such as direct action, than violence is applied. For
example, environmental activists protest against the principle of global environmental governance, at the global justice/anti-capitalist protest, in Seattle, London, Genoa, and Evian. The effect is that freedom is suppressed when an activists or subjects, “exercises some kind of agency or free choice” (that is to publicly challenge green capitalism), they are “amenable to forms of power working through practices of freedom, even in the face of violence” (Death,(b)).

In light of such understandings of freedom, power and subjectivity, then the concept of biopower provides a platform from which to administrate life and define normative behaviour. With neoliberal economics, biopower is reinvented as advanced liberal government. This introduces new techniques, encourages a green economy, and creates new markets and a new form of green consumption. It not only informs people how to behave, but equally provides the mechanisms through market-led initiatives and green capitalism. At the same time, at one level biopower sets the norms and boundaries of what is normal or abnormal behaviour. The next section looks at how this shift from biopower to advanced liberal government also shifts the power relations between activists and mainstream party politics. It will do so by drawing on Luke’s (1999) development of Foucault, and the notion of green governmentality.

**Governmentality and Green Governmentality**

Governmentality is a useful approach for this thesis in order to account for the shift in power from activism to capital as dominant in environmental discourse, and to environmental discourse as a neoliberal project. This section will argue that through techniques, or technologies as Foucault terms them, environmental politics merges with advanced liberal government to generate apparatus that persuades individuals to
solve environmental problems through consumerism (technologies of the self in Foucauldian terms). At the same time, examining how activists are placed into a discourse of deviance, through media representation and state apparatus (technique of dominance in Foucauldian terms), provides a framework within which to understand the shifts in power between environmental activists and the state.

Lemke argues that governmentality is introduced by Foucault in order to “study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is linked to forms of political rule and economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 4). Governmentality allows the state to guide the self, although it does not control the self. Through different technologies – systemised, regulatory modes of power – such “techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination” (Lemke, 2000: 4). The governing of the self provides individuals with the skills to govern others. Foucault suggests this is achieved from the level of the family up to that of the state, as “running a family has the same principles as the good government of the state…the central term of this continuity is the government of the family, termed economy” (Foucault, 1991: 91–92).

Governmentality is defined by Dean as:

how we think about governing others and ourselves in a wide variety of contexts. In a more limited sense, the different ways governing is thought about in the contemporary world and which can in large part be traced to Western Europe from the sixteenth century. Such forms of thought have been exported to large parts of the globe owing to colonial expansion and the post-colonial set of international arrangements of a system of sovereign states. (2003: 109)

Governmentality is therefore an understanding that in order to govern, there needs to be an ability and understanding of how to control or govern oneself. Governmentality is the “modern deployment of power” which comes through control of the population
(biopower) and its environs (space) (Darier, 1999: 22–24). An increasing population means that governmentality is a form of conduct, or “conduct of conduct [which comes from]…governing oneself to governing others” (Lemke, 2000: 3).

McNay (1994) identifies two key differences between the theories of biopower and governmentality as the “objectivising” and “subjectivising” of the population. Objectivising is a process that involves the transformation of individuals into objects or docile bodies; subjectivising is the manipulation of consciousness (McNay, 1994: 123), a form of internalisation of social norms.

The key principles that shape the development of governmentality are, firstly, the formation of:

institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections…which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatus of security. (Foucault, 1991: 92)

The formation of power through a government involves “a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses and, on the other hand, in the development of a whole complex of savior” (Foucault, 1991: 102–3). This study argues that legislative measures and the defining of activists as delinquent and deviant is a means of re-framing environmental activism as a security threat (this is discussed in greater depth in Chapter Four). When the state applies apparatus to punish or convict those outside normative behaviour they do so through reflexive technologies. Techniques of dominance relate to power relations between the state and the individual. Foucault argues that domination is a particular type of power relationship that is stable and hierarchical, fixed and difficult to reverse. The effect of domination is that “people are subordinated with little room for manoeuvre because their ‘margin of liberty’ is
extremely limited” (Lemke, 2000: 5–6). Dean defines this as a reflexive approach. Reflexive approaches involve conscious direct influence on subjects through force, leading and guidance, mainly by a:

means of legislative measures. Moreover, non-reflexivity and reflexivity can also be understood in terms of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, market/socially driven environmental solutions and mainstream/radical political ideology. The individual internalises their behaviour based on a ‘morality of government (Dean, 2003: 11)

This emerges from a series of policies and practices of governments that “presume to know, with varying degrees of explicitness and using specific forms of knowledge, what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate responsible conduct of individuals and collectives” (Dean, 2003: 14).

Within environmental discourse, these different technologies of biopower enable the state to push through an advanced liberal agenda, based on neoliberalism; at the same time, technologies of dominance identify environmental activists as deviant and delinquent. The result, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, is that shifts in power place advanced liberal government as dominant in environmental discourse. Radical environmental activism’s power becomes weakened within environmental discourse, in a reversal of historical practice. How this is achieved is the focus of the next section, which draws on Luke’s and Oels’ interpretation of governmentality.

Green Governmentality, Eco-governmentality and Advanced Liberal Governmental Technologies

Luke (in Darier, 1999) offers a compelling illustration of how governmental and commercial pressure to control ecological resources can place the “population as an

Geo-power defines ecological problems as transnational security threats that require political, economic or military intervention. Indeed, Foucault acknowledges that ecology has evolved into a “public potential; it called for management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses” (Foucault, 1976: 24–5). Luke takes this one step further by suggesting that environmentalism has become a platform for framing potential economic or nature disasters as a threat to human life. For example, US President Clinton made geopolitics an “integral part of his global doctrine on engagement. [Indeed, to]…reassert America’s leadership in the post-Cold War world” (Luke, 1999: 126). He linked American imperialism with environmental discourse, through the administration of political economy. Echoing the paradigm of governmentality, the governing of oneself before the governing of others could be achieved through environmental discourse. A green governmentality, at the level of governing oneself, is a means of:

[advancing]…freedom and democracy – to advance prosperity and the preservation of our planet… in a world where the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy is increasingly blurred…Our personal, family and national future is affected by our policies on the environment at home and abroad. (Clinton, 1995: 43)

The solution was Al Gore’s “Global Green Marshall Plan” of adopting a “strategic environmentalizing initiative as a central organizing principle by using every policy
program, every law and institution, every treaty and alliance, every tactic and strategy, every plan and course of action – to use, in short, every means to halt destruction of the environment and to preserve and nurture our ecological system” (Gore in Luke, 1999: 130). Gore drew on a language associated with American patriotism by linking geo-power to the pursuit of happiness with advanced liberal government:

the task of restoring the natural balance of the earth’s ecological system is both within our capacity and desirable for other reasons – including our interest in social justice, democratic government, and free market economics. Ultimately, a commitment to healing the environment represents a renewed dedication to what Jefferson believed were not merely American but universal inalienable rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. (Gore, 2007: 270)

Unlike biopower, geo-power is a green politics that “counters the logic of geo-economics industrialism by moving liberal welfare states on to an ecological footing” (Luke, 1999: 133). Clinton and Gore utilise geo-power to attempt to position American policies at the heart of any emerging environmental free markets.

*Eco-knowledge* is a way of articulating ecological problems and solutions through multiple discourses of sustainability concerning the e-factor. The e-factor is knowledge of ecology that “boils down to a new form of economic rationality” (Luke, 1999: 133), through a “search for the lowest-cost method of reducing the greatest amount of pollution…to enhance corporate profits, national productivity and state power, because the e-factor is not merely ecological – it is also efficiency, excellence, education, empowerment, enforcement and economics” (Luke, 1999: 133). Thus, Clinton’s and Gore’s geopolitics links solutions to counter the problems caused by industrialisation, and to market-led solutions. Those countries, groups or individuals who reject this solution, are persuaded through *enviro-disciplines* (technologies of dominance in Foucauldian terms).
Whereas geopolitics in relation to green politics is slightly distanced from biopower, enviro-discipline has closer similarities in its execution. While biopower “normalises individual behaviour by imposing environmentally friendly codes of conduct upon individual bodies and by policing the fitness for survival of all biological organisms” (Oels, 2005: 195), enviro-disciplines are the product of a growth in eco-knowledge, which provides the platform to develop a geo-power focused on “a strategic technology that reinvests human-bodies” (Luke, 1999: 144). The human body becomes another tool for economic, social and cultural development, by its engagement with modes of production so that “the facts of life pass into fields of control for any discipline of eco-knowledge and spheres of intervention for the management of geo-power” (Luke, 1999: 143). Put simply, eco-knowledge provides a platform on which the human body as both an individual and collective form becomes another economic tool presented through an environmental lens. Both individual and collective behaviour becomes “enmeshed with the tactics and strategies of more complex forms of power, whose institutions, procedures, analysis and techniques loosely manage mass populations and their surroundings” (Luke, 1999: 145).

Oels (2005) takes a similar approach to Luke, although she refers to green governmentality as eco-governmentality. She argues that “green governmentality can be understood as an instance of reinforcing the power of the administrative state in the name of ‘responsible stewardship of nature’, namely to legitimise governmental interventions” (Oels, 2005:195). Oels notes that advanced liberal government is the latest type of governmentality to “regard the population as a pool of resources whose potential for self-optimisation needs to be unleashed” (2005: 191). To unleash these
resources, an “advanced liberal government…employs market forces to guarantee freedom from excessive state intervention and bureaucracy” (2005: 191). Oels’ and Luke’s observations are useful as they enable us to see how market forces, advanced liberal government and environmental discourse converge, and can be traced, as Oels puts it, from “bio power to advanced liberal government in the environmental field from the mid 1980s onwards” (2005: 193).

In adopting a similar approach to Luke’s green governmentality and the technologies of geo-power and eco-knowledge, this chapter will now draw on a series of examples to show how eco-governmentality became the prevalent position in environmental discourse. It is worth noting that Luke’s observations are founded on a study of American political discourse with an emphasis on the politics of the right, and its relationship with the environmental activists’ movement Earth First! The discussion here is centred around the emergence of UK geo-power and eco-knowledge. Despite the differences, the idea of green governmentality makes the state and individual responsible for environmental problems.

**Green Governmentality and Technology of Self in the UK**

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also took an interest in climate change, primarily from the position of the interests of the capitalist state. Following the discovery of a hole in the ozone layer by British scientists in Antarctica, Thatcher’s “markets, monetarism and authoritative” form of government (Luke, 1999: 159) looked towards enterprise to find solutions to global warming and the depleting ozone layer by encouraging business leaders to work with scientists.

[helping] our academics to spot commercial applications…Industry is becoming more scientific-minded: scientists more industry-minded. Both have a responsibility to recognise the practical value of the ideas
which are being developed. (Thatcher Press Conference, 22 March 1988)

Carvalho suggests that Thatcher appropriated environmental discourse to push forward an agenda of nuclear power and privatisation of energy sources, in light of the demolition of the British coal industry (Carvalho, 2007) and a more general adoption of market strategies to confront the problem. Lester (2010) supports Carvalho’s claim that Thatcher’s “appropriation of the risk of climate change” helped to “support a case for nuclear energy over coal and thus weaken the coal industry” (2010: 67). Thatcher’s “green speech” (Anderson, 1997) to the Royal Society in 1988 set out plans to pass the responsibility of solving “global warming” to businesses working with science. Thatcher’s speech had two aims, to place Britain on the global stage when it came to finding solutions to climate change; and to reinforce the shift rightwards towards neoliberalism, deregulation of markets, increased freedom in regulatory rules, including oil and financial industries, and greater fluidity in “networks and partnerships” as “boundaries between different parts of companies, between different companies, and between companies, governments and NGOs, are broken down as actors seek new ways of solving problems” (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 22). However, critics argued that Thatcher’s proposal for business and science to find a solution to the hole in the ozone layer devolved responsibility from state to business. Thatcher’s speech centred on “addressing the absence of leadership on the international environment” (McCormick, 1991: 65), suggesting that British business might take leadership over climate change solutions. Thatcher also stressed the need for international cooperation in tackling climate change and global warming, whilst reminding the world it was “British scientists [who] had discovered a thinning of the ozone layer over the Antarctic” (McCormick, 1991: 104).
The impact of Thatcher’s speech gave greater media coverage to climate change solutions, but to the detriment of scientists, who were replaced by “political actors [who] increasingly sought to shape the agenda” (Carvello and Burgess, 2005). Political parties came to realise that climate change solutions no longer meant conservation, many government policies were given a “green tinge” (Watt 1999: 86). Media images of Margaret Thatcher picking up litter in St James’s Park in central London reaffirmed her new-found alignment with environmental discourse. Thatcher linked climate change and environmental discourse with family values, “conservation, heritage and English values” (Watt, 1999: 86). This example of governmentality was reinforced with a media message and press conference. Thatcher’s speech at the launch of the Tidy Britain Campaign (1988), implied that the British population needed to look after itself, starting with the individual.

Litter is everyone's problem in which everyone must contribute to a solution. It is like good manners, in my opinion…I want to see pressure coming from below, from street level, from village level, from individuals, and to see that pressure converted into action. If we could do this, it would make more laws and more penalties unnecessary. (Thatcher Press Conference, 22 March 1988)

However, there was certain level of scepticism from both the press and environmental NGOs. Thatcher’s academic background in science enabled her to hold a relatively pioneering acceptance of the science of climate change, but her environmental discourse was greeted with caution. Former Friends of the Earth leader Jonathan Porritt suggests that “making statements on the international environment…involved far fewer policy commitments than statements on the domestic environment” (McCormick, 1991: 66). Indeed, until the “green” speech, it was clear that Thatcher’s administration in its early years had greater enthusiasm for
war than climate change solutions. In discussions on the Falklands War in 1982, Thatcher defined climate change solutions as “humdrum”, in comparison to dealing with conflict – it was more “exciting to have a real crisis on your hands” (Robinson, 1992: 177). The “green” speech served a useful purpose in pushing forward her own “style of how the nation should be run” (Robinson, 1992: 176), and, like war, gave a sense of immediacy to Thatcher’s open acceptance of the scientific arguments.

At the time the “green” speech was made against the “backdrop of drought in the United States and unusual weather patterns” (Grubb, 1998: 1), environmentalism was slowly becoming more prominent in the media (Anderson, 1997, Lester, 2010). However, it would be ten years before Thatcher’s ambition for a business-led, economic solution became the key approach to climate change. Climate change gave her the opportunity to place responsibility for addressing global warming on to businesses, paradoxically through the use of state mechanisms and economic instruments, for example, moral appeals not to use CFCs in aerosols, the banning of environmentally harmful activities, or improvements in recycling facilities (Jacobs, 1991: 122–23).

Thatcher’s embracing of the science behind climate change, along with the sense of immediacy, set in motion a shift in environmental discourse that combined biopower and economics. The move towards market-led solutions was supported by the global institutional policies of the IPCC. There emerged a clear narrative that a high-carbon industrialised society and the global expansion of human activities had created the problem of increased global temperatures. Governments proposed that this could be addressed only through individual and collective action, as a combination of problem-solving and survivalist discourse (Dryzek, 1997). This approach was
iterated in 2006, when two global events began to change the green political landscape.

The 2006 local elections, the first since New Labour had won the general election in 2005, made environmentalism a key issue. In addition, there was an explosion of celebrity-led events that raised the public profile of environmental discourse. Former special advisor to Gordon Brown, Michael Jacobs, notes that for the 2006 local elections all three parties were chasing the green vote (Jacobs, 2010). Making eco-politics central to the local election campaign meant that environmental discourse was for a short period at the forefront of political discourse. In addition, public opinion around environmental discourse was being swayed by the more liberal UK newspapers (such as The Guardian and The Independent), and the BBC began to increase its reporting on climate change. At the same time, celebrities and NGOs were linking up, and the release of former American Vice President Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth (2006) all influenced public opinion. Rock band Razorlight’s singer Johnny Borrell credited Gore’s film for raising awareness: “The whole thing about climate change didn’t register until I saw Al Gore’s film” (Daily Mail, 2006). A march through central London culminating in a pop concert at Trafalgar Square, was the height of a media campaign by Greenpeace, the Stop Climate Chaos coalition, and the Friends of the Earth (including their Big Ask campaign of May 2005) that called for a climate change bill to be introduced into UK legislation. This move by the political parties and NGOs drew together Dryzek’s environmental discourse of problem solving, but to the exclusion of the non-hierarchical grass-roots protest movements. In calling for a legislative framework to address climate change, the NGOs provided a platform on which governments could develop a green governmentality that linked individuals and collectives through tactics and strategies.
under the rubric of the Climate Change Bill. The following section will explore how the UK government and other political parties combined to create legislation that included the “problem-solving”, “survivalist” and “realos”, but at the exclusion of grass-roots environmental activism movements.

**Vote Blue, Go Green: The “Green” Vote as an Electioneering Strategy**

Picking up from Thatcher’s “green” speech, the Conservative Party’s new Director of Strategy, Steve Hilton, began moving the party away from the right and into the traditionally liberal politics associated with environmentalism. Hilton, once described by the *Daily Mirror* as “the puppet master who has attempted to transform pin-striped Old Etonian Cameron into dressed down ‘Dave’, man of the people” (Brough, 2010), was instrumental in moving the Conservative Party towards an environmental discourse. The May 2006 local elections were used as a platform to launch a new party branding. The previous logo, a flaming torch introduced by Thatcher in 1977, was replaced by an oak tree (Browne, 2006). They chose an oak tree as it stood for “solidarity, tradition, friendliness towards the environment and Britishness” (Browne, 2006). The rebranding signalled a turning point in Conservative politics. Until 2006, the only significant time the Conservative Party was connected to environmentalism was Thatcher’s geopolitical speech to the Royal Academy in 1988. Cameron and Hilton realised that environmentalism could benefit the economy. Cameron, speaking in the *Guardian* newspaper revealed that environmentalism is “one way we come out of recession more strongly…you create green tech jobs…you kick start the investment in meters, tidal powers and electric cars. This is not some sort of airy-fairy lifestyle stuff” (cited in Watt and Wintour, 2007: 6). Environmentalism gave the Conservative Party a new way of distancing
itself from the “sleaze” label of the 1980s, by moving towards becoming a party of social responsibility. At the same time, the Labour government was also promoting green ideals.

Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, called Cameron’s green ideas, “empty rhetoric about the Tories’ green agenda while Labour are generating firm policies” (Blitz, 2006). Whilst Cameron was taking a tour of a Norwegian glacier, Brown gave a speech to the United Nations emphasising the need for “a new synthesis between environmental and economic policy” (Brown, cited in Blitz, 2006). Echoing Gore, and Thatcher, Brown placed an emphasis on the need for global action on climate change, as “we will need a comprehensive global response. We will need the co-operation of all countries...we are going to tackle the global challenge of climate change comprehensively and cost effectively” (Brown, cited in Blitz, 2006).

At the same time, the Liberal Democratic Party proposed an increase in National Insurance contributions to address the problems associated with climate change, and both the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives adopted the idea of introducing a climate change bill. The result of the two opposition parties shifting towards environmental policies in their manifestos meant that New Labour found themselves left out in the environmental cold. Responding to changes in global governance and partly fearing a public backlash, the New Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, took radical steps by creating the UK’s first Climate Change Act (2008). Encouraged by New Labour’s former Environment Secretaries, David and Ed Miliband and Special Advisor Michael Jacobs (see Jacobs, 1991; Stern, 2006c), Brown took “radical” steps to reduce carbon emissions.
Economically, the business case for a climate change bill was led by the commercial energy sector needing fresh and new forms of investment. In creating a strong business agenda for climate change, green governmentality generated new markets and also new investment opportunities for corporations. The creation of emissions-trading markets opened up new avenues of investment for large corporations, whilst fulfilling their corporate social responsibility. There was also an element of moral-suasion (a term that has similar meaning to persuasion) in the rhetoric. The adoption of a green agenda by multinational corporations meant they would appear to be pushing a “green” agenda, whilst expanding new markets.

The Climate Change Act shows flamboyant Blair bravado, as the opening statement declared “The threat from climate change is perhaps the greatest challenge facing our world” (House of Commons, 2008), echoing Gore’s earlier rhetoric. The new legislation was considered to be daring and radical by the Labour Party, which set out a number of key objectives and targets. The Act recommended that a carbon reduction target should be built into a statutory reform by 2050, achieved by creating a carbon budget system. The legislation set out a series of targets, established by an independent committee on climate change. The committee’s aims were a 34% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in all areas, through a low carbon transition plan. It also gave parliament powers to establish trading schemes for the purpose of limiting greenhouse gas, and to formulate a green bank.  

At the same time, economic solutions were being presented as the key solution to climate change. Lord Stern of Brentwood’s report The Economics of Climate Change

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32 For more information and a complete copy of the Act, see http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/climatechangehl.html (accessed June 2010).
Change: The Stern Review (2006a) set out to establish the economic impacts of ignoring climate change. Lord Stern’s report created an economic discourse for markets to focus on climate issues. The findings showed that each tonne of CO₂ that the UK emits causes at least US$85 worth of damage to the nation’s economy (Greenpeace, 2011). The report recommended that a cut in emissions now would limit the economic impact of climate change to approximately 1% of global GDP. Stern proposed to offset the cost by charging individuals more for carbon-intensive goods and by investment in new technology, “a techno-fix approach” (Stern, 2006a).

A low-carbon economy would ultimately be less costly than the current high-carbon economy, which spoke to the dominant discourse, generated political agents and supported the climate change argument. Shifting the world onto a low-carbon path could eventually benefit the UK economy by $2.5 trillion a year and, by 2050, markets for low-carbon technologies could be worth at least $500bn a year. However, it was argued that subsidising or reducing aviation emissions would be too costly (Stern, 2006a).

Lord Stern’s review also reinforced the notion of bio-politics, because it shifted the emphasis onto the individual through advanced liberal government. The individual was set renewable targets through a separate range of micro-systems. These targets included smaller projects aimed at promoting the increased use of renewable resources in homes and small businesses, and a small-scale renewable target of 6% in all homes by 2020. Where possible, dwellings in UK should have proper insulation by 2015, and each household must install smart-meters to measure energy consumption, an idea earlier mooted by Cameron (Cameron cited in Watt and Wintour, 2007). The commercialisation of electric-powered vehicles would be accelerated with the introduction of a low-carbon industrial strategy, and a new
financial institution (a green bank) would be created. Geopolitics would lead the way in implementing the low-carbon transmission plan.

Around the same time, the Kyoto agreement came into practice, and brought free-market economics very clearly into environmental discourse. The Kyoto Protocol came into effect alongside the release of the 3rd Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001) and two other reports (IPCC, 2004, 2007) raised the role of transnational institutions. Although Thatcher firmly believed Kyoto was an “anti-growth, anti-capitalist, anti-American project” (Thatcher, 2003: 453), it did generate new markets that acted as technologies on the individual. The key proponent was the new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs).

**New Environmental Policy Instruments and Advanced Liberal Government**

The development of NEPIs emerges out of regulations that command and control governments to set environmental goals and tell actors how to act (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito, 2003). NEPIs include market-based solutions (eco-taxes or emissions trading), voluntary agreements (to reduce waste as an alternative to a regulatory approach) and moral-suasion. These three ways of reducing carbon emissions (market, voluntary and moral-suasion) have negative and positive elements – a carrot and stick approach. Governments use regulations to beat corporations, institutions and organisations into endorsing environmental policies. Yet, at the same time, they allow companies to set their own benchmarks, through voluntary agreements on emissions trading.
Trading in emissions, unlike other more tangible forms of exchange, emphasises the relationship between the actual and the hypothetical product. Market-driven targets for the reduction of pollution and emissions levels, as defined by the European Union (EU), literally constitute the buying and selling of the atmosphere. The air we breathe has a price tag (Newlands, 2012). According to the Friends of the Earth’s report (Clifton, 2009) carbon trading “results from action by governments to create this new commodity – the right to emit carbon – and then to limit the availability of this right in order to create scarcity and therefore a market for it” (Clifton, 2009). The report goes on to say, “the development of secondary markets involving financial speculators and complex financial products based on the financial derivatives model brings with it a risk that carbon trading will develop into a speculative commodity bubble” (Clifton, 2009: 32).

Trading in emissions on a global scale was an idea first developed in the UK by Michael Grubb (1998), and developed by the City of London and the UK government. Grubb drew on an earlier North American plan to address the problem of acid rain and identified that any decrease in emissions needed a multilateral approach between countries and global companies rather than individuals, states or regions. Grubb proposed a new emissions trading scheme (ETS) or “cap and trade” – “the buying and selling of pollutant entitlements” (Newell and Patterson, 2010: 96) – that focused on a division of emissions between countries, through a system of “contraction and convergence” first developed by London company the Global Commons Institute (GCI).
Carbon trading and similar approaches offer advanced liberal governments a win–win solution. Governments retain control of new markets through regulatory processes, and businesses gain greater revenue from the expansion of new markets. The creation of NEPIs, through voluntary schemes, produces market-driven changes and the mode of production to create new areas of market development. A reliance on technology to reduce the energy required in manufacturing and distributing goods shifts production from the global north to the global south and, some would argue, generates new wealth for developing countries. At the individual and collective level, NEPIs provide the mechanisms to buy our way out of climate change, through eco-labels, green consumption practices (such as recyclable carrier bags) and doorstep recycling. Individuals are encouraged to “dutifully take their wine bottles to be recycled” (Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 50).

The introduction of eco-labels introduced an ethics debate about the commoditisation of the environment. The targets set by the government provided a platform for the state to regulate the individual through economic incentives and “moral-suasion”, whilst providing nominal regulatory measure to the markets. Whilst the individual was encouraged to buy ethically labelled, green products, these products were being developed by large businesses (for example, Tesco’s “green” rewards scheme). The effect was that through bio-political decisions iterated through legislation at the domestic level and environmental governance at the global level (such as the Kyoto Protocol) capital could develop new markets that coerced individuals to conduct themselves in an environmentally sound way for the benefit of the whole.

Market-led initiatives were supported by global environmental governance (GEG) policies, such as the Brundtland Commission (1989), the Kyoto Protocol (1992) and
Agenda 21, which became “embedded” in global industry and institutional practices. Global environmental governance is governance that goes beyond the state, but not at the exclusion of the state; it involves multiple actors and mechanisms.

A growth in governmentality as a mechanism for guiding environmental discourse helped to “make sense of a changing world- that favours a view of power as dispersed, not statecentric”, by grasping “ liberalism and (neo)liberalism, not as a an ideology or philosophy, but as a “ arts, tactics and practices of governing” (Larner and Walters, 2004: 4). By the late 1980s a second understanding of the term ‘neoliberalism’ emerges as in opposition to “projects of domestic governance” , concerned with a series of developments and policies that includes “privatisation, deregulation …and the power of global financial markets within capitalism…neoliberalism is used to denote nothing less than a fundamental restructuring of the world political economy” (2004: 8). Governmentality draws “attention to forms of power that work through ‘rule at a distance’ and the ‘conduct of conduct’, the eco-governmentality literature”. Green governmentality also shows how power, freedom, fields of visibility, regimes of knowledge, “techniques and technologies and the production of subjects in contemporary environmental governance” (Death, forthcoming) pool together to show how environmental discourse can be a platform for analysing relations of power. Relations of power within environmental discourse as analysed through a governmentality framework, also draws on environmental citizenship and scientific discourse as generating regimes of truth. Moreover, relations of power are also central to academic debates on freedom, subjectivity, governmentality, and global governance.
The subject becomes a pawn (willing or unwilling, consciously or unconsciously) from “regimes of government [to] produce and work through plural and multiple free subjects” (Death, forthcoming: 18). Thus, “in a governmentality perspective, the role of IOs [international organisations] or NGOs in shaping and carrying out global governance functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors (Foucault, 1982, 2000, 341). Rather it is an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon and into an entity this both object and a subject of government” (Neumann and Sending, 2010: 5). A consequence is that subjectivities are recast (to borrow Rydin’s term), which “allows government at a distance and is the way that the problem of how to achieve ‘conduct of conduct’ is resolved” (Rydin, 2007: 611). Governments and institutions recast subjectivists through mechanism and policies found in global environmental governance. On this basis individuals would govern or conduct their behaviour in a ways that reflect the priorities and rationalities defined by sustainability indicators, such as emissions trading schemes, or take upon eco-friendly home improvement schemes. The largest expansion of global environmental governance schema emerged as a culmination of policies and practices in the 1990s (see earlier discussion in Chapter One).

As Larner and Walter’s note, “the paradox remains that governmentality studies proliferated during the 1990s, precisely at a time when the fascination with globalisation exploded across the social sciences” (2004: 5). However, neoliberalism does not sit in opposition to realism – whereby realism as a concept takes the
position of political struggle acts as a homogenous and continuous barrier against examining the practices of specific political struggles on specific levels (Neumann and Sending, 2010: 53). The structure of global environmental governance allows for “the international as a socially embedded realm of governmentality as the international as a structure (defined by relations of power) that generates different and change practices of political rule (defined as governmental rationality)” (Neumann and Sending, 2010: 68). Thus the “emphasis on global markets and the new prominence of international institutions can be seen as a response to the problems of how to govern the world when even the poorest are no longer dependants or subjects but ‘citizens’ of formally independent states” (Larner and Walter, 2004: 9).

In contrast, Joseph’s (2010) critiques global governmentality for having a western-centric, neoliberal emphasis on governmentality. Joseph maintains that governmentality struggles to survive on a global scale “because the international domain is highly uneven, contemporary forms of governmentality can only be usefully applied to those areas that might be characterised as having an advanced form of liberalism” (224). Joseph suggest that rather than a world where neoliberalism maintains a hegemonic role, that in fact, there is a “liberal core where power operates through freedom” (Death, forthcoming: 11) and in those geographies outside of neoliberal politics, greater disciplinary tactics are employed to manage populations. Consequently, power is exercised over “free subjects who are faced with various new possibilities in a globalising world. The exercise of freedom takes the form of the behaviour of a consumer expected to follow competitive rules of conduct” (Joseph, 2010: 228), and idea similar to Paterson and Stripple. Paterson and
Stripple (2009) view global green governmentality as a project that entails “a complex and interesting shift in the way that subjects are being formed around climate change” resulting in an “emergent governmentality that entails the ‘conduct of carbon conduct’ through moulding and mobilising a certain subjectivity (the individual as concerned carbon emitter) to govern his or her own emissions in various ways- as counter, displacers, dieters, communitarians or citizens” (342). Paterson and Stripple’s argument highlight how this thesis is applying the method of governmentality in relations of power between environmental activists and the state.

Indeed, Darier’s study on the Canadian governments is a good example of how governments have applied alternative disciplinary techniques. Darier’s Foucauldian interpretation of the Canadian ‘Green Plan’, a document to achieve sustainable development within the Canadian community. Darier’s application of Foucault’s concept of governmentality found that “environmental governmentality requires the use of social engineering techniques to get the attention of the population to focus on specific environmental issues and to instil –in a non-openly coercive manner- new environmental conducts” (2007: 549). However, the green plan was neither a neoliberal discourse, nor advanced liberal rule, instead a plan “designed to discipline the population into becoming an environmental population” (2007: 596) through an environmental citizenship discourse. Individuals would be educated through sustainable policies through both social spaces and time. Darier’s interpretation of the Green plan through a Foucauldian governmentality analysis show that governmentality can be more than a clear cut bifurcation between neoliberal and advanced liberal rule, and more about understand the relations of power of the state.
Thus, environmental governance is applied as a term which defines the rules, regulations, policies and NEPIs of environmentalism. These include, but are not limited to, the IPCC, the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC), MEAs from Basel (1987), Montreal (1987) and Kyoto (1992), Agenda 21, emissions and carbon trading, and the UK’s first Climate Change Act of 2008.

GEG emerged out of market-driven, public and private partnerships (PPPs) as the main economic implementation of global environmental policies such as Agenda 21 (United Nations, 2003) and the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2005). GEG acts as a bridging tool between public and private partnerships. The public (state) mode of hierarchical government lies within the regulation of networks and markets. States, at national and European levels, formulate policies and regulations (such as emissions-trading systems), regulated through law and city networks. The private sector’s role is acted out through markets and networks, voluntary carbon markets and corporate responsibility.

Critics of PPPs argue that the division of responsibility between state and capital means a lack of any strong regulation. Without a state-led approach, entrepreneurs and business have no boundaries or regulations to adhere to. The state’s decision to hand over responsibility to business means the state becomes limited in how much regulation it can impose on business to address the problems of climate change. The emergence of GEG is market-interest led, and not environmentally focused, and there

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33 In 2010, the “UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals concluded with the adoption of a global action plan to achieve the eight anti-poverty goals by their 2015 target date and the announcement of major new commitments for women’s and children’s health and other initiatives against poverty, hunger and disease” (United Nations, 2011).

34 At present there are 344 PPPs registered with the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). A CSD report into the benefits of PPPs for environmental governance argues that PPPs benefit green issues, because they “provide incentives to the private sector to adopt green criteria” whilst avoiding “politically correct “add ons’ that mean nothing” (United Nations, 2009).
is a lack of effectiveness in measuring the success of any GEG schemes. The hybrid nature of PPPs absolves both state and private enterprises of the responsibility to find solutions to climate change. The state’s inability to regulate policy procedure leads to a lack of legitimacy in environmental claims, and limited accountability for the acts of either governments or corporations. The role of private companies means that GEG transgresses both national and international boundaries, and there is a gradual emergence of a transnational public sphere. This approach creates two problems – it is open to accusations of greenwashing (Beder, 2001) and corruption.

Accusations of corruption emerge around companies that, after purchasing permits, shelve plans intended for the permits, leaving surplus permits to sell on the markets. For example, steel manufacturer Corus, after being given emissions permits for development at their Teesside plant, shelved their plans, leaving them able to sell the unused permits for an estimated profit of £250 million (Clover, 2010). Moreover, with the global recession came a decrease in demand for energy. Companies and institutions that could not raise capital through bank loans were able to generate funding by “selling their allowance – gambling that they would be able to buy […] back when customers returned” (Clover, 2010). Moreover, once the third phase of ETS comes into effect in 2013, organisations with remaining permits will “carry over 1.8 billion permits…obviating the need to buy any new credits before 2016” (Schiller, 2011). This profiteering on permits shows how a reduction in energy consumption means a decrease in emissions freeing up more permits to sell on the carbon markets. Moreover, the reliance on networks and trade in non-tangible products leaves the systems open to abuse. In February 2011, the ETS system and nine participating countries were subject to a cyber-attack. A series of phishing emails convinced many companies to sell their emissions allowance, and the
“Financial Times Deutschland” reported that one firm had lost €1.5 million as a result (Philips, 2010).

**Conclusion**

This chapter began with a quote from Timothy Luke that stated “most environmentalist movements now operate as a basic manifestation of governmentality” (1999: 121). The purpose of this quote was to highlight the divisions between horizontal activist networks and global, local and NGO-led environmental governance. The purpose of this chapter has been to show how the state's application of neoliberal concepts to environmental discourse has excluded horizontal environmental activism from environmental discourse. Over time, party politics, local and global institutions, large corporations and cross-party policies have used eco-power and eco-knowledge to create new markets in a discursive struggle between activist and governance. The chapter has drawn on the earlier discussion on discourse (see Chapter Two) to chart how environmental discourse is increasingly linked to neoliberal economics. Building on the discussion of environmental discourse by Dryzek (1997), this chapter has illustrated how the UK government’s co-option of environmental discourse through the scientific data around ozone layer depletion has combined three of the four environmental discourse categories set out by Dryzek (problem-solving, survivalism and realos).

Developing Luke’s argument that power/knowledge in an environmental context translates into eco-power alongside eco-knowledge (1999), the chapter has explored how power relations can aid discursive shifts. As power is omnipresent, and it has argued that power is not about ownership or control but relations between two
contrasting sides. Through the discussion on biopower, this chapter has shown how the UK government began to persuade individuals to engage with environmental discourse through the concept of neoliberalism. In charting how neoliberalism became central to environmental discourse, this chapter has shown the increasing role of economics in relation to environmentalism. Moreover, shifts in power can be seen through technologies of governmentality that provide the mechanism to “go green”, whilst at the same positioning activists as abnormal, delinquent and deviant. Once the domain of activists through the media, environmental discourse has changed from activism to advanced liberal government as the leading policy. Biopower allows the state to frame activists as delinquent and deviant reinforced through technologies of dominance, whilst encouraging individual to consume ethical eco-friendly lifestyles.

Moreover, the findings of this study show that the realos (discussed in Chapter Two) of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the Stop Climate Chaos organisations, in calling for a climate change bill, provides a platform for economic and market-led environmental discourse. The Act provided new markets, in the form of NEPIs, GEG and PPP, to reinforce economics as the dominant position of environmental discourse. Furthermore, this action is mirrored on a global scale, with the Kyoto Protocol’s launching of other market-led solutions to climate change (such as EU ETS and carbon trading).

This chapter has focused on plotting the historical process of green capitalism and its creation of new markets. The next chapter will look at the consequences that an increased economic role in environmental discourse has had on the environmental activists’ movements. It will explore how the exclusion of environmental activists
from environmental discourse that was discussed in Chapter Two, is repeatedly reiterated through technologies of dominance predominantly found in legislative and state apparatus.
Chapter Four: The Consequences of Green Governmentality for the UK Environmental Activist Movement.

“...employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved.” (Foucault, 1991:95)

“in terms of how many people are involved, compared to the amount of criminalisation, it just doesn’t make sense ...the kind of level of real actual threat to the system that these movements pose is tiny.” (Interview with activist John Jordan, November, 2010)

Introduction

This chapter looks at the consequences of advanced liberal government for the activists’ movement. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that “techniques” used by the state place environmental activists into a discourse of deviance. This chapter looks at the consequences and mechanisms of this shift in power to examine Luke’s notion that economic competitiveness means environmental activism could “be recast as a type of civil disobedience, which endangers national security, expresses unpatriotic sentiments, or embodies treasonous acts” (Luke, 1999: 125).

The previous chapters have set out how discursive challenges shape the understanding of relations between the state, activists and the media. They charted how political parties have co-opted environmental discourse into an advanced liberal government that shapes the practice of green governmentality. Through advanced liberal practice such as green capitalism, individuals are encouraged to conduct themselves in a pro-environmental manner, for the benefit of society. The creation of green capitalism through techniques of (self-)investment (e.g. door-to-door recycling, hybrid and electric cars, bicycling campaigns) places the onus on the individual to reduce their carbon emissions (e.g. by insulating their houses, making fewer car
journeys). The objective of such an approach by state and business is to attain a dominant position in environmental discourse. That is not to say that a “government of individualisation is not understood simply in terms as domination” (McNay, 1994: 123), but through the notion of “docile bodies” as the “disassociation of power from the body” (Foucault, 1991: 138). Thus, Chapters Two and Three have set out how language shapes discourse, and how shifts in power shape environmental discourse.

This chapter will illustrate the key themes raised so far by drawing on a series of examples that illustrate the influence that advanced liberal government has on media representations of environmental activism. As the two quotes above show, there is a sense from activists that the police believe a large percentage of them are intent on violence. The chapter will argue that individuals and collectives that reject governance are treated as criminals and subjected to “techniques of dominance” in Foucault’s terms. Through the concept of resistance (that is resistance by the state to radical politics, and resistance by activists towards political discourse) and power relations, this chapter will examine how the state applies both resistance to power in environmental discourse, and resistance from the activists’ movement against advanced liberal solutions to environmental problems. The chapter will also draw on Stuart Hall’s concept of the signification spiral to explore how bio-political actions place activists into a discourse of deviance. The signification spiral is evidenced in legislative measures, such as the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act and the Terrorism Act, which increase the criminalisation of environmental activists and radical politics. The conflating of environmental activism, deviance and criminalisation is evident in the neologism “eco-terrorism”. In drawing on media representation of environmental activism as eco-terrorism, this chapter will highlight how legislative measures that link the
animal liberation movement to environmental activism increase the labelling of environmental activism as eco-terrorism. Moreover, the increased use of “political policing”, a term activists apply to secret or undercover police officers, will be briefly discussed to illustrate how political policing increasingly places environmental activists in a discourse of terrorism and deviancy.

**Resistance and Signification Spirals**

As already discussed in Chapter Two, Foucault acknowledges that ecology has evolved into a form of management and administrative procedure (Foucault, 1978). Luke connects his post-structuralist analysis (concerned with power, knowledge and discourse) to show how governmental discourses place individuals as “dynamic bio-economic units” (1999: 134), via a neoliberal discourse that is “willing to feed green industrialisation” (1999: 134) that generates new markets.

Power relations of resistance are dependent on a “multiplicity of points of resistance: [but] there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case…by definition, that can only exist in the strategic field of power relations” (Foucault, 1978: 95). As Foucault observes, “resistance really always relies upon the situation against which it struggles” (1978: 168). Resistance is often found against or in reaction to altering strategies or situations.

Power relations cannot exist if society is not free to formulate either compliance or resistance. In environmental discourse, resistance comes from radical, and at times professional environmental activists’ movements through direct action and civil disobedience. Foucault (1991) believes that resistance is addressed and curtailed
through “tactics of law” (Foucault, 1991:95) to constitute a technique of dominance (Foucault, 1977) that places environmental activism into a discourse of deviance. For example, during the Camp for Climate Action (2007) at Heathrow, owners British Airport Authorities gained a court injunction to prevent any environment-related groups from disrupting the business of the airport. The injunction included activists from Plane Stupid, Climate Camp and HACAN, as well as environmental and conservation groups, the Woodland Trust, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the Campaign to Protect Rural England. The conflating of such diverse groups within a “tactic of law” can be understood in terms of power relations of resistance.

This chapter will argue that governments and the mainstream media place activists within a “signification spiral” (Hall, 1978) as a way of “signifying events which also intrinsically escalates their threat” (Hall, 1978: 223). The signification spiral is similar to the “amplification spiral” taken from sociologists of deviance (Wilkins 1964), whereby “amplification suggests an increasing of deviances” (Hall, 1978: 223). It will then draw on a series of examples, starting with legislative measures such as the Criminal Justice Bill, and other laws that criminalise radical environmental activists.

Hall’s work on the signification spiral argues that the media and the state link together two or more events, groups, or collectives and take the most threatening point as defining a group of people. This is known as “convergence” – “when two or more activities are linked in the process of signification so as to implicitly or explicitly draw parallels between them. …this links the manner in which new problems can apparently be meaningfully described and explained by setting them in
context of an old problem” (Hall, 1978: 223). Hall cites the example of linking student protest and hooliganism to form “student hooliganism”. Thus “in using the imagery of hooliganism, this signification equates two distinct activities on the basis of their imputed common denominator – both involve mindless violence or vandalism” (Hall, 1978: 223). The net effect “is amplification, not in real events being described, but in their ‘threat-potential’ for society” (Hall, 1978: 223). Moreover, it “take[s] place when political groups adopt deviant life-styles or when deviants become politicised. They occur when people thought of in passive and individual terms, take collective action, or when supporters of single issue campaigns enter into a wider agitation or make common cause” (Hall, 1978: 224). The signification spiral takes the most extreme point, and once an event crosses a “threshold” it can lead to an escalating threat. Once the threshold is defined there emerges a “prophesy of more troubling times to come if no action is taken” and a “call for firm steps” (Hall, 1978: 224). An example of this can be seen in the events surrounding the 2011 London Summer Riots, when MP David Lammy called for the Blackberry Messaging (BBM) service to be shut down “in an attempt to prevent protesters using it to organise themselves” (Cohen, 2011), as it is mainly teenagers who use BBM.

**Technology of Dominance**

To examine how radical environmental activists are framed through language that shapes a discourse of deviance and terrorism, this section will firstly sketch out Foucault’s idea of techniques of dominance in relation to resistance. As already discussed, one purpose of governmentality is to “study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is linked to forms of political rule and
economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 4). Governmentality provides a platform for state legislative measures to guide the individual, without directly controlling the self, through “techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination” (Lemke, 2000: 4; Foucault, 1993: 203–4), whereas dominance is a technique that relates to power relations between the state and individual. Foucault argues that domination is a particular type of power relationship that is stable and hierarchical, fixed and difficult to reverse. The effect of domination is that “people are subordinated with little room for manoeuvre because their ‘margin of liberty’ is extremely limited” (Lemke, 2000: 5–6). Granted, some individuals will reject such persuasive tactics as door-to-door recycling or hybrid cars, but there is no penalty or criminality attached to such action, because people are persuaded not commanded.

Environmental activists agree that action should be taken to address climate change, but they disagree as to whether advanced liberal policies are the solution. The use of biopower to produce “a disciplined populace through docile bodies continues to be broadly achieved” (Salter, 2011: 214), but the radical activist communities reject such advanced liberal policies as the dominant means of governance. Foucault defines such resistance as “not wanting to be governed…not wanting to accept these laws because they are unjust because by virtue of their antiquity or the more or less threatening ascendancy given them by today’s sovereign, they hide fundamental illegitimacy” (Foucault, 2007: 46). Resistance to solving climate change through capital is also a resistance of “not accepting as true…what an authority tells you is true, or at least not accepting it because an authority tells you that it is true, but rather accepting it only if one considers valid a reason for doing so” (Foucault, 2007: 46). Resisting green capitalism is a form of “power relations through the antagonism of strategy” (Foucault, 1982: 780) found in the discourse of environmental activism.
In the UK, the first specific environmental activism occurred in the 1990s, although there had been other actions in the 1970s, with direct action, civil disobedience and large-scale protest helping to place environmental activism at the heart of environmental discourse. At the same time, environmental governance was still developing through institutional policy-making and fledgling moves towards global environmental governance. The 1990s began with a renewed cycle of environmental protests, with anti-road protests and a DIY\(^35\) culture (McKay, 1998). Political reaction to the Conservative Party’s “Roads for Prosperity” white paper (1989) led to a series of high-profile environmental protests.\(^36\) A brief look at the timeline of environmental protest in the 1990s reveals that the decade began with the Twyford Down Protest against the M3 extension (1991–92). The following year, activists took over Claremont Road, East London, against the M11 link road, and a protest grew up around the proposed Bath Easton bypass in 1993. Towards the end of the decade, large-scale radical activism emerged at the Newbury bypass (1995), the A30 in Devon (1996–97) and against the planned second runway at Manchester airport (1997). Protests of the late 1990s and during the 2000s have shifted from debates around the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those of the anti-capitalist/global justice movements.

The government reaction to the roads protest and the wider socio-cultural phenomenon of the free-music/rave scene was to draft the Criminal Justice Bill (1994). The Bill was aimed to restrict, criminalise and prevent large gatherings and

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\(^{35}\) DIY politics stands for “Do-It-Yourself” – a form of politics that is a “youth centred, and directed cluster of interests and practices around green radicalism, direct action politics, new musical sounds and experiences” (McKay, 1998: 2).
trespass on private or common land. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (CJB) (1994) was designed to restrict or prevent unauthorised protests or the occupation of land. The Bill contained 171 clauses that “gave police greater stop and search powers, and stamp out raves, squatting and mass protest” (Mills and Penman, 1994: 8). The new powers aimed to “deal with activities which can be a blight for individuals and local communities” (Mills and Penman, 1994: 8). The CJB contains sections “specifically targeting direct action” (McKay, 1998: 165) and limits the number of people able to gather together. It also contains new anti-trespass laws, which restrict anti-road protesters. The Bill was designed to give the police increased power and the ability to “stop and search”, while abolishing the “right to silence” (McKay, 1998: 276). Section 5 of the CJB focuses on laws to prevent “collective trespass or nuisance on land”. It identifies that senior police officers who believe that two or more people “with the common purpose of residing there for any period can be removed from such land” (CJB, 1994: P5, s.61). If there is any refusal to leave the land, or an attempt to return to the land within three months, the police have the power of arrest.

The CJB took measures against the prominent “new age traveller” movement (originating in the mid 1980s) which “offers alternative housing and living options from squatting in houses and land to moving around by bus or truck” (McKay, 1998: 28). The Bill defines such a vehicle as:

whether or not it is in a fit state for use on roads, and includes any chassis or body, with or without wheels, appearing to have formed part of such a vehicle, and any load carried by, and anything attached to, such a vehicle. (CJB, 1994 P5, s.61 1 (a))

37 New age travellers are bohemian travelling communities. Unlike the Romany culture that has a heritage of travelling, new age travellers follow a more esoteric travelling community, without paternal or maternal lineages.
This new law followed on from earlier confrontations between the police and new age travellers, epitomised ten years earlier in the “Battle of the Bean Field” on 12 June 1985, when the police seized numerous vehicles of travellers who were making their way to Stonehenge for the summer solstice. The CJB was seen as “a corollary of the Thatcherite notion of the privileging of the individual” (McKay, 1998: 19). The result was a semi-co-ordinated response from the Freedom Network and Criminal Injustice Act campaign with a series of protests, joined by Advanced Part Road Alert, Forgive Us Our Trespasses, EarthFirst!, the Hunt Saboteurs Association, Liberty, and many others (SchNEWS, 2004: 23). The “Kill the Bill” campaign involved many others affected by the Bill, including hunt saboteurs, trade unionists, new age travellers, squatters, roads protesters and even football fans. Protesters planned to conduct mass protest knowing police resources would be unable to arrest all those trespassing. The protests continued into 1995, and “by June there had been 1000+ arrests” (SchNEWS, 2004: 30) as the environmental protest movement grew to incorporate roads protest and anti-CJB action.

The CJB was the first in a series of new laws that aimed to prevent or criminalise the activist movement. For example, the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act was a “law originally introduced to protect vulnerable women from stalkers” (Lewis and Evans, 2009), but through the signification spiral has also been used against animal rights protests. The law applies to activists on the grounds that anyone “whose course of conduct causes another to fear...that violence will be used against him is guilty of an offence...that his course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those occasions” (ACT, s4 (1)). The Protection from Harassment Act has been applied to gain high court injections against “those fighting to stop climate change, anti-war
activists and even wildlife enthusiasts campaigning to save a beauty spot” (Lewis and Evans, 2009).

So far this chapter has examined how resistance from activists to advanced liberal policies is a rejection of being conducted through a green capitalist lens. In reaction to this resistance, the UK government applied the “tactics of law” (such as CJB) to curtail and, to some extent, criminalise protest camps. The next section will consider a number of examples of how the “tactics of law” as a technology of dominance is applied to protest collectives in a way that both criminalises and places activists into a discourse of deviance. The first example draws from the UK, the second argues that the tactics of law as a technique of dominance is not restricted to the UK, but, through the neologism of eco-terrorism, is a global phenomenon. The final example will briefly look at “political policing” through surveillance techniques. The first example is the Metropolitan Police’s attempts to restrict the monthly pro-environmental collective Critical Mass.

**Example One: Critical Mass**

The conflating of protest with terror is another form of social control. In placing activists into a discourse of deviance, it creates a sense of fear, an “us” and “them”, and prevents people with a genuine interest from learning about activism (interview with two observers (Metcalf and Young) outside the 2007 Heathrow Camp for Climate Action). In 2005, the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) passed through Parliament. The Act developed and modernised the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act created by the Thatcher government in the early 1990s (later becoming the Criminal Justice Bill in 1994), which was a measure aimed at
preventing the new age traveller and rave movements. However, the aim of SOCPA 2005 (under the rubric of anti-terrorism measures) was to prevent protests being held in central London. Under section 132 of this Act, it is an offence to organise or take part in a demonstration in a public place within the “designated area” (up to 1 km around the Parliament buildings) if authorisation has not been given by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.

In 2005, the Metropolitan Police attempted to stop the monthly Critical Mass bicycle ride in London, which at times went through the exclusion zone. Critical Mass, like other collectives and protest groups, is a non-hierarchical, horizontal collective of cyclists. Critical Mass bicycle rides are “no protest movement…instead, riders have gathered to celebrate their choice to bicycle, and in doing so have opened up a new kind of political space” (Carlsson, 2002: 5). However, like other collectives, there is no one definition of the Mass, and each participant is able to “offer a perspective, a manifesto, a purpose” (Carlsson, 2002: 7) for the monthly events. Critical Mass began in San Francisco, USA, in 1992. Two years later, the first London “Mass” took place, and the movement soon spread across the country. There were “Masses”, in sixteen other UK cities, including “Oxford, Bath, Cambridge, Liverpool, Edinburgh and Glasgow in Scotland” (Anon in Carlsson, 2002: 69). Despite these various geographical areas, both nationally and globally, they are united in a celebration of cycling. However, in the UK, there is also a strong influence from the “long standing roads protest movement…to create a powerful force as they demand that the government build less roads, [and] fund better public transport” (Anon in Carlsson, 2002: 69). Today there are over 300 Critical Masses that meet on a regular basis, with thousands of participants.
Although an autonomous collective of individuals, Critical Mass has created some codes and rules which have developed since 1992. The Mass is not organised or led by one individual. Numbers can range from twenty-five to thousands of cyclists, often with pedal-powered sound systems, with a unifying objective to reclaim the roads for cyclists. The Mass creates its own discourse through a “system of representation” and “affiliation” (as discussed in Chapter Two) that links with the wider environmental activist movement – such as “die-in”\(^{38}\) and “swarming”\(^{39}\). The Mass also has its own rituals and language that give it a form. Techniques of corking,\(^{40}\) “navigating”,\(^{41}\) and “breaking the mass” or “splitting the mass”\(^{42}\) are actions the Mass uses to negotiate the ride. This discourse and its systems of affiliations were central to Critical Mass’s defence against the Metropolitan Police’s case to prevent the rides.

The Metropolitan Police argued that under the Public Order Act (1986), there must be advance written notice of a public procession, that demonstrates, “support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons…to publicise a cause or campaign or mark or commemorate an event”\(^{43}\). Moreover, organisers of any public procession must deliver notice, “to a police station…in the police area in which it is proposed the procession will start”. What is problematic about these criteria is that the mass has no organisers, no set route, or leader, and the “the police wanted to know where the route was, who the organisers were, neither of which we

\(^{38}\) A die-in is a form of protest when activists pretend to be dead, often symbolising the death of the environment ETC. The die-in is a common tactic of the anti-aviation collectives, and occasionally Critical Mass

\(^{39}\) Swarming, is a protest tactic, where activists split into small groups ahead of a protest, and then come together as one, from different directions, to create a mass, often at a pre-arranged target.

\(^{40}\) Corking is when one or more cyclists place themselves on their bicycles in front of any waiting traffic at junctions and roundabouts. Once the Mass has passed, the cyclists move to allow traffic to continue.

\(^{41}\) A navigator is one or more bicyclist at the front of the ride who is followed by the rest of the ride. It is an important part of the ritual of the ride that the navigator always changes.

\(^{42}\) Breaking or splitting the mass occurs when at a red light a large group of riders thins out to create a safer mass. (http://www.joelpomerantz.com/genresources/cmglossary.html#splittingthemass accessed January 2011).

\(^{43}\) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/lrd200708/ldjudgmt/jd081126/metro-1.htm
can give them, there’s no organisers and we don’t have a route. I mean we haven’t a clue where we go when we start out” (interview with Des Kay, September, 2010). The non-hierarchical semi-structure of the rides means no one person is responsible, and no ride has a set route. In essence, the action was based on the grounds that the Mass was a procession, and therefore needed a permit, yet there was no one that could be identified as an organiser, or leader, and no one person to defend the case in court.

In a good example of the blurring between boundaries of environmental discourse, the NGO Friends of the Earth provided legal support to anyone within the Mass that wanted to challenge the Metropolitan Police’s attempt to curtail the rides. The realos of Friends of the Earth were aided, albeit as a silent partner, by the fundis (see Chapter Two’s discussions on Dryzek) of Critical Mass, thus demonstrating that there is a cross-over between horizontal and vertical environmental activists’ groups. Indeed, Friends of the Earth instigated the challenge to the Metropolitan Police by contacting regular Critical Mass cyclist, Des Kay, a former member of CND and ardent cyclist. Friends of the Earth’s newly formed Rights and Justice Centre, which provides legal support for environmental campaigns,44 asked Kay if he would:

contest this in court, but we don’t really want any of our members...cos it would look like it was prejudiced and they said would you like to do it and I was quite happy. (interview with Des Kay, September 2010)

Yet Friends of the Earth define Kay’s role as “acting for London cyclist, Des Kay, who will be represented in court by Michael Fordham of Counsel” (FOE Press

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44 For more information see http://www.foe.co.uk/community/campaigns/rights/rights_justice_centre16424.html (accessed November 2009).
Fordham “argued in terms of it being a procession, and it’s ok to have a procession if it’s customarily held, and it was customarily held because it had been running for thirteen years” (interview with Des Kay, September 2010). The Law Lords agreed with the Friends of the Earth solicitor, that, like a funeral procession, the monthly rides were “not really a procession anyway…so that’s how we ended up legitimised” (interview with Des Kay, September 2010). The attempts to criminalise some radical environmental activism through legislative measures and a discourse of deviance shows an “intent to drive a wedge between more mainstream and broadly supported organisations (the good) and radical grassroots activists (the bad) seeking to ferment disagreement on one level, and movement splintering on the other” (Salter, 2011: 227). Yet, as the earlier discussions on realos and fundis show, there is much cross-over between the vertical NGOs and horizontal collectives of the environmental activist movements. However, one way that more clearly differentiates between realos and fundis is through the neologism of eco-terrorism (as discussed in the next section).

The example of Critical Mass shows how state legislation places activism into a discourse of deviance, enhanced by making terrorism the threshold on which they must act. The criminalisation of environmental activism creates barriers in which to contest economics as a central approach in environmental discourse. Hence, as Luke predicted in 1999, economic competitiveness has increasingly led to the placing of activism into the realm of being a threat to national security.

This chapter has shown so far that much of this placing of activists as deviant or terrorism discourse occurred before the attacks on the World Trade Center (referred
to as 9/11 from now on). The 9/11 attacks provided a platform from which to increase “action at a distance” (Slater, 2011).

**Example Two: Eco-Terrorism**

As this chapter has shown, new laws and legislation have been created through the wielding of bio-political power to prevent or place the activist movement as “terrorist-like”. Yet there was no evidence of activists conducting or being involved in acts of terrorism. It might be expected that the conflating of terrorism with environmental activism would be a post-9/11 reaction. However, this chapter will show that environmental activism occurred before 9/11, around the same time as the growth of the animal rights and liberation movements. Repeating the signification spiral witnessed through bio-political legislation (e.g. CJB), American neoliberals have linked environmental activists to acts of terror. Moreover, in the UK, the National Farmers Union has also attempted to conflate environmental activism with animal liberation in a discourse of terror, also through the neologism of “eco-terrorism”.

Prior to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the media and business lobby were already linking environmentalism with terrorism. This section will focus specifically on the use of the term “eco-terrorism” to identify environmental activism. It will also look briefly at political policing through the example of undercover police officer Mark Kennedy.

A year after the formation of the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI), the neologism of “eco-terrorist” was introduced into environmental discourse. In 1987,
Ron Arnold, a member of the conservation-based Sierra Club, left to form the Wise Use movement and coined the term “eco-terrorism”. The Wise Use movement wants to industrialise as much American land as possible. Arnold argues that in giving the government control of land use, the eco-activist movement can influence political discourse, and that “American industry has a moral obligation to protect itself from environmental attacks” (Arnold, 1987: 21). He also argues that negotiating with environmentalists is futile because:

> The adherents of wilderness are convinced of their moral and ethical superiority, are blind to reason on questions of dogma, and feel they have an exclusive hold on the truth. It all adds up to religious behaviour, and one does not expect objective rationality from religious behaviour. (Arnold, 1987: 44)

Arnold believes that environmental activism is threatening the progress of American business. Governments are allowing environmental activists and environmental organisations to influence political discourse, to the detriment of business. “Environmentalism is essentially anti-progressive and ultra reactionary, but masquerades in the most popular words it can find” (Arnold, 1987: 84). Arnold adds that the environmental movement will destroy American business, as a result of “an ignorant public made irate by anti-capitalist assertions that we are evil profit-mad monsters” (1987: 51). What Arnold outlines is, for him, epitomised by the neologism of environmental activism, or a “new vanguard for a new society in the form of eco-terrorism will become more widespread” (1987: 25).

The Wise Use movement has been influential in the development of green governmentality in the USA. In June 1998, Arnold gave evidence to a Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Washington. In his evidence, Arnold, speaking as the Executive Vice President of the Centre for the Defense of Free Enterprise, argues how:
Eco-terror is a crime committed to save nature, that generally takes the form of equipment vandalism, but which may include package bombs, blockades using physical force to obstruct workers from going where they have a right to go, and invasions of private or government offices to commit the crime of civil disobedience… I'm stating that there is no difference between eco-terrorism and animal rights terrorism. And there evidently has been some dispute about that difference. The perpetrators are, in large part, the same people. (1987: 54)

Here, Arnold makes terrorism what Hall calls the “converge point” (Hall, 1978) by linking together animal activism, environmentalism and terrorism. Semiotically, the language gives meaning to a discourse of actors as “perpetrators”, using “bombs” for their “crimes”, giving a rhetoric of aggressive activists using no form of peaceful protest. In the USA, members of the US Congress proposed the Eco-Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) and, although the Act failed to become law, a similar bill, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act passed into law in 2006. Post-9/11 provided an ideal platform for the political right in the USA to scoop up all “outsider groups” under sweeping legislative measures. Salter notes that:

Post 9/11 is the potential, constructed or otherwise, of perceived “threats” to the state-capital order, justify the mobilisation of large numbers of police and anti-personal weapons against civilians. (Salter, 2011: 225)

More recently, climate-denier organisation, the EastWest Institute produced a report conflating eco-terrorism with a potential nuclear threat (Berry, 2007). The author of the report, Ken Berry, a senior consultant to the global security programme at the EastWest Institute, uses as a case study for his argument the poisoning of former Russian spy, Alexander Litvinenko in 2006. Berry argues that this case study shows how easy it can be to move nuclear material from country to country, and that ease could result in the use of nuclear material in terrorist attacks, and that:

regardless of whether the death of Litvinenko was directly linked to terrorists, its implications for the prevention of nuclear terrorism are much the same. …there may be an even bigger prospect that scientific
personnel from the richest countries will aid eco-terrorist use of nuclear weapons and materials. (Berry, 2007: 1)

Journalists reacted to the report with headlines “No time for dithering as we wake to new eco-terror” (Farrelly, 2007) and “Nuclear terrorism risk seen as growing” (Reuters, 2007). Berry contends that:

In the next 10 to 15 years terrorism inspired by Al Qaeda will likely to give way to violence inspired by other causes. The emergence of eco-terrorism, in response to the rising panic of global warming, may be one such case. (Berry, 2007: 4)

A more radical argument was proposed connecting the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 and environmental activism as acts of terror, where environmental activism contributed to the 9/11 terrorist attacks:

Those who engage in activism or eco-terrorism for the purposes of reducing the perceived damage to the environment are indirectly facilitating the kind of terrorism that led to the September 11th attacks. (Saliba, 2003: 6)

Saliba argues that trying to preserve the environment can give information to potential terrorists, citing the Clean Air Bill as an example which implicates environmental activists with terrorism. The Bill wants companies to publish any chemicals that may go into the atmosphere, and this, Saliba maintains, is inviting terrorists to use the information to carry out attacks. British political policy reflects US policy, in the form of the UK Terrorism Act (2000), amended in 2006. The Act gives the police powers to arrest anyone glorifying terrorism, or selling, loaning or spreading terrorist publications. This has strong implications for environmental activism – for example, during the Greenpeace blockade of the Faslane Naval Base entrance (in February 2007), when several MPs were due to visit the base, the MOD cancelled the visit.
Eco-Terrorism in the UK

The notion of eco-terrorism first appeared in the British mainstream media when the leader of the National Farmers Union (NFU), Ben Gill, equated eco-terrorism with the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. To a meeting of Australian farmers, Gill claimed that “Eco-terrorists may have deliberately triggered the foot and mouth epidemic in Britain and other outbreaks around the world” (Gill, 2001). Saliba reinforces this idea:

There is a growing likelihood incidents like England’s sudden outburst of foot and mouth disease may herald a new form of animal rights terrorism, in which diseases are deliberately spread. (Saliba, 2003: 3)

Gill’s comments appeared in both national and regional newspapers (Brown, 2001). The Scotsman reported the story on page seven of their farming section. Framing the article under the headline “Eco-terrorists could have spread FMD, says chief” indicates who is responsible for the UK foot and mouth outbreak (Maxwell, 2001: 7). The opening paragraph places the crisis in a local, Scottish context, outlining the latest case (ninth) of foot and mouth to be confirmed in Scotland. The connection between environmentalists and the outbreak arrives in the third paragraph, when:

...confirmation the epidemic is not over came as Ben Gill, president of the English NFU, made a speech in Australia claiming that it may have been deliberately triggered by eco-terrorists. (Maxwell, 2001: 7)

The Newcastle Journal conflates the lexicon of eco with terror, stating “NFU chief in eco-terror controversy” with a subheading of “Campaigners slate mad-hatter theory” (Lognoone, 2001: 17). There are comments from regional members of the NFU alongside Friends of the Earth and Charles Secrett (a leading British environmentalist). The only government comment, from a spokesperson at the then Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), said it had “no reason to
believe eco-terrorists were behind the outbreak” (MAFF, 2001: 1). The Northumberland Regional Spokesperson, Malcolm Corbet, reinforced Gill’s preferred reading, stating that “his comments weren’t based on idle speculation. He is a well respected man who chooses his words carefully” (Corbett, 2001), yet neither Gill nor Corbet voiced any evidence in the Newcastle Journal article. The only clear suggestion of the source of foot and mouth comes from the MAFF:

The theory [eco-terrorism] was put to us …in the absence of any evidence we were unable to investigate it further. All the evidence that we have strongly points to the source of the outbreak being the pig unit at Heddon-on-the-Wall. (MAFF, 2001: 1)

Responding, the NFU Press Officer stated that there had been a misunderstanding of Gill’s comments, adding “Who was responsible for the source of the outbreak? We just don’t know” (Simpson, 2001). Such support for environmentalists over the NFU by regional newspapers signals sympathy in the regional representation of eco-activism. Paradoxically, the national newspaper reporting, which focused attention on Gill and reiterated environmental activists as eco-terrorists, was different.

The Daily Telegraph and Guardian newspapers reinforced the dominant codes or preferred meaning of the NFU. They also covered the story in their main sections. “Eco-terrorists may be to blame, says NFU head” (Brown and Saville, 2001: 12). This introduced a more hostile rhetoric to the story, linking animal activists and militants to the outbreak of foot and mouth. The article talks of “increasingly militant green splinter groups that would stop at nothing to undermine existing agricultural practice”. The rhetoric of militant environmentalists who stop at nothing, alongside the comments by Gill, forms a “determinate moment”. Hall’s encoding/decoding model defines the determinate moment as being when the author “employs a code and yields a ‘message’: at another determinate moment, the ‘message’, via its
decoding, issues into a structure” (Hall, 1973: 3). The national newspapers, in contrast to regional newspapers, preferred a reading of eco-activist as militant, antagonistic and linked with animal activism.

This example of “eco-terrorism”, used within an agricultural context, highlights how the term gives a preferred reading to a message. The attack of 9/11 signalled the beginning of a change in legislative measures towards environmental activism. Soon after, the proposed Eco-terrorism Prevention Act in the USA, and UK law in the form of SOCPA (2005) began framing environmental activism as a political threat. Charting the idioms of eco-terrorism allows us to locate it within the broader political context of a post-9/11 association of the sensed subversive political moves being terrorism. Such moves placed the discursive identification of the environmental activist as a terrorist, and the conservative regulatory changes outlawed collective political dissent in both the USA and (later) the UK. In linking these discursive moments, this work is mapping a cultural moment in which a network of political and media discourses chime and resonate to produce a heightened sense of eco-terrorism as an existent threat.

**Evidence for Eco-terrorism**

The purpose of linking environmental activism with terrorism is to act as a signification spiral for a language that justifies the labelling of activists as deviant. As earlier discussions show, once a label is applied it becomes a “truth”. The attempt by the neoliberal American right, and the NFU leader to place activists into a discourse of deviance is based on opinion with little evidence. Rootes found no clear correlation between animal rights and environmental activism, but he notes:
Any association, proven or not, of animal rights protests and anti-hunting protests with the environmental movement...it is likely the image such people hold will be of an environmental movement that is not only more confrontational than it was a decade age, but one that is more violent than is warranted. (Rootes, 2003: 46–47)

Rootes (2003) considers that there is no evidence for eco-terrorism or the threat of eco-terrorism, stating that during his nine years of study, only three cases of activism could truly be identified as acts of eco-terrorism. These three cases were: (1) the bombing, in 1989, of a McDonald’s restaurant in the town of Chico, California, in protest at the destruction of the rainforest; (2) the 1996 anti-road protest at Newbury, where catapults were used against construction equipment, causing injury to a security guard; and (3) a year later in 1997, when Newbury protesters set fire to construction equipment. Rootes considers that these case studies show that violent acts are “noticeable by their absence” (2003: 38), yet they could still influence the public’s understanding of environmental discourse.

Salter also found that there is little evidence for eco-terrorism in the literature of either the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) or the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), as “There’s no mention that a single person has been injured in an action attributed to an ALF or ELF underground cell” (Salter, 2011: 228). Any violence in the environmental movement (as discussed in the next chapter) has been against non-human machines. Governments and businesses view direct action against material or organic objects as a “direct threat to corporate agribusiness, pharmaceutical and related industries” (Salter, 2011: 228).
In 2008, an article in the Observer newspaper ran with a headline “Police warn of growing threat from eco-terrorist” (Townsend and Denning, 2008). In the article, environmental activists were “researching a list of target companies which they believe are major polluters”, and “officers are concerned a ‘lone maverick’ eco-extremist may attempt a terrorist attack aimed at killing large numbers of Britons” (Townsend and Denning, 2008: 8). The article offered no new evidence that proved that environmental activists are either eco-extremists or eco-terrorists. The article was challenged by academics from Keele University (Doherty, Dobson, and Rootes et al), and by Kevin Smith, a member of the Climate Camp media team, who pointed out there was no evidence for the story. “Neither in Britain nor in the US have even the most radical environmental activists attacked people rather than property” (Doherty, Doyle, Hayes, Rootes and Saunders, 2008: 32). Smith noted “environmental activists engaging in legitimate civil disobedience are presented as planning to resort to terrorist acts, without any evidence” (Smith in Doherty, Doyle, Hayes, Rootes and Saunders, 2008: 32). On the basis of the comments, the Observer pulled the story, claiming, “it is perfectly legitimate to report police security concerns, but none of the statements were substantiated…the paper had no intention of suggesting that every activist was a potential terrorist…the claim itself was the story” (Pritchard in Doherty, Doyle, Hayes, Rootes and Saunders, 2008: 34).

Yet, the repeated use of the term “eco-terrorism” means that it becomes a “truth”, a foundation of knowledge about environmental activists. Moreover, the term became a labelling for imagined threats towards anyone who fails to lead an ecologically sound lifestyle. For example, in 1994, Special Branch announced that “it was changing its priorities to concentrate on environmental activism” (Monbiot, 1996: 19) because “environmental activists might be preparing for ‘suicide attacks’ on road
builders” (Monbiot, 1996: 19). This statement was made despite the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) admitting that “no terrorist offences by greens have taken place and failing to furnish any evidence to suggest that they were likely to occur, decided to start using the antiterrorism squad to gather intelligence” (Monbiot, 1996: 19). This “amplification” of deviance equates environmental activists with potential acts of terrorism. Seeing the media as part of the state is a clear “tactic of law” that places activists into a discourse of deviance and terrorism. These examples show how the media repeatedly place activists into a discourse of deviance and terrorism. The final example briefly shows how biopower operates through what activists term political policing, a term activists use for surveillance by the state through undercover officers.

**Example Three: Political Policing**

In October 2010, the website Indymedia Nottingham posted a short message that read:

Mark “Stone” has been an undercover police officer from 2000 to at least the end of 2009. We are unsure whether he is still a serving police officer or not. His real name is Mark Kennedy. Investigations into this identity revealed evidence that he has been a police officer, and a face-to-face confession has confirmed this. Mark claims that he left the police force in late 2009, and that before becoming an undercover officer he was a Metropolitan police constable. (Indymedia, 21 October 2010)

Mark Stone was a pseudonym used by Police Constable (PC) Mark Kennedy, an officer in the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). NPOIU was one of many “secret police” units that observed and infiltrated the environmental activism.

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45 Political policing and protest began with the formation of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968), a Special Branch unit also known as ‘hairies’ (Taylor, 2002). SDS was formed as a reaction to the Anti-Vietnam protests, the growth in membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The Cold War and the burgeoning civil rights movement all meant an increasing recognition by police of the need for better intelligence, equipment and training for public order work.
movement from the 1990s to 2010. Between 1994 and 2000, a number of parliamentary measures gave greater powers to the police to conduct surveillance exercises on the activist movement. The National Extremism Tactical Co-ordinator Unit (NECTU\footnote{NETCU is a national policing unit set up by ACPO to respond to the threat of domestic extremism in England and Wales. NETCU’s objective is to aid peaceful protest, and rout out “a few individuals [who] resort to criminal activity to further their cause. These individuals sometimes try to hide their illegal activities by associating themselves with otherwise peaceful campaigners.” They are overseen by the Counter Terrorism Command. For more information, see \url{http://www.netcu.org.uk/about/about.jsp} (accessed 17 October 2011).}) (2004), the National Domestic Extremism Team (2005) and the Counter Terrorism Command\footnote{The Counter Terrorism Command took over terrorism-related issues from the Anti-Terrorism Squad and Special Branch. Their remit is to provide a response to “terrorist, domestic extremist and related offences, including the prevention and disruption of terrorist activity”; gather intelligence on terrorism and extremism in London, bomb disposal, work with the “British Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service” and to offer “protection of British interests overseas and the investigation of attacks against those interests”. For more information, see \url{http://www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism.htm} (accessed October 2011).} (2006) had powers to monitor and prevent any protest in order to “gather intelligence so appropriate policing could take place” (Hattenstone, 2011). Kennedy was directly involved, with other activists, in the planning of direct action on the Ratcliffe-on-Soar coal-fired power station. Activists were not surprised that an undercover police officer had been amongst the collective for a nine-year period: “we assume at every meeting there are at least one journalist and one special branch officer” (Anon, 12:42). Paradoxically, the surveillance by the state failed to have a panoptic effect; instead it reaffirmed to activists that the state was determined to use tactics of law to curtail or prevent environmental activism.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to identify how discursive challenges by mainstream party politics shifted the meaning of environmental discourse. The contestation between economic environmentalism and social justice environmentalism began to change from environmental activism being the dominant position to a situation where green capitalism had the dominant position in environmental discourse. Through
green governmentality, individuals are coerced to take responsibility for climate change. Through techniques of the self in the name of advanced liberal policies, individuals are persuaded to go green, whereas those who reject being conducted through such policies are increasingly labelled as deviant, to the extent of placing environmental activists in a discourse of terrorism.

Through the practice of green governmentality governments are able to create new markets, politically position themselves on the global stage with global environmental governance, and maintain their hegemonic position in environmental discourse.

Using Hall’s “signification spiral” (Hall, 1978) concept to analyse the use of “tactics of law” shows that the rapid increase in global and national environmental governance has created a division between environmentalism as an act of radicalism, and environmentalism as an economic discourse. Environmental reflexivity (to borrow Dean’s term), through economic practice, means the onus falls on individuals to change their behaviour in favour of a green capitalism.

Green governmentality provided a platform that was not simply a post-9/11 effect. The terror attacks on 9/11 created a politics of fear, which some organisations could use to instil greater fear and retain the other in discourses of deviancy or terrorism. Yet the earlier techniques of dominance through covert police operations, the Criminal Justice Bill and subsequent Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, The CBJ, SOCPA and Terrorism Acts were all justified through the threshold of a signification spiral. Because earlier governments had put in place measures to criminalise environmental activism there was no strong need for more legalisation or
to iterate the discourse of deviance. Instead, the government was able to take control of environmental discourse by pushing forward new green capitalism plans and legalisation.

Thus the relationship between mainstream politics and the environmental activists’ movement is one of a discursive challenge over the hegemonic position of environmental discourse. This relationship has reversed over time, and the use of legislation and the signification spiral has led to mainstream politics holding the hegemonic position. The next chapter will draw on Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (1995) to examine how this relationship is represented in the mainstream media.
Chapter Five: Critical Discourse Analysis: Journalistic Narratives of the Environmental Activist Movement

Introduction

This chapter will apply a critical discourse analysis (CDA) to newspaper reports of environmental activism, to examine how the media report environmental activism in relation to environmental discourse. The CDA will identify critical discursive moments. Critical discursive moments are a way of identifying key events that impact on a discourse. In Carvalho’s study (2000), data was drawn from a series of “critical discursive moments” – periods “that involve specific happenings which may lead to challenges to the ‘established’ discursive position” (Carvalho, 2000: 5). An analysis of “moments” helps identify any continuation of arguments over a period, and any challenges or changes to discourse “at particularly important times in the social construction of an issue” (2005: 37). For Carvalho, the identification of critical discourse moments is “essentially interpretive work, which is probably not replicable in the same exact terms by other individuals” (2005: 34). However, as Carvalho observes, “if the goal is to understand how meanings assigned through language to reality are a crucial basis for social and political (inter)action, and to look at the subtle ways in which those meanings are achieved, discourse analysis offers an important potential” (2005: 38). An example of critical discursive moments is found in Gamson and Stuart’s (1992) study Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest: the

48 Similar to Carvalho’s findings, to collate all articles that focus on different protests with a connection to environmentalism would have to include a wide range of other disciplines and subjects. It would be a huge undertaking to comprehensively analyse every single environmentally focused protest since the 1970s. There are a large variety of articles, from news, to editorials, letters pages, comment, and even a short-run weekly column by roads protestor, Daniel Hopper (Daily Mirror, 1997). The reporting covers a wide dimension of environmental activism, appearing in the entire spectrum of UK national newspapers. Therefore, it would be absolutely impossible even for a Ph.D. to give a detailed analysis of all the articles.
Bomb in Political Cartoons. The research focused on “framing the prevention of nuclear war”, and as such the “critical discourse moments were chosen accordingly” (58). The result is an ability to unpack a “particular type of package at different critical discourse moments” (1992: 58).

This chapter also explores whether there are historical patterns that shape journalistic traits. Do journalists repeat the same narrative when reporting environmental protest? This chapter will draw on four samples, charting key protests to identify any reiteration of journalistic language patterns when representing environmental activism.

The aim of this chapter is to apply critical discourse analysis to a series of historical samples. The objective in drawing on historical practice is to identify if there are any journalistic practices that reaffirm a will to truth (as discussed in Chapter Two) that environmental activism exists within a discourse of deviance. The critical discourse analysis will look to identify whether the practices of green governmentality (discussed in Chapter Three) reaffirm a particular journalistic stance, by examining if an order of discourse (see Chapter Two) exists that “excludes” environmental activists as actors from their own representation. Moreover, the analysis of four samples (Greenham Common Peace Camps, Swampy, the May Day and the Global Justice Movement) reflects the political application of the “tactic of law” (see Chapter Four) to increasingly criminalise environmental activism.

This chapter will firstly look at earlier studies that represent protest in newspapers to establish how journalists frame protests. By drawing on the studies of Halloran et al. (1971) this chapter will aim to identify any linguistic patterns that shape the reporting
of protest. The next section will outline the methodological innovation, before turning to the patterns and analysis of critical discourse analysis.

**Earlier Research on UK Media Representations of Protest**

A study by Halloran *et al.* (1971) on newspaper reports of protest draws on Lang and Lang’s (1955) notion of an “inferential structure” to test if there is a bias in news reporting techniques. Lang and Lang’s study focuses on the reporting of local elections in the USA. Lang and Lang analysed the coverage of four different news outlets. Their study of a local election reveals that television producers appeared to be following a pattern or structure that conferred a specific meaning and bias around each candidate. Lang and Lang found that both intentional and unintentional bias “can influence public definitions” (1955: 177) and that such preconceived bias, in the form of an “inferential structure” significantly directs the “public definitions in a particular direction” (1955: 171). Based on Lang and Lang’s inferential structure, Halloran *et al.* found that newspapers framed protesters in an unfavourable light. In order to establish how linguistic styles shape the public perception, they categorised journalistic language into nouns and adjectives. These categories were then slimmed down into sub-categories of nouns which were either “neutral”, “specific descriptions” or “unfavourable”. Adjectives were sub-categorised as “favourable”, “neutral” and “unfavourable”. Specific descriptions included the terms “militant”, “activist”, “student” and “left-wing”. Unfavourable terms included “confrontation”, “attack”, “riot”, “mob” and “extremist” (1971, 107–12). In fairness, Halloran *et al.* also found the use of less aggressive adjectives, such as “peaceful”, “sincere” and “good humoured”. In general, however, Halloran *et al.*’s findings reveal that news reports focused on either violence or the potential for violence.
The representation of marchers as young hooligans empties the event of any political context, shaping the identity of the protesters as violent, giving “an indication of the way in which ideas about current events are structured, simplified and fed into the general social consciousness” (Halloran et al., 1971: 216). This deliberate ploy of structuring the order of discourse to undermine political validity continues throughout the history of radical protest. In looking at today’s reporting of protest, one can see the continued use of such an inferential structure.

Moreover, there are similarities between Halloran et al.’s findings and the reporting of the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp (1980s) that show how the inferential structure is not limited to the 1960s protest movements. Eldridge (1995) found that when coverage did occur, reporters would couch the women’s actions as violent and aggressive. News reports on confrontations applied a language of “force”, “blockade”, “tear down” and “bare hands” (Eldridge, 1995: 327). In contrast, much of the “violence against the women” (Eldridge, 1995: 329) went unreported, and accusations of police violence did “not make the news” (Eldridge, 1995: 329.). In one example, when women tried to prevent a delivery lorry from entering the base, reporters focused on “the police view: the men and supplies” (Eldridge, 1995: 328). A language that referred to the Cold War and metaphorical use of masculine rhetoric shaped the identity of the women.

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49 Anecdotally, Hamish Campbell encourages citizen journalism at the Camp for Climate Action and runs the website VisionON.TV (the main news platform from the camp). His family was involved with the Greenham Common peace camps – evidence, I would suggest, that each protest cycle takes and reinvents elements of previous protests and builds a historical discourse around the UK protest movement.
Outline of Samples for CDA

The criteria for choosing the critical discourse moments are based on (a) their historical significance, and (b) their impact in changing the environmental activist discourse. The articles are newspaper reports of the following moments.

1) Two protest at the Greenham Common Peace Camps, Embrace the Base (13 December 1982) and Dancing on the Silos (2 January 1983);
2) “Swampy” and the roads protesters;
3) May Day protests (2000–2004); and
4) Global Justice Movement G20 protest.

The Global Justice Movement’s protest generated the highest volume (32 in total) of reports as it covers four years (2000–2003).


Where possible the sample was taken from front page and news sections in the first few pages of a newspaper has a greater chance of capturing material that was likely “to mobilise public opinion through unorthodox forms of action and so put pressure
on decision-makers” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, 167). The final samples are the Embrace the Base (December 1982) and Dancing on the Silos protest (January 1983) at the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp; Swampy and the roads protest; and two samples each from the Global Justice/Anti-capitalist protests. This CDA is focusing on national newspaper coverage. These examples have been chosen because (1) they received the highest number of returns on a Nexis database search; (2) they have been addressed by other academic work in the field, and (3) they are often referred to by activists in the movement as seminal or watershed moments (see Chapter Six for empirical data).


The first CDA is the Greenham Common Peace Camp. The peace camp has been chosen for two reasons: firstly because it was the first “camp” to emerge on the political arena, and secondly because “the peace movement was just as significant with overlapping membership in environmental and peace organisations being the rule rather than the exception” (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005: 87). This is identified as a critical discursive moment because Greenham was the first large-scale, long-term protest in the UK. Its links to anti-nuclear protests mirror those of the first environmental activism. Greenham Common was also significant for its role in building the foundations of contemporary environmental activism. The first example is the Embrace the Base protest. Embrace the Base gained front-page media

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50 Although this work frequently refers to the Heathrow climate camp (2007), this will not be included in the CDA, as the majority of coverage came from the London Evening Standard, a regional newspaper. Moreover, the Heathrow camp is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

51 This study has chosen to focus on UK representations of environmental activism, although it acknowledges the influence of American environmental activism in shaping UK activist discourses. Indeed, the first environmental protest, which later formed Greenpeace, was made up of political activists and journalists (see Chapter Seven for more details). The event made the front page and caused a political incident between the Canadian and American governments. However, American journalism is different from British journalism, and for that reason, and because it was about American politics, it will not be part of this critical discourse analysis.
coverage. All earlier efforts by the women were ignored or given little news value by editors and journalists. Eldridge (1995) notes how, in December 1982, the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp had been established for just over a year and the women organised their first large-scale protest. Embrace the Base was a campaign to circle the airbase with a human chain of women and children. Thirty thousand women “were seen on television embracing the base” (Eldridge, 1995: 318).

All together, there were eight articles from this action. The Daily Express and Daily Mirror newspapers ran with the protest as front-page news. The Daily Express led with a headline of “The peace war” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982a), whereas the Daily Mirror simply stated “Peace: the plea from 30,000 women who joined hands in the world’s most powerful protest against nuclear war” (Palmer, 1982: 1). The Daily Express focused on the role of the Russian media in the event, arguing that the protesters gave Russian reporters access to the base, putting the UK at risk. In contrast, the Daily Mirror very much focused on the carnivalesque nature of the event and the role of families. The Daily Mirror’s coverage was surrounded by visual imagery of women with the peace sign painted on their faces, the women embracing the base and children, sub-headlined as “Keeping warm” (Palmer, 1982: 2). Other press coverage carried headlines “30,000 women at Greenham” (Brown, 1982), “Peace: the plea by 30,000 women” (Palmer, 1982); “Peace war that won’t go away” (Pratt, 1982); and “Scuffles as women seal off airbase” (Brown, 1982). Each of these headlines had similar articles, and were fairly factual. With the exception of the Guardian piece (Brown, 1982) there was little use of adjectives that indicated either a positive or negative representation.52

52 Of the thirteen articles on Greenham Common for this study, those by Brown, Express Staff Reporter, Pratt (1982), Steven and the anonymous piece in the News of the World newspaper (1983) were rejected, because they were either shorter than 200 words or appeared buried in the newspaper. There were two articles retained.
Palmer’s article (1982: 1–3) covers the front and two inner pages of the *Daily Mirror*. The event is given prominence with the banner headline “Peace”, and an image of the women linking arms around the base. The language is stoic and the discourse is of patriotism and national pride – typical British adversity. The top line proclaims “amid the sleet and rain of a bitter winter afternoon,\(^5\) 30,000 staged a remarkable protest…[and] they linked hands in heart of the English countryside” (Palmer, 1982: 1). The language of Britishness is juxtaposed against the “90 American cruise nuclear missiles” (Palmer, 1982:1). The order of discourse continues to place the women in a patriotic role with “a mass shout of freedom went out to signal the world’s most powerful demonstration of peace” (Palmer, 1982: 1). In Fairclough’s interpretation, the language is fairly emotive and informal (heterogeneity in Fairclough’s terms), favouring the women’s actions. The next paragraph becomes more informal as the “demonstration of peace” becomes “the demo was good-humoured throughout” (Palmer, 1982: 1). Indeed, the order of discourse favours the women. There’s no mention of state representation, and the first direct quote comes from “mother of two Geraldine Adams from north London hung up nappies said they symbolise women in home” (Palmer, 1982: 1). The absence of comment from an official spokesperson or representative of the state continues on pages two and three. There are several direct quotes from “Rebecca Johnson, 28, who has camped outside the base for five months”, to “seven year old Georgia Brown who was there from Oxford with her dad and two sisters”, and “Pensioners Pat and Fred Sweeney who had travelled from Bognor Regis”; Pat and Fred were joined by “social worker, Jean Wilson” and “Mary a militant multiple

\(^5\) The Embrace the Base action occurred on 13 December 1982.
sclerosis suffered” (Palmer, 1982: 3). Each of these people works as a bridge between the text and a discourse of unity (intertextuality in Fairclough’s terms). The text signals a media discourse that supports the peace camp by providing a narrative through the different female voices.

The second sample is the Dancing on the Silos action. Smith’s reporting of the Dancing on the Silos begins with a sense of subterfuge and underground activity as “dark figures of women in anoraks, trousers and scarfs emerged from the Berkshire woods where they were sleeping” (Smith, 1983: 4). Initially, the journalistic language creates two meanings, either dark and dangerous as the “dark figures” are emerging, but equally there’s an interpretation of fairies and goblins sleeping in the woods. Initially, Smith’s language makes it sound a little sinister, but then noticing they are wearing “anoraks” is hardly the balaclavas of block bloc54. The language reinforces the warlike action as “Silently, they pulled hidden metal ladders from under the gorse bushes and advanced against the target” (Smith, 1983)

The order of discourse begins with the women, as “Nell Logan, a 73 year old grandmother, whispered to me that she was a little nervous, but determined to go over the top” (Smith, 1983: 4). After this quote, the language shapes the women’s actions as underhanded – the warlike stealth of the activists is reinforced with the mention of the “headlights of the military police patrol car”, who, later in the piece are, “joined by officers from Thames Valley force, begin to climb the mound in pairs to bring down the protesting women” (Smith, 1983: 4). Although in Fairclough’s terms there is normative identifying of the protesters as “women”, with the exception of “Nell” no other activists are named. The order of discourse gives the first voice to

54 Black Bloc is not a prescribed collective, but more a group of individuals who believe that “violence against the police” is a legitimate political tool, a form of self-defence against the state (Viejo, 2003:371), although some activists see the Black Bloc as “a tactic… a dress code. Nothing more” (K, 2001:31)
the protesters, but is soon replaced by official language of the state and a war discourse. The discourse shapes the protest as a clash with the police through words of “targets”, “over the top” and “bring down”, but this is all relatively localised in the “Berkshire woods” (Smith, 1983: 4).

Glocalisation 55 (Fairclough’s term for local and global discourse) is very prominent in Bishop’s reporting of the same event. The piece opens with the normalising term of “Forty-four women peace protesters”. The reader is soon introduced to the global context of the base designated as “the American future missile base at Greenham Common” (Bishop, 1983: 2). Almost immediately, the order of discourse favours the state and military, as the women “were charged with common law breach of the peace”, they were detained by the police and “held in custody at police stations in Newbury, Reading, Slough and Oxford, over the weekend” (Bishop, 1983: 2). The listing of various geographical locations infers a widespread involvement of many police officers. Techniques of dominance are reinforced as the “women will appear before Newbury magistrates tomorrow” (Bishop, 1983: 2). These techniques of dominance are all in the first two paragraphs of the piece, which then returns to issues of the local and the global. The global context is reiterated slightly later in the piece as the United States is positioned against the local area: “step ladders were placed against the perimeter fence of the United States airforce base – where it runs along the well used road close to Newbury Race course” (Bishop, 1983: 2).

Yet a quote later on in the story contradicts the earlier discussions of America storing missiles at RAF Greenham, to imply that America’s use of the base had yet to be decided. At paragraph ten (of 14) there is a direct quote from the protesters “they

55 This term stands for putting the local into a global context.
want to get them [the silos] finished before there is an election where there is a prospect of the missiles being rejected, said Deborah Law” (Bishop, 1983: 2). This contradicts the early comment that the base belongs to the USA, and also places the activists much lower down in the order of discourse than Smith’s story.

There is also a clear sense of journalists using language about media discourse; that is, journalists talking about journalism. Bishop is a good example, as illustrated in “the women climbed into the camp with embarrassing ease, watched by photographers, reporters and TV cameras” (Bishop, 1983: 2). Furthermore, Bishop rounds off his story with a reference to the media discourse increasing the number of activists “many of the demonstrators yesterday were said to be recent converts to the cause…after the mass demonstration last month” (Bishop, 1983: 2).

The three different news reports indicate a media discourse that initially supports the women. Following the first action, Embrace the Base, the tone changes to one that makes greater use of metaphors of war and a narrative that includes political and state discourses. The first protest is indicative of stable relations between the journalists and activists, but over time the order of discourse moves from the women only, to include observations on media discourse and law courts. The result is that media discourse places the protesters at the top of the order of discourse, but they are displaced by techniques of dominance. The reporting begins with a heavy concentration on quotes from the protesters, but as the article progresses, the voice of the women is replaced by direct quotes from representatives of the state (that is police officers and MPs) This increase in formal heterogeneity in the language also begins to criminalise the women. A similar pattern is found in the reporting of the roads protesters (1990s).
The second action, a month later (Jan 1983), saw the women enter the base and climb onto the top of the missile silos that held nuclear warheads. The headlines about this action applied more adjectives about the women’s actions, carrying more images of the women and police lines. The Dancing on the Silos event took place on New Year’s Day (1 Jan 1983). As a consequence, only a limited number of journalists were working the beat, and the newspapers first published the event on 2 January, which was a Sunday. There are fewer Sunday newspapers than weekday publications (seven on Sunday, eleven weekday national newspapers), which may account for the low number of articles. The action gained some reports (five in total) but no front-page coverage, which tended to be focused on New Year’s Day celebrations. The *Sunday Telegraph* ran with a headline, “44 women invade air base” (Steven, 1983), the *Sunday Times* reported the event as “Peace women go over the top” (Smith, 1983), and the *Observer* newspaper followed up the event with a count of women arrested: “Peace women’s raid: 44 charged” (Bishop, 1983). The *News of the World* focused on the number of women, “44 peace women held over roof demo” (Anon, 1983).

**Sample Two: Swamp(ing) the Media**

The second sample is the case of activist Daniel Hooper, aka Swampy. As Paterson notes (2000) in his essay *Swampy Fever: Media Construction and Direct Action Politics*, in relation to environmental activism, “if you mention Swampy, people will know what you are talking about”. Swampy became “one of the most talked about figures in British political debate, and his popularity endured throughout 1997” (Paterson in Seel, Paterson and Doherty, 2000: 151). Moreover, film Director Emily
James in her film *Just Do It: A Tale of Modern Day Outlaws* (2011), predominantly about the climate camps, refers to Swampy as an iconic image of the movement. Swampy became a “folk-hero” (Paterson in Doherty, 2000) of the anti-roads movement. There were numerous other anti-roads protest from 1992 to 1997, including Twyford (1992), M11 Wanstead (1993), Bath Easton (1994), Newbury (1995), and later in the 1990s, the roads protest moved to support residents against the expansion of Manchester Airport (1997) (Howarth and Griggs, 2000). Despite Swampy emerging later in the decade, the entire movement was epitomised by his relationship with journalists. Two key protests were at Newbury and Manchester Airport. Newbury was the largest single road building plan, a critical part of the Conservative Government’s (that is, the 1979–1997 administration) £23 billion roads programme. The Newbury bypass was a large part of the “strategic transport connection between the industrial West Midlands and the port of Southampton” (Barry, 2001: 180). Linking the Midlands and south coast ports was outlined in the trans-European Networks plan. Thatcher’s “opening up” of Britain to European trade was a clear signal by the Conservative government to increase economic and industrial growth, at the expense of the environment. At the same time, government legalisation made protesting in large numbers a criminal act. The roads protest garnered much support from an interconnectivity between the roads protest/runways

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56 This film caused friction in the movement, as the director initially filmed it through covert action. The title also attempts to hook into the folk hero discourse of Swampy, but created divisions within the movement. Many activists refused to watch the film (data from focus group, 9 August 2011).

57 The Treaty on European Union first provided a legal basis for the trans-European networks. Under the terms of Chapter XV of the Treaty (Articles 154, 155 and 156), the European Union must aim to promote the development of trans-European networks as a key element for the creation of the internal market and the reinforcement of economic and social cohesion. This development included the interconnection and interoperability of national networks, as well as access to such networks.

58 The trans-Europe network meant the carving-up of swathes of green-belt countryside. The M3 extension meant cutting through Twyford Down, in the heart of the Hampshire countryside, and not too far from Newbury. Other similar sites were the Bath Easton Protest (a new bypass around the city of Bath) and the A30 Fairmile bypass in Devon. However, not all protest sites were in rural areas. Whereas Twyford, Manchester, Newbury and Bath Easton all involved the coalescing of local residents and protesters in trees and tunnels, the M11 urban protest took place in derelict houses, across streets and in makeshift squats.
movements and protests against the Criminal Justice Act (1994), the free music/rave scene and the new age traveller collectives.

There were numerous headlines that focused on the “novelty” around the activists’ repertoires of tactics, and the tactics to “bear witness” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006) to the tunnelling were the focus of some news stories. Tunnelling is the building of tunnels under the proposed route, a tactic borrowed from Earthfirst!, that makes the ground unsafe to drive diggers and road building equipment over. Tunnelling was first used at Claremont Road, and reached “a whole new level of ingenuity and dedication at the A30 protest” (Aufheben in McKay, 1998: 125). Swampy was a well-known figure because he was in the deepest tunnel, for the longest period, and hence the most dangerous position. Couldry (2000) identifies “novelty” and location as one way of increasing the news value of events “not usually open to media coverage” (Couldry, 2000: 156). The tunnels, trees and protest site all make use of location to turn the event into a novelty news item.

A search on the Nexis newspaper database with the key words “Swampy”, “A30”, “Manchester”, “Protest” and “eco-activism”, between the dates of 1 January 1990 and 1 June 1998 returns sixteen results from national newspapers. The Independent and Guardian newspapers had the highest percentage of coverage (six and five, respectively), although only one story from each made the front page. The Daily Mail and Mirror newspaper groups (two each) were the next highest groups and there was one article each in The Times and Observer newspapers. However, much of the coverage outside of the Independent and Guardian was less than 300 words. The Independent led with headlines from “First it was tunnels, now it’s runways” (Aitkenhead, 1997); to “Going underground” (Gibbs, 1996) and “Risk grows as
Swampy digs deeper” (Jury and Schoon, 1997). As Paterson notes “Swampy became a byword for environmental direct action and youth disaffection from formal politics, often being used in headlines where he, as a person, never appears in articles” (Paterson in Seel, Paterson and Doherty 2000: 151). Swampy became synonymous with the roads protests of the 1990s.

Here critical discourse analysis is applied to an article in the Independent newspaper “One week on, Swampy comes out blinking” (Jury 1997) and the Times newspaper’s piece “Last A30 tunneller emerges defiant” Fresco, A. (1997). The only tabloid coverage came from the Sunday Mirror newspaper, which commissioned Hooper to write a weekly column under the tagline “Britain’s best-known eco-warrior writes for the Sunday Mirror: You really dig our boy!” (Sunday Mirror, 1997). Swampy’s column had three narratives: (1) a self-mocking of his “celebrity status”; (2) a symbiotic relationship with local residents (this narrative reoccurs at the Heathrow Climate Camp and is discussed in the next chapter); (3) a justification for the protest. Swampy notes “we [protesters] met lots of people who would be badly affected…many were very middle class but have realised the democratic system has failed” (Hooper, 1997). This language reinforces the folk hero discourse. The Sunday Mirror shifts the focus away from the camp onto personality-led narrative, as in “Swampy’s camp is buzzing with rumours he’s about to be signed up by Hollywood to work on a film of his life story” (Sunday Mirror, 1997d). Note that it has become “Swampy’s camp” and not the camp or site of protest. The move away from autonomous collectives to a personality-led focus made “Swampy a household name, as well as altering public perceptions of new environmental movements and their objectives” (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62). The glut of excess publicity removed any discursive space of political debate (Jordan, 2002). The impact of focusing on
one protester devalues the efforts of the camp. As Swampy emerged from the tunnel, his first direct quote was “I’m alright – I had plenty to eat” (Jury, 1997), and Ian, a fellow tunneller at the A30 site, “agreed to come out if he was given a cigarette, cup of coffee and a chance to speak to the press” (Jury, 1997).

Ball’s report “Swampy: a tunnel star undermined” (1997: 3) for the Independent newspaper highlights how media discourse had become central to the narrative around the roads protest. The second sample “Risk grows as Swampy digs deeper” (Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1) has a similar theme. Ball’s piece begins in a similar manner to Palmer’s reporting on the Greenham Common Peace camp, “three protesters against the A30 road development… Swampy, 23 was at least 30 feet down…[a]16 year old girl known as animal and a colleague John Woodhams, 24” (Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1).

In both samples, the boundaries of representation move away from the activists to either a third person, or the journalists speaking on behalf of the activists. In Jury and Schoon’s piece, the first direct quote from an activist comes two-thirds through the article. The activists comment comes after the sheriff discussing the possible collapse of the tunnel – “undersheriff Trevor Coleman said yesterday ‘this is obviously a matter of great concern’” (Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1). The boundaries are clearer in Ball’s piece in which the first instance of official language is from an author “Writer Michael Fordham attacks the Newbury bypass tunnellers and folk hero” (Ball, 1997: 3). This war metaphor is maintained when “fellow protester, Alan, an ex-Para, who fought with Swampy to prevent the new runway” (Ball, 1997: 3) is discussed but not quoted directly in the story. The piece then returns to Fordham for a final quote that describes environmental activists as “people who have led troubled lives and for the
most part the sub-culture of the camp is their only family” (Fordham in Ball, 1997: 3). Ball’s piece links the new age traveller movement with the environmental roads protest and the metaphor of war – “new age eco-warrior” (Ball, 1997: 3).

However, what is clear in both pieces is this notion of journalists talking about journalism as a theme of the reporting. Similar to Bishop’s observation, Ball’s piece opens with a clear indication that media discourse is part of the narrative “the surge of publicity that turned Swampy the environmental protester into a media celebrity is now creating waves of unrest among underground supporters” (Ball, 1997: 3). Jury and Schoon also focus on media discourse “if media cameramen were allowed to film the men emerging from the tunnels – at the end of what is now the longest road protest in Britain – the demonstrators would be satisfied their point had been made” (Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1). The implication of journalists talking about journalism places media discourse within environmental discourse, as an additional discourse that influences meaning and the will to truth.

Journalists use the term “Swampy” as a node to give meaning to environmental activism, through their use of language as an interdiscursive practice. For example, Richard Littlejohn’s recent article on the Occupy protest movement carries the headline “Move over Swampy, it’s us who should be protesting” (Littlejohn, 2011). There’s also “intertextuality” (to borrow from Fairclough’s interpretation, although not his neologism) in an article on the No Third Runway campaign, which declares: “New wave protesters target airport expansion: University educated campaigners are learning lessons from Swampy and the 1990s road protests” (Milmo and Bowcott, 2008). Indeed, Hooper also took part in the Heathrow climate camp. The Sunday Mirror, once an advocate, was quick to dismiss his effort: “Swampy joins airport
camp: (but goes to sleep at his mum’s)” (Hodgson, 2007). Another Swampy supporter, *The Independent*, reiterated the folk hero discourse as “The return of Swampy underground eco-hero joins the Heathrow protest” (Owen, 2007). Hooper’s presence caused friction in the camp, much to the annoyance of other protesters – “The *Standard* [London Evening Standard newspaper] actually interviewed Swampy about Heathrow” (activist Steve in an interview, 2011), “…he was on television. That was embarrassing” (activist Michael, 2011). Indeed, post-2005 collectives learnt from the journalists’ treatment of Hooper by developing media tactics that ensure that the focus moves from one protester (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven).

The two examples set out so far, Greenham Common Peace Camps and Swampy, were both articulated around one-off big events. The next two examples are annual events and they shift the temporal and historical discourse of the movements. Up until now, these actions have taken place before the incorporation of global justice / anti-capitalist discourse into environmentalism.

What can be concluded from the Swampy instance is the focus on an individual as both a trope for a movement, and as environmental discourse focused around individual action, a parody of green governmentality. Swampy’s longevity in the tunnel generated a large volume of media coverage for its novelty on the news agenda. Comparing this sample with the reporting of Greenham Common Peace Camps, there are clear divisions between the two camps. Greenham Common Peace Camp was very much about one voice of the camp, the collective voice. From the

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59 Anecdotally, informal discussion with Sasha Roseneil (26 June 2012) on the Greenham Common Peace Camp revealed that some journalists had abandoned their media work to join the camp. However, the journalists
early days, the mantra of the peace camp was “we have no leaders here, all the stars are in the sky” (Abraham, 1988), whereas the Swampy sample shows how much focus was placed on the individual. In Foucauldian terms, these two forms of conduct can be understood in terms of the peace camp being a “conduct of conduct” under the collective action, whereas Swampy was conducting himself for the benefit of the movement. Swampy was the only time one individual spoke for the entire movement, subsequent action, up until the climate camps (see Chapter Six), meant many activists spoke as collectives with one voice.

**Sample Three: The Global Justice Movement and Violence**

The third “moment” looks at the May Day protests (2000–2004) centring on protest from 2000 to 2002. The May Day protests began as a combination of anti-capitalist and environmental discourse. The first May Day event, Guerrilla Gardening (2000), aimed to highlight issues around environmental discourse. The action followed large-scale demonstrations which coincided with meetings of the G8, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) across the globe, as “Eco-warriors and Swampy’s friends” became “anarchist anti-capitalist” (Plows, 2002). Unlike the Greenham Common Peace Camps and the anti-road campaigns that centred on “big events”, the May Day protests and later the Camps for Climate Action occurred roughly the same time over consecutive years. There were five May Day protest events, each taking place on 1 May in London. Similar protests took place across the world aided by the growth of the internet as a communication tool. Prior to the first May Day protest, there had been two other global justice/anti-capitalist protests in London (J18, found it difficult not to be a “star in the sky” and to speak as a collective voice. It was a skill some journalists learnt, whilst others left the camp.
The movement gained global attention in Seattle, USA (1999). The protest against the World Trade Organization, World Bank and the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in Seattle introduced the global justice movement to the world’s media.

Given the vast range of articles, this section will highlight a mere few, and as with the earlier examples, attention will focus on two stories as representative samples of the reporting as a whole. From the sample there were thirty-two articles across four years that focus on the anti-capitalist / global justice protest (2000–2004). Due to the volume of articles and length of time, the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 will be given priority. There were twenty-nine articles, with the highest percentage from years 2000, 2001 and 2002. As with the overall criteria, there was a second round rejecting any articles that did not appear on the front page or initial news section, were comments or editorials, or were predominantly images and lacked text. For example, the Daily Mirror (Harris, 2001) and Daily Mail (Nawar, 2002) newspapers carried full-page spread images of protesters clashing with police but limited text. The articles chosen were taken from the Times, Independent and Daily Mail newspapers as these (a) were front-page coverage, and b) carried the greatest number of words. The articles are “100 held as thugs riot in London anarchy” (Lee, Peachy, Urquhart, and Tendler, 2000: 1); “Veggie burgers, militant cyclists and rain” (Boggan et al., 2001: 1); “Rain rescues capitalism from spiked hair horde” (Cobain, 2001); and “4000 police tame May Day militants” (Allen, Craven and Taylor, 2002).

The protests of 2001 and 2002 are worth examining to see if recurrent events are reported differently to one-offs; and secondly to see if the terrorist attacks of 9/11

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60 J18 and N30 signal two dates of other global justice movement activism in the City of London. J18 stands for 18 June, the protest before Seattle. N30 stands for 30 November, another protest day.
had any impact on representation of environmental activism. The activists behind the Guerrilla Gardening took their lead from the earlier Reclaim the Street movement, turning public urban spaces into green havens. The protest began with a Critical Mass cycle ride meeting with fellow activists in Parliament Square. A camp was established on Parliament Green, and activists began planting flowers and other greenery (including marijuana plants). A slice of turf was placed in a Mohican style across the head of a Winston Churchill statue. This is a form of culture jamming, ‘a generic name given to a range of activities which seek to re-work and reconceptualise elements from mainstream culture in order to make some kind of satirical comment’ (Gilbert, 2008: 96). The Churchill incident drew cries of outrage from the tabloid newspapers as “Riot yobs desecrate Churchill monument” (Sullivan, 2000: 1) and “Rioters shame legacy of Churchill” (Black, Dixon, Mitchell, and Swift, 2000: 1–3). A discourse of moral panic dominates the Sun newspaper, with a call to “Find these animals”, as a “Riot rocks London” (Parker, Sullivan, and Whitaker, 2000: 4–5). Activists become “mobs” who “picked establishment symbols and McDonald’s for its rampage” (Parker, Sullivan, and Whitaker, 2000: 4–5) or were a “reasonably behaved mob looking for a catalyst” (Vidal, 2000: 3).

A year later (2001) and the protest, titled “Mayday Monopoly”, had a greater emphasis on capitalism and consumption. Protesters attempted to echo the route of the Monopoly Game around the streets of London. The day of action saw “activists plan and carry out as many ‘autonomous actions’ throughout London” (urban75, undated). Many newspaper “articles ultimately bolstered the dominant frame of anti-globalisation as a security problem, suggesting that without a heavy police presence,

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61 The term originated from the Adbuster magazine (1999), which “elevated the term culture jamming into an entire political philosophy, albeit a decidedly incoherent one. Highly critical of all mainstream politics and commercial culture” (Gilbert, 2008: 97).
such events would not be peaceful” (Meade, 2008: 343). In her article “Mayday Mayday”, Meade (2008) notes the Irish Independent newspaper provided a highly charged inferential structure that anticipated violence. Readers were invited to adopt the subject positions of the security forces, or at least the security conscious, repeated discussions of the scale of the policing operation emphasised the gravity of the impending crisis (Meade, 2008: 341). This is very common, and there is a similarity in Meade’s findings with UK newspaper reports from the 2002 May Day protest. Moreover, this protest is part of a moment, because (a) it was the first protest after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and (b) it was the third established May Day protest.

May Day 2002 was a more subdued affair. Termed “Mayfayre”, it centred on the large multinational companies and high-end consumer brands of the London area of Mayfair. Headlines ran with “4,000 police tame anarchists”. The protest never achieved its goal when protesters were penned in, or “kettled” by the police at Oxford Circus. This reflexivity measure by the state (technique of dominance in Foucault’s terms), is an example of the state controlling activists and limiting any protest. Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner David Vaness defended the use of such reflexive mechanisms as he claims, “we have high visibility policing and it will in effect be ‘in yer face’ policing with strong evidence gathering” (Nawar, 2002: 7). Newspaper headlines iterated these reflexivity measures by defending the role of the police: “relieved police left to talk of love and peace” (Harding, 2002: 2–3), and Vaness’s comments are reiterated with the headline “In yer face” (Nawar, 2002: 7) and in the Daily Telegraph’s headline – “Police win May Day face off” (Steele and Pook, 2002: 1).
The two samples for the global justice movement are taken from the May Day 2000, and May Day 2002. These representative samples are intentionally pre- and post the terror attacks to establish whether the event in New York had an impact on UK media discourse. The two pieces are Lee, Peachey, Urquart, and Tendler’s front-page splash “100 held as thugs riot in London anarchy” in the *Times* newspaper (2000: 1). The story is accompanied by the Winston Churchill culture jam image. The second sample is from the *Daily Mirror* with the headline “In yer face’” (Nuwar, 2002: 7). The discourse of journalists discussing journalism re-emerges as “members of the Sky news crew were caught up in the McDonald’s violence” (Lee et al., 2000: 1). However, what is clear from both is that boundaries are now set by the police, politicians and social commentators. The voice of the activists is almost completely removed, replaced by comments from “official” spokespersons. Lee et al. note that “Tony Blair condemned the mindless thuggery of the eco-activists” and that “vandalism was beyond contempt” (2000: 1). Blair’s comments continue, with the metaphor of war a re-emerging and repetitive theme, “in an angry statement the Prime Minister said ‘it is only because of the bravery and courage of our war dead that these idiots can live in a free country at all. The police must have full support of everybody in dealing effectively with them’” (Lee et al., 2000: 1). The Blair quote also reintroduces into the narrative the role of power. The call to support the police by “everybody” is, this work would argue, a technique of the self, whilst the activists become the abnormal – defined as “them”. There are numerous quotes and comments on the role of the police – with “nine officers injured”, whilst the police had spent “nearly six months planning Scotland Yard and the City of London Force” (Lee et al., 2000: 1). There is a similar theme in the 2002 reports, as “five police officers were injured” despite “officers dressed in riot gear” as “police charged demonstrators” (Nuwar, 2002: 7). Nuwar’s piece does contain one quote from an
unnamed protester to finish the article: “one demonstrator said “we’ve been walking around in circles for hours. The day doesn’t seem to have any focus” (2002: 7).

After the May Day protest, the next major global justice / anti-capitalist protest was the “G20 Meltdown in the City”, which saw a shift in the style of reporting. Journalists continued to use the same linguistic patterns, but also applied “convergence” (Hall, 1978) between protest groups. Reporters began linking radical protest movements to wider social issues. The linguistic style connects together (or labels) all the collectives (i.e. climate camps, environmentalists, anti-capitalists) with other (often more violent) collectives, which heighten or “escalate” (Hall, 1978: 223) a sense or threat of violence spreading across other parts of society. Journalists identify a specific issue or concern, and then link it with a “subversive minority” (Hall, 1978: 223). Reporting of the London G20 event made a convergence between collective environmentalists, Whitechapel Anarchists, and a university lecturer as one violent group against city workers. Newspaper reports in The Times (O’Neill, 2009a, 2009b) advised bankers to “dress down” or “work from home” on “police advice” – for fear of violent attacks. The Times pre-empted the protest with threats of terrorism as “Hospitals all set for victims of G20 violence; London is braced for riots in City streets as protesters vent anger” (O’Neill, 2009b). Adjectives used to define the march included “alert” and “injured”, with protesters expected to “storm buildings”. Similarly, the Guardian’s phrases defining the day included “pandemonium”, “anarchist cells” and “resurgent anarchists” (Guardian, 2009: 4). This form of “converging” reaffirms the protesters as being outside of society, deviant and terroristic.

For further details, see also http://www.g-20meltdown.org/.
These different examples of critical discourse moments show that there was a shift from the relatively objective, folk hero discourse of the pre-1997 communicative events, to a stronger sense of an antagonistic relationship between the environmental activist movement and the state. The reflexivity mechanisms with the CJB and kettling are reflected in the traditional media’s support of techniques of dominance. This is backed up by the findings from the CDA of the different newspaper samples. The next section reveals the findings, and shows that as the state increases its techniques of dominance, environmental activists are placed into a discourse of deviance.

**Findings: Critical Discourse Analysis of Critical Discourse Moments**

The findings show a clear shift in the order of discourse post-1997. Prior to 1997, the order of discourse runs in chronological order from media discourse, activists’ discourse, and third, environmental governance as a discourse. Post-1997 there is a clear shift that places environmental governance as the dominant discourse, followed by media discourse and then activism as a discourse. These findings begin to show evidence of the earlier arguments in this work. Prior to 1997, there are thirteen articles that cover two protests (1982 and 1983) from the Greenham Common Peace Camps (1981–87). There were four articles rejected in the coverage of Greenham. The first two to be excluded were the *Guardian*’s “30,000 women at Greenham” (Brown, 1982), and *Daily Express*’s “The peace war” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982). The latter was rejected because it linked the Greenham Common protest with a Russian journalist to place it in a global context of the Cold War. Although the Cold War is used as a metaphor in the article, the fact that American missiles were stored at RAF Greenham means that the global framing in the article moves the story away
from specific British protests to a wider discussion of international relations. The two other rejected articles on Greenham were the *Daily Express*’s “Peace war that won’t go away” (Pratt, 1982) and the *Observer* newspaper’s “Peace women’s raid: 44 charged” (Bishop, 1983). Articles retained for analysis focused on two events, the Embrace the Base protest (December 1982) and Dancing on the Silos (January 1983).

What emerges from a CDA of these moments are four themes: (1) motherhood, (2) journalism, (3) violence or the pre-empting of violence, and (4) terrorism. Overall, the order of discourse also shifts as the themes emerge. Early reports of environmental activism have journalists applying a neutral, objective language. The hierarchical order of discourse runs from activists and media to the state. In the Greenham Common reports the activists are defined as “women” and “protesters”, and a quote from “spokeswomen for the group said the action was designed to draw attention…construction of the silos had been speeded up” (Bishop, 1983). There are generic references to the state as the “judicial system”, “police” and “legal system” (Bishop, 1983; Palmer, 1982) and these follow the women and protesters. There’s a similar prioritising of activists in the Swampy reports. Jury’s (1997) piece starts with Swampy and protesters. The first quote in the piece comes from Swampy, followed by media discourse, then state – “police”, “PPP consortium – connect a privately funding and building the £75m road and the government repays the cost over the next ten years” (Jury, 1997). Post 1997 the order of discourse reaffirms the state as the dominant discourse, with a large concentration of “Scotland Yard 6,000 officers”, and “3,000 in reserve” (Cobain, 2001). There are “mounted police”, “police” and “violence” (Boggan *et al.*, 2001: 1), but no mention of activists. Only the following year do activists clearly re-emerge in the order of discourse. Allen, Craven and
Taylor (2002) define activists as “hard core protesters”, “anarchists” and repeat Boggan et al.’s (2001) use of the term “militant” in the headline. Thus the order of discourse moves from activists being directly quoted to negating the activists’ position, and when they are defined, it is in terms of deviancy. The role of the state increases post-1997 and around 2000–01 there is little mention of activists in the order of discourse.

This is reiterated through the “grammar” of journalists. Fairclough notes the use of sentence connectors “however”, “but”, “nevertheless” or “meanwhile” as “markers of the ordering of voices”, and in a sentence it “implicitly contrasts positive and negative sides” (1995: 82). In the earlier reports, journalists apply “but” to create a contrast between activists and local residents. It’s a technique used to divide and rule the activists. For example, Palmer (1982) applies “but” to juxtapose the women at Greenham Common Peace Camp with local residents, noting “but, not everybody at Greenham yesterday was happy” (1982: 1), whereas in the 2001 reporting “but” was used to mark out the dominant police position against activists: “smoke bombs and sticks were thrown but police in riot gear refused to allow protesters in or out” (Boggan et al., 2001: 1). “Nevertheless” is often applied to give authority to the state by these Independent newspaper journalists. Their use of the term, for example, in “Nevertheless, the wanton rampage anticipated – and criticised in advance by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the Mayor of London, Ken Livingston, were kept in check”. This flags up the pre-empting of violence, a theme that repeatedly emerges, from the Greenham Common protest reports to G20.

Lee et al. (2000) note the organisational element of the state, when “After nearly six months of planning Scotland Yard and the City of London force had 5,500 officers
ready on the streets for trouble...and another 9,000 in reserve across London”. Meaning is shaped from official sources, as “the Yard had intelligence that a hard core of several hundred protesters was bent on using the demonstration as a cover for hit and run attacks”\textsuperscript{63} (Lee et al., 2000). As Boggan et al. (2001) say, “London was braced for riots and looting”, without any concrete evidence to substantiate the claims. Boggan et al.’s (2001) concentration on violence comes later in the piece. The first half of the article challenges the pre-emptive assumption of violence, yet the second half focuses on violence when:

\begin{quote}
At Oxford Circus shortly before 3pm, it was here, if anywhere, that trouble was expected...a dark green R registered Jaguar car was damaged as protesters climbed on the roof and kicked the front bumper off the vehicle. BUT, there was no obvious damage to shops, many of which had been boarded up ahead of the demonstrations. (Boggan et al., 2001: 4)
\end{quote}

There is also a quote from an activist as “one protester, who gave her name as Spirit, said ‘this was always intended to be a peaceful day. The police provoked what little violence there was by their very presence’” (Boggan et al. (2001). The theme of violence echoes Halloran, Elliott, and Murdock’s study (1971) \textit{Demonstrations: A Case Study}.

When an environmental activist’s voice is heard the language is informal, colloquial and can be interpreted as depoliticising the event. Journalists’ focus on colloquial language detracts from the reason for the camp, by presenting a notion of casualness and disorganisation, in contrast to the organisational language of the state. A shift post-1997 also places the activists away from a discourse of motherhood and caring and into one of conflict. For example, up to 1997 the term “militant” is used

\textsuperscript{63} Intelligence here refers to the Special Branch Squad and the newly formed NPIOU (1999). This intelligence would have come from the undercover police officers, as discussed in Chapter Four.
sparingly, yet between 2000 and 2009 it occurs more regularly. In the coverage of Greenham Common and the roads protest there is a strong use of metaphors that indicate caring, mother earth, and eco-feminism. Journalists use metaphors of motherhood, the Women’s Institute (Greenham reports) and even Swampy’s “mum still loves him” (Jury, 1997). Protesters at Greenham and later the anti-roads movement are defined as “a mother of two” (Palmer, 1982). Two women of 73 and 63 were allowed bail “because of their age” (Bishop, 1983), all of the participants at Greenham are referred to as “30,000 women” and, after their arrest, “44 women” (Palmer, 1982), and “peace women” (Bishop, 1983). This neutral definition continues, with the roads protesters referred to as “demonstrators”, “protesters” and “people in groups” or “groups of people” (Jury, 1997).

From 2000 onwards, a metaphor around ritualism, male rituals, war, and conflict is common in the journalistic language. There is an increasing use of the term “militant” as in “militant cyclists and eco-warriors” (Cobain, 2001), and the Independent newspaper ran with a page-two headline “Veggie burgers, militant cyclists and rain” (Boggan et al., 2001). It seems also that vegetarianism is being linked to militancy, a less than subtle indicator of other links between animal activism and environmental activism. The Daily Mail declares that “May Day militants”, “Soho sex workers” and a “hard core” all took part in the 2002 May Day. This “amplification”, to borrow Hall’s term (1978), places the environmental activists into a framework that links numerous different movements, all appropriated through a discourse of deviance. This use of “noun-like” terms to define activists is what Fairclough terms “nominalisation”. This nominalisation indicates the wider move towards deviancy, and mirrors the political shift from the Conservative party
(under John Major’s (1992–97) and Margaret Thatcher’s (1979–92 premierships) to the centralised premiership of Tony Blair.

Despite the order of discourse altering from the late 1990s onwards, journalists’ discussion of media discourse remains a constant in the order of discourse. In establishing the media order of discourse, it gives an indication of fixed or shifting boundaries, discursive practice within the media order of discourse, and relations between media order of discourse and “socially adjacent orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 1995: 205).

**Conclusion**

The critical discourse analysis has shown that the order of discourse affects the relationship between environmental activists and the state. A change in language from relative neutrality to a discourse of terrorism, places environmental activism into a discourse of deviance. The critical discourse moments act as nodal communicative events that create knowledge and meaning of environmental discourse. Over time, the production and consumption of knowledge around environmental activists is bridged through historical events to provide journalistic traits that rely on intertextual analysis. The production (and consumption) of text, contextualised within a critical theory of green governmentality enables us to identify a discourse practice that supports political discourse and creates socio-cultural practice that favours green governmentality. The media discourse supports the reflexivity measures that criminalise elements of environmental activism to reinforce knowledge that activists exist outside of society. However, the middle ground taken up by the media in the order of discourse provides ample opportunities for both the
state and the activist to contest the discourse of deviance, by actually utilising the media in a particular way. The next chapter will look at how the “novelty” of environmental activism enables the movements to create a heterotopic space (Foucault, 1995) that challenges both green governmentality and the order of media discourse.
Chapter Six: Fighting Back: The Internet and Heterotopia

Communication isn’t about having words on paper, it’s about having words on paper you would like actually to read. There’s no point having information because that’s not communication, communication is catching someone’s eye and having a conversation with them, you’ve got to add some journalism, make it shorter (interview with visionOntv activist Hamish Campbell).

Introduction

This thesis has argued that as neoliberal policies increasingly linked environmental discourse to party politics, so environmental activists were placed into a discourse of deviance through legislation and media discourse. Journalists have consistently reverted to a pattern of framing environmental activists as deviant, and this pattern has increased as political discourse increasingly criminalises environmental activism through legislative measures. In Chapter Five, the critical discourse analysis showed how, despite a rather sympathetic leftist reporting of the Greenham Common Peace camp, there were undertones of activists as terrorists or deviant. This increased through the reporting of Swampy and became overt in the reporting of the May Day and G20 protests, juxtaposed with the increasing use of “eco-terrorism” as a label for environmental activism.

Why, then, has the environmental activism movement survived in spite of the technique used to quash or curtail grass-roots direct action and radical politics? Despite the legislative measures that criminalise elements of radical protest, the environmental activism movement has survived in a variety of forms since the first environmental activists protests. From the vertical organisational realos (see discussions on environmental discourse in Chapter Two) of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and other NGOs, while the horizontal radical environmental activists have
continually reinvented themselves, with the most recent incarnation being the Camps for Climate Action.

This chapter argues that the radical environmental activists’ movement has survived and grown for three keys reasons: (1) linking environmental discourse with green governmentality shifts environmentalism onto a greater global scale; (2) the emergence of the internet provides a global platform for protest and enables activists to bypass traditional media practices; and (3) the retention and development of protest camps creates a space (heterotopia) to challenge neoliberal co-opting of environmental discourse. The term “heterotopia” originates as an anatomical reference to parts of the body that are either “out of place, missing, extra, or, like tumours, alien” (Hetherington 1996: 35). Cultural theorists have translated the biological concept of “out of place, missing, extra”, to examine how “otherness” exists in society (Hetherington, 1996; Foucault, 1986; Saunders and Price, 2009).

The co-opting of environmental discourse through a green governmentality lens into global economic and political policies such as the Kyoto Protocol (see Chapter Three) also placed the environmental activists’ movement onto the global stage. What is problematic about a green governmentality approach is that it cannot be a universal rule applied to all. Governmentality and green governmentality can only work in relationships between the individual and the individual state. Moreover, with the emergence of the WTO and IMF, and the internet, many state-led policies became meshed into global policies (as discussed in Chapter Three). Secondly, the World Wide Web enables local protest to become globally recognised. The Internet provides a new platform for various activists’ movements to engage with protest outside their own countries (such as the Zapatista movement, Mexico, or
Oberservatree in Australia), taking them from the local to the global. Yet, despite Castell and Klein’s (see Chapter One) enthusiasm for appropriating the success of the Zapatista movement to the Internet, there were other factors to consider. There were other factors outside of technology, media practice and activism that brought the Zapatista to the world’s attention. Collier and Collier, (2005) note how the “Chiapas had become host to independent and non-governmental organisations sympathetic to the plight of the peasant and indigenous poor” (Collier and Collier, 2005: 454). Moreover, a lack of desire to seek state power was as Berger (2001) notes, “another crucial difference between the Zapatista and earlier guerrilla movement is that the former do not seek to capture state power” (156). Berger goes on to say “Zapatistas can be defined as a postmodern political movement in that they are seeking to move beyond both the politics of modernity associated with the economic liberalism of the Mexican government and the Marxism of the cold war guerrilla tradition” (Berger, 2001: 155). The Zapatista engagement with NGOs, indigenous groups and women’s rights, aligned them with wider social movements, and aided their support from the local to the global. The camps become what Foucault called heterotopias, that offer an alternative solution to green governmentality. This chapter will draw together the themes of this thesis so far (discourse, governmentality, green governmentality and media discourse) to examine how environmental activism has retained a place within environmental discourse. It will do so through empirical research with interviews\(^{64}\) and a focus group, as set out in Chapter Two.

\(^{64}\) The interviews are with White Chapel Anarchist Martin; cyclist and Critical Mass regular attendee, Des Kay; Clown Liberation Army and author John Jordan and Greenham Common activist, Barbara Tizzard. These individuals were important for their personal contribution to the moments.
The rationale for a focus group is twofold. Firstly, Stubbs in Poole (1997) and O’Halloran (2003)\(^6\) argue that CDA lacks any ability to show “causal links between particular textual features”, and that without any direct research “data is needed on readers’ thought processes” (Stubbs in Poole, 2010:148). Secondly, the use of a focus group aims to address the concerns raised that a critical discourse analysis begins at a pre-emptive stance, and that, as the findings of Chapter Five show, the voice of the activists has been lost within media discourse. This chapter will therefore draw on focus group data with different activists from various collectives, each of whom had an integral role at the Camps for Climate Action.

The first section of this chapter will draw on Foucault (2007) and Death (2010a and b) to examine why resistance exists within power relations. This will then illustrate how resistance emerges from radical activists through the concept of heterotopia, followed by a discussion on how the internet has provide a virtual heterotopia that enables activists to move from the local to the global and bypass traditional media reporting. The final section will look at what happens when a protest camp moves away from a heterotopia.

**Resistance and Power Relations**

In *Security, Territory and Population*, Foucault discusses how “we might describe resistance to processes of governmentality as distinct from revolts against political sovereignty or economic exploitation” (Foucault, 2007: 196). He argues that political uprisings against economic disparities, protest against living standards, human rights, divisions in wealth (such as the 99% Occupy protest) are common, but protest and

\(^6\) See discussion in Chapter Five about what is problematic with CDA.
revolts against forms of political governance rarely register. Resistance to
governmentality is a different form of resistance from economic exploitation or
political sovereignty, as it is often about wanting to be governed in a different way.
Resistance occurs, for Foucault, when power and politics are interlinked through the
practice of governmentality, and, as earlier discussion shows, there is a power
struggle between activists and party politics over environmental discourse. Politics
and power are central to resistance because “everything is political by the nature of
things; everything is political by the existence of adversaries. It is a question of
saying rather: nothing is political, everything can be politicised, and everything may
become political. Politics is more or less than that which is born with resistance to
governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation” (Foucault, 2007: 390). As
Death notes, “resistance against a pre-determined politics or system” (2010b: 235)
often occurs at times of “heightened conflict across the social system”, which
produces “intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end
in reform, repression and sometimes revolution” (Tarrow, 2005, 153).

Foucault defines these “points of resistance” (Foucault, 2007: 194) as “movements
whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say, wanting to be
conducted differently, by other leaders and other shepherds, towards other objectives
and forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods” (Foucault, 2007:
194). Resistance to governmentality seeks a different way of being ruled that remains
within the boundaries of governance – what Foucault calls “counter-attacks, or kinds
of reaction…are we not dealing with the same phenomena in reverse” (Foucault,
2007: 195). There is always “resistance to political discourse and power, and in every
epoch, or a crisis of governmentality it is important to ask what forms these counter-
conducts take in the current crisis in order to define new modalities of struggle or
resistance” (Foucault, 2007: 389–90). By counter-conduct Foucault refers, not to dissent, resistance or revolt – all terms he rejects in preference for a term that “in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others; which is why I prefer it to mis-conduct – which only refers to the passive sense of the word, of behavior, not conducting oneself properly… the word ‘counter-conduct’ enables us to avoid a certain substantification allowed by the word ‘dissidence’” (Foucault, 2007: 201–2). In other words, Foucault’s preference for counter-conduct as a term of resistance is akin to acts of dissent, such as civil disobedience, over overt anarchic action. Thus counter-conducts often have the same objective as governmentality, but seek answers and solutions in alternative ways. That is, the climate camps seek a solution to climate change that negates green capitalism, as a counterpoint to the state’s solution through green governmentality found in ‘revolts of conduct’ (Foucault’s term). Resistance comes when those who resist unite with similar collectives and movements to form what Foucault terms a “revolts of conduct” (2007: 194).

Revolts of conduct often occur at large gatherings around environmental governance. These “mega-protests” (Death, 2010b) provide platforms for understanding how “Political clashes and counter-conducts are not simply a battle of ideologies or worldviews, but involve wars of position and movement between particular forms of action. Repertoires of protest are clearly invented, inherited and learnt… they are also produced and shaped by the forms of government they confront” (Death, 2010a: 241). Death shows that although most “social movement literature has tended to conceptualise resistance as the act of opposing power” (2010a: 235), and this “Literature on governmentality and resistance have remained largely separated. This disconnect can be redressed through a return to Foucault’s lecture series” (Death,
A Foucauldian approach to many protests reveals that “a counter-conducts approach focuses on practices and mentalities of resistance, rather than movements, and also seeks to show how power and resistance, government and dissent, are mutually constitutive” (Death, 2010a: 240). Moreover, counter-conduct “captures the close interrelationship between protest and the forms of government they oppose” (Death, 2010a: 235). Counter-conducts may echo the forms of government they confront. They have also developed tactics and strategies that “acted as transgressive and carnivalesque spaces in which normal social identities and codes of conducts are inverted and subverted. Yet protests have their own discursive norms of behaviour-of conduct” (Death, 2010a: 241). Governments and protesters depend on an inversion of how the other applies Foucault’s notion of conduct – “just as government depends upon the creation of governable subjects, such as the liberal citizen, the infirm, the delinquent, the poor, the dangerous and the terrorist, counter-conducts subvert, reproduce, and invert these categories” (Death, 2010b: 32). Death shows that counter-conduct exists through repertoires of protest. To take it a step further, the current research found that the repertoires of protest exist within a certain space, and once they remove themselves from that space they lose any chance of challenging governmentality. It is within a heterotopia that these “revolts of conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 194) (when conducts are linked to other conflicts) exist.

Environmental activists create a form of resistance to “power as conducting” through the heterotopia of the camp. They resist the green governmentality, top-down, economic-led way of conducting individuals to address climate change in favour of another form of conduct – horizontal, consensus, deep ecology networks. They challenge the power of conducting through their own forms of resistance (direct
action, civil disobedience, site of contestation) to offer an “alternative” (heterotopia) way to be conducted. This research concurs with Foucault’s argument that the revolt of conducts is not “merely dealing with the same phenomena in reverse, from the negative or reactive side” (Foucault 2007: 195). To show how UK environmental activists act as resistance to governmentality, the next section will discuss how the space of the protest camp exists as a heterotopic space.

**Protest Camps as Heterotopias**

Foucault argues that each heterotopia acts as a “real place, places that do exist, and are formed in the very founding of society – which are something like counter-sites” (Foucault, 1986: 24). These counter-sites sit “outside of all places” (Foucault, 1986: 24) to exist in a space between a utopia and the real. The space acts as a mirror to the real world, made from ideas in the real, but the mirror transposes neither a true nor utopian reality, but an alternative. The space works as a mirror held up to show how existing society works, but as a slightly distorted, opaque image, of an alternative. For example, the week-long Camps for Climate Action were devised to show the potential of an ecology-based society outside of neoliberalism, as an alternative to a green capitalist society.

However, a heterotopia is not a fantasy place, neither is it wholly real – it is “connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal” (Foucault, 1986: 25). Foucault argues (1986) that what differentiates an alternative, counter or minority space, are the five principles of a heterotopia, which are (1) crisis, (2) determined function within society, (3) several sites encapsulated into one space, (4) a slice in time (heterochronies) and (5) openness to manipulation and alternative
directions (Foucault, 1986: 24–26). The first principle of a heterotopia is crisis – a space occupied by people who live in society but who are in a constant state of crisis. For Foucault, crises are “adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly” (1986: 24). A crisis heterotopia is a space that is “outside” of society, but at the same time held up as a mirror to show the flaws and discrepancies in any society. For example, if the state imprisons activists, it places them into a space outside of society, but still within a societal system (such as the prison). Heterotopias also play a role of having “determined function within society” (the second principle of heterotopia).

Each heterotopia has a “precise and determined function within a society, and the same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have one function or another” (Foucault, 1986: 25). The “determined function” of the space current environmental activist movements exist in is to be the radical flank in society. Gupta defines the radical flank as the role of “radical groups [who] pose a threat to the interests of the State or to other external actors by advocating extreme and politically unpalatable goals, and/or by pursuing those goals using transgressive (often violent) methods” (Gupta, 2002: 5). Thus it can be argued that the radical environmental activist movement (such as horizontal networks) will be seen as the most extreme (deviant) elements of environmental discourse. In addition, within the movement, the anarchists are seen as the most radical element (radical flank). Depending on the cultural or political context, each movement can be framed as having different functions over time. Always existing as the radical flank, these functions can be “terrorists”, “activists”, “eco-celebrities” or “hippies” (such as the first environmental activism), depending on the dominant discourse.
Moreover, the radical environmental activist movement is made from a plethora of politically diverse collectives. The multiplicity of movements exists within one space, because a heterotopia is “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault’s third principle of heterotopia, 1986: 26). When these various groups gather together with one objective (such as a climate camp), the heterotopia works at full strength (heterochronic) at the moment when activists “arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time” (Foucault, 1986: 26). For example, not all activism is a full-time role, activists often have jobs or families to raise. Each action takes time to plan around the everyday, when they come together it reinforces the heterotopia. The protest camp becomes a unifying space that, regardless of external factors, is united though a common objective, such as stopping a road building or educating people in ecological cultures and lifestyles.

However, one problem with heterotopia is its propensity to be open to manipulation and alternative directions (the fifth principle of a heterotopia). A heterotopia “always presupposes a system of opening and closing that both isolates [it] and makes [it] penetrable” (Foucault, 1986: 26). Szerszynski notes that radical environmentalism is a “cultural politics which operates not simply by marking and performing the boundary of its own form of life. It does so in such a way that beckons those outside its boundary, hailing them with a moral claim that one should be on the inside” (1999: 212). This illustrates Roseneil’s ideas about whether activists can ever truly be both inside and outside of society. Roseneil (1995) defines this difference as “internal” and “external” modes of action. An internal mode of action is how individuals act together to constitute a collective, regardless of contrasting ideologies; but there are outward representations through external modes of action –
the ways they (social movements) confront the outside world and their political opponents (Offe, 1987 cited in Roseneil, 1995: 71). For example, the women at Greenham Common were physically outside the bases, and outside in the camp, but they were also outside of their traditional family or homemaker roles. A more contemporary example is the Camp for Climate Action at the G20 Meltdown protest, which, in April 2009, set up a camp in the streets outside the European Climate Exchange. The European Climate Exchange was set up as a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange to facilitate trading in carbon emissions. The street became a heterotopic space because both the Exchange and activists are looking to tackle climate change; one through economic means, the other through social solutions. The activism exists outside (physically and metaphorically) of the buildings. The camp is juxtaposed to the material symbols of wealth, whilst representing an alternative to the green capitalism of carbon and emissions trading.

Howarth (2006) observes that “whilst the inside can be constituted through excluding or demonizing the outside (an enemy to be demonised or a state of anarchy to be feared) the outside is not necessarily an other whose otherness threatens to subvert or overflow from the inside” (Howarth, 2006: 119). The Greenham Common peace women were demonised by the men to the point of fear in two ways. Firstly, the activists demonise the outside, men, in the case of Greenham, the state and big business for the global justice and climate camp movements, to constitute the social space of the camp. Equally, the state demonises the activists for fear of a state of anarchy (through a discourse of deviance) as one activists notes:

A group of international peace people came over and set up a camp …after a while there was the most terrible row and a group of men rushed into the camp saying we’re going to get these peace people…I could hear them slashing tents, you know, knives. When they came to mine, luckily they just pulled it up and slashed across – they didn’t
either see me or they didn’t think there was anyone in there, but then the next guy who was Dutch bloke left his tent unzipped and they just kicked his face in, it was, you know he was really badly damaged…very quickly the police arrived, somebody, of course there weren’t mobiles, somebody outside must have phoned them. (interview with CND and Greenham Common activist Barbara Tizzard)

Despite the ordeal, there’s a clear distinction between the camp as “inside”, while help and others are “outside”. Resistance to governmentality comes from inverting the “conduct” through “a counter-conducts approach focuses on practices and mentalities of resistance, rather than movements, and also seeks to show how power and resistance, government and dissent, are mutually constitutive” (Death, 2010a: 240). Activists place themselves outside of society, and inside heterotopias as space to practise “mentalities of resistance”. They can never remain “outside” as the objective is “mutually constitutive” (Death, 2010a: 240) in achieving the same goal – the elimination of climate change. Governments achieve this through techniques of self and dominance, whereas activists have the same goal through the heterotopia. The space is measured, semi-organised, unlike a “temporary autonomous zone” (TAZ) (Bey, 1991), spaces that exist as individual islands in society.

Briefly, TAZ are islands of “mini-societies living consciously outside the law and determined to keep it up” (Bey, 1991). They are lawless, in an anarchic rule-less sense, and neither engage with the state nor remain a permanent situation. A TAZ can be a space that emerges only to dissipate just as quickly, and in the process “liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to reform elsewhere” (Bey, 1991). It is easy to see why an environmental protest can be understood as a TAZ, for it may appear to be an ephemeral protest that is soon disassembled, only to re-form elsewhere. Yet, there is more to environmental protest than a “here today, gone tomorrow” spectacle. Each protest draws on strategies,
practices and discourses from earlier actions, it re-works old practices (see Plows, 2006) to re-emerge with new forms, founded in a historical process. Instead of defining environmental activism as happening in a TAZ, it is more useful to say it is a heterotopia. However, a heterotopia, unlike a TAZ, whilst existing outside of the norms of society, also mirrors contemporary society to the point of suggesting an alternative, or counter-society (Death, 2010a).

Having set out how activists create a heterotopic space, compared to an ephemeral TAZ, the space of the camp attempts to situate itself within the binary position of “inside” and “outside” society. What happens within the heterotopias, it will be shown, is how and why environmental activists continue to resist green governmentality as the dominant environmental discourse of climate change. Each heterochron retains the practices, rituals and quasi-organisational structure of the movement. Drawing on Hetherington (1996, 1997) and the idea of liminoid practices, and Doherty (1999) and Della Porta (1999) the next section examines how technological advances have enabled the longevity of activisms to challenge media coverage, as discussed in Chapter Five. The internet enables activists to “become another device in the strategic toolbox of the environmental movement for gaining mainstream news media access”, “bypassing traditional media” (Hutchins and Lester, 2009: 580–81). The final section will examine what happens when activists change their practices and values to move out of the heterotopia, and the subsequent consequences for the movement.
Environmental Activism and Heterotopias

The pluralist and egalitarian nature of the environmental activist movements means they constantly evolve through repetitive “forms, dramaturgy, and distinct aim” (Foucault, 2007: 196). The “act of protest”, the spectacle and “image event” (Deluca, 1999), rely on a series of strategies and tactics built on the historical evolution of the environmental activist movements. These actions can be described as “liminoid”, as opposed to liminal, rituals within a heterotopia. Liminal ritual, put simply, can be a rite of passage, or a marker that indicates a change in individual status. Liminal rituals are associated with ceremonial practices such as marriage, christening and funeral and are often ascribed by social order (Hetherington, 1996). Liminoid rituals, on the other hand, are “achieved rather than ascribed…weaker as sources of social integration…and created out of spaces during particular events” (Hetherington, 1997: 32). These liminoid spaces are associated with “political protests that have a strong carnivalesque element” (Hetherington, 1996: 43). They form the basis of the practice of protest. As tactics and repertoires of protest emerge out of the space of particular camps a toolbox of tactics is created that forms the foundation of both the heterotopia and the movement. For example, activists use “consensus decision making” (Camp for Climate Action Handbook, 2009: 10), in which all voting processes are excluded, no one wins or loses, decisions are made through a series of hand signals. For example, many global justice (1990s) and environmental activist movements (1990s onwards) apply hand signals as a non-linguistic communication tools. Five key signals are: (1) the blocking of a proposal (a fist); (2) a request to make a direct response (both index fingers raised); (3) a point of order or clarity (single index finger raised); (4) a technical point (a two-handed “T” shape); and (5) general agreement, which is indicated with the waving of both hands (Camp for Climate Action Handbook, 2009: 10). Anecdotally, climate camp activists shared such
practices with NGOs at the Kingsnorth camps, as HACAN Chairman, John Stewart, notes: “they adopted our working practices like consensus decision making. Saying, ‘It was amazing, we’ve never had meetings like this, they are so fast, so efficient,’ you know, they really loved that actually, our working practices” (interview with John Stewart, August 2011).

Hetherington draws on the new age traveller movement to show how “the nomadic New Age Traveller who travels to sites such as Stonehenge [is] engaging in a liminoid rather than liminal ritual process of identity transformation” (Hetherington, 1996: 37). Moreover, “the use of heterotopic spaces, such as Stonehenge, which act as sites of social centrality for those who attempt to transform their identities through transgressive and carnivalesque performance…and through the shared sense of belonging that underlies their identification with one another” (Hetherington, 1996: 39). The shared sense of belonging is achieved through liminoid practice to help define the identity of the environmental activists’ movement as a heterotopia.

The festival is a liminoid social occasion in which the norms and values of society are overturned and a new code of behaviour established…such festivals have generally been held on common land sites, the sites of old medieval fairs or at a pagan site like Stonehenge. It is the sites of such festivals that can be described as heterotopia. (Hetherington, 1997: 42)

And, as with the Stonehenge and the roads protest, as Doherty notes, the protest camp becomes a “a heterotopic space in which it becomes possible to express a new way of life” (Doherty, 1999: 13). The physical space itself is part of the process, because unlike a lot of protests, environmental activism occurs at the site of contestation. Each cycle or heterochron, such as the Greenham Common Peace Camps, roads protests, and the anti-capitalist (outside banking institutes) protests are
held at the source of the issue. Be it a proposed road route, a new runway, military site, the South China Sea, 99% of environmental activism occurs at the site of contestation. Thus the protest camps occur at sites of contestation, creating a liminoid practice of the environmental activist movement. For example, the first anti-road protest against the M3 extension at Twyford Down “saw the first use of an action camp at a road construction site, it saw the convergence of the rural ‘New Age Traveller’ subculture with the direct action environmentalism” (McKay, 1998: 81).

Protesting at the site of contestation “allows for identification between an uncertain place and marginal and uncertain identities, eclectic, shifting and ambivalent in composition, to develop” (Hetherington, 1996: 43). On several occasions heterotopias are as seen as liminal spaces held together both by ritualised access and by fostering a sense of community through various practices. The site of contestation becomes the “symbolic sites of Otherness… through the rituals of festivals, allows an identity to be fully expressed” (Hetherington, 1996: 42). That identity is expressed by bringing together “a collection of unusual themes (or discursive statements), and give them a unity of meaning through the production of a space, that acts symbolically as a site for the performance of an alternate mode of social ordering” (Hetherington 1996: 38). A further impact was to shift the political ground:

The roads protest, along with some other recent forms of direct action, involved a dispersion of politics. On the one hand, political activity was spatially dispersed... by developing an inventive form of demonstration, it was possible, however imperfectly and momentarily, to reveal something which would have been otherwise unknown to others. (Barry, 2001: 192–93)

This work suggests that the sites of contestation were the first liminoid practice, which acted as “obligatory points of passage within the network of social spaces that should be viewed as successful heterotopic sites” (Hetherington, 2001: 52). Each protest, from Greenham Common to the climate camps, exists as a heterotopia (that
is offering an alternative to nuclear war, green governmentality) by drawing from specific historical tactics so that “those who make these places their own…attempt to take on attributes of uncertainty and ambivalence presented by the alternate orderings of such places when performing an ordering of their identities in liminoid ritual practices” (Hetherington 1996: 38–39).

Dominated by direct action as a means to “directly change perceived political, social or environmental injustices…by using their bodies to occupy a space or to harm people or damage property” (Doherty et al. 2003: 670), activists have developed tactics and strategies as a repertoire of protest within the heterotopia. In his paper, “Manufactured Vulnerability: Eco-Activist Tactics in Britain” (1999) Doherty identifies three factors to have “influenced the development of tactics by protesters” (1999: 9). These are (1) situation (site of contestation as this work defines it) – the terrain and the relationship with the local residents; (2) values and adopting a tribal identity (similar to Hetherington’s rituals argument); and (3) the ability “of opponents to adapt to earlier tactics” (Doherty, 1999: 9). Many of the road protests were situated at places of outstanding natural beauty, wildlife habitats, or, in the case of the Claremont Road, Leytonstone, east London, understood in terms of “social destruction of an east London community, bisected by a road intended to bring commuters from outside London” (Doherty, 1999: 9). Once the space was defined, within that space, tree-camps and tree-top walkways would be built. Homes would be established in the tree tops, a practice also common in Australia and North America. Activists tended to either live in trees or tunnels, each working as a demarcation of the space, without the necessity of a physical fence or wall.
Alongside the protest camps, which make environmental activism unique within environmental discourse, the second most common tactic at the heart of environmental activism is direct action. Van Der Zee notes “direct action is not one specific tactic but rather a spectrum of them” (2010: 172). Direct action is a practice shared with the vertical environmental organisations such as Greenpeace, and for radical environmental activists is a tactic that reinforces the heterotopia through historical practices and “liminoid social occasion” (Hetherington, 1996: 43). For example, the Newbury bypass protest (1996) reworked “forms of spectacular protest remembered and developed at Greenham [and] figured in the Newbury action” (Barry, 2001: 181); Plows (2006) notes in her study on the Blackwood protest, “tactics remembered by older activists were passed onto new ones, from camp maintenance, section 6’s, tree climbing and walkways, fighting the legal process, through to the simple joys of stopping work by getting in the way of machinery” (Plows, 2006: 13). The emergence of the anti-capitalist/global justice movement (from 1999 onwards) meant the “tactical repertoire of the environmental movement was expanded in the 1990s by alliances forged in the course of the roads protests, and direct-action was legitimised by their apparent success” (Rootes and Saunders, 2007: 131). Direct action in the space of each protest camp worked as a heterochron when activists “came to realise that each direct action was raising the cost of the subsequent construction and that, in the end, though they might not save one particular woodland, the struggle might save a woodland in the future” (Jordan, 2002: 64). In the most recent cycle (Tarrow, 2005), some members of the climate

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66 A road protest at Blackwood, South Wales, during February–April 2004. Approximately two miles of road, costing £56 million pounds, were scheduled to destroy an ancient, and extremely beautiful, stretch of woodland. Extremely well-informed local campaigners had contested the scheme for 11 years through the usual legal channels, and 11,000 people signed a petition (Plows, 2004: 464).
camps’ (2006–10) media team were children at the Greenham Common Peace Camps.  

Other repertoires of protest include tripods and locking–on (both borrowed from North America and Australasia) (see Chapter One), and “spiking”, borrowed from the Earth First! movement. Each of these tactics over time shapes the heterotopia. Moreover, Della Porta claims that, as tactics, there needs to be a series of “logics”, or “modes of operation that shape how protests form and succeed” (1999: 172). These are (1) numbers, (2) material damage, and (3) bearing witness. The logic of numbers is very simply the greater the number of people protesting, the more power there is as an “indication of how much support the dissidents enjoy” (DeNardo, quoted in Della Porta, 1999: 174). The logic of material damage is “developed alongside those based on the logic of numbers or the logic of inflicting damage…activists are willing to run personal risk to demonstrate their convictions. Bearing witness is expressed through participation in actions which involve serious personal risk or cost” (Della Porta, and Diani 1999: 178). These may involve targeting machinery or the offices of large corporations, but rarely human life. The result is that environmental activism as a movement has developed as a discourse through liminoid practices, language, codes and rules (see Chapter Two). A person can arrive at a camp predominantly in the global north and, providing they know the discursive language and liminoid practices, can easily live within the heterotopia of that camp, regardless of geographical location. Whilst this work shares with Doherty (1999, 2003), Della Porta (1999) and Jordan (2002) the argument that direct action camps, logics, and the

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67 Interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 August 2011.
68 Spiking is the insertion of nails into a tree trunk designated for removal, The nails acts a barrier to the chainsaw, preventing the cutting down of trees.
69 This observation is based on informal research by the author at the Florentine Camp, Tasmania, Australia. The Florentine Camp, along with the nearby Styx Valley protest is about logging in World Heritage Tasmanian forest. The second experience comes from observations at camps against logging for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada.
practices of protest remain stalwarts of environmental activists’ discourse, the role of the media, new media and cyberprotest (Pickerill, 2003) is central to how activists resist and challenge green governmentality.

**Media, New Media and Heterotopia**

New media provides two roles for the protest camp. Firstly, it enables activists to have both a physical space (that is, a heterotopia) and a virtual space. A recent development in the heterotopia of protest camps is the introduction of a media tent, media team, and the practice of embedding journalists in the camps to introduce a media discourse into the heterotopia. The virtual space provides a platform to challenge environmental discourse and the neoliberalism of green governmentality. Activists can create their own media, space and presence, whilst using the internet to organise and co-ordinate global protests. Both the physical and virtual exist within the space of the protest camp to reinforce the heterotopia of the protest camp, whilst challenging media discourse (as discussed in the previous chapter). The following section illustrates these ideas through a series of discussions on the role of social media within environmental discourse.

As the earlier discussion by Death shows, a counter-conduct protest often “inverts” and “subverts” “normal social identities and codes of conduct” (2010a: 241). Protest camps, such as those that take place at a site of contestation, invert and subvert the relationship between activists and journalists. The heterotopia does not “exist in the order of things, but in the ordering of things” (Foucault, 1996: 38). The protest camp re-orders the relationship between journalists and activists by drawing journalists to the site of contestation, away from what Couldry terms the “media eye” (2000).
Media eye refers to spaces with a greater concentration of journalists and politicians. This means a higher chance of media coverage (Couldry, 2000: 156). For example, many non-environmental protests held outside the Houses of Parliament or in Downing Street are close to the media hub of the Parliamentary Press Centre, home to 300 journalists, and Millbank Tower with BBC and ITV studios. The anti-war protest against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Countryside Alliance march in 2002, the Pensioners Rights protest in 2006, and the Make Poverty History 70 campaign (2005), all occurred at “sites in the media eye” (Couldry, 2000: 156). None of these protests is disconnected from the environmental heterotopias because, although they have the paraphernalia (banners, whistles, placards) of protest, they are, as Foucault observes, protest against economics, policy, work-force related, political decisions, and not about governmentality. Such protests are not suggesting an alternative discourse, as opposed to the heterotopia of the environmental activists’ camps, which are suggesting an alternative way of being governed.

There is one exception to this rule in the direct action of the Plane Stupid collective. Plane Stupid, the anti-aviation expansion collective, utilised the media eye of Parliament to stage a protest against the proposed third runway at Heathrow Airport (February 2008). Activists climbed onto the roof of the Palace of Westminster to unfurl a banner proclaiming that Parliament was “BAA Headquarters”, while a second banner carried the web address for Plane Stupid. It could be argued that the protest created a heterotopia, because they drew on liminoid practices of the

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70 The Make Poverty History campaign (aimed at cancelling the debt owed to the UK government by developing countries) is significant for its strategy solely of gaining media coverage, without including any people in the protest. The campaign involved painting their slogan (Make Poverty History) onto the grass of Parliament Green in Parliament Square. The only way to see the slogan was from the news cameras mounted on a building opposite the Houses of Parliament, which then framed the slogan with the Houses of Parliament in the background, without any need to organise protests. The Make Poverty History campaign thus effectively utilised the media eye to gain publicity.
carnivalesque, direct action and “locking on”. Activists intentionally dressed in tweeds to represent what they felt were the gentry of Parliament, and handcuffed themselves to roof railings. As Plane Stupid activist and HACAN chairman, John Stewart, notes:

when the five or six people who went onto the roof of The House of Commons, they were very clear in the early meetings that we didn’t want headlines like that [points to London Evening Standard language of militant to describe activists] so even to the extent of what they would wear. A decision was taken that they would dress up like the sons and daughters of Daily Telegraph reader to attract those papers…it so happened that the Daily Mail actually came to them and wanted to do a feature. (interview with HACAN Chair, John Stewart, 2011)

There are similarities of liminoid practices, the carnivalesque, consensus decision-making as tools “to try and use the media by subverting it, by using their own tools” (interview with John Stewart, 2011). Plane Stupid deliberately attempted to subvert the media by taking protest to the media eye to gain coverage from the many journalists and permanent television cameras around Parliament Square. In one sense, such action could be a heterotopia. The house was debating the proposed third runway, so theoretically it was at the site of contestation, although the direct action could be understood as a TAZ. The protest lacked the counter-conduct, it echoed the other protests in the media eye – calling for policy change, not an alternative, and this was reflected in the media coverage. Although the action gave Plane Stupid front-page coverage, much of the language focused on a discourse of terrorism (as discussed in Chapters Four and Five). The London regional newspapers: London Lite, the London Evening Standard and the London Paper all ran with an image of the protesters on the roof. Headlines announced, “Airport protesters make a mockery of Commons security” (Murphy, 2008), and “The graduate eco-warrior in Commons raid” (Mendick et al., 2008). The London Paper called the protest the “Storming of Parliament” and “Security alert at Commons: protesters scale Parliament” (Sutherland, 2008). However, in general, environmental activists’ heterotopias are often at places and areas “not usually open to media coverage” (Couldry, 2000: 156).
The effect is that the story or protest becomes a novelty for journalists, and there emerges an inversion of control over media and political discourse. The anti-nuclear, roads protest and later global justice protest all brought to public attention “something that would have otherwise been unknown to others” (Barry, 2001: 193), because, prior to the Twyford Down protest, “there was no national roads protest campaign at grassroots level” (Connelly and Smith, 1999: 99). A further reason the protest gained media coverage was the geographical locations. Barry notes that when direct action occurs away from the “centres of political authority, but in a diverse set of sites” the sites themselves become “places of political activity” (Barry, 2001: 192). The Newbury and Twyford Down roads protests, as well as Greenham Common Peace Camps, were “only an hour’s drive from London and therefore easily reached by journalists” (Barry, 2001: 180). The geographical locale of the Newbury and Twyford meant more journalists were willing to travel to the story (within the south-east of England) and that gave the roads protest news value. In contrast, the A30 protest near Honiton, Devon (in 1997), received less media coverage, with most national newspapers taking reports from the Press Association, and only the Guardian sending one journalist down to the site (Barry, 2001: 258). Thus, by drawing journalists away from the media eye, and resisting governmentality through heterotopias and liminoid practices, the effect is to subvert the “symbolic hierarchy of the media frame” (Couldry, 2000: 163). The protest no longer presents itself to journalists and politicians; they have to come to the party. Yet, as the discussions in Chapter Five showed, even the techniques of “inversion” and “subversion” fail to remove activists from a discourse of deviance.
The emergence of the internet, websites and social media provided a new platform and new liminoid practice that activists could use to provide an alternative, predominantly through citizen journalism as a repertoire of protest. The internet enabled activists to challenge green governmentality by bypassing traditional media, and building global networks between activist groups. The strength of “different networks and campaigns [that] share the same struggles” consolidated “the ground from which anti-globalisation action springs…through continued focus of generating and building capacity at local group level; eco camps are useful way of doing this” (Plows, 2006: 26). The internet provided the next step for the movement to contest green governmentality. The next section will examine how the internet aided the global growth of environmental activists’ movements.

**The Internet, Social Media and Activism**

New technological developments aided the environmental activist movement, but the internet also aided the application of green governmentality. Initially created as a communication tool by the American military, the internet has subsequently aided the advance of capital and global communication. Creating new forms of communication and developing new technologies as part of “capital’s dream of superfast networks that will spread consumerism across the planet” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 65), the internet, and later, the world wide web, gave new opportunities for wider communications, greater networks and organisational structures – not just for capitalists but also for the activists’ movements. Whilst the creation of the internet allowed the spread of consumer capitalism, it also meant that activists could flourish in the “public part of cyberspace” (Lovink, 2002: 254).
The growth of the internet has benefited environmental activist movements by expanding their numbers (logics of numbers, to borrow from Della Porta) and aiding the easier co-ordination of tactics and skills. Two key global justice movement actions served to aid the global growth of activism: in the UK, the Global Justice Movement’s J18 protest, Carnival of Capital (London, 18 June 1999); and in the USA the Anti-World Trade Organization protest (Seattle, 1 December 1999). Seattle and London were united by what appeared to be a spontaneous anti-capitalist protest that emerged from nowhere. In reality, the two events were a highly organised protest as a “result of clear sets of mathematical principles and processes that govern a highly connected network” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 68). The protests had in part been co-ordinated through a network of internet sites, emails and websites. The structure of the internet mirrors the networks of protest movements.

This growth in communication meant activists’ networks in the UK could learn from other activists’ movements around the world, as “global networks of power and counter-power landed simultaneously to confront each other in the spotlight of the media” (Castells, 2009: 340). The most notable example is the Zapatista movement,71 which partly inspired the Global Justice Movement. The Zapatista movement was effective for its combining of “broad-based, local and national networks, run by communities, and linked internationally, by the Internet, have proved themselves capable of bringing together very large groups of people in very short spaces of time” (Kingsnorth, 2003: 75).

71 Canadian, Mexican and American governments drew up the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), framing it as an opportunity to lower trade barriers and provide opportunities for export. In reality, it led to lower subsidies to the indigenous populations, whilst opening up opportunities for large corporations. To appease the indigenous population, the Mexican government agreed to an amendment to the Treaty, and when the newly elected president, President Fox, sent the Indigenous Rights Bill to be passed in 2001, the Zapatista army (a group of farmers) travelled the 2,000 miles to the capital to address Congress. When they reached Mexico City they were greeted by 100,000 people. The mobilisation of thousands of people through the internet showed the organisational potential of the world wide web. By 2001, details of the Zapatistas’ protest against NAFTA had spread around the world via email, websites and blogs.
The internet provides additional tools for the environmental activists’ movement. In particular, it enables activists to bypass the traditional media and avoid the order of discourse that favours state over activists. The creation of alternative media (such as Indymedia, Schnews, etc.) means that activists can be both producers and consumers of news. The symbiotic relationship between activists and the internet shifts any action from local to global. Operating a website means that activists can provide information directly to journalists. As Castells (2009) notes, besides Indymedia, numerous hacklabs, \(^{72}\) temporary or stable, populated the movement and used the superior technological savvy of the new generation to build an advantage in the communication battle against their elders in the mainstream media (Castells, 2009: 344). Indymedia was the first alternative news website for the movements. Activists believe they are subverting the original intention of the internet as a tool to spread consumerism, by “inverting” social media to bypass the state and police prevention measures:

...just being able to upload something we’ve occupied, Manchester, Stanstead, Aberdeen airports, it’s been genius. You know, one of the things about the Aberdeen protest, they put a Fire Engine in front of the cage that we were in so that no media could see us, but by that time we’d taken our own photos and sent it out so “I’ve done it anyway”. So it’s been really useful. And of course there was the Twitter on the whole swoop and everything like that, so it’s been brilliant in many ways for organising actions and bypassing, A), the police and B), the powers that be, and C), the traditional media. (interview with Dan Glass, 9 August 2011)

Thus, activists realise they need to source traditional media to increase citizen journalism but, equally, social media enables them to bypass the state. Moreover, today environmental activists exist in a virtual heterotopia, allowing them to organise

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\(^{72}\) Hacklab is a computer hackers’ space.
the physical protest camps, and by giving reporters direct access to “action” through their website’s homepage, texts, social networks and citizen journalism. This “tactical” media approach allows activism to flourish in the “public part of cyberspace” (Lovink, 2002: 254), by blurring the boundaries between the traditional binary positions of the media and new media, and journalists and activists.

The internet has become a pivotal tool for organising protests, informing the media or voicing opinion, and has become a “key ingredient of the environmental movement in the global network society” (Castells, 2009: 316). The World Wide Web provides the tools to enable the activist movements to develop their own media and political strategies, and has extraordinarily “improved the campaigning ability of environmental groups and increased international collaboration” (Castells, 2009: 316). Activists are now able to use a new “global communications infrastructure for something completely different, to become more autonomous” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 65). Activists are reworking the technology by placing hackers and cyber squatters at the “forefront of the movement, freeing activism from the limitations imposed on their autonomous expression by corporate control of the media networks” (Castells, 2009: 345). The capacity of new technologies to support and sustain dispersed coalitions of protestors and new forms of political organisation has been witnessed in the anti-capitalism protests (J18 and Seattle in 1999, the May Day protests between 2000 and 2004) and similar “summit sieges” at the G8 Conference in 2005 and G20 Conference in 2009. The internet, Web 2.0 and new technologies have aided the co-ordination of action by bringing together “hundreds of local organisations and the thousands of activists come to the local from the global” (Opel and Pompper, 2003).
For example, the 2009 Camp for Climate Action used an earlier activist technique of the “swarm” but organised it via SMS, email and blogspots, to co-ordinate a “swoop” on a pre-designated organisation in central London. The “swoop” and “swarm” are terms coined by the RAND Corporation (2002). A “swarm”, like the collective actions of swallows and similar birds, is used as an analogy to the protest movement. Like swallows, many protesters move en masse, each “moves as one, as if it’s one organism. Yet no-one is in charge, it seems to happen as if magically” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 67). Pre-internet days, a swarm would have been organised through word of mouth, limited direction and vague instructions based on Chinese whispers and a maze of symbols and whistles. For example, during the Carnival Against Capital (on 18 June 1990), 8,000 face masks were handed out to activists. The masks were of different colours and, on a signal (in this case a whistle) each colour (red, blue, green or black) would follow one person with a correspondingly coloured flag out of the railway station (Tyler, 2003). Later, with the internet, this was easily organised via text and SMS messaging. Technology makes the organising of a swarm or swoop much easier, as SMS messaging means that activists can arrange the events through tweets and smartphone messaging (Newlands, 2012b). Using mobile phones and a social networking site, it opened up the event, enabling anyone with an interest (including journalists and the police) to be part of the swoop, either physically or at a virtual level.

A simple website is easy to produce and with little need for any “formal organisation behind it…used as a node for organising protest campaigns” (Tarrow, 2003: 30) to provide journalists with information. At the climate camps, documentary maker

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73 The RAND Corporation is a non-profit institution. Its research is commissioned by a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations and private-sector firms. RAND began in 1946 as a research project (Project Rand) backed by the US Army Air Forces.
Hamish Campbell at visionOtv website encouraged activists to produce their own news media. Anti-aviation expansions collective Plane Stupid’s communication strategy uses websites to provide journalists with direct access to protesters. Doyle (2009) observes how Plane Stupid’s website “constitutes its action…the website is action orientated…alongside press releases” (Doyle, 2009: 113). For example, during the Westminster Palace roof protest, Plane Stupid provided the mobile phone numbers of the activists on their homepage.

“This perspective sees the web as an adjunct to conventional sources, rather than as an additional one” (Gavin, 2009: 136). Moreover, in a time-conscious environment, the media rely heavily on PR sources, and it could be extended to relying on protest websites, as “the pressure placed on them [journalists] to produce additional web-based copy alongside conventional packages – with fewer resources and an infinite amount of time – can lead to a dependence on readily available PR sources that, some argue, compromises the quality and integrity of the resultant coverage” (Gavin, 2009: 136).

Websites, social media as an organising tool, technological developments, and the ability to invert media practices provides the radical environmental activist movement with tools to challenge the media and state representation that places them in a discourse of deviance. However, for the heterotopia to retain a position that supports the movement and challenges green governmentality, there needs to be both a physical and virtual presence. As activist Dan Glass notes, “You’ve been on the internet for 2 hours, 5 days, that’s it, get off! because it’s so easy to get sucked in” (interview 9 August 2011 ). The next section will examine how, in order to challenge
environmental discourse, activists have begun to engage with journalists to influence media discourse.

Media Engagement: A Tactical Change

A year before the first camp at Drax, activists made a conscious decision to introduce a media tent as a practice into the heterotopia of the camps. The climate camps were week-long protest camps with the objective of educating new protesters and the wider society on alternative ecologically focused lifestyles. The most significant moment came in 2005, when activists connected to the Dissent! network felt that, although the media are “part of the problem and not part of the solution” (CSC, 2005: 322), it would be a “mistake to reject the possibility of strategically using the mainstream media outlets to promote our ideas and tackle head on the discourses of politicians, corporations/ Recipients of such media coverage to think differently outside their own comfort zone” (CSC, 2005: 322). The activists chose the locus for the new encounter: the G8\(^{74}\) meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland (2005), and the climate camp(s) (2006–present) into which the media were invited under specific conditions. In 2005, two months before the G8 summit, the “media group” had developed into the so-called Counterspin Collective (CSC). The main role of the CSC was to “facilitate media relations...like a sort of dating agency for journalists and activists...offering a network of translators so that press releases could be distributed in many languages” (CSC, 2005: 324). CSC introduced an “open hour” (CSC, 2005: 324), when journalists were invited onto the site. The term “open hour” is perhaps contradictory, as there was a form of control over the space and the journalists. What

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\(^{74}\) G8 is a forum for the governments of the eight largest economies. They were meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland. At the same time, Live Aid Two was taking place, bringing a greater number of international journalists to the UK.
emerged from this strategy was a clear definition of space and boundaries between activists and journalists, and also a form of control of the activists themselves.

Like the direct action that marked out the early days of Greenpeace, the post-2005 collectives such as Plane Stupid, the Climate Camps, So We Stand, Climate Rush, and others are actively engaging with traditional media. These contemporary collectives are repeating the much earlier media tactics of environmental activist movements, by providing good copy to journalists. Environmental activists understand that a “self-imposed isolation”, a tactic of non-interaction with the mainstream media, was a “luxury that we [activists] could not collectively afford” (CSC, 2005: 322). What was clear at the camp was how different groups utilised the space to conduct their own media strategies and campaigns. Additionally, creating a media team and engaging directly with journalists they are, to quote one activist “preaching to the converted” (interview with Nim Ralph, 9 August 2011). Activists engage with journalists from the Guardian newspaper knowing they will gain media coverage – “there’s always …Aww, just go to the Guardian” (interview with Dan Glass).

In the initial days of the camp there was collegiality between the different radical groups. All the collectives agreed to exclude the larger professional environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, fearing it would detract from their purpose. Activist Steve notes at the earlier Heathrow climate camp:

> everybody wanted to get involved, including the mainstream NGOs [non-governmental organisations], some quite clumsily, like Greenpeace and some not quite as clumsily, like Friends of the Earth, and it culminated in, when we actually got to the camp, it was a media scrum, you know, the whole street was full of media and we had volunteers from NGOs in their personal capacities who did media for
The result was that the activists created their own media tent, firstly outside the camp, but over time the tent moved into the protest camp (McCruddy, 2009) and the role of gate keeping was brought inside of the protest camp under the remit of the “media tent” team. The tent formed the press centre for journalists, and was a nexus for the numerous media classes taking place. Protesters were offered workshops and leaflets on citizen journalism and its potential to shift away from negative representation. Workshops were run to “do media work, from making an online sensation with your mobile phone to staying on message” (Anon, 2009: 9). Footage was then uploaded with collaborative partners visionOntv. Climate Camp TV, part of visionOntv, ran a series of workshops at the camp, to encourage and train activists to produce their own news and commentary footage. Activists were given three different pamphlets, each setting out how to record a one-minute news item following the inverted pyramid structure. The media tent recommended adoption of the inverted pyramid form in order to maximise the chances of radical content being aired on the mainstream media. The media team were advised that “TV crews and press photographers are allowed in the camp between 10am and 7pm, so long as they have a friendly guide from the media team” (Media Team advisory, 2009: 12). Media spots could be arranged outside of these hours, providing journalists “are accompanied on and off the site” (Media Team advisory, 2009: 12).

However, a consequence of media engagement was the focus on individual rather than collective action (see Chapter Five), which led to a depoliticisation. Activists therefore devised techniques to counter the focus on individualism. In order to prevent a repetition of what some activists felt was an embarrassing relationship with...
the media during the Swampy reports, the aim was to challenge the reliance on journalists to define the protest camps.

**Swamp(ing) the Media: Lessons Learnt from the Road Protest Movement**

*(1990s)*

Post-2005 environmental activists learnt from the media discourse around roads protester Swampy (see Chapters Two and Five for discussion on Swampy). Activists countered such depoliticisation with a media strategy to ensure their objectives remained. The move away from autonomous collectives to a personality-led focus made “Swampy a household name, as well as altering public perceptions of new environmental movements and their objectives” (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62).

The climate camp media team, and other collectives such as HACAN and Plane Stupid, learnt that a focus on one activist could become problematic for the whole movement.

One of the things was, if someone was in the media for a while, we accepted that for a they would go back...having been through the roads protest thing where the media did mess us up, kind of, big time, is, we had a very clear strategy from the very beginning how to do it, so we tried to be in control of what we were doing and without that strategy, of course we messed up from time to time, but without that strategy and that clear kind of vision it would have been quite difficult. (John Stewart, 9 August 2011)

Dan echoes John’s views on the importance of differentiating between media strategies and other objectives as

having a press strategy and movement building are often, incompatible. If you’re appealing to the press and movement building is often incompatible. So with Plane Stupid, which was a lot more media orientated than So We Stand. Plane Stupid never really claimed to be movement building, it clearly was a small group of people from quite similar demographics, and for me that was ok, but where,
because, So We Stand and Climate Camp and stuff; if you’re claiming to be joining the dots, supporting, movement building or stuff, you’ve got to pay vigilance to that, and you can’t be the same demographic of people, you can’t be empowering a few people, and so that’s why, I think it’s very, in terms of having media engagement, its, you’ve got to be very careful how it aligns with movement building or stuff like that. (interview with Dan Glass, 2011)

Activists learnt from the “Swampy” episode to counter the depoliticisation and personality-led reporting by rotating “who’s in the media for the actions and then take a step back from the limelight, so it doesn’t become about the person but becomes about the issue” (Dan Glass, Plane Stupid, August 2011). A media strategy, media tent and the lessons learnt all adapt the liminoid practices within the heterotopy of the climate camp, and for activists meant that:

Climate Camp only really had two things that I would call a success. That’s not to say that there weren’t other good things that came out of the two successes of it, and one is that, was Heathrow, cos I don’t think any of the other camps, none of them achieved their day of actions, none of them were long-lasting, none of them were engaged with the local community beyond the actual week of the camp and some of them more likely did more damage than good in that sense. Erm, and the other thing is that between Drax and Kingsnorth, I think it really did transform the discussion and the narrative of media around environmental and climate change issues. (Nim, So We Stand, interview August 2011)

Activists believe that the media were less inclined to place activists into a discourse of deviance due to the increased use of citizen journalism. Citizen journalism was a way to adapt earlier repertoires of protest by inverting journalistic practice. Citizen journalism enables activists to apply journalism without professional markers, using inverted-pyramid journalistic techniques, sub-editors, and so on. Engaging with professional journalistic practices, the internet and associated technologies offers a way of altering mainstream media representation of radical protests. Today, activists are utilising the internet and Web 2.0 technology to produce their own news reports through citizen journalism.
Guardian journalist Paul Lewis’s article “Climate Camp gets a lesson in citizen journalism” (28 August 28 2009: 19) sets out the increased use of social media and citizen journalism as a repertoire of protest. The article focused on the use of social media by the activists and the workshops on citizen journalism. Focus group participants Hamish and Richard were both quoted directly – and feel they were misrepresented:

Almost all the quotes in there I didn’t actually say. It’s very noticeable. I was going nuts…his [Lewis’s] attitude has changed; he was very dismissive of the radical media…He started out his career as a politician, dissing radical media to try and get himself onto this greasy pole, which he did make it up the top of, impressive. Doing a good job on the top of the greasy pole but actually completely misquoted just about everything. (interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 August 2011)

Fellow visionOntv activist Richard feels slightly differently, believing that mainstream journalists working with the media team aided the use of citizen journalism:

The Climate Camp media team had strong connections with journalists, with traditional media journalists and knew the editor of The Guardian was interested in citizen journalism and therefore managed to get this piece. What I generally say is, not that I am misquoted there but when we do a presentation we like to try and be funny and they never put in anything funny… I’m quoted as saying something entirely boring, which I probably did say because it was important at the time. (interview with visionOntv activist Richard, 9 August 2011)

Despite a realisation that activist’ voices can be altered or “boring”, Richard noted the importance of traditional media coverage “we can’t do citizen journalism if we don’t get mainstream media pieces. Can’t get anybody to go to the courses because people don’t know anything about us, don’t trust us. Once you’re in the Guardian…then you’ve got a hundred more citizen journalists taking better reporting than Sky” (interview with Richard, 9 August 2011). Echoing the earlier discussions
on how activists are moving towards capitalist ventures, here Richard’s comments reveals that, despite being misrepresented, the media attention still produces capital.

**Not All Good News**

Pickerill (2003: 24) notes, “cyberspace has been likened to that of a rhizome”, where a “rhizomatic structure provides multiple entryways, facilitating potential participants’ entry into environmental activism through connections to their rhizomatic online networks”. The hypertextual architecture (Kahn and Kelner, 2003) of the internet as a non-hierarchical “rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 7) is a linear network which connects any point to another point, understood in terms of a “non-signifying system without an organising memory as the Internet is reducible neither to the one or the multiple” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 7). The rhizomatic pattern of the internet was and is useful for movements as it echoes the consensus politics of environmental activism. The internet is viewed by some activists as a mimetic platform for new social movements that correlates with like-minded, non-hierarchical groups of people, linked through similar interests. However, others see problems of adapting mainstream media discourse into activist politics. The internet and World Wide Web may have opened up new media platforms, but they have also created divisions between the “older” and “younger” activists, and the radical flank of anarchists, who rejected total engagement with journalists at the camp.76 Saunders and Price (2009) note “within the [climate] camp, the main tension is between the

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75 The rhizome has been defined as “[a] multiplicity that has no coherent and bounded whole, no beginning or end, only a middle from where it expands and overspills. Any point of the rhizome is connected to any other. It has no fixed points to anchor thought, only lines, magnitudes, dimensions, plateaus, and they are always in motion (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996: 377).

76 Some of the tents had a sign outside saying “No Media”.

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ideal anti-authoritarian self and those more sympathetic to corporate – or state led solutions” (Saunders and Price, 2009: 118).

Saunders and Price (2009) observe that there lies a tension which “will prove difficult to resolve: between those who believe states and corporations alike will end up hijacking the movement with promises of false, profit-orientated solutions, and those whom Monbiot accuses of seeking to ‘create an anarchist utopia and to use climate change as a way to achieve it” (Monbiot, 2008, in Saunders and Price, 2009: 120). Journalists clearly felt the tension in the camp, exacerbated by the gatekeeping tactics of the media team. Journalists were advised by media tent members of rules such as asking permission before speaking to participants, observing the “media-free zones” and, if they chose to “stay for the duration of the camp…to wear press badges at all times” (Camp Handbook, 2009). Such gatekeeping practices led some “journalists to complain about being asked to sign ‘codes of conduct’…even though it is common land” (West, 2009).

**Going Online to Get Offline**

Environmental activists can “increase their chances of enacting social and political change – even if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources, or symbolic legitimacy” (Castells 2009: 302). As Hamish Campbell notes, social media “are the best tool we have ever had”, but he is very cautious about embracing social media:

I think, activists relying on them wholesale with such national naivety that I want to scream and jump…and the success of the corporate stuff comes at the price of the failure of the radical alternative stuff and the radical, alternative media is in the doldrums nowadays. I mean,
Indymedia almost doesn’t exist. (interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 August 2011)

Morozov argues (2011) that “the problem with political activism facilitated by social networking sites is that much of it happens for reasons that have nothing to do with one’s commitment to ideas and politics in general, but rather to impress one’s friends” (2011: 186) The internet shouldn’t be a solitary force for mobilisation of new political forms, but one factor of it, and “success is conditioned by many factors that have little to do with the internet” (Gavin, 2009: 130). Gavin (2009) observes that if traditional media sees the web as an add-on “an alternative transmission mechanism for these media, which are far and away the public’s most trusted and most often used source of political information” (Gavin, 2009: 138). The internet and various sources on the web “does not in itself constitute usable information, any more than usable information constitutes a contribution to knowledge or to rational debate” (Gavin, 2009: 138). Activist Dan Glass has similar ideas:

I don’t think it’s the question social media is the problem in terms of intercultural organising for political change. I just think in Britain, we don’t have that cultural, intercultural organising; people stay in their different issues. Whereas in America you can say there is a lot more overlap between racial justice, environmental justice, gender justice, de, de, de, you use social media for the context whereas here, we’re all fighting our own battles and not. And now I think there is a change, and this is what So We Stand is about as well, it’s joining the dots and seeing the power structures and I think social media could be used for that, for intercultural organising, I can’t really see why not. (Dan Glass, 9 August 2011)

Activist Steve adds that there is a need to:

Do more face-to-face stuff and, whatever means necessary, we are going to go to the actual mainstream media is, with all the growing things that are coming, we need to continue to expose the role of the state, The state are complicit in this scheme with the media and with multinational corporations, and the power, the power that is out there isn’t held by governments, governments just set the parameters and if multinationals don’t like it in that little parameter, they’ll move somewhere else into another parameter. And I think the, ourselves need to do our own investigative journalism … I mean, for the Drax camp, we had a long, really long, difficult debate in Rising Tide as to
whether we should fly over 2 activists from the US, who were going to set up Rising Tide and the Climate Camp movement in the US. Eventually we did and, obviously sometimes you’ve gotta take a chance. Anyway, they went back and within 6 months, they had set up a 200 group network, in six months. And the way they did it was by tapping into existing networks, mainly of native communities, mainly of native communities that were already engaged in fighting something that they didn’t see as climate change, like mountain top removal for coal but was climate change and was literally as grassroots as you can get; and not just join these up within a Rising Tide, climate change, direct action network but put them in touch with each other. Amazingly, they weren’t even in touch with each other. (interview with Steve, August 2011)

Put another way, “one cannot start with protests and think of political demands and further steps later on. There are real dangers to substituting strategic and long-term action with spontaneous street marches” (Morozov, 2011: 196). The internet and social media networks are a good reorganising tool, although “what people have lost in the social media hype, is the ability to have a chat. Too busy, got 3000 email to answer. No, no I’m not friends with you because you’re not on Facebook” (interview with Dan Glass, August 2011). As Morozov observes:

While Facebook-based mobilization will occasionally lead to genuine social and political change, this is mostly accidental, a statistical certainty rather than a genuine achievement. With millions of groups, at least one or two of them are poised to take off. But since it’s impossible to predict which causes will work and which ones won’t, Western policymakers and donors who seek to support or even prioritize Facebook-based activism are placing a wild bet. (Morozov, 2011: 180)

Despite lessons learnt from the roads protests and heterochronic periods, such as rotating activists in the media spotlight, the reporting continued a depoliticisation of the movement. The presence of gatekeeping, the stalwarts of a media team and press officers led to antagonism with journalists and between activists, with the consequence that the protest camp was no longer a heterotopia.
Activists have come to realise that engaging with mainstream media brings a new set of problems, problems that have led to the dismantling of the kind of heterotopia that has protected and supported the movement since the days of the Greenham Common Peace Camp. The engagement with mainstream media discourse, the adoption of mainstream media practice, and the negating of earlier liminoid social occasions does in fact create another form of governmentality. The media tents create a hierarchy of top-down politics that begins to conduct the climate camp. The objective and history of the movement becomes lost, replaced by branding. In the next and final section of this chapter, this work will set out why it believes that climate camps, and specifically the Blackheath climate camp, shows that the movement is no longer a “revolt of conducts” or “counter-conduct”, or even a heterotopic space, but is a form of governmentality that the very values of the movement are attempting to offer an alternative, or counter-conduct to.

Conformity, Non-places, and a New Governmentality

The Blackheath Camp for Climate Action was the penultimate camp before a decision was made to end the annual national gatherings. Although the camps took place over a five-year period, over time, many of the original objectives were lost, diluted or disappeared. Slowly the camp began “losing touch with its anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian roots and appears as a gathering that lends its support to top-down, state-centred response to climate crisis” (a group of anti-authoritarians, 2008 cited in Saunders and Price, 2009: 120). Those behind the camp realised it was fragmenting and dislocating from its original objectives. The end of the camp was announced through the common media practice of a well-crafted press release. The camp noted that as a movement it had ceased:
to be relevant, we need to move with the times…this closure is intended to allow new tactics, organising methods and processes to emerge in this time of whirlwind change, which they plan to achieve through the creation of interim working groups to manage the transition. The end of the camp was announced through a press release onto a list serve, and stated the camp although not finished it would be going through a phase of metamorphosis. (Climate Camp Media Team, 2011)

The press release goes on to say they would develop “working groups” to address “ongoing communications plus learn from and document our experiences over the past few years” (Climate Camp Media Team, 2011). Each working group would investigate “new organisational forms, structures and tactics for possible next experiments”. The language is not one of autonomy, or even environmental discourse, but a managerial, business language. The “working groups” are not offering alternatives to green capitalism or even green governmentality but appear to be searching for a move away from governing themselves and more towards a “different form of conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 194). They are no longer rejecting the notion of being “conducted”, but are looking to “be conducted differently, by other leaders and other shepherds” (Foucault, 2007: 194).

The need to “metamorphosise” emerged when after five years the camp was no longer about challenging green governmentality; instead it was shifting its focus towards movement building. This work identifies a series of elements that led to the spilt, from the formation of a hierarchy, to generational differences, a lack of historical understanding of the movement and removal of politics. In addition, the issue of class became increasingly prominent. Activist Mike Camden notes:

77 This information was sent on 1 March 2011 via email to those signed up to a listserve. The email, entitled “Metamorphosis: A Statement from the Camp for Climate Action” sets out the rationale for not continuing with the camps.
After Kingsnorth there was such an obvious split, where you had some, debutante type, who was controlling the media and the spokesperson, and then when they finally got to the site, it was the stewards or whatever they were called, kept the group and made them turn around and march back which left a group of 20 to 30 people to scale the… and do the direct action… And by the time we got to Blackheath, it just seemed like the Climate Camp label was going to be a summer fixture. (interview with activist Mike, 2011)

Echoing Mike’s comments, Rising Tide activists reaffirm his comments and note how the loss of liminoid practices led to the depoliticisation of environmental activism discourse by removing the objective of the gatherings.

After Kingsnorth, it was such hell being there, that everyone was so exhausted that it defined a new definition of exhaustion really. It created a vacuum into which a lot of new people with different ideas, without any sense of history at all and without a lot of sense of consensus. I would say, and it became immediate, it became part of what I’ll call a marketing strategy up to and including the Blackheath Camp, complete marketing strategy: t-shirts, badges, stickers, participation in festivals and then when we get to Blackheath it became a festival. We had a sub-group, whose sole purpose was to book bands for the entertainment, and big bands came, named people came because it was cool to play at Climate Camp. (interview with Steve, activist, August 2011).

The “festival” of environmental activism discourse no longer has a politically determined function in society, as the camp’s role of resistance has been removed. As Steve notes, the camp lacked any sense of a history or historical practice. The liminoid social practices are lost as the camp moves away from a heterotopia. The “marketing strategy” is reiterated in the “Media Q and A: Camp for Climate Action, Summer 2009” leaflet given to activists. The nine-page handbook (Media Team advisory, 2009), covers the “key message and general guidelines” and advises activists on questions under various subheadings, such as “The Camp”; “Why London?”; “The Economy and Workers”; “Copenhagen”; “Policing”; “Direct Action, Disruption, Risk”; and “Solutions” (p. 1). A key theme to emerge from the document is the ideology that the camp was “building a new movement” (p. 1), a
term mentioned nine times in total. When speaking to journalists, activists are advised to “take control of the interview by bridging the key message” of linking political economy with climate change. The camp has four main objectives, with movement building a common theme in the media tent literature. The aims are to (1) take collective action, (2) demonstrate alternatives, (3) educate ourselves, and (4) build a movement for radical change. The first three chimes with a heterotopia, the last aim is an indicator to why the camp disbanded.

This form of conduct and “mentality” begins to indicate the shift towards the camp’s own form of governmentality. Activists are able to give their own responses, but the language guides them to “try and get as much of these as possible” (p. 1), “things to keep in mind” (p. 2); “current key messages” (p. 4) is the direction for discussing the key messages of the camp. The shift towards movement building means it can no longer act as a mirror or exist in the world between the real and unreal, it can no longer be a heterotopia (Foucault, 1989). At Blackheath, in particular, alongside activists there emerged a series of leaders who were unaware or uninterested in the history of the movement. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, any heterotopia is both open and closed, both isolating and penetrable (Foucault, 1986). The challenge for the activists was not the control of their space but the fact that opening the site to journalists made them vulnerable to criticism that often cast them back into a place of “deviance” and depoliticisation of the movement. Reactions, as indicated above, ranged from acts of aggression against individual journalists to general ambivalence towards the media. Yet, far from regulating access for those attempting to enter from the outside, the “entry” requirements applied equally strictly to those on the “inside”. At the same time, openness has provided some activists with the opportunity to (1) engage in movement building; (2) alter the camp’s relationship
with journalists, thus removing any autonomy; and (3) in the case of Blackheath, move away from protesting at the site of contestation.

Thus, the camp is no longer a heterotopia, or even a place of “counter-conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 75), nor is it a “movement whose objective is a different form of conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 194) looking to be governed – “not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price?” (Foucault, 2007: 75). Instead, it is increasingly looking to “capture the close interrelationship between protest and the forms of government they oppose” (Death, 2010a: 235). The lack of protest at the site of contestation, the creation of a media team and the fostering of a sense of community are more akin to managerial training for radical activism. Thus, Blackheath was less about a heterotopia and more about conformity.

Journalists reported the camp in dismissive terms. The camp is defined as “the cheapest- and chic-est date in the summer festival calendar” (West, 2009: 30). Protesters are identified as being “of the “tree-hugging variety” and “children of the privileged” (West, 2009: 30), and “nice, white and middle-class…students who have made their way to Blackheath via a summer of Glastonbury, Inter-railing, camping in the south of France” (Fryer, 2009: 6). The camp is made up “of posh upper-class white people” and the camp “looks more like a gentle middle-class festival than a political training camp” (Fryer, 2009: 6). The opening-up of the camp to journalists meant that news stories were structured as being about young, affluent students uncertain of their political conviction, leading to a depoliticisation of any objectives to build a new movement. Indeed, much of the coverage asks why the protest even exists. If it is to highlight climate change, then it is “hardly a subject that lacks awareness” (West, 2009: 30). Yet there seems to be uncertainty in the rationale for
the protest, aside from it being an annual event which runs the risk of forming “climate camp, the institution” (Beaumont, 2009: 27).

There are two key indicators that the camp was slowly beginning to conform towards a green governmentality approach, as already discussed: (1) the creation of a media team and a set of rules for journalists; and (2) the building of a fence around the site.

Engagement with the media had unintended consequences: it highlighted internal divisions, brought to light power struggles running beneath the “common” cause and essentially altered the function of the space. What emerges from the above is the likelihood of division and dissonance, which seems to undermine the plurality and symbiotic heterogeneity inherent in Foucault’s definition. Activists need to find a voice or, as Chapter Five discussed, mainstream journalists will continue to position environmental protest in a negative framework. However, the media tent created friction both inside and outside the camp.

At Kingsnorth we decided not to engage with the Climate Camp process at all and just set up the thing [visionOnTv] and fuck the lot of them...So we were out of the programme or out of everything, but we were running this huge big tent, you know, producing tons of content.

(interview with Hamish Campbell, August 2011)

Hamish also produces documentaries with Richard Herring, who shares his concerns to reiterate a move towards marketing/business discourse over environmental discourse. Now through media discourse the camp is mirroring green capitalism, not offering an alternative:

There was a tension within the media team, therefore, because what was interesting is, Climate Camp itself then became the brand…Rather than it being a No-Brand Space, Climate Camp became the brand but we were doing it both as Climate Camp TV and as visionOnTv. Now, because we do have a life outside Climate Camp, which is important as well, and um, um, so, so, so there was this kind of tension. I remember we put up a banner, and, and, and someone
came and took it down and replaced it with a Climate Camp banner.
(interview with Richard, visionOnTv, August 2011)

This sense of PR and branding appears to have originated at the Heathrow Camp for Climate Action two year earlier. Rising Tide activists Steve notes the Heathrow camp was:

the moment in time really, because it was when everybody wanted to get involved with the climate camp and in fact Drax has become a bit like the 1966 World Cup Final, where there were only about 60,000 people there and about 300,000 people say they were there. But it was also then that the divisions grew and the divisions grew as a direct result of the media and everybody wanted to get involved, including the mainstream NGOs, some quite clumsily, like Greenpeace and some not quite as clumsily, like Friends of the Earth, and it culminated in, when we actually got to the camp, it was a media scrum, you know, the whole street was full of media and we had volunteers from NGOs in their personal capacities who did media for those NGOs who came and helped us. That really did piss off a lot of people who’d put a lot of work into it because it was as John said to stop a third runway and make sure that didn’t happen, but it was also to stop it by doing what we do with our aims and objectives for the Camp, and that’s when it got diluted and that’s when the anti-capitalist stance of the camp, which it always had and still does got diluted by these extra people, and it wasn’t their agenda at all but they didn’t care that they were joining a movement that had an agenda, they didn’t care about that, so that’s when those divisions started to occur. (interview with Steve, 9 August 2011)

The decision in 2005 to engage with the media had several impacts on the discourse of environmental activism. The adoption of media stalwarts, press centres, spokespersons, media training, guidance documentation, citizen journalism, open hours, and rules of the camp abandons the liminoid social practices that define environmental activism. Visually, there are tripods and “workshops” on repertoires of protest, but the once quasi-structure is formalised for movement building, autonomy has been abandoned, and white-middle class “activists” wearing the branding and marketing products of the “climate camp” have come to dominate. Such fragmentation emerged early on as:
the use of physical space at climate camp is interesting in that the radical
media and the traditional media team. At the first one, they pretty much
shared the same space, it was pretty low key; in the second one they shared
the same space, but I think they might have moved to the tent next door – the
traditional media team; the third one, they shared the same space for the first
two days and then I think they separated; and the fourth one they were just…
(interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 August 2011).

However, unlike subverting the media eye, the camp is adopting the capitalist
practice epitomised in the fencing around the camp. A perimeter fence was built
around the entire camp. This was a fairly new development and signals another move
away from the heterotopia and liminoid social practice. Fences have become
symbolic of struggles between state and activists, from the Greenham Common
Women’s Peace Camp “inside” the camp, but “outside” the nuclear base. The cutting
of fences to gain entry to coal-fired power station, airport runways, etc., played a
significant metaphorical and physical role in the movement. The cutting of a fence is
a breakdown of the barriers between activists and another party. Yet at Blackheath
the camp put the fence up themselves. This is an act of conformity; the activists are
controlling and containing themselves, without relying on the state or police to
contain them. The fence was only broken at a controlled point (the entrance)
monitored by “gate crews and comms team” (Climate Camp Handbook, 2009).
Activists believed they needed to protect themselves from the police, who were
taking a hands-off approach through Operation Bentham.78

This approach by the police, partly in reaction to the death of Ian Tomlinson at the
earlier G20 climate camp, was unusual. There had been violent clashes between
activists and the police in the past. For example, the “Battle of the Beanfield” was a

78 Operation Bentham was the “Met’s response to the Camp for Climate Action 2009” (Metropolitan Police,
2009). It is surely no coincidence that the name of the operation reflects Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the
panopticon as a disciplinary method of surveillance (one suspects a Cultural Studies graduate had a hand in the
title!). Police were “camped” in a cherry picker overlooking the site, and community officers entered the camp.
police raid on a convoy of new age travellers on route to Stonehenge. What ensued was a clash between the police and the travellers that led to many converted vehicles being damaged. Yet the traveller movement (and later the roads protesters’ camps) did not build fences at subsequent protests, and the openness (the fifth element of heterotopia) was still central to many environmental activist camps. Seen through a Foucauldian lens, the fence can be seen as a means of the activists conforming by controlling access to the site, and, as Foucault notes, once incarcerated and observed, the “convicts” begin to “behave” (Foucault, 1991: 14).

Conclusion

The concept of heterotopia provides a useful way to think about the spaces in, and through which the environmental activist movement contests neoliberal green governmentality. Various liminoid practices such as direct action, provide a media spectacle whilst inverting the traditional relationships between activists and journalists. Unlike the direct action of realos such as Greenpeace, the fundis or activists build short- and long-term camps and communities as an alternative space. As activists define an alternative space they create a discourse that challenges the neoliberal approach adopted through green governmentality. Despite legislative measures to criminalise the protest camps (as heterotopia) the liminoid practice developed from generation to generation enabled radical environmental activists to challenge environmental discourse.

The internet enables activists both to have a media presence and to turn liminoid practices into new strategies. The internet provides a platform on which to turn protest from the local to the global, as the rhizomatic style echoes the quasi-
organisational structures of the environmental activists’ movement. Technological developments enhance and aid the creation of heterotopias, such as the swoop/swarm.

However, once activists begin to engage with the media within the heterotopia, and the media tent moves from outside to inside the protest camps, the media are no longer outside of the camps, as they were at Greenham and the roads protests, but now they are inside the camp with the activists. This can be interpreted as a welcoming in, and acceptance, agreement and conformity by the activists towards a green capitalism, and environmental solutions through economics. In inviting the journalists, they are inviting normative behaviour into the movement. Activists are no longer “outside”, but “inside” society and environmental discourse. Once the movement moves out of the heterotopia it can no longer challenge the labelling of activists in a discourse of deviance, or green governmentality. The movement must retain its heterotopic spaces to challenge and survive.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This conclusion will begin by showing what has been achieved by the research. This will be followed by a brief discussion on how much the thesis has moved professional discussion along. It will then examine the wider themes to emerge from the thesis and open them out to a wider discussion on relevant professional debates.

This research on the relationship between radical environmental activism and the mainstream media has revealed clear and definite relations of power. The thesis has conducted two research practices – the application of a governmentality framework to the field of radical environmental activism, and the empirical data derived from the focus group. Death’s (2010b) examination of environmental governance at the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on sustainable development offers insight into relations of power in environmental discourse. This work differs in that it uses a similar principle to examine the environmental activism movement in the UK. Through Foucault’s governmentality approach, this work has examined how relations of power influence media discourse. Moreover, the theoretical position of this work is underpinned by an interpretation of governmentality and green governmentality applied to the UK political discourse. This theoretical approach is supported through the methodological innovation of critical discourse analysis and original empirical research. This three-tier approach gives the work a distinct understanding into the relations of power.

The concept of governmentality has enabled this thesis to chart the shift in power relations in environmental discourse. Moreover, in identifying these power shifts it
also reveals how environmental discourse is shaped, formed and constantly challenged by media discourse. Drawing on Luke’s and Oels’ interpretations of governmentality through a green lens, the work has examined why power relations shift. Foucault’s historical approach to discourse has enabled an examination of how environmental discourse in the media began with a high concentration of coverage on activism. At the same time, there was the fledgling development of environmental governance. As activism was in the media spotlight, governance sat back, slowly developing new power relations. The creation of the Department of Environment was an administrative move that gave power to governments and the state to regulate everyday “environmental” issues, from town planning to transport systems. The creation of new towns and transport routes gave the government power to decide where people would live, how they would travel and what facilities they would live by. These techniques could then be applied to influence individual behaviour.

Foucault’s idea about how power persuades individuals to conduct themselves in a particular way is useful to explore discursive challenges to environmental discourse. Through techniques of self-government rules and regulations are developed that guide the individual to act in a way that is of benefit to society as a whole. The individual is encouraged to conduct themselves in a way that benefits society before they can conduct others (the conduct of conduct). Moreover, institutions such as the Department of Environment provide the administrative tools through which individuals can conduct themselves. Environmental activism is no longer the sole role of environmental discourse. The creation of administrative tools over the individual (biopower) creates a platform to challenge environmental discourse.
As neoliberal economics began to take hold of British politics with the election of the Conservatives in 1979, biopower became more prevalent in persuading individuals to act in certain ways believed to be of greater economic benefit to the individual and country. Individuals who challenged or rejected a neoliberal discourse, often expressed through protest, were criminalised for their “abnormal” behaviour (techniques of dominance). Biopower provided the tools (techniques in Foucauldian terms) to encourage individual behaviour and contain those who reject this new neoliberal approach to a whole range of social problems. Criminal measures mainly came from legislative measures, with the Criminal Justice Bill (CJB), later the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (SOCPA).

These new laws were passed to effectively criminalise aspects of environmental activism. The CJB and SOCPA were both designed to limit the number of people able to organise or attend a protest. The laws also linked together various collectives and movements from free music/raves to new age travellers and environmental activists. The effect was to criminalise a large portion of radical politics by placing it in a discourse of deviance. At the same time, more subliminal and subtle legislative measures were used as surveillance techniques on activists’ movements, reinforcing the discourse of deviance and practice of criminalisation. Legislative measures gave the police powers to use undercover policing practices, and later to access emails, databases and mobile phone messages. The rationale for these new surveillance powers was that they were needed as preventative measures against potential acts of violence. Violence and a fear of violence is epitomised in the increased language conflating activist with terrorism. As Rootes’ (2003) study showed, there is little evidence of eco-terrorism occurring. However, despite the lack of evidence, the state continued to use techniques of dominance. New laws were framed as preventative
measures against anyone deemed abnormal by the state and general public. This approach was iterated through media discourse on environmental activism, which reinforced the power relations by placing activists into a discourse of deviance, thus enabling the neoliberal approach to become dominant in environmental discourse. In other words, media discourse constructed a narrative around environmental activism that reinforced a neoliberal approach in environmental discourse.

Studies on earlier protest marches (the 1960s) found that media discourse focuses on the violence or the potential for violence. This is reaffirmed through a language that identifies some protesters as “militant”, “yobs” and “delinquent” (see Halloran et al., 1971; see Chapter Five). These terms are still applied today. This thesis has shown that in the reporting of the Heathrow climate camp there is also a conflating with security and terrorism. This is not new. Through a critical discourse analysis this work has shown that a discourse of security and terrorism has underlined media discourse when representing protest and environmental protest. Despite activists having a greater voice in earlier days, reflecting their stronger position in environmental discourse, there was still a link to terrorism. For example, at Greenham Common Peace Camps, the women’s peace camp was seen as encouraging violence through Cold War disunity. The Daily Express’s headline “The Peace War” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982: 1; see Chapter Five) blames the women for any potential violence between Russia and America, with the UK in the middle – “as the Soviet cameras rolled, the 30,000 demonstrators milling in the mud appeared unwitting dupes of a propaganda coup by Moscow” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982: 1). Moreover, this article also discusses journalists discussing media discourse. The top line of the article shows “A Russian TV crew filmed the mass anti-nuclear protest by women at Greenham Common” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982: 1).
Therefore, this work has identified that government biopower to persuade individuals is propagated through media discourse.

The two themes of violence and pre-emptive violence are joined by a peculiar language of journalists observing media practice. Moreover the critical discourse analysis shows that these two themes continue throughout the historical period to the present. Violence becomes more prominent in the discourse after the 9/11 terror attacks but was certainly not in reaction to the attacks, it just provided the platform to increase the bio-political approach of placing activists in a discourse of deviance. The emergence of the term “eco-terrorism” used by the political right in the late 1980s shows that neoliberalism has applied biopower to the representation of environmental activism. The criminalisation of activism labels activists as “abnormal”, and green governmentality as “normative” behaviour of environmental discourse. The shift in power relations through biopower in a governmentality framework has enabled advanced liberal government and the creation of new economic markets under the dominant position of environmental discourse.

What is problematic with a governmentality approach is its inability to adapt to global changes and new forms of communication. In addition, the creation of the internet provided a new platform from which activists could challenge the advanced liberal government that had crept into environmental discourse. The Indymedia website (1999) provided a perfect platform to organise the Seattle and anti-capitalist protests. These events shaped the global justice movement and informed many of their actions. For example, the Zapatista movement gained global awareness through the internet (see Kingsnorth, 2003; Krøvel, 2011, see Chapters One and Six).
Moreover, the internet enabled activists to retain their repertoires of protest and adapt old tactics and strategies to new techniques (see the discussion on the swarm/swoop in Chapter Six). Activists can invert hierarchical power relations between themselves and journalists by protesting at the site of contestation, away from the media eye. Through their social practices (liminoid practices) activists create not a counter-space, but an alternative, which demonstrates a way of being ecologically aware. However, this thesis has argued that in order for environmental activism to survive and challenge the dominant discourse it must retain the repertoires of protest within the heterotopia of the camps and actions. As this work has shown, once activists remove or alter the liminoid practices of the heterotopia, they also remove the ability to challenge advanced liberal governments in environmental activism. Once activists look to be “conducted” through counter-conducts (see Death, 2010a; see Chapter Six) they are no longer an alternative space to explore other options in environmental discourse, but conformed and contained through state apparatus of surveillance and building fences. Once activists remove the liminoid practice they are no longer inverting media practice, but conforming – they are being conducted through biopower and no longer seen as “abnormal”. However, an over-reliance on new social media has almost turned environmental activism back into simply a “media frenzy” (Hunter 2004, see Chapters One and Five) created with the first ever environmental activism. As the empirical data revealed, the activists are aware that there is too much focus on media tactics and not enough on political strategies to challenge advanced liberal government. In order to keep challenging and surviving biopower and green governmentality, activists must remain within the heterotopia.

**Wider themes of the Thesis**
The key themes in this thesis have been biopower, power, deviancy (increasingly linked to terrorism) and criminalisation. How far have these discussions addressed the four research questions 1) in what ways do the mainstream media frame environmental activism?; 2) How do journalists report environmental discourse?; 3) In what ways do reporters construct narratives around environmental activism in the mainstream media?; and 4) What kind of relationship is there between environmental activism and mainstream politics?

This thesis has examined the relationship between the radical environmental activist movements and the state, through the lens of media discourse. The research shows that the mainstream media frame environmental activism as part of environmental discourse, but excluded from mainstream party politics. Knowledge of environmental activism as part of environmental discourse, is formed through language to provide meaning, or ‘maps of meaning’ as Hall defines discourse (see Chapter Two). In other words how we generate knowledge over time about a specific subject/discourse. In relation to the mainstream media and environmental activists, this thesis has argued that the relationship between political and environmental activists discourse has influenced the various ways the media frame environmental activism. The effect is that power relations between activists and journalists are framed by media, environmental and political discourse. How these three discourses interact, and challenge each other affects the ways environmental activists are represented. Thus, this thesis has argued that when the political discourse of the Conservative political parties, both Margaret Thatcher’s administration (1979-1992) and David Cameron (2010-present) co-opted environmental discourse into party politics, it changes the way journalists frame environmental activism. Thus one way journalists frame
environmental activists is from a passivity, and at times negative frame, to activists as deviant.

With the increasing application of biopower through policies of global, national and local environmental governance, and their associated techniques of self, journalists reflected a increased labelling of activists within a discourse of deviancy. As discursive struggles over the hegemonic position of environmental discourse became more apparent, tensions between activists and the state (such as the anti-roads and CJB) was reflected in the reporting of activism. Unlike the scepticism of Thatcher’s embracing of environmental discourse (see Chapter Three), media coverage of the Conservative party election campaign, Vote Blue, Go Green (2006) acknowledges the shift to ‘green’ as an electioneering tactic. *The Sunday Times*’ headline, Cameron goes in search of green credentials at Ice Station Dave (White,2006); whilst the *London Evening Standard* and *The Sun* both saw the shift towards environmentalism as a political move. The *London Evening Standard* defined the move as ‘Brown and Cameron vie for green vote’ (Waugh,2006) and *The Sun* ‘Green for Go, Dave’ (Anon, 2006).

The development of party political discourse into environmental discourse led to struggles over the best solutions to climate change. The co-opting of environmental discourse by mainstream parties increasingly became the dominant position within environmental discourse. The media’s support for the co-opting of environmental discourse was reiterated with the emergence of global environmental governance. The move by the Conservative party to Vote Blue, Go Green, meant most journalists supported the move, in the context of a global shift (such as the Kyoto Protocol ) towards economic led solutions as the central tenet of environmental discourse.
Moreover, there was no evidence of activists’ engagement with the reworked green capitalism of environmental discourse. The media reports of the Vote Blue, Go Green Campaign lacked any reference to NGO such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth. Equally there was no reference to any previous horizontal radical environmental activism.

Journalists reflected this shift in their reporting of activists as deviant. As activists resistance (as discussed in Chapter Four) to green capitalism enabled journalists to place activists into a signification spiral (Hall 1978), with terrorism (see Arnold in Chapter Four). The horizontal quasi-structure of radical environmental collectives meant that journalist could bypass the activists and reflect the legislative changes that criminalise environmental activism. Activists attempt to challenge such media discourse through social media and web 2.0 (see Chapter Six). The dichotomies are analysed in discussion on how language and discourse reflects the relationship between media, politics and environmental activist discourses.

Chapter Two explored the various interpretations of environmentalism as a discourse, with particular focus on John Dryzek’s categories of environmental discourse. Dryzek outlines four different definitions that shape environmental discourse; 1) problem-solving, 2) survivalism, 3) Realos and 4) Fundis. This thesis began by arguing that the green radicalism of Realos and Fundis were prominent within environmental discourse. Many of the tactics and strategies of Realos were found in NGO’s such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. These NGOs also shared media strategies and tactics with the more radical horizontal collectives of environmental activism. For example, see the discussions in Chapters Two and Four outlining Friends of the Earth legal assistance with the collective Critical Mass.
Through the concept of green governmentality it can be judged that shifts in power have moved environmental discourse from the green radicalism to Dryzek’s definition of problem-solving (within the boundaries of liberal capitalism). Lord Stern of Brentwood’s report (see Chapter Three) clearly links the solution to problems of high carbon society with economic solutions. Thus, problem solving has replaced green radicalism as the dominant position in environmental discourse. The consequences of this power shift, between activists (green radicalism) and governments (problem-solving) results in the activists increasingly placed into a discourse of deviance. The move away from the dominant hegemonic position once held by radicalism, towards problem-solving through economic solutions is epitomised by the Wise Use movement and Heritage Foundation, conflating environmental activists with terrorism (eco-terrorism, see Chapter Four). Moreover, the evidence has shown that despite environmental activism’s nascent position in environmental discourse the historical discourse analysis shows that shift in power has resulted in removal of radical environmental activists voice and actors. This loss of voice is evident in the narrative which journalists construct around environmental activists.

The finding from the critical discourse analysis reveals several narratives and themes that journalists draw from when representing environmental activism in the mainstream media. The narratives focus on political passivity (activists are framed as lacking engagement with mainstream politics, which seems to devalue the political message of action); deviance, terrorism; violence; criminality and class. There are limited positive narratives found in the analysis, and those found focused on the individualisation of Swampy, and not the collective ‘conduct’ of grass roots radical politics (see discussions in Chapter Five).
Class emerges very strongly in the reporting of the Blackheath camp. Class is another indicator of the shift away from historical liminoid practices of the movement. Activists Dan Glass believes that if protesters only engage with the left newspapers, such as The Guardian, the result is limited demographics to appeal to as “white liberal press and you have predominantly white people at the Camp” (activists Dan Glass interview August 9th, 2012). Schlembach (2011) observes, that debates around ‘clean coal’ and aviation exposes conflicts between different agendas, and the problems and possibilities of maintaining a radical focus on social justice within the environmental movement, as the climate camps “explicitly sought to re-introduce a political space” (2011).

Analysing the relationship between activists, the state and media reveals discursive challenges by mainstream party politics that shifted power relations in environmental discourse. Media discourse supports this power shift, supporting the government position over NGO and radical activists. The examples of Greenham Common Peace Camp, Swampy, May Day and G20 protest show that media discourse initially gave activism a voice (boundaries of representation in Fairclough's terms). Over time through the signification spiral (Hall, 1978) the activist voice is replaced. Journalists move away from the activists to either a third person, or the journalists speaking on behalf of the activists. The key shift emerges around 1997, when prior to this date, the order of discourse has less focus on deviancy or militant. Post-1997 and the incorporation of global justice movement and anti-capitalist rhetoric into environment activists discourse there is a clear power shift in environmental discourse. This shift is reflected in the relationship between activists, the state and media discourse. Thus the media supports the state over the collectives, but will
occasionally support the individual (as indicated, for example, by the discussion on Swampy).

**Relationships between environmental activism and mainstream politics.**

The media reflect a negative or dismissive representation of environmental activism through either a focus on violence or discussions on class, or individualism. Although the media support the power shift towards economism and problem-solving, this has little impact on the collectives. This thesis began by asking what the relationship between activists and mainstream party politics is. Yet, as discussions in Chapters Four and Six show, there is no relationship for three reasons. Firstly, horizontal politics negates the traditional Realos strategies of lobbying and engaging with party politics. Second, horizontal activism is reactionary not ‘movement building’ to challenge legislative measures. The movement takes civil disobedience against legislative measures once they begin the parliamentary process (as discussed in Chapter Four). Protest at Greenham Common was against the UK and American nuclear policy, the anti-roads were against the trans-European Networks plan (as discussed in Chapter Three). Protest against legislation, CJB, SOCPA and so on were also reactionary not a spring board for movement building. Third, environmental activism exists within heterotopias, and as such is not counter to green governmentality but works as an alternative space. The protest camps are a mirror held up against green capitalism, as an alternative solution to climate change. For example, composting toilets, communal cooking, communal living, consensus decision-making, and wind and solar power.
When the protest camps remove themselves from heterotopias, then they begin to have a relationship with mainstream party politics. In conforming through media discourse to create a hierarchy of working groups, spokesperson, and movement building then the protest camp begins to engage with party politics. The creation of media tent and fences means the protest camp is not longer an alternative space, but a space of counter-politics. To paraphrase Death’s interpretation of Foucault – there is now a desire to be governed not like that, but in terms of another form of counter-conduct. The protest camp shifts from an alternative space to one that wants to be governed by a top-down hierarchical system, led by the media team, which forms its own a green governmentality but one founded on civil disobedience and direct action.

The consequence of being governed ‘thusly’ has been detrimental to the movement. The introduction of managerial techniques, (working groups, workshops, and media stalwarts of PR and branding) and a language led to fracturing of the movement. The creation of a media tent, first outside the protest camps, and slowly become integrated into the camps led to antagonism between journalists and activists, and between activists and activists. The media tent generated a hierarchy within the camps that was transferred to other protests (such as Occupy LSX which also had a media team). Therefore, it can be concluded that protest camps must remain a heterotopia to survive. Whilst climate camps remain a heterotopia, it provides a spatial zone in which to offer alternative ways of living and social relations. The heterotopias acts as an alternative, a mirror, not a counter space, but an another way of addressing climate change.

**Implications for Environmental Activist Movement and Journalists**
This study has explored the various relationships between environmental activists, the state and the media. Social media has provided the platform to activists to contest mainstream journalism. Activists realise that social media needs to be supplemented with the face-to-face practice of protest camps. The horizontal radical environmental politics enable anyone with a website or smart phone to challenge mainstream journalists. Although as the activists note this often only results in preaching to the converted. So We Stand activists Nim notes:

I think it’s about having a critical relationship with it, understanding it and knowing its strengths and its pitfalls and who the audience is and who the audience isn’t... it’s about understanding where the overlaps can come and how you can use both situations there to your advantage (interview with Nim).

Nim’s observations are echoed by Richard, in that “there needs to be a constant awareness that “there’s a permanent of back to nature kind of thing which environmental activists used to get into” (interview with Richard Herring), although as discussion in Chapter six shows, today’s activists have a strong focus on social media to generate media spectacles. Hamish Campbell notes activists should not reject technology:

Don’t get offline yourself because you lose a huge amount of organising power, build tools which their purpose it to get people offline, we need to concentrate on that. We’ve got to get people out of the hamster cage, so we’ve got to build better tools, tools which work in ways which people would like to work. On-line openness is the only solution, so stop building secure online communities because they’re fantasies, there is no security on-line, it’s digital, all information just wants to be free (interview with Hamish Campbell)

Moreover, he pleads to activists to be aware of how information is shared, especially in light of the PC Mark Kennedy incident

Please activists think about security models and what’s appropriate...we’ve got to build better tools so that activists, so that real people might actually want to use our media and might want to, use these tools we build.” (interview with Hamish Campbell)
Activist John Stewart reiterates Hamish idea of working both off line and within the community:

to get across to ordinary householders was that you can make a difference because most people think they can’t make a difference with something as big as that, and so I that sense it’s hope that, not that we would do it for them but that they could be part of something [inaudible] changes, that they should help to change things… hope that they can take action because if people feel no hope at all, then actually, they feel, “Well, what’s the point?” You’ve got to give them hope that they can make a difference (interview with John Stewart)

Thus this knowledge and combination of online tactics can continue to challenge media discourse that supports the state and offer an alternative to green governmentality.

**Contribution to the Field**

The outcome of this research contributes to and derives from the niche field of environmental activism and the media. As discussed in Chapter One, the field of media and the environment is relatively new. Anderson’s book (1997) *Media, Culture and the Environment* provided the first in-depth analysis of how journalists report on environmental discourse. Lester’s work (2007 and 2010) provides insight into the practice of environmental activism and media discourse in Tasmania, to show how Australian environmental activist collectives relate with the media. Both Lester and Anderson conduct empirical research with journalists and activists. There are several texts that examine “alternative” politics using environmental activism as a case study. Seel, Paterson, and Doherty’s (2000) important work on *Direct Action in British Environmentalism* draws on media discourse without exploring the relationship between the two fields. More recently, Doyle and Carvalho have published studies on the representation of climate change and the use of images by NGOs such as Greenpeace. Boyce and Lewis’s (2009) edited collection *Climate*
Change and the Media charts recent developments between media and environmental discourse. This work builds on Lester’s (2007 and 2010) work on Tasmania, to focus on the UK focus and new empirical data. It also brings up to date the work of Anderson (1997), and Seel, Paterson, and Doherty (2000) in examining the radical environmental activism movement. Moreover, this work’s significant contribution to the field is the use of a theoretical position often reserved for examining governance, government and governmentality. Foucault talks about governmentality to understand relations of power between the state and individuals to examine social relations. This thesis draws on governmentality to unpack the non-hierarchical relations of power between horizontal activist movements, the state and the media. Moreover, the rapidly evolving social media discourse means activists are theoretically able to challenge environmental discourse. This work brings new knowledge on how activists view social media, and the realisation that, as Foucault notes, it is important to retain knowledge of the past to understand and contextualise contemporary.

This thesis fills a gap in the knowledge of how relations and shifts in power between environmental activists and mainstream party politics impacts on media discourse and language when reporting environmental action. It also has shown how the relationship between environmental activists and mainstream politics is defined by discursive struggles. Environmental activism began in the dominant role of environmental discourse, only to be challenged by the neoliberal policy of the political right. The shift towards new environmentally focused markets, juxtaposed with the application of biopower frames, environmental activists as abnormal. Moreover, a consequence of this is that it depoliticises any environmental activist’s demands, whilst persuading the individual to consume their way out of
environmental problems. Thus the thesis fills the gap in knowledge around the shaping of environmental discourse.

The work reported here also interprets original data and adds new knowledge on how activists use traditional media practices (such as the media eye) to invert media discourse. In bringing together the different collectives to show the lessons learnt from earlier encounters with journalists, it shows how activists are aware that social media is just another platform to communicate. Activists understand that media and direct action strategies that rely on Facebook and Twitter are often naive and vulnerable. Social media is useful in challenging the dominant positions, as shown in Glass’s observations on the ability to get media images out that challenge a dominant position. However, they also realise that for the movement to survive they need to combine the tactics of social media with face-to-face planning of direct action to ensure objectives aren’t lost in the media frenzy.

This major findings of the study have implications for both the environmental activist movement in the UK and journalists. The analysis shows that journalists continue to echo the mainstream political positions, whilst returning to linguistic traits that frame environmental activism as deviant. Technological advances in communication should make it increasingly difficult for journalists to retain this position, as websites, blogs, smartphones and the internet enable activists to bypass mainstream media. The internet also takes local protest onto the global stage to generate more interest and more individuals to challenge the advanced liberal government approach to environmental discourse. At the same time, this thesis will inform activists of how power relations place them into a discourse of deviance. Moreover, the empirical data provide knowledge for other transnational movements
to learn lessons from the demise of the climate camp to challenging media discourse (see discussion on the PCC, see Chapters One and Six). Just as contemporary activists have learnt from the past power relations between activism and media discourse, so too can transnational protest collectives learn from the UK experience. The findings of this research indicate that journalists continue to repeatedly construct a narrative that pre-empts or concentrates on violence when reporting protest.

Employing a variety of investigative and analytical techniques, this research on media and the environment provides new knowledge that charts power relations between environmental activists, environmental politics and the media. The thesis has shown how historical processes have led to negative representation of environmental activism. The mainstream media frame environmental activism as deviant, encouraged by laws and surveillance techniques to iterate a discourse of deviance. I hope that this study encourages future research in this area which is important in understanding what shapes our cultural and political fields of knowledge.
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**Acts, Bills and Other Statutes**


