‘Working from the Symptom’: Stuart Hall’s Political Writing

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Much of the writing we see about politics falls into two categories, each as unsatisfactory in its own way as the other. The first and by far the most common of these, which fills up acres of space in the newspapers every day, is commentary on the surface flow of events. Which politician has said and done what? What steps have governments announced, what policies have they promulgated? What response has been made to these by their political opponents? Who is gaining ground and who is losing it, by such indicators of public support as votes, press commentary, opinion polls, or more vaguely, ‘mood’, as in ‘someone close to the Government said to me in the lobby earlier today’.

Organisations and institutions get a say in this accounting, as when their spokespersons announce their dissatisfaction or approval. Even social movements get a look in, if they can raise enough noise by demonstration or direct action to raise them above the threshold of invisibility. One can, and does, devour volumes of this kind of stuff on a daily basis whilst feeling in the end that one has learned little. What’s being described
here is of course the daily discourse of political practitioners, including the journalists whose practice is reporting and commentating.

At the opposite pole, lie more abstract and more scientific forms of discourse, developed by political scientists and sociologists. These trade in models of systemic equilibrium and disequilibrium, statistical trends, profiles of public attitudes, models of class composition and political affiliation, and the like. These methods can be illuminating, and one can even draw comfort from them. An example of a recent interesting piece of work in this genre is Judis and Texeira’s (2002) book the Emerging Democratic Majority, which predicted on the basis of the changing demographics of the United States of America, and the rise of a highly educated, post-industrial workforce to a leading position in the economy and society, an era of ‘progressive centrist,’ —‘the emerging democratic majority’ of the book’s title. Cheered up by this volume, which I had acquired on a visit to the West Coast, I enthusiastically passed it over to Stuart Hall on my return home. ‘It’s somewhat optimistic’, said he sombrely, never one to be deluded by false dawns. (Two years later, he was unfortunately proved right when George W, Bush won his second term).

Texeira and Judis are politically engaged writers; practitioners of academic forms of political science generally hold themselves aloof from political practice, distinguishing their ‘value-neutral’ stance from committed political commentary or polemic. A gap is thus established between everyday political practice, and the academic study of politics,
one which is reinforced by the rewards attached to specialised academic production in contrast to writing for general publics.

Stuart Hall’s political writing belongs to neither of these genres, and this has been one of the main sources of its originality and brilliance. What have always interested him are neither particular events, nor abstract models alone, but rather the connections between them. The questions for Stuart Hall have always been, one, how can we make sense of this or that particular phenomenon, in terms of a broader orienting theoretical conception? Secondly, how can we put the theoretical ideas on which all thinking about society depends to actual use, in explaining the situations and conjunctions which we encounter in an engaged political life? What has continually amazed me about Stuart Hall’s political writing and speaking is the capacity he has to locate meaning in the everyday epiphenomena of politics, to see and identify the deep currents beneath the flotsam drifting on the surface.

Mapping Social Change

The starting point has always been Stuart Hall’s recognition of how hazy and opaque political realities actually are. We think we know — everyone seems to speak with such confidence, all the time — but we do not. It is as if we are being carried along in a political mist, trying to discern new land-forms emerging and disappearing before our eyes. There are maps, which some people have great confidence in, and some of which have even been drawn by our own comrades, but unfortunately these are usually at least
partly wrong. In the early days of his political writing, the land-forms which Stuart Hall was most interested to understand were those of Britain’s changing class society, which he began to map anew in three remarkable papers, ‘A Sense of Classlessness’ (1958), ‘Absolute Beginnings’ (1959) and ‘The Supply of Demand’ (1960) two of these published in *Universities and Left Review*¹ and one in *Out of Apathy*. What he noticed in these articles, and began to give a shape and explanation to, are the changes of social identity which were then taking place in Britain’s class society. The papers describe both a new sense of individual freedom and opportunity brought about by relative prosperity and the emergence of a consumer-led economy, and the continuing inequalities and constraints which prevailed.

‘Absolute Beginnings’ is particularly striking in its interest in both of these dimensions. Its first part described the rejections and blockages inherent in the Secondary Modern School (this was a review of books by two teachers, Edward Braithwaite and Margareta Berger-Hammerschlag, but drew on Stuart Hall’s own experience as a teacher in a south London school). The second part, elaborating a new cultural sociology of the young from the point of departure of Colin MacInnes’s novel, *Absolute Beginners*, described the emancipations of identity and style which were then being accomplished by young people in the cities, and especially in London. These young people were conspicuous in Soho where *New Left Review* had its office, in the life of the streets, clubs, pubs and coffee bars, and in the style-oriented workplaces of the West End. It was a remarkable feature of those days that it took an intellectual community consisting of many exiles — from Jamaica, Australia, Canada, the USA, and individuals from rather marginal or
sequestered native communities — to really appreciate what was going on England at that time. The difference between the *New Reasoner* and the *Universities* and *Left Review* strands of the early New Left are encapsulated in the fact that the headquarters of the former lay in northern industrial Halifax, in Yorkshire, and that the latter had in effect just moved down from Oxford to what would soon be called Swinging London.²

In ‘The Supply of Demand’, Stuart identified at a very early stage the great problem which the emergence of consumer capitalism was going to pose for socialists. Many goods can and will be supplied by the market, and it would be stupid, arrogant, and patronising, he noted, not to recognise that many of these bring genuine benefit to large numbers of citizens. It helped in coming to this conclusion that Hall shared and enjoyed the ways the people he saw around him dressed, danced, listened to music, and went to the cinema - socialist puritanism has never been part of his outlook. But the other side of the argument of the ‘Supply of Demand’ are all those goods that can not be provided through shopping, or as items of individual consumption - the health care, education, housing, and public space on which society as a bonded and moral entity depends³. The problem is how to refashion the supply of these public goods in ways which can compete with the seductions of the market, and of what twenty-five years later we came to call ‘individualisation’, though much of its essence had already been identified in these early essays.

He argued that it was essential to attend to both aspects of the emerging market society which involved the satisfaction of people’s needs, and indeed the creation of new
demands whose fulfilment gave enjoyment, and to its considerable and inherent lacks. Unless one took full note of the creative and inventive capacities of the system one was basically opposed to, one had no chance of generating an effective oppositional response to it. This has been an almost universal principle in Hall’s political writings.

On the one hand, changes are taking place, which are pushing to the fore individualism, competition, and markets of all kinds. These forms of life have popular appeal, and would not be succeeding in winning assent and political support if they did not. There is no point in denial, in preferring an ideologically-driven view of reality to the world which is taking shape before our eyes. But on the other hand, we need to resist the remaking of the world by capitalism; instead we should be inventing alternatives to class society which are egalitarian, democratic, and solidarist, which celebrate difference whilst at the same recognising the equal worth and entitlements of all human beings. It’s a tall order to hold together both sides of this argument, and it has always involved Stuart in an argument on two fronts. Socialist orthodoxy has been his antagonist on the first, since he has consistently held that conventional socialist beliefs about class structures, identities and their contradictions are untenable, and amount to a state of wilful denial of unwelcome realities. On the other side his antagonist has been on the right, since his commitment has been to promote an alternative socialist future, not to collude with the triumph of capitalism. This has usually been an uncomfortable position to occupy, since those on the left were often be infuriated by challenges to their traditional view of the world, while those on the right recognised an enemy when they saw one. A duality of this kind has been central to almost all of Hall’s political thought.
The Crisis of the Social Order

In the second major phase of Hall’s political writing, he took on a more complex task. This was nothing less than to chart the changing shape of class relations in Britain, as these were mediated in political and ideological terms over a crucial period of twenty years or so. The intellectual ambitiousness of this project has been to some degree obscured by the fact that its principal address, in true Gramscian spirit, has been not to the academy, but to participants in the political process itself. Even though much of the work was produced in universities, both in Birmingham at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, and at the Open University, even the mode of production within the university was unusual. *Policing the Crisis*, a work of political sociology of the highest standard, was published under the co-authorship of Stuart Hall and four other writers who were actually graduate students at the Centre during the writing of the book. Many of the remarkable papers which developed the arguments of *Policing the Crisis* were first published in Marxism Today, a monthly magazine which successfully sought a large public readership, and which made few concessions to the norms of academic writing.

A more intrinsic feature of this work which somewhat obscures its scope is the way in which it moves back and forth between particular instances and theoretical conceptions, refraining from developing a theoretical model which can be clearly abstracted from its particular there-and-then uses. It is easy to misremember this project in its narrower terms, as an attempt to clarify the phenomenon of Thatcherism, and later, in the debate
about ‘New Times’, to find some viable political perspectives for the post-Thatcher period. It had this purpose, and was taken up as such by its directly political audience. But it was considerably more far-reaching in theoretical terms than this. In fact one cannot understand Hall and his colleagues’ argument about Thatcherism unless one also understands the larger theoretical argument about order and conflict in British society in which they situated it.

The argument of Policing the Crisis and the subsequent papers is that Thatcherism was the solution, for British capital and its associated ruling class interests, to a problem. One had to recognise and understand the problem before one could understand the full scope and importance of the New Right’s chosen solution to it. The analysis, in Policing the Crisis, of the long pre-Thatcherite phase of social crisis and deadlock, is as original as that of Thatcherism itself. Indeed, without the former Thatcherism is indeed unintelligible, and the Thatcher regime becomes instead merely an instance of inspired political opportunism by Mrs Thatcher and her associates.

Some on the left criticised Hall’s thesis about Thatcherism on the grounds that it misrepresented Thatcher as some kind of new departure, when she was surely a highly recognisable and familiar kind of Conservative. ‘Weren’t the Tories always in favour of the free market, and of law and order, so why is this anything special?’ they said. What was naive about this reaction was its neglect of the larger framework of the analysis, of a social order which had been in a state of deep crisis for two decades. Thatcherism was not the first ‘exceptional’ response to have taken place in this situation. One thing that is
remarkable about *Policing the Crisis* and its accompanying writings is that it charts all of this development, and the different tactical adaptations which different political formations made to its exigencies. Only on the assumption that nothing ever much changes in political life, and that the same battles are continually re-fought on the same ground, could one ignore all this, thus sparing oneself the necessity for much thinking.

What is the crisis which *Policing the Crisis* describes and explains? It was nothing less than a general crisis of social order in Britain, part of which was crystallised in the events and symbolism of 1968, and of the 1960s more generally. *Policing the Crisis* was successful in bringing together the many different dimensions of this crisis, and to connect them within a model of contested hegemony, developed from Gramsci's writings. The authors recognised the links between industrial insurgency (in miners’ strikes which had defeated two governments, and in very high rates of strike action generally); a generally hyper-inflationary climate, which condensed an excess of demands for public and private goods of all kinds; and a sharply-contested moral climate, in which new claims to freedom of speech and behaviour, not least in the sexual domain, provoked an extreme conservative reaction, represented by such interventions as the Festival of Light, Mrs Mary Whitehouse’s National Viewers and Listeners’ Association, and the Black Papers which attacked ‘progressive’ orthodoxies in education. At the same time, the degeneration of the conflict in Northern Ireland into armed struggle, and broader fears of terrorism brought about across the world by groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the Weathermen in the USA, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, and the Angry Brigade in Britain, engendered an atmosphere of anxiety and paranoia.
Policing the Crisis describes the Selsdon Man phase of the Heath Government of 1970-74, and the cumulative repressive moves on which it embarked, before it was pushed by the miners into a return to the negotiated corporatism which had emerged in the 1960s as the dominant mode of managing class contradictions not only in Britain but across the western world. But then Heath chose to take on the miners in 1974, and lost his ‘who governs Britain?’ election, returning Harold Wilson to power for the second time to try once more to make this precarious settlement work. It was only when this collapsed, under Callaghan, in the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978-79 that the way finally lay open to the more radical social recomposition accomplished by Thatcher.

In other words, Thatcherism emerged as a ‘solution’ to a crisis which had been developing for about twenty years. For much of this time, governments seemed to be at the mercy of forces they could not control, and regularly took over each other’s ground (for example, in Heath’s corporatist interventionism, and in Labour’s repressiveness towards its own working class constituencies), under the extreme pressure of events. One reason why the Thatcher government maintained its support despite the widespread economic damage it inflicted through de-industrialisation, unemployment etc., was because it seemed to have regained control of an ‘ungovernable’ situation. Indeed the Conservatives only lost office much later when they had visibly lost control of events, through ‘Black Wednesday’ and the exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the mass resistance to the Poll Tax, and in their own internal splits over Europe.
The Origins of Thatcherism

If one part of the originality of Hall and colleagues’ work was in describing the ‘problem’ of the crisis of order which led to Thatcherism, its other aspect was a brilliant grasp of the nature of the ‘solution’, the ‘hegemonic project’ of Thatcherism itself. Here, once again, the procedure was to connect the various particulars which made up the Thatcher moment, and see how they had been made to cohere through the exercise of political leadership and by their assemblage into a coherent ideological narrative. Central to all this was the issue of ‘law and order’ itself. This was not merely a matter of local instances of disorder (urban crimes or riots) but reflected anxieties about a much broader social condition. Policing the Crisis identified the issue of ‘mugging’, exploited by the right in the same way as similar racialised anxieties had been exploited by Richard Nixon in the USA, as a particular focus of conservative mobilisation, against the ‘threats’ posed by immigration and the growing ethnic minority presence in Britain. This issue brought race to the centre of Hall’s published work, where it has remained ever since. It identified, at an early stage, a fundamental element in the disorganisation of the left in the politics of the United States of America and Europe, namely the successful mobilisation of working class anxieties to perceived competitors from ethnic minority groups. These anxieties had their economic root in the effects of de-industrialisation and globalisation on working class living standards and self-respect. The subsequent rise of the new right across Europe has shown how prescient this analysis was.
‘Mugging’ was important in the argument of Policing the Crisis, and in the analysis of Thatcherism as a major ideological and political formation. It had been an issue which the media, and Conservative politicians were able to seize on, as a signifier for much broader social anxieties and antagonisms. The idea of ‘mugging’ served to condense many different fears into one concrete object, indeed as we might now say it became a focus of unconscious fantasy. The various fears were of crime, of young adults perceived to be more sexual and dangerous than they were remembered to have been in the regulated past, and of course of black people, and immigrants more generally. Policing the Crisis was at pains to demonstrate how the opportunistic focus on this topic had been made possible by the elaboration of anxieties about immigration and race over a longer period, notably by Enoch Powell. Hall’s contention was that although Powell might have been dismissed from the Heath government for exceeding the limits of acceptable rhetoric, he had in fact succeeded in his bid to change the entire political agenda. The potency of this signifier lay in the fact that the implicit reference of ‘mugging’ was unmistakably racial, while because this reference was implicit its racial connotations could be disavowed. If a certain kind of crime were on the increase, how could anyone reasonably object to its being reported, even if its perpetrators happened to be disproportionately black? It was not easy to argue that the reason why mugging had been selected for this exceptional level of media attention was because of its racial associations.

This argument in Policing the Crisis brought together in the brilliant synthetic mode which characterised so much of the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies and Hall in particular, several explanatory discourses. The ‘new criminologists’ in the National Deviancy Symposium, had noted that crime and deviance were not merely objective facts, but were culturally constructed entities (Two of Hall’s co-authors in Policing the Crisis, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, were criminologists). The symbolic representation of crime and transgression by the media and by others with powers of public definition were important phenomena in themselves, perhaps as important as criminal behaviour itself. The idea of ‘moral panics and folk devils’ had already been placed by Stan Cohen (1972/2002) on the agenda of social science, and indeed of public debate more generally. Mugging had many of the attributes of the moral panic, and muggers were ‘folk devils’ par excellence.

But a more complex theoretical discourse was needed to demonstrate how an apparently rather minor issue like this could have a significant role in the transformation of political discourse, and in the conquest of a key field of ideological conflict. Fundamental to this was the idea that ideological formations were ‘constructed’ by discursive and political action, and were not, as Marxists had tended to believe, merely reflections of social realities. Politics was a practice with its own effects. This practice proceeded through the construction of discourses which gave a shape and meaning to the experience of subjects, and became the symbolic basis of collective identifications. It was vital to understand this as the New Right began its ideological advance. This thinking drew on Gramscian conceptions of the cultural dimensions of class struggles, and of the ways in which they could solidify in long-lasting regimes of class power, the famed idea of ‘hegemony.'
Laclau’s charting of the autonomous role of ideological practice in the construction of Latin American populism was another important element of this analysis (Laclau 1977).

Althusser’s idea that the antagonistic relations of classes had an inescapably contingent or ‘conjunctural’ dimension provided a further resource for trying to map this ongoing crisis and the fateful outcome to it that was foreseen by Hall and his colleagues. While underlying configurations of power were relatively stable over long periods, in periods of instability and crisis the outcomes of struggles could not be predicted from economic determinism, or evolutionist presuppositions. Among the most important elements of uncertainty was political action itself, and the processes of persuasive definition and interpretation on which this always depended. Political identifications were always to a degree created and chosen, not given. The ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences of which the Birmingham Centre was one of the most important embodiments in Britain in the 1970s enabled interpretation and definition – the work of the symbolic sphere – to be recognised to be a crucial element in the political process with a causal weight of its own.

The argument was not that the manufactured issue of ‘mugging’ had made Thatcherism possible, or even been a necessary condition of its success. It is rather that all political struggle proceeds through a process of antagonistic and competitive signification. The construction of an advancing bloc entails as one of its dimensions the attachment to one another of chains of signifiers through which different collective subjects are able to recognise themselves and make common cause with one another. Bringing off these
semantic linkages and equivalences is one of the principal tasks of political leaders when they put together a following. It is through this process of signification, in part, that a social bloc is constructed.

_Policing the Crisis_ and the essays which followed provided an anatomy of a shifting discursive field, in which many crucial and disputed terms figured. In a liberal democratic system in which power is won by parties through elections, it is inevitable that struggle by signification will happen serially and by accumulation. The news media and the consumer public’s insatiable appetite for novelty further determines that representations continually change their form, even though one can discern persisting objects of reference beneath the shifting patterns. To be sure, the cyclical electoral system does generate its own natural climaxes, and these lead parties to attempt condensations of very complex representations into summary versions of themselves, and their opponents. The analysis of Thatcherism described the process of construction, maintenance and evolution of a whole programme of representation of this kind, including its adaptations to opportunities – such as that provided by the Falklands War in 1981 – when these arose.

It is consistent with this account of Thatcherism that so important a part was played in the development of its signifying structure by specialists in mass communication and mass persuasion from the advertising industry, such as the Saatchi Brothers and Sir Tim Rice. One can describe the construction of discourses and chains of signification in the language of cultural studies or sociology, but its actual practice in developed societies
takes place through a highly specialised technical expertise. One might say that this apparently rather theoretical analysis of the discursive construction of Thatcherism influenced New Labour to give such great emphasis to the media, in the later construction of its own counter-project.

Much work was put into giving coherence to the method of analysis which led to the understanding of Thatcherism as a response to the organic crisis of British capital and social relations in the 1970s, and some elements of this theoretical synthesis are referred to above. Hall’s approach – enumerated in countless apparently improvised speeches as well as in many articles over these years, had another, more intuitive component. This was evident in Hall’s feeling for the significant detail, the turn of phrase, and the event given special attention, as starting points for his many explanatory forays.

From Symptoms to Crises

Hall began university as a student of English Literature, and on the completion of his undergraduate studies he began to undertake a doctoral thesis on Henry James. James was of course an exemplary practitioner and fastidious advocate of the literary method of beginning from particulars. Only from such particulars as can be registered in their full immediacy did he believe one could proceed as a writer to larger narratives or descriptions of fictional worlds. James approvingly quotes Ibsen, in this respect a kindred spirit, saying that he can begin a character from imagining the button on a man’s coat, and he refers to the acorn principle, whereby very large literary undertakings
start from tiny seeds. James’s details of course give rise to novels with the most complex and fully-realised connectedness imaginable. Some of the satisfaction in reading them comes from the density and intricacy of meaning that is revealed as one proceeds, in particular as the world of the novel is made largely through the perception and understanding, or its absence, of each of its characters. James’s worlds are intricately full of particulars, the author himself and his opinions, whatever they may be, deliberately remaining in the shadows, behind his characters.

One of the implicit aims of Hall’s accounts of moments or periods in the life of a society seems to me to be that in principle they should be inexhaustibly full in their points of reference to the particulars of social experience. It seems that it ought to be possible, in this approach to political analysis, to start almost anywhere, since any thread one chooses to start from, once one pulls on it, will lead eventually to the centre or the totality. (Except of course that there is no stable centre or totality in this view, but always an evolving process) One of the reason why Hall has been such a gripping speaker and writer over the years is that his habit of starting where he happens to be, with the observed detail of the moment, creates a recognition in his audience of a common starting-point in experience, and they are then invited to participate in an exploration of its meaning. I’ve also seen people asking themselves ’where on earth are we going’ as some of his eloquent narratives unfolded, finding the apparent lack of a obvious map or grid references rather disconcerting. But generally the outcome is that one follows a process of disclosure of connectedness and meaning from initially apparently inchoate or
banal materials. ‘A figure in the carpet’ emerges, which brings a sense of discovery since it was not evident at the start of the journey.

The idea that sociological analysis can proceed from details to structures, from surface to depth, has affinities with psychoanalytic methods of investigation, when it is the ‘material’. Dreams are a good example, which emerges in analytic sessions which leads the analyst to explore with the patient the underlying unconscious configuration which is shaping his or her state of mind. Lacanian psychoanalytic ideas had some influence on Althusser’s theory of conjunctures, helping to explain how an ‘excess’ of meaning and force could become concentrated in apparently contingent events. This Althusserian model of ‘ensembles’ of social relations and the ‘conjunctures’ which punctuate their development has a contemporary formulation in ‘complexity theory’ and ‘chaos theory’, with their ‘butterfly effects’ – the idea that a system can be tipped from one ‘phase-state’ to another in certain conditions by apparently minor or trivial events. The crisis which is examined in *Policing the Crisis* is of this kind. The issue of ‘mugging’ condensed energies which helped its political definers and operators - the Thatcherites - to move the system from one state to another, bringing about the tipping-over from its decaying ‘corporatist’ mode to its new form of ‘authoritarian populism’. In this sense the particulars on which Hall’s analysis can be read as ‘symptoms’, as nodes of signification (and thus of solidarity and power) which can have transformative power. This may be analogous to patterns of psychic crisis in individuals and organisations (we have all known these) when some specific event or object becomes the projective focus of intense anxiety. The symptom, for Freud, was the psychic system’s means of containing
unbearable tensions. The alternative to the hysterical, phobic or obsessive symptom might breakdown as the psychic system becomes overwhelmed with desire or anxiety. We may see the condensation of social conflicts in heavily charged signifiers of this kind – he unburied dead of the ‘Winter of Discontent, the ‘sleaze’ of the late Major government, ‘mugging’ in the 1970s, the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ of the last year or so – as symptoms of this kind. In each case they focused collective sentiments which led to or threatened a social convulsion or transformation. The psychoanalyst W R Bion called such moments in psychic life experiences which threatened ‘catastrophic change,’ not a bad psycho-social description of the onset of Thatcherism.

We are here in fields in which structures have their effects, and become evident, only through particular elements of experience, including subjective states of mind. It is the latter which gives society and social processes their ability, their capacity to defy and transform law-like patterns. It is this principle of uncertainty and the unknown, to a point, which Hall has insisted we must attend to, if we are to learn anything about the actual world.

It is interesting to reflect on Hall’s political writing over the years. With this reflection, is there anything we should now be doing with this exemplary method to understand our current political realities.

Where is the Social Crisis Today?
Hall himself has written some important essays on the successor epoch to Thatcherism and its weakened succession under John Major, namely that of New Labour. His recent paper, “New Labour’s Double Shuffle”, looks characteristically beneath the surface of an excessively-discussed topic, that of media ‘spins’, and tries to make some structural sense of it. ‘Spin’, he demonstrates, has been a functional necessity for New Labour since the role it has chosen to occupy is to continue the Thatcherite programme of modernisation and full ‘marketisation’ of British capitalism, while having to maintain support for this project from its working class constituency to whose interests and values are contrary to such a programme. ‘Spin’ signifies the continuing necessity to find and impose descriptions which will achieve this impossible act of translation.

In previous Labour governments, the compromises with capital unavoidable to social democracy were to some degree openly negotiated and contested, within the Labour Party and the trade unions, and with a wider public opinion. In the new situation, the institutions where these arguments would previously have taken place have been pushed aside, and the very idea that ideological differences are there to be clarified and debated is rejected. New Labour is, in its own self-conception, unitary. It is the project of a vanguard, now incorporated in or close to government, which formulates its mission as ‘modernisation’. But since intractable political realities remain, conflicts and contradictions still have to be managed, and in a different way than through the conventions of debate which accompanied the earlier settlement, which was essentially, as Ralf Dahrendorf (1959) put it, an institutionalised class compromise. Hall suggested
that ‘spin’ was the new institutional device for mediating New Labour’s project of modernisation, in many respects a continuation of the Thatcherite programme, to constituencies which retained other beliefs and interests. The controversies over the Iraq War have subjected this device to exceptional strain. The contradictions of the situation were most intensely felt within the BBC, whose conception of itself as an institution through which differences and oppositions should be negotiated by accepted rules and rituals came into collision with the government’s own media apparatus. The two chief officers of the BBC were forced to resign as a result, though wider public reactions, and the government’s continuing difficulties to win its argument over the war, has held off for the moment more lasting damage to the BBC’s mission, as a key institution of mediation. Of course all this recalls Hall’s earlier work, also undertaken in a period of intense conflict, on the conventions governing news broadcasting, as an instrument of managed consensus and compromise (Hall 1980).

But valuable as this ‘Double Shuffle’ intervention has been, there remains a notable difference between what we have available to us in the analysis of the present Post-Thatcher conjuncture, compared with the complexity of analysis that was developed previously. The earlier analysis was based on a theory of a larger social crisis, to which Thatcherism was able to represent itself as a solution. There could have been no analysis of Thatcherism without the prior analysis of the organic crisis of disintegrating corporatism, of the eventual failed class deadlock of the post-war era. Thus, in order to understand where we are now, we need to understand why, in the final event, the Thatcherite regime disintegrated and was driven ignominiously from power. That
moment was also the expression of a social crisis, objectively speaking. How could it have been, we should have asked, that the project of completing the ‘Americanisation’ and full-marketisation of British capitalism should have foundered so spectacularly on a popular demand for better public services and for some reasonable standards of altruism in public life? Thatcherism’s victory must have been far from complete to have led to this outcome. It seemed we had been too overcome by defeat to have noticed that democratic social aspirations remained alive and even well, after all that battering. Perhaps there had even been an element of emancipation and invigoration brought about by Thatcherite populism and assertiveness, its own unintended contribution to the democratic cause.

New Labour believed that its only feasible mission was to continue a version of the Thatcherite programme, moderated in some respects, reinvigorated in others. It insisted on the most minimalist view of what the electorate would tolerate. It brought a renewed disciplinary force to the project of public sector reforms initiated by the more capable Conservative modernisers. As every one knows, New Labour in power maintained Conservative-defined limits on public expenditure for a full three years after regaining office with one of the largest Parliamentary majorities ever. Those connected with Marxism Today were disillusioned with New Labour in office —the one-off revival issue of Marxism Today in 1998 put their critique forcefully — but at that point they also found it hard to articulate an alternative political course. They had been among the foremost critics of the Old Left, insisting that progressive politics now had to be reinvented for these ‘New Times’. Marxism Today had in this respect given intellectual
substance to New Labour’s project of modernisation. But because the old ‘container’ for
democratic aspirations was now so weak, and because the right had been in power for so
long, there was nearly everywhere a tacit pessimism or minimalism everywhere about
what was then possible.

But then, around the time of its second election campaign in 2001, New Labour
underwent a partial self-radicalisation. It then committed substantial resources to selected
public services, notably health and education, and reaffirmed that its commitment to full
employment, ‘social inclusion’, and its own ‘war on poverty’ was genuine. Why did this
self-radicalisation even take place, and what does this tell us about the ongoing social
crisis in modern Britain? Is it possible that the weakness of the political expression of
‘progressive’ social demands led us to underestimate them, even to fail to notice their
continuing existence? Is the New Labour’s adoption of its second-term public services
agenda its own recognition that it had no choice but to do this, if it wished to survive in
power? The constituencies on which New Labour was seeking to impose its agenda of
capitalist modernisation, via the machineries of spin, had after all in some obscure way
bitten back, and imposed reciprocal demands of their own. The actual location of this
social compromise – where the deals were done – remained a mystery. It seemed to have
something to do with what went on in the Granita restaurant in 1997, and in the recurrent
rumours of rows between the occupants of Numbers 10 and 11 Downing Street. But
typically enough, these differences were read merely as conflicts of personality and
ambition, and not as the expression of much deeper societal tensions.
Caesarism and Tony Blair

How should we think about the political role of Tony Blair, and the Third Way formation around him, in the light of all this? In his article, ‘The Little Caesars of Social Democracy’, Hall provided a brilliant Gramscian characterisation of the project of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the early 1980s. In terms drawn from Gramsci’s model of Caesarism as a condensation in the person of an individual leader (sometimes a collective leader) of social contradictions which it had not been possible to resolve by more constitutional means. The original exemplar of this model of analysis was Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the classical text to which Hall’s historical political analysis has also been closest. Should we not perhaps see Tony Blair as just such a ‘Caesar’, chosen by the Labour Party as a leader who was specifically not identified with Labour’s own political culture, in order to win much broader cross-class support? Blair and his coterie’s rejection of Labourism have often been represented in terms of political pragmatism rather than conviction. This is also how it has preferred to represent itself, as a necessary pragmatic solution to Labour’s electoral problem, given the withering away of its traditional support base. The fact that Blair has also always claimed to be a conviction politician, with a principled agenda, has been somehow ignored, as if the convictions themselves, whatever they were, did not matter. In so far as there plainly were such convictions, this at least had the advantage of showing that Blair was in his own way honest.
But suppose we do take Blair and New Labour’s definite convictions seriously, and recognise that they have a fundamentally new project, that they envisage a different kind of social settlement altogether than ‘social democracy’. By social democracy I mean the institutionalised, pluralist class truce of the earlier social democratic settlement, with its shifting balance of public and private sectors, and its significant ‘neutral’ constitutional space of mediation between ‘countervailing powers’ (made up of a civil service, of independent professions, of strong trade unions, of the judiciary, of public service broadcasting, even of autonomous universities.) The alternative new project is for a system substantially dominated by capital, with a state whose role is to secure its conditions for existence, not arbitrate between it and contending even if subordinate social interests. The welfare state becomes conceived not as a bastion of alternative communitarian values, but as a means for the reproduction of the capitalist work ethic, and as a sphere in which new opportunities can be found for private capital accumulation. After all, in a post-industrial economy, if capital accumulation is barred from the spheres of health, education, social care and transport, its scope of operation is going to be severely constrained. The state has to be restructured in managerial terms, to ensure that market mentalities – what the Thatcherites used to call the ‘Enterprise Culture’– are inculcated in every sphere of society, overcoming the earlier dualism of an individualist private and a broadly collectivist public sector. The managerial state becomes distinct from the arbitrating, conflict-managing state. Mostly the new model state has been successful in imposing its disciplines on other social institutions – its burgeoning systems of audit and inspection have been one mechanism for this – but it does from time to time
meet resistance, from the judiciary, from the public service broadcasters, even from the doctors and the military.

It has been easy to see this as a juggernaut rolling all before it. But then why did this partial self-radicalisation take place, why did the government commit itself to a substantial enhancement of collective provision, in the first instance in health and education, but perhaps shortly in an expanded programme of early years’ child care also. The explanation may be that the sources of division which brought the social order to the point of collapse in the 1970s and 1980s have not in reality gone away, and remain latently if rather inchoately present. The petrol price protest movement of two years ago showed how great is the latent potential for social disorder, and how quickly a crisis can emerge apparently from nowhere. New Labour’s insistence on its success in maintaining economic growth throughout its period of office has as its unspoken shadow its anxiety about what would happen if this were to falter. The splintering of the electorate in the current round of elections (June 2004) shows how volatile the political system has become, and how weak the hold of the major parties is on the social constituencies which they need to sustain them.

From this perspective, the change of course of New Labour in its second term, and the different public spending priorities it has adopted, were a prudent judgement of what had to be offered to the majority of the electorate if New Labour were to remain in office. The New Labour government remains, that is to say, a coalition, in which the radical pro-capitalist modernisers, whose leader is Blair, share power with a subordinate but still
powerful group, whose leader is Brown, who retain their social democratic commitments, despite their endorsement of the Blairite modernising project. This coalition continually threatens to unravel. If it moves too far to the New Labour right, it risks the desertion of its working class voters, and overt opposition from the trade unions, still important sources of party funding and support. If it moves too far to the left, it risks antagonising its tacit ‘social partners’ in business, and their press baron advocates, and losing votes in ‘Middle Britain’. But there is a deeper, more long-term risk, or potential, that in so far as New Labour succeeds in office it *ipso facto* strengthens the democratic aspirations which were so beaten down by the years of Thatcherism. How is it to prevent the re-emergence of structures, institutions and agencies which will engender new social demands, and will want to renegotiate the terms of settlement between different ‘social partners’ and their value-systems? In other words, success in demonstrating that Labour can win and keep power is likely to wake up its various constituencies to the idea that perhaps they can ‘ask for more’. Adjustment to this changing balance of forces has already happened, as Labour’s second-term programme showed. The ongoing stresses on the partnership between Number 10 and Number 11 Downing Street, between Blair and Brown, reflect these contradictions of power-base and political purpose. Ken Livingstone’s unique success for Labour in the recent round of elections is another indication of the emergence of more autonomous democratic institutions as a consequence of even modest achievements.

If ‘Blairism’ was a ‘Caesarist’ moment, what happens when it passes, as it inevitably must? Will the system again be pitched into crisis, with the reawakening of collective
action, and a counter-response from the right? Some unstable resolution of such a crisis from the right is one possible outcome of that situation. Or can some routinisation of this charismatic, Caesarist moment be achieved, stabilising a lasting settlement between the contending conceptions of social order now contained within the New Labour system, and making such a social compromise into the ‘common sense of the age’. Is it possible to set limits of possibility for the right as the post-war welfare settlement successfully achieved fifty years ago? The argument here is that we would have a better chance to influence these outcomes if we were to return to the problematic of social crisis which Hall originally set out for us, and attempted to analyse this new conjuncture with the subtlety and complexity which he brought to its earlier moments. If we do this, we might even manage to catch up with the history of our own time.

A Postcolonial Intellectual

I want to conclude with some reflections on how Stuart Hall’s Jamaican origin has been fundamental to his work. He came to England as a Rhodes Scholar when he was eighteen, and has lived there ever since.

A number of important analyses of contemporary British intellectual history have drawn attention to the vital contribution that has been made to it by émigrés and immigrants of various kinds. The central argument of Perry Anderson’s essay ‘Components of the National Culture’ (Anderson 1968) was that English intellectual life had been wholly revitalised by the arrival of successive generations of refugees from Europe, who had
helped to overcome the insularity and anti-theoretical cast of English thought. Anderson and Nairn cite the influence of Wittgenstein, Malinowski, Namier, Popper, Berlin, Hayek, Namier, Gombrich, and Klein, among others. This was mostly a white influx – more progressive figures, such as members of the Frankfurt School like Adorno, Horkheimer, and Fromm, who went to America instead. The project of the later New Left Review, under Anderson’s editorship, was to bring about a comparable exposure of British intellectual life to ‘red’ influences from abroad, in particular through the translation and assimilation of writing in the Western Marxist tradition – Lukacs, Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas, Benjamin and countless more. These became familiar figures in British academic life in the 1970s and 1980s, but were scarcely read in 1960.

Terry Eagleton, in his *Exiles and Emigres* (1970) developed this argument in the context of literature, drawing attention to the role of émigrés from the USA, Poland, Ireland, and also, following Raymond Williams, the English working class in bringing new energies into a rather closed and complacent English literary culture. It is not difficult to update this argument by reference to the influence of later Irish, American, and postcolonial writers and interpreters, such as Heaney, Plath and Alvarez.

Stuart Hall’s contribution, both in his individual work, and his contribution to the work of others around him, needs to be seen in this context, though the fact that he has found such a central place in one ‘quarter’ of English intellectual life. In this sense, he was an initiator of the new left, a founder of the major new discipline of cultural studies, holder of a major chair at the Open University, key figure in the critical analysis of the move to
the right in British politics since 1978, latterly the most influential theorist of issues of ethnic identity in Britain. This may have somewhat obscured this aspect. What is significant, however, is how much of this influence and contribution has depended on Hall’s origin, on his initial distance from the metropolitan society, and has not been merely incidental to it.

In fact, a great deal of the freshness and perceptiveness which the grouping of the new left took brought to British society and culture came from the fact that so many of them came from outside it. Charles Taylor (French Canada), Norman Birnbaum, Clancy Sigal, Norm Fruchter (USA), Peter Worsley (Australia), John Rex (Rhodesia), Stuart Hall (Jamaica) are examples, well represented in the pages of *Universities and Left Review* and *New Left Review*. The other *New Reasoner* strand of this tradition, came from a different kind of ‘outside’, that of the ‘small world of British Communism’, represented in the Oxford-London new left by Raphael Samuel, and by the larger group of New Reasoners. It was from these ‘outsider’ locations that it was possible to ‘pick up’ so quickly and sensitively what was changing in British social relations, and what was so limited about the standard political repertoires, whether Fabian or Communist.

Sensitivity to issues of empire and race were there from the beginning in this project. Suez – a late but it now turns out by no means the last paroxysm of the Empire – was one of the founding moments for the formation of the new left. The idea of ‘positive neutralism’ developed in association with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), drew heavily on the anti-imperialist identifications of ex-colonials such as
Worsley, Rex Nettleford, and Stuart Hall, as well as on the commitment to find some space independent of both capitalism and state communism. This ‘positive neutralism’ looked to the non-aligned, post-imperial nations – India, Ghana, Indonesia, Egypt, and the Bandung Conference – for a new leadership. Gandhi’s idea of non-violent resistance was also one of the inspirations of CND. Recognition of the role that race was going to play in the politics of the British right also came very early, in the involvement of the New Left, by Stuart Hall in particular, in the community politics of Notting Hill, one of the first areas where antagonism towards Caribbean immigrants became mobilised by the right. Recognition of new kinds of freedom and expressiveness among young people in the cities, reported in the ‘Absolute Beginnings’ essay mentioned above, included noting that black youngsters, and cultural models for white young people which were being taken from black culture, were part of this. Colin MacInnes, who was one of the inspirations for Hall’s essay, was another incomer, from Australia.

When youth culture came to be one of the foremost topics of investigation by the young researchers at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, the interfusion of different ethnic voices and styles, in music in particular, was a central and liberating discovery. It seemed that here for once ethnic differences were a resource which young people were celebrating and making creative use of, something which has continued to fertilise British popular culture to this day.

The analysis of Thatcherism developed in Policing the Crisis and in the subsequent Marxism Today essays began as a response to police and media activities which were
focused on race in Birmingham, which is the context for much of the media analysis of
the book. The issue of ‘mugging’ led the way to the recognition of the role of racial
antagonism in the construction of the new left, through Enoch Powell’s success in
racialising the political agenda (even though he was himself removed from office by
Edward Heath), and through Thatcher’s confident mobilisation of racial anxieties (the
danger of the ‘swamping’ – a term chosen with intuitive cleverness – of indigenous
communities by immigrants). The analysis of Thatcherism in ‘The ‘Great Moving Right
Show’ and elsewhere note the reassertion of British national and imperial identity,
against ‘others’ of several kinds, as one of its central ideological components.

Whereas in much of Hall’s earlier work, ethnicity has been a crucial dimension in a more
inclusive political and cultural analysis, in recent years he has come to address its
importance more directly. As questions of ethnic self-definition became important in the
black community, and as the question of national and ethnic identities became important
in multiracial and multicultural Britain, Hall made his intervention through his idea of
ethnic hybridity, his insistence that ethnicities were made through processes of social and
cultural definition, and did not exist as natural essences. This analysis drew on ideas of
cultural construction developed within cultural studies, to explore issues of gender and
sexuality as well as class and race. This argument drew attention both to the emergence
of new identities – ‘new ethnicities’ – made possible by experiences of migration, of its
second and third generation communities, and the many interactions with other
communities that were taking place. It was also a critique of, and a cautionary warning
against, ethnic essentialism and separatism among black radicals, in which he did not see
much promise. His BBC television series on the Caribbean gave a memorable exploration to these ideas of ethnic hybridity and difference, exploring as it did the significant ethnic and cultural mixes – between African, Indian, British, French, Spanish, and North American inputs – that make the Caribbean islands so distinct from one another. As he has himself said, he did not know himself to be a ‘West Indian’ until he arrived in England, and found himself part of a small community made up of people – including a group of novelists - from Caribbean islands he scarcely knew, and had never visited.

Another more recent television series made on the 50th anniversary of the docking of the ‘Empire Windrush’ in 1948, which began the major post-war Caribbean migration into Britain, recorded the psychic disappointments and deep injuries inflicted on the new arrivals, who imagined Britain from its own idealised imperial representation of itself, and encountered something quite different, and mostly far from welcoming. However, one could draw more positive implications from the Windrush television series taken as a whole, since so much could be seen to have changed for the better since those early days.

Hall became active in the defence of the rights of black people in Britain, for example as a member of the Runnymede Commission following the Stephen Lawrence murder. In this context he has taken up positions which are militant in demanding just and equal treatment for black citizens, even though he has remained committed at the same time to the encouragement of cultural diversity.

The courses he helped to develop at the Open University, whose publications have much wider dissemination than any other degree programmes in the UK, gave particular
emphasis to issues of modernity, globalisation, and identity, to which the history and consequences of empire, and the dimensions of ethnicity, are fundamental.

For the last few years, post-retirement and away from a formal institutional role in a university, Hall has undertaken more of his work within the context of ethnic minority cultural communities, notably in engaging with photography and the visual arts as expressions and explorations of ethnic identities in Britain. This work has given rise to significant writings, which are at this point probably rather less well known than his earlier work in cultural studies, politics and sociology. He is a very active chairman of the International Institute for the Visual Arts (inIVA) which is in process of funding a major new cultural institute in London devoted to ethnic perspectives on the visual arts. If this project succeeds, as it will probably do, it will constitute a major addition to London’s cultural landscape, giving a new centrality to multi-ethnic culture in London, and to the contribution of the various overseas Diasporas to which it is connected.

It should be clear then that Stuart Hall’s postcolonial formation (Jamaica was not yet even independent when he left for university in Britain in 1952) has been fundamental to nearly all of his work. He has interpreted British society and culture from the perspective of someone who was both deeply formed by it, as a colonial citizen, but was also an outsider to it. His work has from the beginning made the British notice the significance of racial differences in their midst, and take some explicit note of their imperial identity as something to question and ponder. For most of Hall’s career, has been to seek always to connect one thing to another, to make ethnicity and colonisation visible and evident as
part of a larger totality of culture or politics, and not to insist on their separateness. One can see in this an implicit 'strategy of alliances' on the left, which aims to link anti-colonial and anti-racist politics, fundamental to Hall’s position, to a broader ensemble of issues and antagonisms, in relation to domestic political alignments in Britain, to the recomposition of cultural studies, sociology, and politics as fields of study, and earlier on to the issues of the Cold War. It seems probable that the strong tradition of anti-colonialism in British liberalism and on the left, and the relatively peaceful transition to independence in some of Britain’s former colonies, made this option more feasible than it would otherwise have been. There was always some receptive ground for anti-racist and anti-imperialist politics in Britain, reflected also for example in the vigorous anti-apartheid campaign. This approach has enabled Hall, as a postcolonial intellectual from Jamaica, to be accepted as a formative and deeply-admired figure on the left of British politics and cultural life. He has contributed substantially, in this way, to the acceptance and valuing of contributions to the national culture by those of diasporic origins, and to the cultural diversification of British life. The establishment of inIVA will among things show how many others have been able to follow in these footsteps, even in a society which retains many racist and exclusionary habits of mind. It has been possible for Hall to do all this without making compromises or disavowals of his own commitments or integrity. One consequence of this is that he has remained a dissenting and non-incorporated figure in British public life, slightly awkward for even the left-centre establishment to deal with. He has thus had less influence with mainstream Labour, and with its government, and has had a less visible media presence, than one might have hoped. It should be noted as a fact that despite Hall’s considerable success in interpreting
the Caribbean Diaspora in Britain to itself, and to the British, not much interest seems to
have been taken until lately in these explorations in the Caribbean itself. But perhaps this
is now changing.

There have no doubt been different ways of taking up the role of a postcolonial
intellectual in the past fifty years. Stuart Hall’s way of doing this has been to make
himself fully at home in his country of migration, but spend a good part of a lifetime
there trying to change its ways of thinking to take account of experiences of millions of
people like him. British academic, cultural and political life is much better for his efforts
than it would have been without them. Space has been made for others to continue this
work. Hall does not see himself as a political optimist - pessimism of the intellect,
-facing up to the real, have been his watchwords. But there has been something deeply
hopeful about his commitment to finding people who will listen and respond if one shares
one’s attempts at understanding with them. Many have done so.

References

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