AFFECT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 
THE RISE OF POPULAR ZIONISM IN 
THE BRITISH JEWISH COMMUNITY 
after the Six Day War (1967) 

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Abstract

In current Jewish Studies scholarship there is a broad consensus that the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 caused both an intense emotional response in Britain’s Jewish community and a change in the relationship this community had with the State of Israel. What this scholarship has yet to provide is either a detailed account of the ways that the June 1967 war impacted on this community or a sustained theorisation of how the intensity generated by a world-historical event might bring about change.

This thesis attempts to address these gaps by interviewing twelve British Jews who lived through their community’s response to the war and supplement this data with original archival research, adding detail that is currently missing from the historical record.

It then interprets this data using a cultural studies approach grounded, primarily, in the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In using this approach this thesis reveals that it was the intense affectivity generated by the Zionist representation of the war as the ‘Six Day War’ that caused the community to change in the post-1967 conjuncture. It then identifies these changes as cultural – occurring on the planes of identity, representation, everyday life, cultural practice and, most crucially, affectivity. In revealing the centrality of affect in the impact of the war on the British Jewish community, this thesis argues that the hegemonic form of Zionism that emerges within that community after 1967 is ‘Popular Zionism’, defined as an intensely charged affective disposition towards the State of Israel that is lived out in the cultural identities, everyday lives and cultural practices of British Jews.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1. The origins of this thesis

“The ‘internal cohesion and solidity’ of Zionism has completely ‘eluded the understanding of Arabs’. As has the ‘intertwined terror and exultation’ out of which it was born; or in other words ‘what Zionism meant for the Jews’. It is the affective dimension, as it exerts its pressure historically, that has been blocked from view.”

(Rose, 2007, p. 197)

“I think, if cultural studies as a practice is a fairly significant departure from the ‘normal’ and dominant practices of the western academy, it is a challenge in a number of ways. One: being contextual. But two is precisely because it both recognises ‘feeling’ as part of its study, and also because it allows feeling as part of its practice, so in that way it has something over many forms of intellectual production.”

(Grossberg, 2010, p. 335)

“Only ... after the Six Day War in June 1967... did concern for and identification with Israel’s fate become central to what it meant to be a Jew in Britain.”

(Endelman, 2002, p. 235)

The idea for this thesis originated at the intersection of two different intellectual concerns. The first was an interest in the extraordinary power a certain idea of the State of Israel has in contemporary British Jewish culture or what Jacqueline Rose calls in the above quote the “‘internal cohesion and solidity’ of Zionism” – what Zionism has meant for the Jews. As a British Jew of Israeli heritage who has fallen out of love with Zionism (see Chapter 3) I have experienced first hand the ‘intertwined terror and exultation’ out of which Zionism is born and wanted to get a fuller sense of how the affective dimension of Zionism exerted its pressure historically.

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1 Rose is quoting Edward Said’s The Question of Palestine (1992).
2 As will soon become clear, the word ‘love’ is carefully chosen here.
This desire to understand Zionism’s affective dimension leads to the second intellectual concern governing this thesis. Over the past fifteen years there has been an ‘affective turn’ in humanities scholarship (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010), in which critics have begun sustained explorations into the sensuous, corporeal, visceral, intensive, embodied, emotional, volitional, libidinal, passionate… i.e. the affective dimensions of culture. Different theorists have been used to understand affect within the affective turn; for reasons explained below (and at length in Chapter 2), this thesis uses a cultural studies approach rooted in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari as exemplified by the work of Lawrence Grossberg (and others). So as much as this thesis is interested in the specificity of Zionism’s affective dimensions it is also interested in what cultural studies informed by Deleuzo-Guattarian theory can reveal about how affect operates in culture more generally.

In a bid to explore these concerns, I have chosen the case study of the impact of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 on the British Jewish community. There were different reasons for choosing this as a case study. The first was that it is a mainstay of Jewish Studies and Jewish historiography that the 1967 war generated a tremendous emotional response in global Jewry so using it as a case study would provide an opportunity to theorise how world-historical

3 Different critics use different definitions of affect in the affective turn. This thesis uses Brian Massumi’s definition of affect outlined in his introduction of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateau’s: “a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (in Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. xvii).

4 The war is given different names throughout the thesis: the June War, the June 1967 War, the third Arab Israeli-War and the Six Day War. All but the last are used for stylistic variation. The term the Six Day War is used specifically in reference to the Zionist representation of events of the war. The term emerged in the Israeli press shortly after the Israeli victory. The term is imbued with Israeli triumphalism, designed to invoke the Bible’s six days of creation (Segev, 2005, pp. 450–451) It also suggests that the effects of the war are over, when the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Golan Heights and the Israeli siege of Gaza demonstrate that they are not. The term Six Day War is used in the thesis only in reference to the Zionist representation of events.

events affectively impact on communities (and their cultures) invested in these events in particular ways. The second was that if Endelman’s claim that it was only after the June 1967 war that Israel became a central feature of British Jewish identity is true then the war’s impact on British Jewry could be used to explore Deleuze and Guattari’s notion that surges and dissipations of affect are what cause cultural change. The third was based on the idea that after 1967 British Jews began to relate to Israel in a highly affectively charged fashion. This is touched upon in the literature but rarely, if ever, as the main focus of scholarship and is always under-theorised. Researching the ways British Jews relate to Israel and Zionism post-1967 from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective – one that places a certain primacy on affect – might reveal something of the nature of the British Jewish relationship to Israel and Zionism that has not yet been revealed in the existing literature. Using this case study for these reasons, this thesis asks the question: ‘What role did affect play in the British Jewish response to the Six Day War and the changes that occurred in British Jewish culture as a result?’

2. Chapter outlines

This thesis answers this question in the following way. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework used in the thesis to make sense of what happened to the British Jewish community as a result of the war. It first makes the case for the benefits of a cultural studies approach to the question by arguing that because the empirical research demonstrates that the changes which occur within the British Jewish community happen in the realms of affectivity, identity, representation, everyday life and cultural practice (all

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6 This thesis disagrees with the detail but not the thrust of this claim. Israel did not become central in British Jewish identity but more prominent and it was not only British Jewish identity that was affected but a whole range of aspects of British Jewish culture (see Chapter 7).

7 Chapter 2 contains a full literature review.

8 This thesis recognises that affect is not the only form of power at play in the British Jewish response to the war and the changes that occurred in British Jewish culture as result. Other forms of power also played their part, notably discursive power and state power. These are touched on in this thesis e.g. in the changed discursive construction of the State of Israel in British Jewish culture after the war and the role of the Israeli state in shifting this discursive construction through its propaganda machinery. However, whilst this thesis does argue that multiple forms of power were at play during and after the war, it also argues that the affective was the most influential in terms of the way British Jewish culture changed.
traditional concerns of cultural studies) a cultural studies approach is best used to make sense of these changes. This chapter then considers three cultural studies paradigms that might be deployed to answer the research question through the work of the theorists who best exemplify these paradigms. The first theorist is Antonio Gramsci who emphasises the cultural aspects of politics and the political aspects of culture. The second is Ernesto Laclau who focuses on the discursive aspects of culture. The final theorists are Deleuze and Guattari who emphasise the affective dimensions of culture. Ultimately this chapter argues for the deployment of a primarily Deleuzo-Guattarian framework because of the presence of so much affect in the empirical evidence collected for the thesis, although it does not dismiss entirely the value of the other cultural studies paradigms, aspects of which are also used through the remainder of the thesis.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach used to carry out the research necessary to answer the research question. It begins with a self-reflexive section that attempts to assess the impact that the specificity of my positioning as a researcher may have had on the research findings. It then moves on to argue that the most effective method for researching affective states that emerged a number of years ago is a mix of original semi-structured in-depth interviews, archival research and secondary sociological and historical sources. This chapter then details the research process, the problems I faced and the unexpected benefits of using this methodological approach. This chapter finishes with a brief section of the ethics of research in such a politically fraught area.

Chapter 4 – ‘Affect and Zionism in the British Jewish Assemblage 1880–1967’ – attempts to detail the historical context in which the post-1967 changes in British Jewish culture occurred. It does this by combining the two different Deleuzo-Guattarian analytical frameworks developed by Manuel DeLanda and Lawrence Grossberg to perform an assemblage analysis of the British Jewish community from 1880–1967. The material analysed in this chapter is primarily the extant sociological and historical data but is also interwoven with biographical information of the interview participants. This
Chapter 5 attempts to present an historical narrative of the June 1967 war using a variety of secondary historical sources from across the political spectrum. This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to provide the reader with details of the events that constituted the Middle East crisis and the war it precipitated as a reference to use throughout the rest of the thesis. The second is to demonstrate how the Zionist representation of the war as the Six Day War differs from the versions that exist within historical scholarship. As is demonstrated in the following chapter it was these differences that led the affective response within British Jewry to be as intense as it was, generating the cultural changes outlined in Chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 6 attempts to narrate the British Jewish experience of the war as what Deleuzian Clare Colebrook has called a “history of intensities” (2009) i.e. a narrative in which the British Jewish intensely affective response is at the forefront. It does this by using Manuel DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* (1968 (a)) and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the Body-without-Organs (1980) to show how surges and dissipations of affectivity can change the organisation of cultural formations. Using the interview and archival data, this chapter argues that it was precisely the surge of affectivity that flowed across the British Jewish assemblage as a result of the war that triggered the changes in British Jewish culture after it.

Chapter 7, ‘The Production of Hegemonic British Jewish Cultural Identity after the Six Day War’, uses Guattari’s work on subjectivity to make sense of the shifts in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity triggered by the war. It argues that the “refrains” (Guattari, 1996 (a)) of Zionism “catalyse”
(ibid.) a contradictory affective disposition within the subjective ecology of hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity. This affective disposition makes British Jews feel that a strong militarised Israel will protect them against the threat of a genocide, which, post-1945, is unlikely to occur, but they nevertheless feel is just beyond the horizon, in large part because of Zionism. Guattari’s attention to the affective dimensions of subjectivity allows us to see precisely how British Jewish cultural identity works in relation to Israel, post-1967 i.e. primarily affectively.

Chapter 8, ‘The Rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish Community after 1967’, uses the Gramscian/Deleuzo-Guattarian analytical framework developed by Lawrence Grossberg in We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (1992) to argue that what emerges in the British Jewish community after June 1967 is Popular Zionism. It defines Popular Zionism as the hegemonic, and highly charged, affective disposition that British Jews have towards the State of Israel in the post-1967 conjuncture and that is lived out in their cultural identities, pop cultural consumption and everyday lives. This is different to classical Zionism, which is conventionally understood as an ideology and/or movement that is lived out at the levels of the state or institutions. It supports this claim with evidence from the interview and archival data.

3. The originality of this thesis

In approaching the impact of the June 1967 war on Britain’s Jewish community, analysing original archival and interview data from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, this thesis is an original contribution to knowledge in a number of ways. The first is historical. Whilst there have been historical accounts of the impact of the war on the British Jewish community these accounts have very often been cursory (Alderman, 1992; Endelman, 2005) mainly because they have appeared in histories covering much longer periods than would allow for a detailed look at the British Jewish reaction to the war. Interestingly in the most exhaustive study of the global Diasporic Jewish community’s reaction to the war (Lederhandler, 2000) an in-depth analysis of
the British Jewish reaction is largely absent. The one place in the existing literature where the British Jewish reaction to the war is given in-depth consideration is in Gould (1984) in which London Jews were asked to reflect on their commitment to Israel before, during and after the war. These reflections, however, were part of a much broader focus on notions of Jewish commitment in general as opposed to a specific concern with the Jewish relationship with Israel per se. In order to answer the research question that structures this thesis I have had to address this gap in the existing literature, and conduct in-depth interviews (the first of their kind) with twelve British Jews that explicitly addresses their recollection of their and the British Jewish community’s response to the 1967 war. These interviews (the full transcripts of which appear in Appendix 2) add important detail to the historical record.

The expansion of the historical record, however, is not the primary concern of this research. Instead it is an attempt to make sense of the role affect plays in the British Jewish relationship to Israel after the 1967 war from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective. Deleuze and Guattari have been used in both the context of Palestine/Israel and Jewish studies before (Silberstein, 2000; May, 2007; Weizman, 2007). In fact Deleuze and Guattari have both intervened in relatively limited ways into Palestine/Israel. Deleuze wrote a series of articles that were published in the French press speaking out politically against Zionism and in favour of the Palestinian cause but in a non-theoretical manner (Deleuze, 1978 (b), 1983, 1988; Deleuze and Sanbar, 1982). In Deleuze and Guattari’s most influential work, A Thousand Plateaus, there is a sentence long critique of Zionism in a larger discussion of the concept of ‘becoming’: “Even Jews must become-Jewish (it certainly takes more than a state)” (1980, p. 320). However, Deleuze and Guattari have yet to be used to account for the impact that the 1967 war had on British Jews or the relationship that community has had with Israel and Zionism more generally.

For reasons explained in Chapter 3 I have supplemented these interviews with original archival research.
The originality, however, does not lie simply in using Deleuze and Guattari to make sense of the war’s impact on the relationship that British Jewry has with Israel. More importantly it lies in what Deleuze and Guattari’s approach reveals about this relationship. By giving affect a primary role in the constitution of their radically complex ontology, one of the benefits of a cultural critic using Deleuze and Guattari is the possibility of a clearer view of how affect works in the operations of the cultural formation that critic is analysing. One of the key arguments made in this thesis is that Popular Zionism in post-1967 British Jewish culture (identity, representations, cultural practice and everyday life) operates as an intensely charged affective disposition. This is different to how it is conventionally understood in the existing literature either as an “idea” (Heller, 1947), an “ideology” (Shimoni, 1995), a “movement” (Laqueur, 1972) or “a broad identification with Israel” (Schindler, 2007 (b), p. 9). By using Deleuze and Guattari as a prism, this thesis argues, we are able to get a more accurate sense of how Zionism operates in British Jewish culture than has previously been revealed by other methodological and theoretical approaches.

A final way that this thesis is original is in its theoretical contribution to the literature that constitutes the “affective turn” (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010). This body of literature is broad covering a diverse range of academic disciplines, theoretical perspectives, political projects, methodological approaches and historical contexts. However, none of this scholarship has theorised the way that affect can generate instances of cultural change, something which analysing the specific dynamics of my chosen case study from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective will allow.

4. The politics of this thesis

The purpose of this thesis is not only to more accurately label the sort of Zionism that emerges in the British Jewish community after the June 1967 war. Understanding with greater accuracy how Zionism operates in post-1967 British Jewish culture is a step towards the successful opposition and resistance of Zionism in that culture. Gilbert argues that the defining purpose
of ‘cultural studies’ is to “put into question what is apparently fixed, to bring it out into the open, to de-sediment it, to make it public and to make visible its contingency, to put it up for discussion” (Gilbert, 2012). That has been one of the key intentions of this thesis – to ‘de-sediment’ the not only ‘apparently fixed’ but also intensely charged relationship that British Jews currently have with Israel. Chapter 4 shows that prior to 1967 it was acceptable for British Jews to be non- or anti-Zionist. Chapter 6 shows the processes by which these positions were expunged from British Jewish culture and Chapters 7 and 8 show the culture that emerges as a result. By outlining these processes of ‘sedimentation’, one of the hopes of this thesis is to make visible Popular Zionism’s ‘contingency’ and ‘put up for discussion’ other ways of thinking, feeling and acting towards the State of Israel that does not involve devotedly supporting a form of political organisation that privileges Jewish existence over Palestinian existence with often brutal and devastating consequences.

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10 Stuart Hall defines cultural change as “a polite euphemism for the process by which some cultural forms and practices are driven out of the centre of popular life, actively marginalised” (Hall, 1998, p. 443).
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework: Cultural Studies, Deleuze and Guattari and the Impact of the Six Day War on the British Jewish Community

1. Introduction

Leading historian of British Jewry Todd Endelman has observed that “only … after the Six Day War in June 1967… did concern for and identification with Israel’s fate become central to what it meant to be a Jew in Britain” (2002, p. 235). This thesis is an attempt to elaborate on this observation in two ways: i) by arguing that it was not only a shift in British Jewish identification that occurred as a result of the Six Day War, but in fact the emergence of a whole range of identifications, cultural practices, ideological suppositions and, most importantly, affective dispositions that can be grouped together under the term ‘Popular Zionism’ and ii) detailing the processes by which Popular Zionism came about.

What this chapter attempts is to outline the theoretical framework used to arrive at this conclusion. In doing so it wants to make the case for i) what might be called a ‘cultural studies approach’\(^{11}\) to understanding the impact of

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\(^{11}\) This is a problematic formulation because, as During argues, cultural studies “possesses neither a well-defined methodology nor clearly demarcated fields for investigation”. The broadest definition he allows is, “cultural studies is, of course, the study of culture or, more particularly, the study of contemporary culture. But this does not take us very far.” He then argues that cultural studies work can be of an economic, sociological or textual bent, but what its orientation emphasizes uniquely is a focus on “subjectivity” and “political engagement” at a moment when objectivity and scientific detachment were the dominant modes of humanities research (During, 1999, pp.1–2). He also stresses its “multidisciplinarity” and the need “not so much to dismantle disciplinary boundaries as to be able to move across them” (During, 1999, p. 27). To During’s definition I would add the following: a cultural studies approach has tended to historicise its research object. Lawrence Grossberg has argued that cultural studies defining property is that it is radically contextualist and conjuncturalist (Grossberg, 2006) i.e. it not only attempts to situate its research object in all the social relations that constitute it but tries to assess how its formation changes in time. If it is theoretically informed, cultural studies work tends to be rooted in the theories of twentieth century continental philosophy (most usually French structuralism and post-structuralism). If it is empirically based, it tends to use a qualitative approach. That research orientated from within other disciplines might fit into these broad (and cautious) definitions
the Six Day War on the British Jewish community and ii) more specifically a cultural studies approach that is rooted in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. As of yet no such approach has been used to understand either the impact of the 1967 war on British Jewry or the more general relationship that this community has with the State of Israel. As is argued through the remainder of this chapter, the reason this perspective is being used here is because it reveals in-depth what the existing literature has only touched upon: the profoundly affective way that Zionism has operated in the identities, cultural practices, ideological suppositions and affective dispositions of ‘ordinary’ Jews in their everyday lives as a result of the Middle East crisis and Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. All of these categories have been identified as key areas of research by cultural studies since the discipline emerged in the 1960s. Attention to the affective properties of culture has increased since the ‘affective turn’ (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010) of the past fifteen years of which Deleuzo-Guattarian thought has been such a key influence. It is for these reasons that this chapter will be arguing that a cultural studies approach based on Deleuzo-Guattarian thought is best placed to make sense of the cultural changes that occurred in the British Jewish community as a result of the 1967 war.

It will do this in the following way: first, it will briefly survey the extant literature on the effect of the 1967 war on the British Jewish community, and the more general relationship that both British and Diaspora Jews have had with Zionism and Israel since the war. It will also review the existing literature on affect theory in order to situate this thesis’ theoretical innovation vis-à-vis cultural change. This chapter will then make the case for the benefits of a cultural studies approach to a question that has yet to be considered within the discipline. It will do this by outlining the ways that some of the leading theorists demonstrate the influence of cultural studies and its approach to research within the academy. As will become clear in later chapters, the research undertaken for this thesis fits neatly into the above definition: i) the subjective appears in the choice of one-on-one interviews for the primary method of data collection and in Chapter 7’s focus on British Jewish cultural identity; ii) the political engagement in the thesis being informed by anti-Zionism; iii) its use of theories and methods from cultural studies, history and sociology; iv) its attempt to be radically contextual and conjunctural (see Chapter 4) and v) it uses continental philosophy, a qualitative method and empirical data.
used within the discipline – Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari – have conceived of processes of cultural change. There are different reasons why these theorists have been chosen. The first is that each of them represents a different paradigm that has emerged within the discipline since its inception in the 1960s, each of which have value in making sense of the question this thesis is attempting to answer. Gramsci’s thought is being used here to represent the first ‘phase’ of cultural studies: the cultural studies of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham during the late 1960s and 1970s. This work used a Gramscian approach (amongst others) to examine the political dimensions of culture, and the cultural dimensions of politics. Exemplary works of this period include *Resistance Through Rituals* (Hall and Jefferson, 1975), *On Ideology* (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1978), *Policing the Crisis* (Hall et al., 1978 (b)) and *The Empire Strikes Back* (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982). Laclau represents the second phase from the 1980s onwards when cultural studies scholars began to emphasise the discursive aspects of culture. Deleuze and Guattari represent the most contemporary evolution in the theories used by cultural studies – the cultural studies of the affective turn (op cit.). Despite being described here chronologically, these paradigms overlap in a way that continues to make them all relevant in different ways today. Each of them, with their different emphases, have value and are used in different ways for this project; although, for reasons explained below Deleuze and Guattari have been chosen as the primary approach.

A final point: any number of theorists could have been used to represent the different paradigms just outlined. E.P. Thompson, Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams or Louis Althusser might have replaced Gramsci; Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida or Jacques Lacan might have replaced Laclau and any number of the psychoanalysts used in the affective turn (Gustave Le Bon, Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Silvan Tomkins, Daniel Stern) could have replaced Deleuze and Guattari. The primary reason why the final three have been chosen is because they are all historical materialists (of different kinds) who have elaborated theoretical perspectives that explicitly address the material processes of historical and
cultural change in complex social formations. In different ways they are all radically contextualist and conjuncturalist in the way that Grossberg argues is the defining property of the cultural studies project (2006). This is precisely the approach needed when looking at a community as a whole (with all the methodological problems that entails (see Chapter 3)) and how different aspects of its culture changed as a result of a world-historical event. These perspectives do appear in the work of the other theorists just listed but nowhere quite so elaborately or as in-depth (with perhaps the exception of Raymond Williams, who does appear in the thesis through the work of Lawrence Grossberg).

2. Literature review

The question of how the Six Day War impacted on the British Jewish community has been addressed in both sociological and historical literature. Both Todd Endelman (2002) and Geoffrey Alderman (1992) have touched on it in much broader histories of British Jewry. Endelman argues it shifted Israel to the centre of British Jewish identity and Alderman argues that it cemented the place of Zionism within the community. These arguments are corroborated by historical work by Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks and Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovitz in (Don Yehiya, 1991). All of this work states that these changes occur, and suggests this is because of what British Jews felt was at stake in the war and its build-up (i.e. the annihilation of the State of Israel and a genocide of its Jewish population), but does not detail the range of changes that occurred, nor provide any sustained theoretical analysis of how these changes came about. The impact of the Six Day War is also measured in Julius Gould’s Jewish Commitment: A Study in London (1984), a study based on a survey that was undertaken in 1969. As part of the survey, participants were asked to measure their levels of identification with Israel before during and after the war and in follow-up semi-structured interviews they were asked to elaborate on these measurements. This data has proved invaluable to this thesis in giving a contemporaneous sense of how the war impacted on London’s Jews’ cultural identity (and is used in Chapter 7). Ronald Taft used a similar method to measure the effect of the war on Melbourne’s Jewish
community (1974). This has provided interesting comparative data, although because of its geographical specificity it has not been used explicitly in this thesis. The edited collection *The Six Day War and World Jewry* (Lederhendler, 2000) uses a mixture of historical (archival research) and sociological (a mix of quantitative methods) approaches and so again has proved to be a rich source of empirical data. Although it has chapters that look at individual Jewish communities around the globe, the British Jewish community receives no such attention. Nevertheless, however rich all these studies have been as sources of data, none of them have engaged in any sustained theoretical manner with how Zionism works in British Jewish culture (identity, representations, affective dispositions and everyday cultural practice). The same criticism can be made of the sociological research being produced within the tradition of British Jewish sociology, which has not looked at the Six Day War as such but has provided extensive empirical data about the ‘attachment’ different sections of British Jewry have had to Israel and Zionism since the 1960s (Krausz, 1964; Krausz, 1969 (a); Krausz, 1969 (b); Prais and Schmool, 1968; Prais and Schmool, 1975; Krausz, 1981; Kosmin and Levy, 1983; Kosmin et al., 1997; Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 2004; Graham and Boyd, 2010).

In order to find sustained theoretical engagement with how Zionism functions one has to look at more general studies of the ideology and movement as opposed to either the way it has been practiced in Britain or in relation to the Six Day War. One of the first pieces of work to bring the sort of critical theory that has since become popular in cultural studies to bear on Zionism was Edward Said’s *A Question of Palestine* (1979). This is a mainly political work but its emphasis on the place of discourse in the context of Zionism draws on a Foucauldian methodology. This emphasis on discourse reveals a crucially important dynamic within Zionism, i.e. the near total occlusion of Palestinians and the Palestinian representation of events in Palestine/Israel within the West and the role this plays in strengthening political support for Zionism. It briefly touches on the affective dimension of this support – “I can understand the intertwined terror and the exultation out of which Zionism has been nourished, and I think I can at least grasp the meaning of Israel for Jews…” (Said, 1979, p. 60). It is testament to the insight
of this ground-breaking book that this cursory statement so incisively summarises Zionism's affective economy – terror and exultation. These are precisely the affective states that British Jewry experiences during the war and which also maintain popular support for Zionism after it. This insight provides the basis for much of the analysis in this thesis. However, in *The Question of Palestine* precisely how Zionism functions affectively remains under-theorised in comparison to how it operates discursively.

2.1. Psychoanalysis and Zionism: Jacqueline Rose

In the book chapter ‘Continuing the Dialogue – On Edward Said’ (2007) Jacqueline Rose uses the above quote from Said as the springboard for her inquiry into Zionism. In doing so, her work stands out in the literature as the best attempt to understanding Zionism’s affective dimensions. However, in using a psychoanalytic theoretical framework Rose addresses the psychic dynamics of the ideology, which invariably includes the affective but does not treat the affective *as such* as a distinct category of human experience. As a result of her theoretical treatment being so sustained and because psychoanalysis offers, arguably, the most persuasive alternative to the Deleuzo-Guattarian approach taken in this thesis this section will look at Rose and psychoanalysis in some detail.

Rose, a leading psychoanalytic cultural critic, first turned her attention to Zionism in her book *States of Fantasy* (1996) but her most sustained engagement with Zionism appears in *The Question of Zion* (2005) and *The Last Resistance* (2007). What she sets out to do in these books is “to try to enter the imaginative mindset of Zionism in order to understand why it commands such passionate and seemingly intractable allegiance” (Rose, 2005, p. 13), thereby anticipating almost entirely the broader questions addressed in this thesis. In keeping with psychoanalytic cultural criticism she conceives of Zionism as a psychic state and analyses it using mainly Freudian (and occasionally Lacanian) concepts. In *The Question Of Zion* she diagnoses leading Zionists Herzl and Weizmann as manic-depressive through a close reading of their writings. In *The Last Resistance* she uses ‘splitting’,
‘resistance’ and ‘displacement’ to analyse newspaper interviews, policies and literature which all deal in some way with Israel, Zionism or the Holocaust. To give an example: in using psychoanalysis in her essay ‘Displacement in Zion’ (2007) she reveals important insights into the dynamics of Zionism. Her definition of ‘displacement’ is “there is something you cannot bear to think about or remember, so you think about or remember something else.” (2007, p. 42). One of the examples she uses to illustrate the way in which displacement works in Zionism is in the following newspaper quote from an Israeli soldier: “I remember the Holocaust. We have a choice to fight the terrorists or to face being consumed by the flames again” (2007, p. 55). Rose argues that the soldier is displacing the historical trauma of the Holocaust onto the suicide bombers of the second intifada, to which she retorts, “the flames on the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are not the flames of the Holocaust” (ibid).

Rose offers here (and elsewhere) a persuasive account of the psychic processes by which Zionist ideology generates intense affectivity but there are a number of problems with her approach and the psychoanalytic approach more generally in assessing the Jewish relationship to Israel. The first is methodological. Whilst textual analysis of media and literary representations can reveal a great deal about the culture(s) in which these representations are situated, this method, arguably, does not give as finer-grained insight into the everyday cultures of ‘ordinary’ Jewish people in the way that an ethnographic approach can. At the very least, textual analysis should be situated within some ethnographic data, if only secondary, in order to understand exactly how a media representation operates within the culture that produced it. However, when the conclusions are as persuasive as Rose’s, the deployment of this approach is not necessarily a problem but does lead her to some problematic formulations. For instance, throughout her work on Zionism, she repeatedly refers to the ‘Jewish people’. The ‘Jewish people’ is used most commonly in religious discourse (e.g. in ancient religious texts and contemporary rabbinical sermons drawing on these texts) and suggests an unbroken continuity between the ‘Jewish people’ of ancient times and the present day. This is profoundly ahistorical: Jewish peoples have related to Jewishness and
Zionism (not to mention the other aspects of their cultures and identities) in
different ways in different societies at different points in time. For example,
Chapter 4 demonstrates the shifting formations of British Jewry, and how
Zionism has functioned differently within that community over the course of the
twentieth century. Rose’s approach does not differentiate between the
specificities of the different Jewish communities she discusses – e.g. French,
Russian and Israeli Jewry in her displacement essay – and how Zionism and
its representations might operate differently in these different contexts. For
reasons made clear below, Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical approach
requires a far more historicized methodology than Rose’s psychoanalytic
approach allows.\footnote{Interestingly she lauds Said’s Gramscian approach, “to make an inventory of
the historical forces that have made anyone – a people – who they are.” (Rose,
2007, p.195) but does not quite follow its lead.}

Rose’s oversight points to a broader criticism of the Freudian approach
in general – its tendency towards ahistoricity and universalism. Freud himself
suggested the psychic processes he formulated in his work were universal.
Deleuze and Guattari (amongst others) offer a persuasive critique of this
approach. \textit{Anti-Oedipus}’ (1972) broader argument is that what Freud is
actually sketching are the psychosocial processes of the cultures of industrial
capitalism whilst imagining they are universal. This leads to a number of more
specific criticisms of how a Freudian approach might be bought to bear on the
Jewish relationship to Zionism. In applying a cultural theory that imagines that
the psychic processes specific to industrial capitalism are in fact universal, the
scope for formulating strategies of radical cultural change is severely limited in
a context in which they are desperately needed. His essay ‘Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego’ (1921) is a case in point. This essay lays the
basis for much of Freud’s ‘social turn’ a decade later and as such is instructive
for how he thinks groups of people become formed around certain
ideas/objects. One of the key arguments implied in this essay and others that
pursue similar themes is that “… rivalrous hostility towards the other is integral
to the very formation of the group.” (Rose, 2007, p. 66). The Freudian Other is
very specifically an object that is transformed by our projection of the qualities
we cannot bear to recognise in ourselves onto it. This is a very persuasive theorization of how Zionism is formed around the hostility towards the Palestinian/Arab/Muslim Other(s) and certainly offers insight into the structures of the post-1967 turn to Zionism of British Jewry. However in suggesting this is the only way any collective can be formed, through a relationship to an Other who we can only ever relate to with varying degrees of hostility, a solution to the conflict in Palestine/Israel – of how different cultures live peaceably and justly in the same territory – becomes nigh on impossible. By using Deleuze and Guattari we not only achieve the same level of analytic insight into the hostile relationship to the Zionist other through concepts such as ‘black holes’, ‘lines of death’, ‘the cancerous body without organs of the fascist’ but we also are given the possibility of strategising our way out of this hostile relationship: ‘lines of flight’ ‘becomings’ and particularly the multiple modalities of group formation which inhere in their concept the ‘virtual’ (these concepts are defined below and in other chapters) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980).

The final problem with Freud’s approach is the way he conceptualises affect. As argued above, whilst Freud’s theories of psychic processes invariably involve affect he rarely, if at all, theorizes affect as a distinct category of human experience. The two papers in his oeuvre where affect appears most prominently are in ‘Repression’ (1915 (a)) and ‘The Unconscious’ (1915(b)). The notion of affect developed here is problematic for this project. Freud understands affect mainly as anxiety. As a result much of the psychoanalytic work within the affective turn concentrates on trauma and the anxiety it produces (Walkerdine and Jimenez, 2012). The empirical data collected for this project showed that anxiety and trauma were only part of the complex affective ‘assemblage’ generated in British Jewry by the war. The taxonomy of affect elaborated by Spinoza in The Ethics (1677) that informs the Deleuzo-Guattarian approach (explained below) is much better placed to make sense of this response than Freud’s more limited approach.
2.2. The affective turn and cultural change

Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis are not the only traditions in which questions of affect have been explored in relation to culture. Over the last two decades a rich body of literature has developed which has recently been called “the affective turn” (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010) and this also needs to be considered in terms of what it can and cannot offer to the research question governing this thesis.

Despite the fact that affect and emotion have long been concerns within the philosophical currents that inform contemporary social sciences and humanities scholarship (Spinoza, 1677; Freud, 1915 (a), 1915 (b); Jameson, 1991), according to Gorton (2007) and Blackman and Venn (2010) they only became the focus of a distinct theoretical tendency within the field in the mid-1990s with the publication of Brian Massumi’s ‘Autonomy of Affect’ (1996) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s and Adam Frank’s ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold’ (Sedgwick, 2003).\(^{13}\) Both these essays used different theoretical frameworks to account for affect (Massumi used Deleuze, whilst Sedgwick and Frank used psychoanalyst Silvan Tomkins) but their intention was similar: to move away from the (post-)structuralist paradigms that had dominated cultural theory over the previous two decades and that tended to focus on the linguistic aspects of culture (Gilbert, 2004).

The turn to affect initiated by these essays actualised a number of “lines of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) within humanities and social science scholarship. One of the most significant claims made about the affective turn’s contribution to cultural theory is summarised by Blackmann and Venn who argue that attention to affect reveals that “social and natural phenomena are complex, processual, indeterminate, relational and constantly open to effects from contiguous processes” (2010, p.8). Arguably, it is not attention to affect per se that reveals the processual, indeterminate and

\(^{13}\) Lawrence Grossberg’s *We Gotta Get Out Of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture* (1992), a crucial theoretical resource for this thesis, is often left out of literature reviews on the affective turn despite pre-figuring some of the concerns of Massumi and Sedgwick and Franks.
relational nature of the social and natural world rather it is the wider theoretical frameworks that are used in the affective turn that do this, most notably the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Arguably, the unique contribution of the affective turn to cultural theory is the shift in focus from the linguistic to the material, specifically the corporeal, aspects of culture – how culture makes us feel and not necessarily how we make sense of it. What attention to affect within relational, processual and indeterminate ontologies has enabled is the extension of cultural theory’s well-established deconstruction of hierarchical power structures that are based on binaries. Whereas, in the cultural studies of the 1980s and 1990s, critics tended to focus on binaries of a textual or discursive nature, the affective turn has enabled the deconstruction (though not within deconstruction’s terms) of binaries organised around questions of materiality – for example, material/immaterial, corporeal/incorporeal (Blackman and Venn, 2010), mindy/body, actual/virtual and social/asocial (Massumi, 1996). For cultural studies in particular this has also meant the extension of its interdisciplinarity from its humanities and social sciences focus towards natural sciences such as genetics, biology, neuro-biology (Blackman and Venn, 2010), biotechnology, physics and neuroscience (Clough, 2008); and in doing so Gilbert (2004) argues that it potentially contributes to a significant paradigm shift within the discipline.

Some of the theoretical questions that have been addressed in the affective turn are as follows. The first are structured around the various problematics of subjectivity. Some theorists have argued that attention to affect enables the opening up of another front in critical theory’s attempt to de-centre the liberal individualist notion of the discrete, autonomous subject. For instance, in contrast to certain strands of psychoanalysis, which argue that affect and emotion originate in the bounded subject, theorists of the affective turn have argued that affect is ontologically distinct from the subject and therefore can traverse its boundaries. For Deleuze affect is pre-subjective (Massumi, 1996); for Brennan (2004) affect transmits across social groups

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14 For instance both Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and Michel Foucault (1975) have theorised the social as relational, processual and indeterminate but make no mention of affect.
whilst for Ahmed (2004) affect is contagious. For certain feminists emotion is personal (and therefore resides within a subject) whereas affect is collective, public and social therefore further contributing to feminism’s deconstruction of the binary personal/political (Cvektovich, 1992; Berlant, 2000; Riley, 2005). This relates to another important theoretical question addressed in the affective turn – its distinctiveness from emotion. Probyn (2005) argues that emotion is social and cultural whereas affect is biological and physiological. Grossberg (2010) argues emotion is the ideological attempt to make sense of affect. Massumi (1996) and Gilbert (2004) argue that emotion is affect qualified by language.

These theoretical insights have been applied in the analysis of a number of cultural objects, processes and contexts. The scholarship is too wide to review in full so what follows is a brief survey of some of the key texts. One of the key areas that has been explored is the relationship of affect to the reconfigurations of culture within postmodernity. Jameson (1991) argues (uniquely) that affect has waned within postmodernity, specifically in the field of aesthetics. Most other critics disagree with Jameson on this issue. Massumi argues that postmodern politics operates with a surfeit of affect (1996). Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that “affective labor” (sic) is one of the three forms of “immaterial labor” that have come to define the mode of production in a postmodern global economy. Grossberg (1992) argues that affect was vital in securing the hegemony of the new right in postmodern America. Another important research area has been the exploration of affect in relation to media. Hansen (2004) explores affect in relation to new media; Massumi (1996) in image reception; Clough (2008) in bio-media and other biotechnologies; Podalsky (2011) in Latin American cinema; Gormley (2005) in American cinema and Paasonen (2011) in online pornography. Music is a key area that has been transformed by the affective turn: Grossberg (1992) in relation to the music of the 1960s American counterculture; Henriques in relation to Jamaican dancehall culture (2010); Seigworth in relation to children and music (2003) and Gilbert in relation to disco (2006). Gorton provides a comprehensive account of how the affective turn has impacted on feminism.
Despite the potentially paradigm-shifting depth of insight offered by the turn to affect and the breadth of research topics it has covered, it is surprising that affect has been so little explored in relation to processes of cultural change. What makes this particularly surprising is precisely the fact that, as already discussed, the wider theoretical frameworks deployed within the affective turn tend to emphasise the processual nature of the social and natural worlds. This oversight is particularly prominent in work carried out in a Deleuzo-Guattarian vein that operates on the basis that “affect is integral to a body’s perpetual becoming” (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010, p. 3). Indeed, this thesis argues that it is the intensification and dissipation of affect caused within the British Jewish community by witnessing the 1967 war that secured the hegemony of Popular Zionism within that community; in this instance this means that affect is a motor of cultural change. If affect is so profoundly related to processes and becomings it follows that cultural studies work within the affective turn is well placed to theorise its relation to cultural change – this is, after all, what cultural processes and becomings entail.

The only study that approaches a theorisation of how affect relates to cultural change is Valerie Walkerdine and Luis Jimenez’s Gender, Work and Community After De-Industrialisation: A Psychosocial Approach to Affect (2012). This book looks at how the inhabitants of a town in South Wales affectively respond to the closing of its steelworks in 2002. With its attention to the affective impact of an historical event on a community and its culture, this book shares many of the concerns of this thesis. However, it takes a different approach to affect and cultural change, never focusing on cultural change as an object of analysis in itself. For Walkerdine and Jimenez, affect works in the context of a community by holding its members together in a sense of “communal beingness” (p. 50). The closing down of the steelworks served to “puncture … the social and affective relations that [held] the community together” (Walkerdine and Jimenez, 2012, p. 72). This in turn stimulated different affective responses that bought about change on the individual and
collective levels. As will become clearer in later chapters, this thesis takes a different approach arguing that the Zionist representation of the 1967 war stimulated affective responses across the community that subsequently re-orientated its culture favourably towards Zionism. For Walkerdine and Jimenez affect constitutes the relationality between members of a community. Historical events have the capacity to disarticulate (and by implication rearticulate) these affective relations. This thesis conceives of affect differently – not as relation but as force that, through its intensification and dissipation, has the capacity to reorganise the relationalities of a community and its culture. These differences in the characterisations of affect and its relationship to communal and cultural change are due to the different theoretical frameworks used – Walkerdine and Jimenez use psychoanalysis, mainly in the psychoanalytic tradition, and this thesis uses cultural studies grounded in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, the benefit of which has just been discussed in relation to approaching the specificities of this thesis’ research question.

3. A cultural studies approach

The historical, the sociological, the post-colonial and the psychoanalytic all have something to offer in the understanding of how the Six Day War impacted on the British Jewish community’s relationship to Israel and as such have all contributed in different ways to the analysis in this thesis. However, for the reasons just stated, on their own they arguably do not provide the most suitable theoretical frameworks for addressing the specificities of this question. As evidenced by the data collected for this thesis the Six Day War impacted on various aspects of British Jewish culture: identity, representation, ideology, popular culture and everyday life – all areas which, whilst alone are the concerns of various disciplines, taken together, fall into the traditional disciplinary concerns of cultural studies. Coupled with cultural studies’ radical contextualism and conjuncturalism (Grossberg, 2006) i.e. the imperative to locate cultural formations in the context of all their constitutive relations that shift through time, the remainder of the chapter looks at how three highly influential theorists within the discipline – Gramsci, Laclau and Deleuze and
Guttari – have conceptualized processes of cultural change. All have their strengths in making sense of the cultural changes in post-1967 British Jewry and are used in different ways throughout the thesis. Ultimately, however, this chapter argues that Deleuze and Guattari provide the most suitable approach, primarily (though not only) through the particular emphasis that they place on affect within these processes.

The remainder of this chapter will be structured in the following way: there will be three sections each outlining how cultural change occurs according to Gramsci, Laclau and Deleuze and Guattari. In order to describe these theories of cultural change more efficiently each of those sections will be divided into a further three sub-sections. Subsection i) will outline the ontology of a particular theorist – the way that theorist sees the world, particularly the social world, being put together. Subsection ii) will outline how they see cultural change occurring within their ontology. Subsection iii) will discuss the applicability of each theory of cultural change to this particular study.

4. Gramsci

The thought of Antonio Gramsci was one of the most important influences in the development of British cultural studies at the CCCS in the 1970s. The reason for this influence is because Gramsci was one of the Marxists whose historical analyses shifted the emphasis away from the economic base and onto the superstructure, an approach that the CCCS argued was far more suited to making sense of the changed historical conditions of Britain’s advanced consumer capitalist society in the post-1945 period than the sorts of Marxism that were dominant at the time (Hall, 1980 (a)). In shifting the emphasis from base to superstructure, Gramsci innovated a rich conceptual schema to make sense of the historical arrangements of specific ‘conjunctures’, namely: ‘hegemony’, ‘relations of forces’, ‘historic blocs’, ‘the economic-corporate phase’ and ‘the national-popular phase’ (Gramsci, 1971). The definitions of these concepts are outlined below. The fundamental problematic that Gramsci attempts to address in formulating these concepts is: ‘What are the material processes through which certain
classes or class fractions become hegemonic in particular historical circumstances?' Using this problematic to frame this thesis enables a real depth of insight into the research question that structures it. What this thesis is trying to address is what role the 1967 war played in the becoming-hegemonic of a particular form of Zionism within the British Jewish community in the current conjuncture. The following section defines the concepts just listed in order to explain Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as a theory of cultural change. It then performs a purely Gramscian, thumbnail analysis of the effects of the Six Day War on the British Jewish relationship to Zionism and Israel. Finally it explains the benefits and limitations of a purely Gramscian approach to answering this question and how these have come to bear on the overall theoretical approach deployed by this thesis.

4.1. Gramsci’s ontology

Arguably Gramsci’s most important concept is ‘the struggle for hegemony’. Originating from ancient Greek, ‘hegemony’ was first used to denote the dominance of one nation or region over another. It first enters Marxism via Plekhanov and then Lenin to specifically mean that the proletariat should lead the peasantry in the anti-Tsarist revolution (Simon, 1982, p. 21). Gramsci’s use of hegemony differs from Lenin’s. First Gramsci changes it from a political strategy to a heuristic concept. Secondly he shifts the definition to mean how “a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion” (ibid). The key difference here is in the distinction between ‘power’ and ‘leadership’. A class and its representatives can lead but not have power just as they can have power but not lead. According to Gramsci, hegemony is achieved when the subordinated classes consent to being led by another class, for instance, using Lenin’s example when the peasantry consented to being lead by the proletariat. (As a Marxist, Gramsci argues that groups of people only become politically meaningful through their relationship to the ‘means of production’ i.e. as a class or subsection of that class – a class fraction).
Before this discussion moves on to describe the specific processes that constitute the Gramscian struggle for hegemony it will be useful to outline his theory of the material context in which Gramsci sees this struggle taking place: his ontology. Although Gramsci was a Marxist, his perception of how the social world is put together differs from the way it is constructed in classical Marxism. For Marx social relations can be divided up into either the economic base or the superstructure (Marx, 1859). The economic base refers to the complex socio-economic arrangements that constitute the means of production of a particular historical epoch. The superstructure comprises all the other forms of human activity that are not primarily economic – the political, the artistic, the ideological etc. In classical Marxism the superstructure emerges from the base and therefore all the activity in the former is determined by the activity in the latter. The precise nature between base and superstructure changes in Marx’s writing and is described differently by different Marxists, however, regardless of these variations, the base is always the privileged term in the base/superstructure relationship in classical Marxism. Cultural change (changes in ideology, in aesthetic practice, in identity), then, is a reflection of shifts in the way society is organized in relation to the goods and services it produces. For example, a classically Marxist reading would attribute the rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish community after the 1967 war to a change in the relationship of that community to the means of production. As Chapter 4 demonstrates there was such a change in the 1960s: namely the remarkable upward socio-economic mobility of the community between 1945 and 1967.

Gramsci’s ontology does not completely omit the terms base and superstructure but he complicates their relationship in the following ways: i) he develops new terms that he uses alongside, and sometimes instead of base and superstructure e.g. ‘Relation of Forces’, ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Political Society’ (Gramsci, 1971) and ii) argues for a more complex intertwining of the different forms of human praxis than classical Marxism, with its more deterministic relationship from base to superstructure, (what he calls ‘economism’ (ibid.)) will allow.
Two important concepts in Gramsci’s ontology are ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’. Civil society is comprised of institutions such as trade unions, political parties, mass media, churches, schools etc. In the struggle for hegemony these institutions operate by means of persuasion, whether through political speeches, newspaper editorials, sermons or school lessons. Political society is comprised of state institutions like the army, the police, parliament and the courts. These institutions coerce citizens back in line with the prevailing ideology should they fall out of it through methods such as arrest and imprisonment. For the struggle for hegemony to be won, all the institutions of both civil and political society need to be lead by the representatives of one particular class or class fraction, and operated in the interests of that group.

In Gramsci’s civil society and political society it is possible to see forms of human praxis that classical Marxism attributes to either base and superstructure being dispersed by Gramsci across alternative categories. A further concept into which they are dispersed is Gramsci’s ‘relations of force’, broadly defined as all the social forces that constitute a given society. Gramsci breaks down the ‘relation of forces’ into the following: “the material forces of production”, “the relation of political forces” and “the relation of military forces” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 181–3). The ‘material forces of production’ refers to the socio-economic conditions of a society and as such parallels Marx’s ‘base’. ‘The relation of political forces’ refers to the political relationships between different social groups in a given historical moment, and ‘the relation of military forces’ refers to the tools and techniques of brute force that the hegemonic class/class fraction uses to enforce its hegemony. For Gramsci, the arrangement of the relation of forces specific to an historical period both enables and constrains the sorts of cultural formations (for Gramsci it is mainly political formations) that will emerge.

If the concepts ‘civil society’, ‘political society’ and ‘relation of forces’ offer an ontological alternative to classical Marxism’s base and superstructure that, in important ways still respects it, it is through the relationship between these concepts that Gramsci offers a more significant departure from Marxist orthodoxy. In classical Marxism, the relationship between base and
superstructure is a determining one. As described above new cultural formations emerge because of shifts in the base. Gramsci relieves the socio/economic of its privileged status in Marxism: “It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical events; they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of public life.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 184). For Gramsci the relationship between the different types of human activity is far more complex and intertwined than classical Marxism would have it, meaning that all the different types of praxis have the capacity to reverberate on each other in a more or less equal fashion.\footnote{With regards to the relationship between Base and Superstructure, Gramsci does not rid himself of Marxism completely. As Simon says, “civil society consists of a complex network of relations of forces dominated by the central conflict between capital and labour” (1982, p. 73). The base might not determine the form and content of particular historical moments but it does go some way in framing them.}

\section*{4.2. Gramsci and cultural change}

All this provides the ground upon which the struggle for hegemony takes place. In the Selection from the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci is exacting on how hegemony is struggled for in history. First a class (or class fraction) is formed in relation to the material forces of production. Then the class acquires political consciousness of itself as a class. This is the economic-corporate phase whereby a class begins to act politically but only in its self-interest. At this stage, “a tradesmen feels obliged to stand by another tradesmen, a manufacturer by another manufacturer etc. but the tradesmen does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 181). The second stage of the economic-corporate phase is when the class begins to act in accordance with the interests of its class i.e. tradesmen stand in solidarity with manufacturers. Marx spoke about ‘class consciousness’ in relation to this phase. This normally coincides with the development of an ideology that will make sense of their position in relation to the material forces of production and simultaneously advocate for their improved position in the political sphere –
which will be carried out by a political party acting at the state level. iv) The economic corporate phase is transcended and the national-popular/hegemonic phase is achieved. This occurs when the class comes into conflict with other classes in a bid to persuade (and coerce) the widest possible amount of people that their competing ideologies best serve their interests. The most persuasive (and coercive) class achieves hegemony, creating what Gramsci calls a new ‘historic bloc’. An ‘historic bloc’ is the term given to the bloc of social forces across civil and political society that have been hegemonized by the leading class and whose new ‘hegemonized’ configuration can endure for a substantial historical period. Hegemony cannot be achieved at the levels of civil society and political society alone. Most crucially it has to be achieved at the level of what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ and defines as, “the diffuse, uncoordinated features of a generic form of thought common to a particular popular environment” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 330). Common sense then is the spontaneous way groups of people react to, discuss and make sense of their life-world. If a class is able to hegemonize its ideology at the level of ‘common sense’ i.e. make large swaths of society live out its ideology as if it were natural, then total hegemony would be achieved at all levels, creating what Gramsci called ‘organic unity’ between all the relations of forces.

A final point: hegemony is most commonly achieved during periods when the relations of forces are out of balance i.e. during periods of social change. This is when hegemony is slipping away from the social group who had held together the previous historic bloc giving other groups a chance of securing it. Gramsci differentiates between two types of period when the balance of forces are out of kilter – the ‘organic’ and the ‘conjunctural’. “A[n organic] crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural conditions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts… form the terrain of the conjunctural, and it is

16 The balance between persuasion and coercion should always heavily favour persuasion otherwise a class will dominate instead of lead through consent.
upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organized.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 178). Organic crises occur deep within the structures of society, causing entire social arrangements (the relations of force, civil and political society in their entirety) to alter and thus have longer term effects than the conjunctural. Conjunctural phenomena are more superficial and therefore have limited historical impact. The election of a new party into power tends to be conjunctural. A revolution where one political system replaces another as a result of profound social change would be an organic phenomenon.

4.3. A Gramscian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day War

Bearing all this in mind what might a Gramscian reading of the changes that occurred in the British Jewish Community around the Six Day War, particularly the rise of Popular Zionism, look like? The first step in this reading would be to identify either the organic crises or the conjunctural manoeuvrings that set the stage for the rise of Popular Zionism. The second would be to identify the different classes and their struggle for hegemony in the British Jewish community. The third would be to identify the stages (economic corporate and hegemonic) by which the successful class achieved its hegemony. The final stages would involve extrapolating the ideology of the hegemonic class and demonstrating how it acts as the cement of the newly formed historic bloc (the post-1967 Popular Zionist British Jewish community) finding evidence of it across its civil society, political society and common sense.

The first and final stages are demonstrable in the events that lead to the Zionisation of British Jewry post-1967. The organic movement in this context would be the mass Jewish migration into Britain between 1880 and 1914 that saw the population of Jews in Britain rise from 50,000 to 200,000 (Bentwich, 1960, p. 16). The structural changes that occurred in the community in this period were profound, changing the socio-economic make up, the ethnic origins, the geographical location, the political disposition and the religious practices of the majority of British Jewry. By the time of the 1960s the British
Jewish community was also engaged in various conjunctural phenomena, namely its upward social mobility into the middle class, its suburbanisation, its decline in religious practice, and the shift of focus of British racism from Jews in Britain to the newer postcolonial migrants. These phenomena are described in great detail in Chapter 4. All this activity at the conjunctural level points to shifting social arrangements that opened up potential new fronts in the struggle for hegemony. This is achieved at the level of ideology with the emergence of Popular Zionism. If a defining feature of Popular Zionism is Jewish power, as embodied by the victorious Israeli soldiers of the Six Day War, there is a logic to it becoming one of the ideologies through which the British Jewish community makes sense of its shifting position within both the material forces of production and the relation of political forces in 1960s Britain. Put more simply: as the Jewish community enjoyed increased economic, cultural and political power in British society during the 1960s, they needed an ideology that reflected this and Popular Zionism served this purpose. This Gramscian reading of the shifting relation of forces of the British Jewish community in the 1960s informs the analysis in Chapter 4, specifically via the way that Lawrence Grossberg brings Deleuze and Guattari to bear on Gramsci in his work (1992; 2005).

More importantly this ideology becomes hegemonic during the post-1967 conjuncture and this can be evidenced when looking at both the civil society and common sense of the British Jewry post-1967. For example, the editorial line of the Jewish Chronicle after the Six Day War was pro-Zionist when in other periods, particularly pre-1945, it had been more equivocal (Cesarani, 2005). Jewish institutions that had been anti-Zionist, or at least non-Zionist prior to the war, became pro-Zionist as a consequence of the war. The most notable example of this is the Liberal synagogue (Endelman, 2002).

Finally, the interviews conducted for this research provide overwhelming evidence that Zionism becomes the common sense of British Jewry after the

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17 As a minority community in Britain, Jews do not have a Gramscian ‘political society’ as such. The Beth Din is a rabbinical court but has little jurisdiction beyond religious matters. For instance, the Beth Din oversees divorce procedures and the implementation of the laws of kashrut (kosher) in Britain’s Jewish butchers and meat-sellers.
1967 war. This use of Gramsci to demonstrate how ideology becomes hegemonic in a specific conjuncture forms the basis of the analysis in Chapter 8, again via Grossberg’s uses of it.

For all this, a purely Gramscian reading of the effects of the Six Day War on the British Jewish community is inadequate in different ways. Firstly British Jews do not operate simply in class terms – the community is formed at the complex intersection of different social forces (class, place of habitation, religious practice etc.) outlined above and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It is the shifts across this range of forces, of which class is only one, that set the stage for the Zionisation of British Jewry after the Six Day War. Having said this, there is, according to Alderman (1992), a moment in British Jewish history where class plays an important role in the whole social formation in the way Gramsci describes. Historian of Zionism, Gideon Shimoni has written two articles in which he describes the Zionist “capture” of British Jewish institutions (1986 (a); 1986 (b)). Geoffrey Alderman adds a class dimension to this account when he describes the Zionists as middle-class Jews who are trying to access the levers of power of British Jewry, which up until 1937, were held by the upper class grandees of the community, the majority of whom were non- or anti-Zionist (1992). In 1937 the Zionist Selig Brodetsky is appointed the President of the British Board of Deputies, the community’s leading institution (this is described in more detail in Chapter 4). In Gramscian terms, this might be understood as the Zionists as a class fraction advancing in the struggle of hegemony against the non-Zionist Jewish upper classes. However, even if Alderman introduces class into the historical account, it is disputable whether Zionists in Britain, middle-class or otherwise were acting in a classed capacity or in their class interests. The dominant interpretation of Zionism is that it is a politics rooted in, what is now called, ethnicity and not class (Shimoni, 1995).

Another way that a purely Gramscian reading provides an inadequate analysis is in the connection between the civil society, political society and common sense of the British Jewish community. British Jewish civil and political society may have been captured by Zionists in 1937, but organic unity
with British Jewish common sense is only achieved thirty years later in 1967 (Endelman, 2002). This is partly because despite institutions like the Board of Deputies claiming that it represents British Jewry to British society, the actual level of representation between these institutions and British Jewry is minimal. This is because these institutions are not democratic: who leads them is decided internally and not by any sort of community-wide democratic process. This means organic unity between the various levels of the British Jewish community is unachievable in the way Gramsci describes. The reason for this is that Gramsci formulated his theories in relation to the political structures of advanced capitalist western democracies, so a direct fit between these theories and the very different political structures of an ethnic minority community is not really possible. There is also the question of the intense affectivity generated in the community by the war and the role it played in transforming British Jewish culture. Gramsci does talk about affect and the political in his writing but it is left theoretically undeveloped. All the data gathered for this thesis overwhelmingly demonstrates that affect played a crucial role in the changes brought about by the war, so in order to make full sense of this it is necessary to use an approach that fully theorises what affect does to the organization of social and cultural formations, something Gramsci does not do.

5. Laclau

The theoretical inadequacies of a purely Gramscian approach to understanding the impact of the Six Day War on British Jewish culture – the emphasis on class and the political – are, to some degree addressed in the work of Ernesto Laclau. Laclau, a post-Marxist, is also concerned with the struggle for hegemony and the creation of new cultural formations (political positions, discourses, identities). Whereas Gramsci emphasises the struggle undertaken by classes and class fractions at the political level, Laclau is more

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18 "The intellectual's error consists in believing that it is possible to know without understanding and especially without feeling ... History and politics cannot be made without passion, without this emotional bond between intellectuals and the people-nation" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 418).
concerned with how social groups (not only classes) struggle for hegemony at the level of the discursive. He understands all cultural formations as discursively constructed, examining their constitution, how they emerge in society, and how they become and remain hegemonic. There is obvious value in this approach when examining the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day War and how it becomes the hegemonic position of British Jews in relation to Israel after 1967. What follows is an exposition of the sophisticated way that Laclau builds on Gramsci (amongst others) and the benefits and limits of applying his approach to the rise of Popular Zionism.

5.1. Laclau’s ontology

Laclau’s description of the way society is put together is a significant departure from how it had been previously described in Marxist theory. In the long essay ‘New Reflections On The Revolution of Our Time’ (1990) he not only develops Gramsci’s critique of base and superstructure but, more substantially, radically revises the metaphysical grounds upon which Marxist thought is based. Laclau begins the essay with the claim, “negativity is part of any identity and… the rationalist project to determine the ultimate objective or positive meaning of social processes was ultimately doomed to failure.” (Laclau, 1990, p. 4). Here he is referring to nineteenth century Enlightenment thought in general but the essay itself is specifically a critique of Marxism. For Laclau, the rationalist, positivist, totalizing Marxist view of the social world as comprised of ultimately knowable, discrete and self-defined objects is a mistake. ‘New reflections…’ instead argues for a social world that is structured fundamentally by ‘negativity’ and he deploys a range of concepts that stem from this insight: ‘antagonism’, ‘contradiction’, ‘dislocation’ and ‘contingency’.

To illustrate how negativity appears in Laclau’s ontology it will be useful to demonstrate how it plays out at the level of the social. In Marxism the social is often referred to as both ‘structure’ and ‘social totality’. As described above, this structure is split into the base and superstructure (with base determining superstructure) and both being split further into autonomous levels of human praxis e.g. the economic, the political and the ideological. In the essay, Laclau
retains the use of the word ‘structure’ but disputes the idea that it can be conceived of as a ‘totality’ with self-contained levels, straightforwardly determining one another. He argues this by using the notion of the ‘constitutive outside’ that claims that objects are only constituted by their relationships to other objects that exist externally to them. Laclau gives this concept a Marxist twist by arguing that this constitutive relationship must always be ‘antagonistic’. He evidences this using the classic Marxist example of class struggle saying that it is only through the network of antagonistic relations that workers and capitalists enter into as a result of capitalism that a person becomes either a worker or a capitalist at all. But as much as these relationships produce identity, because they are antagonistic they are only able to do so through denial. To give an example: a person only becomes a worker when, for instance, s/he has surplus value extracted from her/him by a capitalist. This denies her/him a fair wage for his labour. In this case the identity, ‘worker’ has emerged as a result of a denial, meaning its constitution will only ever be partial. If this is the case for every object that constitutes the social world this means that the picture that emerges of the social in Laclau’s thought is a field of partially constituted objects whose conditions of emergence are all contingent upon webs of other partially constituted objects in the field. What this means in terms of the post-Marxist critique of base and superstructure is as follows:

"What we find then is not an interaction or determination between fully constituted areas of the social, but a field of relational semi-identities in which ‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘ideological’ elements enter into unstable relations of imbrication without ever managing to constitute themselves as separate objects."

(Laclau, 1990, p. 24)

This renders both the notion of ‘social totality’ and economic determinism redundant.
5.2. Laclau and cultural change

Laclau’s claim that the ‘economic instance’ is a myth provokes the question, ‘what, then, brings about historical change?’ If Laclau conceives the structure as a complex aggregate of partially formed objects whose constitutions are contingent upon the antagonistic relationships they have with the other partially formed objects in the field, it follows that the relationships are themselves only partial. This means the structure is in a permanent state of dislocation, and as it evolves through time the state of dislocation between the various objects becomes more or less dislocated depending on where they exist in relation to other objects in the structure. To illustrate ‘dislocation’ Laclau gives the real world example of emerging capitalism and lists its dislocatory effects on the working class: “the destruction of traditional communities, the brutal and exhausting discipline of the factory, low wages and insecurity of work” (Laclau, 1990, p. 39). For Laclau the temporality of capitalism (particularly late capitalism) moves at such an intense pace that it possesses an “uncontrolled dislocatory rhythm” (ibid.) that causes a series of dislocations across many different parts of the structure. He calls these dislocated areas ‘power centres’: “the vision of the social emerging from this description is that of a plurality of power centres, each with a different capacity to irradiate and structure” (Laclau, 1990, p. 40). In the late twentieth century Laclau implies that power centres opened up around the issues of gender, sexuality and ethnicity as a result of capitalism’s dislocatory effects (moving him away from the economism of earlier forms of Marxism).

An important point to be made before we continue expounding Laclau’s theory of historical change is that when he conceives his ontology, he not only draws on Marx, Gramsci and Derrida but also Jacques Lacan particularly the seminal notion of the ‘lack’ (1966). For Lacan, all human experience is defined by the lack and so appears in his thought in different ways. One of the ways Lacan conceives of the lack (that can be used to illustrate how it is deployed by Laclau) is the role the lack plays in subject formation. When an infant is
born he\textsuperscript{19} does not yet experience himself as an autonomous subject, rather as existing as one entity with his mother. The union with the mother provides the infant with a sense of highly pleasurable completeness (what Freud called an ‘oceanic feeling’ (1930)). When, through different psychic processes, the infant begins to assume an autonomous self separate from the sense he is connected to the mother, this completeness is shattered. The infant experiences this loss of completeness as the lack. For Lacan, subjectivity can only ever emerge in a state of lack, which the subject will spend the rest of his existence trying to fill. Lacan calls the attempt to fill the lack, ‘desire’; and because lack fundamentally structures subjectivity it can never be filled without the subject entering into psychosis meaning that Lacanian desire is always unsatisfiable.

Lack can be seen throughout Laclau’s ontology: in his insistence that negativity is what structures the field of objectivity, in his partially formed objects and in his dislocated structure. How the lack plays out in reference to the dislocated power centres just discussed is that there is always the desire on the part of social actors inhabiting the structure to resolve these dislocations i.e. close them up. This desire is what constitutes political struggle (this is why ‘power centres’ are so called). So if a power centre is dislocated around gender in the late twentieth century, feminism is the political struggle that seeks to close it up. For Laclau this struggle is largely carried out discursively in what he has called “the hegemonic-discursive construction of the social” (Laclau, 1990, p. 28). It is his insistence on the discursive that Laclau departs most significantly from Gramsci. Gramsci does touch on the discursive in his discussions of the ideological but it is only one front amongst many upon which the struggle for hegemony is carried out. For Laclau, the discursive is paramount in this struggle.

In ‘New Reflections…’ Laclau argues that what happens at the newly opened power centres of the social structure as a result of dislocation is the breaking up of the relationships that had previously held the objects together:

\textsuperscript{19} The Lacanian subject is invariably male.
“The basic hegemonic articulations weaken and an increasing number of social elements assume the character of floating signifiers.” (Laclau, 1990, p. 28). The specific nature of a Laclauian political struggle then is the attempt by a social group to establish connections between these newly freed signifiers and the signifieds of the group’s political project. By re-establishing fixity between these signifiers the dislocation that freed them appears to be resolved. If they are successful in this, the social group not only creates a new discourse but also make that discourse hegemonic: “to ‘hegemonize’ a content would therefore amount to fixing its meaning around a nodal point. The field of the social could thus be regarded as a trench war in which different political projects strive to articulate a greater number of social signifiers around themselves” (ibid.). The struggle for hegemony then becomes a struggle over meaning: the ability for one social group to persuade other social groups that their newly articulated discourse is best placed to make sense of a given historical situation. An example that Laclau gives is the ability for the Nazi party to persuade large swathes of the German public in the early 1930s that Nazism was the most appropriate discourse to make sense of the dislocations caused by the Great Depression in Weimar Germany. They did this by establishing a chain of equivalence between, amongst other things, Germany’s post-Versailles shame, the Great Depression and anti-Semitism.

There is a final stage in making a discourse hegemonic. For a discourse to be hegemonic it must achieve the status of a “myth” that establishes the limit of the structure’s “imaginative horizon”. For Laclau ‘myth’ is another name for discourse, but understood specifically in terms of the way a discourse functions within his ontology. In this respect, a myth has two defining features: i) its literal content and ii) its, ultimately unachievable, promise of fullness. Every discourse has a literal content i.e. the specific configuration of the signs that constitute its chain of equivalence. For a discourse to achieve the status of myth it must appear to close the dislocated spaces of the social structure. But because Laclau’s structure is always dislocated and partially formed it would be impossible to close these spaces up. The myth here is the myth of fullness that the discourse promises in closing the open spaces of the dislocated structure. For Laclau, the literal
content resides inside the myth whereas its capacity to promise (unachievable) fullness operates on its surface. The surface is what’s called “a surface of inscription” and the more social groups who are able to inscribe their demands on the surface of the myth, the closer the myth comes to hegemonizing the social field. When a critical mass of demands are inscribed upon the surface of the myth, it achieves hegemony, becoming an ‘imaginary horizon’ which structures the entire social field. “The imaginary is an horizon: it is not one among other objects but an absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility and is thus the condition of possibility for the emergence of any object” (Laclau, 1990, p. 64). What this means in simple terms is that one particular discourse becomes the dominant way for a society to make sense of its material conditions at a given moment, structuring all the other discourses that emerge at that moment.

To summarize a Laclauian approach to cultural change: society is not totality comprised of autonomous levels of human praxis straightforwardly determining one another; instead society is a structure conceived of as a complex web of partially formed objects all of which are constituted by the antagonistic relationships they have with one another. One way in which the structure changes is through dislocation. As it moves through time, external dislocatory forces perpetually disfigure the structure, destroying the relations that form its objects, setting these objects free. The areas of the structure where these relations are destroyed become power centres – sites of political struggle. This struggle consists of attempts to re-articulate these floating signifiers into a coherent discourse that is able to make sense of the dislocation that produced them. This is essentially a struggle for meaning. The discourse that is able to present the most persuasive strategy for closing up the dislocated space (an ontological impossibility), in a way that occludes the possibility that other discourses that could have done the same even existed, achieves the status of a myth that establishes the imaginative horizon of the social field in a given historical moment. This imaginative horizon establishes the limits of the dominant way of thinking in a given historical moment i.e. the myth becomes hegemonic. This is how new social conditions are bought about, how discourses emerge to make sense of these conditions and how
these discourses become popular. It is in this way that it becomes possible to use Laclau to make sense of the rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish community around the Six Day War. A Laclauian analysis would first need to understand the key objects of the case study in Laclau’s terms. It would then have to identify the dislocations of the British Jewish community around the war, the power centres that open up as a result, and the discourses that emerge to resolve this. This is possible but only partially persuasive.

5.3. A Laclauian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day War

The major object in this research to be understood in Laclauian terms would be British Jewish identity and how the community is discursively constructed around and through it. This would have to be understood through antagonism. It is clear from the interviews that the major antagonism that produces British Jewishness at the discursive level is anti-Semitism. The people interviewed with the strongest sense of Jewish identity were those who grew up with the strongest sense of anti-Semitism in Britain before and during the 1960s (Evelyn, Jeremy, Stephen). Those with the weakest sense of anti-Semitism had a weaker sense of identification with the British Jewish community (Brian, Harvey). Another area where an antagonistic sense of anti-Semitism was keenly felt in the research was in the interviewee’s perception that it motivated the Arab nations when they fought the war. All the interviewees but one felt the Arabs fought against Israel in the 1967 war because of a genocidal sense born of anti-Semitism. This in turn produced a stronger identification not only with the Israelis but also as Jews in Britain. The Laclauian insight that identity is produced in antagonism would appear to apply here.

The question of dislocation is where a Laclauian analysis becomes less persuasive. Part of the reason Laclau wrote ‘New Reflections…’ was in order

20 This coincides with Gilroy’s argument that western modernity’s racialised subjects are only produced in relation to racism and the discourses of racial science from which racism emerges (1987, 1993).
to make sense the new social movements that emerged in the late 1960s. He argues that contemporary capitalism\textsuperscript{21} produces more power centres than earlier forms of capitalism – power centres around ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘sexuality’ as opposed to just ‘class’ – and that these all have their own attendant political struggles broadly understood as identity politics. Can capitalism, in its late twentieth century, disorganized form, be said to have opened up a power centre in Diasporic Jewishness with (Popular) Zionism, the political struggle designed to close it up? As detailed above, there were certainly important shifts in the British social structure in relation to the Jewish community during this period but it is disputable that they are dislocatory in the Laclauian sense. There is little in the way of lack occurring in the embourgeoisement of British Jews that occurred after 1945. They enjoy increasing status both socio-economically and terms of their position in Britain’s racial hierarchies. Perhaps dislocation can be more specifically located in the gap between this increased socio-economic position and the lack of any suitable discourse that reflect this. Even in the growth of Jewish representation in popular culture that occurs during the 1960s and 1970s – the literature of Saul Bellow and Philip Roth, the films of Woody Allen, the musical and film \textit{Fiddler on The Roof} (1964, 1971), the television plays of Jack Rosenthal, particularly \textit{Bar Mitzvah Boy} (1976) – the familiar archetypes of Jewishness which are rooted in the ‘Ghetto Jew’ are explored; sexually neurotic, intellectual, bookish men and overbearing Jewish mothers. Zionism, on the other hand offers a self-conscious inversion of those archetypes: the strong, powerful and sexually desirable Jew in control of his own destiny. The Zionist archetype had existed since the days of Herzl, specifically in his colleague’s Max Nordau’s ‘Muscular Jew’ (Presner, 2007). It is possible to argue that it only begins to take root and achieve popularity in the late 1960s in Britain because of the need for Jews to have their socio-economic conditions reflected back to them in their cultural texts and practices. Their perception of the war as the Zionist Six Day War provides this. However, the notion that all these processes coalesce specifically because of capitalism’s \textit{dislocatory} effects is less convincing.

\textsuperscript{21} Here he adopts Lash and Urry’s term ‘disorganised capitalism’ (1987).
According to Laclau, the next stage in the historical process would be the struggle to re-articulate this relationship into a discourse that is persuasive enough to establish a new imaginative horizon for British Jewry. It is quite plausible to think of Popular Zionism as a discourse that does this, establishing a chain of equivalence between concepts such as ‘Jewishness’, ‘nation’, ‘security’, ‘Holocaust’, ‘anti-Semitism’ etc. Throughout the interview process it became apparent that Popular Zionism was still the imaginative horizon that governs the British Jewish community. It was the dominant ‘principle of intelligibility’ (Laclau, 1990) through which they were able to make sense not only of their own relationship to Israel, but their position in Britain as well. When asked questions that put across an anti-Zionist perspective, the interviewees became confused or defensive. They could not imagine any other way of thinking about Israel unless it was in terms set out by Popular Zionism.

Where Laclau’s thesis ceases to work quite as effectively is in that it is difficult to characterize the emergence of Popular Zionism as a result of a struggle between conflicting factions of the British Jewish community to articulate the signifiers freed by the war into a more persuasive chain of equivalence than the other. This is perhaps one of the problems of applying Marxism in general, not only Gramsci and Laclau, to this case study: the reification of ‘struggle’ as the basis for all political activity. As described in the discussion on the applicability of Gramsci, there was a struggle between Zionists and Assimilationists over the institutions of British Jewry in the period 1910–1937. This was settled in 1937 by the Zionist capture of these institutions. However the connection between these institutions and British Jewry is so weak, that any attempts that British Zionists might have made to win over the hearts and minds of British Jews in the subsequent thirty years could only ever have been severely limited. That is not to say that the Zionist ‘struggle’ does not play its part, there are just other more influential, and very often unconscious forces at play, namely the dominant way that the community experienced the Six Day War.
The same criticism of Gramsci, with his lack of attention to the affective, also applies to Laclau. Though there was substantial activity occurring on the discursive level in the British Jewish community as a result of the Six Day War – the shifting discursive construction of British Jewish identity in order to include Israel, and the discourse Popular Zionism is created – to focus exclusively on this level at the expense of the affective misses a crucial (this thesis will go on to argue the crucial) element in what occurs to British Jewish identity and its relationship to Israel as mediated through Popular Zionism as a result. Having undertaken the interviews and sifted through archival material it is impossible to analyse the cultural processes initiated by war without talking about intensity, desire and emotion all under the broad umbrella term ‘affect’, as seen in the tremendous anxiety both before and during the war, the euphoria after Israel’s victory and in the affective intensity with which British Jews invest in Israel as a result.

6. Deleuze and Guattari

Whilst Deleuze and Guattari are not (post) Marxists like Gramsci and Laclau, their approach does parallel some Marxist concerns, if only in the way it forces the consideration of social and cultural formations as complexly constituted and contingent upon constantly changing historical circumstances. In *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), Deleuze and Guattari praise Wilhelm Reich’s attempts at bringing psychoanalysis and Marxism together to answer the question, “why did the masses desire fascism?” (Reich, 1946). Arguably, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* addresses the same problematic but in extending its theoretical repertoire to include Nietzsche, Bergson, Spinoza (amongst many others) as well as Freud and Marx, Deleuze and Guattari are able to address Reich’s question in a more sophisticated and persuasive manner. In bringing together questions of ‘desire’ ‘masses’ and ‘fascism’, the thought of Deleuze and Guattari redresses both the (post-) Marxist emphasis on social structures over psychic/libidinal agencies and the psychoanalytic tendency to emphasise psychic/libidinal agencies over social structures. Therefore this, arguably, enables a fuller account of the different human and non-human forces at play in the production of social and cultural formations. As is explained in detail in
the following section, in affording affect a central place in the constitution of the social, Deleuze and Guattari are better placed to understand how the Six Day War impacted on post-1967 British Jewish culture.

6.1. Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology

The structuring principle from which most of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts and ideas are derived is Spinoza’s interpretation of Duns Scotus’ ‘Univocity of Being’ – the idea that all matter is comprised of the same substance and that substance is God. This ‘pantheistic monism’ was profoundly heretical in the seventeenth century undermining traditional Judaeo-Christian theology, which held that God did not comprise nature, rather ‘he’ transcended and organised it. For Spinoza, God is not transcendental of nature but *immanent* to it. Furthermore the substance ‘God’ does not just compose the so-called physical world, it also constitutes the realm of consciousness – meaning thoughts and feelings are composed of the same substance as human beings, flora and fauna etc.. The duality between the physical and mental worlds, between mind and body, is therefore false, hence pantheistic *monism*. Spinoza breaks substance down into essence and expression. Essence is substance itself whilst all the attributes of nature (people, flora, thoughts etc.) are expressions of this essence.

God does not appear in Deleuze and Guattari’s work but they still fully appropriate the Spinozist idea of monism. As Rosi Braidotti notes: “[Deleuze] retains philosophical monism from Spinoza but only to hijack it away from the concept of a divinely ruled, rational substance” (Braidotti, 2002, p. 66). They agree, therefore, that nature is constituted from a single substance but for Deleuze and Guattari that substance is not God, it is Desire.22 In *A Thousand Plateaus* essence is described as an infinite multitude of elements which, in keeping with Spinoza, are defined by relations “distinguished by movement and rest, slowness and speed.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 280) as

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22 Desire should not be confused with its everyday usage: erotic or sexual desire, i.e. libido. As the substance of which all life is produced it can be more closely likened to ‘force of existing’.
opposed to form and function. These relations of movement and rest, slowness and speed give the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology its defining feature – its perpetual dynamism. Nature (and here ‘nature’ includes culture and the social) is in constant movement, flux and change. This means that the elements that comprise nature barely ever (if at all) exist in solitude. Their perpetual movement draws them together into multiplicities (a key Deleuzo-Guattarian concept). So, in fact, it is more accurate to describe the attributes of nature as not being composed simply of elements but as multiplicities of these elements.

Deleuze and Guattari more commonly call these multiplicities either bodies or machinic assemblages and both terms have their merits in describing the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology. ‘Bodies’ is being used in its Spinozist sense and therefore emphasizes the capacity for multiplicities to affect other ‘bodies’ and be affected by them. ‘Machinic assemblages’ draws attention to the constructed nature of multiplicities and the fact that they can be broken down and built back up into other machinic assemblages or be connected to machinic assemblages to form highly complex aggregates of machinic assemblages. So a body or machinic assemblage is any attribute of nature. As Deleuze writes, “a body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity” (Deleuze, 1970, p. 127).

The final step in the construction of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology culminates in the Plane of Immanence, the field, or plane, where all reality, both ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, exists. The Plane of Immanence is the infinitely complex assemblage of all the machinic assemblages (“there are only multiplicities of multiplicities forming a single assemblage, operating in the same assemblage” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 38)) and because this whole system is defined by its internal relations of movement and rest “the Plane of Immanence… is always variable and is constantly being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and collectivities” (Deleuze, 1970, p. 128). Because machinic assemblages are constantly being made and unmade, connecting, disconnecting and re-connecting, the ‘architecture’ of the
‘Plane of Immanence’ is in constant flux. The reason it is called the Plane of Immanence is because, in keeping with Spinoza’s pantheism, there is no organizing entity or principle that is transcendent to it. The Plane of Immanence is auto-poeisitic, self-constructing and self-organising; its ‘architecture’ determined by the movement and rest of the elements that compose it and the various multiplicities they form; it is organised by forces that are immanent to it.

6.1.1. Affect in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology

Perhaps the most straightforward exposition of affect in the combined work of Deleuze and Guattari is in a lecture that Deleuze delivered at the Cours de Vincennes in 1978 on Spinoza’s concept of affect. In the lecture he does little to critique Spinoza’s version of the concept and it is Spinoza’s version that both Deleuze and Guattari use throughout their work (though read through Bergson and Nietzsche).

His first step in explaining affect is in opposition to an idea. An idea, in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, is a “representational mode of thought” (Deleuze, 1978 (a)) or any mode of thought which represents an object. Affect, conversely, is “any mode of thought which doesn’t represent anything” or “non-representational mode of thought” (ibid). Deleuze illustrates this with a straightforward example: you see Peter (an idea) and you feel hostile (an affect), you then see Paul (an idea) you then feel happy (an affect). Paul is an idea, because your mind uses the idea of Paul to represent the person Paul. Happiness is an affect because it has no external referent, it exists only in and of itself: “there is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for, but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing.” (ibid.) He also notes how life is experienced as an endless succession of ideas i.e. as you move through a room you perceive the door, the wall, the book etc. This endless succession of ideas will in turn generate an endless succession of affects, or variations of feeling, which Spinoza has called our ‘force of existing’.
In fact, to describe our ‘force of existing’ as a succession of different discrete affects is not strictly accurate. For Deleuze (and Guattari) and Spinoza there is no real difference between affect and the transition between different affects – the transition and the affect itself are ontologically identical. It is more accurate to use the term ‘affectivity’ in place of affect and describe it, as Deleuze does, as a “melodic line of variation” (ibid). Spinoza designates two poles to this melodic line of affectivity – Joy and Sadness. The terms are not used in their common sense usage (happiness and melancholy). Rather they represent an increase and decrease in affectivity, an increase and decrease in our force of existing. An affect, then, is better thought of as our isolating a moment on this continuum of perpetually dynamic affectivity and labelling it according to the position it occupies between Joy and Sadness. Spinoza spends some time doing exactly this in his master work Ethics. For example he defines the affect ‘hope’ as “an inconstant joy, which has arisen from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt.” The affect ‘fear’ is “an inconstant sadness which has also arisen from a doubtful thing” (Spinoza, 1677, p. 165). Deleuze, with and without Guattari, and the work that follows them does not follow this Spinozist taxonomy of affects or even try to develop an alternative taxonomy. They prefer to talk about affectivity or, more generally, use the term affect in the singular to delimit the spectrum of affectivity in a given situation.

Affect and the notion of affectivity are first fully elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari in the second instalment of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus (1980). In the ‘Notes on Translation’ in the 1987 English language edition, Brian Massumi translates affect and its corollary affection in the following way: “Neither word denotes a personal feeling. L’affect is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (1980, p. xvii).

It is here we see the crucial distinction between Deleuze and Guattari’s affect and the various ways affect has been theorized in the ‘affective turn’.
For Deleuze and Guattari affect is not synonymous with emotion or feeling precisely because it is ‘pre-personal’, i.e. it exists not only pre the subject but independently of it. According to Deleuze and Guattari, emotion is produced when the thinking subject tries to capture and make sense of the ‘intensities’ they call affect. In his seminal essay ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ Massumi argues that, “it is crucial to theorise the difference between affect and emotion” (Massumi, 1996, p. 221) and goes on to define emotion as intensity qualified by language (ibid). Gilbert, also deploying a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework, similarly argues that, “an emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience” (Gilbert, 2004) and Grossberg with a more Gramscian approach defines emotion as “… the ideological attempt to make sense of some affective productions” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 316). It is in this distinction between emotion and affect that we begin to understand affect’s ontological status as pure intensity. All the other experiential states that have been called ‘affect’ in the affective turn – emotion, volition, passion, feeling, sensation, caring… – are not ‘affect’ as such but they are all comprised of affect. Affect, then, is everything that we feel across our bodies and in our psyches, as individuals and as collectivities. Emotion, volition, sexual desire etc. are particular modalities of affect, or affect mobilized by a different facet of subjectivity. So emotion is affect mobilized by language (or ideology as Grossberg would have it); sexual desire is affect mobilized by the libido; sensation is affect mobilized by the physical body or the autonomic (nervous) system (Massumi, 1996). Affect is what we feel; emotion, desire and sensation are different ways that we feel it. So for Deleuze and Guattari, ‘affect’ is the irreducible substance of all human experience – the raw material of subjectivity; the very feeling of being alive.

23 Deleuze felt the mistranslation of ‘affectus’ in Spinoza’s Ethics as ‘emotion’ was “disastrous” (Deleuze, 1978 (a)).
24 Seigworth says of the relationship between affect and the pre-subjective child: “An infant is criss-crossed by force fields of energies and intensities, immersed in affect well before he or she stands up to say “I” (much less “I” think) in discourse” (Seigworth, 2003, p. 87).
6.1.2. Desire, affect and power relations in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology

The account thus far has missed out a defining characteristic of the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology, namely the complex ways that desire, affect and power are distributed across the Plane of Immanence. If the multiplicities that compose the Plane of Immanence are bodies in the Spinozist sense i.e. they have the capacity to affect and be affected, dis/empower or be dis/empowered, this means two things for the Plane Of Immanence: i) the organization of desire into affect is its defining property and ii) the multiplicities which compose it always, necessarily, co-exist in a complex system of power relations. Two or more bodies will intermingle in an encounter, affect each other either augmenting or diminishing their capacity to act, holding each other in a particular power relationship until they are affected again (which, in a system defined by its perpetual dynamism, they inevitably will be), changing the relationships of power.

This complex distribution of desire/affect and power is the main focus of A Thousand Plateaus and Deleuze and Guattari develop a rich conceptual framework in order to describe its manoeuvring. Rhizome/arborescent, molar/molecular, territorialisation/de-territorialisation (and re-territorialisation), smooth/striated, stratification and becomings all express in different ways the constant re-organisation of the Plane of Immanence in terms of power and affectivity. This conceptual framework emerges in response to the key set of problematics that govern not only A Thousand Plateaus but also Anti-Oedipus: namely how does one account for the successes of fascism. In France, in the immediate post-1968 conjuncture, this does not just mean the state Fascism of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco etc. but also the fascisms, as Deleuze and Guattari see it, of Western (particularly French intellectual) culture; Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis, structuralist theories of signification, capitalism and the Marxism of both the USSR and the French Communist party are repeatedly singled out in A Thousand Plateaus as machinic assemblages that have been
organised into fascist structures. A fascist organization of the Plane of Immanence occurs when machinic assemblages are arranged into hierarchical relationships with each other, resulting in the hindered flowing of desire, an accumulation of ‘sad affectivity’ and an increased (but always unstable) sense of power of the few at the expense of the many. According to Deleuze and Guattari this is precisely what happens in, for instance, the process of Oedipalisation, which fascistically organizes the libido into a genital dominated hierarchy. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari persistently advocate for non-hierarchical organizations of machinic assemblages that will allow the free-flowing of desire, the perpetual accumulation of joyful affects and the empowering of those machinic assemblages which does not rely on their dominating others. This is their normative ethical orientation.

6.2. Deleuze and Guattari, affect and cultural change

That the Plane of Immanence is defined by its perpetual dynamism demonstrates the crucial place of ‘change’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, and as a result, they have developed a number of concepts that elaborate upon it. Of these concepts, this section will look at the meta-concepts of Deleuzo-Guattarian change: ‘becoming’, ‘the virtual’ and ‘the actual’. Arguably the specificity of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology is that they do not simply theorise the way the world is put together, they argue that the world’s defining feature is how it repeatedly produces itself anew (hence the title of Deleuze’s book *Difference and Repetition* (1968 (a)). As will become clearer after the following section the relationship between affect and the production of the new is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari are best placed to theorise precisely how the Six Day War produced newness in the culture of British Jewry.

The key concept for understanding this is their notion of ‘becoming’, developed first in *Difference and Repetition* but used extensively in A

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25 To this list you might also add phallocentricism, hetronormativity, whiteness-supremacy and, in its more localised way, Zionism.

26 Which they see as specific to the epoch of industrial capitalism and productive of the nuclear family that makes this socio-economic system possible.
Thousand Plateaus. Their notion of becoming differs from the common sense usage of the word. In order to understand how it is different it is useful to see how it works in relation to the Plane of Immanence. As described above, the Plane of Immanence is everything that exists in the universe – not only the universe as it is, but the universe as it could be. The universe as it is, is called the ‘actual’ in Difference and Repetition and the Plane of Organisation in A Thousand Plateaus. The universe as it could be is called the virtual in Difference and Repetition. The use of the word ‘Organisation’ here is important to understand the relationship between the virtual and the actual. The virtual is not another world (or multiple other worlds) that is materially different from the actual. The virtual is all the possible other ways that the matter that constitutes the actual can be organized. It is all the different forms the Plane of Organisation can take.

Boundas provides the most helpful summary of the relationship between the virtual and the actual: “In Deleuze’s ontology, the virtual and the actual are two mutually exclusive, yet jointly sufficient, characterisations of the real.” (2005, p. 296). The real here is the Plane of Immanence. What joins the actual (the universe as it is) to the virtual (the different ways the universe could be organized) is the Deleuzian (-Guattarian) concept of becoming. Becoming is the process by which the virtual is actualized; or the process by which substance is reorganized, giving the actual a new form. Affect (intensity in Difference and Repetition) has a privileged place in the re-organisation of substance. If the elements that comprise the Plane of Immanence are distinguished by relations of movement and rest and desire/affect is the force which animates these elements then it follows that an intensification of this force will cause these elements to move faster and its dissipation will cause them to move towards a state of rest. Moreover, if these elements are always assembled into larger and larger multiplicities the speed at which these elements move will affect the fashion in which they are assembled. Fast moving elements can break the bonds that assemble them into a multiplicity; slow moving elements can coagulate into larger assemblages. Affect, specifically differences in intensities of affect, is the agent that drives the
process of becoming i.e. in the context of culture, affect is the agent of cultural change.

It is precisely the pivotal place of affect in not only Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of how the universe is put together, but also as one of the agencies that transforms the very constitution of the universe that makes it so suited to understanding the impact of witnessing the Six Day War on the British Jewish community. Perceiving the war in the way that it did triggered a highly intense affective response in the community and in doing so the formal constitution of their cultural identity changed as did the place of Zionism in the community producing a new cultural formation – Popular Zionism. These changes were primarily changes in affectivity: the way that a militarily victorious Israel made British Jews feel towards Israel and Zionism and how this in itself continues to make them feel empowered and disempowered as Jews in Britain and the world. The empirical data collected for this thesis therefore requires a cultural theory that places the affective and its relationship to (constantly changing) social and cultural formations at its heart, in order to fully make sense of it. That is why a cultural studies shaped by Deleuzo-Guattarain thought is the best approach to understanding the cultural changes the British Jewish community undergo as a result of the Six Day War and that is what the rest of the thesis will now do.

6.3. Outline of Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day War

The remainder of this thesis performs a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day War so this subsection will instead provide a brief overview of how their theories are used in each chapter. In fact, the chapters do not take a purely Deleuzo-Guattarian approach in their analyses; they have had to be supplemented by Gramscian and Laclauian perspectives in order to make sense of the different aspects of how Popular Zionism emerged after the war often through other theorists who use these perspectives. The intention of this chapter has been to provide an
overview of the ontologies that the theoretical frameworks adopted in the other
chapters are operable within.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology developed in response to the
theoretical and empirical requirements of this thesis. Chapter 4 uses Manuel
DeLanda’s ‘assemblage analysis’ of social formations alongside Lawrence
Grossberg’s Deleuze-Guattarian reading of Raymond Williams’ ‘social totality’
(1973) and ‘structure of feeling’ (1961) to understand the broader historical
context of the British Jewish community in the 1960s out of which Popular
Zionism emerged. Chapter 5 presents an historical narrative of the Arab-Israeli
war of June 1967. In doing so, it does not use theory as such, but it is vital in
showing how the Zionist (mis)representation of those events triggered the
intense affective response outlined in the following chapter. Chapter 6 uses
DeLanda’s reading of Difference and Repetition alongside Deleuze and
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus to analyse the British Jewish experience of
the Six Day War as what leading Deleuzian Claire Colebrook has called a
‘history of intensities’ (Colebrook, 2009) i.e. the intensive processes which
produced Popular Zionism. Chapter 7 develops a Guattarian approach to
cultural identity (in opposition to the way Stuart Hall synthesized various
poststructuralist perspectives on cultural identity – Laclau amongst them) to
understand the shifts in British Jewish cultural identity after the war. Finally,
Chapter 8 uses Grossberg’s Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the Gramscian
‘Popular’ (by way of the CCCS) in order to demonstrate why the Zionism that
emerged post 1967 is Popular Zionism as opposed to the various Zionisms
that preceded it (Shimoni, 1995).
Chapter 3

Methodology

1. Introduction

The following chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this thesis. It is organised chronologically so as to both demonstrate how the research process unfolded and theoretically situate the decisions that constituted this process. The chapter begins with a short autobiographical section that describes my personal relation to Zionism and Israel and, in doing so, explains how I came to identify the research area for this project (affect and Zionism) and how my own position within this area of research may have impacted my findings. I then explain the logic of how I came to formulate a specific research question out of this area (what role did affect play in the British Jewish response to the Six Day War and the changes that occurred in British Jewish culture as a result?) and the research methods that I felt were best suited to answer this question – a mixed approach using interviews, archival research and extant data from British Jewish sociology. I then describe the experience that arose out of applying these methods: the problems I faced and the unexpected benefits that I discovered in deploying them. The chapter concludes with a short reflection on the ethics of this project.

2. Self-reflexivity: positioning myself within the research

The following section outlines my personal relationship to Israel and Zionism, and my assessment of the impact it had on this thesis. Aull Davies argues that all researchers need to ‘self-reflexively’ position themselves in relation to their research, especially if it contains elements of ethnography (1999). She situates this claim in an epistemological position she calls ‘critical realism’. Critical realism sits at the intersection of materialist and idealist epistemologies: it believes that although the social world exists independently
of the human endeavour to know it, we can only ever know the social world through our subjective positioning within it. She then clarifies ‘subjective positioning’ as meaning the interconnection of a researcher’s personal history and the disciplinary and broader socio-cultural circumstances they find themselves in. Our subjective positioning within the social world effects every aspect of our research practice: the research areas we identify, the questions we ask of these areas, the general methodological approach to these questions (and the methods we use to answer them) and the findings that emerge as a result. Aull Davies also argues that our subjective positioning has a material effect on the research areas we want to explore. The research setting is changed by our presence in it, meaning our findings can never be transparent reflections of an objective social reality (as positivists aspire to), but are produced out of the specific dialogical relationship we have constructed with our research setting at a particular moment in time. Arguably the key factor for this project, in this respect, is the impact of my being a British Jew of Israeli heritage. For reasons discussed below, had I been a Palestinian, asking the same questions of the same cohort of interviewees, the research process would have been different. What all this means is that researchers need to be ‘self-reflexive’ about our research i.e. reflect upon the ways our subjective positioning impacts upon it. This is not so our research becomes ‘more objective’; that is not what is at stake in a critical realist epistemology. What self-reflexivity does is help give a fuller account of the final outcome of our research and the process of how we arrived there. That is the intention of the following section: to outline how my personal history, disciplinary and broader socio-cultural background have shaped the research process for this PhD.

2.1. My relationship to Israel and Zionism

My interest in Israel is rooted in the fact that my father is an Israeli-born Jew. Born in Haifa to an Egyptian Jewish father and Moroccan Jewish mother, they and his sister migrated to London when my father was three in 1958. He
has remained in Britain for the duration of his life. His parents and his eldest sister, however, returned to Israel in the late 1970s. Throughout my life I have had family living in Israel who we have visited approximately once a year. Having family in Israel is perhaps the first way that the country came to matter to me personally, but even had I not had family living there, I would hazard that I would have cared about Israel anyway. As this thesis argues, to care about Israel has been the hegemonic position of British Jewry through the course of my lifetime (I was born in 1979). That Israel should matter to me was communicated both consciously and unconsciously as I grew up. It underpinned the basis of both the everyday conversations between my parents, our family and friends and their specific responses to news coverage of the world-historical events that were occurring in Palestine/Israel. It was present in the synagogue services I attended, not only in the Rabbi’s sermons but also in the fact that every week British Jewish congregations say a prayer to the State of Israel. It was present in cheder (Sunday school) lessons, in the charity that was collected in the community and the different activities and events organised by the Jewish youth club I belonged to. Most importantly perhaps, it manifested itself in the month long trips to Israel that are organised by Zionist youth organisations for British Jewish sixteen year olds, colloquially known as ‘tours’. The majority of British Jewish teenagers go on these tours. I went with a group of around thirty other sixteen year olds on a tour organised by Zionist youth organisation Hanoar Hatzioni. It must be said that most Jewish teenagers go on these tours for social as opposed to explicitly political reasons. Only a handful have ever been involved in Zionism in any organised or sustained way. Nevertheless theses tours are designed to instil a love of Israel and Zionism into their participants. For the most part they are successful; mainly, I would argue, as a result of how pleasurable a month long trip to an exotic country that you are told you have a special claim to, in the company of thirty other sixteen year olds without parental supervision is. (In my recollection most people on the tour ignored the few Zionist history lessons).

27 Except for a brief attempt by his family to settle in Paris in the early 1960s.
Describing my exposure to Zionism in the way that I just have might give the impression that I was much more involved in Jewish and Zionist organisations and institutions than I was. This is not the case. Like most British Jews post-1979, my engagement with these sort of institutions was minimal (Kosmin and Levy, 1978). I went to synagogue twice a year (except in the year leading up to my bar mitzvah, when I went with my father once a week), I loathed going to cheder, and my minimal involvement in youth groups and my decision to go on tour were motivated by social, not political reasons (Chapter 8 shows how this is typical). Still, I cared profoundly about Israel. To give some examples: i) I have only kept a diary for a short period in my life (six months in 1999) and, one entry in that diary gushingly describes how much I loved Israel in implicitly Zionist terms; ii) in my mind, I likened holidaying in Israel to a quasi-religious experience, despite not being religious at all; iii) I was successfully made to feel terrified by Arabs and Palestinians, an ‘indistinguishable mass of terrorists’, not one of whom I had ever met. In other words, I was fully engaged in the complex and contradictory affective economy that Zionism had successfully maintained in the post-1967 conjuncture and that I have chosen as the subject of this thesis. In Chapter 8 I define this affective economy in the following way: terrified and elated and practiced in my everyday life and pop cultural consumption as opposed to my engagement with Zionist institutions. In many ways I was an ideal subject of Popular Zionism.

This began to change after I went to the University of Sussex to do a BA in History and Cultural Studies. The School of Cultural and Community Studies (as it was 1997–2000) had strong radical tendencies and although I never covered Palestine/Israel in any part of my degree, I did engage with critical theory, mainly on post-1968 identity politics, and progressive approaches to history.28 I touched upon Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) but only became familiar with his anti-Zionist writing during my MA. The real turning point of my affective relationship with Israel and Zionism came about

28 History at Sussex has strong ties with the ‘history from below’ approach formulated by Raphael Samuel in the 1960s and 1970s – in many ways a parallel project to British cultural studies.
through a close friendship I developed with a fellow student whose South African mother had been involved in the ANC’s anti-Apartheid politics. This friend began explaining to me the parallels between Apartheid-era South Africa and Palestine/Israel. Had she drawn these parallels prior to my university education, I imagine I would have adopted the defensive position that continues to be typical of Popular Zionists. As a result of my being engaged with the sorts of ideas and perspectives being taught at Sussex, and because we agreed with so much else in our politics, I entertained the notion that what she was telling me could have been true. My switch from Popular Zionism to anti-Zionism was cemented during my MA in Cultural Studies at the University of East London in 2002–2003. There, I did a module on postcolonialism that included a session on Palestine/Israel and was taught by an Israeli professor (my current director of studies) from an anti-Zionist perspective. My large piece of assessed work for this module used the thought of Julia Kristeva to argue that Zionist ideology functioned through symbolically ‘abjecting’ Diaspora Jewry and used the Popular Zionist classic Exodus (1960) as a case study. The research for this essay familiarized me far more with postcolonial critiques of Israel and Zionism, critiques I remain persuaded by and which influence this thesis.

My switch from Popular Zionist to anti-Zionist was, and remains a troubled one, not in any rational sense, but in an affective one. In a rational assessment of the two positions, I find anti-Zionism far more persuasive in a number of different ways. Though of Jewish heritage, I am an atheist and therefore do not have the requisite faith to believe that there is a divinely ordained connection between the Jewish people and ‘Eretz Israel’ that some strands of Zionism make. I also believe that the essentialist connection made between peoples and territories by modern nationalisms, of which

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29 The ancient Hebrew term for the ‘Land of Israel’ according to the borders that appear in the Bible.
30 I do not believe that it is possible to talk about ‘the Jewish people’ in any meaningful or coherent sense. Judaism, as a religion, and Jewishness, as a cultural identity and way of life, means different things at different times in different cultures resulting in a variety of different individual and collective engagements with the world. The differences between Ashkenazi and Sephardi, united and reform, ultra-orthodox and Zionist etc. are testament to the contested nature of the term ‘the Jewish people’.

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Zionism is one (Shimoni, 1995), is unsustainable both ontologically and empirically: there has never been a time in human history in which territories have ever contained one people or culture nor do I believe that one ethnic group and its culture be privileged over those who it shares territory with. The material effect of this nationalist myth on polities has always been the privileging of one group of people over the others it shares its territory with. This is precisely what happened during the rise of European Nationalism in the nineteenth century. A major by-product of this nationalism was anti-Semitism (defined one way as the desire not to want to share European territory with an ‘alien’ people) which resulted in, amongst other things, the Nazi Holocaust. Zionism’s response to the injuries of modern nationalism to European Jewry was, paradoxically, the production of more European style nationalism, inevitably establishing a racial hierarchy, not only of Jews over Palestinians but also Jews living in ‘Eretz Israel’ over Diaspora Jews and Israeli Jews of European heritage over Israeli Jews of non-European heritage. This has resulted in the exile of Palestinians from their ancestral homes. For some this has meant a life consigned to poverty and non-citizen status in refugee camps, for others the misery of life under the brutal Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the siege in Gaza, and for those who remain within Israeli borders, the status of second class citizens – all for the fact they are not Jewish. The only rational response to nineteenth and twentieth century anti-Semitism, I believe, would have been resistance to nationalism per se, not the production of more of it, and the creation of forms of political organisation in Europe and its empires that are not based on racial hierarchies. In Palestine/Israel, I believe the most practicable solution to this problem is the creation of a single state that democratically reflects the interests of all its citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity or any other group identity.

Arriving at this position was not easy and neither has been trying to maintain it whilst wanting to participate to some degree in the life of the Jewish community, even simply spending time with my family. My anti-Zionism has been a source of intense conflict with members of my family. Like anti-Zionist David who is interviewed for this thesis, “I'm incapable of having a
peaceful discourse with Zionists. Sometimes they shout first sometimes I shout first but I always do my share of shouting” (p. 469). But like Brian, another anti-Zionist I interviewed, I do not always want to have arguments with my family: “I thought, ‘I just don’t want to hurt people’s feelings. You might be right Brian but you don’t want to spoil…’ I’ll eat shit; I’ll let them have the last word because I don’t want to spoil a family gathering.” (p. 576). So whilst I am absolutely convinced of the ethics of anti-Zionism, my personal biography and current relationship with my family (not to mention how the British Jewish community tends to respond to anti-Zionism) means it produces a complicated affective response in me. To give a brief example: on a recent holiday to Israel an aunt explained that the kibbutz she has lived on for the last twenty-five years might have to close because of the success of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement on the kibbutz’s ability to profitably sell the dates they farm. Whilst I remain persuaded that BDS is both an effective and ethical tactic to force the State of Israel to reconsider its position vis à vis the occupation, I am simultaneously upset by the prospect of my aunt and uncle’s home shutting done (even if it is a kibbutz where, I presume, no Palestinian has ever been able to become a member) and their lives being de-stabilised.

Our political engagements with the world are not always straightforward and I believe this complexity can be productive for the purposes of research. My complex and changed affective engagement with Zionism shaped this specific project in a number of ways. i) the most fundamental was that it made me want to understand how affect works in relation to Zionism for British Jews. I had already used Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of affect in my MA dissertation to understand the production of post-Stonewall gay cultural identity. In researching this dissertation I began to relate this theory to my personal experience of Israel and surmised that ‘affect’ might conceptually clarify Zionism. ii) My own affective engagement with Zionism also gave me a personal insight into this research area. The fact that my allegiances shifted from Popular Zionism to anti-Zionism, meant that

31 The in-text citations for all the interviewees’ quotes refer to the page number they appear on in the interview transcripts in Appendix 2 of this thesis.
Popular Zionism had been, to some degree, de-familiarized for me and I could examine it with some critical distance. iii) I also think that my own affective engagement with Zionism provided some of the animating energy for the research process itself but, again, in ways that were not always straightforward. Its complexity provided some difficult moments. For instance, in my analysis I have compared Zionism to fascism. This is not an easy comparison to make when you consider the genocidal consequences of German fascism for European Jews in the twentieth century, and one that, unsurprisingly, Zionists vigorously resist. Nevertheless it is empirically true, supported by Zionist and pro-Israeli scholarship (Alderman, 1992; Shimoni, 1995), and an important comparison to make in order to reveal the ethical orientation of Zionism. Overall, I believe I have not shied away from criticising Zionism, no matter how complicated the affectivity that is generated in doing so.

3. Methodology

Once I had identified my research area (the relationship of affect and Zionism), I then had to formulate a more specific research question and identify the appropriate methods to answer it. Bryman argues that one of the most effective ways of formulating a research question is to identify an ‘exemplifying case study’ (2008, p. 51) that reveals the dynamics of that research area in microcosmic form. The history of Zionism has been punctuated by many moments of intense affectivity on a collective scale but from a survey of the literature on Zionist history in Britain it became clear the most intensely affective moment occurred during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. More than this, the literature concurred, the war represented a turning point in the fortunes of Zionism and support for the State of Israel amongst British Jewry, which manifested itself at the level of cultural identity. Already, a broadly Deleuzo-Guattarian account was taking shape (the idea that the increase or decrease in affectivity produces new social/cultural formations) and so it seemed pertinent to use the British Jewish affective response to the Six Day War as a case study that could point to the broader dynamics of how affect functioned in Zionism more generally.
The next question was one of method: what would be the most effective research methods to use to explore the role affect played in the cultural dynamics of the British Jewish community before, during and after the 1967 war? The broader methodological issue here is how does one empirically observe affect and the changes that Deleuze and Guattari claim it makes in social and cultural formations. There have been a number of recent ethnographic studies that have attempted to do just this. For instance, Lita Crociani-Windland uses participant observation so that she can observe “the affective processes underlying the festival culture in Siena’s Palio” (2011, p. 18). For Crociani-Windland, “data was everywhere” (ibid.), she chose to gather it, “by living it, experiencing it directly”. Her methodological solution, was to immerse herself within the affective landscape she was studying and apply theoretically informed self-reflexivity (Bergson’s ‘intuition as method’) to this experience of immersion. A similar approach was undertaken in Julian Henriques’s study of affect in Kingston, Jamaica’s dancehall scene (2010). Like Crociani-Windland, Henriques also immersed himself in the cultural formation he studied by using participant observation methods supplemented by interviews. A final example of participant observation as a method of, not capturing affect per se, but of providing empirical evidence for Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological approach is given in Saldanha (2007), in which he gives a Deleuzo-Guattarian account of the racial dynamics of the Goan trance scene. In order to do this he lived on the scene for months at a time taking field notes and interviewing people. In this book he makes a forceful case for ethnography being the most suitable general methodological approach to research questions formulated from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective: “What matters is therefore not the representation of an event, but its actual unfolding. I had to be there, among other bodies, checking out what they were doing, what they did with mats and chillums and trees and Goa trance flowing through the landscape” (2007, p. 5) Sundha is persuasive in arguing that a researcher who is interested in using a theoretical approach that emphasises the affective, the sensory, the intensive, the corporeal, the lived and the material aspects of culture, benefits greatly from actually situating their own body in that culture in order to experience its affective dimensions.
Saldhana’s, Crociani-Windland and Henrique’s methodological solutions to exploring affect all rest on the researcher being able to physically situate themselves within the culture they are researching. The privileged position that affect has with the present is theoretically substantiated by Callard and Papoulias: “the wager is that if we attend to affect and to how it courses through the body, we might edge closer to illuminating the elusiveness and vitality of the embodied present” (2010, p. 248). I was able to do this in the sense that, as outlined in the autobiographical section, I was bought up in the mainstream of British Jewry and therefore was immersed in the affective economy of post-1967 Popular Zionism.\textsuperscript{32} However, my specific research question was orientated towards the role that the affect triggered by the 1967 war plays in creating this cultural formation. For obvious reasons, I have no first-hand experience of this and have no way of gaining some; so participant observation of any kind could not be my primary form of data collection.

Questions of affective states that used to exist are addressed in Walkerdine (2010) in which she, “explores the place of affect in community relations with respect to trauma following the closure of a steelworks from a working-class community in the South Wales valleys in 2002” (2010, p. 91). Although temporally much closer to the event whose social effects she wants to research than me, Walkerdine is neither part of this community nor did she experience the trauma of the steelworks closing, so is unable to deploy any form of participant observation to answer her question. Her methodological solution to the research question she posed was to use, “long, unstructured, narrative-based interviews, which aimed at engaging with feelings and experiences associated with the aftermath of the steelworks closure” (2010, p. 92) as her primary form of data collection.

The case for deploying a “language-based” (ibid.) form of data collection for a phenomenon that is ontologically non-linguistic is far more

\textsuperscript{32} In Chapter 8 I argue that with respect to the British Jewish relationship to the State of Israel the post-1967 conjuncture has yet to finish.
problematic than the experience-based methods discussed above.

Walkerdine duly notes this:

> “I need to make it clear then that what I am exploring here is a sense which emerged from my reading of the interviews and the whole approach could be much more developed if data of a more embodied kind were to be collected.”

(2010, p. 92)

Beyond reflecting on her own experiences of the interviews, Walkerdine does not elaborate what she means by ‘data of a more embodied kind’. (As I explain in detail below I have taken it to mean the affective responses of the interviewees during the interview.) Despite the problems she raises, her research produces persuasive analysis thereby suggesting that the in-depth, semi- or un-structured interview is the most suitable method for trying to measure affectivity which emerged in the past. Affect may be ontologically distinct from language but that does not mean language cannot be used to represent affective states. As with all representations, they cannot but distort the phenomena they seek to represent, affective or otherwise. The challenge for the researcher is, if not to minimize the distortion, than at least attempt to properly account for its distorting effects.

Like Walkerdine, I settled on one-on-one, in-depth interviews that were semi-structured as my primary form of data collection. Part of the reason I chose semi-structured over Walkerdine’s unstructured interviews was because there were specific questions I would have to ask in order to produce the data needed to address the concerns of my research question: questions regarding the interviewees’ biographical information and also the affective response to specific events that occurred during the crisis and the war. A semi-structured approach enabled me to do this whilst still allowing the flexibility needed to explore affective states in depth and pursue areas that came up during the interview that I had not anticipated at the planning stages.

In order to carry out the interviews I would need to find a sample of British Jews who remembered their ‘experience’ of the war; meaning Jews
who were in Britain at the time and were witnessing it through the media, or
the way it was represented by British Jewish organisations (synagogues,
Zionist organisations etc.). The main objective of the interviews would be quite
simply asking these people how the war made them feel and what they
thought changed in them and the British Jewish community as a result. This
raised a number of issues – the relationship between language and affect
being only one. Another issue was the relationship between affect and
memory: even if the participants were able to transparently represent their
affective responses, these responses occurred just over forty years prior to
their interviews, so how could I be sure they would remember them
accurately?33 There was also the question of representativeness: I settled on
interviewing twelve to fifteen people for reasons explained below. If the focus
of my research was how the British Jewish community as a whole turned to
Zionism after the war, how could I be sure that these twelve people would be
representative of the affective response of that community and that changes
that occurred within it? The following section outlines the different aspects of
the interview process and addresses these problems.

3.1. The sample

The first step in the interviewing process was working out how big my
sample needed to be. Arber (2008) argues that sample size depends on the
specific research goal: if you are interested in “maximum theoretical
understanding” a smaller group is sufficient and if you are interested in
“making inferences “ which are representative “of the population” a larger
sample is required (p. 68). Small sampling groups allow for more in-depth
interviews and more time spent bringing theoretical analysis to bear on the

33 A person’s description of an affective response is subjective – a sense of ‘accuracy’ as
such can never be guaranteed in any meaningful sense. However, if we are working with a
Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of affect i.e. it is ‘social’ (Gilbert, 2004) and flows across the
constitutive elements of an assemblage then each interviewee, as constitutive elements of
the British Jewish assemblage (see Chapter 4), should have participated in the same
affective states triggered by the war. Chapter 6 demonstrates that this is in fact what
happened. Some degree of ‘accuracy’ becomes important if we are to build a picture of a
shared affective state and the empirically observable impact it had on the assemblage it
flowed across.
data considering the time and funding constraints of a PhD project (ibid). The emphasis of my project was on maximum theoretical understanding so the sample I aimed to achieve was between twelve and fifteen British Jews who had ‘lived through’ the war. However as King and Horrocks argue, even though qualitative research does not aim to produce statistical representativeness in the way quantitative studies do (which would not be possible with a sample size of twelve to fifteen) “qualitative research very often is concerned to achieve different forms of generalizability or transferability. […] This means that a purely ad hoc, opportunistic sampling strategy is not appropriate; rather the sample needs to relate in some systematic manner to the social world and phenomena that a study seeks to throw light upon.” (2010, p. 29) The Jewish community breaks down into sufficiently distinct sub-communities, so had my sample been drawn from only one of these (e.g. orthodox Jewry) my interview data would not have been at all representative in the way it needed to be to help me draw the conclusions needed to answer my research question. In an attempt to resolve this issue I used both primary sociological research (Krausz, 1964; Krausz, 1969 (a); Krausz, 1969 (b); Prais and Schmool, 1968; Prais and Schmool, 1975; Krausz, 1981; Gould, 1984) and secondary historical literature (Bentwich, 1960; Shimoni, 1986 (a), 1986 (b); Alderman, 1992; Endelman, 2005) in order to help build a demographic sketch of the British Jewish community in the 1960s. These demographics appear in detail in Chapter 4 (the chapter that provides the historical background for the thesis) but just to note here that these included: socio-economic status, family background, religious practice, geographical location and attitudes to Zionism. As I was interested in the British Jewish community as a whole, I wanted my sample to map onto as much as was possible given its size, the demographic profile of the community. Because the central focus was attitudes to Israel, I also felt it would be useful to interview at least one person who was anti-Zionist during the 1960s, an extremely atypical position for British Jews in this period. In doing this, the hope was to introduce a perspective that might illuminate aspects of Zionism in British Jewry that only interviewing Zionist Jews, either Classical or Popular, would not have revealed. These concerns guided me through the process of finding participants to build my sample.
3.2. Recruiting participants

My primary method of recruiting participants was snowballing. Having grown up in the Jewish community, I was able to tap into a number of personal contacts as well as work colleagues, and two of my PhD supervisors, to see if either they would be interviewed or if they knew anyone who was interested in being interviewed. I found Stephen, Jeremy, Zena, Harry, Brian, David, Vivien and Harvey this way. There came a point when approaching personal contacts in this way stopped yielding interviewees so I pursued other means. The first was to contact ‘gatekeepers’ in Zionist organisations and ask if they could contact their alumni lists. Zionist organisation Habonim was the most helpful, sending out a mass e-mail that generated approximately twenty responses all of which expressed interest in being interviewed. I felt having people with organised Zionism in their background would be useful, again to provide a contrast to those who were not so involved (in 1978, only 11.3% of one Redbridge’s Jewish community belonged to a Zionist organisation (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 26)) so, after having had preliminary conversations in order to work out how they would aid or inhibit the (albeit limited) representativeness of the overall sample, I settled for two Habonim alumni – Sarah and Joseph. My final method for recruiting participants was advertising in the classified section of the most widely read Jewish newspaper in Britain, The Jewish Chronicle. Two people responded to the advert: my interviewee Rose and an academic who stopped getting in touch with me after two e-mail exchanges. Rose fit in suitably with the requirements of my sample so she became my final interviewee. Thumbnail biographical profiles for all my interviewees are included in Appendix 1. These include discussion of how each of the interviewees fit into the demographic profile of the British Jewish community detailed in Chapter 4. Overall, I think, the sample provides the representativeness required to satisfactorily answer the research question set by this thesis.

34 “A gatekeeper is a person who stands between the data collector and a potential respondent.” (Keesling, 2008)
3.3. Conducting the interviews

The interview questions followed the same format. They began with some biographical questions so I could situate them within the demographic data I had gleaned from the extant sociological research. I then asked a series of open-ended questions about the events that occurred before, during and after the war in the Middle East and in the British Jewish community. The focus of these questions was to see how they perceived these events, how they felt individually, how they remembered others feeling, the general atmosphere in the community and how they were mobilized as a result. These questions were designed to yield empirical evidence of Deleuzo-Guattarian affect as defined by Brian Massumi (see Chapter 2). The answers to these questions (which were recorded on a digital Dictaphone) ended up providing most of the data for Chapters 6 and 7. The final section of the interview asked the interviewees about more general attitudes, opinions, feelings and experiences of Israel, Israelis, Zionism and the Palestine/Israel conflict. Much of the data generated here was used for Chapter 8 but also supplemented the analysis in other chapters. All of the interviews took place in the home of the interviewee (except Harry and Zena), a place where I felt they would feel most comfortable.

When it came to analysing the affective responses of my interviewees, I did not rely on their descriptions of these responses alone, but was also attentive to body language; changes in the volume, pitch and timbre of their voice and any affective responses that occurred within the interview. I noted these in a research journal as soon as was possible after the interview finished and many of these were picked up by the Dictaphone so I included descriptions of them in the transcriptions (see Appendix 2). This extra-textual, embodied data was particularly useful when it came to writing my analysis chapters. A sigh from Zena, a sense of menace in Jeremy’s voice, Stephen re-enacting his remembered affective responses and especially a moment when Sarah began to cry were all particularly revealing in where affect is most intense in relation to Zionism.
A final point to make about the interview process: on reflection, the fact that I am a British Jew of Israeli heritage and with an Arabic surname unquestionably had an impact on the data produced by the interviews. My surname is Hakim, a common Arabic name that is equally common with Jews of Mizrahi heritage. The fact it is an Arabic word caused two problems during the interview process that reveal a great deal about the research setting. The first occurred when I contacted Habonim to ask if they could send a circular e-mail to their alumni list in a bid to find participants. At first the administrator expressed enthusiasm about my project and agreed to contact British members of Habonim who had been involved with the organisation during the war. A couple of days after she had agreed, she sent me a strongly worded e-mail explaining that many alumni had got back to her questioning the intentions of my research. Here is an excerpt of the e-mail:

“…They are concerned and sceptical as to the validity of who you claim you are and what you may really be doing. This must be understandable in the world today when there is every attempt to delegitimize us, the Jewish People and Israel as our home. Anti-Semitism has reared its hideous, fire breathing head only it hides under the cloak of anti-Israel and there is a world wide movement, which is preoccupied in destroying us, politically, economically and physically. Britain, with its huge Moslem population perpetrates or at least condones the most forceful and horrifying hatred towards us.”

After I sent her an e-mail designed to assuage her fears she explained that the reason she had doubts about me as researcher was, “I was concerned about your name as Hakim is… an Arab name”. This e-mail exchange raises a number of important issues: i) the racism of the first e-mail, which demonstrates the Zionist conflation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism which, post-9/11, is attributed it to Britain’s ‘huge Moslem population’ (discussed at length in Chapter 8); ii) it also raises the ethical issue of not disclosing my anti-Zionism to my interviewees, which is discussed below. Both these issues relate to the point I want to raise specifically in this section, namely that had I been Arabic and interested in the same research question the data produced would not have been the same. If the research process had been completed at all (the e-mail above suggests potential interviewees would not have agreed to take part), one possibility is that the interviewees may have
responded in either a more defensive or guarded way. Another possibility is they may have been more belligerent. All the interviewees knew I was Jewish and of Israeli heritage (mainly established in pre-interview conversations) and so presumed I was supportive of Israel. This, I think, meant they were far more comfortable speaking to me and revealing feelings and attitudes they might have kept more guarded had I been Arabic. This conviction was strengthened when I first met Harvey, just before doing the interview. In our introductory conversation he let me know that my surname must mean I was Arabic. After I explained its origins he noticeably softened and became more open. This produced a particular kind of data (not just with Harvey but the interviewees in general): it gives a sense of how many British Jews talk to each other about Israel in an unguarded and undefensive way. For instance it is doubtful whether Zena would have claimed that ‘Muslims want to take over the world’ in her interview had the interviewer been Muslim, and would have been less revealing of Popular Zionism as a result. It also meant they presumed a certain degree of shared knowledge, which I tried to get them to articulate in the interview, though I may not always have been successful. These incidents also reveal a great deal about Popular Zionism itself – its highly defensive response to criticism, its perception of ‘Arabs’ and Muslims, its conflation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, the way Popular Zionism limits the possibility of dialogue with its others. All of these are analysed in more detail throughout the thesis.

3.4. Problems encountered doing the interviews

Although the interviews generated substantial evidence with regards to the British Jewish affective response to the war and the changes it bought about, this evidence was not unproblematic. As stated above the first problem was an issue of memory. This applies to all interviews, not only those dealing with affect, but other issues are raised when the interviews are trying to access affectivity. How do affective states, intense or otherwise, impact on

35 This was not the case with the anti-Zionists. They had been contacted through two of my supervisors both of whom are anti-Zionist in differing ways and so they presumed I was anti-Zionist.
memory? Are the original events remembered more intensely? Do the affective states distort the memory of the event itself? Callard and Papoulis (2010) address these questions in a book chapter that surveys various psychoanalytic, psychological and neuroscientific positions on how affect impacts on the act of remembering. There are as many positions on this question as there are authors. At one end of the spectrum is the neuroscientific ‘flashbulb’ hypothesis that argues that high affective arousal in a person works on their memory in a flashbulb-like fashion, capturing every detail of the event with great clarity (Callard and Papoulis, 2010, p. 253). At the other end of the spectrum Callard and Papoulis posit Freud, who, focusing on the memory of traumatic events in hysterical patients, argues that whereas the unconscious can successfully repress the ideational aspect of the traumatic event (i.e. the details of what occurred), attempts to repress its affective quota (the anxiety generated by the trauma) are not fully successful. What can happen is that some part of the affect resists repression and enters consciousness attached to a different idea (this is the hysterical symptom). If we subscribe to Freud’s idea, this means that there potentially could be some disconnect between the affects that the interviewees remember feeling, and the events they attribute them to, undermining the validity of the interview data.36

The question of misremembering emerges as a methodological issue in another way. The last thirty years has seen a rise in critical memory studies. As a sub-discipline located at the intersection of history and cultural studies it has raised many important theoretical issues around the cultural politics of remembering historical events, objects and people. Perhaps the most important issue that critical memory studies raises for this project comes from sociologist Maurice Halbwachs’ seminal work on collective memory (1925). Amongst the various insights Halbwachs had on memory as a collective (as opposed to individual) phenomenon, the most crucial for this

36 For reasons explained in Chapter 2, this thesis does not use a Freudian approach to affect. Current work on Deleuze and memory (Radstone and Schwarz, 2010) does not focus on affect, but on Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and his unique approach to temporality. Freud is used here in order to imagine a methodological worst case scenario and consider how it might be surmounted.
thesis is his claim that “the past is… reconstructed on the basis of the present” (Halbwachs, 1925, p. 40). Halbwachs (and the work he inspired) supported this claim by arguing that institutions like the Church and the state commemorate iconic events, objects and historical figures in a highly selective way so as to serve the ideological goals of the present. For example, Zerubavel (1995) uses Halbwachs in order to explore how the Zionist political elite (both pre- and post-1948) in Palestine/Israel has officially commemorated events from ancient Jewish history that were considered marginal in traditional Jewish historiography e.g. the Bar Khokhba revolt and the events at Masada. Academic historians have contested the Zionist construction of these events as innacurate and Zerubavel argues these inaccuracies remain within the construction because they help reinforce the projects of Zionist nation building and identity formation.37

The Halbwachsian focus on official state commemoration of events of which a social group has had no direct experience gives this work a slightly different emphasis to this thesis. The British Jews interviewed for this thesis did have direct experience of their own affective response to the 1967 war and so, arguably, their memory of it is less vulnerable to state manipulation. Nevertheless the affective response of Diaspora Jewry has been memorialized in popular histories of the war (though never as a central focus) in order to reinforce Diaspora Jewish support of the State of Israel in the present. It follows that the interview data could be distorted by the interviewees’ exposure to the Zionist commemoration of the war – a commemoration that, like all forms of collective memory, is more interested in serving Zionism’s present ideological goals than it is in transparently representing events as they happened (if indeed that were ever possible). As Halbwachs has argued “the various groups that compose society are capable at every moment of reconstructing their past. But, as we have seen, they most

37 Other case studies for work rooted in Halbwachs include Halbwachs’ own study of how commemorative locations of sites mentioned in the Bible changed in accordance with the ideological demands of different historical periods (1925). Pierre Nora’s Realms of Memory (1992) analyses the construction of Frenchness through commemorative symbols such as Joan of Arc and the Eiffel Tower. Barry Schwartz (1982) investigates the shifting politics of commemoration in the US national context by analysing the visual art in Washington’s Capitol building.
frequently distort that past in the act of reconstructing it” (Halbwachs, 1925, p.182).

How is it possible to surmount the potential distortions in the interview data raised by these Freudian and Halbwachsian perspectives? The focus of this thesis is the material changes that occurred in British Jewry that were caused by the intensification of affect triggered by the war, therefore the interview data needed to accurately reflect as much as possible what occurred at the time. A classic sociological solution to limiting the degree of inaccuracy in ethnographic data is ‘triangulation’. Triangulation is when three different methods of data collection are deployed so the various data sets they produce can be cross-referenced for similarities and differences (Denzin, 1970). The two other methods of data collection I undertook so I could limit the inaccuracies of my interview findings were archival research and using extant sociological and historical data.

3.5. Archival research

I went to various archives during the course of the research: the British Newspaper Archive, the archive of the Jewish Museum in London, the Israeli State Archive, the Central Zionist Archive, the Wiener Collection at the University of Tel Aviv, and the Parkes Library at the University of Southampton. By far the most useful were the Israeli State Archive (ISA) and the Central Zionist Archive (CZA), both in Israel and both of which I utilised with the help of a translator.38 The ISA contains the official government documents of the State of Israel. The files it had from the Israeli Embassy in Britain were most useful. The CZA holds the files of the worldwide Zionist movement. The files of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael were the most useful of these. The Wiener Collection contained small amounts of Zionist propaganda material that was produced by the State of Israel and the WZO during the war.

38 When material from these archives is referenced in the thesis, the following format is used: (Name of archive (abbreviated): Folder number, Folder name (if included)). E.g., for the Central Zionist Archive (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Albert Hall) and for the Israeli State Archive (ISA: 1394/18 Radio and Television).
However, I had already seen these documents in the ISA and the CZA. Time spent in the British Newspaper Archive gave a good impression of how the war was represented in the British press (much more varied than it appeared in British Jewish memory). All the material relating to the 1967 war in the Parkes Library came in the form press cuttings, so most of it exists in the British Newspaper Archive. The Jewish Museum’s archive was, at the time of visiting, small and disorganised and had nothing relating to the 1967 war.

I had gone to the archives hoping to find personal documents (diaries, letters etc.) of British Jews written as the Middle East crisis and the war itself was taking place, thereby providing contemporary first hand accounts of the affective response of British Jewry. The archives, repositories of official Zionist organisations, contained no such documents. However there was substantial contemporary evidence of the British Jewish perception of the war, the affective response it triggered, the short-term mobilization and long-term cultural change that occurred in British Jewry as a result. These could be found in reports written by Zionist officials, minutes from meetings, memos written between Zionist bureaucrats describing their own affective responses to the crisis and the war and their impressions of the community’s affective response. When it came to writing up my analysis chapters I was able to confirm and add more historical detail to or dispute the claims of the interviewees with documentary evidence that was produced at the time, and thus produce a more accurate version of the affectivity the war generated and the cultural changes that arose as a result.

The archival documents were also particularly good at providing detailed evidence of the Zionist propaganda effort in Britain: from the documents that were distributed to the debates within the Zionist organisations about what they should contain and where they should be distributed. This detail does not exist in the extant historical literature, nor did it emerge in the interviews. It did help answer the question of how British Jews came to perceive the war in the way that they did. At the beginning of the research process I had spent some time in British Newspaper Archive sifting through various newspaper accounts of the war. The events happening in the
Middle East were being reported from a variety of different perspectives e.g. *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian* were relatively even-handed; *The Daily Mirror* – the most widely read tabloid in 1967 – was pro-Israel. When I conducted the interviews I was surprised that only Brian, an anarchist and therefore atypical of the community, claimed to perceive the war at the time in a different way to the Zionist version of events. This might have been as a result of the Zionist memorialisation of the war in histories that the interviewees had consumed in the past forty years, but the archival evidence strongly suggested that at the time the dominant interpretation of the war within the British Jewish community was in line with Zionist propaganda. Actually seeing the detail of this propaganda and the effort to disseminate it in the archive helped resolve a key issue in understanding what triggered the British Jewish affective response to the war.

### 3.6. British Jewish sociology

The other issue with using semi-structured interviews with a sample of twelve people is how representative the data was going to be. Twelve interviews could only have been suggestive of this and so I needed some other method for verifying how representative the interview data was. Fortunately, the 1960s saw the rise of British Jewish sociology, with a number of scholars (Krausz, 1964; Krausz, 1969 (a); Krausz, 1969 (b); Prais and Schmool, 1968; Kosmin and Grizzard, 1974; Prais and Schmool, 1975; Krausz, 1981; Gould, 1984) a journal (*The Journal of Jewish Sociology*) and a research institute (the Institute of Jewish Affairs)\(^\text{39}\) frequently producing quantitative (statistical) research on, if not the whole community, then local subdivisions of the community. The primary method of data collection in this tradition of British Jewish sociology has been surveys of samples averaging 300 participants. Attitudes towards Israel, Zionism and Zionist organisations have been a constant reference point in this research and so it became possible to cross-reference what my interviewees were saying with the findings of this research. This was particularly useful in the discussion

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\(^{39}\) The institute of Jewish Affairs was established in New York in 1941 but moved to London in 1965.
sections of Chapters 7 and 8, where as much as possible each interview quote, is checked for accuracy against relevant documents from the archive and representativeness against statistical data from these quantitative studies. No research is ever water-tight in this respect, but a degree of historical accuracy is important in a project that wants to understand the material (and therefore empirically observable) effects that intensifications and dissipations of affect have on collectives of people and the culture that binds them.

4. Ethics

Although the central thrust of this PhD is theoretical and not political – it looks at the role that affect plays in the creation of new cultural formations, using Zionism in British Jewry as a case study – it is still guided by political principles, namely wanting to provide an account of how Zionism in Britain functions in order that it can be successfully opposed. This political position was never disclosed to the participants. What ethical issues does this raise?

The answer to this question is not straightforward. It is quite normal for researchers not to disclose their political positions to participants in a bid to appear neutral and elicit less ‘biased’ data from the interviews they are conducting. However, as mentioned above, this non-disclosure coupled with the fact I am a British Jew of Israeli heritage led most of the interviewees to believe I was a Zionist, therefore establishing a presumed complicity between us that undoubtedly impacted on the research process. Without carrying out a controlled experiment to discover what the effects of this presumed complicity were – i.e. keeping all the variables of the process the same except having it conducted by a self-disclosed anti-Zionist – I can only offer speculation. Possibly some participants would not have taken part, as the e-mail exchange with Habonim suggests. Possibly some of the participants would have given more guarded interviews. Possibly the more confrontational interviewees would have relished the opportunity to defend their position producing different data that was revealing in a different way. Whatever the outcome, the
fact remains that the interviewees agreed to participate in a project in which they might not have participated had they been aware of its political position.

My response to this is that whilst recognising the problem, there is another set of ethical issues at stake that also need to be considered in this project, namely the ethics of what Zionism has meant, primarily, for the Palestinians, but also for Jews both inside and outside Israel. This is discussed in detail in different parts of the thesis but just to briefly summarise: Deleuze defines ethics as encounters between bodies that are mutually empowering (1968 (b)) (see Chapter 2). The ethical encounter produced by Zionism plainly disempowers Palestinians in often brutal ways, and though it has persuaded Zionist oriented Jews that it has empowered them, this thesis has provided ample evidence that this is actually not the case. What Zionism continues to do is actively perpetuate the sense that Jewry across the globe always faces the threat of an existential threat, and only a militarised Israel will protect them. This, I would argue, amounts to the affective disempowerment of the global Jewish ‘body’. The ethical commitment of this thesis is to different forms of political organisation that enable encounters that are mutually empowering to all the bodies involved in the encounter currently known as ‘Israel/Palestine’.

One of the ways that this ethical complexity has manifested itself in the research process is in the decision not to show the participants their interview transcripts – a common practice in qualitative interview research. For example: there was a significant amount of data produced by the interviewees that described Arabs, Muslims and Palestinians in racist terms. This, I argue in Chapter 8, is a crucial component of Popular Zionism and reveals its disempowering ethical nature. Had my participants asked for these statements to be edited out of the transcript, the analysis would have been severely distorted. Therefore, I made the decision not to give them this opportunity. However, as a researcher I still want to protect my participants so

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This threat takes different forms in different historical moments. In 2010 it was the alleged nuclear threat from Mahmoud Admenijad’s Iran, which Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu implied was similar compared to the threat of another Holocaust (The Jerusalem Post, 2010).
have anonymised their data during the process of writing up by changing their names and removing revealing biographical information,\(^\text{41}\) so any politically sensitive opinions are completely non-attributable.

\(^\text{41}\) Although, it is important to note here that Jeremy, Stephen and Brian all explicitly stated they had no problem in being named in the final thesis.
Chapter 4

Affect and Zionism in the British Jewish Assemblage
1880–1967

“Desire is always assembled. It is what the assemblage determines it to be.”

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 253)

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the historical context in which the rise of Popular Zionism took place after the 1967 war. In doing so it will argue that it was not the war alone that prompted this rise; instead the war occurred at a moment when the British Jewish community was configured in a way that pre-disposed it towards having the intensely affective relationship with Israel that emerged once the Middle East crisis began. The Six Day War acted like a catalyst, actualizing a complex cultural formation that already existed within the virtual. In order to make this argument, this chapter will analyse the British Jewish community and its development from the 1880s–1960s, deploying a theoretical framework derived from the ideas of two leading Deleuze and Guattari scholars: Manuel DeLanda and Lawrence Grossberg, specifically the former’s assemblage theory (2006; 2010) and the latter’s Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of Raymond William’s structure of feeling (1992, 1997, 2005, 2010). In doing so it will provide empirical evidence (from the interviews and archives) for Deleuze and Guattari’s vision of the social in which, as the quote that begins this chapter suggests, desire and affect are determined by the organization of the assemblages that they flow across.

Using these two conceptual frameworks, this chapter will attempt to outline the ‘arrangement’ of the British Jewish assemblage in 1967 and narrate the various territorialisations and codings that bring this arrangement into being. These include: i) the shifting location of the British Jewish community in Britain’s class structure; ii) the shifting location of the British
Jewish community in Britain’s racial hierarchies; iii) the role anti-Semitism plays in the self-perception of British Jewry and iv) and the types of Jewish representation prominent in the popular culture of the 1960s. The second part of this chapter will attempt to put the rise of Popular Zionism into a broader historical context by outlining the history of Zionism as both a movement and an ideology in Britain’s Jewish institutions and amongst ‘ordinary’ British Jews.

In outlining these territorialisations and codings this chapter ultimately argues the following: by 1967 the British Jewish community was enjoying a status in British society it had yet to experience. This can be seen in its increased socio-economic position and its place in Britain’s racial hierarchies, which had seen a significant reduction in anti-Semitism (Julius, 2010). Despite their increased status British Jews still felt a sense of threat living in British society (compounded by the fact that the Holocaust was still in living memory). This contradictory structure of feeling was reinforced by the representations of Jewishness that British Jews were consuming at that time. On the one hand the Jew as subject to anti-Semitism (the ghetto Jew) was still circulating in the 1960s, but on the other a new representation of Jewishness had began to emerge, the defiant Jew who transcended society’s anti-Semitic structures. The Six Day War resolved the contradictions in this structure of feeling. The Zionist representation of the events of the Arab-Israeli 1967 war as the victorious Israeli army vanquishing the threat of a genocide of Israeli Jews at the hands of anti-Semitic Arab ‘hordes’ is not only a powerful counterweight to the stereotype of the ‘ghetto’ Jew but it also persuades British Jewry that Jews could be powerful in ways they had just begun to experience. Moreover, the powerful Jew, in the form of the Zionist representation of the Israeli army would protect diaspora Jewry against any existential threat.

2. DeLanda’s assemblage theory

develops Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological approach into a theory of how societies are formed and how this form changes through time. DeLanda calls this theory assemblage theory. As described in Chapter 2, Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblages are the multiplicities of elements that aggregate to form the Plane of Organisation. For Deleuze and Guattari an ‘element’ is any singularity that exists on the Plane of Organisation. Their definition of an element ignores the ontological distinctions usually made in western metaphysics, so a person is an element, as much as a government, a mountain or a dream. As a result of this unique ontological approach, the basis for DeLanda’s socio-historical analyses is broad and includes such diverse phenomenon as cities, the natural environment in which these cities have developed, and the laws that are used by a city’s governing institutions. However, because his focus is social theory, DeLanda has tended to privilege human beings as the principle social actors of history (2010, p. 1). His analyses, therefore, have human activity in its various manifestations, as their central focus. It is this focus that makes his particular reading of Deleuze and Guattari useful in analyzing the British Jewish community through the twentieth century.

For DeLanda society is an assemblage and one of its defining characteristics is its ‘relations of exteriority’. This term refers to the way an individual element connects to other ‘exterior’ elements to create an assemblage. An element has a potentially infinite number of relations of exteriority which means elements can combine with a potentially infinite number of other elements. This means two things: i) the assemblage to which it belongs can increase and decrease in size and ii) an element can belong to more than one assemblage at one time. Relations of exteriority are not fixed so can connect and re-connect with an infinite variety of other elements in an infinite variety of ways. Herein lies the radical anti-essentialism of Deleuze and Guattari; a social field in which none of its relations are inherently fixed and therefore can be re-configured in an infinite variety of ways. It should be

42 This procedure parallels Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘articulation’, though they use this term in relation to the constructed nature of discourse i.e. to refer to the articulation of signs into chains of equivalence (1985).
made clear that it is not only elements that have relations of exteriority with other elements but also assemblages too (everything is an assemblage for Deleuze and Guattari/DeLanda, including ‘elements’) and that their connections with another, produce a vast network of interconnected assemblages that constitute the social field. For DeLanda, everything on the Plane of Organisation is an assemblage but the examples he uses most prominently in his work on assemblage theory are societies and the human assemblages which comprise them: people, couples, families, friendship groups, institutions, communities, the market, state organisations.

DeLanda explains that the process by which elements are bought together to form an assemblage is two pronged, or what Deleuze and Guattari have called ‘double articulation’ (1980). The first articulation involves the selection of elements out of which the assemblage will be comprised. In the context of a community, this would be the sorting of people into insiders and outsiders and the insiders into those of good and bad reputation (DeLanda, 2010). The results of this first articulation are maintained through processes of territorialisation. Territorialisation has two dimensions in this context. The first is spatial: putting the elements into close proximity of each other so the relations of exteriority that constitute the assemblage are easy to maintain. In the context of communities this would be the establishing of neighbourhoods (territories) in which the community lives (e.g. Hackney, Redbridge and Edgware for Greater London’s British Jewish community in the 1960s). The second aspect of territorialisation is the habitual practices that work to stabilize the relations of exteriority between the elements that constitute an assemblage. DeLanda defines these habitual practices as “the routinization of everyday activities”, “repetition of rituals” or the “systematic performance of regulated activities” (DeLanda, 2010, p.19). In the British Jewish/Zionist context these activities could be the regular attendance of Zionist youth clubs, the month long ‘Israel tour’ that numbers of sixteen year old Jews continue to attend in the summer or the regular discussion of events relating to Israel as they are reported by the press in Britain. Habitual practices such as these not only put people into close proximity of each other but also give them a shared
experience of the world – a culture – ultimately giving the community its identity.

If the first articulation selects the elements out which the assemblage will be comprised then the second articulation takes these selected elements and arranges them into the configuration that gives the assemblage its identity. The first articulation is concerned with the ‘materiality’ of the assemblage – the material out of which the assemblage is constituted – and the second articulation is concerned with the ‘expressivity’ of the assemblage or how that material is expressed. Here DeLanda is building on Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the Danish linguist Hjemslev who argues the two basic analytical units of linguistics are ‘content’ and ‘expression’ (with ‘content’ being the substance out of which language is constituted and ‘expression’ the fashion in which this content is expressed) (Hjemslev, 1943). As a result of the second articulation being to do with language and expressivity Deleuze and Guattari call the second articulation ‘coding’. In the context of communities DeLanda argues this ‘expressivity’ can take different forms: i) the regulations and charters, both written and un-written, in a community (Jewish law and custom); ii) expressions of solidarity, verbal and physical (the synagogue meetings held during the Six Day War); iii) the narratives that a community tells itself that serve to reinforce social cohesion (the Zionist narrative that Israel is the only place a Jew can really feel safe serves this function in this context). Whereas territorialisation gives a community both a material presence (by organizing the people into the networks that constitute a community) and a culture (the iterative practices that maintain these networks), coding only works to give a community a culture, operating on the level of representation.

It is important to state here that just as much as assemblages are produced through processes of territorialisation and coding, they can be unmade – the elements can be set free – by processes of de-territorialisation and de-coding. In the context of British Jewry the most notable process of de-territorialisation would be ‘assimilation’ (when a minority culture assimilates into the dominant culture). Assimilation has been a source of contention within
the community through most of the twentieth century. A spatial de-territorialisation could be the migration of Jews into neighbourhoods that previously had a low density of Jewish inhabitants. A de-territorialisation of the order of habitual practices would be not participating in Jewish rituals like circumcision or bar mitzvah, or by marrying someone who is not Jewish. An example of de-coding is the virtual disappearance of Yiddish as a language spoken by British Jews in the beginning of the twenty-first century when it was commonly spoken by the immigrants of the twentieth century, either alone or mixed with English.

It is here, in the notion that cultures and communities are constantly being made and unmade, deterritorialised and reterritorialised, coded and de-coded, that it is possible to see the consequences of Deleuze and Guattari’s radical anti-essentialism played out in the socio-cultural. It is also here that we begin to see the value of the Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to understanding Popular Zionism in the post-1967 conjuncture. This approach can be used as both a theoretical approach to deconstruct and a political strategy to resist and oppose the essentialism in which Zionism is based. In the most general sense, this essentialism claims that there is an essential link between ‘the Jewish people’ and ‘Eretz Israel’. Specifically for this thesis it has also suggested that British Jewish support for some form of Zionism is similarly immutable, essential and unchangeable. As this chapter will demonstrate this has not always been the case: for example, between 1880 – 1914 Zionism was highly unpopular amongst British Jewry with many high profile British Jews publicly expressing hostility towards the ideology and the political movement acting in its name (Alderman, 1992; Shimoni,1986 (a) , 1986 (b); Lerman, 2008). The widespread support Zionism experiences after 1967 came about as a result of a series of territorialisations and codings – most importantly the Six Day War. What this means is that the intensely affective relationship that Popular Zionism mediates between British Jews and the State of Israel is “inherently changeable: [it] may undergo destabilizing

43 One of the driving concerns of much Jewish sociology in Britain has been to trace the contours of assimilatory processes in order for them to be countered. In this work ‘assimilation’ is coded as a negative process for Britain’s Jews. See (Lipman and Lipman, 1981)
processes affecting [its] materiality, [its] expressivity or both.' (DeLanda, 2010, p.33) This Deleuzo-Guattarian, anti-essentialist approach which understands the British Jewish support of Zionism and the State of Israel as always tenuous (even when it appears most strong) is useful for both Zionists and anti-Zionists who have to constantly attempt to produce opposing territorialisations and codings in order to further their own political projects.

However well-suited DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari is for making sense of the British Jewish assemblage and the processes that produce it, there is an oversight in DeLanda that, if it were the only approach applied in this chapter, would miss a crucial aspect of the way the British Jewish assemblage changed after the war; that is in either of his works on assemblage theory there is no mention of affect. In order to find a DeLandian reading of affect we have to turn to an earlier book, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (2002), in which he develops a definition of affect in the context of pure mathematics and thermodynamic physics. In this book he argues that all assemblages, “possess an indefinite number of capacities to affect and be affected” (DeLanda, 2002, p. 62). For DeLanda affect is defined purely in terms of an assemblage’s ‘capacities’. To illustrate this definition he uses the following example: the assemblage of a walking animal, a piece of solid ground and a gravitational field. The ‘capacity to affect and be affected’ in this context is the capacity of the animal to walk. This capacity only emerges in relation to the other heterogeneous elements that constitute the assemblage. In defining affect in this way (i.e. purely in terms of ‘capacity’) DeLanda misses a crucial aspect of the Massumian definition being used in this thesis and defined in Chapter 2. With its attention to the experiential and the intensive properties of affect, Massumi’s definition puts it much more in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s self-professed vitalism (1991). For Massumi, Deleuzo-Guattarian affect is akin to Spinoza’s ‘force of existing’, or energy, whereas for DeLanda affect is not energetic, it is functional: the acts enabled by an assemblage’s relationship with other assemblages (2002, p. 63). The shift in emphasis is important in the context of a thesis that goes onto argue that it was specifically the intense affective response of British Jewry’s
‘experience’ of the war that triggered the widespread cultural changes that occurred in the post-1967 conjuncture.\textsuperscript{44}

2.1. Lawrence Grossberg: affect, assemblage, cultural change

In order to redress this oversight, this chapter now turns to the theoretical framework developed by Lawrence Grossberg in \textit{We Gotta Get Out Of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture} (1992). Grossberg not only uses a definition of affect more in line with Massumi’s but, importantly, he places it within approaches developed at the CCCS in the 1970s and in doing so presents a highly persuasive account of how affect works in the context of social and cultural formations.

As a student of the CCCS under Stuart Hall in the 1970s, Lawrence Grossberg is one of the key exponents of a particular type of cultural studies, one that draws heavily on the work of ‘cultural Marxists’ (namely Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart and E.P. Thompson). Grossberg’s unique contribution to this intellectual legacy was the introduction of Deleuze and Guattari to ‘cultural Marxism’. Of this contribution, what matters most for this thesis are the similarities he draws out between the cultural Marxist and Deleuzo-Guattarian ontologies. The cultural Marxist social ontology is outlined in section 4.1 (‘Gramsci’s Ontology’) of Chapter 2. The slight difference between Gramsci’s theory of being and the ontology developed at the CCCS is that whereas Gramsci holds on to the notion that the superstructure is in some non-absolute and highly complex fashion determined by the base, the CCCS follows Williams (1973) in arguing that all the levels of base and superstructure have the capacity to determine one

\textsuperscript{44} Intensity’ does appear in DeLanda’s ontology but he locates it in Deleuze’s ‘intensive’ as opposed to Deleuzo-Guattarian ‘affect’. This could be because he elaborates his Deleuzian approach to intensity in the context of thermodynamics as opposed to assemblage theory’s concern with human communities. Chapter 6 uses the DeLandian framework developed in \textit{Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy} to make sense of how the intense affective response of Britain’s Jewish community to the 1967 war triggered a range of shifts in the formal organization of British Jewish culture. To do this the chapter deviates from DeLanda’s schema by arguing that in the context of human culture the ‘intensive’ is the ‘affective’ in Massumi’s sense. The rest of DeLanda’s approach is retained in Chapter 6 because it provides such a persuasive account of how the intensive alters the formal arrangements of Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblages.
another, equally and unpredictably. It is here, Grossberg argues that we begin to see the similarity between Deleuze and Guattari and cultural Marxism (1997, p. 151). The Marxist ‘totality’ can be understood as all the human activity that occurs on the Deleuzo-Guattarian ‘Plane of Organisation’. The Marxist concept of ‘social formations’ parallels Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘assemblages’. The ‘relations of exteriority’ between the assemblages are similar to Stuart Hall’s use of Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘articulations’. Finally, both Deleuze and Guattari and cultural Marxism share the idea that the assemblages/social formations that constitute the Plane of Organisation/totality are connected to one another in multiple, highly complex, constantly shifting and non-determining ways. Moreover, both agree that the shifting relations of exteriority/articulations are what constitute social and cultural change.\(^{45}\)

What is particularly useful about bringing cultural Marxism together with Deleuze and Guattari is the way that Marxist cultural analysis categorizes different types of human praxis. Grossberg calls these types of human praxis ‘planes’ – a term he takes from Deleuze and Guattari (as in Planes of Immanence and Organization). The way Grossberg uses ‘plane’ here is to describe an aggregate of assemblages that perform similar functions. So the economic plane is the aggregate of the assemblages that perform an economic function on the Plane of Organisation. In this context it would be Jewish businesses and Jewish charities. If an assemblage performs more than one function it will constitute more than one plane. For example, the Zionist Federation in Britain performs multiple functions and therefore helps constitute a number of planes i.e. the economic, political, and the social. It is not just the classic Marxist categorisations of human praxis that provide the basis for these planes. Grossberg also writes about the “plane of desire”, the “plane of meaning” (1992, p. 44) and the “plane of effectivity” (1997, p. 148) and considering the Plane of Immanence constitutes all human and non-

\(^{45}\) Deleuze and Guattari’s *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, particularly *Anti-Oedipus*, was consciously written against Marxism. Similarities such as these demonstrate that whilst Deleuze and Guattari represent a significant departure from Marxist thought they never entirely escape its influence. See (Thoburn, 2003) for an in-depth examination of the parallels between Deleuze (and Guattari) and Marx.
human activity, both virtual and actual, the scope for what planes might exist becomes similarly all encompassing. Ultimately, the concept of ‘the plane’ becomes a useful tool when analyzing the place of any assemblage in the context of its wider relations of exteriority (one that is lacking from DeLanda’s assemblage analysis).

For all the similarities that Grossberg draws out between cultural Marxism and Deleuze and Guattari, the crucial difference is the lack of attention that Marxism in general has paid to affect (or any libidinal agency of any sort, for that matter). The key place in Marxist theory in which affect (of sorts) does appear, Grossberg argues, is in Raymond Williams’ concept ‘structure of feeling’. One of the ways that Williams defined a structure of feeling was as the “disturbance, tension, blockage [and] emotional trouble” that emerges in between what is expressed in a culture and that which is lived but not yet expressed” (cited in Grossberg, 1992, p. 409). Grossberg’s ultimate assessment of Williams’ theorisation is that “to a certain extent [he] failed to theorise the added depth that the notion of ‘feeling’ brings” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 152). In order to redress this, Grossberg adds Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of affect to his otherwise cultural Marxist approach.

In a 2010 interview Grossberg explicitly addresses this move:

“Stuart Hall might say isn’t it the structures of meaning that make the relations [of a conjuncture]? I would say: ‘but no, the difference is you could have ideological interpellations but people do or do not invest in them.’ The meaning-structures have to somehow be affectively charged for it to constitute your experience.”

[My emphasis] (Grossberg, 2010, p. 317)

In this quote Grossberg explicitly addresses Hall’s move beyond Marxism into the post-structuralist concern with meaning (pre-figured by Althusser’s work on ideology) and its lack of attention to the affective dimensions of culture. A similar criticism could be made of DeLanda’s assemblage theory and the way it privileges the structural arrangements of society as opposed to the flows of affectivity these arrangements allow. Grossberg describes the relationship
between assemblage and affect in his description of the Plane of Organisation as, “a system, a particular arrangement… that could take on various forms, and could be reorganised; a kind of range of possibilities. A virtual realm of machinic assemblages that organize the energy or investment in life”. [My emphasis] (Grossebrg, 2010, p. 312). For Grossberg one of the key functions of Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic assemblages are the flows of affectivity that they produce across the Plane of Organisation. Every different arrangement of these assemblages produces a different flow of affectivity both qualitatively (the type of affect) and quantitatively (the intensity or force of the flow) (Grossberg, 1997, p. 159). So the arrangement of assemblages that emerge within a particular conjuncture, in turn produce a spectrum of possible ways of feeling in that conjuncture.

Using the various terms set out by DeLanda and Grossberg, the remainder of this chapter will begin by using sociological and historical data to outline the various territorialisations and codings that gave the British Jewish assemblage its 1967 configuration. In doing so it will argue that by 1967, the British Jewish assemblage was situated on the Plane of Organisation in such a way that meant it was already pre-disposed to the intensely affective relationship with Israel that emerged as a result of the war. It will argue this by demonstrating how the organisation of the British Jewish assemblage in the 1960s produced contradictory flows of affectivity across it. The community’s ‘improved’ position in the racial and economic hierarchies of 1960s Britain increased its sense of confidence and power. However, as the interview data suggest, they were never able to rid themselves of the threat of anti-Semitism, despite it being at its lowest ebb in British history (Julius, 2010). Their intensely affective ‘experience’ of the war resolved this contradiction by presenting them with an image of Jewish power (a victorious Israel) that not only reflects their changed material position in British society but also convinces them of the Zionist claim that the only solution to anti-Semitism in Britain was the existence of a strong State of Israel.
3. An assemblage analysis of the British Jewish community in 1960s Britain

In order to perform an assemblage analysis of the Jewish community in 1960s Britain this next section will identify the following aspects of the assemblage: the elements; the processes of territorialisation and coding that organise these elements into an assemblage; the relations of exteriority that it has with other assemblages most relevant to Popular Zionism, and finally the flows of affectivity that circulate across the assemblage as a result of its arrangement.

3.1. Territorialisations: population and immigration

The ‘elements’ in this context are the individual Jews who are living in Britain. Between 1961 and 1965 Prais and Schmool estimate the Jewish population in Britain numbered at 410,000 (1968). If the first articulation is defined as the territorializing processes that select the elements that will constitute an assemblage, then in the context of British Jewry in the 1960s the most significant of these was the process of immigration. Existing historical evidence suggest Jews first arrived in Britain during the rule of William the Conqueror in 1066 (Langham, 2005). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to chart Jewish immigration into Britain from the eleventh century, and for reasons that will become clear, it is the series of immigrations from the end of the nineteenth century that had the most significant territorializing effects in creating the British Jewish assemblage as it existed in the 1960s. These will be the focus of this subsection.

Of these series of immigrations the most significant was of the Jewish communities who fled the anti-Semitic pogroms that took place in Russia’s Pale of the Settlement at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1880 the population of British Jewry numbered approximately 50,000 (Bentwich, 1960). At this point the Jewish community’s roots in Britain reached back to the pre-
Emancipation period. In the 1880s British Jews were primarily middle class with the exception of a small and influential group of Jews who had become part of the British establishment. These included families ‘of reputation’ such as the Rothschilds and the Montefiores. Between 1880 and 1914, the emigration from Tsarist Russia meant the Jewish population in Britain grew by nearly five times to 240,000 (Alderman, 1992). This migration fundamentally changed the character of Britain’s Jewish community from one of post-Emancipation English, middle class respectability to one in which the majority are poor Yiddish speaking working class immigrants. Of the interviewees Rose and Jeremy spoke explicitly about have roots in this immigrant community. This migration was in many ways the primary territorialisation from which many of the others that shaped the British Jewish assemblage in the 1960s flow. The next significant wave of immigration came after 1945 when between 50,000 and 60,000 Jews fleeing post-Holocaust central Europe move to London. Rose’s father was from central Europe as were both Vivien’s parents. The final immigration to impact on the constitution of the assemblage were the Jews who emigrated from former British colonies in the 1950s totalling between 2,000 and 3,000 people. Stephen, with an Egyptian father, was the only interviewee who came to Britain as part of this migration. As a result of these various migrations and the high birth rate, particularly of the East European/Russian Jews, the Jewish population in Britain was at its highest in 1955 numbering 450,000 (Alderman, 1992). The birth rate steadily dipped until the present day (producing a population of 267,000 in 2001 (ibid.)) pointing to various deterritorialisations, which will be discussed below.

3.2 Territorialisations: areas of settlement

The second territorialisation that shaped the British Jewish assemblage was the establishment of heavily populated Jewish neighbourhoods in Britain that occurred particularly after the post-pogrom migration. At the beginning of

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46 The Jewish Emancipation was the process whereby Europe’s Jewish communities were granted equal rights as citizens of the nation-states in which they lived. The process began in the late eighteenth century and ended in the early twentieth century. In Britain the Jewish Emancipation ended in 1890 when the restrictions based on religion for official positions within the British Empire (except that of monarch) were removed.
the twentieth century Jewish immigrants settled in the areas where immigrants had traditionally settled throughout modern British history, that is the impoverished and overcrowded centres of Britain’s large cities – notably the East End of London. During this period 80% of London’s Jews lived in the working class areas of Stepney, Bethnal Green and Poplar (Alderman, 1992). Both Zena and Harry lived in London’s East End. In Leeds Jews settled in the Leylands district and in Manchester, in Red Bank. Throughout the course of the twentieth century British Jews slowly moved away from what became known as ghettos and into slightly more affluent areas: Stamford Hill and Hackney in London (by the 1950s, Hackney had the densest population of Jews in the country), Camp Road, Chapel Town and Moortown in Leeds and Prestwich and Whitefield in Manchester. Stephen, Evelyn and Sarah resided in either Stamford Hill or Hackney during this period. This movement to more affluent areas is an indication of the social mobility of British Jews in this period that will be discussed in greater detail below. By the 1960s the social mobility of British Jews began to accelerate and the process of suburbanization deepened. For example, London’s Jewish population began to move out of Hackney to London’s suburbs, notably Edgware, Finchley and Redbridge. This process continued into the final decades of the twentieth century, by which point many primarily Jewish neighbourhoods (some of which were as far out as London’s ‘green belt’) were amongst the most affluent in Great Britain.47 All the interviewees, aside from anti-Zionists Brian and David, currently live in suburbs of London or Manchester.

There are two important trends to take note of with regard to patterns of Jewish settlement in Great Britain between 1900 and 1967: i) regardless of where in the UK Jewish people have lived, the majority have always chosen to live with each other. In 1969 a survey undertaken on ‘Jewish Commitment in London’ found 76% of Jews “felt it important to live in an area where there were a significant proportion of Jews” (Gould, 1984). This spatial

47 To give some indication of this, the 2001 census revealed that the area in Britain that has the highest concentration of Jewish people is Radlett in Hertfordshire: Jews make up 24.1% of Radlett’s population compared to an average of 0.5% in the rest of the country. In 2011, local newspaper The Borehamwood and Elstree Times reported that property in Radlett was the second most expensive place to buy property in the south east of England (Sharma, 2011).
concentration achieves dense networking of the elements (i.e. British Jewish social networks) within the assemblage. As this chapter will go on to demonstrate, this networking loosened over the course of the twentieth century but never in a way that a distinctive British Jewish culture and identity ceased to be maintained. ii) The pattern of settlement also reflected the upward social mobility of British Jews in the twentieth century, moving out from impoverished urban centres to the more affluent suburbs as the century progressed. In terms of this thesis, this upward social mobility is the most significant sociological trend in the development of the British Jewish assemblage in the twentieth century and will be discussed in greater detail below.

4. Relations of exteriority: the British Jewish assemblage's shifting location in British society

The next stage in understanding the British Jewish community in terms of DeLanda’s assemblage theory is to understand how this community connects to other assemblages around 1967 – that is to map its relations of exteriority. Every assemblage is connected to a multitude of other assemblages and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to chart all the relations of exteriority of the British Jewish assemblage in the 1960s. This subsection will therefore concentrate on the relations of exteriority that most affect and were most affected by the Six Day War. These can be divided into three general areas: i) the relations that the British Jewish assemblage has to ‘British society’ across the economic plane. ii) The relations that it has with other ethnic groups in Britain’s racial hierarchies (across the plane of ethnicity) and iii) its relation to Israel as it is mediated by Zionism, particularly across the affective plane. This relationship will be the subject of a much larger discussion at the end of this chapter.

4.1. Upward social mobility: class and employment

In terms of the social mobility of British Jews throughout the course of the twentieth century the 1960s was a key period of transition from being a
primarily working-class community to being a primarily middle-class one. At the beginning of the twentieth century British Jewry was largely comprised of poor Eastern European immigrants. However by the century’s end the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of these immigrants had become largely assimilated (though with a strong sense of Jewish identity), anglicised, suburban and middle class. Geoffrey Alderman has suggested this social mobility was driven by the Jewish community’s “desperate insecurity” to socially integrate into a society that had marginalized them (Alderman, 1992). The reason these aspirations were able to begin materializing specifically in the 1960s was due to broader and more long-term territorialisations that were occurring both in and around the British Jewish assemblage in the period. The first are society-wide and had the potential to effect the population on the national level. These are the Education Act of 1944 – making all secondary education free, giving people who entered employment in the 1950s and 1960s an increased chance to enter professions; the Welfare State initiatives of the 1945 Labour government increasing the life chances of Britain’s poor (of whom Jews were a part in the pre-1945 era); and Britain’s buoyant economy in the 1960s. There are two reasons why these factors had a more substantial effect on Britain’s Jews specifically. The first was the decline in anti-Semitism across British society in the post-Holocaust period opening access to areas of British society that Jews had previously been denied. This was compounded by the fact that the children and grandchildren of immigrants spoke English as a first language, and practiced Judaism as a religion far less ardently, making it easier to integrate into British society than it was for the first wave of Jewish immigrants at the end of the nineteenth century. The second reason is that because anti-Semitism was more pervasive in pre-1945 Britain the Jewish community was not properly absorbed into Britain’s rigidly defined class structure. This meant that given the right conditions (a decrease in anti-Semitism coupled with the sorts of redistributive policies bought about in the post-1945 period), the British Jewish working class could move around this structure with greater flexibility than the traditional British working class, increasing the opportunity for social mobility. All these larger historical forces coalesce in the 1960s, in a fashion that
results in the upward social mobility of the British Jewish assemblage in relation to the other assemblages whose connections are constitutive of it.

An indication of the social mobility of British Jews can be found in a seminal piece of British Jewish sociology carried out by Ernest Krausz called the Edgware Survey. In it Krausz measures the occupational distribution of the respondents of the survey comparing it with that of their fathers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Respondents’ Fathers</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers and Managers</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual Workers</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Manual Workers</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled Workers</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Krausz, 1969 (a), p. 84)

The generational change in the first two categories and the last two are the most striking. In 1962-3 15.5% of the younger generation are professional compared to 3.9% of their fathers. 17% of the father’s generation were semi-skilled workers compared to 1.8% of their sons. It is also revealing to point out that 53% of the Jews living in this middle class suburb were born in the East End. From these statistics Krausz concludes that “… the Edgware group has a very high upward mobility.” (1969 (a), p. 88). This is confirmed by research undertaken by Prais and Schmool (1975) who compare occupational distribution for the Jewish community as a whole and compare it to that of British society in general. Prais and Schmool find that 4% of the Jewish population are in a profession compared to 2% of the general population.

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48 The survey took place between 1962 and 1963 and questioned 1290 people spread over 382 households and was designed to discover fundamental sociological information about the Jewish community living in Edgware, a recently populated Jewish suburb. The findings were published in a series of articles in the Jewish Journal of Sociology in 1969 (Krausz, 1969 (a), Krausz, 1969 (b)).
They also find that 13% of the general population are in unskilled employment compared to 0% of the Jewish population.

The type of occupation in which Jewish people were employed in the 1960s confirms their upward social mobility, suggesting reasons as to why this had taken place and also revealing something of the way Jewish people felt living in the assemblage of British Jewish society. In the immediate post-Emancipation period, up until the mass immigration of 1880s British Jews tended to be employed in traditionally middle and lower middle class jobs such as merchants, traders and artisans (Bentwich, 1960). After the Tsarist migrations of the early twentieth century, the class character of the Jewish community changes because Jewish immigrants provided cheap labour, mainly for the UK’s clothing industry (what was popularly known as the ‘rag trade’ throughout the twentieth century, or in Yiddish the ‘schmatta trade’). Joseph worked for a textiles manufacturer in Manchester in the late 1960s. This was the largest area of employment up until 1945. In the 1960s Jews may have been over-represented in the professions such as law, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, accountancy and higher education (Alderman, 1992) but these were not the largest areas of employment for Jews in Britain in this period. The most popular areas of employment were in fact market trading (Stephen became a market trader) and taxi driving (Harry was a taxi driver) – one third of taxi drivers in London were Jewish (ibid.). Many others ran their own companies, managed shops or ran modest manufacturing enterprises (ibid.) (Jeremy ran a lighting manufacturer with his father). What is important to note here is that these are areas in which one is primarily self-employed. The most significant trend in British Jewish employment in the 1960s was self-employment: 66.7% of Jews are self-employed in the 1960s compared to 7.4% of the general population (Krausz, 1969 (a)). Krausz argues that, “many Jews strive to work on their account either because they think they have been discriminated against by employers, or because they fear that such discrimination might occur when applying for a job or when seeking a promotion” (Krausz, 1969 (a), p. 77). This means two things: i) the perception that there is anti-Semitism in Britain structures the employment decisions of
the British Jewish community.\textsuperscript{49} This runs counter to the fact that anti-Semitism is actually on the decrease in the 1960s (as will be demonstrated below) and this decrease actually maximises the potential for Jewish economic prosperity in the 1960s.

4.2. Relations of exteriority: the shifting location of Jews in Britain’s racial hierarchies

It is not only the British Jewish community’s economic and political relations of exteriority that shifted during the 1960s but also its relations of exteriority on the plane of ethnicity that moved in parallel ways. As British Jews became more suburban and more middle class – or as they fell more in line with dominant mid-century British socio-cultural aspirations – their difference as Jews became less marked than the generation before them. This is caused by a variety of territorialisations both internal to the assemblage and external to it in British society.\textsuperscript{50}

In terms of an assemblage analysis of British Jewry across the plane of ethnicity a useful starting point is a framework developed by Freeman that Krausz then applies to British Jewry between 1962 and 1977 (Krausz, 1981). In this framework, Freeman develops a spectrum of assimilation that an ethnic minority can exist on in a society, depending on the cultural values of that minority and the societal setting they find themselves in. This spectrum is divided into three sections: ethnocentrism, assimilation and acculturation. Krausz describes ethnocentrism as, “the exaggeratedly favourable evaluation

\textsuperscript{49} According to Stephen, it also influences the employment decisions of British Jews at this time: “Did your mum and dad ever tell you that they faced anti-Semitism, or maybe they did but they never said anything to you? Like maybe at work... Jando’s was a Jewish company, Jewish people running it. So no. That’s what you did. You got a job because someone knew someone... everyone in my area, my age group, went to the West End in the schmatta trade. ‘Can you get my son a job?’ It was jobs for the boys, and people you know rather than were you good at it.” (Stephen, p. 346) This is another way in which the assemblage maintained its dense networking.

\textsuperscript{50} There is no internal and external as such in DeLanda’s assemblage theory as all the elements in across the social field are constitutive parts of multiple assemblages, meaning all assemblages are complexly interwoven. The terms external and internal are away of delineating these assemblages for analytical purposes.
of a group’s own system, culture and values and its likely to set barriers between different ethnically based groups.” Assimilation, “refers to those changes that bring about the disappearance of one ethnic group by its complete submergence into another” and acculturation is “a process whereby an ethnic group assumes in many respects the culture and values of the general society in which it exists but, at the same time, maintains it as a separate entity” (Krausz, 1981, p. 19). Where a minority community is located on this spectrum depends on their stage of development, their strength vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, their societal context and their links to other societies (ibid). In the British Jewish context between 1962 and 1977, Krausz argues that the majority of British Jewry was acculturated.51 He argues that this occurs as a result of “the British structural and cultural scene… becoming more ethnically pluralistic in its orientation” (ibid.),52 ultimately concluding that British Jewry in British society between 1962 and 1977 is on, “an acculturation continuum inside a pluralistic setting.” (Krausz, 1981, p. 22). He explains this as a situation in which:

“… an historically dominant culture persists in many areas of life and the notions of a minority and immigrant group still prevail, but where an incipient notion of plural cultural values is developing a somewhat changed social structure. Thus dominant-subordinate relationships are becoming less pronounced and there is a tendency towards greater acceptance of cultural exchange and adjustment on behalf of both the native British population and the more recently established ethnic groups.”53

(Krausz, 1981, p.18)

What Krausz’s analysis gives us here is a sketch of the relations of exteriority that the British Jewish assemblage had with the assemblages of British society across the plane of race and ethnicity, and the arrangement the assemblage assumes as result. In the 1960s and 1970s, the dense networks

51 Krausz mentions that the Chassidic Jews of London’s Stamford Hill are ethnocentric.
52 Krausz qualifies this by arguing that because ethnic minorities in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s do not experience full social equality that British society is ‘quasi pluralist’ (Krausz, 1981, p. 19).
53 Krausz’s assessment of British race relations in the 1960s and 70s is perhaps overly positive, in that it does not adequately account for racism at either the institutional or popular levels. It does, however, make more sense when applied to British Jewry as opposed to the Black-British, Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi communities, because, as will be described in greater detail further on, British Jewry was far more assimilated into British society in the 1960s and 1970s.
that defined the Jewish assemblage in Britain in the first half of the century were loosening, allowing greater freedom for its elements to intermingle with the assemblages around it, eroding the barriers that define it. These networks do not however loosen completely, with the Jewish community still holding together as a distinct, ‘acculturated’ assemblage. These shifts can be evidenced in the following deterritorialisations: the decline in Jewish religious practice and the subsequent ‘anglicisation’ of British Jews. They occur for a variety of complex reasons: the territorialisations on the economic plane outlined above i.e. the embourgeoisement of British Jewry and the relationship with Israel (which will be detailed below). This subsection will detail the territorialisations of the plane of ethnicity, namely the decrease in British anti-Semitism post-1945 and the rise of postcolonial racism in Britain post-1950s.

By 1967, Jewish identity in Britain had lost much of its religious content. In Krausz’s Edgware survey he finds that 73.9% of Jews only attend synagogues on High Holy Days\(^\text{54}\) (Krausz, 1969 (b)). He had already commented on the loss of religiosity in British Jewish life in his earlier study of Leeds Jewry (1964) where he notes that although approximately 5,000 families belong to the United Synagogue, “most of [their] members adhered only to some of the traditional rules in their private lives, completely ignoring others” (Krausz, 1964, p. 107). The religious laws Leeds Jewry adhere to strictly were circumcision, burial in a Jewish cemetery and attending synagogue on High Holy Days. The rules practiced with moderate commitment were eating kosher food, lighting the Sabbath candles and fixing a mezuzah\(^\text{55}\) to the doors of the house. The rituals that Leeds Jewry did not

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\(^\text{54}\) Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashana are the High Holy Days of Judaism; Yom Kippur lasts a day and Rosh Hashana lasts two, with the majority of Jews only attending synagogue on the first day. This means three-quarters go to Synagogue twice a year (or a maximum of three days if they attend the second day of Rosh Hashana). It must be noted here that synagogue attendance on these days can often be out of a sense of obligation rather than religious commitment and these services can have the atmosphere of a social occasion as opposed to a religious one.

\(^\text{55}\) A mezuzah is a piece of parchment inscribed with the words of the Jewish prayer, the shema. It is very often contained in a decorative case, Biblical law dictates that a mezuzah should be fixed to all the doorframes of a Jewish house.
follow are that of the mikvah\textsuperscript{56} and observing the Jewish Sabbath. It is revealing of the place of religion in the British Jewish assemblage that the rituals which are practiced the least are the ones that would most interrupt the everyday lives of the Jewish people should they practice them. Krausz concludes: “The net result is that the Jew has become more like his gentile neighbour, as he has become more acculturated. There is no doubt at all that religion as a force of control has become considerably weaker than during the early years of the community” (Krausz, 1964, p. 112). This is supported by a study carried out by Gould (1984) (in which the fieldwork was undertaken in 1969 and 1970) which found a marked decrease in religious ‘commitment’ between the adults he interviewed and the adults of their parents’ generation with commitment being measured by the habitual practice of religious rituals. Of the interviewees, Jeremy, David, Joseph, Rose and Brian were all what might be called ‘High Holy Days’ Jews during the 1960s. Evelyn, Stephen and Sarah were more religious.

Aside from the embourgeoisement of British Jews, one of the most significant causes of British Jewish acculturation in the 1960s was the reduction of anti-Semitism in British society. This affected the British Jewish assemblage in two ways. The first is that it increased their potential for integration into British society (as evidenced by their upward social mobility outlined above). The second is that although it objectively decreased, British Jews still felt it was as pervasive as it was during its height in the modern period between 1880 and 1945. In the Edgware Survey 78% of the respondents had said that they experienced no anti-Semitism at all compared to 0.8% who said they experienced a great deal. However Krausz theorises that 66.7% of the same respondents are self-employed because of their fear of anti-Semitism in the job market. This is corroborated in his study of Leeds Jewry where he concludes that Jews are sensitive to anti-Semitism and may see it where it does not exist (Krausz, 1964, p. 126). Krausz’s findings are confirmed by Anthony Julius’ extensive (though problematic)\textsuperscript{57} study of anti-}

\textsuperscript{56} A mikvah is a ritually purifying bath.

\textsuperscript{57} Its major problem being that the final part of this book elides anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism.
Semitism in Britain *Trials of The Diaspora* (2010), in which he argues that between 1945 and 1967, anti-Semitism is at its lowest ebb (pp. 335–336). Paradoxically, the fear of anti-Semitism maintains the dense networking of the assemblage even as its decline allows greater freedom across the economic plane of British society.

In terms of the interviewee’s experience of anti-Semitism a contradictory narrative emerges within their transcripts. Zena (p. 412), Evelyn (p. 484), and Joseph (p. 547) all claimed that they had strong experiences of anti-Semitism growing up in pre-1945 Britain. In terms of anti-Semitism in post-1945 Britain, Sarah remembers feeling different as a Jewish person but does not recall anti-Semitism as such. Brian only recalls anti-Semitism in reaction to the Irgun’s bombing of the King David hotel in 1946 (p. 572). Rose (p. 646) and David (p. 448, p. 462) do not recall experiencing anti-Semitism. This fits into Krausz’s findings outlined above. Contradicting these findings is Jeremy (p. 416), the only interviewee to attest to repeated instances of anti-Semitism in the post-1945 period. Stephen claims that he experienced anti-Semitism but in a way that is quite revealing of the position of Jewishness within Britain’s racial hierarchies in this period. Shortly after recounting a story that unexpectedly links being called a ‘Jew-boy’ near his school in Stamford Hill to the Holocaust, he then says the following:

> “Throughout my life, though I haven’t come across too many anti-Semitic incidents directed at me there’s always been that hidden fear that you’re always waiting for the next pogrom.”

(pp. 358–359)

Here Stephen notes that although his experiences of actual anti-Semitism are few, he is always fearful of it because of the history of pogroms. This is in keeping with Krausz’s findings that there despite there being a decline in anti-Semitism, it still structures the British Jewish experience.

One of the key reasons for the decline in actual anti-Semitism is the growth of racism towards postcolonial migrants and the ways in which British Jews were positioned and positioned themselves within Britain’s racial
hierarchies in the 1960s. In fact, in Krausz’s acculturation thesis, he argues that the post 1945 ‘coloured’ migration is one of the most significant events to have impacted British Jews on the plane of ethnicity in this period. Between 1948 and 1956, a total number of 40,000 people from the Caribbean immigrated to the UK; between 1948 and 1961 over 100,000 Indian and Pakistani nationals immigrated. With Jewish immigration reduced to a trickle, these migrants replaced East European and Russian Jews as the focus of anti-immigration discourses. One of the structuring principles that organises Britain’s postcolonial racial hierarchies was skin pigmentation (Nava, 2007). Aside from the Jews who migrated from Britain’s ex-colonies (most notably Egypt and India), who totalled between 2,000 and 3,000 of the 410,000 Jews in Britain in the 1960s, the majority of Jews in Britain were of European extraction and therefore much closer in skin pigmentation to the general British population. As a result Jews suffered less racism. As Julius argues in this period, “anti-Semitism had become something of a minority taste among the members of far right groups, while racist attacks on New Commonwealth immigrants acquired greater salience” (Julius, 2010, p. 336).

The impact of postcolonial immigration on Britain’s Jewish community is complicated. As Jeremy remarked in his interview: “Fortunately [the National Front] wasn’t against the Jews was it? It was against the Caribbeans [sic] and all the blacks coming in to work on the railways and stuff like that” (p. 426). In the 1960s and 1970s there was more than just relief amongst British Jews that racism had shifted to newer ethnic minorities. Krausz reports that in his fieldwork, “discriminatory and derogatory remarks can be frequently heard” (Krausz, 1964, p. 131) against Jamaicans. Alderman corroborates the rise of racism in the British Jewish community in a discussion of the conservative political inclinations of Immanuel Jakobovitz, the chief Rabbi of British Jewry from 1967-1991: “in particular, he faithfully reflected a feeling of antipathy towards the aspirations of Britain’s black communities that is undoubtedly widespread within British Jewry” (Alderman, 1992, p. 349). The majority British Jewish relations of exteriority being formed on the postcolonial plane of ethnicity are not with the new ethnic minority assemblages, with whom they have a shared experience of racial discrimination, rather they begin to form
relations with ‘white’ British society with whom they are also integrating with on the socio-economic plane.

4.2.1. Relations of Exteriority: Intermarriage

A final way to consider the relations of exteriority on the plane of ethnicity in the 1960s is to look at the amount of intermarriage that took place within the Jewish community at the time. Prohibited in Jewish law, intermarriage had traditionally been seen as a problem for the community by its leading (and more conservative) bodies like the Board of Deputies and the United Synagogue (Lipman and Lipman, 1981). It is difficult to know how often it occurred in the 1960s because, according to Schmool (2009), statistics for intermarriage in the British Jewish community do not exist prior to 1994. She gives two reasons for this: i) statistical data on marriage collected by the Jewish community is based on synagogue weddings (where only Jews can marry Jews) and ii) British statutory data does not require that the religion of a person be noted at the time of marriage. However, at a conference held by the Board of Deputies on 2nd April 1962 Norman Cohen quoted a report from The Jewish Chronicle that estimated intermarriage constituted 15% of all marriages where one of the partners was Jewish (1964, p. 51, p. 65). This is relatively low, but he also claimed that, “public opinion is no longer outraged by intermarriage” (p. 51). This coupled with the fact that by 1995 50% of married/partnered men under thirty were in interfaith partnerships (Schmool, 2009, p. 63) is evidence that further suggests that the dense networking of the British Jewish assemblage was slowly loosening on the plane of ethnicity in the 1960s.

5. Flows of affectivity

A recurrent theme in the research undertaken by sociologists in the 1960s is the suggestion that the British Jewish assemblage is somehow more ‘affectively charged’ in comparison with the rest of the British population. For instance in Krausz’s study on Leeds’ Jewry he finds intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews is thought not to work by the Jewish community in Leeds
and interprets this dominant attitude arising as a result of “… the difference in personality make up. This is expressed, for example, by a belief in the ‘Yiddishe Heart’ which the gentile is said to lack and that the belief that no close feeling can come about between a Jew and a Gentile because of an inner psychological gulf that exists between the two” (Krausz, 1964, p. 104). In Julius Gould’s study on Jewish commitment he speculates as to “whether it’s true that such Jewish families build up tensions of a kind and intensity not found in other families.” [My emphasis] (Gould, 1984, p. 15). Gould also asked his 217 participants what they felt were the positive distinctive features of Jewish people. Twenty-seven answered ‘warmth’ and ‘sincerity’ (the most popular answer was ‘a concern with family life’, with thirty-nine responses) (ibid). The self-perception of the Jew as emotionally warmer than the non-Jew appeared in the interviews for this thesis. Jeremy said, “…Jewish people are much warmer. There’s more feelings. Non-Jewish people can be quite cold” (p. 442). This greater emotional intensity is understood in more negative terms by Sarah who said, “We’re more neurotic really aren’t we? Well aren’t we? So intense! So self-punishing, self-attacking; we’re complex, we’re neurotic, we’re aggressive…” (p. 541).

One interpretation of the Jewish self-perception that they are more emotionally intense than non-Jews is because they have internalised Jewish stereotypes that circulated at the time (Krausz, 1964). The construct of the over-emotional Jew has a long history (Gilman, 1991) but potentially becomes more vivid in twentieth century British culture which structures notions of Britishness around ideas of emotional restraint (the ‘stiff upper lip’, ‘British reserve’). In order for this construct to be maintained Jews, like other ethnic minorities, become British culture’s over-emotional ‘Other’. The argument that Jews see themselves in the same terms as a result of the internalization of this stereotype is a persuasive one but it is also possible to understand this phenomenon within the terms of assemblage analysis. For Grossberg, the intensity and type of affectivity that flows across an assemblage is dependent upon the arrangement of the elements that constitute the assemblage and its
relations of exteriority on the Plane of Organisation. The chief characteristic of
the British Jewish assemblage, ‘acculturated’ in Krausz’s terms, is the
arrangements of its elements into a dense network that maintains a relatively
strong sense of difference between itself and other ethnic groups. According
to the terms of assemblage analysis, affectivity flows across a relatively
densely networked, self-contained (though loosening) assemblage in a more
intense fashion. The reason for this is as follows: if the defining characteristic
of the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology is its perpetual dynamism, then the
affectivity which flows across it will always be mobile regardless of how
stratified the section of the Plane of Organisation it is flowing across. In self-
contained, densely networked assemblages the mobility is the same but the
space in which these flows of affectivity have to manoeuvre is smaller
therefore increasing the intensity with which it moves. Rose touches upon the
dense-networking of the Jewish community and the affectivity that flows
across it in her interview:

“The non-Jewish people who I meet think very highly of the Jewish family
connections. When I go and talk about Friday night supper… really Friday
night supper, in terms of a family, it stays together until the children move
out. Most of the people I know, the children are at home for Friday night
supper. The non-Jews say to me, ‘we used to do that Sunday lunch time but
the children are all doing different things and we go shopping now’. And
they’re very jealous of it, very jealous of it. The family connection. I have to
say to them that the ideal is wonderful but it doesn’t always happen. I try and
explain ‘broyges’ to them [...] I say that you can have lots of broyges too.”

(Rose, p. 673)

Here Rose thinks Jewish families have a greater propensity for ‘broyges’
because of the rituals that maintain the dense networking of the community as
a whole. This analysis makes ‘Jewish emotional intensity’ a material fact
(though not an ‘essential’ one – different material conditions will produce
different flows of affectivity) rather than merely a self-perception based on the
internalization of a stereotype. The two approaches, however, are not
incommensurable: self-perceptions have material effects i.e. the living out of
the edicts of the stereotype because it has been successfully internalized.

59 Yiddish word meaning quarrel or argument
Giving ‘Jewish emotional intensity’ a non-essentialist material basis is important for this thesis because it could explain why Zionism and the British Jewish relationship with Israel might function more on the affective plane of the assemblage than anywhere else within this assemblage in the post-1967 conjuncture.

According to Grossberg, flows of affectivity have both a quantitative and qualitative dimension – an intensity and a type. If the British Jewish assemblage was organised in such a way during the 1960s that it was pre-disposed to more intense flows of affectivity then what are the dominant types of affect flowing at the time? The most significant types of affect have already been touched upon in the above sections on the transforming position of British Jews both socio-economically and racially. Both these factors increased the confidence and the sense of power and status that Jews felt living in Britain. This is intersected, however, by the fear that British Jews are still the victims of anti-Semitism. This fear could take on monstrous dimensions in the idea that was popular at the time that anti-Semitism’s logical conclusion was the Holocaust, which had only occurred around twenty years prior to the 1960s, meaning it was still in living memory. Therefore, the British Jewish affective plane is animated by a mix of not only confidence and power but also fear that in times of emergency can take on monstrous dimensions in the form of fear that a Holocaust could happen again. This pre-1967 ‘structure of feeling’ enables an understanding of why British Jews began to invest so intensely in Israel and Zionism as a result of the Six Day War. The dominant British Jewish interpretation of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was that a strong Jewish people rose up to miraculously fend off a genocide of Israeli Jews at the hands of anti-Semitic Arabs. This interpretation of events alters the organisation of the British Jewish affective plane. It enables the belief that a militarily strong Israel will protect British Jews from anti-Semitism, which they perceived as always lingering in the background of British society. The way they understood the war assuaged this fear. The changes occur therefore, not only in the relationship British Jews have with Israel but also the way they feel as Jews in Britain. A more detailed discussion of the Zionist construction of the Six Day War, the affectivity it generates and
the impact this construction has on British Jewry is the subject of Chapters 6, 7 and 8. What is important to note here is that the Six Day War functions largely on the affective plane of the British Jewish assemblage: producing its own flows of affectivity whose impact is so large because they resolve the contradictions of this plane as it was organised in the 1960s.

6. Coding: coding Jewishness in 1960s popular culture

In the same way that the 1960s was a moment of transition, in terms of the territorialisations that occurred across the social, economic, political and ‘racial’ planes of the British Jewish assemblage, so it was for the codings that contributed to the organization of the assemblage in this period. This section argues that the majority of representations of Jewishness being consumed by British Jews60 in the 1960s nostalgically looked back at the impoverished and disempowered lives they, their parents and grandparents were moving away from in the post-1945 period. However, at the same time a new representation of Jewishness was tentatively emerging, one that began to reflect, in a more explicit way, the increased power they were experiencing in these new lives. It goes onto argue that it was only after the spectacular display of Jewish power that emerged in the Zionist construction of the 1967 war that representations of Jewish power became incorporated into British Jewish cultural identity in any meaningful way. It is beyond the scope of this section to look at all the representations of Jewishness consumed by British Jews in this period, so instead it will concentrate only on the most popular: the West End production of Fiddler on the Roof (1967), the West End production of Funny Girl (1966), starring Barbra Streisand, and Exodus (1960).

60 Although British Jews were cultural producers in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. authors such as Wolf Mankowitz and Emmanuel Litvinoff) and much of their cultural production had representations of Jewishness at their heart (Litvinoff’s The Lost Europeans (1962) and The Man Next Door (1968); Mankowitz’s book and film A Kid for Two Farthings (1953; 1955)), the most widely consumed representations of Jewishness by Jews in this period had been produced in the United States. Richard Hoggart had expressed concern about the Americanisation of working class cultural consumption in the 1950s (1957). The cultural consumption of British Jews in this period unfolded in-line with this trend. Zena’s ‘Popular Zionist’ cultural consumption is evidence of this.
"Fiddler on the Roof," in both its theatre (1967) and film (1971) versions, was the most popular representation of pre-1945 Jewish life that the just becoming affluent British Jews were consuming in this period. Set in 1905 Tsarist Russia, Fiddler… tells the story of Tevye, a poor milkman trying to uphold the traditions of shtetl life that the onset of modernity had begun to erode. The narrative culminates in a pogrom that forces the shtetl’s inhabitants to leave Russia and embark in the sort of migrations detailed above. Cultural critic Michael Staub reflects on the pleasures of American Jews watching Fiddler… in a way that is relevant to British Jews in the same period: “These comforts of hearth and home provided Jews many things, among them the improbable chance to wax nostalgic over the travails of shtetl life in late nineteenth century Czarist Russia” (2004, p. xvii).

Tevye exhibits many attributes of the classic Jewish archetype of ‘the ghetto Jew’. The ghetto Jew has existed in European culture, at least since the Middle Ages (Aschheim, 1982). The characteristic features all stemmed from him (invariably he was male (Boyarin, 1997)) living in, if not the ghettos of Europe, then certainly its impoverished, Jewish majority areas. Living in a ghetto invariably meant this archetype was poor and lived at the whims of the host culture, a fate he was very often resigned to. Though not true of Tevye, the ghetto Jew could be excessively bookish – a creature of the mind and not the body. Ghetto Jews had developed a sophisticated ‘Jewish sense of humour’ as a means to negotiate the pitiful hand that life had dealt him. There are various examples of this type of Jewishness circulating across the British Jewish assemblage at this time: in the tales of early 20th Century East End Jewish life in Mankowitz’s A Kid for Two Farthings (1953, 1955) and in Emmanuel Litvinoff’s Journey Through a Small Planet (1972); in the sexually neurotic ‘overly-intellectual’ representations of Woody Allen’s comedy persona and the literature of Philip Roth (1959; 1969). In fact, the 1960s saw a rise in the prominence of Jewish culture in the West (Stratton, 2000; Staub, 2004) and arguably, the archetype of the ghetto Jew was the most prominent of the representations that constituted this output.

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61 Shtetls were the Jewish only villages and towns that existed in the Pale of the Settlement prior to the Holocaust.
That there had been such a proliferation of Jewish representation in 1960s popular culture on its own points to the transition in the British Jewish community that is underway in the 1960s. This proliferation of Jewish representation demonstrated the upward mobility of Jews in western societies, specifically the culture industries. During this period certain representations of Jewishness emerged that represent an evolution of the ghetto Jew archetype that still tended to dominate in this period. The satirical and anti-establishment comedy of Lenny Bruce is one example, as is the music of Bob Dylan and poetry of Allen Ginsberg. Dylan’s cultural output rarely traded on his Jewishness, Ginsberg’s more so, but these three artists represented more empowered ways of being Jewish that differed from the archetype of the ghetto Jew. The most mainstream version of this more empowered representation of Jewishness was Barbra Streisand, specifically in her role as *Funny Girl’s* (1966) Fanny Brice, a feisty Jewish vaudeville entertainer who, through talent and determination, escapes her poor Lower East Side origins to become a wealthy Broadway star; therefore paralleling the sociological shifts occurring in British Jewry at the time. Herman (1998) argues Streisand’s success (“a watershed in Jewish film history” (p. 172)) also reflected shifts across, what this thesis calls, the plane of ethnicity.

“Streisand’s ability to be unapologetically Jewish and wildly famous at the same time is due, in large part, to the effects of the countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which sanctioned overt ethnicity as a form of revolt against the white male Anglo-Saxon protestant ruling elite. Aggressively ethnic figures such as Streisand were accepted as part of the rebellion against homogenized WASP norm of the… early 1960s, which had been hegemonic in film as it had been in society.”

(Herman, 1998, p. 172)

Herman’s quote points to the ways in which both Streisand’s star persona and the characters she plays both explicitly and often defiantly celebrate Jewishness. The type of Jewishness she refers to has its roots in the wisecracking and impoverished ghetto Jew archetype just discussed – much of *Funny Girl’s* humour comes from Brice being a poor, Lower East Side

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62 ‘Kaddish’ (1961) is one of Ginsberg’s most famous poems and is named after and inspired by the Jewish mourning prayer.
Jew out of her depth in the rich world she is ascending into. A more radical departure from this archetype and one which represents a more powerful form of Jewishness is the Zionist representation of Jewishness that is the character Ari Ben Canaan in Leon Uris’ novel *Exodus* (1958), played by Paul Newman in Otto Preminger’s film version (1960). Ben Canaan is arguably the most popular representation of the Zionist ‘New Jew’ that had been formulated since the beginning of Zionism specifically to counter the ghetto Jew representation (Presner, 2007). If Zionism saw the ghetto Jew passively accepting his place in the world, its New Jew construction actively railed against it. If the ghetto Jew was overly intellectual, the Zionist New Jew was a creature of the body – a warrior and a farmer. According to Zionism, the Jew physically withered in the ghettos of Europe, and the only place he could flourish was in his homeland, Eretz Israel. Ari Ben Canaan was the most popular representation based on this archetype by the 1960s (Loshitzky, 2001, p. 1). Evidence of the impact of *Exodus* on British Jewry appears in the interviews undertaken for this thesis. Zena bought her VHS copy of the film with her to the interview. Evelyn (p. 488) and Harvey (p. 593) both talked about it having an instrumental effect on either their or someone they knew becoming more Zionist. If *Exodus* popularized the notion of the New Jew, Friedman argues that it was only after the 1967 war that Diaspora Jews actively began to identify with this representation: “After the Six-Day-War… you didn’t have to associate yourself with Woody Allen; you could identify with Paul Newman” (cited in Loshitzky, 2001, p. 1), thus pointing to the catalytic effect that the Six Day War has in re-organising the codings that contribute to the production of the British Jewish assemblage in the post-1967 conjuncture.

New representations of Jewishness may have been emerging in the 1960s (Barbra Streisand, Ari Ben Canaan) amongst the more familiar representations (*Fiddler on the Roof*, Woody Allen) but it was only after the intensive processes triggered by the Six Day War in the British Jewish community (see Chapter 6) that these representations are incorporated into British Jewish cultural identity (see Chapter 7).

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63 In one scene, Brice is offered some pate to which she responds, “I drink it all day”. After eating it she jokes, “Just some dried-out toast in a sliver/ On the top a… a little chopped liver!” in her most comedy ‘Jewish’ sounding voice.
7. The History of Zionism in Britain and the British Jewish relationship to Israel 1890–1967

The territorialisation to have the most direct effect on the rise of Popular Zionism amongst British Jewry post-1967 is the waxing and waning of the influence that Zionism (as an ideology and as a movement) has as an organising principle of the British Jewish assemblage and their relations of exteriority not only to Israel but also to British society. Since the emergence of modern Zionism in the 1890s until 1967, the popularity of Zionism went through a number of peaks and troughs. As this section will demonstrate, the ‘popularity’ that Zionism achieved amongst British Jews in the post-1967 conjuncture was not inevitable. In fact, up until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Zionism and the idea that there should be a State of Israel in Eretz Israel was “deeply divisive” in British Jewry (Kosmin et al. 1997, p. 3). In the decade leading up to the 1967 war, Zionism’s popularity was in decline. “The transition from Zionism as a minority interest to Israel as a point of consensus for the British Jewish Community was not easy” (ibid.).

Over the course of the twentieth century Zionism unfolded primarily across two planes of the British assemblage: the institutional plane and the popular plane. The institutional plane refers to the organized groups of British Jewry that perform a civic function. The plane can include an institution as prominent as the Board of Deputies, who operate as the main representatives of British Jewry, or as small as a local literary group. It can also include Zionist organisations such as the Zionist Federation, or organisations that do not have Zionism as their main focus; a key indicator of Zionism’s popularity is to what extent it influences the decisions made by this sort of Jewish institution. The plane can also be groups who are not Jewish but have a large amount of Jewish members i.e. trade unions.

It is important to note here that traditional histories of Zionism in Britain have concentrated on Zionism on the institutional plane i.e. detailing the establishment of Zionist organisations, the influence of Zionism on Jewish organisations and the interaction of Zionist leaders and ideology with the
British establishment (Shimoni, 1986 (a), 1986 (b); Alderman, 1992; Endelman; 2005). This concentration on ‘the great men’ of Zionism in Britain, as opposed to the history of the popularity of Zionist ideology amongst the bulk of Britain’s Jewish population, is reflective of two things: i) the conservative nature of much research in the area and ii) the ready availability of archival material relating to the institutional plane compared with the scant amount relating to the popular plane. The result is that any attempt at constructing a narrative of the history of modern Zionism at the popular level, based on the existing literature, becomes difficult (though not impossible). What follows is an attempt to do so by using what limited material already exists, and establishing connections between the institutional and popular planes.

7.1. Zionism in Britain: 1880–1914

“At first sight, British Jewry at the end of the nineteenth century might not have appeared a very fertile soil in which Jewish nationalism might grow.”

(Alderman, 1992, p. 211)

Zionism first appeared in Britain in the 1890s, brought over by the mass migration of Jews fleeing the Tsarist pogroms in Russia’s Pale of the Settlement. Of all the political ideologies that these immigrants brought to Britain, Zionism was a minority interest; the most widespread was communism. The reason for communism’s popularity in this period was that it directly addressed the most pressing concerns of immigrant Jews in Britain in this period, namely their poverty. Zionism appealed to a minority of idealists; it was not popular amongst British Jewry in this period. Alderman estimates that during the period before 1914 only 6% of Jews in Britain supported Zionism (1992). At the institutional level the first Zionist organization to be established in Britain was a branch of the East European group Hovevei Zion (translated as Lovers of Zion) and attracted exactly the sort of person just described. Other such organisations began to appear in Britain later in the decade serving a similar constituency, for example Leeds’ first Zionist Society Agudas Hazionim was established in 1898, with a lady’s and youth sections opening
in 1900 (Krausz, 1964). The English Zionist Federation, which eventually became the key Zionist organization in the communal life of British Jewry, was also established in 1898.  

Some of the earliest evidence that Zionism was unpopular within British Jewry includes statements made by Chief Rabbi Herman Adler in 1897 in which he calls the First Zionist Congress (which had convened in Basel, Switzerland in August of that year) “an egregious blunder” and denounced the idea of a Jewish state as “contrary to Jewish principles” (Alderman, 1992, p. 212). The hostility of these comments would become a refrain in the approach that the British Jewish establishment took towards Zionism up until 1948, although the grounds for the hostility would be different. The Chief Rabbi’s claim that a Jewish state was contrary to Jewish principles continues to be the central idea of Jewish religious anti-Zionist discourse in the present day. The central tenet of this discourse is that only when the messiah comes can there be a Jewish state in Eretz Israel. Any attempt to establish one before this time was contrary to Jewish law. This position was a marginal one within early British Jewish anti-Zionism and remains marginal today. The dominant critique of Zionism most popular amongst the British Jewish establishment was that it broke what they understood to be “the Emancipation Contract” (Shimoni, 1986 (a), p. 22) implicitly agreed upon when Jews acquired full emancipation into British society over the course of the nineteenth century. As the British Jewish establishment understood it, by acquiring emancipation Jews in Britain had a “moral undertaking” (ibid.) to divest themselves of any Jewish national attributes and assimilate into the cultures of the host nations where they lived. This assimilationist approach rested on the idea that Jewishness was a religious, not a national identity and it was therefore possible for Jews to be loyal citizens of the countries in which they lived.

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64 Theodor Herzl first visits Britain in this period, arriving in London on 21st November, and is introduced to a number of Jewish notables by the writer and activist Israel Zangwill. In April 1896 Herzl’s book Der Judenstaat is translated into English and published in Britain.

65 The term ‘British Jewish Establishment’ refers to the leaders of British Jewish organisations, such as the Board of Deputies and the United Synagogue, Jewish charities, Jewish businesses like Marks and Spencer. In some cases the British Jewish Establishment is intertwined with the British establishment, like the Rothschild family who in 1885 had a member sitting in the House of Lords.
Zionists, on the other hand, believed that Jewishness was both a religious and a national identity and that Jewish national identity could only achieve its fullest expression in the realization of either Jewish sovereignty or autonomy in Eretz Israel. As the assimilationist establishment saw it, in advocating Zionism you undermined your loyalty as a British subject, threatening the tenuous security Jews had achieved in Britain as a result of emancipation. It also, they believed, fed the anti-Semitic accusation that Jews had no right to live in Britain because they could never be fully British. The conflict between the British Jewish establishment and the Zionists would proceed along these lines until 1948, when the establishment of the State of Israel more or less ended anti-Zionism within the Jewish community.

7.2. Zionism in Britain: 1917–1929

The next significant moment in the rise of Zionism in British Jewry was the Balfour Declaration on 2

nd November 1917. This was a formal commitment on behalf of the British government to the main Zionist organisations that it supported the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The main section of the text was as follows:

“His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”

(cited in Yapp, 1987, p. 270)

66 Chaim Weizmann supported Britain’s leading anti-Alienist and MP for Stepney. He once said, “the fact is inescapable that many Zionists and Anti-Semites share in common the conviction that integration into non-Jewish society was impossible and that basically the Emancipation was a mistake” (Alderman, 1992, p. 229). Conversely British anti-Semites supported Zionism as evidenced by an editorial written in the anti-Semitic paper The New Witness on 11th October 1917: “We have repeatedly affirmed... our sympathy with the cause of Zionism” (Shimoni, 1986 (a), p. 23). Conceptually anti-Semitism and Zionism are co-terminous. Both share a similar social ontology, structured by ethno-nationalism, in which people are segregated into distinct ethnic entities wedded to distinct territorial spaces. It is therefore logical that they should manoeuvre across the political plane in a parallel fashion.

67 Assimilationism was not the only perspective anti-Zionism was fought from. The communist Jews in Britain often denounced Zionism through the Yiddish language paper Arbiter Frand arguing that poor Jews in Palestine should be helped through charity but that Zionism was a bourgeois plot designed to undermine the proletariat.
The declaration came about as a result of much politicking on the institutional plane between Zionists like Chaim Weizmann (president of the Zionist Federation) and Nahum Sokolow (secretary of the World Zionist Congress), members of the British Jewish elite like Baron Walter Rothschild, members of the British establishment like editor of *The Manchester Guardian* C P Scott and the British Government, namely Arthur Balfour, Foreign Secretary and author of the document. Despite its tremendous significance for political Zionism, particularly in Palestine, it had little impact on the popular plane, as Kosmin et al. argue “[The Balfour Declaration] did not signal a sudden and rapid rise in the fortunes of British Zionism. If anything it entered a period of decline and failed, at the time, to become a mass movement” (1997, p. 3). This was reflected in the declining membership of the Zionist Federation in the 1920s (Shimoni, 1986 (a)). The impact on the institutional plane of British Jewry, however, was significant. With the British government apparently favourable to Zionism, Zionist organisations such as the Zionist Federation became less dogmatic and more realistic about what they are able to achieve (Shimoni, 1986 (a)). This conciliatory stance deepened after Britain was given mandatory powers in Palestine by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1919.

Anti-Zionism on the institutional plane also modulated and a newly developed ‘non-Zionism’ (ibid.) emerged in this period. Non-Zionism differs from anti-Zionism, for while they both agree that Jews are not a distinct national entity and therefore there should not be a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, non-Zionism does not actively oppose Zionism and in some instances co-operates with British Zionist organisations in aiding Jewish development in mandatory Palestine. The most high profile manifestation of non-Zionism was an organization called the League of British Jews, a group established twelve days after and in response to the Balfour Declaration. Non-Zionist organisations such as the League of British Jews wanted to aid Jewish immigration as long as it did not oppose their view that people of different religions and ethnic origins could live together in the same state.

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68 The Treaty of Sèvres was the peace treaty agreed between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, which partitioned the Ottoman Middle East into British and French spheres of influence. As part of the treaty, it was agreed that Palestine would fall under the mandate of the British Empire.
Although the League of British Jews could never have claimed to be popular – the maximum number of members at any one time was 1,300, drawn mostly from the British Jewish establishment (the inaugural chairman was Lionel de Rothschild) – it did reflect a shift in thinking about Zionism in the British Jewish assemblage from the indifference and hostility of the pre-1914 period.

7.3. Zionism in Britain: 1929–1939

A series of events occurred, globally and on the British scene, in the late 1920s and 1930s that changed the fortunes of Zionism amongst British Jewry. The first was the rise of anti-Semitic fascism not only in Britain, but across the West, particularly in Nazi Germany. The second were the Arab revolts against Zionist immigration to Palestine and the British government’s response to them. On the institutional plane, Zionism became stronger in these new historical arrangements and at the popular level, British Jews became more receptive to Zionism as an ideology because it claimed to protect them against their growing vulnerability in the new world order (Plane of Organisation) of the 1930s.

Anti-Semitism substantially increased in Britain the 1930s. The most visible representation of this increased anti-Semitism was the rise of Oswald Moseley’s British Union of Fascists (1932–1940). The BUF was explicitly anti-Semitic and particularly popular in London’s East End, where it appealed mainly to white working class people unsettled by the changes Jewish immigration was bringing to the areas in which they lived (Kushner and Valman, 1999). Anti-fascist resistance was at least as strong as the British Union of Fascists, joining together various groups on the political left and certain parts of the Jewish community (the two were closely interwoven in the pre-1945 period). The most prominent anti-fascist group, partly because it was the best organized, was the Communist party who lead the largest anti-fascist demonstration in Britain in the 1930s, in what came to be known as the Battle of Cable Street. Though the Communists lead the anti-fascist resistance in Britain, the Zionists did play a part, aligning themselves to other anti-Fascist Jewish groups like the Jewish People’s Council Against Fascism
in 1936. This explicitly anti-fascist stance contrasted with the non-Zionist British elite like the Board of Deputies who did very little to resist fascism, arguing that fascism should be addressed by the British authorities. The Zionists exploited the British Jewish elite’s approach to anti-Semitism to suit their own agenda. For instance, the leader of the Zionist Federation’s youth organization the Federation of Zionist Youth (FZY) Aubrey Ebban wrote in 1937, “the greatest obstacle in the face of Zionism and all progressive movements in the community is the antiquated tradition of Anglo-Jewish aristocracy” whose neutrality in the face of fascism he claimed was ‘suicidal’ (cited in Shimoni, 1986 (b), p. 93). The result of the Zionist organization representing the approach of the British Jewish elite to rising anti-Semitism as passive and ‘suicidal’ was that, “Zionism became a force on the ascendant in Anglo-Jewry during the 1930s... by associating themselves with [anti-fascist] activism and expressing dissatisfaction with the timid conventionality of the patrician communal leadership, Zionists were able to enlarge their base of support in Anglo-Jewry” (Shimoni, 1986 (b), p. 91).

The late 1920s and 1930s also saw a series of events occur in Palestine that contributed to the rise of Zionism on both the popular and institutional planes. In August 1929 the tensions between the Yishuv and the Palestinians in Palestine peaked in a series of events that Zionists call the ‘Arab Riots’ and Palestinians (and Palestinian supporters) call the ‘Arab Resistance’. In these events 116 Arabs and 133 Jews were killed. The most notorious of these events, from the British Jewish perspective, was ‘the Hebron Massacre’ in which approximately sixty-five Jews were killed. The British government responded by issuing the Passfield Paper in August 1930, which attempted to limit Zionist aspirations in Palestine (in terms of immigration and land purchasing) in order to protect the interests of the Arab population. The Arab resistance and the white paper caused distress across the institutional plane of the British Jewish assemblage, uniting non-, anti- and pro-Zionist organisations (non-Zionist groups like the Union of Jewish Women

69 The Board of Deputies was also against the boycott of German goods in the 1930s. 70 Who would change his name to Abba Eban, and would become the State of Israel’s Foreign Minister between 1966 and 1974 (i.e. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war).
and Liberal Jewish Synagogue expressed identification with the Jews of Palestine). Equally as distressing to British Jewish organisations were the recommendations of the MacDonald White Paper of 1939, which reneged on the British commitment to partition Mandatory Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, as set out by the terms of the Peel Commission of 1937. What the white paper instead suggested was that once Britain lost its mandate to govern Palestine, the country would become an Arab state with a Jewish minority. What angered British Jews the most, Zionists and non-Zionists alike, was the limitation on Jewish immigration the white paper set in place – a cap of 75,000 between 1940 and 1944 – designed to ensure the Jews remained a minority. By 1939 the future for Jews under Nazi rule on the eve of war looked grim and limiting Jewish emigration to Palestine was perceived as cruel by Jews in Britain. In fact, by the end of the 1930s the gathering clouds of war and what it might mean for the Jews in Europe made Jewish people in Britain feel insecure in a more general sense. For reasons about to be discussed, the affective atmosphere generated by the geopolitical arrangements between Britain, Palestine and Europe made British Jews more receptive to Zionism as a way to feel protected during a time of increased anti-Semitism.

The territorialisations that occurred across the British Jewish assemblage in the 1930s had significant effects on the fortunes of Zionism. The institutional plane of the assemblage underwent an almost total territorialisation by Zionism: “the Zionist Federation in effect became the most dynamic and powerful force in the organized life of British Jews.”(Kosmin et al., 1997, p. 4). By 1939, the traditionally non-Zionist Board of Deputies elected an avowed Zionist, Selig Brodetsky, as its head. By this time, “in many organisations not directly concerned with Israel, the dominant lay and professional personnel were very often motivated by their Zionism. Practically speaking Zionism and support for Israel became all pervasive” (ibid.). On the institutional level both anti- and non-Zionism diminished into insignificance by 1939, decreasing further by 1948 (disappearing completely after the 1967 war). In the 1930s the popular level of the British Jewish assemblage is immune to the degree of Zionist territorialisation that occurs on the
institutional plane. There was a rise in membership of Zionist organisations: in 1928/9 the World Zionist Organization has 9,721 members, in 1932/3 this rose substantially to 17,719 members and in 1938/9 23,513 (Shimoni, 1986 (b), 91). However, as Joe Jacobs the secretary of the Stepney Communist Party wrote, “the Jews in East London are not yet in favour of Zionism. That is not to say that many Jews are not Zionists. The majority did not see this as a solution to their problems. They saw themselves as British Jews” (Alderman, 1992, p. 271). This was corroborated in the newspaper The Young Zionists, which wrote, “among Jewish working class young people Zionism has made no headway. The tendency in the best part of our Jewish working class… is to join the Communist party” (ibid.). The relations of exteriority around the British Jewish assemblage in 1930s did open up greater areas of receptivity to Zionism within the assemblage. One of Zionism’s organizing principles is the idea that anti-Semitism is ahistorical, that it will always threaten Jews living in the Diaspora and the only place they can feel safe is in a State of Israel. It is logical then that when the historical arrangements coalesce in such a way as to parallel Zionism’s ahistorical claims i.e. anti-Semitism, both real and perceived, are on the increase, that Zionism becomes more persuasive as an ideology and therefore more popular.

7.4. Zionism in Britain: 1939–1967

The events in the decade leading up to the establishment of the State of Israel, including the establishment itself, had a dual effect on the place of Zionism in the British Jewish assemblage. On the institutional plane, the 1940s paradoxically represents both the height of Zionist territorialisation but also the beginning of its decline, specifically after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. On the popular plane, Zionism as an ideology became accepted, in part because the state now exists but mainly because of the way Zionism came to be articulated to the Holocaust in the minds of Diaspora Jewry i.e. the State of Israel as ‘insurance’ (Gould, 1984), a safe haven in the event should another another anti-Semitic genocide be attempted.
In the pre-1948 period, Zionism was a political force that militated for either Jewish sovereignty or autonomy in some part of ‘Eretz Israel’. On 15\textsuperscript{th} May 1948 Zionism achieved its goal with the establishment of the State of Israel, as recognized by the United Nations. “By the time the state was established in 1948, Zionism had indeed become a mass movement among British Jews and arguably the single most powerful force within Anglo-Jewry” (Kosmin et al. 1997, p. 4). This statement perhaps over-evaluates the place of Zionism in Britain in the 1940s; the expression “mass-movement” is not qualified and suggests that the majority of British Jews were political Zionists in the 1940s when evidence from the period suggests that they were not. However, when applied to the institutional plane this statement is accurate. In 1942 Zionist and non-Zionist groups from across the globe attended the Biltmore conference in the USA in response to the growing awareness of the Nazi genocide of European Jewry. The outcome of this conference was the demand that ‘Palestine become a Jewish Commonwealth’, which, Shimoni argues, radicalised Zionism at an international level mainly because previously non-Zionist groups became fully committed to Zionist goals. In November 1944 the Board of Deputies in Britain issued a ‘Statement on Post War Policy’ reproducing the demands of the ‘Biltmore Declaration’, putting them at odds with the British Government’s post-1939 White Paper position. The ex-Leader of the Board of Deputies and non-Zionist Neville Laski notes in 1943, how, “in geometrical progression the Zionists have assailed and captured the synagogues, literary societies, youth institutions and quasi political institutions of the community” (Shimoni, 1986 (b), p. 98). Zionism became more radical pre-1948 and more Jewish institutions became Zionist, achieving the maximum territorialisation of that plane to date. Non- and anti-Zionist groups still existed even after the establishment of the State of Israel, namely the Anglo Jewish Association, the Liberal Synagogue and The Jewish Fellowship.

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 Zionism’s fortunes changed once again: “In the ultimate success of organized British Zionism were sown the seeds of decline”. As Ernest Krausz remarks in his study of Leeds Jewry in 1958/9: “With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948,
Leeds Zionists shared in the enthusiasm of Zionists elsewhere, although they soon had to face a waning of that enthusiasm on the part of their supporters once the sense of achievement had been felt. Whilst fundraising activities have been successfully maintained, the accent during the last few years has been on a greater cultural link with Israel to be achieved by increased educational activities” (Krausz, 1964, p. 20). Post-1948 Zionist activity shifted away from the political plane (demonstrations, letter-writing, forming bonds with other political groups, meeting with MPs) typical of the 1930s and moved onto the cultural and economic planes (charity) where it was exercised with less intensity in comparison to the Zionist activity of the 1930s and early 1940s. In terms of the popular plane: pre-1948 the idea that a Jewish nation-state might even exist could be and was contested. However, once the State was established –an act that was widely understood in the West as the UN’s response to the Holocaust – the contestability of the state decreased within the mainstream of British Jews. Up until 1967, that the State existed at all is accepted as a fact of life by the majority of British Jews. It is only Jewish political radicals like interviewee Brian who question the existence of a Zionist state in this period.

Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate in some depth the position of Israel and Zionism in the British Jewish assemblage between 1960 and 1967. Just to surmise here: by the 1960s a picture emerges from the existing literature and the interview data collected for this thesis of support for Zionism fading. The existence of the State of Israel remained accepted as a given fact and this was a monumental achievement for the Zionist project, however Zionist activity in Britain remained mostly depoliticized (Krausz, 1964) and the affectivity that Britain’s Jews invested in Israel became muted: “even the enthusiasm for the Zionist ideal as a form of nationalism, which not so long ago reached great heights, appears to be on the wane” (Krausz, 1964, p. 115). The interview data reinforces Krausz’s findings:

“[Israel] was a Jewish country that’s all.”

(Jeremy, p. 418)
“I had no sense of anyone not thinking that Israel was as much of a social fact as France.”

(David, p. 452)

“Israel was just something in the back of my mind... Israel was just a kind of thing in the background. There was a country there that I was born in and that we had lots of family there and I would go to.”

(Stephen, p. 362)

If, as these quotes suggest, prior to 1967 the affectivity that British Jews invested in Israel was of low intensity, this radically changed after the Six Day War. As Chapter 7 attempts to demonstrate an affective investment in Israel became a crucial component of British Jewish cultural identity. Similarly, after the war, (a variation of) Zionism territorialised the British Jewish assemblage in almost its entirety. Aside from some strands of the British ultra-Orthodox, there was not a single assemblage on the institutional plane that was not ‘captured’ by Zionism. Moreover, the way that Zionism operated on the plane of the popular is less like a political ideology and much more like an affective disposition (see Chapter 8 for detailed evidence of this).

8. Conclusion

This chapter places Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory alongside Lawrence Grossberg’s Deleuzo-Guattarian cultural Marxism in order to outline the historical context of the rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish community after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In doing so, this chapter has argued that the 1960s was a key decade of transition for British Jewry, both socio-economically (the process of their embourgeoisement is well underway), and racially (they begin their incorporation into the dominant racial structures of British society). These new socio-historical arrangements produced new flows of affectivity across the British Jewish assemblage; different ways of feeling Jewish in Britain, namely an increased sense of power in British society that is undercut by a fear of anti-Semitism and the fear of a potential second Holocaust. This contradiction was reinforced in the codings that organised the British Jewish assemblage, i.e. the representations of Jewishness they are consuming. In the main these represent Jews as powerless to anti-Semitism; though images of Jews defying anti-Semitism do
begin to emerge in this period. Arguably this pre-1967 arrangement pre-disposed the assemblage to the changes that occur as a result of the war. The Zionist representation of the 1967 war simultaneously convinced British Jews that Jews (mainly Israeli Jews) could be powerful in ways they themselves were just beginning to feel and that these powerful Jews would protect them against a potential second Holocaust, should one be attempted. This process and its ethical implications are detailed at length in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Chapter 5

The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967: An Historical Account

1. Introduction

The following section is an historical account of the June 1967 war, the events that led up to it and the wider historical context in which these events took place. There are two reasons for including this section. The first is to provide a detailed historical account of the war that can be referred back to in subsequent chapters. The second is more integral to the argument being made in the thesis. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, one of the reasons that the British Jewish community had such an intense affective response to the June 1967 war was because they were persuaded by the highly “manipulative” (Segev, 2005, p. 283) Zionist representation of its events. As will be demonstrated below this representation was constructed specifically for propaganda purposes in order to garner international sympathy (at both the diplomatic and popular levels) for the Israeli position before, during and after the war. Like all propaganda, this representation is a radical simplification of the complex historical forces that lead up to the outbreak of war (Jackall, 1994). My argument is that the Zionist version of the war is historically decontextualized, it omits some events entirely, it wilfully misinterprets others and it polarizes the war’s main protagonists into ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (as opposed to a group of nation-states trying to secure their geopolitical interests in the region). The account that follows is an attempt to more accurately represent the 1967 war so that in subsequent chapters the role played by the disparity between what ‘actually’ happened and what British Jews believed happened played in the Zionist territorialisation of the British Jewish community can be properly determined. As is demonstrated in this chapter, it was precisely this disparity that triggered the intense affective response in the British Jewish community that generated the Zionist territorialisation of the community after the war.
The word ‘actually’ is placed in inverted commas because this section begins from the premise that no historical narrative can ever transparently represent events as they ‘actually’ happened. At best, an historical narrative is a representation of events or an historian’s interpretation of that representation. The historical narrative below is constructed from a range of secondary sources written from different political perspectives – from pro-Palestinian/Arab (Sharabi, 1970), to critical Israeli (Segev, 2005) to Zionist (Morris, 2001). Considering not only the political breadth of these sources but also the crucial significance that the June 1967 war continues to have in contemporary politics, the narratives they each construct contain significant differences. The narrative below negotiates these differences in the following way: where possible it presents facts as they happened (for instance all the accounts agree hostilities between the different armies began between 07.00 and 08.00 on 5th June 1967) and where there is a historiographical debate over an event, or an interpretation of an event, the chapter briefly outlines the spectrum of positions on that event and then, if necessary, makes the case for the most persuasive perspective.

The narrative is organised chronologically and split into the following sections: 1) ‘The Wider Context 1948–1966’, which explains the wider geopolitical dynamics that contributed to the outbreak of the June 1967 war. This section explicitly focuses on the relationship between Syria, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel in this period, setting this in the wider context of the rise of Arab Nationalism in the Arab world and its relationship to Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It also touches on the geo-political dynamics of the Cold War. Section 2 looks at what Oren has called “the Catalysts” (2002, p. 33) i.e. the handful of events that signalled a notable intensification of hostile relations between the above mentioned parties in between November 1966 and May 1967. Section 3 looks at what was known at the time as, the ‘Middle East Crisis’ that occurred between May/June 1967 and directly precipitated the war. Section 4 looks at the war itself and section 5 looks at the military and territorial gains and losses for all the parties involved in the war.
2. The wider context: 1948–1966

“Mutual miscalculation” (Morris, 2001, p. 302) is the dominant explanation of what bought about the 1967 war (Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002; Segev, 2005). Israeli historian Avi Shlaim has written “of all the Arab-Israeli wars, the June 1967 war was the only one that neither side wanted. The war resulted from a crisis slide that neither Israel nor her enemies were able to control.” (cited in Brenchley, 2005, p. 122). Michael Oren uses the following metaphor to describe the complex confluence of factors that came together to precipitate the war: “Much like the hypothetical butterfly that, flapping its wings, gives rise to currents that eventually generates a storm, so, too, might small, seemingly insignificant events spark processes leading ultimately to cataclysm. And just as that butterfly needs a certain context – the earth’s atmosphere, gravity… to produce that tempest, so, too did events prior to June 1967 require specific circumstances in order to precipitate war” (2002, p. 2). These circumstances were, i) the highly complex relationships between Syria, Jordan and Egypt in the postcolonial period, dominated as it was by the political ideology of Arab nationalism. ii) The hostile relationship between the Arab world and the newly founded State of Israel particularly after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. This relationship pivots on two factors: the ideological affront to Arab nationalism caused by the Zionist colonization of Palestine and the injustice of the displacement of Palestinian Arabs from their land and homes. iii) The wider geo-political context, primarily of the Cold War dominated by USA and USSR, but also the ex-colonial powers (Britain and France).

2.1. Inter-Arab relations

One of the myths sustained in Popular Zionism about this period was that ‘the Arabs’ were a homogenous group, driven by anti-Semitism, working in concert to bring about the destruction of the State of Israel and the murder of its Jewish population. Most historical accounts of the diplomatic relations

[71]The Palestinian Nakbah (Catastrophe), the Zionist ‘War of Independence’.
within the Arab world, particularly between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in the period 1948–1966 dispute this, agreeing that their relationship was characterized as much by tension and hostility as it was by more than occasional cooperation (Sharabi, 1970; Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002). For example, as late as May 1967, radical Ba’athist Syria was agitating for revolution in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by detonating a truck full of explosives in the Jordanian border town of Ramtha killing twenty-one Jordanians. As a result, Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with Syria, only to be resumed on 4th June, the day before the June 1967 war began (Mutawi, 1987).

2.1.1. Divisions within the ‘Arab nation’

The major ideological division in the postcolonial Arab world was between the conservative monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan and socialist Arab regimes such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq (between 1958–1961 Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) partially based on their shared political orientations). The socialist Arab states regularly agitated against Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s feudal social structures (Egypt was involved in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen throughout the 1960s). In terms of their location within Cold War geo-politics, Jordan was pro-Western and Syria had strong relationships with the USSR. Egypt’s position is more complex: it received wheat and aid from the United States (in 1962 40% of Egypt’s population was fed by US aid (Oren, 2002, p. 15)). However its military was supplied by the Soviets and during this period it was considered a Soviet diplomatic ally.

Syria’s tensions

Syria was the most radical and unstable of the Arab regimes. Attaining independence from colonial France in 1946, it underwent a number of coups between 1949 and 1970. The doctrinaire socialist Ba’ath party was in power in 1967 (having engineered a coup in 1963). Syria had tense relations with both

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72 See (Thompson, 2009, pp. 304–306) for a detailed account of both the formation and dissolution of the UAR.
Egypt and Jordan throughout the 1960s, regularly goading both through its propaganda machinery that neither were sufficiently committed to Arab nationalism or the Palestinian cause. Of the two, Syria’s relationship with Jordan was arguably poorer, with Syria openly agitating for the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy (e.g. the Ramtha bombing) by funding and arming Palestinian guerrilla organisations (e.g. Yasser Arafat’s el-Fatah) based in Jordan. Syria was strongly supported by the USSR, which increased the diplomatic weight it carried with both its Arab and Israeli neighbours.

**Jordan’s tensions**

Jordan gained independence from the British Empire in 1946. It has since been ruled by the Hashemite dynasty. King Hussein, the King during the 1967 war, acceded to the throne in 1953. As a monarchy Jordan was criticized by Egypt and Syria, not only on ideological grounds but also for its pro-Western orientation in trade and diplomatic affairs (for which it was accused of being in collusion with Imperialism). Another source of tension for Jordan was with its Palestinian refugee population. Between April 1950, when the Hashemite Kingdom annexed the West Bank, and May 1967, 50% of Palestinian refugees lived in Jordan. The Palestinians expected the King to provide a radical solution to their statelessness and dispossession. Hussein was reluctant to pursue a radical strategy and mire his kingdom in a war with Israel that he was not sure was winnable. This lead to occasional Palestinian uprisings within Jordan, which the King often attempted to quash. Hashemite repression of the Palestinians led to Egyptian propaganda claiming that Hussein was not sufficiently committed to the Palestinian cause. In a particularly notable fit of rhetoric in February 1967 Nasser called Hussein, “the whore of Jordan” (Oren, 2002, p. 37).

**Egypt**

By 1956, Egypt had not long seceded from the British Empire and undergone a military coup that had made General Gamal Abdel Nasser president. Nasser was a popular and charismatic leader who, until 1967, could claim to be the leading figurehead of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism has been defined in the following way: “Arab nationalism represents the
Arabs’ consciousness of their specific characteristics as well as their endeavour to build a modern state capable of representing the common will of the [Arab] nation and its constituent parts” (Choueiri, 2000, p. 23). It sought to unite the Arab nations of the Middle East and North Africa and to resist all types of imperialism that attempted to dominate the collective Arab nation. This anti-imperialism mainly focused on Zionism but also on the United States, France, Britain and the USSR. Egyptian tensions with Jordan and Syria are described above.

The Palestinians

The Palestinians are the only Arab people in the postcolonial period not to have achieved statehood. Some 80% of Palestinians were made into refugees by Israel in 1948, and not allowed back into their homes. In May 1967 UNWRA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency – the organisation responsible for administering relief to Palestinian refugees) estimated that there were 1,344, 576 Palestinians refugees registered with them (this does not include Palestinians living in Israel) (Buehring, 1971, p. 38). By this point, the Palestinians were being represented in the Arab world by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), founded in 1964 and led by Ahmed Shuqayri. The PLO’s armed wing, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), primarily a guerrilla force, was 10–15,000 strong. Other Palestinian guerrilla groups emerged in this period most notably el-Fatah, lead by Yasser Arafat. During this period Palestinian politics was funded primarily by the Syrians. The Palestinians most antagonistic relationship within the Arab world was with the Jordanians, who they attributed much of the blame for the loss of Palestine in 1948 (Mutawi, 1987).

2.1.2. Arab cooperation in the 1960s

Despite these divisions, Arab nationalism provided an impetus for Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians to cooperate throughout the 1960s, and this was realised with a degree of success. The 1958 unification of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic is the high point of this cooperation. Another expression of Arab unity was the four Arab Summits that convened
between 1964 and 1967, drawing together the Arab nations in an attempt to instantiate an organisational framework through which Arab cooperation could materialise. One of the largest issues that provided the focus for these summits was the desire to coordinate resistance against Israel. At the first summit in Cairo on 14th January 1964, its delegates agreed to spend $17.5 million to divert water from the River Jordan away from Israel (this was a major source of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours) and $345 million to wage war with Israel. The United Arab Command would also be established, uniting the various Arab armies under Egyptian control.\(^{73}\) It was during this summit that the PLO and PLA were formally established and recognised. The final important example of Arab cooperation, before the immediate build up to the June 1967 war, was the Syrian-Egyptian mutual defence pact in 1966. Oren has argued that, although there was clearly the will within the Arab world to coordinate policy, very little cooperation actually materialised (2002). Despite the divisions within the Arab world, and the failure to produce any substantial policy, these gestures of cooperation concerned the Israelis and contributed to the general atmosphere in the Middle East that produced the crisis that precipitated the June war.

### 2.2. Arab-Israeli tensions in the 1960s

From 1964 onwards the tense relationship that the creation of the State of Israel had provoked with its Arab neighbours since 1948 steadily escalated.\(^{74}\) Oren notes that “an atmosphere of extreme flammability” (2002, p. 32) had developed in the region by 1966. The most flammable relationship was between Israel and Syria. Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel were all engaged in bellicose rhetoric throughout this period but Syria and Israel were the only nations to combine rhetoric with armed force. Arguably, it is their relationship that had the most decisive effect on the outbreak of war.

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\(^{73}\) The UAC failed to actually materialize accept in limited form during the 1967 war.

\(^{74}\) The high point of this tense relationship was the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula with the support of UK and France.
Syria and Israel

Between 1957 and 1962 Israel filed 422 complaints with the UN concerning Syrian attacks on Israel’s northern border. These tensions focused on two issues. The first was the Arab-Israeli conflict over access to the River Jordan’s freshwater supply. The second were the skirmishes that broke out between Israel and Syria over the areas of land that had been de-militarized by the 1949 General Armistice Agreement following the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. In direct contravention of the terms of this agreement, Israel claimed sovereignty over these demilitarized zones (DMZs) and attempted to cultivate the land contained within it. The Syrians claimed that the tractors that the Israelis were sending in were armoured, so responded with gun and artillery fire, not only on the tractors, but also on Israeli settlements close by. Israel would then return fire. These skirmishes intensified between 1962 and 1967. Oren (2002) notes a particularly heavy eruption during November 1964 and Kosut (1968) points to intensifications after a Syrian coup in February 1966, again in October 1966, and once again in early 1967. The other manifestation of Syrian/Israeli animosity was the Syrian funded Palestinian guerrilla (Fedayeen) operations that largely took place on the Jordan/Israel border where the Fedayeens were based. This caused significant tension between Syria and Jordan because Israel would always retaliate with punitive counter-attacks on Jordanian territory.

Fedayeen attacks on Israel

Responsibility for the Fedayeen attacks has been mostly attributed to El Fatah (Kosut, 1968). Between June 1965 and January 1967 Morris estimates there were 122 Fedayeen raids within Israel. Oren notes a severe escalation in the first half of 1967 with 270 raids (2002).

Egypt, Jordan and Israel

During the 1960s neither Jordan nor Egypt was involved in conflagrations with Israel in the way that Syria was. Both Hussein and Nasser were pragmatic and were aware of the cost of drawing Israel into a large military confrontation. Hussein was more conciliatory towards the Israelis than Nasser and throughout the 1960s Jordan held highly secret meetings with
Israel in a tentative attempt to reach a peaceful *modus vivendi* between the two countries (Mutawi, 1987). Hussein also clamped down on the Fedayeens in a bid to appease the Israelis and stop retaliatory raids on Jordanian territory. Nasser and Hussein (particularly Nasser) were keenly aware of the central place that the Palestinian cause had within Arab public opinion. One of Nasser’s major concerns was maintaining the prestige of his position as the figurehead of the Arab world, so he constantly promoted anti-Zionist sentiment in Egyptian propaganda (largely disseminated through his regime’s radio station Voice of the Arabs, listened to across the Middle East) as well as his and Egypt’s commitment to restoring Palestine to Arab hands. So although Nasser felt that a war with Israel in the 1960s was not in Egypt’s interests, his propaganda was designed to suggest otherwise. During the May/June crisis, this propaganda played a significant role in bringing about the war.

Like Egypt, Israel was also keenly aware of the role that propaganda, rhetoric and image-making played in the dynamics of the region. Since 1948, the Zionist state has attempted to create and maintain the image of a regional strong man so that its enemies were deterred from attack (Segev, 2005). Throughout the 1960s, and particularly in the few months leading up to the May/June Crisis, Israel pursued this policy not only with threatening anti-Arab rhetoric, but also with punitive retaliations against Fedayeen attacks, often designed to be disproportionately stronger than the original attack. This disproportionality was, arguably, a key factor in the escalation of hostilities between Israel and its enemies since the mid 1960s. As will become clear in the following section it is this escalation that in turn produced the May/June crisis that precipitated the June War.


*Es-Samu’a*

On 13th November 1966 Israel launched its biggest ‘retaliatory’ raid against a Fedayeen attack to date on the West Bank refugee camp of Es-Samu’a (which the Israelis believed to be an El Fatah base). The IDF had designed it to be a ‘clean’ attack but the Jordanian army (the Arab Legion)
arrived at Es-Samu’a and it turned into a pitch battle that included the Israeli Air Force (IAF). By the end of the operation, thirteen Jordanian soldiers were killed and fifty-four were wounded, three civilians were killed and ninety-six wounded and approximately 120 homes had been destroyed. This was the largest and most deadly fight between Jordan and Israel since 1948 and signalled a change in the comparatively acquiescent relationship the two had enjoyed in the preceding decade. As a result there were Palestinian riots against the Hashemite regime across the West Bank that lasted for eleven days because the Palestinians felt that Hussein was not working sufficiently in their interests. Hussein was incensed that Jordan was persistently being punished for Syrian funded Fedayeen attacks and that Nasser, who claimed to be the leader of the Arab struggle against Israel in his propaganda, had done nothing to support the struggle since 1956. Hussein then accused Nasser of “hiding behind UNEF’s skirts” (Morris, 2001, p. 303). The accusation, the beginning of the intensification of the goading between the Arab nations, stung Nasser and was one of the many factors that contributed to the road to war.

**Flight over Damascus**

Another crucial turning point in Arab-Israeli relations that was a “forerunner of the serious crisis that developed in May” (Kosut, 1968, p. 39) was an aerial dogfight that occurred between the Israeli and Syrian air forces on the northern border on 7th April 1967. Once again Israeli tractors entered the DMZs and the Syrians opened fire. The IDF retaliated and what in the past would have been a limited skirmish developed into a ‘mini-war’ (Oren, 2002, p. 46) that included a total of 130 planes from both sides. Israel won the battle and one of its planes flew a victory loop over Damascus, an action that particularly humiliated the Ba’athist military regime.

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75 UNEF were the United Nations Emergency Force that was stationed on the Egyptian side of the Israel/Egypt border as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1956. They acted as a buffer between the two states.
Israel’s threatening rhetoric

During this period of increased hostility, Israel intensified its threatening rhetoric, particularly against Syria. In an interview on Israel Radio, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said of the Syrians, “if they try to sow unrest on our borders, unrest will come to theirs”, (cited in Mutawi, 1987, p. 92) and in a speech given at a Mapai party forum on 12th May 1967 he says, “In view of the fourteen incidents in the past month alone it is possible that we will adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7th” (cited in Oren, 2002, p. 52).

In the IDF magazine Bamahane, the Israeli chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin is quoted as saying, “The type of reaction adopted against Jordan and Lebanon is applicable only against states that do not favor acts of sabotage mounted from their territory… In Syria the problem is different because the government activates the saboteurs – therefore the objective of the action in Syria is different” (cited in Morris, 2001, p. 304). In the same period, the United Press International reported that a “high Israeli source said Israel would take limited military action designed to topple the Damascus army regime if Syrian terrorists continued sabotage raids inside Israel” (ibid). Morris claims the source was Aharon Yariv, the head of the IDF’s military intelligence. Of this threatening rhetoric, Oren argued that it was designed to deter the Syrian regime from continuing to agitate against Israel, “but only succeeded in multiplying the chances for [a confrontation]” (2002, p. 53). This is supported by Mutawii who claims that this rhetoric lead the Arab regimes to believe that, “it would not be long before Israel attacked Syria with the aim of overthrowing the Syrian government” (1987, p. 92).

Soviet misinformation

The suspicion that Israel wanted to invade Syria was confirmed at the end of April 1967 when the USSR told Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt’s National Assembly, that Israeli troops were amassing on the border with Syria and were poised to attack. The Soviets had first claimed this in October 1966, and then again in November and in January 1967, but the aerial dogfight between Israel and Syria on 7th April and the escalation in Israel’s anti-Syria rhetoric finally gave the claim some credence. The claim was, however, false. During this period there had never been an IDF mobilization on the border,
something the Israelis had tried to prove in earnest to the UN and the Soviet ambassador in Israel (the Soviet ambassador declined to inspect the border). Historians have speculated as to why the Soviets passed on this misinformation to the Egyptians, but until the relevant Russian archives are de-classified only speculation is possible (Morris, 2001, p. 305). Whether the Egyptians believed the Soviet claim or not, they acted on it and used it as justification in their propaganda. It is their actions as a result of the Soviet misinformation that precipitated the May/June Crisis that started the war.

4. The May/June Crisis: Brinkmanship and Miscalculations

Most historians have claimed that the May/June Crisis was bought about by a series of 'miscalculations' and was unintended by either side (Brenchley, 2005; Morris, 2001; Mutawi, 1987; Segev, 2005). These miscalculations occurred as a result of over-zealous brinkmanship designed to, on the Egyptian side, shift the regional status quo in their favour and by the Israelis to maintain a status quo. By May 1967, Nasser’s reputation was flagging at home, where the economy was suffering, and in the Arab world, which throughout the late 1966–mid-1967 period repeatedly berated Nasser for claiming to be the head of the Arab Nation while standing passively aside during Israel’s attacks on Syria and Jordan (Mutawi, 1987). Nasser needed a propaganda victory against Israel to restore his image. More than this, Nasser also wished to shift the strategic balance of power in the region, which, the Arabs felt, had favoured the Israelis as a result of the post-Suez Crisis status quo. It was these two factors that drove Nasser to take the actions he did in the May/June crisis as opposed to a genuine desire for war (Sharabi, 1970; Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002; Brenchley, 2005). There is strong evidence to suggest that Nasser did not think the Egyptian army was in sufficient shape to initiate an offensive (a substantial proportion of the army was fighting in Yemen’s civil war) (Mutawi, 1987). The factors that drove the Israeli actions

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76 Both Oren and Morris recount the same story in their narratives disputing whether the Egyptians believed this misinformation: Egyptian General Fawzi flies over the Israel/Syria border on a trip to Syria and sees that there are no IDF concentrations. He tells Nasser this information, who has had similar reports from the US Embassy and the CIA, but Nasser chooses to ignore it.
during the crisis were their desire to maintain the strategic balance of power in their favour and also to maintain their ‘deterrent capability’. The historical evidence suggests that the Israeli cabinet was divided about going to war until the very last day of the crisis (Oren, 2002; Segev, 2005).

**Egypt’s remilitarization of the Sinai**

The first “serious miscalculation” (Brenchley, 2005, p. 17) was on 15th May 1967 when Egypt re-militarized the Sinai desert and thus the Egypt/Israel border, which had been de-militarized as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1956. Egypt argued that it did this in response to the alleged IDF build up on the Syrian border. Oren argues that the remilitarization of the Sinai was “pure propaganda”, supporting this claim by a number of statements Nasser made in the press at the time e.g. “Egypt has no aggressive designs, but neither would it suffer any Israeli aggression against Syria” (Oren, 2002, p. 59). Israel mobilised 70,000 troops in response (Segev, 2005).

**The removal of UNEF**

On 19th May Nasser made another ‘miscalculation’ (Brenchley, 2005). He asked U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to remove UNEF from the Israel/Egypt border. UNEF had been stationed there as a peacekeeping force since 1956. Both Syria and Jordan had goaded Nasser for allowing UNEF to be stationed on Egyptian territory. Brenchley (2005) argues that despite asking U Thant to remove UNEF, Nasser did not actually expect him to remove it. What Nasser hoped was that the request be debated in the UN and as a result the Security Council would pressure Israel to remove its troops from the Syrian border. Nasser would keep UNEF where it was thereby scoring a diplomatic victory against Israel. Instead, U Thant tried to call Nasser’s bluff promising to remove UNEF. Rather than lose face, Nasser agreed and on 20th May UNEF left their post. At this point, Brenchley argues, “it seems clear that [Nasser] was not really seeking a war with Israel”

77 The diplomatic community at the time saw this decision as a mistake on U Thant’s part. He later defended himself with the argument that UNEF could only ever be deployed with Egypt’s consent and once that was withdrawn, the force had no legal basis for being there. Israel had, in fact, refused to allow a UNEF force to be deployed on its side of the border in 1956 so the UN never deployed one.
but he had once again, “miscalculated” (Brenchley, 2005, p. 19). The move gave Israel cause for concern and was reported in the international press, including the British newspapers.

**Closing the Straits of Tiran**

The next miscalculation, this time “fatal” (ibid.), was Nasser’s decision on 21\textsuperscript{st} May to blockade the Straits of Tiran to any shipping carrying ‘strategic’ materials to Israel (Nasser claimed Egypt had mined the entrance).\textsuperscript{78} The Israelis claimed that open Straits were vital to trade interests. This claim is undermined by Minister of the Interior Shapira’s proclamation in a cabinet meeting that if the blockade took two years to undo, “that’s not a bad thing” (cited in Segev, 2005, p. 239). In the same meeting Rabin also announced that if trade-ships travelling through the straits were accompanied by an American escort, the Egyptians would not stop them (Segev, 2005, p. 240). Nevertheless, Israeli propaganda at the time represented the decision as a “noose tightening around their neck” (Morris, 2001, p. 309). Since 1956, Israel had persistently claimed that the blockading of the Straits of Tiran would constitute a *casus belli*. As late as 19\textsuperscript{th} May, Israel was re-iterating this claim (Sharabi, 1970). By blockading the straits Nasser not only scored a propaganda victory, restoring some of his lost prestige (according to Oren, the Arab world was “elated” (2002, p. 84)) but had also begun to shift the regional balance of power into Egypt’s favour. Segev writes that in Israel this action made the Israeli public think a Middle Eastern war would happen “almost certainly” (2005, p. 238).

**Anti-Israeli Arab Propaganda and its effect on Israel**

Throughout this period in-fighting between the Arab States all but stopped and the anti-Israel propaganda from all sides escalates. The following are a selection of Arab propaganda statements from the period of the crisis:

\textsuperscript{78} The Straits of Tiran is the eight-mile wide opening into the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea, lying in between the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas.
“The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.”

Nasser (cited in Mutawi, 1987, p. 95)

“Arab masses, this is your day. Rush to the battlefield… Let them know that we shall hang the last imperialist soldier with the entrails of the last Zionist.”

Damascus Radio broadcast (cited in Morris, 2001, p. 310)

“It is difficult to discern whether such propaganda was intended as written or whether, like the Israeli anti-Syrian propaganda, it was to boost their own country’s morale and deter the enemy from starting a war. The weight of historical evidence demonstrating that Nasser did not want a war would suggest the latter. Nevertheless, this propaganda could be heard in Israel. Coupled with Egypt’s recent manoeuvrings, this propaganda had a decisive effect on the Israeli public’s affective disposition at the end of May, who were now convinced that the Arabic armies were about to invade with the explicit purpose of murdering the Jewish population. Edited excerpts of Arab propaganda were also disseminated internationally by Zionist organisations as part of the Israeli propaganda effort to portray Israel in a sympathetic light. On 25th May, Richard Helms, the Director of the CIA, noted “an explosive growth of Israeli anxiety” (Segev, 2005, p. 257). On 23rd May Yitzhak Rabin suffered a nervous breakdown from a sense of responsibility for putting Israel into this situation. The Israeli population began to hoard food, dig trenches in the street and Rabbis began to consecrate public parks in case they need to be used for mass graves (Segev, 2005, p. 286). Segev argues that, “this was fear of destruction and its source was rooted in the Holocaust” (2005, p. 282). Segev also notes how the idea that Israel’s Jewish population faced destruction a at the hands of the Arab armies began to appear in Israeli cabinet discussions about the crisis. For instance, in a

79 The Zionist propaganda effort and the affectivity it triggered is outlined in more detail in Chapter 6 but it will be useful to touch upon it here in order to demonstrate the decisive effect such an atmosphere had on the unfolding of the May/June crisis.
Security Cabinet meeting held on 23rd May 1967, Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir says, “we are talking about our very existence here” (Segev, 2005, p. 240).

The idea that Israel faced an existential crisis and that this idea was rooted in the memory of the Holocaust, played a decisive role in the Zionist territorialisation of the British Jewish community. This will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter. What is important to note here is that the spectre of the Holocaust was also a central dynamic in the decision making process of the Israeli elite during this period. In Segev’s account this issue split Israeli decision-makers three ways. Some (eg. Zerah Warahftig, Minister of Religious Affairs and Pincas Sapir, Minster of Finance) sincerely believed that the Jewish people faced destruction in Israel and argued as much in cabinet meetings. Some army generals including General Avraham Yaffe and Quartermaster General Matityahu Peled did not believe that this destruction was possible but used the idea as a rhetorical strategy to persuade Eshkol and Rabin to go to war to further Israel’s strategic interests. The third group (including Eshkol and Yigal Allon) did not believe Israel faced an existential threat, nor did they use the Holocaust as a rhetorical strategy (Segev, 2005). They did, however, realise its value for propaganda and diplomatic purposes, and the idea that Israel faced an existential threat was put into the service of both. For example, Moshe Biton, the director of the North American department in the Israeli foreign office instructed the Israeli Embassy in Washington to coordinate a pro-Israeli publicity campaign that evoked the Holocaust targeting the American Jewish public. No such directive was issued to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain or to the Israeli Embassy in the UK but a wealth of propaganda material exists in the archives of these institutions that strongly suggests both operated according to the same principle (see Chapter 6 for more details). Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban also raised such fears during his intensive shuttle diplomacy in the last days of the crisis. For example, in Washington Eban was instructed by the Israeli cabinet to describe the atmosphere in Israel as apocalyptic and that the country was facing a “life or death” situation (Segev, 2005, p. 254). Neither Eban nor Lyndon B. Johnson believed this claim. In fact, not long before Eban
flew to Washington US intelligence had filed a report on the potential prospects if Israel went to war with its Arab neighbours. The report was prophetic, predicting that terrorist activity would lead to a war; that Israel would win in six to ten days; that Israel was militarily superior to the combined Arab armies and that Israel would destroy the Egyptian air-force, occupy Sinai, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (Segev, 2005, pp. 252–3). Eshkol, Rabin and Dayan (who had been bought into the Israeli cabinet as Defence Minister to great fanfare on 1st June 1967, to assuage the hysteria emerging in Israeli society) more or less concurred with these findings, though the idea of occupying territory only became concrete after the war started. In cabinet meetings, Dayan and Rabin advocated starting a war, quickly and as a surprise, in order to strengthen/maintain Israel’s deterrent capacity and keep a favourable Israeli status quo not because they believed Israel was facing a genuine existential threat (Segev, 2005).

The fact that the Israelis who made the decision to go to war had surmised there was no existential threat and the fact that they actively sought to promote the idea both diplomatically and through their propaganda machinery around the globe has important consequences for this thesis. For instance, all the British Jews interviewed for this study believed Israel and its population was facing annihilation, even those who were anti-Zionist. Moreover, in their interviews they demonstrate that they had no sense that this may have been propaganda either in 1967 or at the time of being interviewed (anti-Zionists David and Brian differ in this respect). That they believed Israeli Jews faced genocide was the key factor determining the quality and intensity of the British Jewish affective responses to the war as well as the politics and shifts in identity that this response mobilised. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

By the 4th June Eshkol is finally persuaded that Israel should start the war in order to maintain Israel’s deterrent capabilities and to shift the status quo into Israel’s favour. The strategic objectives Israel set itself was the re-opening of the Straits of Tiran and the destruction of the Egyptian army. The idea of occupying Eastern Jerusalem, (including the Old City), the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights was not an immediate military objective at this point. Rabin and Dayan set ‘H-hour’ for between 07.00 and 07.30 the following morning. By this point the IDF had been fully mobilized for ten days with 275,000 men, 1,100 tanks and 200 planes poised to attack.

By the end of May and the beginning of June, hostile relations between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians had begun to cool. On 30th May 1967 Nasser and Hussein signed the Egypt-Jordanian Defence Pact that agreed that if either were attacked both parties would defend each other. The pact endorsed an idea mooted in previous Arab summits – that Jordan’s army come under Egyptian control. On 1st June 1967 Egyptian General Riad arrived in Jordan to lead its army. The pact also signalled a rapprochement in the relationship between Hussein and the Palestinians. On 4th June Jordan and Syria re-established diplomatic relations. Of this moment of rare Arab unity Oren argues, “in spite of the bitter of differences between them, the divisions of opinion in each, Arab nations were united as at no time in their postcolonial history. There could now be no doubt: an Arab world existed and could act” (2002, p. 163).

According to the empirical evidence gathered for Chapter 6, the British Jewish perception of the various parties’ strategic intentions during the Middle East Crisis was that ‘the Arabs’ (little distinction is made between the different parties) wanted to go to war in order to destroy the State of Israel and its Jewish population, whilst the Israelis had no choice but to defend themselves from the oncoming genocide. As the historical account given in this chapter demonstrates this perception does not accurately reflect the events as they

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80 This account of Israeli intentions at the start of the war is provided by a close reading of the minutes of Israeli cabinet meeting minutes during this period by both Segev and Oren. It slightly nuances Sharabi’s (and other Palestinian) claims that the war was an expression of Zionist colonialist and expansionist tendencies. That is not to say that Zionism did not have these tendencies. The desire to occupy ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’ (the biblical names for the areas around the Jordan river including the West Bank) had been present in Revisionist Zionism long before the war started, and this tendency is explicitly introduced into Israeli decision making with the inclusion of Menachem Begin (leading light of Revisionist Zionism in the 1960s) into the emergency cabinet formed a few days before the outbreak of war. Moreover the IDF had long drawn up contingency plans to annex Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank, it is just at this point there were no plans to enact them.
happened. The weight of evidence presented in the historical literature suggests that despite the claims in their propaganda neither Egypt, Syria nor Jordan wanted a war (and if the Palestinians did they were in no position to initiate one), let alone a genocidal war that would bring about the destruction of the Israeli state. What Nasser wanted, through a series of carefully orchestrated diplomatic initiatives, was to boost his flagging status in the Arab world and to shift the geo-political status quo back into Egypt’s favour. Nasser’s lack of finesse in executing this plan was one of the reasons Egypt found itself dragged into a war it had no intention of starting. Hussein was even less favourably disposed to starting a war with Israel (let alone exterminating its Jewish population) because Hussein believed such a war was unwinnable. The reason Hussein signed the defence pact with Egypt was that, by the beginning of June, he knew a war was inevitable and if he did not fight on the Arab side, the Palestinians refugees residing in Jordan would revolt and possibly drag Jordan into a civil war. Hussein would also be further alienated from the Arab world (Mutawi, 1987). There is less evidence about Syria’s intentions before the war but the fact Syria does not aid Jordan during the war nor begin a offensive of its own (as demonstrated below) would suggest that bellicose rhetoric was little more than empty propaganda. Throughout the May/June crisis, the key decision-makers in the Israeli cabinet knew that at no point was Israel being threatened with extinction, but adopted this line of argument to garner international sympathy both at the popular and diplomatic levels. Israel (and not the Arabs) went on to start the war in order to maintain not only a Middle Eastern status quo that favoured their strategic interests but also a strong man image that would deter their neighbours from attempting future attacks. Despite the anti-Zionist/Palestinian claim that Israelis started the war to occupy the territory it had by the war’s end, there is no historical evidence to suggest occupation was the aim by the end of the Middle East Crisis. (However, that the strategic goals change throughout the war is unsurprising: Revisionist Zionist expansionism was always a potentiality within the ideological assemblage that is Zionism, that, as will be demonstrated below, is only operationalized during the unfolding of the war).
5. The War

Day 1

The war started on 5th June between 07.00 and 08.00 with a surprise Israeli air strike on the Egyptian air force in its airfields. Both at the time, and in the subsequent historical literature, Zionists have argued that this strike was ‘pre-emptive’. This claim was one of the biggest controversies of the war: in terms of its diplomatic consequences at the time, in terms of the propaganda war both sides were waging during the war and in terms of the ensuing historiographical debates. The reason that the ‘pre-emptive’ claim is controversial is simple – ultimately it ascribes responsibility to who started the war. Did Nasser’s role in the May/June crisis precipitate the war or did Israel purposefully misinterpret Nasser’s “sabre-rattling” (Jeffrey, 1967, p. 11) as a pretext to start a war that would serve its own expansionist interests? There are different positions in histories of this dispute. As demonstrated above both, Oren and Shlaim argue that the war began as a result of a diplomatic crisis escalating out of the control of the parties involved – that the crisis took on a life of its own. Brenchley argues that Nasser had put Israel into a position that justified a ‘pre-emptive’ attack: “Israel had for a decade warned that an Egyptian blockade of Elath [sic] would bring war. Their decision that it should be they who made the pre-emptive strike must be adjudged to have been consistent with these warnings” (2005, p. 40). Sharabi (1970) argues that the war was the expression of Zionism’s colonial, expansionist, aggressive tendencies, explicitly claiming that Israel was the aggressor. Zionist propaganda at the time argued that Israel, being threatened with destruction, had no choice but to start the war as an act of self-defence. The Zionist version is also the dominant view of British Jewry (see Chapter 6). The affective impact of this interpretation will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. What is important to note at this point is that the Israeli decision to strike, their representation of that strike as ‘pre-emptive’ and its significant military success played an instrumental role in persuading British Jewry that the ‘Zionist Jew’ really was as daring and heroic as Zionists had always claimed. The myth of the ‘heroic Jew’ is one of the central pivots.
around which the post-67 Zionist territorialisation of British Jewry turns (see Chapter 7).

In strategic terms, the Israeli air-strike was an enormous success. Within 100 minutes 286 Egyptian airplanes (of 420) had been destroyed. At 10.35 IAF commander Motti Hod reports to Rabin that “the Egyptian air force has ceased to exist” (cited in Oren, 2002, p. 176). Already Israel had nearly total air supremacy, and an Israeli victory was now almost a certainty. As a result, Ezer Weizman, the IDF deputy Chief of Staff, told his wife that Israel have all but won the war (Segev, 2005). At 08.15 the ground war began and the IDF entered the Sinai Peninsula. At 10.00 Jordan started limited shelling along the Israeli border. Dayan, who throughout the war acted as Israel’s chief decision maker (often going over Eshkol’s head), did not want to open a second front with Jordan, but by 12.30 felt Israel had no choice and ordered the IAF to attack Jordan’s airbases. The small Jordanian air force was quickly destroyed. Dayan then ordered two IDF brigades to assault Jenin, in the West Bank and the areas around Jerusalem. By 16.30 the IDF had captured Jerusalem’s Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives, Al-Tur, Government House (which had been used as UN offices since 1948) and Sur Baher and Rafah in the Gaza strip. At 14.30 Syria began to shell Israel’s settlements on its northern border. Dayan did not want to open a third front, but again ordered the IAF to attack Syrian air force positions eventually destroying two-thirds of Syria’s air power. By the evening Israel had captured Southern Jerusalem and the whole Gaza strip excluding Gaza City where the IDF encountered formidable resistance from the PLA. Kosut called the Israeli ground offensive ‘crushing’ (1970, p. 74). This can be evidenced by Israel’s impressive military gains. However, it is important to note that the majority of the accounts of the war, notably Oren’s and Mutawi’s, use evidence, including IDF reports, that record the spirited resistance of the Arab soldiers on all fronts. This is important for this thesis because a significant element of the Popular Zionist discourse of the war is that the Arab soldiers were weak and cowardly and were easily overrun by the heroic and mighty IDF. The reasons for the Arab loss will be discussed below, but it is important to note here that the historical
evidence strongly suggests that this image of the Arab soldier during the war is an orientalist misrepresentation within Popular Zionism (Said, 1970).

Throughout this first day propaganda raged on both sides. In the morning Dayan felt it important that Israel maintain a fog of war that portrayed Israel as the victims according to the following logic: “As long as the world thought Israel was defending itself and fighting for its life, there would be no pressure from the outside to stop the attack” (Segev, 2005, p. 338). The anxiety felt by the Israeli public was tremendous as a result. However, given how inextricably bound the IDF was (and continues to be) to the other parts of Israeli society (it is a civilian army and Israeli society was relatively small), the early Israeli gains could not be kept from the public for long. At 12.00 Israeli Radio announced that 120 Egyptian planes had been destroyed, with Israeli newspaper Ma’Ariv printing this statistic in their third edition. At 15.00 Dayan informs the editors of three major Israeli newspapers that Israel had destroyed 400 Arab aircraft and Rabin and Hod announced as much on Israeli radio at 02.00 the following morning (Segev, 2005). As will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters this information was quickly taken up by the international press, so that British Jewry became aware of the enormous Israeli gains by the end of the first day. Interestingly the Arab side adopted an alternative propaganda strategy to Dayan, reporting Arab victories as late as 22.00 on the first day. This had no effect on British Jewry but frightened the Israeli public and confused the Arab armies who could not tally what they are hearing on Arab radio stations with what they were experiencing on the battle field. Arab propaganda became a real strategic hindrance to the Arab armies throughout the rest of the war.

Day 2

At 02.20 on 6th June, Israel launched an offensive on Jerusalem, with the express intention of capturing the Old City. According to Oren and Segev, this decision had been made by the Israeli security cabinet the night before in the excitement of the first day’s military victories. The goal Israel had set itself when it started the war was the destruction of the Egyptian army in order to strengthen its position within the Middle East and deter Arab armies from
continuing hostilities on Israel’s border whether that be border skirmishes, guerilla attacks or war. By the end of the first night, the security cabinet felt that Israel’s performance in the war thus far had created an historic opportunity to capture East Jerusalem. In doing this they could reunite Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, which, by 1967, was a dream at the centre of Zionist ideology.81 As will become clear below Israeli territorial gains in the June war proceeded in a similar fashion. On the eve of the war, Israel had not set out to capture Jerusalem or occupy the West Bank, and the Golan Heights (a limited occupation of the Sinai including Gaza fits in with their strategic goals), but the way events of the war unfolded in the Israelis favour meant that the IDF’s strategic goals changed on a daily basis.

By 05.25, King Hussein knew of Jordan’s losses and the severe effect this had on the chances of successfully defending Jerusalem from the Israeli army. As a result he sent four messages to Israel requesting a ceasefire, which arrived in Israel at 08.00. The Israelis ignored these requests. At 07.00, Syria began an offensive on the northern border with a feint that was repelled by the kibbutzniks living in the northern settlements. At this point, Dayan was still resistant to opening up a third front. By 10.30 Jenin and Latrun on the West Bank had been captured and later that afternoon Ramallah was also under Israeli control. In the Sinai, Israel continues its successful advance and the Egyptian Army began to retreat, under orders from the Egyptian high command. This was an agonizing process: for instance soldiers stationed at Sharm El Sheik, located at the most southern point of the Sinai peninsula had to flee to Suez 180 miles away. Most of this journey was undertaken on foot because their vehicles had run out of fuel. The water also would not have lasted. The retreat became chaotic and desperate – heavily contributing to one of Popular Zionism’s most enduring images of the conflict, the ‘backwards’ Arab armies.

81 It is important to note that Jerusalem had not always occupied such a central and affectively charged position within Zionist discourse. Pre-1948 neither Herzl, Weizmann or Ben Gurion felt Jerusalem was the most suitable option for the capital city for a Zionist state, as it represented superstition against the Jewish modernity that Zionism was trying to carve out in the Middle East. According to Laqueur, “their emotional attachment was not overwhelming” (1972, p. xxii).
There was a significant development in Arab propaganda on the second day of the war. Arab radio began to explain its defeats by accusing the Israeli army of receiving support from the US and British armies. This was untrue. Lyndon B Johnson calls this ‘The Big Lie’ and American and British diplomats at the UN vehemently denied the claim. The immediate effect is that seven of the Arabic oil producing nations stopped supplying USA and Britain with oil until August 1967, when ‘the Big Lie’ was disproved. By the afternoon of the second day the Israeli media are reporting Israeli military achievements “joyful[ly]” (Segev, 2005, p. 358). As early as 4am the BBC announced the war would be over soon.

Day 3

The 7th June was arguably the most significant day for Zionism with the capture of Eastern Jerusalem and the Old City. By 1967, Jerusalem occupied a central position within Zionist discourse, signifying the ancient Jewish claim to ‘Eretz Israel’, the perceived spiritual centre of the Jewish religion, and political Zionism’s desired capital city for the State of Israel. This polyvalency exerted tremendous affective force across, not only the Zionist assemblage, but also the diasporic Jewish assemblage. The Israeli capture of East Jerusalem was arguably the most important element in Popular Zionist representations of the June 1967 war. The affective force that Jerusalem and the capture of its Eastern section by the Israeli state had on British Jewry will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. However, in briefly sketching the details of the capture of the Old City as part of the narrative of the war the following sub-section will touch upon the affective reaction of the IDF and the Israeli public in order to communicate how significant the event was for Jews and why it had such a tremendous effect on the British Jewish community.

In the early morning of 7th June, King Hussein requested another ceasefire, which Israel again rejected. The Israeli leadership knew that the IDF had to act quickly if it was to be successful in capturing East Jerusalem before it accepted the terms of the ceasefire that the UN was trying to impose throughout the war. At 06.00 the IDF opened fire on the Old City’s Muslim
Quarter. At 09.45 the army bombarded Lion’s Gate and entered the Old City. By 10.00 the IDF had entered al-Haram al-Sharif (Arabic for ‘The Noble Sanctuary’)/Har Ha-Bayit (Hebrew for ‘The Temple Mount’), the site that contains the Western Wall and the Dome of the Rock; both have tremendous religious significance for Judaism and Islam respectively, and therefore this area continues to be the most contentious of the Palestine/Israel conflict. By this point the Jordanian army had retreated, with the exception of a handful of snipers. This put the Old City in Israeli control.

IDF intelligence officer, Arik Akhmon described the following scene when he arrived at the Western Wall: “There you are on a half-track after two days of fighting, with shots still firing in the air and suddenly you enter this wide open space\(^2\) that everyone had seen before in pictures, and though I’m not religious, I don’t think there was a man who wasn’t overwhelmed with emotion. Something special had happened” [My emphasis] (quoted in Oren, 2002, p. 245). Ezer Weizmann recollects an affective response across his body: “We approach the Kotel and I feel my heart and my blood and my breath are pounding and coming faster and faster. I have no control. This is the history of my people, breathing here its breath of thousands of years.” (Segev, 2005, p. 379) Mordechai Gur, the leader of an IDF paratrooper squadron, writes about how this affective response was a collective one when he describes the Israeli soldiers’ response to capturing the Temple Mount: “Hugging, yelling, overwhelmed, slapping each other on the back. Laughing, shouting, hugging again. I feel at home here. The object of our laughing – the Temple Mount! Mount Moriah. Abraham and Isaac. The temple. The Zealots, the Macabees, Bar Kokhba, the Romans and the Greeks. They all tumbled together in my mind. But the feeling steady and deeper than anything. We are on the Temple Mount! The Temple Mount is ours!” (Segev, 2005, p. 367).

\(^2\)Akhmon is not historically accurate here. The space in front of the Western Wall only became ‘wide open’ on 11\(^{th}\) June 1967, after the IDF destroyed the 135 homes standing in front of it and displaced between 650–1,000 Arabs who lived in them (an elderly woman died during this process). (Masalha, 2003, pp. 189–195; Segev, 2005, p. 400)
All three of these accounts point to the affectivity flowing across the Zionist soldiers surging past a ‘critical threshold of intensity’.\textsuperscript{83} for instance, in Akhmon – “I don’t think there was a man who wasn’t overwhelmed with emotion. Something special had happened”. Gur also described the troops as being overwhelmed and the feeling being “steady and deeper than anything”. Both Weizmann and Gur ascribe meaning to this surge of affect by situating the IDF’s capture of Jerusalem within Zionism’s highly specific reading of Jewish biblical history that emphasizes ‘heroic’ and warrior-like individuals and stories (the Zealots, the Macabees and Bar Kohba).

Segev writes about a change in social relations between soldiers deriving from this surge in intensity. He describes how the soldiers who arrived at the wall put on tefilin and began “praying with great intensity and extraordinary devotion… each Jew bound to every other Jew. Whole groups, swaying clusters of hands and feet and heads and bodies… some were nailed to the spot, perhaps not even feeling the tears rolling down their cheeks” (Segev, 2005, p. 379). What Segev is describing here is a Deleuzo-Guattarian Body-without-Organs, when a surge in intensity across an assemblage re-organises its constituent elements in a de-hierarchized fashion so that affect flows across the assemblage undisturbed.\textsuperscript{84} The phenomenological experience for a singular element within the assemblage when it becomes-Body-without-Organs is, in the words used by one of the British Jews interviewed for this thesis when describing what the effects of the Israeli victory on the British Jewish community, that of being “all joined up” (Jeremy, p. 414). The Body-without-Organs cannot be sustained for a long period of time. However, once it re-forms the configuration has changed from what it was before undergoing this intensive affective process. The political and

\textsuperscript{83} As is explained in Chapter 6, the idea of affectivity surging passed a ‘critical threshold of intensity’ is taken from DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze’s \textit{Difference and Repetition} (1968 (a)) in his book \textit{Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy} (2002). In this reading, DeLanda argues that what causes a change in the formal constitution of an assemblage is the intensity of affect that flows across it surging past a critical threshold.

\textsuperscript{84} According to Deleuze and Guattari, the normative organisation of the assemblages that exist within the cultures of industrial capitalism (in both its liberal and social democratic variants) is that of being ‘oedipalised’, i.e. a hierarchical organisation of the assemblage’s elements that disperses the flows of affect in the interests of the elements at the top of the hierarchy – the State, or the Capitalist depending on the historical formation of the society in a given moment.
ethical consequences of such a re-configuration will be discussed in Chapter 6. Suffice to say here that the capturing of Jerusalem had an extraordinary effect on the Israeli public (the Israeli poet Natan Alterman describes the Israeli people as being “drunk with joy” (ibid.)).

By 12.15 on 7th June the IDF had taken Sharm El Sheik, the coastal town overlooking the Straits of Tiran and shortly after Dayan declared the Gulf of Aqaba an international waterway (thus overturning Nasser’s decision to close it to Israel shipping). On 7th June, the Egyptian army was still retreating chaotically across the Sinai. By the evening of 7th June the whole of the West Bank was in Israeli control: Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and Jericho had fallen as had all the four crossings of the Jordan River. The fear of an Israeli occupation of the West Bank had prompted tens of thousands of Palestinian villagers to flee. Major hostilities between the Jordanian and Israeli armies had ceased by this point. Contrary to the Popular Zionist version of events an IDF report claims the Jordanians fought with “courage” and “determination” (Oren, 2002, p. 257).

**Day 4**

On 8th June 1967, fighting was still taking place in Sinai despite the retreat of the Egyptian army. By this point the IDF had estimated that 70% of the Egyptian army’s ‘hardware’ had been destroyed and that 11,000 Egyptian soldiers had crossed the Suez canal and 20,000 were stranded without water. Muhammad Ahmad Khamis, the communications officer of the Sixth Division of the Egyptian army, describes what the Sinai looked like on the fourth day of the war: “It was a horrible sight. The broken pieces of the army strewn over the sand… Burnt out tanks… Destroyed vehicles… charred bodies that looked like statues” (cited in Oren, 2002, p. 273). On the Syrian front, the Syrian army continued to shell Israel’s northern settlements, but as long as the IDF was still fighting in Sinai, Dayan did not want to open a third front. The Israeli cabinet discussed invading Syria and occupying the Golan Heights for the first time on this day. The reason for Israel occupying the Golan was strategic, as opposed to the ideological reasons for occupying East Jerusalem: in the Syria/Israel conflagrations of the previous decade the
Syrians were able to use the high ground of the Golan to their strategic advantage. An Israeli occupation would also safeguard their interest in the source of the Jordan River. During discussions about the Golan Heights on 8th June, the cabinet was split: both Rabin and Yigal Allon wanted to invade Syria (although Rabin was more reluctant), as did Eshkol who, during his career, had been personally involved with the water issue in Northern Israel. Dayan, however, continued to resist the idea and so no final decision was taken. By the end of 8th June, Israel, Jordan and Egypt had accepted the terms of a UN ceasefire, and fighting ceased on these fronts.

Day 5
At 06.00 on 9th June, Dayan ordered the IDF to initiate hostilities with Syria with the strategic goal of occupying the Golan Heights. This decision contradicted the position he had taken about attacking Syria up until that point and was made without Eshkol’s approval, infuriating the Israeli Prime Minister. The attack began at 09.40. Despite the fact that fighting was fierce and bloody, Israel managed to take Syrian positions eight miles from the border by the end of the day. On the Egyptian front, the whole of Sinai was under Israeli control (apart from Port Fu’ad) by the same time. The Egyptian propaganda machinery could no longer disguise the scale of the Arab loss from the Egyptian public and as a result the public began to turn on Nasser. At 18.30 Nasser was forced to resign, blaming American and British military aid to Israel for Egypt’s losses. His resignation devastated the Egyptian people, who, on hearing his resignation speech, poured out onto the street in their thousands demanding he stay in power.\(^85\) Nasser then withdrew his resignation.

Day 6
By 10th June, the only fighting still occurring was on the Golan Heights. By the end of the morning the Syrian command thought that the IDF had taken Quneitra (the largest population centre in the Golan) and so ordered the

\(^85\) It would be instructive, but beyond the scope of this thesis, to analyse the collective affective response of the Egyptian people to the Arab loss manifested in moments such as this, and the effect it had on Arab Nationalism on the plane of the popular as a result.
Syrian army to retreat and protect Damascus from an Israeli invasion. During the retreat 4,000 Syrian soldiers fled to Lebanon, 3,000 fled to Jordan, and 95,000 civilians fled the Golan. By this point the global perception was that Israel wanted to invade Damascus (Oren, 2002, p. 294). As a result the USSR threatened to intervene militarily and severed all diplomatic ties with Israel. There was intense international pressure for Israel to observe a UN ceasefire, which Dayan ignored instead allowing David Elazar (head of the Northern Command) more time to secure the Israeli occupation of the Golan. By 12.30 Israeli forces had arrived in Quneitra to find it empty of soldiers and civilians. The Israelis were now in full control of the Golan Heights. Israeli objectives had been achieved so Dayan accepted the UN ceasefire, which became operational at 18.00. The hostilities were officially over.

5.1. Israel’s victory/the Arab’s loss

One of the aspects of the war accurately represented within Popular Zionist discourse is the scale of the Israeli victory. Occupying the Sinai, the Golan Heights and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) added 42,000 square miles to Israel’s territory. This meant that Israel had grown roughly three and a half times in size since 5th June 1967 (Oren, 2002, p. 307). The comparative number of fatalities for both sides was similarly disproportionate: the maximum estimate for Arab fatalities is 22,450 compared to 800 for the Israelis, hence the Arabs suffered nearly thirty times more than the Israelis (Segev, 2005). Egypt had also lost 85% of its Soviet supplied military hardware, which cost approximately $2 billion. Taking into account that the war lasted six days, the Popular Zionist representation of a stunning Israeli victory compared to a devastating Arab loss is supported by the statistics.

What Popular Zionism misrepresents, however, are the reasons for the Arab loss, which is explained as a result of an essential Arab backwardness (see Chapter 7). A similar orientalism is reproduced in some of the historical literature, for example: “the Six Day War was in all essentials a clockwork war carried out by the IDF against three relatively passive, ineffective Arab armies” [my emphasis] (Morris, 2001, p. 313). There is substantial historical
evidence (including IDF reports) to demonstrate that Arab armies were not passive (Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002). The Arab armies, were however, rendered ineffective by a number of factors, both internal and external. The most important of these was Israeli air supremacy, achieved as a result of the Israeli strike that began the war and which severely disabled the Arab armies by robbing them of the necessary air cover to carry out defensive operations. Another major factor was that the Arabs were not a unified side in the way that Arab nationalism presented itself or that British Jews still imagine. Despite the attempts described above to co-ordinate the different Arab countries into a unified entity, diplomatically and militarily, Egypt, Syria and Jordan were riven by division up until the last days of the May/June crisis. Sharabi argued in 1970 that,

“what we call the Arab side does not in reality constitute a single entity; it has no co-ordinated, organizational arrangements, no unified political or military structure, no adequate communications and information systems. Inherent in Arab agreements is a multiplicity of conflicting decisions, desires, intentions: formal collective agreements lack substantive content and as a result have little practical import”

(Sharabi, 1970, p. 64).

What this meant for Arab operational strategy during the war was that, “the Arabs, incapable of devising a unified strategy, were incapable of carrying out a rational military plan”, resulting in “… miscalculation, faulty intelligence, inability to convey messages and inadequate communication” (Sharabi, 1970, p. 63). The most extreme example was that at various points throughout the war, different Arab governments dissembled to each other about the movements of their armed forces. For example, at the beginning of the war Nasser informed Hussein that Israel had suffered ‘staggering' losses and that Israel airfields had been destroyed. This lie had a decisive impact on encouraging Jordan to fight (Mutawi, 1987). This lack of unity was compounded by the IDF’s better training and motivation, something represented accurately in Popular Zionism.
6. After the ceasefire

Israel’s immediate response to the situation created by the ceasefire lines was formulated in a cabinet meeting on 19th June 1967. In this meeting the cabinet agreed that the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights would be returned to Egypt and Syria if those states would negotiate a peace treaty with Israel – ‘land for peace’. Gaza would remain part of Israel and its citizens would be resettled. Jerusalem would remain the sovereign and undivided capital of Israel. The cabinet could not agree on the future of the West Bank (Oren, 2002, pp. 313–4). The US communicated this offer to Egypt and Syria. Neither country responded because Israel’s proposals did not include any of the Jordanian territory that the Israelis had captured (Mutawi, 1987, p. 180).

The Arab response was complex, attempting, as it did, to signal different things to the Palestinians and the Israelis. In trying to show to the Palestinians that their cause had not been forgotten the Arabs formulated the hardline ‘three no’s’ at the Arab Summit that took place in Khartoum on 29th August 1967 – ‘no negotiations, no recognition and no peace treaty’ – implying the only Arab response to Israeli aggression would be another military conflict. The Arab armies, however, were in no position to fight another war so Hussein and Nasser also agreed to covertly pursue the diplomatic and political means that had been so explicitly ruled out by the ‘three no’s’. This consisted in attempting to indirectly negotiate with the Israelis through third parties. The ‘three no’s’ played into Israel’s hands in the sense that it enabled the Israelis to paint the Arabs as intransigent. In August the Israelis withdraw the 19th June offer, stressing they would only have direct negotiations with the Arab states, something to which the Israelis knew no Arab leader could agree. On 17th October the Israeli cabinet announced that it would, “fully continue to maintain the situation established by the ceasefire agreements and to safeguard her position” (Mutawi, 1987, p. 180).

The UN responded by issuing Resolution 242 ‘Concerning Principles for a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East’ on 22nd November 1967. To summarise, its main terms were: i) that the acquisition of territory by war was
“inadmissible”; ii) “the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security”; iii) the withdrawal of Israel from “territories occupied in the recent conflict”; iv) terminations of all “states of belligerency”, and the acknowledgment of the “sovereignty” of all states in the area”; v) the guarantee of open international waterways; vi) “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem” (cited in Mutwai, 1987, p. 179). The terms were problematic in the following ways. In the French and Arabic language version of the text it says the withdrawal of Israel from “the territories occupied…”. In the English language version it only says “territories occupied”. The Arabs therefore interpreted it as all the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war and the Israelis have argued that the wording leaves the question of exactly which territories need to be returned open to interpretation. The PLO (by this point with Yasser Arafat at the helm) was furious that no explicit mention of the Palestinians had been made. All the Arab nations apart from Syria accepted the terms of the resolution. Israel accepted them “begrudgingly” (Oren, 2002, p. 326) though Mutawi claims that the Israelis make demands that are not included in the resolution (1987, p. 180) (though does not specify what these demands are). The PLO accepted Resolution 242 twenty years after it is passed.

6.1. The Palestinian refugees

Aside from the fatalities, casualties and the occupation, the other devastating consequence of the war was the creation of more Palestinian refugees, primarily through their forced migration from the newly occupied territories at the hands of the Israeli state (Masalha, 1997, 1999, 2003; Segev, 2005). With approximately 1.3 million Palestinians within Israel’s de facto borders created by the new ceasefire lines (including Palestinian citizens of Israel), Israel contained a new demographic profile that challenged the ideological imperative for the Zionist state to retain a Jewish majority. The pre-1948 Zionist concept of ‘transfer’ was revived across Israeli society as a means to solve this ‘problem’ (Masalha, 2003, pp. 178–189). As a result a series of measures were enacted by the State of Israel that resulted in the forced migration of approximately 430,000 Palestinians between June and
December 1967, depleting some areas of as much as 88% of their Palestinian population (many of whom were 1948/9 refugees) (Masalha, 2003, pp. 189–205). On 6th June, villages in the Latrun salient were destroyed and 2,000 families were expelled (approximately 6,000 people). On 11th June, a similar fate befell Jerusalem’s Al-Magharbeh quarter (detailed above). At the very beginning of the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the West Bank, the army’s first Military Governor of the West Bank Haim Hertzog (later President of Israel) started the process of deporting approximately 200,000 Palestinians from these areas. This was primarily achieved by supplying Israeli buses that took Palestinians from these areas to the Allenby Bridge that connected the West and East Banks of the River Jordan. There were various methods used to stimulate this forced migration – outright violence being one. Masalha quotes at length one of the Israeli soldiers who oversaw this process and details the violence used to force some Palestinians onto these buses (2003, pp. 202–203). Kossaifi (1996) contends that between 1967 and 1987 there was a steady flow of Palestinians out of Israel and the occupied territories averaging approximately 33,000 per annum. This includes those forced out by the Israeli policy of deportation detailed in (Masalha, 1997, pp. 110–134). Between 1967 and 1977, just over 1,100 Palestinians had been deported as a result of this policy (ibid.).

7. Postscript: the effect of the war on Great Britain

The 1967 war had ramifications outside the region, mainly in terms of trade. Though these ramifications never emerged in the interviews, they would have affected the interviewees, if only indirectly, so they warrant brief mention here. The main way Britain was affected was through the ‘Big Lie’, the immediate result of which was that seven Arab oil-producing countries stopped supplying oil to Britain until August 1967 (when the lie is disproved). The Suez Canal was also closed from the beginning of the war until 1975, a decision that “seriously damaged Britain’s trade”, costing Britain approximately £20 million per month (Brenchley, 2005, p. 50). The result of this trade loss was the devaluation of sterling, which, British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson claimed, contributed to Labour’s loss in the 1970 general election (ibid.).
Chapter 6

May–June 1967: A History of Intensities

1. Introduction

“In [Deleuze and Guattari’s] historical account of human social machines through time they regard individuals in the polity to be composed of racial and historical intensities. This then produces a history that is neither social history in its usual sense nor a history of macro structures and great individuals. Instead one needs to read macro or ‘molar’ social formations as composed of molecular intensities… Such a history would attend at once to art and to the relations among bodies, and to the production of intensities and their circulation.”

(Colebrook, 2009, pp. 30–31)

“Good or bad, politics and its judgements are always molar, but it is the molecular and its assessment that makes or breaks it”

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 244)

The last chapter provided an historical account of the events that both precipitated and constituted the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. This chapter will look at the immediate effect of the war on the British Jewish community during the period of May–June 1967. It analyses three aspects of the effect of the war: i) the way in which the war was perceived by the British Jewish community; ii) the afectivity this generated; and iii) the activity that took place as a result. In doing this, the chapter takes its cue from Claire Colebrook’s imagining of a Deleuzo-Guattarian practice of molecular history – one that attends to art (interpreted broadly here as the representation of the 1967 war), the relations among bodies and to the production of intensities and their circulation. From surveying the interview and archival material it is clear that what occurred within the British Jewish community during May and June 1967 was the production and circulation of molecular intensities across the bodies of the British Jewish community. Although the intense reaction of British Jewry to the war has been touched upon in the existing historical literature (Endelman, 2002) the history of May and June 1967 has yet to be conceived of as, primarily, a history of intensities. This is an important theoretical move if
we want to understand the intensely affective relationship British Jews have had with Israel in the post-1967 conjuncture.

In positing a history of molecular intensities, Colebrook does not provide a methodology for how one might be practiced. Therefore, this chapter turns to the reading of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* (1968 (a)) offered in DeLanda’s *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (2002). The reason for using DeLanda’s approach is because he so lucidly draws out the material processes that Deleuze argues bring about ontological change into a single cohesive theory. He does this by using examples from maths and physics, specifically thermodynamics, to illustrate his particular reading of Deleuzian metaphysics. According to the dominant logic of the academy (one that separates knowledge into discrete disciplines) it does not follow that thermodynamic processes can be used to explain changes in human culture. It does, however, make sense from a Deleuzian perspective because the ‘flattening’ of his ontology (see Chapter 2) enables ‘transversal’ movement across the disciplinary boundaries constructed by this logic.

In short, this chapter offers a DeLandian-Deleuzian reading of the immediate effect of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 on the British Jewish community as a history of molecular intensities. It does this by sifting through the interview data and archival material gathered for this PhD from a Deleuzian perspective in order to reconstruct the intensive processes that bought about the molar changes in the organisation of British Jewish subjectivity and the organisation of British Jewish popular politics which are the focus of the subsequent two chapters. Focusing on the intensities that were produced and circulated in this historical moment enables a clearer understanding of the relationship British Jews have had with Israel post-1967 as a result of the war – a relationship that is still defined by its intensely affective nature.
2. DeLanda, Deleuze and intensive processes of ontological change

“The human sciences with their materialist, evolutionary and even dialectical schemas, lag behind the richness and complexity of causal relations in physics or even biology”

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 476)

In *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, Manuel DeLanda sets out a reading of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* relating it to the fields of mathematics and physics. In the first chapter he uses examples from pure mathematics and thermodynamics to illustrate how Deleuze conceives of processes of change. The key term in this chapter (and the rest of the book) is “intensive” and DeLanda relates it to processes of change by showing how in Deleuze’s work, change according to the terms of the Deleuzian ontology emerges as a result of the accumulation of intensive forces passing a critical threshold. This process is outlined in the following section and is illustrated using DeLanda’s example of how change comes about in thermodynamics. This section will then explain how this Deleuzian theory of processes of change can be applied to the field of human culture. The remainder of the chapter will demonstrate its applicability to the intensities generated within the British Jewish community as a result of witnessing the Six Day War through the British media, and will conclude by pointing to the changes within British Jewish culture that this accumulation of intensities bought about.

DeLanda begins *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* explaining the fundamentals of the Deleuzian ontology. His first move is to demonstrate how Deleuze is an anti-essentialist philosopher, but atypically for an anti-essentialist writing between the 1950s and 1990s, his focus is on the ontological as opposed to the epistemological. He does this by demonstrating how the basic unit of post-Platonic essentialist ontologies is the transcendental ‘essence’ that gives each entity that constitutes those ontologies their particular identities. The intention of defining identity in terms of transcendental essences is to communicate the idea that the identity of these ontological entities is fixed and immutable – they have an essence that
remains eternal and unchanged. As an anti-essentialist, Deleuze does not believe that objects have immutable identities fixed by transcendental essences. He instead argues that the identity of entities changes in accordance with the historical conditions in which these entities emerge – specifically the changing relationships they have with the other entities to which they are connected. To communicate the multiple identities that the same entity can have dependent on the historical conditions in which it is located, Deleuze replaces the term essence with ‘multiplicity’. DeLanda defines the term multiplicity in the following way: “Multiplicities specify the structure of spaces of possibilities, spaces which in turn, explain the regularities exhibited by morphogenetic processes.” (DeLanda, 2002, p. 10).

A multiplicity is an abstract model of all the identities an entity can assume in shifting historical circumstances. (The spatial metaphor – ‘the structure of spaces of possibilities’ – is simply a way of concretising a highly abstract notion for expositional clarity). ‘Morphogenetic processes’ refer to the material processes that bring these different identities into existence.

One of the concrete examples that DeLanda uses to illustrate this idea is the molecular compound H₂O. The multiplicity in the context of H₂O would be an abstract model that represents all the possible forms that H₂O can take without radically changing its nature – steam, water or ice. Whether H₂O is steam, water or ice depends on how, as a multiplicity, the ‘space of possibilities’ is structured at a given time. What determines this structure are ‘singularities’, a term that DeLanda defines as representing “the intrinsic long-

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86 This definition of multiplicity is specific to the way it is used in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze often uses the same term to mean slightly different things in different books. DeLanda explains this in the following way: “Gilles Deleuze changes his terminology in every one of his books. Very few of his concepts retain their names or linguistic identity. The point of this terminological exuberance is not merely to give the impression of difference through the use of synonyms, but rather to develop a set of different theories on the same subject, theories which are slightly displaced relative to one another but retain enough overlaps that can be meshed together as a heterogeneous assemblage. Thus, the different names which a given concept gets are not exact synonyms but near synonyms, or sometimes non-synonymous terms defining closely related concepts.” (DeLanda, 2002, p. 157)

87 The definition of ‘morphogenesis’ is the birth of form.

88 i.e. the decomposition of the compound into hydrogen or oxygen atoms or the addition of other atoms to create a new molecular compound.
term tendencies of a system, the states which the system will spontaneously adopt in the long run as it is not constrained by other forces" (DeLanda, 2002, p. 15). What this means is that theoretically, $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ can take on a variety of forms (more than just steam, water or ice). However the fact that in the physical arrangements of our universe at this historical moment, $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ tends to manifest as either steam, water or ice is as a result of the arrangement of singularities that govern its potential unfoldings. Therefore, in order to change the form an entity adopts at a given moment it is the singularities that need to change.

In order to outline the morphogenetic processes that rearrange the singularities that determine the form of an entity at a given time it will be useful to introduce two more terms: ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’. In thermodynamics every entity has extensive and intensive properties. Examples of extensive properties are length, area and volume. DeLanda explains extensive properties as intrinsically divisible i.e. a volume of matter can be divided in two, resulting in two equal halves of the original volume, each half the extent of the original (2002, p. 26). Temperature and pressure are examples of intensive properties. Intensive properties cannot be divided in the way just described. If a quantity of water heated to $90^\circ$ is divided in two the result is not two quantities of water at $45^\circ$. To half the temperature of that quantity of water would involve a reduction of temperature through a series of states until the halfway point between $90^\circ$ and $0^\circ$ is reached. Extensive properties, therefore, pertain to the form an entity assumes in given conditions. Intensive properties pertain to the morphogenetic processes that cause that form to change.

To illustrate this, DeLanda returns to $\text{H}_2\text{O}$. In order to change the extensive properties of $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ – the formal arrangement of its molecules into steam, water or ice – an intensive process needs to be ‘triggered’ i.e. the $\text{H}_2\text{O}$ needs to be heated passed temperatures of either $0^\circ$ (ice to water) or $100^\circ$ (water to steam). $0^\circ$ and $100^\circ$ are what as known as ‘critical thresholds’ in thermodynamics because these are the points at which an intensive process will cause a change in the extensive properties of a specific entity. The
change bought about in the extensive properties of an entity as a result of an intensive process reaching a critical threshold is called a “phase transition”. What specifically changes during a phase transition is the arrangement of the singularities that are structuring what the entity can be at that given moment. The intensive process (heating in this instance) dislodges the specific arrangement of those singularities causing them to arrange anew once the critical threshold has been passed.

The more fundamental idea being addressed in DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze’s work is the construction of Deleuze’s ontological construction of the universe into three distinct fields: the actual, the virtual and the intensive. The actual is how Deleuze understands the universe as it is, and all the multiplicities that comprise it, as they have been ‘actualised’ during a specific historical moment. The virtual is all the ways the universe could be realised depending on the morphogenetic processes to which the multiplicities that comprise it are exposed. The virtual is no less ‘real’ than the actual – they are both comprised of exactly the same elements. The virtual is just the different, as yet unrealised, ways that these elements could be potentially rearranged. The intensive refers to the morphogenetic processes that rearrange these elements i.e. that actualise the virtual (give birth to its form); specifically the accumulation and dissipation of intensities and the phase transitions they bring about.

DeLanda argues that it is within a phase transition that both the virtual and the intensive – all the things the world could be and the processes that bring them about – becomes most visible in the actual. When a phase transition ends and the new extensive properties take shape, the newly actualised actual occludes the virtual and the intensive processes which bought them into being. There are instructive parallels here with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the processes through which it is secured. At moments of ‘organic crisis’ the processes that bring about potentially new relations of force (namely political struggle) become visible. Once the crisis is

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89 The actual refers to the Plane of Organisation and the virtual to the Plane of Immanence, as outlined in Chapter 2.
resolved i.e. the relations of force become settled through a specific class or class fraction achieving hegemony – all the other possible ways of organising the polity become obscured and common sense holds that the current form of political organisation is the only one possible.\textsuperscript{90} It is in parallels with more politically orientated philosophy (not only Gramsci but also Foucault and his concept of ‘normalisation’ (1975)) that it becomes apparent how Deleuzian metaphysics as illustrated through thermodynamics becomes applicable to the fields of politics and culture. The broadest application of the Deleuzian approach to ontological change outlined above to the field of politics and culture is the notion that if we are unsatisfied with the cultural and political arrangements that currently exist in the actual and we want to bring about new cultural and political arrangements (as they exist in the virtual) it is the intensive that should be the focus of our energies. Similarly, if an historian is interested in making sense of how new cultural and political arrangements were bought into existence at a particular point in time, according to Deleuze’s logic, it is the intensive to which that historian should direct their focus.

Before this section explains precisely how the thermodynamic terms outlined above (singularity, multiplicity, phase transition, critical threshold etc.) can be applied to the fields of politics and culture, it will introduce a final term from \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} that will enable a much fuller understanding of the immediate impact of the war of the British Jewish community – the Body-without-Organs (B-w-O). In the terms outlined above, the B-w-O corresponds to the form an entity assumes whilst it is undergoing a phase transition. In \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} ontological entities are referred to as either ‘machinic assemblages’ or ‘bodies’ and like the entities described above they are assembled out of much smaller elements connected to each other by relations of exteriority. These relations of exteriority do not simply fix the specific arrangements of the elements within the assemblage they constitute; they also fix the power relations that circulate across these assemblages and the other assemblages that they are connected to. One of the ways Deleuze and Guattari, illustrate these ideas is through the metaphor of the human body, the

\textsuperscript{90} For in depth explanations of these terms see Chapter 2.
organs that compose it, and the way these organs are organised within the Oedipalised psycho-sexual arrangements of late capitalism. These arrangements work to organise the polymorphously perverse flows of sexual desire that Freud argued characterises infant sexuality (Freud, 1905, p. 280) into the more organised arrangement of adult sexuality in which the reproductive organs are privileged as locuses of sexual desire. Deleuze and Guattari are deeply critical of these arrangements and throughout *A Thousand Plateaus* argue for ontological arrangements in which desire (in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms i.e. ‘force of existing’ as opposed to sexual desire) can flow more freely across the Plane of Organisation. One of the ways this can be achieved is through the creation of the B-w-O – or the creation of a body that is organized in an absolutely de-hierarchised fashion, i.e. one where no organ is privileged, and across which desire flows un-interrupted.

One of the ways a body becomes dis-organised is through a surge of intensity, the force of which undoes the relations of exteriority holding its constituent parts in place. Whereas in thermodynamics, intensity is heat or pressure, in the context of cultural and political change, intensity translates as affectivity.\(^91\) Once the affectivity surging through a human population reaches a critical threshold of intensity, that human population undergoes a phase transition in which its formal arrangements will in some way (be it social, economic, political or cultural) change. In between the critical threshold being passed and the phase transition occurring there is a moment in which the old arrangements have come undone and the new arrangements have not quite taken hold; this is the moment of the Body-without-Organs. Deleuze and Guattari describe the organisation of the B-w-O in the following way:

“A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body upon which that which serves as organs is distributed according to crowd phenomena, in Brownian motion, in the form of molecular multiplicities.”

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 34)

\(^91\) This is not the case for DeLanda in which he defines affect in terms of capacity as opposed to intensity (see Chapter 4).
They then describe the experience of ‘organs’ distributed according to crowd phenomena… in the form of molecular multiplicities as:

“There is no longer a self that feels, acts and recalls; there is ‘a glowing fog, a dark yellow mist’ that has affects and experiences, movements and speeds”

(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 180)

The moment of the B-w-O is when all the elements become charged by the same intense affectivity that undid the relations that had kept them together in their previous formation; and because they are charged by the same intense affectivity they are mobilised in the same way – all the elements begin to act in concert with each other. At the level of human populations this is a de-subjectificatory and de-significatory moment, “there is no longer a self that feels, acts and recalls…” Meaning and subjectification are replaced by a ‘mist’ of intensities that breaks the human subjects, who constitute the machinic assemblage, down into molecular multiplicities of “affects and experiences, movements and speeds”.

A B-w-O is only ever a transitory moment, a moment of passage between two states, a phase transition. (Deleuze and Guattari warn that sustaining the B-w-O over long periods of time could result in psychosis).

What new form the body takes after it has become a B-w-O depends on what type of B-w-O transpired during the phase transition. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari describe three different possible B-w-O’s: the joyous B-w-O, which results in a more joyously arranged body; a B-w-O that violently destratifies resulting in a new psychotic body; and the cancerous B-w-O of the fascist. It is the final B-w-O that, this chapter argues, occurs during the phase transition bought about by witnessing the Six Day War in the analysis below.

A cancerous B-w-O of the fascist is so-called because of the specific way it gives form to matter on the Plane of Organisation: “each instant, each second, a cell becomes cancerous, mad, proliferates and loses its configuration, takes over everything” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 180) Like a cancer cell, the cancerous B-w-O insinuates itself within another body producing identical cells which eventually work to destroy the other cells comprising that body.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the cancerous B-w-O affects two strataums of the Plane of Organisation specifically: the stratum of significance and the stratum of subjectification. Its ‘cancerous’ function on the stratum of significance is the ‘mad proliferation’ of a single meaning and the destruction of this stratum’s ability to produce and circulate a variety of different meanings across the Plane of Organisation. Similarly, its cancerous function on the stratum of subjectification is the ‘mad proliferation’ of identical subjectivities (the ‘serialisation’ of subjectivities) typical of fascist political and cultural arrangements. The examples of a cancerous B-w-O used in *A Thousand Plateaus* are the state and the army. As will become clearer below, this chapter does not argue that the Six Day War produces fascism in its conventional sense but rather that the effect of witnessing the war limited the circulation of the various possible interpretations of what the war, Israel and Zionism means, and the various subjective positions that had existed and might still exist towards Israel as a result.\(^\text{92}\)

\(^\text{92}\) The terms ‘cancerous’ and ‘fascist’ are highly problematic in any discussion of Jewish culture because a key trope of the modern anti-Semitism deployed by the Nazis to justify the Holocaust was the representation of Jews as a disease that polluted the racially pure body of ‘indigenous’/Aryan German culture (Gilman, 1991). There is a very significant danger of reproducing this association in the assessment of what occurred in British Jewry during the crisis and the war as the becoming cancerous B-w-O of the fascist. To avoid this danger it is important to carefully demonstrate the different use of the terms ‘cancerous’ and ‘fascist’ in Deleuzo-Guattarian discourse compared to their use in modern anti-Semitism. The fascism to which *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* refers is only tangentially Fascism in its conventional sense, i.e. the early twentieth century political movement founded by Benito Mussolini and adopted around the world in various forms and with different relationships to race science and anti-Semitism. Conversely, fascism, in its Deleuzo-Guattarian usage, refers to any assemblage whose power relations are organised in a highly arborescent (hierarchical) manner. The main culprits of fascism in *Anti-Oedipus* are not Mussolini et al. but the French Communist Party and L’Ecole Freudienne under Jacques Lacan, organisations that, ideologically, have nothing in common with political Fascism. In fact, the French communist party was explicitly anti-Fascist and anti-racist. Similarly, the use of the metaphorical term ‘cancerous’ in *A Thousand Plateaus* refers not to notions of racial purity and the diseased body politic but specifically to the morphogenetic function of cancer cells in human and non-human organisms i.e. the ‘mad proliferation’ of identical ‘cells’ on the ‘stratum’ of signification and subjectification, whose very sameness serves a destructive function (as just described).

There is a debate as to whether Zionism is a form of fascism, and most serious Zionist or pro-Israeli scholars point out, not only the similarities between the two, but how often the two movements worked together in the early twentieth century (Alderman, 1992; Shimon, 1995). The position this thesis takes within this debate is Edward Said’s in *A Question of Palestine* (1979) that “Zionism is Zionism” i.e. that as an ideology and a practice, Zionism has a specificity that direct comparisons to other political ideologies occlude. This specificity needs to be fully accounted for, if Zionism is to be successfully opposed.
3. Thesis

The remainder of the chapter attempts to outline the morphogenetic processes triggered in the British Jewish community by witnessing the Six Day War. It argues that the multiplicity in this context is the British Jewish assemblage – not only the form it takes in the actual on the eve of the crisis that precipitated the war, but also all the other potential forms it could take in the virtual. The ‘form’ of any assemblage is measured by its extensive properties. The extensive properties of a community of people are its economic, political, social, kinship and institutional arrangements, the different forms of cultural and aesthetic expression and the affectivity that flow across it. These extensive properties are outlined in detail in Chapter 4. Different singularities structure this arrangement, however, the singularity that became the focus of the intensive process that is the subject of this chapter is the traumatic memory of the Holocaust. The reason this can be understood as a Deleuzian singularity is because it gave shape to a number of the extensive properties of the British Jewish assemblage during the conjuncture prior to the 1967 war (1945–1967) – for example the decision of the majority of Jewish men in this period to self-employ. As will become apparent, the extensive property most changed by the intensive process triggered by witnessing the war was the affectivity that flowed across the British Jewish assemblage, i.e. the way that British Jews felt as Jews in Britain and the world more generally. As discussed in Chapter 4, the trauma of the Holocaust meant that British Jews had an inflated sense of anti-Semitism in Britain, making them feel less safe as Jews.

The focus of this chapter is the intensive process that occurred in the British Jewish community during May/June 1967 and what happens to the community as a result. The trigger that sets off the intensive process is witnessing the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 through the prism of Zionist propaganda, i.e. as the Six Day War – a quasi-religious event in which the

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93 This definition is taken from Grossberg’s reading of Marx’s social totality (Grossberg, 1992). Grossberg adds an affective plane to classical Marxism’s breaking down of the social totality into the economic base and superstructure. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed explanation).
super-heroic IDF saved Israel’s Jews from a genocide at the hands of anti-Semitic Arab armies. The representation of the war in this way triggered an intense affective response within the British Jewish community: first an intense terror during the crisis that preceded the war and then a similarly intense elation triggered by the Israeli victory. The affectivity generated during this period was so intense the British Jewish community passed a critical threshold and became a Body-without-Organs. This can be seen mainly in the frenetic political activity that occured within the British Jewish community in May/June 1967. During the moment of the becoming Body-without-Organs of the British Jewish community, the singularities that structured its organisation began to re-arrange – i.e. it underwent a phase transition. What happened specifically is the traumatic memory of the Holocaust became articulated to the idea that a second Jewish genocide (which they saw as almost inevitable at all times) would only be stopped by a militarily strong State of Israel. This in turn causes a re-arrangement of the extensive properties of the British Jewish assemblage at both the molecular level (the affectivity flowing across the assemblage) and at the level of the molar (British Jewish cultural identity changes and Zionism becomes ‘Popular’). All these changes are discussed in depth in Chapters 7 and 8.

4. Analysis

4.1. The Trigger: The Six Day War

The first step in analysing the effect of the 1967 war on the British Jewish community in the terms set out above is to discern what precisely triggered the morphogenetic process. From the interview data and archival material it is clear this was the way that British Jews perceived the war – specifically what they felt was at stake during its build up – (commonly referred to as the ‘Middle East Crisis’ at the time), and what the Israeli victory meant for Israel as a result. For British Jews the Middle East Crisis of May/June 1967 threatened the annihilation of the State of Israel and the genocide of its Jewish population at the hands of the armies of anti-Semitic Arab nations. This perception is partially rooted in the idea that British Jews
had of Israel at this time i.e. that it was a small, weak nation associated with Holocaust victims and refugees. Therefore when Israel achieved its resounding military victory it was so unexpected the dominant tendency within British Jewry was to understand it as a miracle. As a result, the perception of Israel changed to a superheroic nation. This is a dramatic misrepresentation of what was at stake during the crisis and the war it precipitated. This section argues that this misrepresentation came about as a result of the Zionist propaganda effort, which is discussed in more detail at the end of the section.

4.1.1. The British Jewish perception of the Middle East Crisis

The perception of the Middle East Crisis as threatening the annihilation of the State of Israel and the genocide of its Jewish population appears throughout the interviews in a number of ways. This perception was largely expressed through the language of Zionist propaganda. The broader discursive framework through which these ideas are formulated is the memory of the Holocaust itself, images of which appear explicitly in the interviews. The Holocaust also appears through the perception that the Arabs were motivated by anti-Semitism and through the elision of Nasser with Hitler.

‘Annihilation’

When the interviewees were asked what they remembered thinking was at stake during the build up to the war they all responded in the same way – it was “the very existence of the State of Israel” (Stephen, p. 353). For most of the interviewees, the annihilation of the State did not simply mean the end of the state apparatus but annihilation of Israel’s population.

“… we could see it happening: the whole population being wiped out by potentially hostile forces on the one hand and the complete elimination of the State of Israel.”

(Brian, p. 577)

“All I can see is a picture of a little strip of land [...] And there’s the med and they’re surrounded by all these countries [...] I can almost see [...] the
graphics of how they would descend on Israel, from all sides and drive them into the sea.

**So that would be killing Israelis or expelling Israelis...**
I think killing them, killing Israeli’s, that’s how we saw it.”

(Sarah, p. 525)

“... ‘they would have been wiped off the map’? Did that mean...
A lot of Jews would have been killed again.”

(Rose, p. 648)

Both David and Rose felt that this was the only possible outcome for Israel, considering its size and the fact it faced a united Arab front:

“Very unlikely. The only sensible end to the war seemed like an Arab victory because there were five times as many of them.”

(David, p. 457)

“A lot of Jews would have been killed again [...] And it had to happen. How could it possibly not happen? You know all the newspapers were filled with all these maps with so many thousands airplanes, so many thousand tanks and there’s Israel.”

[My emphasis] (Rose, p. 648)

The fact that the interviewees all responded in this way is interesting for two reasons. The first is that it is evidence of Deleuze and Guattari’s cancerous Body-without-Organs of the fascist, particularly the effect it has on the stratum of signification. Of all the possible significations (ways of decoding what the crisis signified) that could have circulated across the British Jewish assemblage in May and June 1967, the signification of the Middle East crisis as the annihilation of the state almost completely dominates. For David and particularly Rose – there was no other possible outcome. This closing down of polysemy is a persistent feature of the British Jewish perception of both the crisis and the war.

The second way that the perception of the crisis as the potential annihilation of Israel is interesting is because the idea that Jewry is
perpetually facing an existential threat is a foundational idea of Zionism. One of the ways classical Zionist ideology argued the case for establishing a State of Israel was that as long as Jews existed in the Diaspora, they would never be safe from anti-Semitism and the only way to protect themselves from this was through the up-building of a strong Jewish nation-state in ‘Eretz Israel’ (Shimoni, 1995). The fact that the Middle East crisis began to be represented in this fashion demonstrates the beginnings of the Zionist territorialisation of British Jewry in 1967.

The Language of Zionist Propaganda

Further evidence of the start of the Zionist territorialisation of British Jewry can be seen in the way that the interviewees use the language of Zionist propaganda to make sense of the Middle East Crisis.

‘Poor little Israel’

The first example of this was voiced by the women interviewees – the Zionist representation of Israel as a ‘tiny’ land surrounded by hostile Arab forces:

“\[\text{I remember that my parents and I were […] very concerned that poor little Israel compared to all the Arabs around would be able to cope.}\]”

(Vivien, p. 625)

“\[\text{[The Arabs] don’t want the land. They don’t want Israel to be there. Full stop. […] It’s a tiny little land. It’s tiny. [Light laugh]\}’

(Evelyn, p. 492)

“All I can see is a picture of a little strip of land. It was a very narrow strip of land.”

(Sarah, p. 525)

94 The notion that Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel persistently face an ‘existential threat’ has continued to exist since the State was established, from 1948–1967 the threat was symbolised by Nasser and ‘the Arabs’. Between 1967–2004 it was mainly represented by Arafat and the PLO. In the present day Iran represents this threat in the Zionist imagination.
The representation of Israel as a geographically small proportion of the Middle East is technically accurate. However, this representation performs two important ideological functions. The first was to misrepresent the State of Israel as weak and vulnerable. The second is to justify the colonisation of Palestine and the displacement of the Palestinian people. It does this by implying that the Palestinians who wish to remain in their ancestral homeland are unreasonable when they could just move somewhere in the much larger Arabic Middle East. The first is a misrepresentation because, as the Israeli cabinet knew at the time and as was proved by the victory, Israel was not vulnerable in 1967. As the Israeli victory goes to prove it was militarily stronger than the Arab armies combined. The second aspect of this ideological misrepresentation misunderstands the relationship between a people, their culture and the territory they have inhabited for centuries. Regardless of the veracity of the representation of Israel as ‘tiny’, it is one of the key ways Israel was understood during the crisis and it plays a key part in the affective response triggered as a result.

‘Push them into the sea’/’Wipe them off the map’

Two other refrains that emerged in the interviews was the idea that an Arab victory would result in i) Israeli Jews being ‘pushed into the sea’ and ii) Israel itself being ‘wiped off the map’. Both are different expressions of the same annihilation anxiety.

“That’s what I thought was at stake: that these bullies, which is what they were at the time, that they could just squish them into the sea. But that’s not the case.”

(Jeremy, p. 422)

“My fear was that Jews were going to be driven into the sea.”

(David, p. 454)

95 Remarkably, the interview data suggested that British Jews still feel Israel is weak and vulnerable at the time of being interviewed.
“They would have forced them into the sea. That’s what they had proclaimed.”

(Joseph, p. 556)

“… but back then people were saying, ‘it’s going to be wiped off the map’, ‘it’s going to be pushed into the sea’, ‘it’s going to be decimated’. Everybody you spoke to said that.”

[Emphasis in original] (Rose, p. 648)

(The origins of the notion that the Jews would have been pushed into the sea are addressed below.)

The Holocaust

The broader discursive framework that produced the above representations of the build-up to the war as the potential genocide of Israeli Jews was the traumatic memory of the Holocaust. The Holocaust emerges in the interview data and archival material in a number of ways. First it is mentioned implicitly and explicitly by the interviewees, in the British media at the time and can also be seen in the archival material. Explicit refers to instances when the word Holocaust is used by both Jews and non-Jews in Britain to describe what they thought would happen to Israeli Jews if the Middle East Crisis turned into a war. Implicit refers to instances when words taken from popular discourses on the Holocaust are used in the same way – for example extermination, annihilation and liquidation – and would have invoked the memory of the Holocaust, intentionally or otherwise. The Holocaust also appears in the British Jewish perception that the Arab nations were driven by anti-Semitism and in the representation of Nasser as Hitler.

Perhaps the strongest articulation of the Middle East crisis as a potential genocide of Israel’s Jews with the notion of the Holocaust can be seen in the following statement by British Jewish writer Wolf Mankowitz, written in the edition of literary journal Jewish Quarterly published immediately
after the war. In it he claimed that what the war in fact threatened was the accomplishment of Hitler’s final solution:

“It’s very simple. 150 million Arabs, backed by the greatest military power in the world, were committed to the elimination of a people of 2 ½ million [...] Any minute they were going to be liquidated. The ‘final solution’, unsuccessfully attempted by Hitler’s technocrats, was about to be accomplished.”

(Mankowitz, 1967/8, p. 15)

The most detailed articulation between the Holocaust and the build up to the war in the interviews is made by Rose, whose father had fled Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Second World War.

“I was terrified, yes. Because then people were very much aware of what had happened in 1936 [...] in Germany. People had nowhere to go [...] people wanted to go out of Europe and there was nowhere for them to go. Nobody wanted them you see [...] It suddenly came back. Especially those of us with European backgrounds who realized that if they had wanted to, if our grandparents had wanted to run away from the Nazi threat, there was nowhere for them to go. It suddenly came home to us that Israel was our insurance really, if this sort of thing, if the Nazi threat had happened again [...] Our views at that point was if Israel was destroyed we all were going to be in exactly the same position as the Jews in the thirties.”

(Rose, p. 653)

In this quote Rose does not think that the war would have meant a second Holocaust (i.e. the attempted industrialised genocide of global Jewry). Instead she thinks that had Israel lost the war, British Jews would lose their insurance from a potential second Holocaust – a claim made by Zionists since the 1967 war and one that appeared across the interview data (discussed at length in the next chapter). Anti-Zionist David, says he made the same connection in 1967:

“I… saw a continuity between that and the Holocaust.”

(David, p. 458)

Vivien, who also had family perish during the Holocaust, implies the connection:
Do you remember what that might have meant to you: that the State of Israel would cease to exist or that people would have been killed or that people would be deported... or maybe you didn't have a sense of it, I don't know.

[Long pause] I don't know. I think it was a frightening thought. I don't think I had gone that far as to think what might have happened. You know, especially my parents were very worried about it because they felt it was very important to have Israel."

(Vivien, p. 626)

This articulation between the war threatening a genocide of Israel’s Jews and the Holocaust is not one being made retrospectively by the interviewees in line with the Zionist memorialisation of the war over forty years preceding the interviews. It was an idea that circulated widely across British society at the time. For example, it appeared across many British media outlets both implicitly and explicitly. It appears explicitly in a reference to the final solution in a letter written by the leftist Jewish playwright Arnold Wesker to The Guardian published on 1st June 1967:

“I urge [Prime Minister] Wilson and the leaders of the world to recognize that what is happening in the Middle East is… a re-emergence … of the same spirit that stirred Nazi Germany to implement a “final solution” for the Jews. Egypt, Syria and the Arab world have stated … that their aim is the annihilation of Israel.”

The Holocaust also appeared implicitly in a number of statements made across the British media during the build up to the war and the war itself. On 31st May, BBC journalist Ian Trethowan appeared on TV news programme 24 Hours and said “... the most potent danger, which seemed to build up palpably before our eyes... is the threat to the very life of Israel” (Churchill, 1967, p. 224). On 7th June 1967 a full-page advert appeared in the Daily Express with the headline ‘Israel is fighting for survival’ and including the text, “the openly avowed intention of the Arab nations is Israel’s complete annihilation of two and half million men, women and children.” The advert was signed by a number of celebrities including Elizabeth Taylor, Vanessa Redgrave, Dudley Moore and Oliver Reed. On BBC Radio’s World at One Winston Churchill (grandson of the war Prime Minister) recounted a conversation he had with David Ben Gurion during the Middle East crisis in
which Ben Gurion said, “one thing you’ve got to understand is that for the Arabs, what is a military defeat? It’s the loss of an army… For us military defeat means probably death for every single one of us” (Churchill, 1967, p. 226). On the same day Liberal MP Jeremy Thorpe appeared on BBC television programme *Panorama* arguing that Britain ought not “wash our hands and allow a small nation to be exterminated” and then re-iterated the sentiment in a question to pro-Nasserite MP Cristopher Mayhew asking, “would he then stand aside and watch this nation exterminated?” (ibid.). Using terms like “threat to the very life”, “Israel’s complete annihilation” and “extermination”, whilst not explicitly stating that the war threatened a Holocaust would have invoked its memory in this context.

The notion, rooted in the memory of the Holocaust, that an Arab-Israeli war would mostly like result in the genocide of Israeli Jews was also repeated in speeches made at public meetings held in solidarity with Israel. One of the largest of these was a demonstration of solidarity at the Royal Albert Hall on 5th June 1967. A speech was delivered at this demonstration that included the line:

“Ladies and Gentleman, six million Jews were destroyed in the Second World War. Are we to say that two million of the survivors are not to be entities on any of the worlds surface, to live in peace and harmony.”

‘Two million’ refers to the population of Israel in 1967, not all of whom were Holocaust survivors as the speech suggests. The connection between the Holocaust and the impending war is made once again by Wolf Mankowitz in a speech delivered at a ‘Solidarity with Israel’ conference on 11th June 1967 at Woburn House in London.

“But for us Jews there can be no doubt or discussion about our commitment, because the destruction of Israel would be the destruction of Jewry… Many liberal-minded people said that, of course, when it comes to the point, the west would not allow the Arabs to make good their Hitlerite threats of extermination. But Hitler made good his threat to the extent of six million

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(CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Albert Hall)
human beings. Why shouldn’t a Holy War of Arab states supported by the Soviet Union be able to manage a relatively small genocide?  

The articulation of the Middle East crisis to the idea of an Israeli Jewish genocide and the memory of the Holocaust did not only appear in Zionist propaganda or in certain parts of the British media but also circulated amongst the British Jewish population. Evidence for this is provided by the interviews undertaken for this thesis. It could be argued that because these interviews were conducted approximately forty years after the war took place that this articulation might be a Halbwachsian collective memory, i.e. a memory constructed by British Jews to serve present Zionist ideological needs. A striking piece of evidence that shows that this is not the case and that this idea circulated during the crisis can be seen in the private correspondence of notable Jewish leftists Ralph Miliband (living in Britain at the time of the war) and Marcel Liebman (living in France). Throughout this correspondence the articulation of the crisis to a potential genocide of Israel’s Jews rooted in the memory of the Holocaust is repeatedly made by Ralph Miliband. For example, in a letter written on 28th May 1967, Miliband claimed that the goal of blockading the Gulf of Aqaba was to “destroy… the State of Israel… in a war of annihilation” (Achar, 2006, p. 14). According to Miliband the elimination of the state means the elimination of its citizens (Achar, 2006, p.15). In the same letter he echoed the sentiment made at the Royal Albert Hall in the above quote by writing, “I would consider the extermination of two million Jews, including hundreds of thousands of survivors of the camps, as an appalling catastrophe” (Achar, 2006, p.16). Liebman critiqued these claims in his letters to Miliband but Miliband insists, in a letter dated 2nd June 1967, that “the Arab world directly threatens Israel’s existence – and the idea that this is not the case is absurd” (Achar, 2006, p. 43) going on to say that the war would be “an event that would have the dimensions, if not the numbers, of Hitler’s massacres” (Achar, 2006, p.47). The last statement is particularly powerful and, along with the others, provides evidence that the connection between the Holocaust and the crisis is not one being retrospectively applied by the interviewees. What makes this evidence striking is that Miliband was a  

97 ibid.  
98 This correspondence has been published as a small book (Achar, 2006).
Marxist academic with anti-imperialist political sympathies, and a self-professed ambivalent relationship to Zionism (Achar, 2006) – so not a typical British Jew as described in Chapter 4 and someone who would have been more resistant to Zionist propaganda. In a moment of self-reflexivity Miliband speculated that it was as a Jew that he made the connection between the Holocaust and what was unfolding in the Middle East and that “no doubt an emotional element enters into play” (Achar, 2006, p. 47) – gesturing towards the affectivity triggered by the connection and that is discussed below.

*Arab Anti-Semitism*

The use of the Holocaust as the dominant interpretive framework, through which the interviewees made sense of the build-up to the war, appears in the interview data in another ways. The first is in interpreting the Arab states’ motivation as anti-Semitism.

“For you what did you think the Arabs wanted?
To wipe Israel off the map.

**Completely to destroy…**
Absolutely. It wasn’t about land. It was about destroying this fly in the ointment.

**If it wasn’t about land can you explain what you think it was about?**
[Pause] Well at that time it just felt anti-Semitic. It felt, ‘we just want to kill the Jews’.”

(Sarah, p. 526)

Stephen interprets UN chief U Thant’s decision to remove the UN peacekeeping force from the Israel/Egypt border as motivated by anti-Semitism.

“… to me that’s anti-Semitism […] And why would you take a peacekeeping force that needs it desperately now […] how does the guy at the top of the United Nations pull out a peacekeeping force, just as things are getting worse. ‘Widely perceived as fault of Thant’. [raises voice] Who else’s fault could it have been? No good piece of shit.”

(p. 373)
'Arab Anti-Semitism' was also a central plank in the Zionist propaganda being disseminated at the time and is discussed in detail below.

Nasser as Hitler

The final way that the Holocaust appears in relation to the build up to war was in the elision of Nasser with Hitler. This elision first happened during the Suez Crisis in 1956 in when the British government and the British press described Nasser as 'Hitler on the Nile'. The intention of representing Nasser as Hitler during the Suez Crisis was an attempt to garner support from the British public for the joint British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Hitler represents absolute evil in post-1945 British culture so it was a common tactic of British propaganda during wartime to try and align enemies of Britain with Hitler in the minds of the British public. This tactic was revived in 1967 by pro-Israeli members of Britain’s establishment. In the context of the 1967 war it had the double effect of not only suggesting that Nasser was totalitarian, dictatorial, bloodthirsty, and evil but also that he had anti-Semitic and genocidal intentions in going to war with Israel.

Liberal MP John Pardoe made the connection between Hitler and Nasser in a speech he gave at the Royal Albert Hall rally:

“[Israel’s] annihilation has been more specifically threatened by Nasser than has the annihilation of any other small country since the publication of Mein Kampf.”

The connection also appears in Zionist propaganda. The Labour Friends of Israel (one of the main disseminators of Zionist propaganda at the time) published a pamphlet called ‘Nasser’s Nazis: Egypt a Home for Wanted Hitlerites’.

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99 (CZA: F13/560 General)

100 Zionist propaganda represented Yasser Arafat as ‘Hitler in the Bunker’ during the 1982 Lebanon-Israel war.

101 (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Albert Hall)

102 (CZA: S5/12478 ‘England’)

180
It is impossible to speculate what would have happened had the war ended in an Arab victory. It is, however, highly unlikely that it would have ended in the industrialised genocide of Israel’s Jewish population. In the unlikely event that this had been the secret intention of the Arab states during the build up to the war – and there is no historical evidence to support this – the Arab states did not have the means to undertake genocide on an industrial scale. Why then, does this become ‘the only possible outcome of the war’ (to paraphrase Rose) in the minds of the British Jewish community in the weeks preceding its out-break? There are two reasons for this. The first is that in 1967, the immense trauma of the Holocaust had yet to be negotiated in British (or world) Jewish culture. It structured the British Jewish cultural unconscious, profoundly shaping the perception British Jews had of their place in the world, namely that ultimately they would never be safe from anti-Semitism. It is because of the crucial role that the traumatic memory of the Holocaust plays in giving shape to post-1945 British Jewish culture that it can be seen as a Deleuzian singularity (as defined by DeLanda) i.e. as a structuring principle that governs the unfolding of a culture determining many of its formal attributes. This is one of the reasons that post-1945 any threat to a Jewish community, the spectre of the Holocaust is resurrected as a possible outcome.

The second reason is that there was a concerted effort on the part of the Israeli state and Zionist organisations in Britain to present the build up to the war in these terms in their propaganda. For instance, in a last minute attempt to gain support from the USSR before the beginning of the war Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol wrote the following to his Russian counterpart Alexei Kosygin: “Surrounded on all sides by hostile armies, we are engaged in a life or death struggle to defend our existence and to prevent Nasser from fulfilling his goal of repeating the crimes perpetrated by Hitler against the Jewish people” (Oren, 2002, p. 169). In Britain this and similar messages were disseminated by the Israeli Embassy and the Zionist Federation (ZF) – a ‘nerve centre of … public relations work’ according to a ZF press report. This work included issuing a series of pamphlets, reprinting speeches and writing
letters to newspapers editors. One of the pamphlets that warranted special mention in the report is ‘From Egypt With Dove’ “in which we reproduced a series of cartoons that had appeared in the Arab press”. Many, though not all, the cartoons within this booklet represent Israel in the form of an anti-Semitic depiction of a Jewish man (large nose, stout hunched over figure, forelocks) that was used most famously by Nazi newspaper Der Stuermer. The booklet also includes a December 1934 Der Stürmer cartoon in its pages. Quotes from Arab leaders and the media are also printed, including: “with the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel is faced with two alternatives, either of which will destroy it: it will either be strangled to death by the Arab… blockade… or it will perish by the fire of the Arab forces…” (Radio Cairo, 20th May). This booklet (and others like it) raise complex issues for the historical interpretation of the intentions of the Arabs in the month long tensions before the outbreak of war. These images and quotes did appear in the Arab press during the build up to the war and using a Der Stürmer style image of a Jew to represent Israel is plainly anti-Semitic. However, the link between these representations and the idea that the Arabs were driven by anti-Semitic intention or that they had planned a Holocaust is not as straightforward as the Zionist Federation suggests, having gathered these representations together into a single booklet. Firstly, as argued in Chapter 5, there was no unified Arab intention during the build up to the war. The events of May/June 1967 transpired as a result of the power struggle taking place within the complex geo-political arrangements of a Middle East fraught with competing political ideologies – not as a result of an ahistorical and genocidal anti-Semitism. Secondly, the picture of Arab propaganda that emerges in the existing historical literature is more complex than its Zionist representation. For example, in an article examining the historical origins of the alleged Arab threat to ‘throw the Jews into the sea’ Israeli historian Moshe Shemesh demonstrates how this specific formulation was created by the Israeli

103 (ISA: 4006/13 Press Report on Six Day War)
104 (CZA: S5/1247 England: Material Relating to War)
information bureau by distorting a statement made by PLO leader Ahmed Shuqayri at a press conference. When asked what would happen to the citizens of Israel if the Arabs won the war, Shuqayri answered: “We will endeavor to assist [the Jews] and facilitate their departure by sea to their countries of origin.” Regarding the fate of Jews born in pre-1948 Palestine, he replied: “Whoever survives will stay in Filastin, but in my opinion no one will remain alive” (Shemesh, 2003, p. 72). The prospect that ‘no one will remain alive’ would no doubt have disturbed an Israeli and Jewish audience. However the statements couching this claim – ‘whoever survives will stay in Filastin’, ‘we will endeavour to assist and facilitate their departure by sea’ moderate its meaning. The ethics of forced repatriation are highly problematic, even in the context of colonial-settler societies, but it is not the genocide implied by the Zionist representation of Shuqayri statement as ‘throwing all the Jews into the sea’. In the cases where the Zionist propaganda does faithfully reflected the violent language used in the Arab propaganda: arguably, this Arab propaganda was designed for the eyes and ears of an Israeli public, with the specific intention of de-moralising them. The mere fact this language existed does not automatically mean that it was intended literally.

However, whether it was intended or not, the existence of this material, its distortion and dissemination by Zionist organisations and the fact that the Holocaust was a singularity that structured post-1945 British Jewish culture meant the unfolding Middle East Crisis had a profound effect on the British Jewish community. In DeLandian-Deleuzian terms it triggered an intensive process that would eventually lead to the change in the extensive properties that are the subject of the rest of this thesis.

### 4.2. Intensive process: terror

“I can understand the intertwined terror and the exultation out of which Zionism has been nourished…”

[My emphasis] (Said, 1979, p. 60)
DeLanda introduces two further conceptual terms in his discussion of affect: intensity and quality. Intensity refers to the force with which the affect is being exerted. Quality refers to the qualitative nature of the specific affect – happiness, sadness etc. The intensive process triggered in the British Jewish community during the Middle East Crisis occurred in two phases. The first phase was the terror triggered by the thought of the repetition of the Holocaust. The second was the elation/exultation triggered by the perception that Israel had successfully fended off this threat – (terror and exultation being the affects which nourish Zionism, according to Said). Although qualitatively these phases are opposed to each other, they were of an equally high intensity. As will be demonstrated this high intensity surpassed the critical threshold required to trigger the becoming B-w-O of the British Jewish community and the phase transition in which the extensive properties of that community are altered.

The representation of the Middle East Crisis as the potential genocide of Israel's Jews triggered, what can be described broadly as, intense terror in the interviewees. The following words were used to describe the reaction they had: “fear” (Vivien, p. 625; Stephen, p. 361; Sarah, p. 525), “frightening” (Vivien, p. 625), “very worried” (Vivien, p. 625), “horrifying” (Evelyn, p. 492), “tension”, “feeling of being surrounded”, “helpless”, “dread”, “sick”, (Stephen, p. 361), “horrendous”, “trauma” (Sarah, p. 525), “very, very afraid”, “anxiety” (Brian, p. 576). All the interviewees related this, in different ways, to the threat of annihilation they felt Israel faced. The fact that all these words are essentially different descriptions of the same affective response is evidence of the social nature of Deleuzo-Guattarian affect – the same affect circulating around the British Jewish assemblage. The fact that its is essentially only one affect as opposed to a more complex assemblage of different affects that has important consequences for the type of Body-without-Organs that emerges at this time and the extensive properties that emerge after the war as a result. This is discussed below.

The interviewees also point to the intense force with which they experienced the terror that was sustained through the duration of the crisis.
The British Jewish writer Louis Marks describes the “sheer horror” that took hold during the crisis (1967, p. 12). Evelyn describes the intensity of the affect she felt in the following quote:

“What did you think would happen if Israel… if war broke out? It was too horrifying. I think it was too horrifying to actually anticipate. I think it was back of your mind always, couldn’t be anything else.”

(Evelyn, p. 492)

In the following quote, Stephen describes how the affect was ‘overpowering’ and ‘took over’:

“So there was this real overpowering feeling and sense of dread and fear around my household… that did, kind of take over on the lead up. That was the over-riding feeling… most of the memories I have were of fear, of fear.”

(p. 371)

For Sarah, simply the act of remembering the ‘total’, ‘absolute’ fear made her emotional during the interview:

“Total fear. Absolute fear, that my country… ooh I’m getting quite emotional… yeah, driven into the sea. I mean, it was a horrendous thought at that […] They might be wiped out. It was an absolute trauma.”

(p. 525)

British Jewish writer Louis Marks describes the intensity of his reaction in an article he wrote for literary journal *Jewish Quarterly*:

“Thinking back to those sticky June nights… the total commitment to Israel’s survival – *the emotional strength of which, I think, surprised and engulfed us.*”

[My emphasis] (1967, p. 12)

That this was affect in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense can also be demonstrated in the way it appeared as a bodily, as well as psychological reaction. In the same article Louis Marks writes:

“It was the start of that tea and biscuits week when the crisis hit us in our stomachs"
Stephen gives a vivid description of a similar bodily reaction that he had during the crisis:

“It's a sick feeling in your stomach. That low, sort of sickness that you think... it's a fear, but it's not all encompassing because you still live your life but it's there the whole time. It's that fear. I can only imagine it's a bit like someone who's been diagnosed with cancer. It's in the background the whole time. So in the period, the leading up to it.”

4.3. The becoming Body-without-Organs of the British Jewish assemblage

That this intense terror reached a critical threshold is evidenced by the becoming B-w-O of the British Jewish assemblage during May/June 1967. To illustrate how a variation in intensity produces a B-w-O it will be useful to return to DeLanda's example of H$_2$O. What determines whether H$_2$O is either steam, water or ice is the degree of fixity/fluidity between the H$_2$O molecules in the specific state they are in: H$_2$O molecules are most fixed as ice and most fluid as steam. When H$_2$O reaches either of its critical thresholds of intensity (0°C or 100°C) and begins its phase transition, the relations between the molecules begin to simultaneously deterritorialise and reterritorialise i.e. the old relations which previously held them together disintegrate as they enter into new relations. This process is the phase transition and it is when the H$_2$O molecules are at their most disorganised and most active.

Whilst human populations and the cultures that bind them are far more complex as multiplicities than H$_2$O molecules, according to the logic of Deleuze's ontology both are subject to broadly similar processes of change. If a collectivity of people are charged to a sufficient degree of intensity the social relations that had held them together disintegrate, whilst new ones begin to forge amidst frenetic activity. To give an example: Capitalism and Schizophrenia and its dynamic conception of ontological de- and re-
assemblage was, in part, inspired by the events of May 1968, which is itself a moment of the B-w-O. Charged to the requisite degree of intensity, students, workers, academics and political radicals – groups who had not operated collectively before – began to work in concert through frenetic cultural and political activity. Old social relations disintegrated and in the brief moment before new ones were formed, the collectivity, charged by the same intense affectivity, operates as one. This is a phase transition at the intersection of the planes of culture and politics, or a Body-without-Organs. A similar process occurs a year earlier in the British Jewish community but because of the specific way the community is assembled (see Chapter 4) and the different type of affectivity running across it as a result of the crisis and the war, a different type of B-w-O is produced than that of May ‘68, with different political consequences.

That the British Jewish community becomes a B-w-O in May/June 1967 is evidenced by the frenetic activity it became involved in during this period. What makes this activity particularly striking is that in the 1945–1967 period Jewish political activity was in decline, not simply in terms of Zionism but also compared to the left wing activity of the organised Jewish proletariat in the first half of the twentieth century. By the 1960s, Jewish post-war social mobility into the bourgeoisie meant Jews in Britain had less to actively struggle for (see Chapter 4). The activity that occurred during the Six Day War represents an intense form of political dynamism in comparison to the sedimentation that was occurring in the 1960s.

‘The Great Togetherness’

The first step in the creation of the B-w-O is the organisation of the ‘organs’ into a single surface so the intensity flows across it uninterrupted. That this occurred in the British Jewish community is evident from both the archival materials and the interviews. First, the fact that the British Jewish response was almost uniform in the types of affective response and types of activity it generated suggests a single surface being created during May and
June 1967. The creation of a single surface is also explicitly articulated in the archives and the interviews. For instance, in a sympathetic piece about young British Jews volunteering to go to Israel to fill the civilian jobs of IDF reservists, left wing activist and journalist John Pilger describes what was happening in the Jewish community at the time as the ‘Great Togetherness’ (1967, p. 9). Jeremy, corroborates this in his interview:

“…all of sudden you were all joined up in one week.”

(Jeremy, p. 425)

Earlier in the interview he highlights this ‘joined-upness’ in terms of the communications technology of the late 1960s:

“It really was the air-strikes, and it was quite early in the morning some time, either going to work or at work and hearing it on the news thinking, ‘Blimey’. And then everybody phoning one another. Mobiles weren’t really in then. I don’t remember them then. And everybody put televisions on.”

[My emphasis] (Jeremy, p. 422)

Louis Marks describes Pilger’s ‘Great Togetherness’ in terms of the ‘Writer’s for Israel’ group that he formed with colleagues in solidarity with Israel as a result of the war.

“‘Writers for Israel’ was formed last June by a group of Jewish writers who came together spontaneously out of a sense of commitment to Israel’s survival. Whatever the reservations of individuals on many issues, this did not alter the fact that a new situation had called forth a wholly new response. Never before had so many Anglo-Jewish writers stood together on one

\[105\] Even Jews of the New Left, the most significant politically organised group of Jews to be explicitly anti-Zionist in this period (‘Old Left’, pro-Soviet, communism had been in decline in Britain since 1956) participated in this response: “During the Six Day War … all of Jewry abroad underwent a tremendous shock. Even the most remote and most placid of world Jewry felt as if caught in the center of an earthquake. The consciously assimilated intellectuals who belong to the ‘life of the entire world’, the prophets of universalism, dreamers envisioning the end of the “era of nationalism”, even these were for a moment inflamed by a sense of identification with the State of Israel threatened by annihilation at the hands of militant Arab nationalism with the aid of the totalitarian-Soviet nationalism. This feeling flashed for a moment then passed.” (Bar-Nir, 1969, pp. 35–36). The interview with anarchist Brian, confirms this, although he claims his sympathy was equally distributed amongst all sides.
platform as writers and as Jews. It seemed at the time suddenly the natural and right thing to do."

[My emphasis] (Marks, 1967/1968, p. 10)

Solidarity Demonstrations

The most explicit manifestation of Pilger’s ‘Great Togetherness’ was the solidarity demonstrations that occurred in all parts of Great Britain as a demonstration of support and way to raise finance. The following is not a conclusive list of all the solidarity meetings that occurred within Britain during this period, rather just an attempt to provide a snapshot of the different forms and scales these demonstrations took.

The largest demonstration of all was organised by the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. It was called ‘Solidarity with Israel: A Public Demonstration’ and was held on Monday 5th June 1967 (the day the war started, though the ZF would not have known this at the time of organisation). 10,000 people attended. Three British MPs addressed the crowd, as did the Chief Rabbi and Lord Sieff, chairman of Marks and Spencer and notable Zionist. In a letter to the event’s organiser the Chief Rabbi described the rally in a way that demonstrates the Deleuzo-Guattarian dynamics under discussion:

“The rally was certainly one of the most stirring experiences of my life, and I want to commend you and your colleagues on the magnificent arrangements. I shall be forever thankful for the opportunity and privilege to have contributed in some small measure to arousing and representing the united feelings of our people at that historic moment of Israel’s supreme trial. May we now succeed in maintaining this sense of passionate Jewish identification and unity among our community.”

Lord Jakobivitz describes the intense affectivity that bought about the meeting and was sustained by it: “one of the most stirring experiences of my life”. He also describes the uniformity of this intense affectivity – “united feelings” and

106 (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Royal Albert Hall)
points towards the change in the extensive properties that this intense affectivity brings about “a sense of passionate Jewish identification and unity”.

Similar events with similar types of affectivity happened all over London. The Jewish socialist group Poale Zion hosted a ‘Solidarity with Israel Demonstration’ at Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park on 1st June 1967. A ‘Solidarity with Israel’ conference was held at Woburn House in London on Sunday 11th June. An event advertised as ‘An Emergency Appeal to Express Solidarity with Israel’ took place at North Finchley and Woodside Park Synagogue. The most detailed archival evidence of the frenetic activity occurring within the British Jewish Body-without-Organs is in a report filed by the Manchester and District Zionist Central Council detailing their activity from October 1966 – November 1967 including the “dozens of meetings… in Synagogues, clubs, private homes and public halls…” that occurred during the crisis and the build up. These included mass meetings at New Century Hall, Manchester’s Great Synagogue, Steel Memorial Hall and the Opera House. It also lists dozens of smaller scale events organised during the crisis by various Jewish and Zionist organisations all over the North-West of Britain, such as coffee mornings and card evenings organised by the Didsbury Women’s Zionist Society and a thrift shop set up by Manchester Mizrachi’s Women’s Organization.

Both Harvey and wife Vivien (p. 615) recall attending a synagogue meeting:

“I remember this one guy got up. He was in the kitchen manufacturing business and after they’d given the spiel: “Israel was in a desperate state, blah, blah and they need money”. This guy got up and said, “I'll give £3,000”, which was a lot of money. And then another guy got up and said, “I'll give £10,000”. [...] And by this stage the rest of the community was in uproar because no one had that sort of money to give. And I could see things were getting out of hand so I got up and I said, ‘I’m going to give £100’, which is what I did. And that helped simmer it down.”

(Harvey, p. 598)
In this account intensity and activity are interwoven. The meeting occurs out of a mutual “concern” shared by the congregants of the synagogue. At the meeting increased intensity is matched by increased donating until the community is in “uproar” and Harvey has to “simmer… down” the intensity that has been building. Jeremy recounts a similar experience whereby a young woman, in what is presumably an emotive decision, donates her engagement ring to Israel (Jeremy, p. 421).

Fundraising

The intense affectivity surging through the British Jewish B–w–O not only unleashed frenetic activity in terms of bodies but it also, as the above anecdotes point to, unleashed flows of capital in the form of fundraising. The fundraising drive was headed by Israel’s Finance Minister, Pinhas Sapir, and was organised through various Zionist organisations in Israel and in the Diaspora, mainly the Joint Palestine Appeal JPA, Keren Heyesod and (in Britain) the Zionist Federation in Great Britain and Ireland and its subsidiary organisations. The fund was called the JPA Emergency Fund and raised a total of £14,638,000. This is nearly seven times as much as had been raised by British Jewry for Israel in the previous year. \(^{110}\) (In 1968, Keren Heyesod attempts to organise a JPA Emergency Appeal Stage 2 but without the British Jewish assemblage charged with the requisite intensity it only manages to raise £1,662,206).

The report filed by Manchester District Zionist Council describes the typically Deleuzo-Guattarian interweaving of intensity, activity and organisation in a B-w-O in relation to the huge flows of capital that were unleashed across the Plane of Organisation by the crisis and the war:

“The most successful appeal ever witnessed in this city… It would need a lengthy volume to describe in detail the intense activity in Manchester during the Emergency Appeal… From the start Achdut-JPA workers played their

\(^{110}\) (ISA: 6588/2 Emergency Fund 1967)
part. Their key workers were available in all sections of the appeal, playing a leading part in creating an atmosphere, which soon involved the whole community. The emergency committee was formed under the leadership of the Zionist Central Council, JP, JNF, and WIZO organisations in the city. This created a sense of solidarity, which never previously existed.”

[My emphasis]

Of the interviewees Sarah, Rose and David (as well as Vivien, Harvey and Jeremy) spoke about fundraising activity. Sarah, sixteen at the time, found a job in a local chip shop in order to send money to Israel (p. 526). Rose talks about spontaneous acts of donation and in doing so relates to the change in the extensive properties of the British Jewish community that occurs as a result of the war i.e. the ‘discovering of Jewishness’ by previously secular Jews.

“My father had a group of Czech friends called the Czech Chevra and he used to meet up with them. Many of them were non-religious, but in 1967 suddenly many of them were in great danger… it was the most amazing thing – people knocked on the door to give my mother jewelry, to give my mother money, because they knew that WIZO was collecting money to go to Israel and all these people, their Jewishness … some of them […] had no Jewish background, most of them were married to non Jews […] Completely unexpected; and that was one of the things in 1967. People discovered their Jewishness, and that was an overall thing.”

(Rose, p. 641)

Volunteers

Arguably the most unexpected activity, which saw largely sedimented bourgeois Jews unleashed into a frenetically charged molecular multiplicity was the decision to volunteer to work in Israel. Of the 7,215 volunteers who had arrived in Israel by 25th September 1967, 1,940 of them were British. At 27% of all volunteers, British Jews were the largest group from a Diasporic community. (The second largest were from South Africa at 801 and 11%).

Many had signed up with the intention of fighting, but having had no military

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112 (CZA: F13/722 Volunteers)
training ended up undertaking the civilian jobs of the IDF reservists who had been called up to fight.

Of the interviewees, Evelyn’s foster child wanted to go but was too young so had to go the year after (p. 490). David remembers writing to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer (p. 456). Sarah went to Eder farm – Habonim’s collective farm in East Sussex – to replace the Habonim members who had been temporarily living there but had chosen to volunteer. Joseph worked in Habonim’s office in Manchester signing up volunteers. Rose actually volunteered herself and stayed in Kibbutz Hagoshrim for a period of three months. She talks about the experience on pp. 649–652 of her transcript.

Revealingly, in John Pilger’s article mentioned above he describes the motives of the Jewish volunteers as primarily affective:

“They all say they feel Israel’s cause deep in their Jewish hearts, and perhaps they feel it with the same bellicosity that Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis feel for their cause deep in their hearts”

[Emphasis in original] (Pilger, 1967, p. 9)

**Miscellaneous: ‘Glued to the Media’, Letters, Marks and Spencer, Blood Drive**

Demonstrating, fundraising and volunteering were the main forms of activity that occurred within the British Jewish community in May/June of 1967. The archival research and interviews did also reveal other activity that occurred on a smaller scale. For instance, Stephen (p. 359, p. 367, p. 372), David (p. 459) and Jeremy (p. 416) talk about their avid media consumption. Jeremy’s radio was ‘always on’ and Stephen watched the news ‘non-stop, virtually’. Evelyn tried donating blood at Marble Arch Synagogue (p. 494). A number of Jews wrote letters of support to the Israeli Embassy. There are 337 in the Israeli State Archive\(^\text{113}\) and some were collected into a book – *Letters to Israel Summer 1967* (Robson, 1968) – that was published a year later.

\(^{113}\) (ISA: 1385/2 Letters that came with donations)
Rose spoke at length about how the Marks and Spencer head office (where she worked) turned into a hive of pro-Israel activity during the crisis and the war. The families who headed the board of Marks and Spencer (the Marks, the Sieffs and the Sachers) were noted Zionists. Rose claims that during the war Michael House was a lynchpin of communications because they feared Rex House was being monitored and because Marks and Spencer had the latest communications technology. She also claims that Marks and Spencer’s employees were told a proportion of their cheques would go to the Emergency Appeal. When she went to Israel as a volunteer, Marks and Spencer continued to pay her salary for six months and sent weekly food parcels to her and other Marks and Spencer’s employees. (p. 641, p. 660). The general thrust of Rose’s claims appear to be corroborated by a telegram sent by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to Lord Sieff on 2nd June 1967.\footnote{114}

4.4. Intensive processes: exultation

“I can only say that we were shown conclusively that Diaspora Jewry – every sector and generation of it – lives by its link with Israel. This war for them was a period of anxiety, which Zahal’s\footnote{115} victory transmuted to pride. I saw them in the days before the decision and on the first day of the war. They were sad, despondent, anxious about what the morrow would be bring, and many of them went with tear-filled eyes. After the first days passed these tears turned to tears of joy, jubilation, pride… It is a pity that as yet no poet or scribe has arisen to portray the manner in which the Jewish people rose up and all the anxiety and concern then the joy and pride, they passed through…”

Israeli Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir describes the affective response to the war and the crisis that precipitated it, in a speech to the Knesset reproduced in the \textit{Jerusalem Post}, 2nd July, 1967.\footnote{116}

The majority of the activity just described stretched over the period of the crisis to the six days of the war itself. The British Jewish B-w-O could be

\footnote{114} (ISA: 1396/17 British Jewry) \footnote{115} One of the Hebrew names for the Israeli Defence Force \footnote{116} (ISA: 6588/2 Emergency Fund 1967)
maintained throughout the duration of the period because the intensity of the affective response never diminished. What did change was the quality of this response. In Pinhas Sapir’s words anxiety transmuted into pride, joy and jubilation. This change began as soon as British Jews became aware of the success of Israel’s strike against the Arab airfields and was cemented at first with the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem and secondly after the speed and scale of the victory became apparent at the end of the war. The affective response to this impressive military victory was intensified by the British Jewish perception that the war had meant that Israel had fended off a genocide of Israel’s Jews. This section demonstrates how this representation of the war and the victory generated an equally intense affective response to that which emerged prior to the war but whose content was qualitatively opposite.

Of all the events of the war itself, the following aspects of the appear to have had the greatest affective impact on the interviewees: i) the shock of the Israeli strike on the Arab airfields on the morning of 5th June 1967; ii) Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan as an inspirational military leader, and implicitly a new type of Jew; iii) the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem, specifically the Western Wall which is understood in almost messianic terms; and iv) the speed and scale of the Israeli victory.

**Shock**

The first instance when the anxiety of the crisis began to transmute into something qualitatively different was after the IAF struck the Arab airfields.

Stephen remembers the moment he heard that Israel had started the war from the news, and in doing so describes the quality and intensity of affect he felt as a result:

"In a fantastic stroke this morning, Israel had struck..." Pundits couldn’t believe it. Newscasters couldn’t believe it. [...] No one had forecast that they would do this. No one had predicted it. *I was completely and utterly shocked.* I was only a 12 year old but I never met anyone that said ‘Oh I knew they..."
were going to do that’. It was out of leftfield. It wasn’t anything that had happened in history. Do you see what I mean? [...] Unheard of. Bravery and not only bravery but who would have thought they would have the bottle to even think that. It turned out it was just a brilliant move and changed the whole course of the war.”

[My emphasis] (p. 368)

Jeremy re-calls a similar reaction:

“No they haven’t, I don’t believe it”

(Jeremy, p. 422)

Stephen’s perception of the Israeli strike as ‘brave’ and ‘just a brilliant move’ is typical of the British Jewish interpretation of Israel starting the war, which was primarily structured by populist notions of jingoistic ‘derring-do’. Even David who had been involved in anti-Vietnam student politics compares his involvement in the war as similar to that in his involvement with his football team (p. 448). Stephen’s phrase, ‘I was completely and utterly shocked’ points to both the intensity and the quality of the affectivity triggered by this perception.

Shock turns to an equally intense sense of elation when British Jewry understands that the consequence of the air strike and how it would determine the course of the war. This ‘elation’ spreads to Britain after the BBC announce the effect of the air strike at 4am on 6th June 1967 (Churchill, 1967, p. 231). Stephen provides the most detailed description:

“Choked up. Delighted. The build up, the tension of the days leading up and how bad it was going to be and the Tiran Straits and the UN forces. You knew it was coming and you feared this devastation and you feared what was going to happen because you couldn’t trust [does finger/quotation mark gesture] the ‘dirty Arabs’ to do the honourable thing [...] I tell you what you’d liken it to. You’re up on drink-driving charges. You could go to prison, you stand up in the dock to tell your story and you wait for the jury to give their decision. And that feeling as you awaiting must be horrendous. And then someone says ‘Right, innocent’ and then it’s like [acts sighing in relief and body losing its stiffness/collapsing] That feeling [...] This huge weight comes off your shoulders.

(p. 368)
Here Stephen describes in the intensely visceral response he had to the war after Israel’s surprise attack. During the interview he re-enacted the switch in the quality of affectivity from fear to delight he experienced as it registered across his body. The intensity, however, remains the same. Other interviewees do not give as detailed responses as Stephen but they do point to similar experiences of affectivity. Jeremy describes the euphoria he felt during the war and the change in extensive properties it generated (the changed self-perception of British Jews):

“It’s terrible to say but there was a sort of Europhobia [sic] … what’s the word? You were really excited it was happening and that’s wrong because it’s a war but each time they whacked them somewhere you thought ‘aarr’ [proud/impressed sigh: as if to say ‘wow’] that’s gonna stop them hurting us. A lot of people respected the Jewish people after that. It changed your opinion. Normally they were weak old people with their shoulders down buying and selling and all of sudden, hello, they can look after themselves.”

(Jeremy, p. 420)

Harvey said he was ‘more happy’ (p. 601). David said it was ‘really exciting’ (p. 457)

Jerusalem

The intensity reaches its height on the third day of the war when the Israeli army takes Jerusalem. Segev and Oren describe different aspects of the genesis of this intensity triggered in the Israeli government and the soldiers in Jerusalem (described in detail in Chapter 5). An unsigned letter found in the Central Zionist Archive and addressed to S L Shipton in Hendon (North London) describes the capturing of the wall and the intensely affective reaction to it:

“Above all, of course, there was the surrender of the Old City, and the reaction to it was something that goes beyond words. It is not even something rational; some of it has been described in the Jewish and the general press, such as burly paratroopers with tears streaming down their faces as they were standing in front of the Western Wall. I wish a tape of the radio newsreel on which Rabbi Goren’s conducting of the first prayer and sounding of the shofar was relayed could be made available to everybody. The reporter was practically incoherent with emotion and this was something which went down
to the marrow. I heard this tape repeated a few times and every time I got a choking feeling in my throat.”

In this account the affective reaction is highly intense (“goes beyond words”, the reporter is incoherent with emotion) and it registers across the body (soldiers cry, it goes down to the marrow and there’s a choking in the throat) – both defining aspects of Deleuzo-Guattarian affect.

The most vivid description of the intense affective response to the capturing of the Western Wall from the interviewees is from Sarah. Merely recounting the memory of this became so intense for Sarah, she started to cry during the interview:

“I can remember the recapturing of Jerusalem, or the recapturing as we called it at that time. I remember the picture of the soldiers going to the wall, and the fight for the wall. I can remember this anxiety about were they going to do it and then they’re in. They’ve captured Jerusalem and the soldiers… [voice breaks on soldiers]… Oh I’m crying now… [laughs]. [Continues to cry and as she speaks her voice breaks] I can remember the soldiers… and their guns… at that wall and the picture of that wall and… weeping. […]

Do you remember reacting similarly at the time? Having a very strong emotional reaction?
[Nods. She can’t speak because she’s so choked up]”

(Sarah, p. 527)

Joseph talks about the euphoria that existed in relation to Jerusalem (p. 563) as does Stephen (p. 371).

Moshe Dayan

The key Israeli figure in the representation of the war and a central locus for British Jewish affective investment was Israel’s Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. Almost all of the interviewees spoke about him in their interviews, being the only figure from the Israeli political establishment at the time any of them remembered. Only one remembered Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and only after prompting. This is, in large part, because of

\(^{117}\) (CZA: S5/1247 'England' (Material relating to War))
Dayan’s iconic presence in global media at the time, something he was very conscious of cultivating.\textsuperscript{118}

Before, during and after the war Dayan was perceived by British Jews as a glamorous, daring and unpredictable political maverick, qualities that came to be embodied in his eye-patch. A typical example of this representation is in a \textit{Daily Mirror} news story printed two days after he was made Defence Minister. The article was headlined, ‘Dayan, a Shot in The Arm for Israelis’:

“One gleaming eye slices through you like a laser beam. The other is covered by a black patch…The last time I saw him… he was lolling on a pavement café chair with his arms round two giggling army privates – girls… Virtually every woman in Israel is in love with him… Now he has the job there is a new feeling in the country. It’s what teenagers would feel if Michael Caine took over from Harold Wilson. He is the shot in the arm Israel needs after being in the latest stage of the Middle East war game… most of all he is a man of action. So there is little doubt now in any Jews mind what will happen to Nasser’s crew when Moshe Dayan chooses a time and a place.”

(Wise, 1967, p. 7)

Dayan and the effect he has on the Israeli public is being described in intensely affective terms in this article. Not only is he being constructed as a locus for sexual desire – “Virtually every woman in Israel is in love with him” – his appointment as Defence Minister produces “a new feeling” in Israel.

The interviewees had a similarly romanticised perception. Both David (p. 461) and Sarah (p. 533) compare him to a pirate as a result of his eye patch. Sarah goes as far as comparing him to Hollywood actor Johnny Depp in the feature film \textit{Pirates of The Caribbean} (ibid.). Zena compares him to Nelson (p. 407), Stephen to Churchill, a superhero and “leader of the pack” (p.

\textsuperscript{118} Segev recounts how Dayan told Levi Eshkol that the Western Wall was too dangerous to visit on the day it was captured, so that he could have his photograph taken entering Jerusalem and therefore be associated with its capture. The photograph (Dayan flanked by Rabin and Narkiss) was carefully staged under Dayan’s instruction and widely circulated. It became one of the iconic images of the conflict, helping cement the articulation between Dayan, the war and the ‘re-capturing’ of Jerusalem in the minds of the Jewish public (2005, pp. 369–370).
The intense affective investment that British Jews made in Dayan can be seen in a statement made by Jeremy:

“You’d felt that you’d like to know him. I’d seen Sharon, you know the one who is Prime Minister now\(^{119}\), the one that they say is still in the coma. I saw him about thirty years ago, twenty-five years ago when he was a general. And he came walking into the Akadia\(^{120}\) and he had such an air of power and respect, you just stood with your mouth open watching him walk past, you know. You’d think if anybody is going to lead you, I’d like to be behind him […] But that respect you felt for Israel, you felt for Dayan. And of course the patch, all the things to remind you… I can’t say it’s good PR… it just suited it. The patch itself reminds you that he’s prepared to lose an eye and that he’s still battling on and ‘don’t start with me’.”

[Emphasis in original] (Jeremy, p. 428)

The broader cultural dynamics which allow Dayan to be represented in this way and the intense affectivity his image generates as a result is touched upon in a *New Statesman* article entitled “Israel’s Coriolanus” written by Paul Johnson and published in the 29th August 1969 edition:

“… to the gross-minded Western public [Dayan is] a glamorous and daunting figure, who has erased the traditional archetype of the Jew… At a popular level he has completely altered the Israeli image, both for better and for worse… [Israelis] feel safer when he’s around”

(Johnson, 1969, p. 27)

The successful entry of a new archetype of Jewish masculinity, embodied by Dayan, into popular culture is one of the key outcomes of the Six Day War on the plane of representation. This archetype had existed since the early days of Zionism as the ‘New Jew’ (Boyarin, 1997) and had been popularised in Ari Ben Canaan – the hero of the film *Exodus* (1960) (see Chapter 4). It was, however, only after the Israeli victory of the Six Day War that Diasporic Jewish communities were persuaded of this representation’s veracity. After the war the representation of the ‘New Jew’ successfully migrates from Zionism into popular culture and is incorporated into British Jewish identity (“After the Six-Day-War… you didn’t have to associate yourself with Woody Allen; you could identify with Paul Newman”\(^{121}\))

\(^{119}\) This is factually incorrect. Benjamin Netanyahu was Prime Minister at the time of Jeremy’s interview, whilst Ariel Sharon was reportedly in a coma.

\(^{120}\) The Dan Akadia is a hotel in Herzliya that is popular with British Jewish tourists.
Dayan is not the only figure through which this process occurs – it also happens through the figure of the Israeli soldier and the representation of the Israeli army more generally. This process is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

The speed and scale of the victory

The final element of the war that generates an intense sense of elation is the speed and the scale of the Israeli victory. British Jews were stunned that in fighting five Arab armies Israel had tripled its land mass in six days. This was even more stunning in the context of how British Jews had perceived Israel in the build up to the war. David remembers his perception of the victory:

“It just seemed so bizarre, that it could happen as quickly as that. Don’t forget that part of the context was Vietnam, which was going on for year after year after year with not much happening. Suddenly this thing goes [clicks fingers] blink of an eye. Umm… Had I believed in God ‘miraculous’ would have come into it because it just seemed bizarre.”

(p. 460)

Sarah uses a biblical reference that was common at the time:

“I think it was seen as a real David and Goliath story and David won and I think as far as I know it was presented as little Israel has survived this terrible threat. And how brave and how strong, and in seven days [sic] and what a feat.”

(p. 531)

Evelyn, one of the interviewees who identified as religious, understood the victory in religious terms:

“Do you remember… what did you think of them winning. What did you think it meant for Israel?  
Je: That heaven above was looking after them. 
E: Yeah I suppose you do as a religious Jew, that someone up there must be looking after them and how did they survive such intense bombardments and God knows what.

So it was a religious reaction?
Je: I think so
E: In a way, I think it was a religious reaction yeah."

(p. 500)

This scale of the victory was impressive by any measure, and the fact that British Jews were surprised by it and accounted for it using biblical or religious explanations makes sense in the context of the general ignorance of Israel’s overwhelming military strength in the Middle East in the late 1960s. The Israeli government exploited this ignorance in their pre-war propaganda drive. Israel as ‘David against Goliath’ is, as previously demonstrated, a misperception as the intelligence community knew at the time (Segev, 2005, pp. 252–3). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the victory was so large and so fast because by 1967, the IDF were better equipped, funded, trained and motivated than the Arab coalition that was hastily put together during the crisis. Another major contributing factor was the fact that Israel started the war unexpectedly, destroying the Arab air forces putting them at a severe disadvantage from the outset.

The use of religious language by the interviewees is interesting. Of all the interviewees only Evelyn, Stephen and Sarah appeared to have been highly religiously observant at any time of their life. Anti-Zionists Brian and David do not practice Judaism at all and the rest are what is termed ‘High Holy Days Jews’ (see Chapter 4). Taking this into account how do we make sense of the religious explanations offered for the victory? One explanation could be the war mobilised what small part of their religious identity remained in 1967. Another might be, that religious or biblical discourses are often adopted in largely secular British Jewish culture when British Jews are unable to make sense of something using the dominant rational discourses. Religious language is also used to account for intense experiences that similarly exceed conventional rationality.

Arguably all these explanations played their part. The last two explanations particularly point to an affectivity of exceptional intensity being
generated by the victory and this is addressed explicitly by the interviewees: Evelyn was “exuberant” and “so excited” (p. 500). Stephen describes how after Israel occupied the Golan Heights, the final act of the war, “the intensity of the first day just grew. The furore…” (p. 369). Stephen also describes a bodily reaction: a “weight off your shoulders” (p. 375) Sarah recalls “dancing in the streets” (p. 530). Harvey was “delighted” (p. 603), Jeremy “really happy” (p. 421).

Although the intensity of the affective states dissipates after the war ends, it alters the affective landscape within the British Jewish community afterwards. This is discussed in the following two chapters, but Rose gives an indication of how it was changed, and how long it lasted:

“I knew that there had been an amazing victory and I knew that the whole of Sinai and the West Bank was under Israeli control and the Golan Heights and the map had expanded tremendously but I can’t honestly say that the implications of that occupation were very strong. You just were living on a high that Israel still existed […] I mean everybody was walking around two feet above the ground cos everybody had felt what they’d done. And when we got to England we were heroes [Rose was a volunteer in Israel for 3 months after the war]. There was no doubt about it. Up until the Yom Kippur War […] the feeling in the country was amazing and then the Yom Kippur war happened and then that was [claps her hands together] it killed the feeling. Terrible, it was ghastly. And we were all aware of it.”

[Emphasis in original] (Rose, p. 660)

4.5. The cancerous Body-without- Organs of the fascist

As outlined above the B-w-O is only ever a transitionary moment (corresponding to DeLanda’s phase transition) and the question for any Deleuzo-Guattarian cultural analysis is what new form does the assemblage assume after it re-organises (what new extensive properties are created), what encounters does it enter into with other assemblages, what lines of flight are potentialised and to what consequence? The answer to these questions depends on the sort of B-w-O that was created. The new extensive properties that were created by the phase transition triggered by the Zionist representation of the war are the focus of Chapters 7 and 8. The final section
of this chapter uses evidence touched upon throughout previous sections to argue that the B-w-O generated by the Six Day War was the cancerous B-w-O of the fascist.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the cancerous B-w-O of the fascist is defined by the function it performs on the strata of significance and subjectification, i.e. the serialisation of subjectivity and meaning-production. That both these things occurred is most strongly evidenced by the uniformity of the British Jewish reaction to the crisis and the war. For instance, all the interviewees perceived the crisis as threatening the annihilation of the State of Israel and the genocide of its Jewish population, often using the language of the Holocaust to express themselves. Rose articulates the shutting down of other possible interpretations of what the crisis could mean most strongly: “Everybody you spoke to said that […] How could it possibly not happen” [Emphasis in the original] (p. 648). Even anti-Zionists Brian and David (and Ralp Milliband), both of whom claimed to exist outside the networks of mainstream Jewry and both of whom were involved in anti-war politics at the time and therefore exposed to the sort of anti-Imperialist discourse that was used by pro-Palestinian groups in the post-1967 period, interpreted the crisis in this way. Other aspects of the war were also interpreted with the same uniformity and as a result the activity it inspired was similarly uniform in intention.

As demonstrated in chapter 4, the strata of significance and subjectification, produced a variety of different meanings and subject positions in the British Jewish assemblage. Prior to 1948, anti-Zionism and non-Zionism were both prominent in British Jewish culture. In between 1948 and 1967 groups such as the Liberal and Progressive synagogues, orthodox Jews and Jews within the New Left were critical of Zionism and the State of Israel (Bar-Nir, 1969; Jakobovitz, 1991; Alderman, 1992). In that moment of becoming a B-w-O in May-June 1967 all of these groups were pro-Israel, with only Jews in the New Left resuming their pre-67 position after the war ended (Bar-Nir, 1969). The dominant position of British Jewry in relation to Israel in the post 1967 period is overwhelmingly pro-Israel: a 1970 National Opinion Poll puts
Jewish support of Israel at 80% (Alderman, 1992). This near uniformity of meaning and subjectivity production in relation to Israel is a key feature of British Jewish culture until the Lebanon war of 1982 (Sacks, 1991), and only reaches a critical mass (i.e. it becomes an identifiable political movement) after the Second Intifada with the emergence of groups like Jews for Justice for Palestine and Independent Jewish Voices.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to use a DeLandian-Deleuzian theoretical framework to analyse what occurred in the British Jewish community in May and June 1967 as a result of witnessing the Middle East crisis and the war it precipitated. Using the interview data and archival material, this chapter has argued that representing the 1967 war as a quasi-religious fending off of a potential genocide of Israel’s Jews triggered a morphogenetic process that altered the formal attributes of British Jewish culture, many of which last until the present day. It does this in the following way: the perception of the Middle East crisis as a potential genocide for Israeli Jewry triggered an intensely affective response within the British Jewish community – terror. The reason that this representation of the war successfully triggered an intensely affective response is because the Holocaust is a singularity that structures British Jewish culture in the post-1945 period. The response was so intense that it reached the critical threshold necessary for the community to undergo a phase transition or what Deleuze has called with Guattari in the context of social formations, a Body-without-Organs. This is evidenced by the frenetic, affectively charged activity that the British Jewish community was involved with during May and June 1967. Once the war started and it quickly became clear that Israel will win, the intensity of affect that circulated across the British Jewish community remained the same (and it therefore remained in the form of a B-w-O) but the quality transmuted from terror to elation. Once the war ended, so did the intensive process. The singularity of the Holocaust, and what it meant for British Jews, dislodged in that it became articulated to Zionist representation of a militarily strong Israel. This caused the following changes in the extensive properties of British Jewish culture: i) the
incorporation of the idea of a militarily strong Israel into British Jewish identity and the way this made British Jews feel as Jews in Britain and ii) the rise of Popular Zionism as the major discourse governing the British Jewish relationship with the State of Israel. These changes are the focus of the following two chapters.
Chapter 7

The Production of Hegemonic British Jewish Cultural Identity after the Six Day War

1. Introduction

“On the one hand, Marxism can degenerate into economic determinism. This may appear very materialist, because it is dealing with the ‘hard’ realities of money and work, but it deals with these realities in an abstracted, idealist way... It fails to understand how economic structures are lived and affected [my emphasis] in the skin and bones of people working. On the other hand, recent Marxist theorists have rightly rejected such economic reductionism. But in their search for an alternative theory have come with one equally prone to idealism. Working from theories of language and from a psycho-analysis [sic] of a certain kind they have put a valuable stress on the role of ideology in history, and in particular, on the way people are socially formed into what we understand people to be – what is called ‘the construction of the subject’. Yet their theory leads to a position where being ‘a person’ or ‘a subject’ is only a construction in language and ideology. Granted that society fashions us through words and representations of humanness, but it fashions us out of flesh and blood, not thin air.”

(Dyer, 1981, p.66)

“French structuralists of the sixties in effect established a kind of religious trinity comprised of the symbolic, real and imaginary... But we know quite well that no trinity... has been or ever will be able to take into account... the singular being of an ordinary sliver in desiring flesh”

(Guattari, 1986, p.282)

“It is no wonder that to very many Jews all these momentous world changes which reached culmination in the events of last June should present themselves on the personal level as a simple question: What does it signify to be a Jew? It is a question of identity.”

(Marks, 1968, p.10)

It was in 1981, just at the point that British cultural studies was spreading outside the CCCS, that Richard Dyer perceptively mapped the blind spot of the theories of the subject that would dominate the discipline for the next twenty years. 1981 was the point at which Althusserians were jostling with Lacanians in order to provide the most persuasive account of subject
formation (Hall, 1980 (a)). Despite their differences, Dyer critiques both these approaches for being too idealist and for not fully accounting for the way that being interpellated by ideology or entering the symbolic is experienced materially by the subjects produced by those actions. Here, material refers not only to the Marxist materialism of economic structures but also the materialism of the body – what ‘corporeal feminists’ would come to call corporeality over a decade later (Creed, 1993; Grosz, 1994) or what Guattari calls “the singular being of an ordinary sliver in desiring flesh” (op cit.).

This thirty-year-old critique of subject formation continues to be relevant. Cultural studies still uses post-structuralism, and its emphasis on the linguistic, as the dominant approach to understand the construction of cultural identity. For example, the most influential work on cultural identity carried out within the mainstream of cultural studies is Stuart Hall’s writing in the 1980s and 1990s (1987, 1988, 1992 (a), 1993, 1996). Based on the work of a range of poststructuralist theorists (Althusser, Foucault, Lacan, Butler etc.), one of Hall’s most important theoretical positions on cultural identity is most succinctly articulated in the statement “identities are therefore constituted within, not outside, representation” (Hall, 1996, p. 4), postulating a notion of identity which is constructed in and as language. Elsewhere Hall does address the material aspects of identity (Hall, 1992 (a), p. 281), but his focus has remained on identity as ideological/discursive/representational/semiotic (depending on the theory, or combination of theories, he is using in the different work).

At the end of Dyer’s essay, he implies that a Foucauldian approach to identity might offer a way out of the theoretical impasse he outlines. However, following Grossberg (1992) and, implicitly, Dyer according to Gilbert (2006), this chapter argues a more productive way out would be to follow a Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to subjectivity and identity formation, as this addresses the material in all its senses: the means of production and the corporeal, or in

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121 Theories of the subject are equally applicable to analyzing cultural identity. If the subject is the sense an individual as of her or himself, cultural identity is how that individual makes sense of him/herself situated within the cultures they inhabit.
Dyer’s terms, the economic structures and the skins and bones of people working.

The specific approach used in this chapter on the changes in British Jewish cultural identity after the Six Day War is a strand of Felix Guattari’s solo authored work, which focuses on the formation of subjectivity. The keystone essay of this strand of work is ‘On The Production of Subjectivity’ (1992). Guattari had been writing on this theme during the same historical moment that Dyer was criticising leftist cultural criticism for not fully accounting for all the materialist aspects of subjectivity and identity formation. Guattari’s work on subjectivity does precisely that, but does so in a way that also includes the representational. Guattari’s theoretical framework posits three ‘fluxes’ that work together to produce subjectivity – the material, the social and the semiotic (Guattari, 1977, p. 223). The inclusion of all three fluxes is important in order to fully understand what happens to British Jewish identity after the Six Day War. Chapter 3 has outlined at length the socio-economic aspects that provide the context for this change in identity. Chapter 5 has outlined the interplay of the semiotic (the representation of the war) and the material (the affective response generated by this representation) that bring about this change. This chapter will analyse how these different fluxes came to bear on hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity in the post-1967 conjuncture. The key change was the way that Israel was represented in British Jewish culture (the semiotic) and the way this made them feel as Jews in Britain as a result (the material).

2. Existing approaches to the place of Israel and Zionism in British Jewish cultural identity

Using a Guattarian approach will be a significant departure from the way that the place of Israel and Zionism in British Jewish identity has been analysed thus far. The effect of the Six Day War on British Jewish identity has so far only been analysed historically (Sacks, 1991; Jakobovitz, 1991; Alderman, 1992; Endelman, 2002; Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007) or sociologically (Gould, 1984) or both (Lederhendler, 2000). There is currently
no scholarship that uses cultural theory to analyse the effect of the Six Day War on Diaspora Jewry, British or otherwise. Rose (1996; 2005; 2007) and Said (1979) have used psychoanalysis and postcolonial cultural theory to analyse the relationship between Jewish identity and Zionism/Israel, in a general sense. There is also a tradition of British Jewish sociology that has tried to account for shifts in the ‘attachment’ British Jews have had to Israel (Kosmin and Grizzard, 1974; Kosmin and Levy 1983; Kosmin et al, 1997; Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 1974; Graham and Boyd, 2010). Within this body of literature, the affective dimensions of the relationship between Jewish identity and Zionism/Israel is touched up but remains undetailed and under-theorised (with the exception of Rose whose approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 2).

2.1. Jewish cultural studies

In the past fifteen years there has been a growth in Jewish cultural studies (Boyarin and Boyarin, 1997; Bronner, 2008; Silberstein, 2000; Stratton, 2000, 2008). All of these use the traditional cultural studies emphasis on the discursive/representational/semiotic and are interested in how Jewish cultural identities have been discursively constructed in relation to textual representations of Jewishness and Jews. For example Stratton argues that, “like all subjectivities that of the ‘Jew’ is discursively constructed” (Stratton, 2000, p. 35). This approach, has been important in bringing questions of Jewish culture and cultural identity into cultural studies but the emphasis on the discursive means that crucial questions of the materiality of Jewishness – how it is lived, felt and experienced – has been overlooked in this work. As will be demonstrated in the rest of this chapter, a (Deleuzo-)

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122 To give an example: Stratton defines the Holocaust as ‘the representational violence of total extermination’ (Stratton, 2008, p. 1). While the discursive construction of Jews as sub-human was instrumental in enabling the genocide of Jews (and others) between 1933–45, Stratton’s over-emphasis on the discursive occludes the materiality of the Holocaust – the ghettos, trains and death camps (not to mention the corpses), the terror, disease and starvation etc. – out of which the Holocaust is primarily constituted. It seems absurd to only understand the Holocaust in terms of representation, yet this is the tendency of the dominant cultural studies approach. This is an extreme example, but does illustrate what is missed by Jewish cultural studies current emphasis on the discursive.
Guattarian approach begins to remedy this oversight in Jewish cultural studies.

3. Deleuze and Guattari against cultural identity

To use a (Deleuzo-) Guattarian approach to analyse cultural identity, in many ways, goes against the grain of Deleuze and Guattari’s politico-theoretical project. The reason for this is that in Deleuze’s solo authored work, and in his work with Guattari (t)he(y) have tended to eschew the notions of both cultural identity and subjectivity. In Negotiations Deleuze goes so far as to say, “there is no subject” (1990, p. 86). In place of the subject, they instead focus on the ‘molecular’ forces ‘beneath’ the subject (affects, perceptions, desire) and the ‘molar’ forces ‘above’ it (the social structures, collectivities, the physical environments etc.). In Anti-Oedipus the term ‘desiring-machines’ is used in places where humanist philosophy might use the term subject (Stagoll, 1998, p.165) to emphasise the machinic nature of the construction of a human being out of these various molar and molecular forces.

Deleuze and Guattari have also eschewed the notion of ‘cultural identity’. Guattari has argued that, “the notion of ‘cultural identity’ has disastrous political and micropolitical implications, because what it fails to grasp is precisely the whole wealth of the semiotic production of an ethnic or social group or society” (Guattari and Rolnik, 1986, p. 100). Deleuze and Guattari, arguably, set out their theoretical position on ‘cultural identity’ (though never explicitly stating as such) in the chapter ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…’ in A Thousand Plateaus (1980, pp. 256–341). In this chapter they look at the power relations that organise the Plane of Organisation at the moment of writing (phallocratic, colonialist and bourgeois) and then argue that rather than using cultural identities like ‘woman’, ‘gay’, ‘Jew’ etc. as the basis for political action, they should instead be used as stages in a deterritorialisng progression away from the molar identity ‘man’ (and by implication, white and bourgeois) towards the ideal Deleuzo-Guattarian state of becoming-imperceptible. All cultural identities are something to be escaped in favour of a state of endless, fluid
becomings that completely evades the possibility of fascistic organisation of power relations. The implication here is that cultural identity in itself is a molarity that blocks the potential becomings inherent in all machinic assemblages, and one that, in turn, tends to produce fascistic and exclusive social relations. This might explain why Deleuze-Guattarian cultural analysis has tended to focus on questions of aesthetics, cultural practice, experience and social movements than cultural identity per se.

Despite the objections raised by Deleuze and Guattari to questions of cultural identity and subjectivity, this chapter is based on the premise that not only is it possible to use a Deleuze-Guattarian approach to these questions but it is beneficial to do so in order to fully account for the changes that happen in British Jewish identity after the Six Day War. As Bogard has argued, “against a common interpretation of post-structuralist thought, Deleuze and Guattari never deny the possibility of the subject” (1998, p. 53). Stagoll’s Becoming Subject: Difference and The Human Individual, writes against ‘common interpretation’ and teases out of Deleuze’s work (with and without Guattari) ways in which it might be used to think through questions of subjectivity. He argues that Deleuze is not against the subject per se, rather

123 Deleuze and Guattari apply this logic of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ more explicitly in the context of cultural identities in their discussion of minor/minoritarian and major/majoritarian (1975; 1980). In keeping with this logic, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of these concepts produces a different definition to their common-sense (almost) namesakes – minority or majority. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘minoritarian’ is a molecular process – a becoming that determinatises molar assemblages. Conversely the majoritarian is the molarization of a, more-or-less, determinatised assemblage. A minority, in the sense of the organisation of a collective of people under the sign ‘ethnic minority’/’sexual minority’ etc., is a territorialised assemblage that functions in a molar capacity. It is a state rather than a process. The examples they use to illustrate this difference are the ethnic minorities Jews and Gypsies. “Under certain conditions” they argue, Jews and Gypsies “may constitute minorities” but this does not make these groups inherently minoritarian (1980, p. 321). In fact, Deleuze and Guattari single out Zionism as an example of the non-minoritarian disposition that a minority can assume: “Even Jews must become-Jewish (it certainly takes more than a state).” (ibid.). Zionism as a majoritarian practice can be counterposed by Deleuze and Guattari’s notion in Kafka: A Minor Literature (1975) that Yiddish is a minor language. Again, it is not because Yiddish is spoken by a minority community that means it is minor; rather Yiddish is minor, specifically because, its mixing of (primarily) German, Hebrew and Slavic languages amounts to a determinatisational of German – a molar language. Major and minor/molecular and molar are not absolutely distinct categories and, typically of these Deleuze-Guattarian dyads often work together in the same assemblage at the same time. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari argue that in order for feminism to function successfully at the time of A Thousand Plateaus it needs to be put molar categories (the cultural identity ‘woman’) in the service of the molecular (the dissolution of patriarchy) (1980, p. 304).
he is against liberal humanist conceptions of the subject (e.g. Descartes’ Cogito, Kant’s transcendental subject and Husserl’s intentional ego) that conceive of subjectivity as a “relatively stable, objective and universally rational centre of identity” (Stagoll, 1998, p. 2).

In a similar fashion, Deleuze and Guattari’s objections to cultural identity are not objections to the idea that cultural identities exist at all, but objections against the organisation of cultural and political practice around distinct cultural identities – for example, the identity politics that was emerging in the period that *A Thousand Plateaus* was being written. Whilst this makes a Deleuzo-Guattarian identity politics oxymoronic, a Deleuzo-Guattarian analytics of cultural identities as they exist on the Plane of Organisation (what they consist of, how they are formed and how they change) is entirely possible. Braidotti (2002), Colebrook (2000) and Grosz (1994; 1995) explore this very problematic in relationship to feminism and the cultural identity ‘woman’. Guattari also addresses questions of subjectivity and, by implication, cultural identity in much of his solo authored work after *A Thousand Plateaus*, most notably in his essay ‘On The Production of Subjectivity’. It is this approach, outlined below, that will be used in this chapter in order to make sense of the changes in hegemonic British Jewish identity after the Six Day War.

4. A Guattarian approach to cultural identity

“[Integrated World Capitalism] understands that the production of subjectivity is possibly more important than any other kind of production, more essential than the production of petroleum and energy.”

(Guattari and Rolnik, 1986, p. 36)

Despite Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative reticence towards questions of subjectivity and cultural identity, Guattari places these questions at the centre of his late work (1977, 1989, 1992, 1996 (a)), largely as a response to what he sees as the central place of the production of subjectivity by Integrated World Capitalism – his term for globalised capitalism.
In keeping with the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology of assembly, Guattari understands cultural identity/subjectivity as a ‘machinic assemblage’ defined by the elements it is assembled from and its relations of exteriority to other assemblages on the Plane of Organisation. Guattari experiments with a number of terms for subjectivity to communicate its assembled nature: first ‘Collectivities of Utterance Formations’ (Guattari, 1977), then ‘Collective Assemblage of Enunciation’ (1989) – both emphasizing the semiotic nature of subjectivity. In later work he de-emphasises the semiotic by using the more materialist term ‘Existential Territory’. Throughout his work, however, these terms never completely replace the term ‘subject’.

What then is subjectivity assembled from? According to Guattari, subjectivity can be assembled from anything across the Plane of Immanence – “no more than to the cosmos do I recognise any limit to myself” (Guattari, 1996 (a), p. 168) – meaning he argues for “a polyphonic and heterogenetic comprehension of subjectivity” (Guattari, 1992, p. 6). Guattari’s monism means that substances which other philosophical approaches see as incompatible can be brought together into one machinic assemblage.

“The process… of subjectivation … involve machines of expression that can be of an extra-personal, extra-individual nature (machinic, economic, social, technological, iconic, ecological, ethological, media systems, in other words, systems that are no longer immediately anthropological), or of an infrahuman, infrapsychic, infrapersonal nature (systems of perception, sensibility, affect, desire, representation, image and value, modes of memorization and production of ideas, systems of inhibition and automation, corporeal, organic, biologic or physiological systems and so on).”

(Guattari and Rolnik, 1986, p. 43)

For Guattari, the nature of subjectivity is vastly complex involving a host of heterogeneous elements that are both extra- and infra-personal. Our sense of selves is constituted as much by, for example, our affective dispositions as it is to our location within supra-national systems of global capital; the effect of the physical environment we grew up in (a farm, a suburb, a slum) as much as the signifying systems with which we identify.
For Guattari, subjectivity is a constant dialogue between the cosmic and the molecular and all the various scales in between. ‘Ecology’ is a term Guattari uses in his later work (1989) in order to communicate the continuous and complex interplay between the heterogeneous elements that constitute subjectivity (and will be the term that is used through the remainder of the chapter). Elsewhere he categorises these subjective elements into three types – the semiotic, the social and the material: “It is never a human being who is working… but an agency composed of organs and machines… which takes part in a machinic ‘assembly’ which puts together semiotic links and a great interweaving of material and social fluxes” (Guattari, 1977, p. 223).

If subjectivity and cultural identity are constituted by heterogeneous elements (broadly material, social and semiotic) from across the scales of the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology (the cosmic to the molecular) what are the processes by which these elements are draw together into a specific form of subjectivity, or in Guattari’s terms an existential territory? This question cuts to the heart of Deleuzo-Guattarian thought. If A Thousand Plateaus has a recurring theme it is outlining the processes by which matter achieves form. Double articulation, territorialisation, the refrain, becoming, consistency… these are some of A Thousand Plateaus key concepts and all of which outline processes of ontogenesis.

For Guattari, the ontogenetic process that constitutes subjectivity (a subjectivity constituted out of affect as well as social and semiotic elements) is the ‘refrain’. The ‘refrain’ is first discussed in a Deleuzo-Guattarian context in A Thousand Plateaus in “1837: Of the Refrain” (1980, pp. 342–386). Deleuze and Guattari illustrate the concept with the example of how birds use the repeated motifs – the refrains – of birdsong to mark out their territory. Guattari applies the notion of a refrain in a more generalised sense – a process that constitutes territory – to subjectivity, or what he calls existential territories.

He defines refrains as “reiterative discursive sequences that are closed in upon themselves and whose function is an extrinsic catalysing of affects” (Guattari, 1996 (a), p.162). One of the examples he uses to illustrate this
concept of the refrain in relation to subjectivity is taken from his clinical practice. In patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder, the obsessive activity that they are reiteratively compelled to perform is what assembles the heterogeneous elements that constitute subjectivity into a cohesive form. The affects that are catalysed by obsessive-compulsive refrains are, primarily, sad in the Spinozist sense – they diminish the capacity for that subjectivity to act. Guattari argues that to simply remove the obsessive-compulsive refrain would not re-arrange the subjectivity into catalysing more joyous affects. It would instead cause the subjectivity to deterritorialise in a way that would cause the patient to enter psychosis. A clinical practitioner should instead introduce another refrain that would catalyse joyous affects. This new refrain is case-specific but could include simple things like driving lessons (Guattari, 1992).

Guattari is once again, defining subjectivity in a way that interweaves the semiotic, the affective (material) and the social (driving lessons are culturally specific).

In keeping with Guattari’s notion of the heterogenetic and polyphonic nature of subjectivity he claims that refrains “can find substance in rhythmic and plastic forms, in prosodic segments, in facial traits, in the emblems of recognition, in leitmotifs, in signatures…” (Guattari, 1989, p. 79). What form do the reiterative discursive sequences that catalyse the affects that constitute British Jewish identity after the Six Day War take? The interviews and archival research would suggest it was the Zionist propaganda that filtered into the British Jewish community in the build-up to the war and appears reiteratively through the interviews. These include a variety of statements: e.g. i) Israel always faces its extinction, ii) Jews in the Diaspora perpetually face anti-Semitism, iii) the existence of a strong Israel protects Jews against these threats, iv) Palestinians and Arabs are only interested in killing Jews and are therefore no different from the European anti-Semites… Articulated together these statements amount to a discursive sequence that appears reiteratively in the interview transcripts (reflecting their more widespread appearance in the cultural production of the British Jewish community). This

124 And at the moment of writing – Iran.
refrain appears most strongly in the interviews in the form of a new representation of Israel and Israelis. This catalyses a complex arrangement of affects within British Jewish culture after the war – a way of feeling about Israel and a way of feeling as Jews in Britain (outlined in detail below). This, in turn, gives form to the matter that constitutes British Jewish identity post 1967.

5. A Guattarian analysis of the shifting position of Israel in hegemonic British Jewish identity

The aim of this chapter is not to give a Guattarian account of hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity, but to give a Guattarian account of the changes that occur within this identity as a result of the Six Day War. The war does not radically alter the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology, just the position of Israel within it. The chapter therefore begins by briefly outlining the heterogeneous elements that constitute the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology before the Six Day War. It then identifies the refrains present within the interview data (the discursive sequences used by the British Jews to represent Israel) the affects they catalyse (the way British Jews feel towards Israel and as Jews in Britain as a result) in order to ascertain the position of Israel within the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology. It finds the representation of Israel that the majority of British Jews subscribed to was vague and the resultant affectivity it generated was low-intensity. It therefore does very little affective work within the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology i.e. it has negligible impact on the way British Jews feel as Jews in Britain. The chapter then repeats this procedure for hegemonic British Jewish identity after the war, demonstrating how the refrains of Zionist propaganda produce a representation of a strong, brave dynamic Israel capable of fending off a genocide of Israel’s Jews within the subjective ecologies of the majority of British Jewry. This catalyses a complex and intense ‘affective assemblage’ in relation to Israel, that combines pride, a sense of security, excitement and sexual desire but also a sense of threat and fear. It also finds that this complex affective assemblage is maintained, in part, by its encounter with the Palestinians who it goes some way in brutally disempowering.
The chapter then uses these findings to argue that the reason British Jewish support for Israel has been so rigid and intractable is because of the way that a post-1967 representation of Israel has made the majority of Jews feel as Jews in Britain. Like Guattari’s example of the refrains that hold together obsessive compulsive subjectivities, if the refrains of Zionism were to be removed altogether, hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity would rapidly deterritorialise in a way that panics those British Jews who consent to it. Arguably the overreaction to criticism of Israel is evidence of this. It is an attempt to urgently reterritorialise a cultural identity that makes them feel safe and strong in a world they still believe threatens them as a Jews. The Guattarian question then is what refrain might replace Zionism that would produce more joyous affects for British Jews and the other bodies they encounter – one that is not undercut by a sense of perpetual fear and one that is mutually empowering for the Palestinians? This question is addressed at the end of the chapter.

Before beginning the analysis, it is very important to stress that what is being discussed in this chapter is the place of Israel within hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity. There are and have been a multiplicity of British Jewish identities whose content and relation to each other continuously shifts in time and space. For example, there are ethnic differences (Sephardi, Mizrahi, Ashkenazi), denominational differences (e.g. progressive, reform, ultra-orthodox) and differences in regional Jewish identity (even in regions as spatially proximate as North-West and North-East London differences in cultural identity are produced). There has also been a multiplicity of shifting ways that British Jews have related to the State of Israel. As chapter 4 argues non and anti-Zionism were legitimate positions to adopt within the mainstream of the British Jewish community up until 1948 and as Brian’s interview suggests there were anti-Zionist British Jews operating in British radical politics even when this position had been delegitimized within the mainstream of British Jewish life after 1948. Within Zionism itself there has also been a

125 The Jewish community’s elision of anti-Zionist critique with anti-Semitic attack is typical of this reaction – see (Julius, 2010).
multiplicity of positions on issues such as where Israel’s borders should lie, what sort of political system the State of Israel should have and, post-1948, what sort of settlement it should have reached with the Arab world and the Palestinians. Indeed one can be Zionist but also critical of Israel – the British Jewish columnist from *The Guardian* Jonathan Freedland is a high-profile example of such a position. However, following the post-Marxist (specifically Gramscian) work of British cultural studies just because there is a multiplicity of political positions, ideologies and identities within a cultural formation this does not mean that they exist in an egalitarian relationship to one another. According to this Gramscian work cultural formations are always criss-crossed by power relations where different political positions, identities and ideologies are vying for hegemony in a “constant battlefield” (Hall, 1998, p.447). So whilst this chapter recognises the heterogeneity of ways that Israel has appeared in British Jewish identities since 1967 (particularly noting the growth of Jewish criticism of Israel since at least the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Sacks, 1991; Landy, 2011) its main concern is the dominant way that the Zionist representation of Israel has appeared in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity in the post-1967 conjuncture i.e. how the majority of British Jews have related to Israel between 1967 and 2012. This chapter will evidence this claim by supporting quotes from the interviews with statistical data from quantitative studies within British Jewish sociology relating to this period.

5.1. The heterogeneous elements that constitute British Jewish identity

In keeping with Guattari’s insistence on the immense complexity of the subjective ecology, it would be impossible to list all the various elements that constitute British Jewish identity, before, during and after the 1967 war. However, in order to give some sense of that complexity here is an inconclusive list of characteristics (gleaned from various sociology, cultural studies and history scholarship) that can be understood as some of the material out of which British Jewish identity has been produced:
Synagogue affiliation, religious observance, keeping kosher, friendship patterns, religious belief, cultural and charitable involvement, attachment to Israel, loyalty to Jews, feelings of Jewishness, the use of Yiddish, involvement with Zionism, the red string worn by devotees to Kabbalah, architecture of the synagogue, Jewish folk music, Jewish literature, Jewish cinema, the Holocaust, Jewish delicatessen, subscription to the racial ethnic classifications of (post)modernity, attitudes to Jewish others, suffering, relationship to means of production, job (market trading and taxi driving) anti-Semitism, political affiliation, synagogue attendance, Jewish charity, communal life, living in a Jewish neighbourhood, going on holiday to destinations popular with Jewish people, Jewish humour...

This selection is both heterogeneous (cultural practice, attitudes, material culture, representation…) and is comprised of elements from across the various scales (Molecular: feelings of Jewishness, Molar: Zionist ideology/relaiton to the means of production).126

5.2. The place of Israel in pre-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity

How does Israel figure within the pre-1967 subjective ecology of hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity? In order to answer this question the following section will look at the reiterative discursive sequences by which Israel is represented and the affects they catalyse as a result. The Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of affect is not solely about sensation, but how the sensation affects a body’s capacity to act so this section will also look at the activity mobilised by the pre-1967 representation of Israel.

126 What’s important to note is that many of the characteristics on the list do not have to do with religion. This reflects a recurring theme within the literature on British Jewish identity that ‘secular Jewishness’ has been a common way of being Jewish in Britain in the twentieth Century (Cohen and Horencznk, 1999; Gitelman et al, 2003; Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007; Endelman, 2011; Krausz, 1969 (b)). Julius Gould simply states that a religious definition of Jewry is “impossible” (1984, p. 4).
5.2.1. Representations of Israel in pre-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity

The representation of Israel before the 1967 war that emerged from the interviews is basic at best. All the interviewees were aware of Israel’s existence, but only self-defined pre-1967 Zionists Sarah, Joseph and Evelyn were aware of Israel in any detail – its culture, the people etc.. Sarah and Joseph had visited Israel pre-1967 (Joseph had lived there between 1959 and 1966) and both were involved in Habonim and had quickly become involved in Zionism as an ideology. A more typical response from the interviewees was as follows:

“It was a Jewish country that’s all.”

(Jeremy, p. 418)

“I had no sense of anyone not thinking that Israel was as much of a social fact as France.”

(David, p. 452)

Harvey, recounts an interesting story when he was at school aged around thirteen or fourteen (1952/53) in which he was corrected by a Zionist speaker for referring to Israel as Palestine.

“A guy came to my school when I was probably about thirteen or fourteen and I talked about Palestine and he corrected me to say Israel [...] Because that time it was Israel. And I felt bad about it. But I didn’t become more conscious [...] I wasn’t that knowledgeable about it.”

[My emphasis] (Harvey, p. 592)

5.2.2. The affectivity catalysed by the pre-1967 representation of Israel

As a result of the vague and ill-defined representation of Israel, the affects that are catalysed are notably low-intensity. Harvey continues the above story:
“It didn’t touch me very much.

[...] so you weren’t massively emotionally involved in the idea of Israel?
No, no.”

(Harvey, p. 592)

Other interviewees repeat the low-level affective intensity described by Harvey:

“What were your feelings towards Israel before the war?
Nothing specific.

Indifference?
Yes. Not a great deal. It was a Jewish country that’s all.

[Overlapping] You didn’t feel any strong emotional attachment?
[Overlapping] No… no…. no… no…

(David, p. 449)

“I had a sense that there was this place called Israel where my cousins would go on holiday and bring back boring photos.”

(David, p. 451)

5.2.3. Pre-1967 Zionist activity

The relative neutrality of the affective investment in the idea of Israel produced a moderate degree of mobilization within British Jewry towards Israel, both culturally and politically. Zionist activity in the British Jewish community at this time has been discussed at length in Chapter 4, using Ernest Krausz’s ground-breaking studies on Edgware and Leeds Jewry in the 1960s. In his study on Leeds Jewry Krausz concludes, “even the enthusiasm for the Zionist ideal as a form of nationalism, which not so long ago reached great heights, appears to be on the wane” (1964, p. 115). Aside from Joseph and Sarah, both members of Habonim for ideological reasons, this lack of Zionist activity was reflected in the interviews.
For example, the majority of interviewees were not involved in Zionist organisations. Some were involved in Jewish social or cultural organisations but Zionism and Israel did not figure prominently within the activities carried out within these organisations. Harvey and wife Vivien ran a Jewish youth group in Manchester and neither of them could remember Israel or Zionism figuring in their schedule of activities (Vivien, p. 613). In Harvey’s interview affectivity and Zionist activity (aliyah) are related:

“There was a lot of lukewarm people like me: ’I’m glad Israel exists but that’s for someone else. I’m happy where I am’.”

(Harvey, p. 595)

The intensity of his relationship to Israel is lukewarm and so his capacity to act as a Zionist (make aliyah) remains unmobilized.

Even, superficially Zionist activity does not always reflect a mobilization inspired by the affectivity generated by a particular idea of Israel. For example Rose was an active member of Zionist youth group FZY eventually becoming membership chairman for her local branch. In the interview she says the following of her reasons to join:

“*And so how come you were involved in FZY?*
Because it was our local youth movement.

*But was it important that it was Zionist?*
No, no. [Light laughing] We say at WIZO, we’ve got lots of groups and if they weren’t raising money for WIZO they’d probably be raising money for the cat’s home – it’s just a nice group of people who like to get together and like raising money. I went to FZY because a friend took me along to an FZY meeting and I liked the people and I got very involved.”

(Rose, p. 645)

This quote reflects the following of Krausz’s findings in his study of Leeds Jewry: “even the attendance at Zionist functions is no more significant for the individual than attendance at other Jewish functions”(1964, p. 114). Zionist organisations, events and functions in the 1960s very often just provided a
framework for the Jewish community to socialize as opposed to a framework for the mobilization of Zionism (though the two did overlap).

5.2.4. The place of Israel in pre-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity

Two of the interviewees talked about the affectivity catalyzed by the pre-1967 representation of Israel, explicitly in terms of their cultural identity. Jeremy insists in identifying as ‘English or British’ within a broader discussion about his feelings towards Israel before the war.

“You didn’t feel any strong emotional attachment? 
No… no…. no…. no… I would have been just as happy being English or British, shall we say. No.”

(Jeremy, p. 419)

In Stephen’s interview he establishes a self/other binary between himself and the, in his words, ‘hardcore’ of British Jews who might have considered Israel in ideologically Zionist terms (they considered making aliyah).

“… most people didn’t think about this Israel in terms of this is where I’m going to grow up or I’m going to migrate there. There were the few and there were the hardcore who did want to go back there. And mainly they were the religious […] None of my crowd.

(p. 356)

From this quote we get a sense of a dominant British Jewish self being constructed against a Zionist Other. This Zionist Other were ‘the few’ and a ‘hardcore’. They were ‘religious’ in a time when religious activity was declining in British Jewry (Lipman and Lipman, 1981). For Stephen, Israel is articulated to Yeshivas (Jewish religious seminaries). This misrepresents the predominantly secular nature of pre-1967 Zionist culture and the motivations of British Jews migrating to Israel. It does however fix a sense of Zionist otherness because orthodoxy is also Othered in relation to an increasingly secular and assimilated hegemonic British Jewish self.
5.2.5. Conclusion: Israel in hegemonic British Jewish pre-1967 identity

From the data collected for this thesis it would be fair to summarize the position of Israel in the ecology of hegemonic British Jewish identity in the following way: before 1967, Israel did not figure prominently in the sense the majority of British Jews had of themselves as British Jews. The Israel that was represented was undetailed and vague. British Jews, in the main, just were not knowledgeable about Israel. It therefore catalysed a low-level, arguably neutral degree of affective intensity, which inspired little in the way of political or cultural mobilization in British Jewry. Even when Jews were involved in Zionist activity, this did not necessarily mean they were being inspired to do so because they felt a certain way about Israel as British Jews – rather it was another form for the Jewish community to socialize.

5.3. The effect of the Six Day War on hegemonic British Jewish identity

“The crisis of 1967 seems to have had something of a catalytic effect in respect of Jewish identification in Britain.”

[My emphasis] (Wasserstein, 1971, p. 150)

“The emergence of the State of the Israel in 1948 and, later and more especially, the Six Day War in 1967, ended the indifference of the vast majority of Jews.”

[My emphasis] (Braude, 1981, p. 119)

As the above quotes illustrate, it is a widely accepted thesis within Jewish studies and contemporary Jewish historiography that the 1967 war had an instrumental effect on the place of Israel within British Jewish identity (as well as Jewish identity all over the world). There is currently limited scholarship that details the specific ways that the Six Day War changes that identity of ordinary British Jews (Gould, 1984). This section attempts to add important detail to the already existing scholarship. Following the same outline as the previous section, this section will first look at the changed representation of Israel within the collective imagination of the British Jewish
community, the affective investment that the majority of British Jews make in this representation and the overall change in hegemonic British Jewish identity as a result. The activity inspired by the new affective investment made is outlined in Chapter 8.

5.3.1. Post-1967 representation of Israel and Israelis

"Incidentally Israel at war destroys the prototype of the pale scrawny Jew; the soldiers I saw were tough, muscular and sunburned"

Taken from a communiqué sent by Presidential adviser Harry McPherson to US President Johnson, dated 11th June 1967 (Segev, 2005, p.352)

From having a vague impression of Israel prior to the war, it is clear from the interviews that a very particular idea of Israel emerges in the British Jewish community after it, and this is mainly expressed through the representation of Israelis. Israelis were represented as soldiers, military heroes (sometimes superheroes), powerful, masculine and aggressive. Each of the interviewees that articulated this representation of Israelis always compared it to the dominant representation of Jewishness that prevailed before the war – Jews as weak, and powerless to protect themselves in the face of perpetual anti-Semitism.

Jeremy invokes a classic Jewish archetype – the ghetto Jew – in his description of the new representation of Jewishness that the Six Day War produced.

“A lot of people respected the Jewish people after [the Israeli victory]. It changed your opinion. Normally they were weak old people with their shoulder's down buying and selling and all of sudden, hello, they can look after themselves.”

[My emphasis] (Jeremy, p. 420)
Sarah sets the emergence of a new powerful post-1967 idea of Jewishness against another Jewish archetype related to the ghetto Jew – the Jewish refugee.

“... I think it was really Israel coming out of victimhood and that we are a force to be reckoned with. ‘Watch it!’ It was sort of us raising our heads... you see so much was associated with Israel, in terms of being a place for refugees you know this was a place for victims [...] and they turned that over so that Israel could say, ‘yeah, and look, we’re not going to be bullied anymore by you lot’. I think it was a real statement to do with their strength from these poor refugees that came off the boat, Exodus, the ones you see in that picture have bred these strong men, these good looking hunky men with intelligence and drive and will not be beaten. This was the turning point in terms of Israel making its mark, ‘we are a land and we’re going to stay’. “

(p. 532)

For Sarah, Jews before the war Jews were ‘victims’, ‘poor refugees’ and after the war Jews as Israelis were, ‘good looking hunky men with intelligence and drive and will not be beaten’.

Stephen vividly describes another Jew-as-victim archetype – the Holocaust victim – and the way it was replaced by the Jew as ‘giant’.

“You’ve got to think you have this picture in your mind of millions of Jews going tamely to their deaths. Tamely. If I say to you, ‘the Holocaust’, conjure up a picture and what do you see? You see camps, you see ovens [...] what do they look like? Emaciated. And you think to yourself why didn’t they stand up for themselves? [...] and this was the complete opposite. You’ve taken a guy who is cowering in the corner to his masters and you’ve turned him into this guy who’s a giant.

(p. 381)

Earlier on in his interview, Stephen uses an evocative term that was widespread in the press at the time and the commemoration of the war since – the comparison of Israel beating the allied Arab forces to David and Goliath.
“I mean David had just beaten Goliath. We were the heroes. Israel were the heroes of the world. If you went to a shop you would buy Israeli soldiers because they were the toughest… to play with. Yeah.”

(p. 355)

Sarah described the Israelis as “superheroes” (Sarah, p. 532). David, an anti-Zionist activist now (although “passively” pro-Israel in 1967) and someone familiar with the language of identity politics explicitly makes the connection between the switch from the representation of the Jew as bookish to the representation of Jew as a ‘sabra’ and the effect this had on his cultural identity as a Jew in Britain.

“The Israelis were obviously very tough and the Arabs couldn’t fight for shit [light laugh].

Did it contribute to a different sense of Israel?
I mean yes, it reinforced this macho… that the Sabras were something different.

Can you explain… the Sabras are...
The people born in Israel.

And they were different because...
They were tougher. They were tougher than the Jews I knew. The Jews I knew read books, they didn’t fire rifles. […]

And, did it effect how you felt as a Jew in Britain?
[Pause] I’m sure it made me feel more Jewish. But not more religious. It didn’t make me believe in any sort of God.

So then how does one feel Jewish if that isn’t through religion?
Cultural identity. A way of understanding the world.”

(p. 461)

The reason that this particular representation of Israelis emerges in the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology is because the Israeli victory was perceived to be such a surprising military achievement. If British Jews represented Jews as refugees, ghetto Jews and Holocaust victims how could they imagine that a Jewish nation could become an effective military force? In representing Jewishness in this way, British Jews draw on two related
discourses. The first is the ‘lachrymose’ version of Jewish historiography that views Jewish history solely in terms of suffering and victimhood (a history solely constituted by ghettos, pogroms, anti-Semitism etc.) whilst occluding periods in European and Middle Eastern history when Jewish communities experienced a comfortable or successful existence (Shenhav, 2006; Baum, 2011; Benbassa, 2007). The second discourse is anti-Semitism. A key anti-Semitic representation of Jews is of their sick and unhealthy bodies (Gilman, 1991). For Jeremy pre-1967 Jews are ‘weak’ for Stephen they are ‘emaciated’.

The Israeli victory meant that British Jews imagined Jews and Jewishness differently. The post-1967 representation of Jewishness reversed the terms that Jews and Jewishness had been traditionally understood: strong not weak, powerful not powerless, a military power actively determining their own destiny, not the passive victims of military power having their destiny decided for them. This is Jewishness as represented in Zionist discourse, (which itself articulates elements of both the lachrymose discourse of Jewish historiography and anti-Semitism). Zionism had been representing Jewishness in this way, as the ‘new Jew’, since the 1890s but this representation remained marginal in British Jewish culture until 1967. How did it come to replace the dominant pre-1967 representation of Jewishness in British Jewish culture? This process is described at length in Chapter 6 but to briefly recapitulate: according to Deleuze and Guattari, one of the processes through which an element (semiotic, social or material) becomes more or less dominant in the constitution of an assemblage is through the deterritorialisation that occurs after a surge of affectivity across that assemblage. This surge of affectivity causes the relations of exteriority that hold the elements of an assemblage in a particular arrangement to undo; when the surge of affectivity ends, the elements re-join but in a different arrangement. This new arrangement depends on what caused the affective surge and the relationship of the assemblage to the complex network of assemblages to which it is connected. The surge of affectivity in this context is described in Chapter 6 but can be briefly summarised by, “it was the palpable fear of Israel’s elimination and the pure joy at its survival that placed Israel
squarely in the identity of world Jewry” (Ben-Moshe, 2007, p. 9). Its connection to the complex network of assemblages that surround it is described in Chapter 4. What is important to state here is that from the interviews it is clear that in terms of hegemonic British Jewish identity, the result of this surge of affectivity was the increased prominence of the Zionist representation of Jewishness within the complex ecology that was British Jewish identity.

5.3.2. The place of Israel in post-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity

That the Zionist representation of Israel becomes more prominent in the complex ecology of British Jewish identity is clear from the interviews and also from archival evidence and sociological research undertaken at the time. For example not long after the victory, British Jewish writer Louis Marks writes about how the intense affectivity generated by witnessing the war created a sense of ‘nearness’ between him, his colleagues from the newly formed ‘Writers for Israel’ advocacy group and the State of Israel.

“Thinking back to those sticky June nights, the formation of the group emerges as one detail among many of the changes brought about by the crisis. The total commitment to Israel’s survival – the emotional strength of which, I think surprised and engulfed us – has left a residue of involvement and ‘nearness’ which must certainly persist”

[My emphasis] (Marks, 1967, p. 12)

The spatial metaphor of ‘nearness’ can be read in relation to the ‘space’ Israel occupies in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity. Marks also mentions involvement with Israel, and therefore links affect (being engulfed by emotional intensity), the shifting position of Israel in his imagination (nearness) and their capacity to act in the interests of Israel (involvement).

Jeremy describes the effect the war had on his Jewish identity:

“It didn’t make me more religious, it made me more Jewish race. More aware and proud.
So did Israel become part of your Jewish identity?
Yes, it did. Before it was just a little country where some Jewish people lived
and now I felt I was part of it.”

(Jeremy, p. 429) [My emphasis]

Stephen describes it in similar terms:

“The first big Israel thing was the Six Day War. It bought it to light. Right the
way around the world. And it brought it to my attention that much more.”

(p. 352)

Even David, a self-defined anti-Zionist now, says:

“My only flirtation with Zionism was for a few weeks in ’67”

(p. 467)

Sarah, already a Zionist talks about the part of her life that was to do with
Israel ‘crystalizing’ after the Six Day War.

“I think up until that point I kept my Habonim life and my school life very
separate. […] and there the whole thing came together and […] I think the
Jewish part of me just had to come out. […] It crystallised something.”

(Sarah, p. 530)

Rose also uses a spatial metaphor in talking about Israel ‘merging’ with
Jewishness and the Zionist activity it generated in people you would not have
expected to be Zionist:

“… my friend’s parents for example, we knew some of them were Jewish, but
suddenly their feeling came to the top […] you did feel that the Jewish bit and
the Israel bit merged […] Previously […] almost the two things hadn’t anything
to do with each other and they merged and suddenly you weren’t only Jewish
but you went to fundraising things for Israel and you belonged to Israel
oriented groups of Israel and you went to talks about Israel and you know…
people who you didn’t even expect.”

(Rose, p. 662)
The greater prominence of Israel in the ecology of hegemonic British Jewish identity is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in the interview both Stephen and Harvey (p. 597) elide British Jewish and Israeli identity. Both say ‘we’ when they mean the Israelis. This is more understandable in Stephen, who was born in Israel (having emigrated to Britain at the age of three) but as he says in the quote below he saw himself as a British Jew and not an Israeli.

“You say ‘we’...
(interrupts) The general perception was that we were heroic and they were seen generally in a good light.

Did that effect the way you saw yourself?
No, because I never really saw myself as an Israeli. I felt proud as a Jew. I couldn’t possibly feel proud as an Israeli because that would be stealing their thunder. What did I do? [light laugh]

Sure. Did it give you the possibility of identifying with heroes?
Just because you were Jewish. Yeah absolutely.”

[My emphasis] (p. 374)

There is confusion in Stephen’s use of pronouns here indicating an instability in the way a British Jew could identify with Israel after the war. He uses ‘we’ and then ‘they’ in the same sentence when referring to Israelis. When asked explicitly if the war changed the way he saw himself he says that he never saw himself as an Israeli despite using we in reference to Israel the sentence before.

The increased prominence of Israel and Israelis in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity is corroborated in the historical and sociological research. For instance, Todd Endelman argues that, “only in the late 1960s, after the Six Day War in June 1967, when the existence of the state and the lives of it’s Jewish citizens seemed to hang in the balance, did concern for and identification with Israel’s fate become central to what it meant to be a Jew in Britain” thereby “becoming the most potent force for keeping Jews in the communal fold” [My emphasis] (2002, p. 235). This is confirmed across the literature: (Davidson, 1968; Wasserstein, 1971; Sacks, 1991; Sheffer and Bayne, 2007).
The most in-depth research on the question of the place of Israel in British Jewish identity before, during and after the war was undertaken by a research team lead by sociologist Julius Gould (1984). He carried out a survey of 217 Jews who lived in London in 1969 to try and ascertain the key features of Jewish identification at the time. One set of questions that was asked in the survey related to the identification of Jews with Israel before, during and after the war. His findings are reproduced in the table below.

The sample is broken down into three groups: i) those with high 'overall' identification with Israel; ii) those with medium identification and iii) those with a low identification. The degree of overall identification was measured by asking participants to score on a scale of 0–9 how closely they were identified with Israel, i) before, ii) during and iii) after the war and how important they felt the continued existence of the State of Israel is for the British Jews. Overall identification was calculated by taking an average of the four scores. Gould and his team then allocated each individual to the three above groups according to this average score.

Unsurprisingly, those with a high overall identification with Israel were extremely closely identified with Israel before the war and maintained this level of identification, during and after it. Those moderately identified, were
either fairly or very closely identified with Israel before the war and then shift to extremely closely during it, where many remain afterwards. Those with low overall identification experience an increase in identification during the war with less remaining closely identified afterwards. These findings provide strong evidence that Israel shifts to a far more prominent position within the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology after the war, as suggested in the interviews carried out for this thesis.

5.3.3. The affects catalysed by the post-1967 representation of Israel

The exact nature of the affectivity catalysed by this newly dominant representation of Israel is complex – itself assembled out of different and inter-related affects. The first is pride in Israel, its military achievement and what it means for Jewishness in Israel and in Britain. Secondly, and arguably most importantly, there is an increased feeling of security that British Jews feel as a result of a militarily strong Israel, again both inside Britain and in Israel itself. This feeling of security is expressed mainly in the idea that as a result of the victory Israel had ‘proved’ itself to be a safe haven for Jews should they be threatened by anti-Semitism. Israel also becomes exciting for British Jews and Israelis become sexually desirable. Sexual desirability is mentioned by only two of the interviewees, so should not be overplayed, but it is important nonetheless. The final aspect of this affective assemblage is not explicitly addressed by all the interviewees but often appears when they make statements about how they felt as Jews in Britain after the war and in doing so describe how they felt before the war. If post-1967 Israel made them feel safe, proud and excited, before the war they felt threatened and/or ashamed. These sad affects (in the Spinozist sense) do not disappear post-1967. Arguably they are what the joyous affects are rooted in giving the affective assemblage a complexity whose political and ethical consequences are discussed below.

Pride

Arguably the most straightforward of the affects catalysed by the post-1967 representation of Israel was pride. British Jews were both proud of
Israel, and proud of what they saw the victory meaning for them as Jews in Britain.

"I think it did increase my respect and pride that I felt…

Of being a Jewish person in Britain or of pride in Israel?
I think both.

Both as a Jew in Britain…
Yes I think so. Yes it did. It enhanced it. I don’t think I didn’t feel it before, but it did enhance it. It made me feel similar towards Israel."

(Harvey, p. 605)

“… the next few questions are how it might have effected the British Jewish community. Do you think it did in any way?
I think what it did, like with this person you met who wasn’t particularly religious but suddenly felt much more Jewish. I think it did, they felt much more Jewish. Felt much more akin to Israel. Felt they should help Israel. You know.

When you say more Jewish do you mean more…
Not particularly praying type but, you know, the feeling of being Jewish, proud of being Jewish I suppose.”

(Evelyn, p. 501)

Security

A slightly more complicated affect catalysed by the war was a feeling of safety and security. Not only is this a persistent refrain of the interviews but it also appears in Gould’s study of London Jews in 1969. The new feeling of security Jews felt after the war stems from the interpretation of the war as Israel successfully fending of a genocide of its Jewish population. It therefore ‘proved’ itself to be a safe haven for world Jewry. None of Gould’s interviewees explicitly talk about the affectivity generated by this representation of Israel as safe haven, but by representing Israel in this way, the affectivity is implied.

"In an emergency, in the case of persecution, the Jew should know that he has a home to go to, to live in freedom. It gives respect to the Jew in that he can show the world that he has a land and that he can fight for himself"
‘Bernard’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 75

“It is some central place to look at and to feel that a Jewish person can go there if they want to. It is possible that there might be a time here when things are very bad and we could be forced out.”

‘Cecil’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 81

“If the Israelis were driven into the sea it would be a very sad day for British Jews who would lose … the security of their national home.”


The representation of Israel as safe haven also appeared repeatedly in the interviews carried out for this thesis with some of the interviewees speaking in depth about the affectivity this representation generates in them.

“I’d say most of the Jews in Britain, most of the Jews of my generation; we feel that we need Israel as much as Israel needs us. You need somewhere to go.”

(Harvey, p. 610)

“… my parents [Holocaust survivors] were very worried about it because they felt it was very important to have Israel.

So why were you parents…
Because of their past you know, they… I think they felt a bit more secure.”

(Vivien, p. 626)

“But every time we go back to Israel there’s this feeling that you’re kind of totally… totally relaxed. I suppose looking back on what I’ve said to you: this hidden fear, this anti-Semitic pogrom fear that you have completely goes away when you’re in Israel. Completely. Because when you’re on the streets and in restaurants you haven’t got anyone looking at you the wrong way because you’re Jewish. […] It’s a great feeling not to be worried about that. That’s a big attraction to me. I really do feel at home there, I feel comfortable there.”

(Stephen, p. 354)

Excitement and Desire

Stephen and Sarah talked about a different sense of affectivity that the new representation of Israel and Israelis generated in the British Jewish community. The first is excitement:
“All of a sudden it became an exciting place to go to. Rather than frightening and surrounded by Arabs.”

(Stephen, p. 381)

The second is sexual desire. Stephen, who was born in Israel, and whose parents originated, unusually for a British Jew, from North Africa talks about how his Middle Eastern physical appearance was understood by his predominantly Ashkenazi peers after the war.

“Within the Jewish community as soon as I say I was born in Israel it would add a bit of kudos. ‘Ooh, Stephen’s Israeli….‘ you know it was like… So you’d never say it and get a derogatory comment back… Because I was a little bit different. Because I was a little bit dark skinned […] They had something about them. They had something that set them slightly apart. Something slightly sexy and slightly attractive. Because, as I say, we were the good guys in those days.”

[My emphasis] (p. 360)

Sarah, who visited Israel in 1968 with the Zionist youth group Habonim, recalls having a relationship with an Israeli soldier who had fought in the Six Day War.

“Well I was working on kibbutz […] I just had a brief love affair, fling with a soldier at the time.

**Was it exciting to you that he was a soldier?**

Oh yes, of course […] It was partly that but partly because he arrived on the top of a tractor, this hugely hunky man [inhales as if she has been caught short of breath] who had just came back from war on a tractor [laughs]. This iconic Israeli, you know, ‘yes! Come to Israel with your blue hat and your kibbutz hat’ and he just arrived on this tractor. It was love at first… of course. And he happened to be, I think he was only doing his miluim,127 but he had been in the war. It was the whole package. But we were very caught up in the poignancy as well of these young men who were building a land, and building a country. And really heavily based on principles. And usually the Israelis we met were incredibly thoughtful and deep and considerate and really emotional effected by their experience.”

(Sarah, p. 538)

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127 **Miluim** is the Hebrew word for reserve service in the IDF
Sarah is deploying one of the central ideas of Zionist discourse here in order to make sense of the relationship that she had with this Israeli soldier – the myth of the soldier who shoots and cries (a post-1967 Israeli attempt to render Zionism ethically sensitive (Loshitzky, 2011)). What is interesting about Sarah’s deployment of this discourse is its affective force upon her. During the interview she represented her affective response in the encounter by dramatically inhaling as if her breath was taken away. The man was ‘hugely hunky’, an ‘iconic Israeli’, who like most of the other Israelis she met was ‘incredibly thoughtful and deep and considerate and really emotional effected by their experience [of the war]’. She ends up having a ‘fling’ with him.128

5.3.3.1. The affectivity of being a Jew in Britain

This newly catalysed affective assemblage had important consequences outside of the way British Jews felt about the newly dominant representation of Israel. It also changed the way British Jews felt as Jews in Britain. Some of the interviews expressed this in straightforward terms:

“I think it did increase my respect and pride that I felt…

Of being a Jewish person in Britain or of pride in Israel? What were you proud of?
I think both.”

(Harvey, p. 605)

“I think what it did, like with this person you met who wasn’t particularly religious but suddenly felt much more Jewish. I think it did, they felt much more Jewish. […] proud of being Jewish I suppose.”

(Evelyn, p. 501)

“OK. And so you… How did it make you feel as a Jew watching the war? It made me feel more Jewish. “

(David, p. 459)

128 It is arguable that sexual desire is more present in the affective complex than the interviews suggest. It is likely that the other interviewees may have been too embarrassed to speak about it.
One of Julius Gould’s interviewees talks about her post-war identity in similarly affective terms.

“I suddenly got a very strong feeling of belonging and being a part of this race. I didn’t think I could ever feel like that about a place I hadn’t ever seen… I feel very proud of the fact that I am a Jew. I know that we are not practicing Jews but I still feel very proud of my religion. To be very honest I don’t know whether it is because of the war or because I have a growing family or just because I am getting older. I do know I feel much prouder of being Jewish than I felt before the war. I was frightened before and I tended not to let people know that I am Jewish. Now I tell people quite openly.”

(‘Rose’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 95)

In one of the most revealing anecdotes of the interviews, Jeremy also talks about feeling ashamed of being Jewish before the war and situates this affectivity in the context of anti-Semitism in Britain:

“I wanted to ask did you experience anti-Semitism in Britain in the 1960s.
Yes, yes. Because it was Colin Jordan. And the Moseley one in Ridley Road. You’re at that age when you’re not a football hooligan but you’re of that mentality that is, ‘all the lads are gonna go and we’re going to upset them’. And it did, it managed to stop the Moseley one in Ridley Road and Colin Jordan didn’t get to speak very long because all the Jewish kids decided to make a bit of a noise. That was because of Israel coming along. I don’t think that would have happened had their been no Israel.

Why do you say that?
Because there’s something behind you. There’s something there, there’s more. You know, nowadays you are much more proud to be Jewish and pro-Israeli because of the strength and the knowledge of the country. Their technology… they’re so advanced in everything, I can hold my head up now. Where us before you were a little bit embarrassed if somebody said, ‘are you Jewish?’ I remember once going to court, for speeding or something like that. I almost felt embarrassed about saying ‘Jewish, the Old Testament’ and that’s wrong. Now I purposely do it. And it’s different.

And you think Israel existing has something to do with that?
It has to mate. Listen: there would be very few Jews in the world without an Israel, in my opinion.”

(Jeremy, p. 416)
This quote reveals in great detail, precisely how the affectivity generated by the idea of a victorious Israel plays out in 1960s British Jewish culture. Before the war Jeremy felt 'embarrassed' by his Jewishness. After the war he is ‘proud’ enough to ‘hold his head up’ as a Jew because he thinks Israel is ‘strong’, ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘advanced’. He is so proud that he and his friends feel emboldened against British fascist anti-Semitism, in a way that successfully mobilizes them against a National Front rally in London’s East End. The final, ominous statement, “there would be very few Jews in the world without an Israel” is an expression of the idea that a militarily strong Israel keeps Jews safe in a dangerous world, whether as a safe haven should another Holocaust occur, or in the more intangible sense of emboldening British Jews to stand up to anti-Semitism in a way that was not possible before the war.

The logic of this statement (a post-1967 Israel makes Jews proud and secure) is interesting because, despite being so strongly invested in by British Jews, it is highly inaccurate. The existence of a Zionist State of Israel, particularly in its 1967 formation, has arguably made the world more not less dangerous for Jews in Israel and in Jewish communities across the globe. For example, pro-Palestinian ‘terrorist’ attacks on Jewish targets, both civilian and military, have substantially escalated since 1967, mostly in response to Israel’s post-war policies in the occupied territories. In terms of the idea that Israel is a safe haven for Jews: through mandatory conscription Israel compels the majority of its citizens to join an army that is routinely put to war or involved in life-threatening actions administering an occupation. For Israeli citizens who are not actively serving in the army, their lives have been demonstrably more at risk than those outside of Israel since 1967 – primarily from ‘terrorism’. Israelis are constantly reminded of this risk in their everyday lives: every time they enter the security point of an Israeli shopping mall or walk past the bomb shelters that, by law, are mandatorily installed in every

129 The State of Israel has made the world exponentially more dangerous for Palestinians than it has for Jews. The relationship between the two is discussed below.

130 Arab citizens of Israel are not required to perform military service.
Israeli residential building. So whilst post-1967, Israel has made Jewish life less secure, the British Jewish interviewees feel precisely the opposite.

The misrecognition that a militarily strong Israel makes the world a safer place for Jews is central to Zionist ideology, specifically its Revisionist variant. This idea had existed since Zionism’s inception but only becomes a refrain that structures hegemonic British Jewish identity after the Six Day War because the way the war was represented in Zionist discourse worked to ‘prove’ it. The reason the idea was able to entrench itself so deeply within British Jewish culture is because it catalysed an affective assemblage that powerfully counteracted the all-pervasive fear of anti-Semitism that Jews had in a post-Holocaust world (this is paradoxical, considering the post-1945 decline of British anti-Semitism (see Chapter 4)). Moreover, it never fully eradicates the sense of fear British Jews have of another Holocaust. The logic of Zionism internalised by the majority of British Jews after 1967 is that Jews persistently face the threat of anti-Semitism and only a militarily strong Israel will protect them from this threat. The fear of this threat is as much a part of the post-1967 affective assemblage catalysed by the war as pride, safety, excitement, and sexual desire.

Understanding the Zionist representation of Israel and the affects it catalyses in post-1967 hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity in Guattarian terms gives an insight into why support for Israel has become so intractable in the mainstream of British Jewry in the post 1967 conjuncture despite Israel’s widely publicised human rights abuses. If this refrain were to be removed i.e. if the majority of British Jews accepted that far from making the world safer for Jews, Israel, in fact makes it more dangerous, hegemonic British cultural identity would deterritorialise in the way Guattari’s obsessive-compulsive patient does in the clinical example discussed above. This potentially explains why criticism of Israel often causes the British Jewish community (at both the institutional and popular levels) to defensively reiterate this refrain in order to territorialise their identity in a way that makes them feel safe. In the interviews, this was communicated most keenly in Jeremy’s statement “It has to mate. Listen: there would be very few Jews in the world without an Israel, in my
opinion”. Jeremy said the words ‘it has to mate’ with a sense of menace.131 If I have interpreted his tone correctly this, arguably, demonstrates that the removal of the Zionist refrain ‘Israel must exist or Jews are in danger’ implied by the question, “and you think Israel existing has something to do with that?” deterritorialises the post-1967 British Jewish subjective ecology in a way that panics Jeremy. In an attempt to reterritorialise this subjective ecology Jeremy has to aggressively re-iterate this refrain in his answer.

6. The ethical implications of the position of Israel within post-67 hegemonic British Jewish identity

So far this chapter has traced the re-organisation of the hegemonic subjective ecology of British Jewish identity after the Six Day War. It has shown how a certain representation of Israel emerged after the war and how this catalysed a complex affective assemblage that altered the way British Jews felt about Israel and how they felt as Jews in Britain. In order to fully carry out a (Deleuzo-) Guattarian analysis of this identity it is necessary not only to look at the refrains and affects that constitute this new identity but also the power relations that this new identity instantiates across the Plane of Organisation, both for the identity itself and the assemblages its constitution is dependent on.

Bogard asks a series of questions that highlight the socio-political consequences of a Deleuzo-Guattarian analytics of desire: “There are modes of social inscription that are exclusive, that separate bodies from what they are capable of doing, that demean their desire and distort their sense; and there are modes that inclusive and connective that liberate desire, destroy limits and draw positive ‘lines of flight’ or escape. The practical and ethical question, for Deleuze and Guattari is always which is which?” (Bogard, 1998, p. 58). Does the post-1967 social inscription of British Jewish identity, separate British Jewish bodies from what they are capable of doing, demean

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131 ‘Mate’ is a colloquial mode of address that Londoners use in different ways. In the interview, I felt it was being used in the ironic way that often starts a fight or argument i.e. ‘I want to threaten you, you are not my mate’. This was confirmed when I listened back to the recording of the interview.
their desire and distort their sense or is it inclusive, liberating of desire, destroying limits and drawing positive lines of flight?

On the face of it, the case can be made for the latter. Todd Endelman ostensibly does just this when he explains the affective work that the State of Israel does in the British Jewish assemblage, “The establishment of the State and its remarkable achievements, military and otherwise, acted as an emotional counterweight to the Holocaust offering consolation, instilling pride and restoring confidence that life was not as bleak – or Jews as powerless as the Holocaust suggested” (Endelman, 2002, p. 238). In Deleuzo-Guattarian terms this could be explained as the Six Day War empowering British Jewry as Jews, augmenting their capacity to act, increasing their force of existing. This notion is corroborated by the interviews own sense of what the Six Day War does for them.

Endelman’s analysis however does not take into account the more complex affective assemblage revealed by the interviews. Post-1967 British Jewish cultural identity does not replace bleakness and powerlessness with pride and confidence as Endelman suggests. Instead it makes the latter dependent on the former, meaning British Jews are not truly empowered in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense. A sense of paranoia of what would happen if Israel did not exist in its current form is evidenced across the interviews.

Endelman’s analysis also divorces British Jewish identity from its social and historical context, a move that is out of step with Deleuzo-Guattarian analytics. His conclusion also does not take into account the other territorialisations that occur across the Plane of Organisation in tandem with British Jews feeling more, superficially, confident and powerful – namely the literal deterritorialisation of Palestinians, Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza strip that occurs as a result of their forced migration and the occupation of those who remained (Masalha, 1997, 1999, 2003). Remarkably a number of the interviewees claim they were not aware of the post-1967 Palestinian refugees (Harvey, p. 608; Evelyn p. 506; Stephen, p. 382; Brian, p. 581). This is remarkable because it was widely reported at the time (making the front
page of Britain’s best-selling paper the *Daily Mirror* on 13 June 1967). This possibly says more about how the Zionist memorialisation of the war has been internalised by British Jews, than it does about how aware the British Jews were of the refugees at the time. Nevertheless it does demonstrate a crucial way that Palestinians are represented in Zionism, popular or otherwise: they simply do not exist. This is an extraordinary act of symbolic violence that has enabled a vast range of actual violent practice against Palestinians since the Zionist colonisation of Palestine. The other important way that Palestinians have been represented in the British Jewish imaginary is through a mixture of classic orientalist archetypes and as a symbol onto which Jewish fears about Nazi anti-Semitism have been displaced (Zena, p. 398; Jeremy, pp. 429–430; Evelyn, p. 503; Stephen, p. 349) (This is discussed in detail in the following chapter). In terms of British Jewish identity the Palestinians are constructed as a radical other around which the British Jewish self is structured.

The terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ are not part Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual vocabulary, in part, because they propose an ontology comprised of multiplicities as opposed to binary oppositions. This approach critiques social relations based on organisations of the socius around self/other relations. This critique is given voice in Deleuze’s book *Expressionism* (1968 (b)), in which he explains the affective consequences of a ‘body’ (in the Spinozist sense) engaging in social relations that not only ‘other’ a different body but also attempt to dominate it:

“It would be all very well to prevail in various encounters with bodies opposed to me; but such triumphs, such joys of hate, would not eliminate the sadness involved in hatred; and above all, I could never be sure of winning the next encounter, and would thus be affected by a perpetual fear.”

(Deleuze, 1968 (b), p. 260)

This insight cuts to the heart of Zionism in general, but for the purposes of this chapter to the problems of hegemonic British Jewish identity after the war. It demonstrates the complicated way that the ultimately sad affective
assemblage catalysed by the war connects with the oppression of the Palestinians after 1967 (and by implication since the beginning of the Zionist colonisation of Palestine). British Jews think a militarily strong Israel makes them feel safer in the world, despite never entirely dispelling the idea that their lives are perpetually at risk from genocidal anti-Semitism. Post-1967 Israel actually makes Jewish lives more at risk, both in and outside Israel, largely as a result of violent resistance to Zionist colonisation i.e. the bodies that Zionism forces Jews in an oppressive encounter with. As a result British Jews misrepresent resistance to Zionism as an expression of genocidal anti-Semitism (their perception of the Six Day War in these terms is a case in point), and the refrains of Zionism that organise hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity are thus ‘proved’ once again.

What way out of this? According to Deleuze, the only way to live ethically is to engage in encounters that are mutually empowering for all the bodies involved in that encounter. There is no space here to get into the various debates about what form that encounter might take from the Palestinian point of view – a one state solution, a two state solution etc. In terms of the organisation of cultural identity, Guattari suggests the following:

“...the question which poses itself then is one of the conditions which allows the acceptance of the other, the acceptance of subjective pluralism. It is a matter not only of treating another group, another ethnicity, another sex, but also of a desire for dissensus, otherness and difference. Accepting otherness is a question not so much of right as desire. The acceptance is possible precisely on the condition of assuming the multiplicity within oneself”

(Guattari, 1996 (a), p. 216)

In the context of hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity the minimal starting point on the route to Guattari’s ideal subjectivity is the recognition that the Palestinians and the grievances done to them in the name of Zionism exist at all. Recognition in itself, however, will not deterritorialise the post-1967 British Jewish subjective ecology. If Israeli Jews are to remain in Palestine/Israel (and in the current conjuncture there is no mainstream political solution to the conflict that suggests they will or should not) and if the fact of a Jewish
presence in Israel remains an important element in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity, that identity will only achieve an affective disposition that is truly empowering if it allows itself to desire subjective pluralism, otherness, dissensus and difference. What this means practically, is producing a cultural identity that incorporates not only Palestinian culture and identity but also anti-and non-Zionist Jewish identities as well.
Chapter 8

The Rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish Community after 1967

1. Introduction

The previous chapter attempted to detail the changes that occurred in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity as a result of the intensive processes triggered in the British Jewish community through witnessing the war. This chapter looks at what happens to Zionist ideology as a result of the same processes. It does this by using the theoretical perspective formulated in the work of Lawrence Grossberg, specifically his book *We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture* (1992). In this book he uses the CCCS reading of Gramsci alongside Deleuze and Guattari to account for the USA’s political shift to the right after the 1970s – what he terms ‘Popular Conservatism’. Using Grossberg’s theoretical approach, specifically the way he conceives of the CCCS/Gramscian ‘Popular’ via Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘affect’, this chapter argues that the Six Day War triggers the rise of Popular Zionism within the British Jewish community. As will be explained in more detail in this chapter, there are various reasons for calling it Popular Zionism as opposed to simply Zionism: i) Popular Zionism has a slightly different ideological content to ‘classical’ Zionism; ii) whereas Zionism is an ideology in the conventional sense, Popular Zionism is as much, if not more, an affective disposition towards Israel, and one that is charged with a high intensity; iii) Popular Zionism does not entail belonging to a Zionist organisation, or even identifying as a Zionist, but invariably its adherents will ‘spontaneously’ reproduce elements of Zionist ideology when they speak about Palestine/Israel; iv) Popular Zionism is ‘lived out’ in the British Jewish ‘everyday’, specifically the popular culture consumption (notably tourism and films), whereas classical Zionism is located on what

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132 “A systematic schema of ideas usu. relating to politics or society, or to the conduct of a class or group, and regarding as justifying actions…” (*The Oxford English Dictionary*, 1989, p. 622).
Grossberg calls the institutional and state planes. Finally Popular Zionism has not been the only ideology/affective disposition through which the British Jewish community has related to the State of Israel in the post-1967 conjuncture, but it has been the hegemonic one.

2. Ideology, the Popular and affect: Gramsci, CCCS and Grossberg

As the leading exponent of cultural studies in the US, Lawrence Grossberg’s theoretical perspective is drawn mainly from the theoretical tendencies that emerged within the CCCS, where he trained in the 1970s. (The two theorists used by the CCCS that have been most influential on Grossberg’s work are Raymond Williams and Antonio Gramsci). Where he deviates from the way that cultural studies developed in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, and what is useful for this chapter, is that since the 1980s he has used Deleuze and Guattari, specifically their concept of ‘affect’, alongside the more dominant CCCS theoretical approaches. Grossberg has argued that whereas in British cultural studies the tendency has been to understand popular culture as primarily a field of meaning, for him, popular culture is only properly understood if we also see how meaning is interwoven with affect. As demonstrated by the interview and archival data gathered for this thesis, conceiving popular culture as the intersection of the planes of meaning and affect is particularly useful if we want to understand the ways that Zionism has been ‘lived out’ in the everyday lives of British Jews after the Six Day War.

The following section outlines the concepts that Grossberg uses to arrive at the position that we do not understand popular culture if we do not take into account both meaning and affect. It begins by outlining the Gramscian terms that were used by the CCCS to make sense of popular culture and then shows how Grossberg uses Deleuze and Guattari to build on these concepts. The focus of this chapter is Zionism as an ideology; therefore the concept ‘ideology’ will be the pivot upon which the rest of the exposition

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133 Which not only included Marxists like Williams, Gramsci and Althusser, but also Foucault (who Grossberg, also uses) and semiotics. See ‘Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms’ (Hall, 1986 (a)) and ‘Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies’ (Hall, 1992) for the best exposition of the theoretical approaches used by the CCCS in the 1970s and after.
turns. To focus solely on ideology is not especially Gramscian. According to Gramsci, the way power operates in society is complex, working across the various levels of the base and superstructure as presented in classical Marxism: the socio-economic, the political, and the ideological. As argued below the rise of Popular Zionism does not occur across the political level of the British Jewish community – e.g. there is an insubstantial rise in membership of Zionist organisations – and neither does it affect the ‘means of production’. (The conception of Jews, Zionist or otherwise, as a class or class fraction is also highly problematic.) This chapter is not attempting a Gramscian account of Popular Zionism. What it is trying to do is show how Lawrence Grossberg builds on particular Gramscian concepts (some of which are explained in greater detail in chapter 2) to show the ways in which political ideologies organise the affective lives of ‘ordinary’ people. The following section will explain the Gramscian concepts used by Grossberg, and the section immediately after will show how he uses ‘affect’ to build on them to provide a more persuasive account of ‘popular’ ideologies.

2.1. Gramsci and ideology

Ideology appears in Gramsci’s work in two guises. The first is ideology in the more conventional sense i.e. systems of ideas that are formulated by intellectuals and philosophers (Simon, 1982). The second is Gramsci’s unique contribution to the definition of ideology – ideology as it is lived out by non-intellectuals and non-philosophers in their everyday lives: what Gramsci calls common sense or “the philosophy of non-philosophers” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 422). In the context of Zionism (as will be explained in greater detail below), ideology would be Zionism as expounded by the likes of Theodor Herzl and Ahad Ha’am, through texts such a Der Judenstaat (1896), Altneuland (1902) and the Basel Programme of 1897. Common sense would be the way the precepts expounded by these ideologues are actually lived out by ‘non-philosophers’ in their everyday lives, whether they be the Zionist immigrants to pre-1948 Palestine, Israeli Zionists in the State of Israel, or Popular Zionists in the Jewish Diaspora. Common sense is distinct from ideology in that it is both non-systematized and unconscious: “the critical and largely unconscious
way in which a person perceives the world, often confused and contradictory and compounded of folklore, myths and popular experience” (Simon, 1982, p. 25).

The relationship between ideology and common sense is crucial to Grasmci’s conception of the exercise of power: in order for a class or class fraction to achieve hegemony (explained in Chapter 2) its ideology needs to become the common sense of an historic bloc.\textsuperscript{134} That class or class fraction has to convince other classes that its ideology is going to work in their interests – what Gramsci calls the transition from the corporate phase to the national-popular phase. This is a process of negotiation between the classes/class fractions, whereby the class who ultimately leads the historic bloc has to make some ideological concessions in order for the classes it seeks to lead to consent to their rule. As will become clearer below, the major way this is applicable to Zionism is the concession it has had to make to Jews in the Diaspora over the issue of aliyah (immigrating to Israel). Aliyah is the key goal of classical Zionism. What this chapter will argue is that it is quite possible for Jews in Britain to have no intention of ever immigrating to Israel, and still be Zionists. If Zionism did not make this concession (which at various points it did not – in the early days of the state, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion was particularly virulent in ‘negating the Diaspora’ (Avi-Hai, 1976, p.46; Schindler, 2007(b)), Zionists in Israel could not depend on the vital political and economic support of non-Israeli Jews, that it has continued to enjoy since 1948.

The other important aspect of common sense is not only that it is contradictory, incoherent and negotiated – it is also ‘spontaneous’ (Hall at al., 1978 (a)). What this means is that in order for an ideology to be truly successful in cementing an historic bloc, it has to appear in the thoughts and actions of all the classes of a society, as if it arrived there spontaneously, or as if these classes felt this system of ideas was their own. Freud’s notion of

\textsuperscript{134} For Gramsci, hegemony is not only secured on the ideological plane, but across the social formation. For a class or class fraction to dominate an historic bloc, they have to become hegemonic across all aspects of the social formation, not only ideologically but also socio-economically and politically etc.
the unconscious might be better deployed here (indeed Simon uses the term unconscious in place of spontaneous in his explanation of common sense (1982, p. 25)), but as an historical materialist whose emphasis is on macro historical forces and social structures Gramsci under-theorises the crucial role that individual and collective psychic agencies play in the formation of the social.\footnote{135} Gramsci does superficially touch on psychological processes by using Marx’s theory of naturalisation and the role it plays in the becoming ‘spontaneous’ of the leading ideology in its transformation into common sense. Naturalisation is when ideologies and social relations that emerge as a result of the successful manoeuvring of classes and class fractions within historically specific social arrangements, make themselves appear as if they are both eternal and universal – as if they had always existed and that no other ideology could possibly exist in its place – by occluding the historical conditions of their emergence.\footnote{136} Marx’s example is the way capitalism makes itself seem as if it were the only possible ideology that could organise social relations and the distribution of the world’s resources.

Naturalisation has successfully occurred in the context of (Popular) Zionism, in the way it has rendered invisible all the other possible relationships to Israel and the idea of Jewish national sovereignty in some or all parts of Eretz Israel.\footnote{137} Chapter 4 details the different positions taken by different groups in the British Jewish community towards Israel before 1967, and the interview data demonstrates the near impossibility of imagining any other ideological position that could plausibly exist towards Israel except Popular Zionism in the post-1967 conjuncture. The interview data does not only demonstrate the occlusion of other political positions (non and anti-}

\footnote{135 Arguably, this is one of the reasons why a purely Gramscian approach to the problems this thesis tries to work through would be less successful than a Deleuzo-Guattarian one, and why Grossberg’s fusing of the two is particularly useful for this chapter. The more important reason is the focus on affect, which is explored in detail below.}

\footnote{136 Neither Marx nor Gramsci propose exactly how naturalisation occurs; the previous chapter, on how a particular representation of Israel becomes incorporated into British Jewish cultural identity is ostensibly an attempt at doing this.}

\footnote{137 This is a key argument in Anthony Lerman’s critique of the place of Zionism in the British Jewish community, although Lerman does not use either a Marxist or Gramscian framework to account for this (Lerman, 2008).}

\footnote{138 This process parallels the ‘mad proliferation’ of a single meaning across the stratum of signification engendered by the cancerous B-w-O of the fascist, outlined in Chapter 6.}
Zionism) but additionally their becoming taboo – any non or anti-Zionist critique of Israel generates a highly affective response in the interviewees. This is part of the reason why the addition of affect to this Gramscian analysis is so important.

This chapter is making the case for the emergence of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish Community as a result of the 1967 war. The term ‘Popular’ is not used by Gramsci in a similar way i.e. to label a ‘popular’ variant of ‘classical’ ideology. The term ‘Popular’ only appears in Gramsci in the concept ‘National Popular’, i.e. when a class and its ideology achieves a hegemonic position in an historic bloc by, in part, persuading other classes that its interests are also their own. The emphasis on a Gramscian ‘Popular’ (as opposed to a ‘National-Popular’) comes about through the CCCS working through of Gramsci’s ideas in their theorising of popular culture. Stuart Hall defines the popular in the following way:

“… there is a continuous and necessarily uneven and unequal struggle by the dominant culture, constantly to disorganise and re-organise popular culture… There are points of resistance; there are also moments of supersession… It goes on continuously in the complex lines of resistance and acceptance, refusal and capitulation, which make the field of culture a sort of constant battlefield.”

(Hall, 1998, p.447)

The ‘Popular’ as a “field” constituted out of “complex lines of resistance and acceptance, refusal and capitulation” helps describes the passage of a political ideology from a marginal place in a social formation to the common sense that binds an entire historic bloc (and how that ideology might be resisted and ‘de-hegemonized’). An example, briefly touched upon by Hall in ‘Deconstructing the Popular’ (the essay that the above quote is taken from), is Popular Imperialism. Hall does not define Popular Imperialism but its meaning can be inferred as the contradictory and diffuse form of Imperialist ideology that appears ‘spontaneously’ in the thoughts and actions of the majority of the British ‘people’ during the period of the British Empire. Another example of ‘popular’ ideology is Lawrence Grossberg’s Popular Conservatism – the

139 Hall tends to mean the working class when he uses the Marxist inflected ‘people’.
organisation of significant swathes of North American common sense by New Right ideologies since the 1970s. The next section will take a more detailed look at Grossberg’s understanding of the Popular.

2.2. Grossberg: affect and ‘the Popular’

Lawrence Grossberg does not deviate substantially from the CCCS’ reading of the popular and the Gramscian framework used to support it. Where his contribution is original and what makes it useful in understanding the place of Zionism in the British Jewish community post 1967, is his use of Deleuze and Guattari, specifically their concept of affect, alongside Gramsci: “Grossberg… has developed a methodology which draws on Deleuze and Guattari to develop an understanding of the affective elements at stake in relations of hegemony” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 31). Chapter 4 looks in detail at the use of affect in Grossberg’s fusing of British cultural studies with Deleuze and Guattari (and Foucault). What this section will do is look specifically at what introducing affect does to the Gramscian/British cultural studies terms outlined above – the popular, ideology, common sense, naturalisation, hegemony – and why using these terms in conjunction with affect is so useful in understanding the rise of Popular Zionism within the post-1967 conjuncture.

Grossberg’s Cultural Marxist/Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology has already been detailed at length in Chapter 4. The most important aspect of Grossberg’s ontology is his introduction of ‘the affective plane’ and how it interacts with the other planes of human praxis. Other alumni of the CCCS omit the affective from their approaches. One of the tendencies of the CCCS was to focus on the operations of politics from a Gramscian perspective (Bennett et al., 1986). The other dominant tendency was to use Gramsci alongside various post-structuralists in a way that privileges the role of meaning in cultural analysis (Stuart Hall is exemplary of this tendency). Grossberg neither negates the importance of meaning or politics when analysing culture but argues that because the affective plane is as vital in constituting the totality as the other planes, culture is not fully accounted for if we omit the affective plane in our analyses.
One way this approach manifests itself is in Grossberg’s argument that by adding affect to the Gramscian model of ideology, we properly understand how an ideology is naturalized, internalized and eternalized:

“Affect is the missing term in an adequate understanding of ideology, for it offers the possibility of a ‘psychology of belief’ which would explain how and why ideologies are sometimes, and only sometimes, effective and always to varying degrees. It is the affective investment in particular ideological sites that explains the power of the articulation which bonds particular representations and realities. It is the affective investment which enables ideological relations to be internalised and consequently naturalised.”

(Grossberg, 1992, p. 83)

This quote is rich in terms of what it adds to the CCCS reading of Gramsci. For Grossberg, affect explains not only the ‘effectivity’\(^{140}\) of ideology but also the way that representations and realities are ‘articulated’\(^ {141}\) into a cohesive ideological viewpoint and the way that ideologies are internalised\(^ {142}\) and naturalised by individuals and collectivities. Affect is what makes abstract systems of ideas work in the real; it is what animates ideas in history. If, for Gramsci, ideology is the cement that binds an historic bloc then, affect, for Grossberg, is the binding agent that gives that ideology traction in social formations. Affect ‘sticks’ ideology to people by transforming ideology into a person’s hopes, dreams and fears. Ideologies only work if people affectively invest in them. For example, Herzl may have advocated for Jewish national sovereignty in *Der Judenstaat* in 1896, but it is only when Jewish ’non-philosophers’ began to affectively invest in this idea – began to care about it in a way that mobilized them politically – that Zionism becomes a material force in history, affecting the various social formations around it.

\(^{140}\) In Foucault’s terms i.e. the material effectivity of a discourse – or the social function of a discourse at a given moment in history (1966; 1972).

\(^{141}\) In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms i.e. the connection of discursive elements into a cohesive discourse (1985).

\(^{142}\) Deleuze and Guattari posit an ontology that is defined by its ‘relations of exteriority’, so strictly speaking, assemblages (ideological or otherwise) cannot be ‘internalised’ as such because there is no interior. Instead Deleuze and Guattari formulate a variety of processes through which different assemblages co-join e.g. double articulation, refrains etc. (1980). Nevertheless, Grossberg, who uses other theorists alongside Deleuze and Guattari, maintains the notion that ideology is internalised.
Adding affect to the cultural analysis of ideology also adds another important dimension that is missed out from the more traditional CCCS approach:

“Of course, it’s that level at which Stuart Hall… might say, “Isn’t it the structures of meaning that make the relations?” I would say: ‘But, no, the difference is you could have ideological interpellations but people do not invest [emphasis in original] in them.” The meaning structure has to somehow be affectively charged for it to constitute your experience…[my emphasis]”

(Grossberg, 2010, p. 328)

Grossberg is not disputing the importance of ‘meaning’ in the operations of culture, or the way Stuart Hall deploys (Laclau’s reading of) Gramsci to do this. What he is saying is that, only when we have a sense of how individuals and collectivities affectively invest in ideologies, discourses and representations do we understand how they make a difference in the material world. To convey this sense of an ideology being affectively invested in, in a way that makes a difference to social formations, Grossberg formulates the concept of ‘mattering’ (1992). He uses the term ‘matter’ in both its senses as a noun (the substance possessed by a physical entity) and as a verb (having significance – the way something ‘matters’ to someone), once again intertwining meaning with affect (as materiality). Grossberg’s ‘mattering’ operates in the context of ideology in the following way: an ideology is, amongst other things, a system of signification. For that system of signification to have material effectivity within the social totality it has to be affectively invested in by a group of people – it has to matter to them, they have to care about it and when they care about it they begin to act in its name. When an ideology begins to matter to a significant number of people it is an indicator of it securing hegemony within the social totality. It is for this reason that Grossberg argues that the struggle for hegemony i.e. the struggle for an ideology to become ‘popular’, is located primarily on the affective plane:

“Within the relations of and to popular culture, the determining moment is often the history of struggle within and over the affective plane. For it is in their affective lives that people constantly struggle to find the energy to
survive, to find the passion necessary to imagine and enact their own projects and possibilities”

(Grossberg, 1992, p. 83)

Grossberg’s ‘mattering’ therefore highlights the important ways that affect and meaning are interwoven in the becoming-effective of ideologies. This leads him to a slightly different conception of the Gramscian Popular to that developed in the CCCS, one that includes the affective:

“The Popular is where social imagination is defined and changed, where people construct personal identities, identifications, priorities, and possibilities, where people form moral and political agendas for themselves and their societies, and where they decide whether and in what (or whom) to invest the power to speak for them. It is where people construct their hopes for the future in the light of their sense of the present. It is where they decide what matters, what is worth caring about, and what they are committed to.”

[My emphasis] (Grossberg, 2005, pp. 220–221)

There is a final way that affect and ideology in Grossberg’s work that is useful for this thesis. This is when affect almost entirely replaces ideology in the constitution of a popular ideology. Grossberg explores this in his notion of the ‘affective epidemic’ (1992). This notion is not directly applicable to Popular Zionism, however its insights into how politics can work affectively is highly instructive for this thesis. An affective epidemic is similar to a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1972). In Grossberg’s terms it is when affect replaces ideology at the intersection of the planes of politics and everyday life. In an affective epidemic, “mattering places are transformed into vectors so that concerns and investments of real social history become the ruins of a displaced, perhaps even misplaced, paranoia” (1992, p. 284). His examples are the ‘war on drugs’, the family, ‘America’ and the economy: all vectors in America’s cultural landscape during the 1980s that were highly affectively charged but minimally invested with ideological content.

“Knowledge no longer seems as important as other questions. People can be ignorant of the stakes in the dispute, or of what the competing positions are
yet in many cases, it does not matter. They may even know they are being lied to, but that does not matter. Affective issues – how positions ‘feel’ – these are what matter.”

(Grossberg, 2005, p. 234)

The consequences of an affective epidemic are as follows:

“The effect of transforming the terrain of ideological sites into affective epidemics is that it is no longer possible to treat them as the occasion for public debates. Questions of fact and representation become secondary to the articulation of people’s emotional fears and hopes. This partly explains the new conservatism’s ‘ideological’ successes: they have been able to construct issues with enormous public passions (such as the current attacks on universities, curricula and ‘political correctness’) without leaving any space for public engagement.”

(Grossberg, 1992, p. 292)

This almost perfectly describes how Popular Zionism works within the British Jewish community post-1967. As demonstrated by the interviews, historical knowledge of both Zionism and Palestine/Israel is minimal, yet both continue to be invested in with a tremendous affectivity by Britain’s Jews. Affect has essentially replaced ideology in Popular Zionism and, as a result, Popular Zionism has been extraordinarily successful in organising both the common sense, and affective lives of this community, so much so that the room for public engagement has been significantly reduced.

3. Thesis

Using the theoretical perspective formulated by Grossberg this chapter argues that what happens to Zionism in Britain as a result of the 1967 war is that it finally becomes the hegemonic way that the British Jewish community understand and relate to Palestine/Israel. Zionism becomes internalised, naturalised and eternalised into the British Jewish assemblage. In becoming hegemonic its content invariably alters, mainly around the importance of making aliyah and the negation of the diaspora. Most importantly Zionism and
the Zionist representation of Palestine/Israel becomes invested in with tremendous affectivity. This affectivity replaces much of Zionism’s ideological content in the minds of British Jews. It also makes it highly difficult to oppose on ideological grounds without the defensive mobilization of British Jewry. Finally, post-1967 Zionism is lived out in the every day lives and popular culture of British Jews as opposed to the political or institutional planes where it has mainly existed prior to 1967 – British Jews do not join Zionist organisations in large numbers or make aliyah, yet there is an increasing tendency to go to Israel on holiday, for example. For all these reasons it will be more accurate to call the type of Zionism that emerges in British Jewry after 1967 – Popular Zionism. In line with the evidence gathered for this thesis, this chapter will also be arguing that the hegemony of Popular Zionism continues to this day (2012, at the time of writing), and therefore in terms of the relationship that British Jews have with both Palestine/Israel and Zionism we are still in the post-1967 conjuncture.

4. Classical Zionism

In order to demonstrate what makes the form of Zionism that emerges in British Jewry after 1967, ‘popular’ it is necessary to provide a definition of ‘classical’ Zionism to see what components appear in, are excluded by and are affectively invested in, in Popular Zionism. This is not straightforward. Classical Zionism is a term applied retrospectively by scholars of Zionism in an attempt to standardize the various ideological strands that existed in Zionism before 1948. It incorporates Political Zionism, Practical Zionism, Labour Zionism, Cultural Zionism, General Zionism, National Religious Zionism and Revisionist Zionism (Shimoni, 1995). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt a definitive account of Classical Zionism. Instead, what this section will attempt is, i) a general introduction to its fundamental precepts and ii) the aspects of its ideological assemblage which are most meaningful to the constitution of Popular Zionism in the post-1967 British Jewish community.

According to the 1973 edition of the Encyclopaedia Judaica, “the modern term Zionism first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century,
denoting “the movement whose goal was the return of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel” (Kressel, 1973, p. 1). Theodor Herzl is often thought to be the founding father of modern Zionism, though Herzl was not the first person to use the term, nor the first person to advocate some form of Jewish ‘return’ to ‘Eretz Israel’ (Hertzberg, 1977, p.32; Laqueur, p. xxv). The intellectual context that gave rise to modern Zionism at the end of the nineteenth century emerges at the intersection of diverse philosophical currents: i) Jewish Messianism: the Jewish eschatological belief that during the age of the messiah the Jews who had been dispersed around the world would gather again in Eretz Israel; ii) the Jewish Emancipation: the post-French Revolution historical process that emancipated Jews as legally recognized citizens of the nation-states in which they were domiciled; iii) nationalism – the political ideology that posits that peoples can be grouped together through their shared connection to specific territories; iii) anti-Semitism: the ideology, rooted in race science, that Jews were racially inferior to Aryan Europeans and/or a threat to the Aryan race. The historical events that galvanized these related intellectual currents into modern Zionism were, arguably, the Dreyfuss Affair in 1890s Paris and the Russian pogroms that spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The most comprehensive exposition of Zionism as an ideology is by Gideon Shimoni in The Zionist Ideology (1995). In this book, Shimoni discusses various strands of Zionism and in attempting to “seek out the common denominators” of these various strands Shimoni arrives at arguably the best ‘umbrella’ definition of Zionist ideology:

“First the situation of the Jewish entity under conditions of dispersion is critically defective, not just in a messianic sense but emphatically in a worldly sense; second, the solution lies in territorial ingathering of Jews in Eretz Israel (or failing that another territory) under conditions of autonomy at least and sovereignty at best; third these purposes should be effected by political diplomacy, settlement activities and the revival of Jewish National morale and culture.”

(Shimoni, 1995, p. 85)
Shimoni expands on what ‘the Jewish entity’ means in Zionist ideology: “… that the Jews are a distinctive entity possessing attributes associated with the modern concept of nation as well as attributes associated with religion” (p. 53). The conception of the Jews as a nation is a Zionist innovation. The dominant way for Jews to understand themselves prior to Zionism was as a religion. If modern nations are conceived as a group of people bound by a shared culture and language and rooted in a geographical territory then defining Jews as a nation gave intellectual substance to the claim that Eretz Israel is the Jewish national home.

The idea that the ‘conditions of dispersion have been critically defective’ is an idea lifted from Jewish messianism. Dispersion refers to the traditional Jewish belief that the Jews were exiled from Eretz Israel after the destruction of the second Temple by the Roman Empire in the second century BC. The term ‘Diaspora’ refers to this dispersion. According to Jewish messianism, it is only during the age of the messiah that Jews can return from exile (galut) and achieve redemption (gelua) by their ingathering in the Land of Israel. According to this belief, the messiah will only come if the Jewish people are sufficiently committed to Jewish law and Talmudic study. Until then they will remain in galut. Modern Zionism secularises the notion of galut out of messianism and into the ‘worldly’. Whereas for messianism diaspora makes the Jewish people spiritually bereft, for modern Zionism it makes the Jewish nation materially bereft, not only in terms of their lower positions within the hierarchies of European society (socio-economically and racially) but also it makes them less culturally distinct as a people (Jewish assimilation is equally as dangerous for the Jewish people for some Zionists as anti-Semitism).

Like messianism, modern Zionism proposes that the solution to galut is the ingathering of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. When Shimoni refers to ‘another territory’ he’s referring to Herzl’s early consideration of an area of Argentina and the British government’s proposal of a Jewish national homeland in Uganda. The dominant tendency within Zionism has always been to advocate for some part of Eretz Israel as the Jewish homeland. When Shimoni says ‘autonomy at least and sovereignty at best’ he is referring to two
different tendencies within Zionism. The first is cultural Zionism, whose leading figure was Ahad Ha’am who felt Jewish political sovereignty in Palestine was unrealistic, considering the means at the Zionist movement’s disposal and the existence of an indigenous Palestinian population. Instead he advocated for Jewish autonomy in parts of Ottoman-era Palestine, which would be the centre of a Jewish cultural revival that would reinvigorate the once exiled Jewish people, both in Palestine and the Diaspora. Jewish sovereignty in Palestine was the goal of Herzl’s political Zionism.

The final part of Shimoni’s definition refers to the means of how the ingathering of the Jewish people into Eretz Israel would be achieved. Political diplomacy was the means advocated by Herzl’s political Zionism. Herzl felt the best way to achieve Jewish sovereignty was via diplomatic activity with world leaders that would result in a legal basis for a Jewish state, and Jewish immigration to that state. For Herzl, the legal framework had to be secured before large-scale immigration could begin. So-called Practical Zionism argued that immigration and settlement activity (buying land from absentee Ottoman landlords, and working the land with Jewish labour) should take place regardless of a legal framework endorsed by some part of the international community. Cultural Zionism, with its call for Jewish autonomy as opposed to sovereignty, advocated the cultural revival of an ‘authentic’ Jewish culture, rooted in Eretz Israel, but also taken up in the Diaspora. Its interpretation of Jewish culture was broad but hinged, primarily, on the revival of ancient Hebrew as a modern language.

4.1. Negation of the Diaspora and Zionism as Colonialism

Thus far this section has attempted to outline the basic precepts of Classical Zionist ideology. What the remainder of this section will now do is outline the aspects of this ideology which are most meaningful to the constitution of post-1967 Popular Zionism in British Jewry, either through their presence or their absence. The first is the concept of Shlilat Ha-Gola, which translates as ‘negation of the Diaspora’. This has already been touched up on but is of key importance in the consideration of the popularity of an ideology
within a community that the ideology wants to negate. The second is Zionism as a colonial discourse (Said, 1979). This has not been touched upon in the above exposition because, as Said argues, Zionism as colonialism is something that Zionism sometimes cannot see and sometimes hides from itself. It is nevertheless a crucial part of Zionist ideology, both Classical and Popular.

*The Negation of the Diaspora and the Zionist imperative to make ‘Aliyah’*

Most scholars of Zionism have argued that the negation of the Diaspora is ‘a central assumption in all currents of Zionist ideology’ (Schweid, 1996, p. 133; Friesel, 1987, p. 173; Shimoni, 1980, p. 27). The most extreme expression of the negation of the Diaspora has been by Ben Gurion when he was the Prime Minister of Israel in the early years of the state. In 1959 he said: “Exile in which Jews lived and still live is to me a wretched, poor, backward and inadequate form of life. We must not be proud of it – on the contrary, we must reject it utterly and completely…” (cited in Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 46). In 1961, at the twenty-fifth Zionist Congress he quotes the Talmud and says, “He who resides outside the Land of Israel is as one who has no God.” (cited in Schindler, 2007(b), p. 9). All forms of Zionism believed that “… separation from the native soil cannot but have a detrimental effect on the mental life of the nation… Zionists believe that the restoration of the Jewish people to its native soil will reawaken many latent mental and spiritual powers which have been atrophied by disuse…” (Heller, 1947, p. 138). ‘Separation from the soil’ results in either anti-Semitic persecution, a life consigned to poverty, or the disappearance of a distinct Jewish culture through the assimilation required of Jewish Emancipation. The ideal solution to this is the aliyah of all Jews to either a sovereign Jewish state in Eretz Israel, or cultural autonomy there.¹⁴³ Friesel has argued that, “the fact that the majority of Diaspora Jews chose not to emigrate to Israel is seen as a failure of one of the major aims of Zionism” (1987, p.173). What is important to note here, is that this component of Zionist ideology is entirely ahistorical. Jewish life in
Diaspora has not always been ‘wretched [and] poor’. The periods in which it has, have been as a result of the impact of pre-modern anti-Judaism, or modern anti-Semitism on the social structures of the nations where Jews have been domiciled, not, as Zionism argues, because the quasi-mystical connections between a people and its alleged territory have been broken.¹⁴⁴

Part of the reason the concept of the ‘negation of the Diaspora’ has never fully resonated with post-Holocaust Diaspora Jewry is because, even now, their lives have been materially better off than Jews living in Israel – those in the West for material reasons and those in Middle East because they never faced European style anti-Semitism or anti-Judaism (until Zionists started provoking it post-1948 (Shenhav, 2011)).

Zionism as Colonialism

The final component of classical Zionism that plays an instrumental role in the construction of Popular Zionism is its colonial aspect. This aspect is illuminated by Edward Said in his ground-breaking essay ‘Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims’ (1979). As its title suggests this essay looks at

¹⁴⁴ Interestingly Zionism saw itself not as a response to anti-Semitism, which is often argued by way of justification of its ‘excesses’, but instead as a response to the condition of Diaspora. For classic Zionism, anti-Semitism is the expected response of a nation who hosts a people made wretched by alienation from their territory. It is Diaspora that is the original sin for Zionism, not anti-Semitism. It is in this strange mis-recognition of the actuality of Jewish life in Diaspora (which has been both ‘successful’ and ‘not successful’ in different places at different times) and the historical conditions that produce this actuality that Zionism is most like fascism. Zionism is fascist in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense in that it conceives of the Jewish people and their relationship to territory in essentialist terms. It is also parallels twentieth century European fascism in that anti-Semitism becomes somehow justifiable within this essentialist framework. Classical Zionist ideology even uses anti-Semitic terms in its representation of Diaspora Jewry. All strands of Zionism talk of the ‘Jewish problem’ (Shimoni, 1995) instead of the problems bought to bear on European Jews by anti-Semitism. Most troublingly is Zionism’s talk of ‘the liquidation of the Diaspora’. In the essay, ‘Galut Jewry Cannot Survive’ Jacob Klatzkin, writes, “the Judaism of the Galut is not worthy of survival” (cited in Shimoni, 1980, p. 27). Halpern also characterises the approach of Zionism after 1948 in the following way: ‘The time had come to ‘liquidate’ the Jewish Diaspora, to commence the ingathering of the exiles – to employ sovereignty of Israel as the means for the great purpose in whose name it had been won: for the final solution of ‘the problem of the Jews’; or the Jewish problem tout court” (Halpern, 1969, p. 50). This is not to suggest that Zionism, even when it was explicitly connected to sympathy for Hitler in Ahimeir’s extreme forms of maximalist revisionism, had ever proposed the genocide of Diaspora Jewry (this is patently absurd) but its repeated use of language like ‘liquidation’ and ‘Jewish Problem’ make it, at times, disturbingly complicit with aspects of the Nazi project, if only discursively.
Zionist ideology from the perspective of the indigenous Palestinian communities who were living in Palestine before the Nakbah in 1948 and in the West Bank and Gaza before 1967. This new perspective reveals aspects of Zionism that Zionist scholars fail to explore – namely the way that Zionism represents both Palestinians and Palestine in the long period it is not under Jewish sovereignty. According to Said, Zionism represents Palestinians as either not being there at all – as expressed in the famous Zionist dictum ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’ – or represented in typically ‘orientalist’ (Said, 1978) fashion as dirty, slovenly and lazy and therefore having no right to sovereignty in Palestine: “Zionism essentially saw Palestine as the European Imperialist did, as an empty territory paradoxically ‘filled’ with ignoble or perhaps even dispensable natives (Said, 1979, p. 81). The invisibility of Palestinians to Zionism, though rarely touched up on by Zionist scholar’s exposition of their own ideology, is, Said argues, absolutely central to how Zionist ideology is constructed: “all the constitutive energies of Zionism were premised on the excluded presence, that is the functional absence of the “native people” in Palestine” (Said, 1979, p. 82). He goes onto argue that the epistemological construction of Palestine as an empty land had “an immensely traumatic Zionist effectiveness” (Said, 1979, p. 83) for Palestinian people, in that it provided the intellectual basis for its colonisation. The wilful occlusion of Palestinians within Zionist discourse also makes it far easier to convince Diaspora Jews that Zionism is not an affront to the rights of Palestine’s indigenous population – something has to exist in order to be affronted. The invisibility of Palestinians for British Jews is evidenced below; just to note here that many interviewees claimed not to know there were Palestinian refugees in 1967, despite it being a major news story at the time, and the issue’s continued importance to any settlement of the Palestine/Israel conflict.

Of course, the Palestinians do exist, so when Zionist ideology encounters them, its strategy has been to deploy the racial hierarchies of European race science in order to delegitimize Palestinian sovereignty: “Those natives already fit a more or less acceptable classificatory grid, which made them sui generis inferior to western or white men – and it is this grid
that Zionists like Herzl appropriated, domesticating it from the general culture of their time to the unique needs of a developing Jewish Nationalism” (Said, 1979, p. 72). Said lists many examples of this in ‘Zionism from the Standpoint…’ Its presence in the ‘official’ Zionism expounded in Britain, is evidenced throughout Joseph E. Heller’s *The Zionist Idea* (1947), a book published by the Zionist Federation to explain Zionist ideology to British Jews. Examples include, Heller’s claims that Palestinian life under the Ottoman Empire was, “an outstanding example of lethargy and maladministration” (1947, p. 112) and that prior to the recent Jewish immigration, “the country was almost derelict” (ibid). Heller also claims that “since the Jews were expelled from Palestine it has remained neglected, uncultivated and under populated” (1947, p. 113). Similar ideas successfully make the transition from official Zionism to Popular Zionism, post-1967, as is evidenced below.

5. Popular Zionism

The previous section attempted to give an outline of the most salient points of Classic Zionist ideology, so that in the following section on Popular Zionism it is possible to show which elements are incorporated and naturalised into British Jewish ‘common sense’ post-1967, which elements were not and the ways in which these elements of Zionist ideology are affectively invested so that they both constitute British Jewish experience and also perform their effectivity within the social totality. Before this section does this, it is going to briefly look at, what could possibly be termed, the precursors of Popular Zionism i.e., the attempts at naming the various forms of Zionist ideology that emerge post 1948 and 1967. The primary reason for doing this is to demonstrate what previous attempts at naming post-1948 and

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145 For an early version of Said’s ‘orientalism’ applied specifically to the representation of Arabs in the 1967 war see his essay ‘The Arab Portrayed’ in (Said, 1970). In this essay Said notes the “depressing… ways in which the Arabs were portrayed” (p. 2) often as mobs of hysterical anonymous men compared to the representation of Israelis as heroic individual. Reflecting on this Said asks, “was not the June war the conflict between the white European bravely facing the amoral wilderness in the person of savage natives bent on destruction” (p. 3).
post-1967 Zionism has failed to do, namely fully account for its affective dimensions.

5.1. Pre-cursors to Popular Zionism: Philanthropic Zionism, Instant Zionism, New Zionism

The notion that Classical Zionism changes in content in different historical periods has been addressed in the existing literature on Zionist ideology. The most crucial date that scholars argue that Zionism’s content changes is 1948. Laqueur (1972) and Shimoni (1995), arguably the leading scholars of Zionism, both argue that Zionism comes to an end once the State of Israel is realised. This conclusion is out of step with how others in the field view the history of Zionism. For instance, Schindler argues that 1948 does not signify the end of Zionism per se rather it signifies the end of classical Zionism: “While classical Zionism had ended with the establishment of the state in 1948, it was unclear what had emerged instead” (2007 (b), p. 9). Friesel agrees but calls what has emerged ‘New Zionism’ and roots it in classical Zionism, “in the sense that the meaning of the components and their relative strength within the Zionist idea became modified” (1987, p. 182), namely there is less emphasis on Diaspora Jews to make aliyah.

There have also been various attempts at discerning what sort of Zionism exists in the Diaspora post-1967. In a 1980 book, Zionism in Transition, published by the State of Israel, Shimoni writes that in the diasporic communities of the post-Holocaust West it is possible to see, “a conceptual mutation of the Zionist idea itself” (1980, p. 30) which he argues is based around the idea to stay in the Diaspora. Graham and Boyd make the case that for British Jews in 2010 Zionism has even less ideological content, defining it as meaning “a supporter of Israel and its governments actions and policies” (2010, p. 12) as opposed to “a nationalist ideology espousing the right of the Jewish people to self-determination in their own sovereign state in the land of Israel” (p. 11). Schindler’s definition of Zionism is even emptier of ideology than this: “for Diaspora Jews, Zionism today means a broad identification with Israel” (2007 (b), p. 9).
Avi-Hai argues for a form of Zionism different from the classical version outlined above. Between 1948 and 1967, the most common form of Zionism in the Diaspora was ‘philanthropic Zionism’ which saw, “Zionism as a collective and political effort to support Israel… aliyah was for others” (Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 44). Ben Gurion called this ‘pseudo-Zionism’ (Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 46) and was critical of it. He argues that as a result of the 1967 war, Zionism changes again in that it becomes hegemonic (though he does not use the term) – “a sense of common fate and oneness became a basic datum. The Zionist article of faith, we are a people – one people’ became the conventional wisdom possessed by all” (cited in Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 48). For Avi-Hai, ‘Surrogate Zionism’ emerges on the institutional and economic planes of America’s Jewish community and is practiced through charitable donations and the organisation of community events by groups like the United Jewish Appeal and the Israel Bonds Organisation.

Whilst there exists within the academic literature on Zionism, a strong sense of its shifting ideological content of Zionism according to world-historical events, no-one so far mentioned has understood these shifts in terms of the affectivity it generates – arguably its defining feature in the post 1967 conjuncture, at least in the British Jewish community. Only Avi-Hai, draws out the work the new ideological content performs in its social formation, i.e. hegemonizing the institutional plane of American Jewry. The only place within the existing literature that the affective properties of post 1967 Zionism is addressed is in an article published in The New York Times by right wing journalist Norman Podhoretz called ‘Now, Instant Zionism’ (1974). Podhoretz locates the genesis of Instant Zionism, not in 1967 but in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War, which, he (somewhat triumphalistically) argues, engendered “the complete Zionisation” of America’s Jewish community, 99% of whom he claims now support Israel. He defines Zionism in similar terms to (Graham and Boyd, 2010) as “supporting the idea of a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine”. Podhoretz’s description of this new form of Zionism, places affect at its centre. He defines it in terms of “depth of concern” and writes about its “astonishing intensity”. He notes how even
Jewish intellectual “indifferentists” (those who were indifferent to the State of Israel prior to the war) began to feel a deep identification with Israel. Podhoretz theorises that this new form of Zionism was born out of the “hidden apocalyptic terror” of the Holocaust:

"This is the deepest, most primitive fear of all, rarely articulated, often repressed, but printed on the nerves of many who were astonished to discover that they even cared about Israel, let alone that they believed themselves to be personally implicated in its destiny – they might disappear involuntarily... It is this very danger that has turned almost every Jew in America into a Zionist, and so long as it goes on hanging in the ominous political air, there will be no deflections from the Zionism to which they have all by now been so thoroughly and passionately and unequivocally converted."

[My emphasis]

Podhoretz is describing what this thesis is calling Popular Zionism. How this thesis differs is: i) it describes it in less triumphalistic terms, and as ultimately that something that should be opposed; ii) in order to oppose it tries to understand it Popular Zionism using the theoretical framework set out above; iii) it looks at the specificity of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish community, and historicises its origins in the 1967 war; iv) it provides empirical data to see how Popular Zionism is lived by ‘ordinary’ Jews and v) it looks at its racist dimension which is only ever touched upon by Zionist expositions of Zionism, if it is touched upon at all.

5.2. Popular Zionism: The becoming hegemonic of Zionist ideology

The previous chapter demonstrated how the Zionist representation of Israel and Israelis becomes not only incorporated into hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity but also becomes invested in with tremendous affective intensity. This therefore demonstrates that Zionist ideology is the primary way through which Israel as a sign is mediated within the British Jewish community. This is a crucial step in the becoming hegemonic of Zionist ideology within British Jewry in the post-67 conjuncture. The following section presents further evidence of Zionism-as-hegemonic, using the terms set out above. The first step is to use statistical data from British Jewish
sociology and historical studies to show how Zionism becomes the dominant political position in relation to Israel as a result of the war. This is ‘Popular Zionism’ in its simplest sense i.e. Zionism as the most popular (in numbers) discourse through which British Jews make sense of Israel. The second step is to understand the Popular in a more Gramscian sense i.e. the way the majority of British Jews ‘spontaneously’ reproduce Zionist ideology when they speak about Israel, thus achieving the status of Gramscian common sense. This will be demonstrated by looking at the way that Zionist ideology is spontaneously reproduced as if it were fact. This is particularly interesting in the case of interviewees who claim not to be Zionists.

Chapter 4 narrated the vicissitudes of the popularity of Zionist ideology within the British Jewish community over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It argued that it was not inevitable that Zionism should become hegemonic within British Jewry after 1967, and that in fact prior to 1948, it was a marginal and highly contested political force within the community. In 1948 this situation changes with the realisation of the State of Israel in the context of a post-Holocaust world. In Kosmin et al.’s (1997) brief history of the Zionist idea in the British Jewish community they cite Brook who argues that after 1948 “Israel had certainly become a focus of consensus, a strong unifying factor, and ‘a means of Jewish identification for those who [lack] religious belief” (p. 4). Hegemony is not entirely achieved in the 1948–1967 period because there are still mainstream Jewish groups participating in the life of the community who define as either non or anti-Zionist, namely Orthodox Jewry and the Liberal and Progressive synagogues. As a result of the processes outlined in Chapter 6, this changes as a consequence of the British Jewish experience of witnessing the Six Day War. As Britain’s Chief Rabbi writes in a letter to Israel’s finance minister two weeks after the war ends:

“Large numbers of religious Jews hitherto entirely indifferent or opposed to the JPA have been prevailed upon collectively and individually to suspend all other fund-raising drives in favour of the JPA campaign. As a result we have
achieved an unprecedented measure of unity and enthusiasm in the cause of Israel.”

According to various studies this ‘unprecedented measure of unity and enthusiasm in the cause of Israel’ is a persistent feature of the post-1967 conjuncture. A National Opinion Poll undertaken in 1970 puts Jewish support for the State of Israel at 80% (Alderman, 1992, p. 342). A 1973 survey completed in the Jewish community of Newton Mearns concludes, “Zionism seems to be the new focal point of Jewish identity” (ibid). According to a survey undertaken in Redbridge’s Jewish community, “support for Israel is a given fact” (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 82), pointing towards the way in which Zionism has been naturalised. In a survey completed in 1995, Kosmin et al. conclude that 81% of British Jews have either a strong or moderate attachment to Israel (1997, p. 1), and in 2010, Graham and Boyd conclude that British Jews are, ‘monolithic’… in their caring and concern for Israel and its long term survival” (2010, p. 36) instructively framing Zionism in affective terms.

A further way that Zionist ideology can be demonstrated as being hegemonic (and therefore Popular) within British Jewry post 1967 in a more strictly Gramscian sense is the way that it becomes naturalised i.e. ‘spontaneously’ emerges in the common sense of British Jews. This is evidenced throughout the interviews in that all the interviewees, to varying degrees, reproduced Zionist ideology, unconsciously and as if it were the only possible framework through which events in Israel could be understood. This is most clearly illustrated in interviewees who explicitly do not identify as Zionist.

All the interviewees were asked a question along the lines of, ‘do you consider yourself a Zionist?’ Harvey and Vivien, Zena and Stephen all answered negatively and did so according to the terms of the classical definition of Zionism outlined by Shimoni (1995) above. Harvey (p. 610),

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146 (ISA: 6303/1 Six Day War Correspondence)
147 As argued in section 5.7. of this chapter, this thesis sees caring and concern for Israel as the hegemonic position not a monolithic one.
Stephen (p. 357) and Vivien (p. 634) refused to identify as Zionist because they felt making aliyah was Zionism’s defining property – they had all never considered moving to Israel. Zena refused to identify as Zionist because she was not involved in the up building of Israel (p. 397). Despite answering negatively, these participants (along with those who answered positively) continuously reproduced Zionist ideology throughout their interviews. There are too many examples to reproduce here, and arguably the previous chapter provides ample evidence to prove this claim. Below are just short examples from each of those participants who claim not to be Zionist but ‘spontaneously’ reproduce Zionist ideology. Harvey reproduces Zionism’s lachrymose version of Jewish history in the following claim:

“Jews had been kicked out of Arab countries. Which was part of the [inaudible]. Even then I was conscious of ¾ million Arabs who got displaced but easily ¾ million Jews got displaced.”

(p. 604)

The Revisionist Zionist claim that Zionism turns wretched Diasporic Jewish victims into warriors is reproduced by Zena, immediately after she claims she is not a Zionist:

I wouldn’t call myself a Zionist but my love for Israel is next to none. […] [Israelis are] not the Jewry of Europe who went to the slaughter. These now, are the Jews from Israel from David and Jonathan’s time […] Israel are warriors and you can’t take that away from them.

(p. 397)

Stephen reproduces an iconic phrase of Zionist ideology:

“I think that Israel has tried to build an oasis in the desert and […] they’ve worked an absolute miracle there.”

[My emphasis] (p. 353)

It is through the ‘spontaneous’ reproduction of Zionist ideology in the common sense of British Jews who explicitly refuse to define as Zionist that we see the naturalization of the ideology.
5.3. Popular Zionism and Colonialism

One of the key components of classical Zionist ideology that was spontaneously reproduced in the common sense of the interviewees was Zionism as colonialism/orientalism/racism with regards to the Palestinians, as outlined by Said. For the interviewees, Palestinians were either rendered invisible in their narrating of the history of Palestine/Israel or they appeared as slovenly, lazy, treacherous natives whose only motivation for opposing Zionism was anti-Semitism.

Interviewed between 2008 and 2011, all of the interviewees were aware of the Palestinians as a people and a political movement. However Evelyn and David claim that prior to 1967, they were unaware that the Palestinians existed:

“I knew nothing of Palestinians or Arabs.”

(David, p. 451)

“… how aware of the Palestinians were you during that period? […]
No it was just Arabs as far as we were concerned at that time. Just Arabs, I don’t think we thought about Palestinians then, no.”

(Evelyn, p. 506)

During their interviews, both Jeremy and Rose deploy a comic book form of orientalism to describe their first hand experience of Arabs and Arab culture during different visits to the Middle East.

“We went to Hebron and then we went to Gaza […] two girls and two boys… we stood on the bloody side of the road and thumbed a lift and then a great big Arab Mercedes stopped, with four Arabs with their tea towels on their head and we got a lift with them to Gaza City. And then they were negotiating with the boys how many camels us two girls were worth. So they dropped us off in 1967, which was disgusting in 1967 with raw sewage running down the streets.”

(Rose, p. 655)
“The only impression is that they were as backwards as I thought they were. Because when I went there it was like pre-historic times when you drove through areas, not towns, but down towards Cairo, and it was like people from the bible, walking with an ass and women walking behind with jugs on their shoulders and I thought, ‘Blimey, they are hundreds of years behind us’.”

(Jeremy, p. 430)

Evelyn deploys the classic Zionist trope of a Palestine left to rot prior to Jewish sovereignty.

“And I do remember places and you’d see what parts the Jewish people had taken over from the Arabs, because the Arab part that they’d taken over was brown and the Jewish part was green where they cultivated before hand, because the Arabs just don’t cultivate do they? They just you know… Je: Just look at a Jew and go, ‘Oh look what he’s got!’”

(Evelyn, p. 502)

Evelyn also reproduces the orientalist stereotype of an Arab as both fickle and dangerous.

“[…] you wonder why they’re doing it because one minute they’re there and your friend and the next minute, they’re, you know. That’s the danger I suppose.”

(Evelyn, p. 508)

Finally, there were a number of instances when Orientalism also appeared in discussions of Islam in the context of the post-9/11 geo-political situation. This mainly manifested itself in paranoid remarks in which interviewees spoke of ‘Muslims taking over the world’ in similar language to that used by anti-Semites in relation to Jews (Zena, p. 387). Jeremy and Stephen related these ideas to Israel and British Jews.

“But now you’ve got people coming in saying, ‘no, we want Islam and you’re an infidel if you don’t’ […] In the long run, I don’t think there is a future for Jews in the UK.”

(Jeremy, p. 443)
“In France where there’s a voting block of five million Arabs and the Jewish community there is diminishing because they’re buying up large swathes of Eilat because they don’t feel comfortable in Paris. Anything is possible. You saw it happen in a relatively modern era in Germany.”

(Stephen, p. 349)

5.4. Popular Zionism not Classical Zionism

Despite the fact that the dominant position of British Jewry has been supportive of Israel since 1967 and that British Jews spontaneously reproduce Zionist ideology when they speak about Palestine/Israel, this does not mean that the majority of British Jews are Zionists in the classical sense. This section looks at the reasons why not: i) very few British Jews subscribe to classical Zionism’s chief characteristic – the imperative to make aliyah; ii) very few of them are involved with Classical Zionist praxis – either joining a Zionist organisation or making aliyah.

This can be viewed in Grossberg’s terms: Zionism does become hegemonic but Zionist ideology does not hegemonise the ‘planes’ necessary to secure the ascendance of classical Zionism in British Jewry, in the post 1967 conjuncture. Zionist ideology would have to hegemonize the institutional, the political and the everyday planes in order for this to happen. The planes that are hegemonized instead are the affective, the everyday and the pop cultural. It is at the intersection of these planes of the British Jewish social formation that Zionism comes to ‘matter’ post-1967 – the same place where Grossberg locates the effectivity of new right ideologies in America in a similar period.

The following section provides evidence to prove this claim. It begins by looking at the lack of Zionist activity on the institutional plane post-1967. It then looks at the absence of aliyah from the complex of ideas that is Popular Zionist ideology and how this means very few British Jews incorporate aliyah into their Zionist praxis. The section that follows moves on to show how the affective plane has been successfully hegemonized by Zionist ideology and
the sorts of praxis that emerge on the planes of the everyday and popular culture as a result.

5.4.1. Zionism and the institutional plane

The intensity of activity – both qualitatively and quantitatively – that occurred on British Jewry’s institutional plane during the war (outlined in chapter six) had little in the way of longevity. As discussed in chapter six the JPA organised another Emergency Fund in 1968 but only achieved approximately 10% of what it raised in 1967. There is a fluttering of activity on the institutional plane in the immediate post-war period. For instance, a handful of new Zionist organisations are formed as a direct response to the war: the Volunteers Union was established in 1967 to try and maintain the sorts of numbers of British Jewish volunteers who went during the war. The Aliyah Movement was established during the 27th World Zionist Congress in June 1968 of which the British Aliyah Movement was a part. In general, however, the long-term effect on the institutional plane was minimal. In a survey conducted within the Redbridge Jewish community in 1978, 89.7% of participants did not belong to any Zionist group at all (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 26). Kosmin and Levy’s reflection on this low statistic is highly instructive in terms of the argument being made in this chapter:

“Both our enumerators and respondents had real difficulty in recognising Zionist organisations and distinguishing them from other ‘Jewish’ groups. This perhaps reflects both the integration of Zionism into Anglo-Jewish life in recent decades as well as lack of perception of a separate Zionist ideology.”

(Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 26)

What they are saying here is that these very low membership figures are not necessarily as a result of a lack of Zionist ideology within the community, but that this ideology has become so naturalised within this community it is indiscernible as a separate ideology at all. Levenberg agrees with this conclusion in an article about Zionism in Britain in the same period – “Some

148 (CZA: F13/722 Material Relating to the Volunteers Union)
149 (CZA: F13/814 British Aliyah Movement)
Jews do not feel the need to affiliate with the Zionist movement on the premise "we are all Zionists anyway" (Levenberg, 1981, p. 110). Even more instructive is that Kosmin and Levy argue that the 10.3% of Redbridge Jews who did belong to Zionist organisations in 1978 had joined for social and cultural reasons as opposed to ideological reasons (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 27). This conclusion bears out in the interview data collected for this thesis. Although Sarah joined Habonim for ideological reasons, her parents, "primarily thought of it as a thinking person's way of meeting nice Jewish youngsters" (Sarah, p. 508). Kosmin and Levy's 89.7% of Redbridge Jews who do not belong to a Zionist organisation is probably best represented in the following statement by Harvey:

“So there's always a sense of that there is a connection between Jewishness and Israel. Yes, yes... having said that it hasn’t made them do an awful lot except maybe give a £100 here and there. People haven’t done an awful lot. At least I haven’t done an awful lot.”

(Harvey, p. 605)

Harvey’s statement points to where the most ‘traditional’ Zionist activity has taken place within British Jewry, the area of fundraising, (the economic plane). Kosmin and Levy found that in 1978, 86.7% (1983, p. 26) of Redbridge Jews had donated to an Israeli charity – a dramatically higher figure compared to the 10.3% who belonged to a Zionist organisation – and therefore conclude that the most significant relationship this community had was via charity. Once again their reflections on this statistic are instructive for this thesis:

“One had the impression that this question related more to general attitudes over philanthropy and the traditional mitzvah (good deed) of tzedakka (charity) rather to anything connected with politics of Jewish nationalism.”

(ibid.)

Arguably, what they are saying here is that economic activity towards Israel is being mobilized at its intersection with the affective plane and not the institutional plane i.e. its not out of a sense of ideological commitment towards Israel but out of a more diffuse sense of ‘Jewish’ ethics.
5.4.2. Aliyah

If Classical Zionist ideology had become hegemonic in Britain as a result of the war, there would have been an increase in the amount of British Jews making aliyah. As is demonstrated below, this is not the case, but this is not for lack of trying on the part of Zionism. During the 27th Zionist Congress of June 1968, the World Zionist Organisation reformulates the Jerusalem Program of 1951\(^{150}\) in direct response to the 1967 war. The reformulated programme includes the following statement:

“This program expresses and symbolizes the tremendous change which occurred in the Jewish world in recent years and particularly following the shock and the awakening caused by the Six Days War. This is a change both in the attitude of the entire Jewish people towards the State of Israel and the definition of the duties and the tasks of the Zionist movement. The major change in the new program places the centrality of Israel and future of the Jewish people at the forefront of Zionist aims and tasks and unequivocally stresses immigration from all countries as the supreme command for the Zionist movement as a whole and each Zionist as well.”\(^{151}\) [My emphasis]

In line with this injunction, the WZO redoubles its worldwide efforts to capitalise on the overwhelming Diasporic support of Israel during the war in an attempt to convert it into aliyah. For example, in November 1967 the Zionist Federation in Britain ran ‘The Aliyah Campaign’, and in 1968 the British Aliyah Movement was set up. Despite these efforts on the institutional plane, the plane of the popular and everyday life remain relatively unaffected, meaning, very few Jews make aliyah, or consider it an important part of either their Jewish or even Zionist identities.

In a report written in February 1968 on a series of university meetings organised as part of the Aliyah Campaign in November 1967, Zvi Jagendorf writes the following:

\(^{150}\) The ideological platform of the Zionist movement, written as a replacement of the Basel Programme for the post-1948 era.

\(^{151}\) (CZA: F13/814 British Aliyah Movement)
“Aliyah was not a subject of immediate concern for the majority of those who came to the meetings. I found my audiences conservative in outlook, concerned about what it means to be and remain a Jew, but not committed to any radical change in their present way of life. Apart from those who had been members of Zionist youth organisations they were not confronted by a choice between Israel and England at the beginning of their careers. However recent events, by posing the question of Israel’s very existence, had disturbed the equilibrium. It was agreed that Israel had been taken too much for granted. Young people previously passive had become aware that the existence of Israel was important to them personally. They were therefore ready to make a personal contribution. Leaving aside the question of aliyah, there seemed to be little disagreement on the desirability of all who could take physical part in the work going on in Israel.”

Here we get a sense of the shifts in the affectivity that Israel generates and its renewed position in the identity of the university students – ‘young people previously passive had become aware that the existence of Israel was important to them personally’. However, just five months after the war, and amongst a cohort who Kosmin and Levy argue are the most likely of the British Jewish community to make aliyah (1978), the largest Zionist institution in Britain is only able to stimulate an interest in volunteering, not immigration in any permanent sense.

Aliyah from Britain remains low throughout the post-1967 conjuncture. Its peak was in 1969 with 1,763 British Jews making aliyah, approximately 0.5% of the community (Della Pergola et al., 2000, p. 19). Throughout the 1970s British olim average around 1,000 a year (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 25) and fluctuated between 500 and 1,000 olim throughout the 1980s (Alderman, 1992, p. 342). Nor are British Jews ideologically committed to the idea of aliyah. 71.2% of Redbridge Jews had never thought about making aliyah, with as many as 53% of members of Zionist organisations never considering it (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 27) – a striking figure in a conjuncture where the World Zionist Organisation has re-insisted on the absolute centrality of aliyah for all Zionists. Aliyah remains a low priority into the late 2000s with 70% of British Jews saying it was either ‘not at all likely’, or ‘not very likely’ that they would live in Israel in the future (Graham and Boyd, 2010, p.18).}

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(CZA: F13/681 Various Materials for Aliyah)

(Hebrew for people who make aliyah.)
These statistics are reflected in the decisions of the interviewees. Only Joseph, self-defined Zionist in the classical sense, even made aliyah, but (significantly perhaps) he returned to Britain after seven years. Sarah, who was also highly involved in Habonim during and immediately after the war – spending time with the organisation in Israel in 1967 – did consider making aliyah but ultimately decides against because she was not sure if the kibbutz lifestyle agreed with her (p. 535). The most common reasons for the interviewees deciding to remain in Britain was either that they had children in Britain (Zena, Rose) or it would reduce their quality of life (Zena, Stephen, Jeremy), demonstrating how weak an ideological commitment to aliyah had been inside the community since 1967.

Despite the lack of interest in aliyah in the context of the central place it has in Classical Zionist ideology and the WZO’s redoubled efforts to stimulate it after the war – Zionism still became hegemonic within the British Jewish community, just a different form of Zionism, one that hegemonised different planes within the British Jewish assemblage. In becoming Popular in a Diaspora community, Zionism lost one of its key components – the injunction for Diaspora Jews to make aliyah. Nevertheless, since 1967 there has not been any organised part of the Jewish community who opposes the existence of a secular State in some part of Eretz Israel as a Jewish national homeland (the Israel-critic Diaspora Jewish groups are not anti-Zionist). Moreover, British Jews reproduce Zionist ideology as if it were ‘spontaneously’ their own – it becomes part of their common sense. The next section will look at, arguably the most important aspect of Popular Zionism – its instrumental relationship with affect and how Zionist ideology territorialises the affective plane of the British Jewish community.

5.5. Popular Zionism as affect

That Zionism hegemonises the affective plane has already been touched upon in relation to British Jewish identity in chapter seven i.e. in the intensely affective way British Jews invest in the Zionist representation of
Israel and Israelis and the way it makes them feel as Jews in Britain as a result. Zionism as primarily affective, as opposed to ideological, manifests itself in other ways.

One of the most interesting ways this manifests itself is in how some of the interviewees defined Zionism. Three of them defined it almost exclusively in affective terms, with very minimal ideological content.

“A Zionist, very simply, is someone who is devoted to Israel”

(Harry, p. 397)

“What does being a Zionist mean?
Love of Israel, for Zion. There must be an Israel.”

(Jeremy, p. 438)

“What makes you a Zionist?
I don’t know. Now you’ve got me [laugh]. Love of Israel? Love of the fact that we have Israel. Love of the importance of Israel. I don’t know.”

(Evelyn, p. 488)

Others claimed they were not Zionist (according to some variation of Shimoni’s definition) but qualified that statement with a demonstration of how intensely invested they were in some part of Zionist discourse:

“What does it mean being a Zionist? [she laughs] [Long pause]. I don’t probably do enough. I feel very strongly… I belong to B’nai Brith but I don’t… it’s a failing on my part that I don’t do as much as I can. I buy Israeli goods when I can, I do that sort of thing, I don’t say that I want to be a Zionist and live there.

So is that for you the defining, kind of definition.
I think so, I think a true Zionist wants to live there and be part of the society.”

[My emphasis] (Vivien, p. 634)

Arguably the most interesting example of this is in a short exchange between Harry and Zena:

“Zionists are like, it’s upper, it’s a very high way of communism and things like that. Their belief…”
They're very ideological.
Zena: Yeah. A proper Zionist is [to herself] is probably not a farmer. [Back to me]... When they went over and they were given the land, the schnooks, as they call them, if you ever saw General Marcus.

No.
You never saw Cast A Giant Shadow?

Oh yes! I did.
Now that was Israel, how those schnooks\(^{154}\) built a road with their bare hands. You wouldn’t get that here. They worked day night, they were being killed left, right and centre, enemies were shooting them. Because those schnooks made that mountain and that’s how Jerusalem became free. Not because of darling England or any other countries but because of the Israelis themselves. [...] To be a true Zionist, is a thing going. If I went to Israel and I lived in Israel, I’d be there because I wanted to be there. I like the people, I like the weather, I love the beaches... ah dear (sighs)... I like the honey cake, I like everything about Israel.

Harry: See she is a Zionist
Zena: No I’m not a Zionist
Harry: Yes, you are.
Zena: No, no, no, no
Harry: You might not know it but you are.
Zena: [Insistent] No. I feel for Israel, I've got compassion for Israel."
[My emphasis] (pp. 397–398)

In this exchange Harry is defining Zionism, using the definition of Popular Zionism set out in this thesis i.e. Zionism as primarily affective and practiced in popular culture. Zena, on the other hand, is defining it in accordance with some parts of the classical definition: it is a political ideology, 'a very high way of communism' and is practiced by warrior/farmer Jews up building the land in acts of Jewish national autonomy – “because those schnooks made that mountain and that’s how Jerusalem became free. Not because of darling England or any other countries but because of the Israelis themselves”. Zena is not one of ‘those schnooks’ so insistently refuses to call herself Zionist.

Looking at the sum of her interview, however, it is possible to argue that Zena is the most Zionist of the interviewees. Not only is her transcript full of Zionist ideology ‘spontaneously’ reproduced, but the degree of commitment she claims to have towards Israel is extraordinary. She, paradoxically, reveals this degree of commitment in refusing to define as a Zionist and in doing so offers a more appropriate definition for Zionism in Britain in the post-1967

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\(^{154}\) Yiddish for stupid or gullible people. The way Zena is using it here suggests that she is mis-using it.
conjuncture. This is a Zionism which is primarily affective as opposed to ideological – “I feel for Israel, I’ve got compassion for Israel” – and one that is practiced in popular culture and the every day as opposed to politically or institutionally – “I like the people, I like the weather, I love the beaches… ah dear (sighs)… I like the honey cake, I like everything about Israel”. (Even the act of talking about Israel in the interview causes an affective response in Zena – ‘ah dear (sighs’) ). Harry is correct in this exchange: Zena is, arguably, an ideal subject of Popular Zionism.

That post-1967 Zionism was primarily affective as opposed to ideological is evidenced as early as 1968 in a report filed for the British Aliyah movement called: “Manchester Aliya [sic]: A Blueprint for an Effective Aliya movement”:

“‘The majority of British Jews are emotionally on the side of Israel, and take pride in her existence and military and social achievements, but even among those who have visited the country there is a widespread ignorance of the historical, economic and social realities. The result of a hasty two week tour gives a very distorted view (through the windows of a luxury hotel and of a tourist bus) and of the people, the climate and the ways of life […] It is not true, as most Israelis seem to believe, that most British Jews contribute to J.P.A as conscience money… Most Jews have little or no guilt feeling because they remain in the country of their birth… the mass of uncommitted Jews feel sympathy, fellow feeling and emotional identification rather than guilt or a sense of unfulfilled duty which are the product of knowledge rather than ignorance.’”

This report is describing the hegemony of Popular Zionism in Manchester Jewry in 1968 – ‘the majority of British Jews are emotionally on the side of Israel’. It describes a Zionism practiced mainly through tourism as opposed to aliyah. It also describes a Zionism where emotion almost entirely replaces knowledge/ideology, in the way that Grossberg describes an affective epidemic, as outlined above – “Questions of fact and representation become secondary to the articulation of people’s emotional fears and hopes” (Grossberg, 1992, p. 292). (Popular Zionism is not an ‘affective epidemic’ in itself, but operates in a similar fashion, and often produces them). The implication of this report is that Zionism is not fully successful because it has

155 (CZA: F13/814 British Aliyah Movement)
yet to inspire Manchester Jews to make aliyah. However, just like Grossberg writes of the new conservatism – “This partly explains the new conservatism’s ‘ideological’ successes: they have been able to construct issues with enormous public passions… without leaving any space for public engagement” (ibid.) – Zionism has been tremendously successful in British Jewry post-1967, in that despite it not being able to stimulate aliyah, it has British Jewry affectively invested in it with so much passion, that the idea that there maybe other ways to organise a Jewish political presence in Palestine/Israel aside from the current Zionist system, has been rendered unthinkable and for anyone, Jewish or otherwise, to suggest other solutions provokes the anger of Britain’s Jewish community. This aspect of Popular Zionism – its success and how it might be opposed – is discussed in greater detail in the conclusion of this thesis. What is important to note here, is that Zionism is primarily affective as opposed to ideological – it is Popular, in Grossberg’s definition of the term.

That Zionism is primarily affective manifests itself in other ways aside from how British Jews define Zionism. Some of the interviewees talked, not so much about Zionism as affect, but about their own affective engagement with the ideology. Most interestingly, perhaps, were the two anti-Zionists on this matter. Both David and Brian talked about the passionate conflict their anti-Zionism has generated in them and in their relations with other people. Brian spoke about arguing with his family (p. 576). David agreed that his engagement with anti-Zionism was passionate:

“I’m incapable of having a peaceful discourse with Zionists. Sometimes they shout first sometimes I shout first but I always do my share of shouting.

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156 An example of this was a roundtable discussion published in the 2010 ‘New Year Supplement’ of The Jewish Chronicle called, ‘Why shouldn’t we be free to criticize Israel?’ (2010, pp. 2–7). This edition is the most widely read of the whole year, and running over five pages, the discussion was the edition’s flagship article. The very fact that a newspaper run in accordance with liberal democratic principles even has to pose this question points to how undemocratic the hegemonic British Jewish political tendencies towards Israel are. The right for a community and its media to criticize the nation-state supposedly acting in its name is a fundamental principle of liberal democracy. The fact that the published version of the discussion ostensibly concludes ‘no’ to the question it poses confirms this.
Is your engagement with Anti-Zionism is it a passionate engagement?
Yeah!

(p. 469)

Sarah, previously a Zionist in the classical sense (she was actively involved in Habonim as a teenager) speaks of the more complicated affective relationship she has with Zionism and Israel as a result of the State of Israel’s post 1967 policies (broadly the ethics of the occupation, and the siege of Gaza, post Sharon’s withdrawal):

“So the emotion you just felt is from memory as opposed to any strong emotion you feel now about the wall and Jerusalem?
[...] I’ve tried to feel the same way [...] I want to feel that sense of love of Israel that I felt the first time, or the second time and when I lived in Israel in ‘67 for a period. I want to feel that same fervour and love of the land, and belief and I feel something’s different and I struggle with that. [...] And I’m envious of my best friend who’s just made aliyah recently and ... you know... and had has this yearning for years to live in Israel and I’m envious that she’s still managed to maintain that fervour all these years and still feel the same way. And I’m saddened that I’m feeling slightly differently towards to Israel.”

(Sarah, p. 530)

This quote is interesting in different ways (Sarah argues elsewhere in the interview that her falling out of love with Israel came as a result of precisely the sort of principles – her commitment to ethics, politics and social justice – that inspired her involvement with Zionism in the first place). What is important to note here is that she is describing her current complicated relationship with Israel in affective terms – “I want to feel that sense of love of Israel that I felt the first time... I’m envious that she’s still managed to maintain that fervour all these years and still feel the same way. And I’m saddened that I’m feeling slightly differently towards to Israel”. Sarah’s struggle with Zionism, specifically as a result of policies set in motion as a result of the 1967 war, is an affective as much as an ideological struggle.
5.5.1. Affect and physically being in Israel

Another aspect of Popular Zionism’s primarily affective qualities, and one that shows that the sort of affect operative within Popular Zionism is Deleuzo-Guattarian, is the many descriptions the interviewees gave of their intensive affective response of physically being in Israel. Both Evelyn and Rose talked about an ‘amazing feeling’ as soon as they get off the plane in Israel:

“So when you went to Israel, how did you feel when you got off the plane in Tel Aviv?
Je: Oh wonderful
E: Oh!
Je: Absolutely wonderful.
E: […] it was fantastic. The feeling was fantastic, that was a great feeling. Yeah. I mean I’d never thought I’d get there. It was wonderful.
(Evelyn, p. 503)

“And we visit very often and we love it when we’re there and we love everything about it when we’re there.

So do you still… do you get...
Yeah. Every time I get off the plane.

Can you describe how you feel?
You can never go to Israel for the first time more than once. So when I went in 1967 that was the first time I went and that was an amazing, amazing feeling that I’m actually here."
(Rose, p. 669)

Zena and Evelyn talked about the intense affectivity of their lived experience of being in Israel, specifically in relation to Zionism; Zena in terms of being there for the State of Israel’s sixtieth anniversary and Evelyn in terms of visiting significant Zionist locations.

“A whole coach load of us were there for their sixtieth. Which was their diamond anniversary, which was absolutely magnificent. And unless you were there you cannot… even I talked to you for hours… to be there … and that’s it."
(Zena, p. 395)
“We went up Scopus yes. We went up Masada. We went to all the places. It’s a wonderful feeling because we never thought… you read about these places, let’s face it. I used to read about Israel, Palestine… and these are places I’d never thought I’d be at. It’s a wonderful feeling.”

(Evelyn, p. 505)

Sarah, Stephen and Jeremy talked about their intensely affective responses in relation to physically being in Jerusalem – Stephen and Jeremy specifically about the Western Wall – a place that ‘matters’ (in Grossberg’s terms) as much in the discursive formations of religious Judaism as in those of modern Zionism.

“Jerusalem is a beautiful city and it does still evoke tremendously strong feelings. It was, I’ve got some wonderful music, ‘Jerusalem the Golden’, and it really did sparkle with that glow of the golden city and surrounded by these wonderful hills, they’ve been built up with these wonderful posh places now. In those days it was an incredibly evocative and beautiful place to be and it did have very special sort of magic. And I was very affected by that. And it also has that very… oriental, seductive power to… there’s something very exciting about that city. And so much history, just the history…”

(Sarah, p. 530)

“… as I walk up to the wall, that last metre or so, the emotion comes over me, I see their faces and I just break up. I don’t get that anywhere else.

Oh really, but you define…
I’m not religious. […]

So what is it about the wall that makes you emotional if you’re not religious?
I don’t know

Is it religious do you think?
No. It can’t be. It’s a place for me to release my feelings. It just triggers it. Maybe it’s just me. Maybe they’re in there anyway, my emotions. And this is somebody saying you can do it here, you’re allowed. Maybe I keep it bottled up, I don’t know.

And there you…
And there I feel it’s the right to place to feel it.

That’s interesting. And why do you think that is?
I don’t know. Because that’s where everybody says is the spiritual home of the Jewish people, the temple, the original temple. Maybe it is, maybe He’s there. I don’t know.

Maybe he’s there – maybe God’s there?
Maybe God’s, maybe Hashem is actually looking down on that wall, ready for you.”

(Jeremy, p. 433)

“I’ve been to Jerusalem two or three times now. I absolutely love it there. […] Did it have any religious significance to me? No. Not at all. It wasn’t the centre of my universe. I did feel quite tearful and emotional by the wall.

Oh you did. You were tearful and emotional?
I wasn’t balling, which [my friend] was. But certainly there’s a feeling around it that you get. Especially the first time. But no, the rest of Jerusalem no. I found it…

[interrupts] Why was it so emotional?
No real reason at all. Because it’s the most prized object in Jewish modern day Judaism. That wall is 2,000 odd years old and it’s a symbol of the Jewish people. The last remaining symbol. And there’s loads of people there shochelling¹⁵⁷ away and you go up to it and you put your little message like this [gestures] into the wall. Usually it would be a little something […] I think every time I go there I feel a bit emotional around the wall, because people are praying.”

(Stephen, p. 379)

Stephen and Jeremy’s affective response to the wall is particularly interesting, because both claim not to be religious (Jeremy questions the existence of God in an earlier part of his interview). Stephen refuses to define as Zionist and Jeremy defines as a Zionist but in non-classical terms. There is a strand within Deleuze and Guattari that argues that affect works directly on the nervous systems of bodies, without being discursively mediated (1980; 1981). If we understand Jeremy and Stephen’s claims on their own terms, it is possible to argue that this is what happens when they visit the wall: simply being a Jew in the physical presence of the Wailing Wall produces an inexplicable and intense affective response. This analysis, however, produces an essentialist link between Jews and the physicality of Eretz Israel, quite out of step with Deleuzo-Guattarian metaphysics. Affect can work on the nervous system unmediated (although the individual or collective response to affect as sensation is always culturally specific) but that is not what is happening here. The Wailing Wall can only produce the intense affective response that it does in Jeremy and Stephen (Jeremy cries, Stephen is tearful) if they subscribe in some way to either Jewish religious or modern Zionist discourses. Jews who

¹⁵⁷ The swaying motion that sometimes accompanies Jewish prayer.
do not subscribe to these discourses do not have these reactions. For instance, anti-Zionist, David talked about feeling immense relief on leaving Israel (p. 463). The model of affect operative here is the one formulated by Guattari (outlined in the previous chapter) in which reiterative discursive sequences catalyse affective responses in a subjective ecology that is interwoven with both the physical and the socio-cultural in complex ways. From their affective responses to being in the physical presence of the wall it is clear, that whether they realise it or not Jeremy and Stephen have been territorialised by the discursive refrains of either religious Judaism, or the parts of it which modern Zionism have secularised. Having been territorialised by Zionism in a way that produces an intensely affective response they, like Zena, become ideal subjects of Popular Zionism, as defined using Grossberg’s theoretical approach.

Adjectives like ‘wonderful’, ‘amazing’ and Zena’s claim that language itself cannot do justice to the feeling of being in Israel during its sixtieth anniversary all point to the intensity of affect triggered by physically being in Israel. Three of the interviewees describe the quality of this affective assemblage:

“…even now it’s a lovely feeling. You feel at home.”

(Evelyn, p. 504)

Jeremy expands on ‘feeling at home’ by suggesting that it means being free from anti-Semitism.

“I just feel at home there. The minute I get off the plane. The minute I see all these Jewish people along the beach. The little kids all healthy and smiling and no-ones starting on them because they’re Jewish. Like my son says, he likes going because he can wear his Magen David\textsuperscript{158} outside his t-shirt and not inside his t-shirt. He’s not worried about getting a whack, which he can do in England, if he wears it on the tube and some Arab decides he doesn’t like him. Or get knived. It doesn’t happen there. There is some crime, yes, but it’s not in the same way. It’s not in the same way at all.”

(Jeremy, p. 441)

\textsuperscript{158} A Magen David literally means Star of David. As one of the most iconic signifiers of Judaism, it is often worn as jewellery.
This is the same affectivity, discussed in the previous chapter – a strong Israel making British Jews feel safe against an anti-Semitism that barely exists. The following statement from Stephen describes the other dimension of this affectivity, also described in the previous chapter, the aspect that makes the affectivity that British Jews feel in relation to Israel both highly complex and contradictory. First Stephen says:

“They are living in a state of standby as far as the army is concerned or bombs. They're just waiting. You've got that fear the whole time that there's going to be another attack, or bomb or whatever. So they've had to harden up, the Israelis are far harder, harsher and they've had to be…”

This statement is shortly followed by:

“But every time we go back to Israel there's this feeling that you're kind of totally... Totally relaxed. I suppose looking back on what I've said to you... This hidden fear, this anti-Semitic, pogrom fear that you have completely goes away when you're in Israel. Completely. Because when you're on the streets and in restaurants you haven't got anyone looking at you the wrong way because you're Jewish. Having been part of that, whether it was the odd occasion as a youngster, I have witnessed anti-Semitism and it's totally uncalled for and unjust and just out of the blue, it's not like we attacked you. Like you could level something at Israel because they attacked you. We're just sitting here, minding our own business. It's a great feeling not to be worried about that. That's a big attraction to me. I really do feel at home there, I feel comfortable there.”

(p. 354)

On a discursive level, these statements are entirely contradictory – Israel is both in permanent danger and Israelis are permanently fearful, yet Stephen feels totally relaxed when he is in Israel, because he doesn’t have to face the anti-Semitism in Britain, (which is empirically at an all time low). In its discursive contradictions these statements are a perfect example of Gramsci’s common sense. In terms of the affectivity he is describing, Stephen as Popular Zionist demonstrates the same complex affective assemblage outlined in the last chapter – incorporating the Zionist representation of Israel into your identity makes you feel both secure and at threat at the same time.
5.6. Popular Zionism and popular culture

If, for Grossberg, popular variants of ideologies hegemonise the affective as opposed to the ideological plane, the practice they inspire happens at the intersection of the planes of everyday life and popular culture and not of the institutional and the political. This is true of Popular Zionism. In the most general terms, Graham and Boyd found that 76% of the British Jews they surveyed in 2010 felt that Israel was relevant to their day-to-day lives (2010, p. 10). According to the interviews, this everyday Zionist practice manifested itself most commonly, not in belonging to Zionist organisations (although some do) but in their media and pop cultural consumption and the consumer decisions they made as tourists.

5.6.1. Pop cultural consumption

One of the findings of Kosmin and Levy’s survey of Redbridge Jewry was, “… it is clearly evident that the majority of Redbridge Jews do not have first hand experience or direct contact with Israel or Zionism. Apparently their image of Israel is formed from second hand or third hand opinions and from the general media” (1983, p. 29). Though changes in British tourism mean British Jews have much more first-hand experience of Israel than they did in 1978 (see below), simply by being Jews who remain in Britain, this statement is as applicable to British Jewry in the contemporary moment as it was in 1978.

One of the key ways Popular Zionism is practiced is in relation to the consumption of Hollywood feature films. *Exodus* (1960), one of Hollywood’s most successful Zionist feature films (Loshitzky, 2001) is mentioned by two interviewees as having a definitive effect on their or their relatives’ becoming-Zionist.

“So you didn't have a perception of Israel or Israelis. It was just a place and there were some Jewish people there. Yes, yes. Yes.
V: You didn’t think it was a homeland? That it was a place where people could always go to...
H. Well I did, but that was probably through things like Exodus, the film. That made it more conscious to me actually.

So Exodus… it comes up a lot, the film Exodus, in the interviews that I’ve done, the film Exodus played apart for you…
I think it did actually."

(Harvey, p. 593)

“He wasn’t a Zionist that was the strangest thing. That was the strangest thing ever because we were Zionists and he wasn’t a Zionist, his wife wasn’t a Zionist. She saw the film Exodus, I don’t know if you’ve ever seen the film Exodus.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.
And she suddenly said, “we’re all going to Israel”, and she took her whole family. […]

So Exodus made her want to go to Israel?
Made her want to go to Israel. Yeah. Amazing. They weren’t Zionists, we were.”

(Evelyn, p. 488)

Zena was the interviewee whose interview suggested she practiced Zionism as cultural consumption most strongly. In it she mentioned Exodus, Cast A Giant Shadow (1966), Leonard Bernstein conducting an orchestra on Mount Scopus, Raid on Entebbe (1976), Evergreen (1985), Schindler’s List (1993), Israeli singer Dudi Fischer, a Yedhiot Arahanot commemorative book of Israeli history, and her own journalistic practice in the service of Zionism. In her interview she told an interesting story which weaves together pop cultural consumption, tourism, and the Zionisation of the Holocaust:

“Julie: Did you tell them we went to Schindler’s grave?
She did, yeah. [Laughs]
Julie: Oh [soft laugh] How did we schlap that day?

She said.
Harry: He’s buried on the mount.
Julie: [with evident pride] We saw him. Zena made sure the taxi driver got us there.
Zena: We got there. I made sure.
Julie: Like the end of the film with all the stones on.
Harry: He’s buried near Herzl.
Zena: It’s right opposite the Dan.”

(p. 404)
As Popular Zionist tourists in Israel, Zena and her friends feel moved to visit Oskar Schindler’s grave because, one can safely presume, of the Steven Spielberg film *Schindler’s List*. In the collective retelling of the story a Hollywood narrative of the Holocaust gets interwoven with classical Zionism – “he’s buried near Herzl” – partly because post-1967, Zionism becomes fused with the Holocaust in Western culture (see chapter seven) and partly because Spielberg interweaves the Holocaust with Zionism in *Schindler’s List* (Loshitzky, 1997). The excerpt above provides a perfect example of Popular Zionist praxis: the articulation of the Holocaust and Zionism, producing an emotive ritual (visiting a grave) at the intersection of two pop cultural practices (Hollywood cinema and tourism).

Jeremy, whose membership to the 1,000 club (an all male organisation that donates charity to different sectors of Israeli society) arguably makes him a Classical Zionist (at least partially), recounted an interesting moment of pop cultural practice that was instrumental in his becoming-Zionist:

“Then when did…
Then when did I feel it? Really? I felt it most through Maccabiah. That’s what I felt. My solicitor, about sixteen years ago, said, “I had just been to the Maccabiah, let me show you the film” and I hadn’t felt anything. And his wife’s taking the film at the stadium and I can hear her crying and she’s saying, “there’s John, there’s John” and she zooms down and he’s waving and I see all these Jewish people and they sing *Hatikvah*159 and I thought, ‘I’d love to be part of that’. So I trained for the next three years and went in for the tennis […] I’m a Maccabean type of person […] It’s just all these different nationalities come together. It’s a fantastic feeling. Just sitting there and hearing the Swedish boys, all blond hair and blue eyes, talking about salt beef and latkes […] You’ve got Spanish speaking ones going, ‘where’s my chicken soup?’ and Los Angeles and from Buenos Aires. You think, ‘what a family this is.’[…] And then when they stand… Sharon… I think it was him who actually said it. He said, ‘You are all our people. Welcome to Israel. I’d like you to come in four years time but in four years time you’ll be competing for Israel instead of against Israel’ And things like that and it just gets your emotions…. It is emotional for me.”

(Jeremy, p. 432)

The Maccabiah Games is a large-scale Jewish sports event, similar to the Olympic games, held in Israel every four years. Organised by the Israeli State

159 The Israeli national anthem
the Maccabiah Games is, arguably, Zionist in the conventional sense. However the fact that it is a sports event, means it appeals to Diaspora Jews regardless of their relationship to Zionist ideology. It was Zionism interwoven with a pop cultural practice like sport that triggered an affective response in Jeremy that began his greater practical involvement with Zionism in later life.

One of the most significant cultural practices through which Popular Zionism is practiced is tourism to Israel. Almost immediately after the 1967 war there is an increase in tourism to Israel from around the world of 48% (Bar-Nir, 1973, p. 56). In terms of British Jewish tourists to Israel, 16% had visited by 1968 (Krausz, 1969 (a)), 26% had visited by 1978 (Kosmin and Levy, 1983), 78% had visited by 1995 (Kosmin et al., 1997), 91% had visited by 2004 (Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 2004, p. 44) and 95% had visited by 2010 (Boyd and Graham, 2010, p. 7). This steady and substantial growth is the result of a variety of factors aside from the British Jewish relationship to Israel and Zionism (i.e. the tremendous growth in British tourism since the 1970s). However, of the effect of the 1967 war on tourism, Della Pergola et al. argue that, “it can be assumed, however, that the Six Day War played a particularly significant role with regard to tourism, by making Israel definitely better known and visible on the international scene” (2001, p. 30). In 1981, Levenberg argued that, “tourism to Israel, therefore, has become a powerful factor influencing the Anglo-Jewish community” (1981, p. 176).

Zena, argues for tourism to Israel as a form of Popular Zionist praxis:

“Zena: Well Israel has got to be number 1. I personally feel that if more people went to Israel instead of supporting... oh no this is terrible, forget it.

Oh no, say it, say it...
Zena: Say it, say it... They should forget their Spains and Portugals and Americas...
Harry: And cruises
Zena: And cruises and really give Israel the best turnover they can have with tourism.
Harry: You’ve also got to think, Zena, of the financial situation.
Zena: I realize that. I’m just saying that when you see where people go to, they should go to Israel more. I had...
Harry: I agree with you.”

(p. 402)
This chapter has analysed the form of Zionism – Popular Zionism – that has been hegemonic within the British Jewish community in the post-1967 conjuncture. The analysis has also contended that in 2012 Popular Zionism remains hegemonic and has used quotes from the interviewees that relate to the present as well as other forms of data from 1967–2012 to support this claim. However, whilst making this claim it is vitally important to note that, in line with the Gramscian theorisation of hegemony as never totally secure, the post-1967 conjuncture has seen the hegemony of Popular Zionism within the British Jewish community challenged in a number of ways.

The earliest challenge to the hegemony of Popular Zionism emerged as a direct consequence of Israel’s victory in the 1967 war. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, pro-Palestinian and other politically radical groups in Britain begin to deploy anti-colonial discourses in order to represent Israel as an imperialist aggressor. A tiny minority of Jews in Britain, like interviewee Brian, advocated these representations in order to challenge the hegemony of Popular Zionism, though not as Jews per se and not from inside British Jewry. Counter-hegemonic movement began within the community itself in 1982 as a result of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (Sacks, 1991; Landy 1991). This emerged mainly in the form of criticism of specific Israeli policies rather than a questioning of the fundamentals of Zionist ideology and was located within the community’s slightly more socially progressive institutions like the Reform synagogue. Whilst this criticism did not seek to challenge Zionism’s central position within the community it is still significant in that it is the first time since 1967 that the hegemony of Popular Zionism is contested to some degree from within British Jewry.

The most important post-1967 contestation of the hegemony of Popular Zionism by British Jews as British Jews and directed towards the British Jewish community (amongst others) is from what David Landy terms “Israel-critical Jewish groups” (2011) like Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP) and Independent Jewish Voices (IJV). These groups emerged in...
response to the second intifada (2000-2005), the 2006 war in Lebanon and Operation Cast Lead in 2008. In Landy’s assessment these groups have offered the most successful contestation of the hegemony of Popular Zionism within the British Jewish community in that they have “loosened the automatic correspondence between Jewishness and Zionism” (p. 212) and have made “criticism of Israel… appear respectable and almost mainstream among segments of British Jewry” (p. 90). However, Landy supports the argument made in this chapter that “Zionist ideology is hegemonic among Jews” (p. 4) and that, “it is important not to overemphasise the power of the [Israel-critical Diaspora Jewish] movement; it is still a small marginalised group of people whose claim to speak out as Jews on Israel/Palestine is subject to constant attack” (p. 6). In line with the argument made throughout this thesis, Landy argues that in the post-second intifada period, “Diaspora Jewish identity has become even more defensive – more closed, right-wing and hostile to the outside world” (p. 8). In sum, whilst the focus of this chapter is the hegemonic way that the majority of Brititsh Jews have related to Israel via Popular Zionism in the post-1967 conjuncture, it is analytically and politically important to stress that Popular Zionism has not been monolithic.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to analyse the effect of the 1967 war on the place of Zionist ideology in the British Jewish community. It has done this using the theoretical perspective developed by Lawrence Grossberg (1992) in bringing Deleuze and Guattari’s affect to bear on the CCCS’s reading of the following Gramscian concepts – the Popular, hegemony, ideology and common sense. It continues chapter four’s narrative of the history of Zionism within the British Jewish community by arguing the effect of the war was the

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160 Landy reports that in 2010 JfJfP had 1, 625 signatories and IJV had 645 signatories. He argues that in the case of JfJfP the amount of signatories “are a somewhat flattering portrayal of its actual strength” (p. 95) noting that numbers of attendees at its meetings have not really changed since the organisation’s inception.

161 Joseph’s is a typical British Jewish reaction to these groups: “I just, ha, I just don’t take much notice of them. They might as well be Jews for Jesus. […] What they do is of no consequence whatsoever” (p. 555).
total hegemony of Zionist ideology within the British Jewish community. This is evidenced in different ways: i) by the numbers of British Jews who both support Israel and accept its existence as a given fact; ii) the way that fragments of Zionist ideology appear ‘spontaneously’ in the common sense of British Jews, particularly in those who say they are not Zionists. The Zionism that becomes hegemonic in the post-1967 conjuncture, however, is not Zionism in the classical sense (Shimoni, 1995). First, it omits Classical Zionism’s defining ideological component – the negation of the Diaspora/the imperative to make aliyah. As a result of this omission, it does not inspire Classical Zionist praxis: actually making aliyah or joining a Zionist organisation. In Grossberg’s terms Zionist ideology does not hegemonize the institutional or political planes. It does, however, hegemonize the affective plane of the British Jewish social formation. This can be seen in i) the way Zionism is defined by some of the interviewees as ‘love of Israel’; ii) the intense affective engagement British Jews have with (parts of) Zionist ideology and iii) the intense affectivity triggered by physically being in Israel. Most importantly it can be seen as the way that Zionism exists in the post-1967 British Jewish social formation more as an affective disposition towards Israel than as an ideology. The praxis this sort of Zionism inspires occurs largely on the planes of everyday life and popular culture – primarily media consumption and tourism. For all the reasons, it is more accurate to call the Zionism that dominates British Jewry in the post 1967 conjuncture Popular Zionism.

The purpose of this chapter has not simply been to name Popular Zionism. Rather, in providing a more accurate label for the sort of Zionism that has dominated the British Jewish social formation post-1967, it has been necessary to i) identify its distinctive characteristics, ii) describe the conditions of their possibility and iii) locate their material effectivity – i.e. its tremendous success – within the social formation, so that it can be successfully opposed and resisted. If the CCCS defined the Gramscian ‘Popular’ as a constantly negotiated ‘field’ defined by ‘complex lines of resistance and acceptance, refusal and capitulation’, it becomes possible to imagine scenarios in which Zionism is successfully resisted and refused within the British Jewish Popular
in a similar fashion to the way it was before 1948. These are scenarios where Zionism ceases to become hegemonic, its historicity is revealed, the majority of British Jews do not affectively invest in it in the intense way they have post 1967, and the possibility of other ideologies aside from Zionism organising the affective lives and common sense of British Jews in relation to Palestine/Israel becomes a reality. Popular anti-Zionism might be one of these ideologies, as might yet to be conceived of ideologies that imagine mutually beneficial Jewish and Arab co-existence outside any sort of Zionist framework, pro, anti- or otherwise. What is important to note here is that because affect has played such a central role in the becoming-hegemonic of Zionism within in British Jewry – it is precisely because witnessing the 1967 war triggered such an intensely affective response in the British Jewish community that it was the affective plane that becomes hegemonized by a compromised form of Zionist ideology – that it is on the affective plane that resistance to Popular Zionism need occur.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

The beginning of this thesis noted that in current Jewish Studies scholarship there is a broad consensus that not only did the Six Day War generate an intensely emotional response in the British Jewish community but also that after the war the British Jewish relationship with Israel changed in important ways. What this scholarship has yet to provide is i) a detailed account of the community’s emotional response to the war and the mobilisation that it stimulated and the changes that occurred as a result or ii) a sustained theorisation of precisely how the representation of a world-historical event like the Six Day War can bring about cultural changes like those that occurred in British Jewry in the post-1967 conjuncture. This thesis has attempted to address both these gaps by using a cultural studies approach rooted primarily in the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. By using this approach, this thesis has been able to reveal two things: i) the central role that affect has played in bringing about the cultural changes that occurred in the British Jewish community after the war and ii) the crucial position that affect occupies in the constitution of these cultural changes. It has therefore been possible to argue that, contrary to claims within current scholarship, since 1967 Zionism in Britain has worked in a primarily affective manner and is ‘lived out’ in the identities, cultural practices and everyday lives of British Jews. For reasons outlined in Chapter 8, this thesis has called this sort of Zionism, Popular Zionism. To evidence these claims, it has been necessary to conduct twelve in-depth interviews with British Jews about their experience of the community’s response to the war. Supplementing these interviews with

original archival research has added detail that was previously missing from the historical record.

This thesis has made the above argument in the following way. Chapter 2 made the case that a cultural studies approach rooted primarily in Deleuzo-Guattarian thought was best placed to make sense of the impact of the war on the British Jewish community. This approach privileges the place of affect in the constitution of social and cultural formations so, this chapter argued, it provided the necessary theoretical tools to fully account for a moment in Jewish history in which, according to the interviews and archival research, affect had played a crucial role. Chapter 3 outlined the necessary methodology to deploy this theoretical approach in this specific context.

Chapter 4 outlined the various ‘territorialisations’ and ‘codings’ that took place within the British Jewish assemblage between 1880 and 1967 that organised it this assemblage in such a way that meant it was pre-disposed to making the intense affective investments in the Zionist representation of Israel that were ‘catalysed’ by the Six Day War. This chapter showed that Zionism was a marginal and highly contested force within the British Jewish assemblage prior to 1948 after which, the idea that a Jewish national home should exist in ‘Eretz Israel’ becomes naturalised though elicits weak support. Up until 1967 it had been respectable (in differing degrees) for British Jews and their institutions to be anti- and non- Zionist. The reason this changed after the war, this chapter argued, is because although during the 1960s British Jews were experiencing unprecedented measures of status and power, both socio-economically and within Britain’s racial hierarchies, they still felt vulnerable to anti-Semitism. This produced a contradictory affective economy within the assemblage that was reinforced in the ways that Jewishness was being coded in popular culture at the time. The successful attempt by Zionist institutions in coding the 1967 war as a (super-) heroic Israel fending off its annihilation and the genocide of its Jewish population resolved these contradictions by reflecting the increased status of British Jews in British society whilst also making them feel protected against the threat of anti-Semitism (which was, paradoxically, at an historic low).
Chapter 6 attempted to detail the role played by the war in doing this. It used a Delandian-Deleuzian/Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical model that argues that changes in the ‘formal properties’ of cultural and social formations occur through intensifications and dissipations in affect. In believing the Zionist claim that the war threatened Israel’s Jews with a genocide, British Jewry was overcome by an intense terror. In their belief that a super heroic army fended off this threat this terror ‘transmuted’ to an equally intense sense of elation.\textsuperscript{163} In experiencing these intensely charged affective states British Jewry became the ‘cancerous Body-without- Organs of the fascist’. This could be evidenced by the community acting in concert in a way that closed down the possibility of difference in either understanding what the war might mean or how one might be a British Jew in relation to the war. This has important consequences for the cultural changes that occur in post-1967 British Jewry discussed in the following chapters.

Chapters 7 and 8 discussed the cultural changes bought about by the intense affectivity generated by the war. Chapter 7 looked at the changes at the level of cultural identity. It did this by using Guattari’s argument that discursive ‘refrains’ are what cause the heterogeneous components of subjectivity (which include affects) to cohere into a functioning whole. Using interview and archival data, this chapter argued that the British Jewish reaction to the war introduced the discursive ‘refrains’ of Zionism into British Jewish cultural identity. These refrains include the notion that ‘the Jewish people’ always face an existential threat from which they can only be protected by a strong, militarised and aggressive State of Israel. These refrains ‘catalysed’ an affective assemblage comprised out of a sense of pride, security, excitement, and sexual desire that is thoroughly dependent on and perpetually undercut by paranoia. This chapter then argued that when these refrains are removed through, for example, the questioning of Zionist precepts, British Jewish cultural identity begins to deterritorialise in a way that causes panic. This might explain why British Jews respond so defensively to criticisms of Israel. This chapter then wondered what refrains might replace

\textsuperscript{163} Said argues that terror and elation are what give birth to Zionism (1979).
Zionism in order that a more properly ‘joyous’ affective assemblage might be catalysed within British Jewish cultural identity than the one which currently exists and is not dependent on dominance over other assemblages, most importantly the Palestinians.

Chapter 8 discussed the cultural changes triggered by the war at the levels of ideology and cultural practice. In order to do this, it used Lawrence Grossberg’s Gramscian/Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical framework which argues for the important role affect plays in the becoming hegemonic of ideologies in complex cultural formations. Using this framework this chapter argued that the Zionism that emerged in Britain’s Jewish community after 1967 was **Popular** as opposed to Classical Zionism. The key reason underlying this claim was that whereas Zionism, in its classical sense, is an ideology practiced on the institutional and state planes, Popular Zionism is primarily a (highly charged) affective disposition practiced on the planes of everyday life, pop cultural consumption and cultural identity (as discussed in Chapter 7) and used archival and interview data to support this claim.

The concluding remarks of Chapter 8 re-iterated the claim made in the introductory chapter that the purpose of this thesis was not simply to name the sort of Zionism that emerged in British Jewry after the 1967 war and outline the processes which produced it. In keeping with the foundational principles of cultural studies (Gilbert, 2012), the purpose of this thesis has been to make visible the contingency of the supposedly natural relationship Zionism claims exists between ‘the Jewish people’ and the State of Israel. It has attempted this by both pin-pointing the historical moment when, in Stuart Hall’s definition of cultural change, “some cultural forms and practices” – in this context anti-Zionism, non-Zionism or less intensely charged affective investments in the State of Israel – “[were] driven out of the centre of popular life, actively marginalised” (Hall, 1998, p. 443) and also outlining the processes through which this took place. In doing this, the hope of this thesis has, in its own

\[164\] "to put into question what is apparently fixed, to bring it out into the open, to de-sediment it, to make it public and to make visible its contingency, to put it up for discussion" (Gilbert, 2012)
limited way, been to resist Zionism in a general sense and, more specifically, the hegemonic position Zionism has enjoyed in the affective lives and ‘common sense’ of the British Jewish community since 1967.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to propose precisely what ideology/affective disposition/Guattarian refrain might replace Popular Zionism within the British Jewish community. Chapter 8 suggested Popular anti-Zionism but did not imagine what that might constitute. A possible area of academic enquiry opened up by this thesis might be to imagine precisely what Popular anti-Zionism might look like. Grounding Popular anti-Zionism, or indeed any other political formation seeking to organise life in Palestine/Israel in a just and equitable way for all the people who seek to live there, within Deleuzo-Guattarian ethics would be an appropriate starting point. This would entail the promotion of “joyous affect” (Protevi, 2009) in ‘encounters’ that are mutually empowering for all the ‘bodies’ involved in them. Of all the current solutions to the Palestine/Israel conflict the one state solution, I would argue, seems to most readily fit this bill. In the context of the hegemonic British Jewish relationship to Israel, at a very minimum it means being able to partake in the democratic principle (both liberal and radical) of criticising state policy without incurring over-reaction on the part of mainstream British Jewish institutions. It also means being able to countenance the dissolution of the State of Israel in its current formation i.e. – one whose structuring principle is the privileging of one ethnic group over the others who inhabit ‘Eretz Israel’ – without making Zionism’s false equation between the reorganisation of the institutional, political and economic planes and destruction on the plane of the corporeal i.e. the genocide of Israel’s Jewish community, and the Popular Zionist belief that this would lead to a more dangerous world for Diaspora Jewry when the evidence suggests precisely the opposite. Only then will the possibility of the British Jewish assemblage existing on the Plane of

165 At the most fundamental level this is because there is, arguably, no realistic way of dividing the territory Palestine/Israel (however defined) that enables the just and equitable distribution of its resources between its various inhabitants. Fair and equal access to the resources of the territory that you inhabit is one of the most basic ways in which mutually empowering encounters emerge between bodies across the Plane of Organisation. See, for example, (Tilley, 2005; Abunimah, 2006; Halwani and Kapitan, 2008; Loewenstein and Moor, 2012) for recent discussions on a one state solution for the Palestine/Israel conflict.
Organisation in a way that is truly empowering for itself and the other assemblages on which its constitution depends begin.
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Appendix 1: Interviewee Profiles

*Stephen*

Stephen is a personal contact. Born in Israel he has lived in London most of his life. He is the youngest of the interviewees and was thirteen during the time of the war. His interview reflects this – he remembers the war with a child’s sense of wonder. He lived in Stamford Hill in 1967. His parents were working class, although poorer than the rest of the community, largely as a result of their migrant status. He speculated that if his parents voted at all they would have voted Labour. He is now middle class and lives in Hertsmere. He has never belonged to a Zionist organisation, but has been moderately active in the life of the Jewish community – in 1967 he belonged to a Jewish youth club in Stamford Hill and sung in the choir in Synagogue there, meaning he went once a week. The norm at the time was to go only on the High Holy Days so aside from this and his Israeli migrant background, Stephen is typical of London’s Jewish community.

*Zena and Harry*

Zena and Harry are personal contacts. The interview had only been organised with Zena but her friend Harry was in the flat where the interview was taking place (our mutual friend Julie) so asked if I wanted to interview him. As a result the interview with Harry was _ad hoc_ so did not include a section with background information. He is a personal contact as well, so I know that he was born in 1925 and lived in Petticoat Lane in London’s East End. As an adult he moved to Redbridge where he lived during the war. He was a cab driver for the whole of his adult life, except when he joined the Navy during the Second World War. He attends Synagogue once a week. He has never belonged to a Zionist organisation but since his war service belonged to a Jewish soldier’s organisations, where he is now the chairman of his local branch, and which is pro-Zionist. He is typical of London’s Jewish Community.
Zena was born in Bethnal Green in 1935 and now lives in Redbridge. She was the interviewee that was the most difficult to direct and so the biographical information I was able to elicit was minimal. Because she is a personal contact I know she has worked as sales assistant at jewellery warehouse since 1979. She is currently the press officer for the branch of the ex-soldiers organisation where Harry is chairman. From the minimal biographical information I have from Zena, I have surmised that she has a typical profile of a Jewish women born in 1935 and who has remained in London throughout her life. The interviews with Zena and Harry were not particularly useful with regards to details of the 1967 war: Zena did not remember anything and Harry’s memories seemed highly inaccurate. Because Zena did not remember anything I was surprised she agreed to the interview. It shortly became clear that she wanted to use the interview to display how much she loved Israel and as such her interview is rich with data that was useful for Chapter 8, the chapter on Popular Zionism.

Jeremy

Jeremy is a friend of Stephen’s. Born in the East End in 1944 he was living in Bounds Green during the Six Day War. In 1967 he was a manager in his father’s lighting manufacturers. He does not believe in God, but goes to synagogue on the High Holy Days. He joined the 1,000 club at some point in the 1990s/2000s – an all male charitable organisation that collects money for different causes in Israel. Prior to that Jeremy had not belonged to a Zionist organisation. As a teenager he went to a Jewish youth club and played football in a Jewish youth league. Aside from Jeremy’s explicit disavowal of God’s existence, he has a highly typical demographic profile of a London Jew.

David

David is a contact of one of my supervisors. I approached him on the basis of wanting to interview an anti-Zionist. In many ways he has existed outside the currents of mainstream British Jewry for most of his life. He was born in Acton in 1942, an area of West London where very few Jews live. He was at the University of York during the war and so was not near a large Jewish community as the war was taking place. Politically he self-defined as
"left of the Labour party, right of the Trotskyists" (p. 446) and was heavily involved in student politics. Despite his minimal involvement in the Jewish community he was pro-Israel during the war, though was largely indifferent to the politics of Palestine/Israel afterwards despite being involved in anti-colonial politics through the 1970s and 1980s. This changes after the Second Intifada when he develops an explicitly anti-Zionist position on Palestine/Israel, and in 2002 joined Jews for Justice for Palestinians but left because he wanted to be more involved in BDS than JfJfP would have allowed. He is now active in a BDS oriented group. In many ways he is highly atypical as a British Jew.

_Evelyn (and Jeffrey)_

Evelyn is the contact of a University of East London PhD student. When I arrived at her house to do the interview it seemed as if she would have been uncomfortable doing the interview had her husband Jeffrey not been by her side. Jeffrey has a severe speech impediment so made a minimal contribution to the interview. Evelyn was born in Hackney in 1932. In 1932, Hackney was transforming from a middle class to working class suburb of London. During the 1967 war, she lived in Norwood, a south London suburb that had a small Jewish community though she lived in a house on the grounds of a Jewish orphanage where she fostered Jewish children. Evelyn and Jeffrey have always been highly religious. She had belonged to Habonim as a child and professed to be Zionist before 1967, and remembered having the sort of affective response to Israel’s Declaration of Independence that most British Jews had to the Six Day War. She is, arguably ‘more Jewish’ than the typical British Jew in 1967 because of the frequency of her religious practice and her high involvement with a Jewish institution. Her pre-1967 emotional involvement with Israel is also not that typical according to the sociological data being produced in the 1950s and 1960s (Krausz, 1964; 1969 (a); 1969 (b))

_Sarah_

I recruited Sarah through the Habonim circular e-mail. She was born in 1952 and was living in Southgate in 1967, a North London suburb with a large
Jewish community. Her family were “quite orthodox” in that they would walk to Synagogue every Sabbath\textsuperscript{166}. She was heavily involved in Habonim, which she explained as her way into the burgeoning identity politics of the 1960s. In the interview she explained that her involvement with Habonim separated her from mainstream Jewish youth because she was more “meaningful[ly]” engaged with the world: “we rather despised the other more materialistic, more dressy-uppy people who hung around discos. Rejected all of that…” She is currently a drama therapist living in New Barnet and is ambivalent about a post-1967 Israel as a result of the principles that first got her involved in Zionism as a teenager. Her demographic profile is not easily categorisable.

**Joseph**

Joseph was the second Habonim alumni that I interviewed. He was born in Salford in 1945. He was the interviewee most strongly involved with Zionism, having moved to Israel in 1959 for seven years. When he came back to Salford (a suburb of Manchester with a large Jewish population) in 1966 he began working for his father-in-law’s textile business. He read *The Manchester Guardian* in 1967. He has never been particularly religious. He is now retired and still lives in Salford. Aside from the highly unusual move to Israel in 1959, Joseph is in many ways typical of Manchester Jewry.

**Brian**

Brian was a personal contact of one of my supervisors, again approached because he was an anti-Zionist. Brian was the least typical of all the interviewees having been an anarchist in the 1960s and explicitly anti-Zionist prior to 1967. He was bought up in Hendon (a middle class London suburb with a large Jewish population) but moved to Notting Hill immediately after leaving home, and worked for John Lewis. At this point he was married to a non-Jewish woman. He defines as a secular Jew, explaining that he would never deny his Jewish background, still claiming Jewish ‘ethnicity’ but is an atheist and opposed to organised religion on political grounds.

\textsuperscript{166} Modern orthodox interpretation of ancient Jewish law forbids driving on Sabbath.
Harvey

Harvey is the contact of a colleague at the University of East London. He was born in Stamford Hill in 1938, but lived most of his young life in London’s West End. He moved to Manchester in 1963 for a job in a computer firm. He was highly involved in Manchester’s Jewish community, organising the youth club affiliated to his synagogue. He has never belonged to a Zionist organisation and cannot recall organising any Zionist activity at his youth club. He defines as not very religious. Harvey shares many of the typical demographic traits of Britain’s Jewish community.

Vivien

Vivien is Harvey’s wife. She agreed to be interviewed when I met her on the day I interviewed Harvey. I came back a week later to interview her. She was born in South Manchester in 1945, the child of a German and Austrian Holocaust refugees (Alderman (1992) estimates there were between 50–60,000 such refugees). She was a housewife. She ran the youth club with Harvey and was similarly observant of Jewish law. She has never been particularly involved in Zionism but claims that her family history in the Holocaust always gave her a strong sense of Israel’s importance as a safe haven for Diaspora Jews.

Rose

Rose responded to the advert I had placed in the Jewish Chronicle. She was born in Kladno, Czechoslovakia in 1946. Her family immigrated to Great Britain in 1948 after the country’s Communist coup. They lived in Croydon – a London suburb with an insignificantly sized Jewish population. She defines as traditionally Jewish but, “very much a three-times a year shul and cheder once a week” Jew (Rose, p. 639). She was working as a buyer in Marks and Spencer at the time of the war. She belonged to the Federation of Zionist Youth for, she claims, social not political reasons, but felt sufficiently moved by the Six Day War that she would have volunteered to go to Israel had her father agreed to sign the consent forms. She did volunteer in the summer after the war had finished. She currently lives in Wembley (an area with a large Jewish population), is a housewife (her husband is a lawyer) and
has children living in settlements in the occupied territories. She is involved in women’s Zionist organisation – WIZO, for whom she occasionally carries out publicity work.