MUSLIM IDENTITY, ‘NEO-ISLAM’

AND

THE 1992-95 WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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ABSTRACT

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Yugoslavia was entangled in a fratricidal break-up. In none of the other former Yugoslav republics did the conflict turn as violent as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which suffered genocide, the greatest number of victims and the highest percentage of infrastructural destruction. Although its three ethnic communities – Muslims, Serbs and Croats – were previously well integrated, the break-up of Yugoslavia exposed Bosnia’s unique Islamic component, which both Serbs and Croats perceived to be the major impediment to the continuation of a pluralistic society. Islam, however, only turned into a divisive and decisive factor in the conflict when combined with ethnic nationalism. Previous research into the causes of the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the break-up of Yugoslavia has identified Bosnia’s long Islamic heritage and large Muslim population on the doorstep of Europe as specific features influencing both its rationale and resolution. Yet there has been no analysis of the role and impact of ‘neo-Islam’ (a term I explained below) in the conflict – an omission this thesis seeks to redress. The thesis uses historical analysis to demonstrate that Bosnia and Herzegovina was frequently subject to international intervention during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it explores whether the unique Islamic component was the reason behind this phenomenon, and seeks to comprehend why Bosnia and Herzegovina has always appeared to pose a problem for the international community, from the papal persecutions of the medieval Bogumils through to the present day.
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<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZ</td>
<td>Islamic Community (Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organisation of the Islamic Conference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serb Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRJ</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Savez Kominista (Communist Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKSRBiH</td>
<td>Communist Alliance of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBiH</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transnational Corporations</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWRA</td>
<td>Third World Relief Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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For any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this work, the responsibility is of course entirely my own.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis provides a re-consideration of the Bosniaks’ identity (an ethnic name for Bosnian Muslims) and political consciousness in the period up until and during the 1992-95 war. Conducting historical analysis of related issues, this research explores the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the origins of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its impact on the conflict. The investigation is twofold: on the one hand, it examines the emergence of a contemporary ideology that I termed ‘neo-Islam’ (see section five, below, for a definition) through an analysis of the complex political relations of the contemporary international order; on the other, it conducts historical research of the role of Muslim identity and neo-Islam in shaping the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its aftermath. The war was brought to an end by international intervention, which resulted in the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dayton divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, de jure, into two parts: the Republic of Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. In addition, the UN Office of the High Representative (OHR) was endowed with unlimited governing powers and appointed to rule over the democratically elected Bosnian government. Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one of the former six Yugoslav republics to become a de facto international protectorate. This thesis suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina was rendered an international protectorate before and offers a contribution of historical context to understanding the 1992–5 war and settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The peace agreement proclaimed for Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen as a continuation of an inverted principle of nation and state building that was adopted towards Bosniaks during the
promulgation of the nineteenth century ethno-nationalism in Europe and Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms. The historical analysis of the origins of Islam in Bosnia and the close examination of the impact of the nineteenth century Tanzimat Reforms (discussed in chapters three and four) explain why at the end of the 1992-95 conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina was settled as an international protectorate.

This thesis also argues that the international peace mediation produced outcomes that did not serve the best interests of the Bosnian people; on the contrary, it was used as a buffer by various international political powers to advance their conflicting geostrategic aspirations. As neo-Islam emerged as a globalised political phenomenon in the twentieth century, a close examination of the significant role it played in the 1992-95 Bosnian war, as well as an analysis of the historical context of Islam and its origins in the region, are crucial to understanding the 1992-95 war and subsequent peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1.1 Research questions
In order to explore the Muslim identity, neo-Islam and the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is necessary to pose a fundamental question as to whether the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the particular legacies of Ottoman rule and subsequent construction of the concept I have termed ‘neo-Islam’ shaped events and the responses during the 1992-95 conflict. In this context the thesis shall analyse three issues: first, why Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one of the six Yugoslav republics to end up as a protectorate; secondly, why the international community pursued a secessionist and parochial approach to the settlement of the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; and thirdly, why, despite the contribution of manpower and significant amounts of financial aid from other Muslim countries (as discussed in chapter six), Bosnian Muslims were the principal victims of the war.

1.2 Methodology and Data

An exploration of the research questions requires a multifaceted, ‘multi-theoretical and multi-methodological’ approach (Wodak and Meyer 2001). I drew on a wide array of contemporary and historical literature. This study did not set out to be based on primary empirical research such as interviews with the Bosnian or ex-Yugoslav political Elites. I could not plan interviews because by the time of writing president Izetbegović was already dead, as were many around him. Following the end of the war, there was an extremely swift and incidental change of government partly caused by the Office of the High Representative’s interventions in removing officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political situation at the time of writing was very volatile and it proved very difficult to find anybody with relevant information in relation to my dissertation. In addition, Milosevic was in The Hague and the rest of the elites were simply inaccessible.

In this thesis, I analysed both library resources and archival documents. In order to juxtapose various views, I used both primary and secondary sources. I consulted the following existing literature on a range of relevant topics:

- the New World Order and the rise of the concept I termed neo-Islamism,

- diplomatic history of state formation and nationalism in the processes known as globalisation and modernity,
- Tanzimat ideology and its impact on the Bosniaks’ nation-building,

- the causes of poverty and Islamic response to the inequalities in the society,

- issues of identity and ethnicity in the Yugoslav conflicts, in so far as they have a bearing on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In order to explain Islamic principles, I consulted the Qur’an and other classical sources, as well as more contemporary literature on Islam. Islam pays special attention to theories of social obligation, and this is crucial to bear in mind when analysing Islamic compatibility with the global neoliberal structure. Although the dissertation is written as a politico-economic history, it also draws selectively on theories of globalisation and international relations that have immediate relevance for interventionist paradigms and the premise of conflict resolution in relation to the Yugoslav crisis and the 1992-95 Bosnian war.

In addition to contemporary literature and library sources, I also used other qualitative data such as archival materials in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey. In order to analyse the extent of neo-Islamist influence in Yugoslavia preceding the break-up, I examined original transcripts of the taped proceedings of a meeting held by the communist leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 April 1983. These transcripts are part of the Sarajevo city archives and contain important references to the views on Islam and Muslims prevalent amongst the Yugoslav leadership. I chose these archival documents because they expose the leadership’s acute awareness of the fact that external forces were working towards the destabilisation of Yugoslavia via usurping ethnic upheavals in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Examining the archival data makes it possible to conclude that instrumentalisation of neo-Islam seemed to have been successfully deployed towards this end. The analysis of the archival information serves as an important aid to understanding the domestic and international circumstances that formed the backdrop to Yugoslavia’s disintegration and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ultimate partition under international arbitration; it offers a perspective that has remained unavailable or inaccessible to, or has been omitted from, modern scholarship.

I used the original Ottoman documents whenever possible, as these enabled me to analyse historical events in the region effectively, as well as consulting the original reports that were generated in the wake of the Berlin Congress of 1878 (published by the Cornelius Library in the US). I also examined the Ottoman archives in Istanbul and Ankara that illustrate the Turkish policies on migration following the outcome of the Berlin Congress and the proliferation of nation-states in the Balkans.

1.3 Scope and limitations

To answer the research questions above there was a need to conduct an extensive historical research and consult documents of reliable authenticity and provenance (Garragham 1946). I chose material according to the scope of the thesis, which is limited to an examination of two specific periods in Bosniak history. I first concentrated on the nineteenth-century Ottoman Tanzimat (reform) period, which took place during the rise of nation-states across Europe. It is because it was during this period that the national development of the Bosniaks was suppressed as discussed in chapters three and four. Second period I explored was the Islamic revival of 1970s and 1980s in socialist Yugoslavia, as this was the first time since the medieval period that the Bosniaks gained national recognition. Continuing
analysis of the topic of Islamic revival in Bosnia, I also examined neo-Islamisation during
the 1992-95 conflict via critical assessment of the information available on links between
Bosnian Muslim leadership and the neo-Islamist states. I address these issues in greater
detail in chapters four and six respectively. The other periods of Bosniak history, such as
the medieval Bosnian state and the Bosnian position during the two world wars, are
mentioned when relevant.

1.4 Academic contribution
I bring a fresh perspective to the historical analysis of the nation-building process in former
Yugoslavia by exploring the origins of Islam in Bosnia and discussing the impact of
Tanzimat Reforms on the process of *Turcification* of Bosniaks. In relation to this, I
conceptualise a novel analysis of the controversial issue of Bosniak identity politics
internalising its formation in the globalised process of creating New World Order. In this
respect, I offer a new perspective on globalisation from the Muslim angle, and
contextualise it using the concept of ‘neo-Islamism’. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the first such study in this form. Materials are sourced in three languages, English, Bosnian
and Turkish, which adds to the originality of the work. Given the nature and complexity of
the research, this appears to be the most appropriate approach for the theoretical framework
of this study, which combines a historical and economic analysis of global trends with a
critical examination of the literature on Islamism, socio-political theories of Islam, studies
of ethnic identity in situations of conflict and the practical outcome of interventionist
paradigms, such as the institution of international protectorates. My analysis is intended to
contribute towards a better understanding of the Bosniaks by examining past and present
ways, in which Islam has been internalised in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such an understanding could aid a more comprehensive appreciation of the nature of the Bosnian war and the internationally supervised settlement. In this respect, my claim to originality rests on a critique of the existing literature of the 1990s conflict; it presents an alternative account of the war. My aim is also to demystify contemporary Islamic ‘revivalism’ on the global level by explaining its symbiosis with neoliberalism. This is the reason I have chosen to use the term ‘neo-Islamism’. I turn to an introduction of neoliberalism and neo-Islamism below.

1.5 The research context: neo-Islamism and neoliberalism in the New World Order

Neo-Islam rose to greater prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the New World Order, when globalisation and a host of other destabilising elements in the international arena came to the fore. Kagan (1996: 23-27) argues in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs* that one result of this was the re-emergence of the traditional fault line between Islamic fundamentalism, representing ‘global absolutism’, and the West, portrayed as the embodiment of liberal freedom of thought. This thesis argues, however, that the New World Order is not a novel constellation of power relations but a project that has re-emerged from a broader map of historical networks, in which Islam played an indispensable role. This claim contrasts with contemporary scholarly and political discourses that often cite the New World Order as an incumbent framework, adjacent to the process dubbed ‘globalisation’ (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Castells 2000; Rosemond 2000; McMichael 2000; Hay 2002).
This thesis endorses the definition of globalisation as a historical process that was crystallised in the nineteenth century in mercantile capitalism and the nascent nation-state, both of which have proved extremely tenacious. In relation to the subject of this work, therefore, globalisation and the New World Order together comprise a significant feature in the geostrategic rearrangement of the political relationship between Islam and the West, which I termed neo-Islam. The process commenced in the nineteenth century and regained focus with the end of the Cold War, as I argue in chapter two. It was out of the ashes of the Cold War that the two most prominent ideological paradigms in the international arena, neo-Islamism and neoliberalism, emerged. Both of these phenomena are discussed in more detail in chapters two and five respectively. The international response to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to be observed and understood in the context of neo-Islamised global politics and the neoliberal political economy of globalisation.

I define neoliberalism as a capitalist ideology that has been adopted globally and whose main agenda is the promotion of trade liberalisation and a market economy. This is achieved through sweeping privatisations, cuts in public spending and the rise of privately owned conglomerates, creating an elite of ultra-rich individuals. The reduction of the welfare state, loss of social justice and rise of market monopolies comprise its defining characteristics. Chapter five provides an extensive review of the literature on the topic. Above all, these sources point to an economy that can only function on the basis of debt.

I define neo-Islamism as an ideology that uses the pretext of Islamic dogma, albeit distorted and misinterpreted, to advance, promote and implement neoliberal economic policies. In other words, these are neoliberal Islamist movements. Led by Saudi Arabia, neo-Islamists have ensured that there is a sufficient flow of money available to be
borrowed, facilitating the continuation of a debt economy and the incorporation of national ruling classes into the wealthy global elite of the New World Order. An examination of the political and economic data used in this work demonstrates that neo-Islamism and neoliberalism are not only compatible, but that neo-Islamism is the incarnation of neoliberalism. Had it not been for the financial procurements of neo-Islamists, the global prominence of neoliberalism would not have been possible.

The politicisation of Islam has been utilised in various ways since the protracted collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Karpat 2001) and the rise of the nation-state. In the post-Cold War period, neo-Islamism witnessed, and took part in, the global proliferation of ethnic conflicts; the involvement of neo-Islamists in the ethnically coloured, belligerent global situation led to a tendency to ‘Islamise’ the discourse and conduct of international relations. This thesis attempts to determine whether the international organisations and nation-states that jointly refer to themselves as the ‘international community’ are able to prevent the instrumentalisation of Islam in the conduct of international affairs, in order to aid more peaceable conflict resolutions. To facilitate such a study, the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is taken as a case in point because the conflict became most violent when waged against the Bosniaks.¹ The discussion below highlights a selection of the existing literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks.

¹ The percentage of Bosniaks killed is about 66, compared with 26 percent of Serbs and 8 percent of Croats (cf. Appendices I and II for figures and charts). The website of the Sarajevo Research and Documentation Centre gives more detailed information on the numbers killed or missing during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to stress that the numbers of persons killed are not final as there are many who are labelled ‘missing’, and not all the mass graves have been identified. The numbers, therefore, are still contested.
1.6 Literature review

Comprehensive analyses of the Bosniaks and the phenomenon of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina are limited. A vast quantity of literature appeared following the break-up of Yugoslavia, but this dealt only marginally with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The tendency has been to focus on human rights, minority issues, economic causes and legal concepts, concentrating on the two dominant republics of Serbia and Croatia (Geoff 1994; Boyle 1996; Woodward 1995; Turković 1996; Ramet 2006). Literature that sets out to deal with the role of religion in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rare, and usually does not deal with Islam *per se* but incorporates all the religions within Bosnia and Herzegovina (for example, Goodwin 2006). Such analyses are most commonly published in the form of collections of wide-ranging essays that present very interesting bodies of reading (Scott 1996; Reza 1996; Mojzes 1998; Mousavizadeh 1996; Shatzmiller 2002). The authors who concentrate on one particular religion generally analyse disputes in a local context (Bax 1995) or perceive them as ideological conflicts between communism/socialism and the ‘free world’, which is represented by the adoption of a market economy (Cancar and Karić 1990; Fyson, Malapanis and Silberman 1993; Sonyel 1994; Djulabić 1995).

The literary works that deal with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be placed in four broad categories. The first group is autobiographical literature, which necessarily includes a rather subjective twist as it incorporates a wide array of memoirs (Owen 1996; Maass 1996; Hoolbrook 1998; Dietrich 1998; Rose 1998; Major 1999; Hadzišehović 2003; Izetbegović 2003; Ashdown 2007). It is important to point out that this literature is mostly written by diplomats who were directly involved in affairs concerning the war, and although it is at times revealing, it falls short of providing a comprehensive account.
full story remains unavailable to the general public – and this may always be the case. However, some excellent studies have been conducted on the role of intelligence in the break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Halilović 2005; Wiebes 2006; Alibabić 2010; Glaurdić 2011).

The second group of literature focuses on the Western response to the Yugoslav crisis and serves more as a study of how foreign policy is formulated in conflict scenarios (Sharp 1993; Burg and Shoup 1999; Radha 1998; Cushman 1997; Williams and Waller 2003; Hansen 2006; Caplan 2005). Some are specifically focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina, either exposing the West’s double standards when dealing with the Bosnian crisis (Hoffman 1996; Reiff 1995; O’Shea 2005; Vulliamy 1998) or documenting direct high-level diplomatic involvement to foil any attempt to stop the carnage and save lives (Hodge 2006; Hartmann 2007). Within this group of literature, I am compelled to single out Simms (2001), who has produced an admirable and well-documented study excavating the leading role the British government took in shaping appeasement policies during the Bosnian war, and its adoption of a parochial approach to the settlement, a mode that was followed by the international community.

Group three comprises literature that attempts to explain the Bosniaks. It offers a wide-ranging survey, which serves as a valuable general introduction to the study of Bosniak historical origins (Malcolm 1994; Donia and Fine 1994; Bringa 1995; Friedman 1996; Pinson 1996; Bieber 2000; Velikonja 2003). Within this literature, the inescapable thematic component appears to be the Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which generally leads the discussion towards the question of Bosniak identity. This strand is particularly prominent in the works of Bosniak authors, who rather than challenging

Finally, the fourth group contains the recent literature and various reports on Islam and Islamism that have emerged as a response to the so-called ‘war on terror’ and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism. This type of literature tries to place Bosnian Muslims within the context of the global proliferation of militant Islamic networks (Kohlmann 2004; Napoleoni 2005; Johnstone 2003; International Crisis Group Reports 2001; Schindler 2007; Hudson 2003; Deliso 2007). However, it is generally undone by the way its authors invariably try to force Bosnian reality to fit their muddled Islamophobic arguments. Some have gone so far as to step into the territory of the Yugoslav war revisionists by diminishing the atrocities or denying the presence of the ‘Bosnian gulag’ altogether (Parenti 2002; Johnstone 2003; Hudson 2003; Shay 2006; Clark 2007; Deliso 2007; Flounders 2007; Herman and Peterson 2010).3 This apologist view has, in turn, been challenged and ubiquitously criticised by scholars who see the Bosnian war as an act of aggression and the site of the worst genocide in Europe since the Second World War (Cigar 1995; Campbell 1998; Shaw 1999; Riedlmayer 2002; Walls 2002; Vulliamy 1998, 2012). The most vociferous critic is perhaps Hoare (2004), who sought to establish that 1992-95 Bosnian war was genuinely multi-national and pluralistic at its inception but, under the

2 The term ‘gulag’ was used by Vulliamy (2012) to describe the Bosnian predicament. I endorse the term.
3 It is necessary to add to this list Chomsky, Chandler and Chossudovsky, who have all made various verbal comments and written contributions in the media regarding the denial of the Bosnian concentration camps, the genocide and atrocities. For the full extent of articles and other sources, refer to the website, balkanwitness, that keeps excellent records: http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/articles-deniers.htm#clark-n (accessed on 12 May 2012).
impact of external aggression, internal treason and international betrayal it turned into essentially Bosnian Muslim struggle for survival. Hoare has also dedicated a significant portion of his political commentary to an analysis of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, paying specific attention to the refutation of the revisionist portrayal of the 1992-95 war.4

These competing views essentially epitomise the entire debate over the nature of the Bosnian war, which is contained in two opposing schools of thoughts, each calling for mutually exclusive policy approaches. Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) critically analyse and usefully compartmentalise these two schools of thought: one, taking an ‘aggressor-victim’ stance, portrays the conflict as an act of aggression against a UN member state by ultranationalist forces using genocide as a means of territorial contest; the other views the conflict as a civil war, with no aggressors or victims but simply warring factions, and spreads the blame evenly. According to this reading, the conflict emerged as an inevitable result of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’. The international community generally supported the latter view,5 leading to the approach that Williams and Waller (2003) term ‘policies of coercive appeasement’. The views of the international community are encapsulated in the work of two particular authors, both of whom use the ‘ancient hatred’ thesis, supported by religious arguments: Robert Kaplan (1994), whose work allegedly caused US President Clinton to retreat from the ‘aggressor-victim’ approach and endorse the idea that the conflict was a civil war, and Rebecca West, whose account (originally published in 1936)


5 This school of thought was supported by former US presidents Bush and (sometimes) Clinton, the Great Powers on the UN Security Council (especially Russia), UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and the European Union member states, especially Britain and France (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 518).
was distributed to UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, presumably to offer a historical context that would reinforce established prejudices (Simms 2001: 179) and provide a justification for the atrocities the soldiers witnessed. Because of the diplomatic and military significance of these works, as well as the influence they reportedly exercised over the international community’s choice of policy approach, both are discussed in more detail below.

1.6.1 Literature review: travelogues of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’

‘Violence was, indeed, all I knew about the Balkans: all I knew of the South Slavs,’ muses West in 1936 (21-22) whilst preparing for an exotically dangerous journey to Yugoslavia ‘to give some lectures in different towns before universities and English clubs’. Her knowledge of the Balkans was non-existent and she ‘quite simply and flatly knew nothing of the south-eastern corner of Europe’ (West 1936: 21), apart from a few scattered youthful memories from Paris and Nice, where the word ‘Balkan’ was applied in blanket fashion as ‘a term of abuse, meaning a rastaquouere [sic] type of barbarian’.6 She apparently soon came to realise the truth of those claims as her four-year long adventure turned out to be ‘a great source of danger’, threatening her safety and depriving her ‘forever of many benefits’ (West 1936: 21).

More than a half century later, Wheatcroft (2004), writing about the ‘Balkan ghosts’ entangled in the history of the conflict between Christendom and Islam, revived this violent image of the Balkans and its people. Dwelling on his childhood memories, Wheatcroft (2004: 221) offers a vivid description of the collection of his grandfather’s ‘worldly books’.

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6 West takes pains to offer two examples of French prejudice against the Balkans and its peoples, in an attempt to assure her readership that such bias comes from outside her cultural realm and is alien to her. She wants her readers to believe that, like them, she just happens to be exposed to this prejudice and is not partaking in its image-building process.
Amid ‘all the battles and gore’ in these books, he singles out one thing that most terrified him: the description of the Balkan adventures of a young officer in the 1860s, who, after his ‘trusty revolver’ had saved him from many ‘sticky situations’, nearly met his death in Corfu in Greece, where he was attacked by a ‘huge Albanian dog’. Immediately after he killed the dog, the protagonist was attacked by ‘the dog’s avenger: the Albanian with his long yathagan’ (Wheatcroft 2004: 222), whose sharp blade injured him badly. All ended well, however, as the protagonist was saved by his friends. This passage was engraved forever in Wheatcroft’s memory:

Simskin’s engraved illustration of this event terrified me at the age of nine, and still has the power to frighten. The Albanian rushing from the woods, with dark cruel eyes, tight limbs and bristling beard, was the stuff of nightmares. To this day, it remains my first instinctive and childish understanding of the Balkans. (Wheatcroft 2004: 222)

This feeling of dread on the part of the author was ominously commemorated when, years later, he read Kaplan’s (1994) book about the Balkans and its people, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. This compelling narrative brought back fearful memories of ‘the garlic-scented Albania’ (Kaplan 1994: 223) of his childhood. The old juvenile nightmares were resuscitated in his present adult consciousness. In this way, mythology and literature inhabit and function within the same imaginative world, one that is ‘governed by conventions, by its own modes, symbols, myths and genres’ (Hart 1994: 23).

However, Kaplan claims, as did West before him and a plethora of other foreign travellers to the Balkans, to know little about the region; it is apparently only during their travels that these authors discover the region to be a nest of animosities. The reason lies,

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7 It is perhaps worth noting that the curious reader is not informed how the protagonist was able to tell an Albanian dog from a Greek one.
Kaplan discovers, in its long, dark history. He reportedly claimed that his aim was ‘to provide the experience of a backpacker, with the disciplined analysis of a good journalist or a policy specialist’ (Rozen [online] 2001). Yet, in his self-proclaimed ‘entertaining journalistic travel book’, Kaplan’s method rests more on a description the re-emergence of a ‘wasteland’ than the production of a simple explorer’s manual would warrant. He depicts a dark landscape, haunted by atrocities arising from ancient grudges that have been perpetuated in present hatreds. All the horrors of the collective past have been carried into the savage present – ‘in modern times, it all begun here’:

Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics has been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe. Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned to hate. (Kaplan 1994: 227)

Everything that is murderous and savage is endemic in the Balkans: ‘The rocky landscape of political crisis and conflict suddenly yields patterns, trends and meaning’ (Rozen [online] 2001). The most recent bloodshed is explained through the prism of the Balkans’ sanguinary past, which Kaplan believes to be pathologically inherent in the region and its inhabitants. It was precisely this caricature of ancient hatreds that made its way onto Clinton’s bedside table. After reading the book, the president abandoned his ‘aggressor-victim’ conviction about the Bosnian war and joined the adherents of the ‘civil war’ school of thought, adopting a neutral stance (Drew 1994: 157-158).  

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8 As a presidential candidate, Clinton was a vociferous supporter of the ‘aggressor-victim’ approach, calling for the ‘international community’ to play a more decisive role in preventing crimes against civilians. His views were influenced by reports in Newsday in August 1992, in which Gutman revealed the existence of
This dichotomous policy approach dominated the entire Bosnian war. Hoffman (1994) explains succinctly:

[T]he international community made the mistake of simultaneously pursuing two incompatible policies – collective security against aggression, and a negotiated compromise between parties that were treated as morally equivalent. (Hoffman 1994: 96)

However, in answer to accusations that his clichés of ancient Balkan grudges had an impact on the policy decisions of the US president, Kaplan pleaded:

When I was reporting ‘Balkan Ghosts’ in the 1980s, the Balkans were like Ethiopia, an obscure country. The idea any policymaker would read it, I didn’t even consider. I saw it purely as an entertaining journalistic travel book about my experiences in the 1980s. (Kaplan, cited in Rozen 2001 [online]).

This over-stated modesty deserves a number of observations as it seems there is a bit more truth in it than Kaplan would perhaps like to admit to. Firstly, it is interesting that he uses Ethiopia as an example. Since its post-imperial conception, Ethiopia has never been an ‘obscure country’, as any ‘good journalist or policy specialist’ would undoubtedly know. It was nested at the heart of the Cold War conflict in the ‘Arc of Crisis’, to borrow Zbigniew Brezinski’s phrase. The country was the largest recipient of American aid to Africa and had the greatest number of Peace Corps Volunteers, until it switched sides in 1977 and became, in turn, the largest recipient of Soviet military and financial supplies and host to 16,000 concentration camps in northern Bosnia, creating a media snowball that generated the ‘aggressor-victim’ approach amongst Western policymakers. For details of the influence of Gutman’s reports on Clinton, see Hansen (2004: 7). It is also worth mentioning that Senator Robert Dole, a bipartisan majority in the US Congress, the majority of the UN General Assembly and the Islamic Conference were all supporters of the ‘aggressor-victim’ school of thought. The U-turn in policy is perhaps best described by Clinton’s statement (cited in Woodward 1995: 285), following the February 1994 Markale marketplace massacre in Sarajevo that killed over a hundred people and wounded many more. Clinton declared: ‘[U]ntil those people get tired of killing each other, bad things will continue to happen.’ Woodward notes: ‘Using arguments … that the hostilities were the result of ancient ethnic and religious hatreds … the West was again able to justify not deploying troops.’
Cuban troops (Ottaway 1982: 53-56, 116).\textsuperscript{9} Secondly, *Balkan Ghosts* ‘explores’ the situation of Yugoslavia immediately after Tito’s death and offers a long-winded account of the rise of post-socialist nationalism that allegedly brought the country to the point of disintegration. Yugoslavia’s position during the Cold War, however, was similar to that of Ethiopia.

Thirdly, this catalogue of ‘ancient Balkan horrors’ was reworked into an image of contemporary ethnic strife, and published in a timely fashion in the wake of the 1990s war, following media reports of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. Anthropologists refer to these types of ethnographies as written in the ‘anthropological present’. Wallerstein (1996: 1) terms this ‘TimeSpace’: time and space are locked together in a frozen, one-dimensional concept, which is used to portray the lives of so-called ‘primitive’ peoples, where apparently no room for change or alteration could possibly exist. The anthropological present is of paramount importance in building a national myth-history, in which narratives from the past morph into narratives of the present and timespan becomes an abstraction, relative to the individual culture (Bloch 1989: 1-18).

Lastly, and most importantly, it is Kaplan’s (1994: 4) conscious choice of informant on the region, a Serbian nun called Mother Tatiana, that betrays his lack of analysis. Her ‘fiery maternal eyes’ expose all the nakedness of anti-Muslim feelings in the region, through either an anti-Albanian or an anti-Turkish mythological narrative, selected according to the particular story, as shown in the following two examples:

\textsuperscript{9} Its strategic position and sheer size, in comparison to its neighbours, rendered Ethiopia a potential chief ally to either superpower during the Cold War, into which the countries of the Horn of Africa were dragged as proxies: ‘Given the huge difference in population size (Ethiopia has a population of 32 million and Somalia only 4 million) and the long history of Ethiopian geopolitical importance in the Horn-Arabian Peninsula region, it is not surprising that both superpowers should consider Ethiopia the greater prize’ (O’Loughlin 1989: 316).
We [Serbs] would have been even greater than Italians, were it not for the Turks.

I am a good Christian, but I will not turn the other cheek if some Albanian plucks out the eyes of a fellow Serb or rapes a little girl or castrates a twelve-year old Serbian boy. (Mother Tatiana, cited in Kaplan 1994: 32, 33)

In fact, the book is so openly chiselled with pro-Serbian motifs that Kaplan is compelled to justify himself in the preface of one of its later editions: ‘Nothing I write should be taken as justification, however mild, for the war crimes committed by ethnic Serb troops in Bosnia, which I heartily condemn’ (Kaplan 1993 [online]). Nevertheless, by linking his own dossier of the crimes of Islam with West’s anti-Turkish statements, written half a century earlier, Kaplan creates an uninterrupted historical flow:

That was a refrain you heard throughout the Balkans, in Dame Rebecca’s day and in mine. Dame Rebecca writes, ‘The Turks ruined the Balkans, with a ruin so great that has not yet been repaired.’ (Kaplan 1994: 32)

Frye (1971: 25) terms this creation of a potentially unified imaginative experience a ‘new poetics’. In essence, this refers to a centrifugal allegory that moves away from textual structure and literary aesthetics to fulfil a social purpose, stressing the thematic connection of stories and characters to the social function of literature. In the (approximately) last two hundred years, almost all international and local literature on the Balkans has been written in this fashion, ‘nesting Balkanisms’ (Todorova 1997). It is only through the lens of

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11 The interchangeability of the terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Muslim’ was introduced by foreign travelogues of the Balkans in the nineteenth century to uphold the thesis that, as far as Islam was concerned, it could be only confined to the newly formed Turkish nation and no other. The usage in this context, and perhaps for this purpose, persisted throughout linguistic tradition, and remained preserved in the majority of domestic and almost all international works until the present day.
12 For this particular critique, see Simmons (2000: 109-124).
‘archetypal criticism’ that the social function of such narratives can be recognised and its readers awakened to ‘successive levels of awareness of the mythology that lies behind the ideology in which their society indoctrinates them’ (Stingle 2005: 25). Literature turns into a ‘displaced mythology’ of ‘myths to live by’ and ‘metaphors to live in’, which…

…not only work for us but constantly expand our horizons, [so that] we may enter the world of kerygma or transformative power and pass on to others what we have found to be true for ourselves. (Bates 1971: 18, italics in original)

West (1936) resorts to the ‘transformative power’ of the allegorical fable to create a meaning and enliven the myth of the perennial presence of the Turks and the imprint of their legacy throughout the Balkans, which she describes as a source of ‘ultimate sadness’ to her during her visit to Sarajevo:

I woke up only once from my sleep, and heard the muezzins crying out to the darkness from the hundred minarets of the city that there is but one God and Mohammed is His prophet. It is a cry that holds an ultimate sadness, like the hooting of owls and the barking of foxes in night-time. (West 1936: 315)

This story is a good example of the way the artefacts of the author’s imagination are capable of transforming the mythological mobilisation of individual feeling into collective experience (Stingle 2005: 2). To attain this, West (1936) conflates past and present through her purposefully selected informants. Amongst these, the one who is portrayed as the most reliable is a certain ‘Constantine from Belgrade’. Speaking about the visit of Turkish officials to the Muslim Bosniaks, in pursuit of a possible military alliance between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Turkey in the event of a further world war, Constantine evokes past stories of great suffering under Turkish malevolence in order to show his disapproval of such an arrangement:
[F]or the Turks were our oppressors and we drove them out, so that we Christians should be free. Now the heads of the Turkish state are coming by the consent of our Christian state to see the Moslems who upheld the oppressors. (cited in West 1936: 312)

By mobilising events from the past, the present is didactically recreated and becomes part of a collective psychosis, imbued with the idea of a cosmological struggle between good and evil. Bosnian Muslims are portrayed as the malign epicentre of this battle. The following example illustrates the aim to internalise the Bosniaks’ disenfranchisement from a wider Christian Slav identity, and keep alive the story of their opportunistic support of the loathed enemies, the Ottomans and the Habsburgs:

The Turkish Empire went from here in 1878, but the Slav Moslems [sic] remained, and when Austria took control it was still their holiday. For they were favourites of the Austrians, far above the Christians, far above the Serbs, or the Croats … they [the Austrians] raised up the Moslems, who were a third of the population, to be their allies against the Christians and the Jews. (cited in West 1936: 312)  

‘Their faces darkening with the particular sullenness of rebels,’ comments West (1936: 312) on the narratives of her informants, ‘shadowed by the double tyranny of Austria and the Moslems’. This commentary underpins a ‘reverse-image projection’, for there is a whole history nested in this short sentence that projects a mirror image of the self. What lies at heart of this type of discursive construction is not only a perception of the ‘other’, but also, as post-colonial literary theorists have postulated, a re-creation of self-definition and self-formation.  

Moreover, by re-telling the stories again they are made yet

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13 This is a classic example of misrepresenting history in order to lead a presumably uninformed readership towards one’s own beliefs. It is a well-established historical fact that the Austrian reign in Bosnia was anything but benevolent towards the Muslim population. This is dealt with more fully in chapter four. For an illustration of this, refer to the excerpt of an account written in 1878 regarding the Austrian reforms of Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘Austria is, at this moment, under the [Berlin] treaty, occupying militarily two provinces of Turkey [Bosnia and Herzegovina] in order to reform them, and is reducing the numbers [of Muslims] hereafter to be reformed by a preliminary process of extermination’ (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 395).

more bitter, and as the embellished stories are kept alive in the popular imagination every time they are retold, they are further immortalised in public consciousness. As Schick (1999: 12) suggests, ‘the other plays a determining role as the antithesis and embodiment of characteristics disavowed by the self that thereby paradoxically mirrors the self’. Thus, through using the anguish of her characters as a mirror, West (1936) commiserates with her readership on Europe’s, or more precisely the Anglo-Saxon world’s, own greatest malaise – Muslims and Austrians. In fact, her account is said to have installed a pro-Serbian attitude in two generations of readers, policymakers and diplomats (Holbrooke 1998: 22), and is reflected in the ‘civil war’ foreign policy approach towards the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is due to an almost traditional European fear of Islam, and in the case of Bosnia, a two-centuries-old bias against Muslims, stemming from previous travelogues and reports from the Balkans. The following passage is a good example of the Islamophobic expressions so readily utilised by West (1936), in which she portrays the self-sacrificing, martyr-like figures of the Balkan Christians, who firmly preserve an ecclesiastical bastion for the entire European region:

[T]he last ducat was extracted to pay tribute to the Turks. These people gave the bread [out] of their mouth to save us of Western Europe from Islam; … I had only to shut my eyes to smell the dust, the lethargy, the rage, and hopelessness of a Macedonian town, once a glory to Europe, that had too long been Turkish. The West has done much that is ill, it is vulgar and superficial and economically sadist; but it has not known the death in life which was suffered by the Christian provinces under the Ottoman Empire. (West 1936: 137)

It was through travel writing that the world was discovered and the ‘foreign’, particularly Muslims, was communicated to European and American audiences. As emissaries and diplomats crossed the globe, their contributions became a significant part of
the genre (Pratt 1992). People generally believed in their veracity. The bias remains today, perpetuated through a process that Goldsworthy (1998) terms ‘narrative colonisation’. This prejudiced view, however, was temporarily abolished with the ‘brotherhood and unity’ approach promoted by the socialist Yugoslav republic, which I turn to below.

1.7 The break-up of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a multicultural federation comprising six republics and two autonomous provinces. In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the province of Kosovo, Muslims made up the majority of the population. To manage the different nations and nationalities, the Yugoslav state apparatus relied on three main policy pillars: economic self-management embedded in a specific type of socialist market economy, political non-alignment and societal norms of ‘brotherhood and unity’ (Ramet 1991: 91). Bosnia and Herzegovina held a specific symbolic position, and Bosnian Muslims a special role, in the promotion of a policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’. The reason is twofold. First, in the early years of Yugoslav formation following the end of the Second World War, the country was still repelled by the consequences of the onslaught, when

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15 According to the data obtained from the 1991 census and published in October 1993 by the Institute of Statistics of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were about two million Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of a total population of 4,377,033. Kosovo Albanian Muslims boycotted the 1991 Yugoslav census. For this reason, the data from the 1981 census is used to illustrate the number of Kosovo Albanians who, at the time, were calculated to number 1.7 million (Golubović 1997: 219). Taking these figures into account, it is considered that Muslims accounted for about four million of the approximately 23.5 million Yugoslav population. Nearly 2.5 million were Bosniaks, who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Muslims from the Sandžak province of southern Serbia, eastern Montenegro and parts of Kosovo and Macedonia, thus forming the largest compact Muslim territory in Europe. For more on this subject, see Balić (1994: 195-259).

16 Yugoslav enterprises were organised on the socialist principle of workers owning the assets through self-managed guilds.

17 For a detailed explanation of the Non-Aligned Movement, see footnote 213.
many different warring factions had turned to exterminating each other.\textsuperscript{18} The war left scars so deep that at times they threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the unified Yugoslav state. To address this problem, the state apparatus constructed a common history of a national liberation struggle by means of ideologically inspired tales of partisan hardship and communist triumph.\textsuperscript{19} As almost all of the major battles during the national liberation struggle took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republic’s place in generating this sentiment of ‘brotherhood and unity’ was most significant (Mlinarević, cited in Spahić-Šiljak 2012: 80).

Secondly, Yugoslavia’s federal principles organised the republics around the most dominant nation, awarding the largest ethnic group a considerable measure of self-governance within ‘its’ republic (Mlinarević, cited in Spahić-Šiljak 2012: 80). Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, was the exception to this rule. Even though Bosniaks formed the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\textsuperscript{20} they were still unable to exercise ‘ownership’ over the Bosnian republic because they were not recognised as one of its ‘constituent nations’. The persistent line of argument was that Bosniaks were Islamised Serbs and/or Croats who had reneged on the Christian faith of their ancestors and needed a nationalist structural environment if they were to comprehend their historic mistake and return to their perceived primordial origins. In the event, they refused. They continued to

\textsuperscript{18} The Second World War in Yugoslavia was not only a war against the Nazis, but also a civil war and a socialist revolution. During the war, some supported the Nazis, whilst others fought with the partisans against them. There were situations in which close family members were on opposing sides.
\textsuperscript{19} Second World War novels were mandatory reading in schools, and ideologically inspired movies featuring the joint struggle for Yugoslav liberation and communist victory were frequently broadcast.
\textsuperscript{20} Even though Bosniaks were the largest ethnic group, there was no absolute majority. According to the data obtained in the 1991 census and published in October 1993 by the Institute of Statistics of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republic comprised 44 percent Muslims, 32 percent Serbs, 18 percent Croats and 6 percent ‘Others’. No other census took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the war, and these numbers are thought to have changed considerably due to the exodus of people, predominantly Bosniaks.
describe themselves as Muslims, adherents of Islam, a religion considered not only nationally unacceptable to both Serbs and Croats, but also portrayed as a ‘late-comer’ to the region, rendering its adherents vulnerable to ‘export back’ when the time was ripe. Material evidence, however, does not support such claims, confirming instead that the arrival of Islam in the Balkans occurred no later than that of Christianity, as argued in more detail in chapter four.

Until 1968, the prerogative of ‘constituent nationhood’ within Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged exclusively to Serbs and Croats, while Bosniaks were left to either classify themselves as nationally undeclared Yugoslavs or to express allegiance to the Serb or Croat nations by declaring that they were one or other nationality. Although this view ran counter to the Yugoslav Communist Party platform, which since 1937 had considered ‘Bosniak’ a separate ethnic entity (Hadzijahić 1974), it was not until the 1971 census that Bosnian Muslims gained national recognition. However, the communist cadres did not allow them to resume their historic name of ‘Bosniak’; instead, they bestowed on them a new term, ‘Muslim’, which was supposed to symbolise ethnic and cultural belonging but without religious connotations. The discussion on the lack of Bosniak national recognition is developed in more detail in chapter four, but, for now, it is important to mention that while this political gesture might have reinforced the policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’ by lessening Serbian and Croatian territorial and cultural pretentions over Bosnia and Herzegovina (Biserko 2006: 12), it did not completely remove them. By classifying Bosniaks as Muslims rather than allowing them to re-embrace their historic name of

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21 Many Bosnian Muslims joined the Communist Party and fought alongside partisans, either in mixed units or in separate Muslim units, such as the 16th Muslim Partisan Brigade. The reason for Muslim loyalty to the Communist Party was the fact that it did not challenge Bosnian Muslims’ separate ethnicity.
Bošnjaci (Bosniaks), the communist leadership left room for disputes to arise over the legitimacy of the Bosniaks’ nationhood and claims of ownership over the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that continue to this day. This argument informs the whole thesis.

The adoption of Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’ policies continued until the end of the Cold War and the ‘declaration’ of a New World Order in 1991, when the process of Yugoslav disintegration and the formation of new states began. At the time, Yugoslavia was one of the last remaining multicultural federations in the region. More importantly, it was the only regional economy run by self-managed guilds of workers, which owned their companies’ assets, rather than by privately operated multinational conglomerates. Following the collapse of the Soviet state-run economy, the New World Order was founded according to capitalist parameters, as described in greater detail in chapter two. As such, it did not tolerate economic deviations in any shape or form. Yugoslavia was no exception. The international community followed developments in Yugoslavia when the skirmish there started eroding the federation; however, it was not until the war began in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that it paid special attention to the conflict, issuing explicit instructions to its countries’ respective intelligence operatives to follow the rapidly developing events closely, and to physically move from their various stations clustered around Eastern Europe to the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo (Wiebes 2006). In this respect, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationalised from the outset, and international involvement proved a decisive element in its outcome. However, the

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22 According to some scholars, the international community even resorted to covert operations to destabilise the country (Fyson, Malapanis and Silberman 1993; Chossudovsky 1996; Chomsky 1997; Hudson 2003; Johnstone 2003; Parenti 2002). They churned out innumerable versions of the conspiracy theory that the break-up of Yugoslavia was engineered by Germany, the Vatican and/or the IMF. These theories were later used by nationalists of all kinds as a popular way of displacing responsibility for the war onto the Great Powers.
international community has not only had an overbearing presence in this conflict, but in every other dispute involving Bosnia and Herzegovina since the nineteenth century.

1.7.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 1992-95 war

The break-up of Yugoslavia revived the primary question haunting Bosnia and Herzegovina: whose is it? Any claim to ownership was supposed to be settled by consensus, a practice the republic began to incorporate from the nineteenth century onwards. However, the unravelling of Bosnia was hastened by the rise of nationalisms. As the former Yugoslav republics started seceding one by one in the early 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a ‘Yugoslav time bomb’, ready to explode if handled unwisely (Hall 1994: 117). Serb and Croat nationalists used the situation to re-commence denial of the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniaks, a practice that had built up a repetitive momentum from the nineteenth century onwards. The lack of a systematic approach on the part of the Yugoslav authorities towards the study of the historiography of Bosniaks in either the school curricula or in public debates, and the failure to satisfactorily tackle sensitive questions, such as the absence of a recognised Bosnian language or nation within Yugoslavia, perpetuated this widely accepted stance. The following statement of a Serbian returnee from Canada in the wake of the 1990s war serves to illustrate the point:

23 Ever since rise of nineteenth-century nationalism in the Balkans, Bosnian state and nationhood was questioned. Bosniaks were not regarded as the ‘rightful owners’ of the land, and their neighbours, Serbs and Croats, often expressed pretensions to ownership of both land and people. This is further explored in the sections of the thesis dealing with the historical background.

24 Prior to this, the ‘eyelet of Bosnia’ was governed by a council of Bosniak ayâns (elders), who were directly answerable to the Ottoman sultan. These elders were Muslim, but Catholic and Orthodox Bosniaks also had some influence, even though they did not sit in the Council. It was only in the nineteenth century that Catholic and Orthodox Bosniaks began to be taught, initially by the clergy, to stop referring to themselves as Bosniaks and to embrace the new names of ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’. This is discussed in more detail in chapter four. In addition, this period marked the rise of new nation-states that caused the mass migration of Muslims to Turkey, escaping persecution and death. The decreased numbers of Muslims, coupled with government reorganisation, led to the introduction of rule by consensus amongst those who stayed in what remained of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Muslims have a question of identity to answer… Serbs, whether they are Orthodox Christians or atheists, are always Serbs: Croats are always Roman Catholics. But what are Muslims? They are something left over from the Ottoman era. (cited in Burns [online] 1993)

Cigar (1995: 68) similarly cites the Belgrade patriarch, Pavle, who justified the Serbian nationalist claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina by explaining that Bosnian Muslims were interlopers from the East and not indigenous to the region. Again, Plavšić, a genetic biologist and former director of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Sarajevo, later charged at The Hague with war crimes, maintained that Bosnian Muslims were the descendants of genetically damaged Serb converts to Islam:25

It was genetically deformed material that embraced Islam. And now, of course, with each successive generation it simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse and worse. It simply expresses itself and dictates their style of thinking, which is rooted in their genes. And through the centuries the genes degraded even further. (Plavšić, cited in Stazmiller 2002: 58)

Croatian nationalist claims were no more subtle. Franjo Tudjman, the first president of independent Croatia, had a problem with the Muslim presence in Bosnia; he spoke of it in terms of ‘contamination by the Orient’ (cited in Sells 2002: 58). The environment had to be purified, and a rampage against Bosniaks and their relics commenced. For example, a Croat militiaman, who belonged to the unit which destroyed the Old Bridge in Mostar, when asked why he participated in the destruction of this architectural monument, replied: ‘It is not enough to clean Mostar of the Turks, their relics must also be removed’ (Riedlmayer, cited in Shatzmiller 2002: 121). Similarly, when the Hague fugitive, General Ratko Mladić, entered Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, he made an address, broadcast on

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25 This is the line of argument used by almost all Serb nationalists. A case in point is Šešelj, a hard-core nationalist and former leader of the ultra-right Serb Radical Party, who is currently on trial in The Hague for war crimes.
Bosnian Serb television, during which he warned that the time had come to take revenge on the ‘Turks’:

Here we are, on July 11, 1995, in Serbian Srebrenica. On the eve of another great Serbian holy day, I make a present of this town to the Serbian nation. Finally the time has come that after the last Serbian uprising we take revenge against the Turks in this area.\(^{26}\) (Mladić 1995, my italics)

However, Alija Izetbegović, the leader of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)\(^ {27}\) and the first president of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, played directly into the hands of his opponents. In July 1991, he visited Turkey to request that Bosnia and Herzegovina be admitted to the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Tanasković 1992: 145-150). At the subsequent OIC meeting in Istanbul in June 1992, Izetbegović, along with members of his close circle, issued a plea to the Turkish government for protection in the event of an attack on the Bosnian Muslims (Silber and Little 1997: 213).\(^ {28}\) The more he was accused of adopting an intransigent Islamic colouring, the more he maintained the image of an ‘Islamic’ leader who wished to return to the ‘sources of

\(^{26}\) Taken from A Cry from the Grave – Muslim Genocide in Bosnia, a BBC documentary, available online at http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=E2BoHeCrHI1 (accessed on 2 March 2012). The above citation is my translation. This is the BBC’s translation: ‘Here we are, on July 11, 1995 … in Serbian Srebrenica … just before a great Serb holy day. We give this town to the Serb nation. Remembering the uprising against the Turks, the time has come to take revenge on Muslims.’ Mladić was probably referring to the 1875 uprising, which is discussed in chapter three. It is interesting to observe the BBC adaptation of the last part of the translation. The phrase ‘revenge against the Turks’ became ‘revenge on Muslims’ because the Western audience might have rightly asked what the reference to Turks has to do with 1995 Srebrenica. In the absence of historical knowledge of the complexities surrounding the identity of the Bosniaks, it becomes increasingly complicated, and at times meaningless, to mention the identification of Bosnian Muslims as ‘Turks’. This is a further reason why it is important to investigate fully the pre-Ottoman Islamic presence, as well as to conduct objective studies on the process of Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to de-mythologise the history of the region.

\(^{27}\) The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was considered to be a Muslim political party – that is, a representative of the Bosniaks. It was formed in 1989, and won the majority of Bosniak votes and parliamentary seats in the first multiparty elections in November and December 1990.

\(^{28}\) The authors state that this plea occurred in February 1992, but the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) meeting did not occur until June 1992, when Izetbegović did indeed attend the conference session and ask for membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which gained observer status at the OIC (not full membership) in 1994.
Islam’. Burg and Shoup (1997: 67) note that when addressing Muslim audiences abroad, Izetbegović liked to stress ‘the need for the Muslim nation in Bosnia to have its own state’, even though at home he often spoke of creating a multicultural civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The secession of Croatia in 1991 signalled that the Bosnian Croats were no longer interested in staying in a federal Yugoslavia. Under Tudjman’s patronage, Bosnian Croats started to ardently lobby for Bosnia and Herzegovina to also leave Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Bosnian Serbs were against Bosnia’s leaving Yugoslavia and campaigned against independence. Radovan Karadžić, in one of his last speeches in the Bosnian parliament, warned that if Bosnian Muslims decided to leave Yugoslavia they might vanish as a people. Bosnian Muslims, as many times before in their history, were caught between Serb and Croat centrifugal forces, which threatened to tear them apart. In a last attempt to save Bosnia and Herzegovina from plunging into war, Adil Zulfikarpašić and Muhamed Filipović, Bosnian Muslim politicians and co-founders of the SDA, gained Izetbegović’s consent to approach Slobodan Milošević, the last president of the socialist federal Yugoslavia, who was subsequently tried in the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and died in detention. They wanted to draw up an ‘agreement’ in which Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain within Yugoslavia, on the condition that it was

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29 ‘I have been attacked as a fundamentalist,’ he says, ‘and in a certain sense I was – demanding a return to the sources’ (Izetbegović 2001: 35).
30 This was perhaps to satisfy the rhetoric of the international community, which on the surface appeared to be pushing for a multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet at the first opportunity divided the country along ethnic lines.
31 Karadžić was a co-founder of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which won the majority of Bosnian-Serb votes in the first multiparty elections. He was also the first president of the Republika Srpska, the region occupied by Bosnian Serbs, which proclaimed independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Karadžić was indicted for war crimes and genocide committed during the 1992-95 Bosnian war, and is currently detained in the United Nations Detention Unit at The Hague.
guaranteed autonomy.\textsuperscript{32} Izetbegović, however, reneged on this strategy and decided to hold a referendum on independence.\textsuperscript{33} Following his decision, the citizens of Sarajevo – myself included – witnessed huge convoys of military trucks from the Yugoslav People’s Army heading towards the hills surrounding Sarajevo. It was only later that we found out they were there to control water and gas supplies, in preparation for the siege of Sarajevo, and to entrench the heavy artillery that was later used to bombard the city.

The referendum took place between 29 February and 1 March 1992. The majority of nationally disposed Serbs boycotted the vote, believing it to be illegal as the Serb members of parliament did not approve it. The Bosnian Serbs withdrew to the autonomous regions they had already formed out of the ‘Serb municipalities’ – that is, the territories that fell under the control of the Serb Democratic Party following elections in November and December 1990. There were Serbs, however, who stayed and participated in the referendum, but the referendum itself turned out to be an affair where the teenagers and pensioners manning the polling stations were bamboozled: the poorly secured ballot boxes meant it was extremely easy to extract any ballot paper that disagreed with the intended result. It seems that Bosnia’s destiny had been sealed once again and the referendum was just a formality.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32} For a detailed account on the ‘historic agreement’, see Djilas and Gaće (1994: 213-222).
\textsuperscript{33} See the interview with Muhamed Filipović in Vele (2009: 1-8). Milošević claimed at The Hague Tribunal that Izetbegović acted under pressure from the US and Britain.
\textsuperscript{34} As a teenager, I worked for three days manning the polling station in my neighbourhood. I did not hold the right to vote as I was still a minor, but I could have stuck as many voting cards as I wanted in the box. In fact, supervision was virtually non-existent: anybody could place as many ballots as they liked, since it appeared as if no one had any intention to count them anyway. It seemed it did not matter, since the outcome looked like a self-fulfilling prophecy. For the most part, Serbs did not vote. The majority had already left for the surrounding mountains, from which the shelling of the city started soon afterwards. However, there were Serbs who refused to leave Sarajevo. They stayed because they believed in a multiethnic Bosnia. Throughout the war, they endured the same hardship as their Bosniak and Croatian compatriots.
On 5 April 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence, and on 6 April, following its international recognition by the Great Powers (a definition of which is provided later in the chapter), the war formally began. In Orwellian fashion, the war in Afghanistan ended on the same day, and rather than leaving the Islamic veterans of the war idle, a great number were shipped to Bosnia and Herzegovina under dubious circumstances and in a highly covert manner to fight in the name of Almighty.\footnote{The fact that Muslim ‘freedom fighters’ or \textit{mujahideen} could leave or come back at any time, despite the strict military curfew and travel blockades that affected ordinary Bosnians, points to a highly confused situation that contains far more than meets the eye. These imported ‘freedom fighters’ originated from obscure backgrounds and were run by a great variety of dubious militant and criminal organisations. A great number were controlled by state-sponsored intelligence services (Wiebes 2006: 207-208). It still remains to be explained how exactly and upon whose initiative the \textit{mujahideen} appeared during the war.}

Since the combative power of the \textit{mujahideen} (the name under which these fighters became known) and their contribution to military operations were insignificant, they received more publicity than they deserved.\footnote{For an account of the \textit{mujahideen}’s lack of military expertise, which resulted in a great number of them being killed or wounded, see Kohlmann (2004: 53-66).} All the available evidence suggests that their presence was used more for ideological and propaganda purposes than for genuine military ones. At the start, however, the Bosnian war hardly presented a viable opportunity to wage \textit{jihad},\footnote{\textit{Jihad} means ‘struggle’ or ‘striving effort’ in Islamic teaching. It can reflect the pursuit of ideals on an individual or collective level, or the struggle to achieve freedom. Nowadays, its meaning is politicised and assigned the apocalyptic definition of a ‘holy war’ against ‘infidels’.} but as it ran its course the leadership representing multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina – the only multi-religious ‘side’ at the onset of skirmishes – evolved into increasingly ethnically homogenised units. Hence, the Islamic development of the Bosniak ‘side’ in the war was determined rather than predestined (Hoare 2004: 87-90).

At this juncture it is useful to point out that this thesis rejects the common misuse of the terms ‘sides’ or ‘factions’ in reference to the ‘Bosnian gulag’. These terms were
introduced and liberally used by members of the international community,\textsuperscript{38} perhaps to justify their partitionist-secessionist rhetoric and parochial approach.\textsuperscript{39} The overt aggression met with opposition from all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina who wished to defend their country.\textsuperscript{40} It was only later that the multicultural Bosnian army was subject to the ‘Muslim purges’, which introduced and incorporated Islamic elements, such as a pledge to God to defend the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regular prayers and the provision of imams. At the same time, imams were also introduced in the schools and other public institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{41} ‘Islamic patriotism’ or ‘religious patriotism’ became equated with the ‘Bosniak liberation struggle’ (Alibabić 1996). Moreover, consistent financial sponsorship from Muslim countries and logistical support from the West,\textsuperscript{42} as well as the subsequent incorporation of the \textit{muhajideen} into the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, served to justify the claim that the war was indeed a religious one. Serbs and Croats – who from the outset cemented their military and national ordeals in religious

\textsuperscript{38} The Bosnian vice president, Ejup Ganić, in summer 1992, described the ‘peace’ talks with Lord Carrington, an EU ‘peace’ envoy at the time, as follows: ‘Talks with Lord Carrington is glamour ... it’s like \textit{Dynasty}. He introduced the concept of three communities ... the concept that is killing us...’ For more on this, see Hodge (2006: 35-55).

\textsuperscript{39} Through a critical reading of international diplomacy, Campbell (1998, 1999) argues that both the Bosnian war and the diplomacy designed to address it was made worse by the identity politics of both paramilitaries and peacemakers. He perceptively observes that the international community intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina not to save the ideal of multiculturalism abroad, but rather to shore up the nationalist imaginary in order to contain the ideal of multiculturalism at home.

\textsuperscript{40} See the online videos of pre-war demonstrations in Sarajevo. People spontaneously poured onto the streets in a futile attempt to resist the war, only to be forcefully dispersed at gunpoint: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBbXRFzn1mo&feature=related (accessed on 11 May 2008).

\textsuperscript{41} Even then, there were still Serbs and Croats fighting in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; many of my Serb and Croat neighbours remained in the army despite its increasingly Islamic rhetoric.

\textsuperscript{42} In December 1992, Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia made a donation of $150,000 to Clement Rodney Hampton-el, an American Muslim convert, for ‘Project Bosnia’, which aimed to mobilise and train \textit{mujahideen} as mercenaries. What is interesting is that \textit{mujahideen} were trained in well-equipped camps across the US by former marines or retired military officers. After an intensive course in ‘insurgency warfare’, the \textit{mujahideen} and their American instructors departed for Bosnia and Herzegovina together on a ‘mission’ as ‘armed humanitarians’ to protect Bosnians against the ‘infidels’ – only to mysteriously vanish from the combat zone after a few days. For more on this, see Kohlemann (2004: 3-75).
narrative and symbolism, without receiving any public admonishment for doing so\textsuperscript{43} – capitalised on the increasing Muslim element within the Bosnian army to justify their claim that they were protecting Europe from Islamic penetration.

The international community, for its part, gained a further alibi with which to defend its policy of calculated neutrality towards the so-called ‘warring factions’. In fact, the more it insisted on promoting a ‘level playing field amongst warring factions’ (Owen 1996) – a rhetorical approach led by Britain that ensured that no other country took a different position (Simms 2001) – the more ethnically inflamed the war became. Insisting on neutrality in the face of criminal actions, the international community encouraged policies of appeasement\textsuperscript{44} (Hoffman 1994; Sharp 1994; Williams and Weller 2004) that gave the green light to the commencement and continuation of the carnage perpetrated against Bosnian civilians, predominantly Bosniaks (Vulliamy 2012). Bosnian Serbs, who were militarily much more advanced and equipped, thanks to support from Serbia, rapidly succeeded in occupying two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnically cleansing most of the non-Serb population from the occupied territories, and even committing genocide against Muslims in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Croats in Herzegovina, who were generously supported and guided by Tudjman, occupied a region they proclaimed as

\textsuperscript{43} For a well-documented study into religious symbolism and anthropology preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Žanić (2007). See also Sells (2002).

\textsuperscript{44} This is how Vuillamy (1998: 75-76) defended the use of the term ‘appeasement policies’: “‘Appeasement’ is a pejorative and historically tendentious term but it seems a good enough word to describe the three years of diplomat-to-diplomat barter between the leaders of the democratic West and Radovan Karadzic – now a fugitive wanted for genocide – beneath the chandeliers of London, Geneva and New York; or the matey soldier-to-soldier dinners of lamb and suckling pig shared by successive United National generals with their opposite number, General Ratko Mladić – likewise now fugitive and wanted – whose death squads perpetrated the Srebrenica massacre, on his personal orders and in his presence … If the term “appeasement” offends, then “toleration” and even “reward” can hardly be contested.’
Herzeg-Bosna (Herzegovinian Bosnia), expelling or murdering Serbs and then Bosniaks following the escalation of the conflict between Croats and Bosniaks in 1993 (Sells 1998).

The Bosnian war developed into a human catastrophe on a horrendous scale (World Bank 1999, 2000). Thousands of people were killed, maimed or massacred; it is often cited as the worst carnage in Europe since the Second World War (Reiff 1995; Silber and Little 1997; Halilović 1998; Borogovac 1995). The war is also significant in that it influenced the International Criminal Court to change its stance on the definition of rape during conflict. Some of those subjected to systematic mass rape – mainly Bosniak women and children – described how, during their ordeal, they were kept imprisoned until impregnated and then released when it was too late to abort. These poignant testimonies compelled international jurisprudence to define rape as a tool of war and crime against humanity. The statute was ratified in 1998, and since 2003 it has been applied to all international conflicts where systematic rape has occurred (Shelton 2005).

The best indicator of the human tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the approximate estimate of over one million people who left the country, fleeing persecution and torture. The great majority of those killed or persecuted were Bosniaks, who became the principal victims of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Their neighbours, Bosnian Serbs and Croats, violently turned against them, expelling them from their homes or driving them into detention camps, where they were subjected to torture, physical and

45 I am aware that other conflicts were simultaneously taking place around the world, but that does not make the Bosnian misery any less, even though there are ‘scholarly’ attempts to diminish it and introduce a degree of relativism to the scale of the Bosnian tragedy. These works are discussed in the literature review section.
46 The exact number of people who were forced to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war is unknown. The UNHCR rough estimate is 1.2 million, but it is widely admitted that the number is far higher.
psychological abuse, rape and sexual assault.\footnote{Bosnian Report, which used to be a biannual publication of the Bosnian Institute in London but which ceased operations due to lack of funding, published a variety of testimonies from a great number of captured and subsequently released survivors of the war. See its website for a selection of the publications available online at \url{http://www.bosnia.org.uk/default.cfm}. At the end of the war, a number of books emerged, written by survivors of the concentrations camps and some foreign correspondents who met them afterwards or witnessed atrocities themselves. Non-exhaustive examples include testimonies from various parts of Bosnia where genocide took place (Rieff 1995; Mašić 1996; Pervanić 1999; Cigelj 2002; Krzić \textit{et al.} 2003; Suljagić 2005; Sučeska 2008; Kozlica 2009; Vulliamy 2012; Demick 2012).} Numerous ‘peace resolutions’ and the British-led policies of the international community allowed the pogroms against Bosniaks to continue unremittingly, in the belief that they comprised ‘a perpetratorless crime, in which all were victims and all more or less equally guilty’ (Simms 2001: 32). Innumerable, fruitless ‘peace’ conferences were convened and re-convened at various summer and winter holiday destinations. In the absolute belief of the moral equivalence of all the ‘combatants’, the world’s leading diplomats claimed they were indeed dealing with ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’,\footnote{There are too many to cite here. Their details are also beyond the scope of this work, but there is a good chronological collection of the various peace resolutions contained in analyses of Western intervention by Burg (2001) and Campbell (1999).} fought out along the traditional fault line of Islam versus the West. Without any ethical quandary, ‘peace’ negotiations were initiated and conducted with local warlords, who were simultaneously engaged in issuing orders to kill. Meanwhile, the international mediators pretended not to see their crimes.\footnote{The ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ argument is discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the literature review.} In this way, once again, Bosnia and Herzegovina became hostage to the competing geostrategic interests of the world powers

\footnote{Vulliamy (2012), who excavated the testimonies of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), reported the early existence of concentration camps and their locations, and the torture, rape and killing that took place in them. His source was an ICRC official who admitted passing on information about the camps to Geneva, and from there to concerned diplomats in Britain and France, at least two months before Vulliamy and his colleagues officially ‘discovered’ them. Six American diplomats resigned from the state department over the concealment of the torture camps in Bosnia when it came to light that the ICRC reports were hidden from the US house foreign affairs committee in 1992. According to Vulliamy, even the CIA admitted having timely intelligence about the presence of the camps. Simms (2001: 42) reports that Douglas Hurd, British foreign secretary at the time, was very much aware of the atrocities committed against Bosniak civilians, but rather than trying to prevent it, he closed Britain’s borders to Bosnian refugees, using their misery to ‘put pressure on the warring factions to treat for peace’. When Cohen (cited in Vulliamy 2012: xxxiii) wrote a review of Hurd’s book in the \textit{Observer}, he put it in the right perspective: ‘You have to read this disgraceful passage several times before you realise that Hurd was denying sanctuary to the victims of the Serbs (and his diplomacy) so he could use their misery to force Bosnia to cut a deal with the ethnic cleansers.’}
(Hodge 2006), as well victim to the anti-Muslim racism of the West, a stance that has repeated itself from the nineteenth century onwards, as discussed later in greater detail.

1.8 The peace settlement

The war came to a halt with the General Framework Agreement for Peace negotiated in Dayton, Ohio. It was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 by the Bosniak president Alija Izetbegović, the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman in the presence of officials from the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, along with a representative of the OIC. Under the auspices of these international players, the Dayton Agreement, as it is best known, created a Bosnian state with weak central institutions. Dayton was ‘an eccentric construct, a long-winded ceasefire agreement rather than a blueprint for a functioning state’ (Steele 2005). It dismantled the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and established two very different entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was populated overwhelmingly by Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats in a ghettoised manner, and the Serb Republic, which was populated almost exclusively by Serbs, the non-Serbs having already been purged through killings or expulsions. These entities, apart from representing a novelty in international law, possessed all the characteristics of independent states, such as police forces, courts and parliaments.

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52 There is very little co-existence of Bosniaks and Croats outside Sarajevo and Tuzla, and there are almost exclusively separate Croat and Bosniak areas all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The segregation is especially evident in the Herzegovina region. A prime example of the apartheid that is still very much present is Mostar. Čapljina, a town situated 30km south of Mostar and about a fifteen-minute drive from the Croatian border, is another example of a stronghold of ultra-radical Croat nationalists, where Bosniaks have returned but are extremely unwelcome. In this town, Croatian money is in circulation, Croatian flags and symbols are recurrent features, and a bridge even carries the name of Franjo Tudjman. Any symbolism even remotely reminiscent of Bosnia or Muslims has been erased. Christian crosses of various sizes have been erected throughout the town and its surroundings, even in front of those villages with majority Muslim populations.
Furthermore, both bore the names of categories that are well established in international constitutional law: ‘republic’ and ‘federation’. However, neither the Serb Republic nor the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were constituent parts of a state, nor did they refer to or identify themselves as a federation of republics, states, territories, cantons, provinces or any other such bodies. The Dayton Agreement, therefore, threw the entire statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina into question by bestowing state-like powers on these entities and leaving the central state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in limbo.

Another characteristic of Dayton was the massive international involvement in the establishment of a single state apparatus. In fact, to this day, the international community continues to take the upper hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entire decision-making process. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), as the international community jointly refers to itself, consists of fifty-five countries and agencies, as well as a fluctuating number of observers.53 Its executive authority rests in a ‘steering board’, comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, the president of the European Union, the European Commission and the OIC, represented by Turkey. As a result of negotiations in September and October 1995 between the European members of the Contact Group54 and the US, the Office of High Representative (OHR) was created to oversee the implementation of the civilian peace process, with ‘final authority in theatre’ (ICG 2001: 2),55 under the political guidance of the steering group. The OHR chairs weekly meetings of

53 The PIC has met five times since its founding conference, held in London in December 1995, with the last ministerial-level meeting taking place in May 2000 in Brussels. For a full list of PIC countries and observers, refer to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) website: http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38563 (accessed on 1 November 2009).
54 The five- and later six-member Contact Group (the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, plus Italy) succeeded the Geneva-based International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in 1994, following the failures of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans.
the steering board members’ ambassadors to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo. In addition, the steering board meets at the level of political directors every three months.

Alongside the PIC and OHR, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have a significant input into the running of state affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an outstanding empirical study, Fagan (2010: 77) identifies the European Union as the main provider of development assistance and the driving force behind Bosnia’s post-Dayton reconstruction. Although these organisations have massive administrative powers and devour a great deal of revenue for the salaries and expenses of their international workforces, they have neither succeeded in building good governance nor managed to engage NGOs in the policy process (Fagan 2008). The IMF has total control of the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and directly appoints the governor of its central bank; the Bosnian constitution stipulates, however, that the governor can be neither a Bosnian national nor a national from the two neighbouring states of Serbia and Croatia.56

The Dayton Agreement itself comprises a total of eleven annexes, which include provisions for demilitarisation, arms control, elections and human rights. Annex IV is the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to one report, the constitution is ‘unwieldy, clumsy, unworkable, and bears no relation to the reality of Bosnian political life’ (ICG 1999: 3). The institutions of central government exist largely on paper and are

56 The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article VII, paragraph II, explicitly states the rules on the Central Bank and the selection of the governor, who is vested with the power to cast the tie-breaking vote on the governing board.
only as powerful as the entities\textsuperscript{57} allow them to be. The concept of the ‘constitutionality of nationalities’ permits legalised discrimination on the basis of ethnic background (ICG 1999: 21) – indeed, the entire constitution condones ethnic discrimination by converting it into a principle of law. This is most evident in the categorisation of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Dayton constitution proclaims three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, with two additional groups, ‘others’ and ‘citizens’,\textsuperscript{58} and three official languages that are essentially linguistic and semantic variations of the same language. Dayton has thus perpetuated the deep ethnic division in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was achieved through pogroms against civilians – predominantly Bosniaks – during the war. In the process, it has created a dysfunctional international protectorate.

Historical analysis, however, demonstrates that this situation is not unprecedented: the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans in the nineteenth century left the way open for the rise of nation-states, which was accompanied by the wholesale persecution and slaughter of Muslims under the watchful eye of the Great Powers. When the Ottomans finally decamped, all their provinces became independent nation-states except Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the only former Ottoman province to end up as a protectorate. It is for this reason, this thesis argues, that the 1992-95 Bosnian war and subsequent peace settlement represent a continuation of the inverted principle of nation building adopted in relation to the Bosniaks in the nineteenth century, the consequences of which continue to

\textsuperscript{57} The two entities that were formed by the Dayton Agreement were the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic.

\textsuperscript{58} It transpires that Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and ‘Others’ are not categorised jointly as citizens – ‘citizens’ are an additional, fifth group of people in the state. It is evident, therefore, that Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be hijacked from its citizens and confined to the three ethnically coloured groups of inhabitants.
have both a regional and international impact upon contemporary political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1.9 The historical background to Bosniak nation and state building

In the nineteenth century, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the principal battleground for the clash between absolute Ottoman centralisation and local Bosnian autonomy, a status Bosnia maintained throughout Ottoman rule and which it fought to preserve in the face of the Ottoman reforms. These reforms, conceived in 1826, abolished the janissary guilds and attempted to centralise the Ottoman army. They culminated in the Tanzimat period that commenced in 1839 with the proclamation of an imperial edict, Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun.⁵⁹ The Tanzimat period lasted until 1876 and is discussed in more detail – particularly as regards its implications for Bosnia – in chapters three and four. For now, it suffices to mention that the controversial Tanzimat reforms were an indispensable tool for the creation of a loan economy, a manifestation of the globalised capitalist economic system. The reforms simultaneously weakened the multicultural Ottoman Empire and pursued the aim of creating a Turkish nation-state that would homogenise all the Muslims expelled from the former Ottoman provinces in Europe and Central Asia. The Bosniaks were among those Muslims from the former ‘Turkey in Europe’, as it became fashionable to refer to the Ottomans’ European lands, envisaged as integral to the new Turkish nation.

However, this presented a problem: the Bosniaks were the Muslim millet with the most developed sense of identity in the entire Ottoman Empire. The millet system (millah

⁵⁹ This had its roots in the earlier reforms of the Lale Devri (Tulip Period) 1718-30. The Tanzimat lasted until the first Ottoman parliament in 1876.
in Arabic) was the form of administrative governance employed by the Ottomans that was based on the Islamic principle of self-administered religious communities. Bosnia and Herzegovina was never a colony of the Ottoman Empire in the classic sense; it was governed by a council of âyans (local representatives) rather than by the direct decree of the Porte (the Ottoman central government). The Ottomans recognised the Bosniak’s unique ethnic fabric and they referred to all Slav-speaking Muslims as ‘Bosniaks’ rather than simply ‘Muslims’, as was the case with other Muslims in the empire. This dated from the time when the Bosnian Bogumils voluntarily accepted Islam en masse. The Bogumils were adherents of a medieval Bosnian religion called Bogumilism; it possessed fundamental features in common with Islam (Asboth 1896; Jalimam 2002; Arnold 2005), making the two religions symbiotic, as explained in more detail in chapter four. In response to the Bogomils’ conversion, the sultan granted the Bosniaks autonomy, because their adoption of the Muslim faith helped him fulfil his worldly duty to spread and preserve Islam in the provinces he conquered.

Thus, it was not surprising that Bosniaks evinced a lively zeal for their ethnic and territorial autonomy when the reforms began to rein in their autonomy and prerogatives of self-determination. The Janissery Decree, a written promise of special treatment (Bašagić-Redžepašić 1900: 19; Handžić 1997), represented a thing of the past for the Tanzimatçular (the reformist ministers), and they used all available means to implement the reforms. This triggered the longest political battle to emerge in the region; no province could match the bitterness of the resistance displayed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, with the help of external interference, Bosniak autonomy was crushed and their self-determination extinguished in blood. Although the struggle lasted over a century and a half and had a
profound impact on the Bosniaks’ future national development, it remains a little studied historical event. This neglect is due to the absence of comprehensive, in-depth studies in Bosniak historiography, partly caused by the lack of availability of original documents and partly by the lack of translations of Bosnian primary sources into those languages most commonly used in academia. This thesis, therefore, offers a fresh analysis of the impact of the reforms on the Bosniaks’ future political development – or lack of development.

While the development of the principle of nation building was arrested or inverted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the decline of the Ottoman Empire simultaneously gave rise to various ethno-nationalisms in the Balkans, emerging predominantly from the Christian millets. The Great Powers of Britain, France and Russia encouraged the Christian millets to embrace the concept of a single ethno-national unit carved out of the post-Ottoman territory, using an array of secret societies dedicated to raising national awareness first amongst the intelligentsia and then amongst the masses (Glenny 1999; Velikonja 2003). The Bosniaks, however, did not receive Great Power support; they were considered to be of Ottoman-Islamic heritage and hence outside the cordon of international aid, which was dispatched exclusively to the Christian millets. Bosniaks were fighting for the rights of Muslims, who had been excluded from the European Enlightenment, and their allegiance to Islam accounted for the fact that they were never promoted as a separate nation. The development of a Bosniak nationality and nation-state was thwarted and forcefully curtailed by two external factors: the ‘reformed’ Ottoman-Turkish Empire and the Great Powers. Both maintained totalitarian and autocratic attitudes in their approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. The inability of Turkish rule to act as a substitute for the former Ottoman supremacy over Bosnia was finally settled by the Europeans – not by giving independence
to Bosnia, but by drafting an agreement that placed it under Austro-Hungarian supervision. Although this was not the best solution for Bosnia, the geostrategic interests of the Great Powers did save it from extinction, as analysed in greater detail in chapters three and four.

As for the post-Ottoman territory in the Balkans, the Great Powers of Britain, France, Russia and Prussia carved it up according to their whims and interests. They granted independence and nationhood (albeit under Great Power suzerainty) to all the newly emerged Slav states except one – Bosnia and Herzegovina. They agreed with the Turkish Tanzimat ministers that Bosnia and Herzegovina would lose almost half of its territory and its major port. This was followed by massive pogroms of Muslims in the lost Bosnian territories; those who survived were prevented from finding refuge in what remained of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mušović 2002; Bandžović 2006) and systematically shipped to Turkey, where they were ‘resettled’ and forbidden to return. The Bosniak forced migrations to Turkey are analysed in chapter four.

In political terms, international mediation left Bosnia and Herzegovina with an undefined status, placing it under Austro-Hungarian administration. Austro-Hungarian rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted until the outbreak of the First World War, after which the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918, which subsequently became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. This period was especially hard for the Bosniaks; they endured agrarian reforms, during which their land and possessions were confiscated in exchange for government bonds that became worthless overnight. Many started to leave the country, initiating a second wave of emigration to Turkey whose policies on Bosniak resettlement had remained unchanged in anticipation of just such another large influx of Muslims. In addition, the Bosniaks’ political and national
development was limited by their need to constantly juggle the approaches of the Serbs and Croats, both of whom assiduously courted Bosnian Muslims, trying to persuade them to declare themselves as one or other nationality since their addition to either population would ensure supremacy in the South Slav state. Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the constant threat of partition between the Serbs and Croats, rendering Bosnian Muslims a permanent and ineffectual minority. A partition agreement finally occurred in 1939, which was known as the Cvetković-Maček Agreement. Its destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed in chapter four.

However, Bosnia and Herzegovina was once again unintentionally saved from extinction by international factors and the raison d’etat of the Great Powers (also discussed in chapter four). Since that time, a complex web of international realpolitik has always been the decisive factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fight for national recognition. It only managed to achieve recognition with the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1943, when it was awarded the status of republic and became constitutionally equal to the other five republics of Yugoslavia. However, this resolution was only temporary. The war of the 1990s threw the Bosnian nation-state into question again, placing Bosnia once more at the centre of international political interests. The internationally brokered Dayton Agreement produced a similar settlement to that of the Berlin Treaty of 1878. The status of ‘international protectorate’ reopened the question of Bosnian Muslim identity and their place in Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina remained an unresolved national issue for the Europeans; the Turks were allowed to retain their Ottoman-Turkish heritage, but the Bosniaks were forced to continue their fight for national recognition.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not recognised as a separate nation-state during the nation-building bonanza of the nineteenth century, nor was it endorsed as a sovereign nation-state following the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Islam played a pivotal role in both periods: in the nineteenth century it prevented the formation of a fully fledged Bosnian nationhood, while in the twentieth the Bosniaks finally found their place in Europe but only through the transformation of Islam into a national identity based on the European principle of ‘nation equals state’ – a myopic concept that ignores the universal, international principles of Islam. Nineteenth-century developments are analysed in chapters three and four, and the twentieth century in chapters five and six.

1.10 The structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured around seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the context, scope and methodology of the research, as well as defining the main terms, including, ‘neo-Islamism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ and the contextualisation for the concepts of ‘New World Order’ and ‘globalisation’. Chapter two provides the theoretical background to the research, analysing the literature on neo-Islam and globalisation explaining the reason for adopting the particular view of the phenomenon endorsed by the thesis. It also illustrates the chain of events that had a bearing on the attitude of the Great Powers in their conduct of international relations in the nineteenth century. This is important for the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters as it addresses the question whether the particular legacies of the Ottoman rule and neo-Islamism construction shaped the events during the 1992-95 Bosnian war, given the changing world order. It also sets the tone for the main trends in international relations in the twentieth century during the 1992-95 Bosnian War, and juxtaposes them with the nineteenth-century ethno-liberal boom.
Chapter three then turns to an investigation of the historical dimension, analysing the extent of international influence during the ‘Eastern Question’ on the Bosniaks’ lack of national recognition. It also explains the European decision, following the Ottoman retreat from the Balkans, to establish the Bosnian province as an international protectorate, addressing the question of why Bosnia was not fully incorporated into the European system of nation-states. Chapter four analyses the continuation of the Bosniaks’ struggle for national recognition and describes their efforts to achieve a nation-state by opposing the Austrian occupation. It also follows their subsequent national development, culminating in an analysis of Communist Yugoslavia’s decision to acknowledge Bosniak national identity, although not under their historic name; the Bosniaks were placed in a novel category, that of a ‘Muslim nation’, which only added to the confusion and encouraged the Serbs and Croats to make further claims to Bosnian territory. Chapter five provides an analysis of the developments in international relations that impacted the break-up of Yugoslavia and subsequent 1992-95 Bosnian war, specifically examining the international aspect of the symbiosis of neo-Islam and neoliberalism. It illustrates how neo-Islam, as an ideology, gained such prominence in the conduct of international relations. This chapter also provides reasons for the neo-Islamists’ renowned interest in the plight of the Bosniaks. Chapter six examines the Islamic revivalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in three decades preceeding the 1992-95 Bosnian war as well as international efforts to settle the crisis. The discussion pays special attention to the infiltration of the neo-Islamist group in the 1980s and analyses the impact of the events on the construction of neo-Islamism during the 1992-95 Bosnian war and its aftermath. It elaborates on the international element in the conflict in an effort to find an answer to the question of whether the peace settlement signed for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ended the conflict but did not finish the war, was inevitable. Finally,
chapter seven summarises the research and attempts to draw out some of the trends that display the internationalised character of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ‘unfinished business’ – to borrow the phrase of Bassuener and Lyon (2009). It indicates that the Bosnian saga is, at present, without any resolution that could help ascertain what course Bosnia and Herzegovina might follow in the near future.

The following chapter offers an analysis of the international events that formed the context in which the 1992-95 Bosnian war story began to unfold. An explanation of how the Great Powers have dealt with Bosnia and Herzegovina, both historically and in present times, is essential not only to understanding the course of the conflict, the subsequent settlement and the construction of neo-Islamism in the war, but also to an elucidation of the complexities that surround the recognition of a Bosnian Muslim nation.
CHAPTER TWO
NEO-ISLAM AND GLOBALISATION

Introducing the question of neo-Islam into the globalisation debate is a delicate matter and a challenging task. At the onset, it is important to highlight the fact that definitions on globalisation tend to come from predominantly Western sources and, although they claim a global reach, they are very much concentrated on the Western experience. Apart from scattered statistical references, the rest of the world, especially Muslim one, is largely missing from the allegedly ‘global’ analysis. Garret (1998: 1-74) asserts that even the most extensive contributions, fortified by a solid body of empirical evidence, refer by and large to the experience of the advanced industrial economies of the West. As such, they do not address the meaning and significance of globalisation for Islam, nor do they define the place of Muslims within the globalisation process.

The main argument of this chapter is that globalisation, when observed from a Muslim perspective, is a continuation of Western-induced modernity, which began in the early nineteenth century. It accelerated with the development of capitalism based on a loan economy and the birth of the nation-state, both of which are concepts alien to Islam. I have adopted this particular approach because it was during this period that neo-Islam for the first time ushered the campaign to establish ethno-nationalism and the usurious practices the West used to gain definitive political and economic hegemony on a global scale. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to give a theoretical underpinning to the thesis and to form a historical framework for the research question presented in the introductory chapter, as well as the arguments that follow during the course of the thesis.
In the nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals started to engage with Western political philosophy in a conscious attempt to mitigate the effects of modernity on Islamic practices. However, the nation-state – accompanied by its ideological tool of nationalism – and the usurious economic practices of neoliberalism continue to remain as discursive, if not defining features of contemporary globalisation and, as such, they continue to present a serious challenge to Islam. Despite this, neo-Islam still makes painstaking efforts to reconcile the effects of globalisation with ‘classic’ Islamic norms.

Analysis of the available evidence demonstrates that Muslims view globalisation as an unfolding process aimed at furthering Western interests and maintaining Western influence over the Muslim world; it is regarded as a Western invention and viewed with suspicion. In order to ascertain the extent of the links between neo-Islam and globalisation, the concept of ‘neo-Islam’, which definition was already provided in chapter one, now must first be further contextualised. This is the task of the chapter’s initial section, which consists of a critique of the literature on Islamism. Section two presents globalisation as the advancement and consolidation of the neoliberal capitalist economy. It is followed by analysis of Muslim chronology of globalisation. Section three analyses the globalisation debates, identifying two main points of controversy for neo-Islam: the state-globalisation debate and the disputed beginnings of globalisation. The literature review reveals that globalisation is an integral part of the process of modernity and therefore began a few centuries ago. This being the case, it is necessary to briefly historicise global Islam in terms of the reach, effect and eventual decline of the last Muslim empire. Section four concludes the chapter. It transpires that the main reason behind Western intolerance of Islam was the power and influence Muslims enjoyed at their imperial height, and the decline of this power
was ultimately the result of globalisation. As far as analysis of the links with globalisation are concerned, the central premise of this thesis – that neo-Islam is a force that was conceived during the rise of mercantile capitalism in the early nineteenth century and ideologically underpinned by the proliferation of nation-states and the spread of a loan economy – remains intact throughout the discussion.

2.1 Review of the relevant literature on ‘neo-Islam’

Comprehensive review of the relevant literature on ‘neo-Islam’ comprises of critique of the current scholarship on Islamism. I first used the term neo-Islam at the conference in Maastricht in July 2006, presenting a paper on neo-Islamism and neoliberalism. At that time this seemed a novel term, at least in the languages accessible to me: English, Turkish and Bosnian. Neo-Islam did not have an established literature body and was only sporadically used in the couple of translated articles dealing with issues of women in Islam (Roded 1999; Bora and Çalışkan 2007). Last year, the term appeared in one article (Chamkhil, October 2014), two books (Al-Da’ami 2014; Lapidus 2014) and a couple of newspaper columns mainly in the United States written by an Iranian journalist (Taher 2014). Nonetheless, even the recent usage defines neo-Islam as a proliferation of radical Islamist networks that manifest a variety of organisational, social and political challenges to the Western ideology. My definition is contrary to this claim and defines neo-Islam as an ideology that uses the pretext of Islamic dogma, albeit distorted and misinterpreted, to advance, promote and implement Western orthodoxies, mainly neoliberal economic policies. In other words, these are neoliberal Islamist movements. Led by Saudi Arabia, neo-Islamists have ensured that there is a sufficient flow of money available to be borrowed
in order to facilitate continuation of debt economy and the incorporation of national ruling classes into the wealthy neoliberal global elite. Critical analysis of the available scholarship purports to the claim that neo-Islam is the ally of the West and not an opponent as further explained below.

Discourse on Islam has been a focal point of heated analysis and discussions not only among academic circles but it came to dominate passionate debates in broadcasting studios and newspaper columns, introducing controversial topic closer to general public into offices and homes. The trend of ‘Islamised discussions’ originated with the US-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, after which victorious Islamic ‘freedom fighters’, who fought on the side of USA, were proclaimed as grave threat to Western civilisation as Communism itself (Niva, 1998: 29). Niva (1998: 29) bases the rationale on the Universalist claims of both Islam and Communism irrespective of race, culture and territory that appeal globally to the less privileged segments of capitalistic societies. This line of discourse continued through the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s with the allegation that the same Mujahedins who fought Jihad in Afghanistan moved to former Yugoslavia to fulfil their martyrdom mission (Deliso 2007, Napoleoni 2005). The literature tried to place Bosnian Muslims within the context of the global proliferation of militant Islamic networks (Schindler 2007; Kohlmann 2004; Johnstone 2003; Hudson 2003; International Crisis Group Reports 2001). However, the arguments are generally undone by the way its authors invariably try to force Bosnian reality to fit their muddled Islamophobic contentions as already explained in the literature review at section six in chapter one.
The legitimate public outcry in the wake of 9/11 attacks was followed by policies that encouraged Muslim witch-hunt and street back-clash heightening debates on Islam. By now, they contained more pronounced anti-Islamic tune and eventually served as justification for the subsequent Western invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The themes encompassing Islam showed no signs of abating, and generally continued to burden Islam with negative images and often misconceived concepts. Bias was aided by certain academia circles, which provided scholarly veneer for hegemonic neoliberal political platform for leading Western regimes. Prime example is a British-born and American-adopted scholar, Bernard Lewis, who in the essay ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ written in 1990 coined the term ‘clash of civilizations’ claiming that the conflict between Islam and the West was always present but it reached its final stages with the end of the Cold War. Using credentials of an historian and a former intelligence officer, the subsequent, well-timed works demonized Islam as an imminent threat to Western capitalistic economies (Lewis, 1996; 1998; 2002). Even though he was criticised for the lack of the objective approach and analytical omission in his modern analysis (Alam 2002; Miles 2004; Gresh 2005), he was nonetheless proclaimed by the mainstream media reviewers as a ‘doyen of Middle Eastern Studies’ (The New Your Sun, Wall Street Journal 2006) and ‘a pillar of wisdom in the great Islamic debate’ (The Times, 2006). Lewis was a recipient of a lavish birthday party thrown in his honour by Dick Cheney, the former US Vice-President, an occasion which served as a round-table gathering of like-minded intellectuals discussing the relationship between Islam and the West in the 21st century. Present at the event were also Samuel Huntington, a scholar with political career who adopted and famed the Lewis’s terminology of civilizational clash, and his fellow-colleague Frances Fukuyama, who advanced the thesis of Western Liberal Ideology over the rest, and especially Islam. Both of these authors will
be further discussed in chapter five due to their relevance in hailing neoliberal structure as well as derogatory neo-imperial sentiments they intellectually grounded on differential position of Islam vis-a-vis West. Writing in the influential *Foreign Affairs*, Robert Kagan (1996: 23-27), similarly observed that the tantalising grip of the new world order witnessed the re-emergence of traditional faultline between Islamic fundamentalism, representing the world’s absolutism, and West, as an embodiment of free liberal thought, for which reason he called for a greater vigilance of Western democratic institutions.

This symbiosis of policy formulation anchored in partisan scientific evidence greatly contributed to politicising discourse on Islam at the global level. Not only partial policies were implemented, but also some previously marginalized parties and personalities inserted themselves into the very mainstream Western politics, often using Muslims as their scapegoats (Zemni and Parker 2002: 235). In a political rehearsal the topics on Islam were deployed in many forms: Fundamentalist, Political, Moderate, Secular, Cultural, Militant, but essentially the Other. Even those scholars who relied on significant intellectual powers and available empirical evidence to incorporate Islam in the complex constellations of contemporary world, generally became susceptible to offering recommendations how to re-educate Muslims, and thus, albeit inadvertently, reinforced the point of incommensurable system value of Muslims to the Western space of socio-political affiliation. The impressive collection of articles on a wide-ranging selection of topics on Islam - from Diaspora studies and Muslim education to participation, assimilation as well as studies dealing with reach of anti-Muslim xenophobic sentiments – was usefully compiled and edited by Swayd (ed. 2007).

Public, media, intellectual and political discourses generally stereotype Muslims as commendably well presented in illustrious study of Morey and Yaqin (2010). In their view, Muslims are bifurcated into one of two categories: Backwards or Terrorists. In this respect, two streams of scholarly approach beg to differ. The first one focuses research on historical evidence emphasizing medieval Islamic contribution to the scientific and technological development of the West. Goody (2004: 8) belongs to this group and he argues that whatever the problems with Islam, it was not only to be seen as attached to the ‘backward other’ but is in fact essentially intrinsic to the Western norms of Christianity and Judaism. Rather than being an alien socio-cultural tradition and foreign religion, Islam ‘has long been established within Europe and has had a great influence not only on its politics but on its culture more generally’ (Goody 2004: 16). Since its first conquest of Europe, Islam had penetrated almost all areas of Western life from science, technology, agriculture, classical
mathematics, philosophy, trade, architecture and literature. Much of the Enlightenment and Renaissance periods are owed to the Muslim translators of classical resources. The Arabic inscriptions have been found on the Isle of Man and date as early as the eleventh century or the well documented English trade with the Saracens can be traced way back to the medieval period (Melitziki 1997: 127). These and other are discussed later in the chapter.

Second group of scholars endeavour to present Islam as a proximate political phenomenon, consequential to the emergence of economic neo-liberalisation programmes. Since the conditions attached to the finance received generally resulted in a decline in state provision of social welfare and increased poverty and inequality (El-Said and Harrigan 2003), this trend analysed Islam as either a force behind provincial protest movements against the penetration of neo-liberal regimes in the Arab world in the 1980s (Fandy 1994; Buşra 1998; Ismail 2000), or a powerful unifying factor in mobilizing social movements to fill in the gap for support networks (Denoux 1993, Wickham 2002, Wiktorowitz 2004). Joel Benin (2005) went one step further in asserting that Islam – based on Turkish and Egyptian experiences he explored - does not represent the recrudescence of backwardness and rejection of modernity, but is the integral part of modernity. They endeavour to present Islamism as a proximate political phenomenon, a consequence of the emergence of economic programmes of neoliberalisation in contemporary international relations.

The research in this thesis builds on this strand of scholarship but attempts to take a more original approach. I base my arguments on interpretations that claim that neither Islamic norms in general nor the socio-political blueprint Islam itself has adopted lie outside the parameters of modern power relations. Since its inception, Islam has claimed a
full participatory role in the establishment of society and state, occasionally in quite revolutionary ways. Islamic participation in the formation of international political dialogue has never ceased. If a modern Islamic contribution has taken place in a more negative way than witnessed in previous history, this is because of the synergy of Islamism with neoliberalism. This thesis, therefore, seeks to establish the claim that not only is Islamism compatible with neoliberal doctrines, but it is neoliberalism’s perfect adherent, and for this reason it can be aptly termed ‘neo-Islamism’. Neoliberalism emerged as a key conceptual reflection and empirical political agency that replaced economic processes previously dubbed globalization (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Castells 2000; Rosemond 2000; McMichael 2000; Hay 2002). The next section explains the paradigm shift from globalisation to neoliberalism.

2.2 The paradigm shift to neoliberalism

Following the initial enchantment with globalisation, the scholars gradually became sceptical about the so-called ‘benefits’ of globalisation, recognising the retrograde tendencies it contained. This is perhaps due to the fact that by the late twentieth century globalisation had mutated into neoliberalism, shifting the discussion towards a new paradigm. The following quote from Hirst and Thompson (1996: 6) is representative of the general mood of scholarship: ‘Globalization is a myth suitable for a world without

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60 This pertains, for example, to matters such as the equal position of women and the conduct of state affairs. Women had full participatory electoral rights, and could even stand as candidates for the position of caliph (the head of the Islamic state). Also, the first four leaders of the Muslim community (‘rightly guided’ caliphs) ran state affairs on the principle of mutual consultation (shura). Policies had to be publicly approved and accepted through sworn allegiance (bai’ah). This was sometimes expressed by means of a referendum (the second caliph, Umar, was elected in this way).

61 cf. Appendices III and IV. This contains an indication of the literature on globalisation from 1980 to 1998, which seems to have developed at a faster pace than the phenomenon itself. The literature originates from a remarkable diversity of authors, ranging from postmodernist scholars, social theorists, pedantic empiricists, economists and geographers to politicians, businessmen and management consultants.
illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope.’ This group of scholars considers the process of globalisation as generally unfettered by ethical and moral considerations (Ritchie 1996), for which reason they challenge the whole concept of globalisation, both its theory and its practice. They see it as a euphemism for capitalism and neoliberalism, as it has been commonly pronounced that globalisation faces ‘no threat from any viable contrary political project, for it is held that Western social democracy and socialisms of the Soviet bloc are both finished’ (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 6; Fukuyama 2000). In this vein, Harvey (1996, cited in Kelly 1999: 385) summarises globalisation as a ‘spatial fix for capitalism and an ideological tool with which to attack socialists’. In the same fashion, Steingard and Fitzgibbons (1995, cited in Kelly 1999) describe the entire process of conceptualising globalisation as a strategic tool exogenous to the capitalistic forces of globalisation, creating …

… an ideological construct devised to satisfy capitalism’s need for new markets and labour sources and propelled by the uncritical ‘sycophancy’ of the international academic business community. (Steingard and Fitzgibbons, cited in Kelly 1999: 383)

Walck and Bilimoria (cited in Kelly 1999) further argue that the discourse of globalisation has been utilised as cover for a different ideological agenda:

[G]lobalisation is not an output of the ‘real’ forces of markets and technologies, but is rather an input in the form of rhetorical and discursive constructs, practices and ideologies which some groups are imposing on others for political and economic gain. (Walck and Bilimoria, cited in Kelly 1999, 1995: 383)

This group of scholars generally protest against the attribution of too powerful a role to globalisation, since the logic of ‘there is no alternative’ is used to pursue a neoliberal policy agenda (Thompson 1997: 151). However, since globalisation has been promoted by
international organisations and spurred on by the actions of governments (Castells 2000), it is not surprising that the globalisation discourse remains overwhelmingly powerful. As Reed (2002) explains:

The message of globalization is so thoroughly integrated into public discourse by mass media owned by the globalizers themselves, a phenomenon known as convergence. The result is resignation and demobilization. That is precisely its design: to demonstrate that no other form of discourse is possible. (Reed 2002 [online])

Gill (1997) argues that the ‘globalising elites’, whom he defines as transitional ‘fractions’ of the world’s capitalistic classes, promote powerful globalisation discourses in a form he terms ‘a new disciplinary constitutionalism’, in order to create regulatory frameworks suitable for the advancement of their interests. In the same vein, Boos (2003) states that globalisation, as envisaged by political and corporate elites, turns out to be a socio-political movement based on its own oligarchic doctrine:

Globalisation is a philosophy, an ideology like socialism, Marxism, communism, which means domination of the economic, political, social and cultural world [by] one or a few powers. It is nothing else than the [return] through the backdoor of the decried … monopolies and oligopolies [of ill repute]. (Boos 2003: 3)

McMichael (2000: 348) further outlines globalisation as ‘an emerging vision of the world and its resources as a globally organized and managed free trade/free enterprise economy pursued by a largely unaccountable political and economic elite’. Meanwhile, Rosamond (2000: 10) poses the question of whether globalisation’s actors ‘knowingly and strategically seek to construct the world in ways consistent with their interests’. His suggestion of a ‘strategic pathway’ comes in useful when evaluating the material conditions created by the process of globalisation (2000: 9-10).
In this sense, a paraphrased synopsis of Castells’ (2000: 162) three-volume work serves as a conclusive summary of this group’s theories. He describes the entire process ‘perceived under the label of globalisation’ as a consciously induced and politically constituted amplifying force that connects only the dominant segments of national economies, and the elites within them, by dramatically expanding markets and tapping into new sources of capital and skilled labour. This process has resulted in the formation of the ‘new economy’. This is still the capitalist economy, but, facilitated by the revolution in information technology, it has spread on a global scale: ‘[F]or the first time in history, the whole planet is capitalist or dependent on its connection to global capitalist networks’ (Castells 2000: 160). This achievement, Castells insists, shows that globalisation was not built in a vacuum. He argues that it was ‘a conscious product of the decisive and tentative capitalistic agenda’ that evolved and replicated itself through governmental policies that created a ‘new global economy’:

Yet, neither technology nor business could have developed the global economy on its own. The decisive agents in setting up a new, global economy were governments, and particularly the governments of the wealthiest countries, the G-7, and their ancillary international institutions, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation. Three interrelated policies created the foundations for globalization: deregulation of domestic economic activity (starting with financial markets); liberalization of international trade and investment; and privatization of publicly controlled companies (often sold to foreign investors). (Castells 2000: 137)

The institutions named above were essential to advancing the process of globalisation, which later consolidated itself as a neoliberal ideology, which economic implications upon countries and Neo-Islamic response are discussed in more detail in chapter five. With the help of governmental intervention, globalisation obtained its final features as a capitalist
network that created a cleavage in global development, due to the fact that its sole goal was profit.

In contrast to the previous globalisation research bonanza, this wave of scholars included Muslim voices for the first time. The general flavour of the Muslim works published in English is highly critical of the entire process of globalisation, believing it to bear neo-colonial connotations. This is not surprising as neoliberalism’s urge for profit and exploitation encouraged Western imperialist expansion, which eventually conquered and colonised most of the Muslim world. When reading these works, it becomes apparent that Muslim scholars were wary of the entire process even before it became fashionable to criticise globalisation, but their studies were simply not available in the \textit{lingua franca} of contemporary scholarship. The uneven development of globalisation has meant that scholars who wish to expound their views on the impact of globalisation on their societies are constrained by the need to publish in English. Mittelman (2002: 22) emphasises the need to de-centre the focus of globalisation and widen the origins of participating researchers, pointing to the number of scholars from all parts of the world whose works are unavailable in English.

\subsection*{2.2.1 A Muslim chronology of globalisation}

Muslim scholarship sees globalisation as two extremes: either as an unavoidable and beneficial reality or as a neo-colonial force, sweeping all before it. For example, a Bosnian compilation, published as a series in \textit{Forum Bosnae},\footnote{Editions 12/01, 13/01, 22/03 and 37/06.} projects an image of globalisation imported from the West, while Neeraj (2001: 7), on the other hand, proclaims it to be
nothing less than ‘recolonisation in a new garb’. An exemplary English publication on the Muslim Arab view of globalisation comes from Najjar, who helpfully summarises the huge volume of Arabic literature on globalisation. In his study, Najjar (2005: 91-103) divides Arab intelligentsia into three groups: those who reject globalisation altogether as the highest stage of imperialism; those who are secularist by nature and call for efforts to ‘benefit from the positive opportunities of globalisation’; and those whom he considers as naively trying to accommodate globalisation with the cultural and economic interests of the Arab and Muslim peoples.

Among the Muslim studies on globalisation, Malaysia has by and large been the most vociferous interlocutor. In 2000 the Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding published a large volume on issues concerning Islam and globalisation. This highly acclaimed work observes the impact of globalisation on Islam from various economic and financial perspectives, touching upon issues of culture, politics, the economy and Islamic banking. The driving force behind this active Malaysian scholarship appears to have been the country’s phenomenal economic success. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, Malaysia, alongside other East Asian countries, fell victim to currency speculation and the volatile inflow and outflow of foreign funds. However, while all the other newly enriched East Asian economies – also known as the ‘Asian Tigers’ – crumbled after foreign currency traders decided to abruptly withdraw their money, Malaysia was the only country to emerge from the crisis without having succumbed to the lure of incremental loans issued by the IMF or World Bank. This fortunate outcome was mainly due to the wit and intelligence of its prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Following his successful resurrection of the

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63 For a complete analysis of the Asian financial crisis, see Bello (1997) and Baer at al. (1997).
country out of the ashes of bankruptcy, he became a zealous, uninhibited critic of globalisation, speaking his mind on what he termed as the ‘conquering euphemism known as globalization’ (Mahathir 2002). In 2002 he published a work that provides compelling reading for researchers interested in the impact of globalisation on Muslims. It comprises a compilation of Mahathir’s selected speeches on globalisation, delivered at various occasions in many different countries, and provides an incisive critique of the phenomenon from a Muslim perspective. The following quote serves as the best summary of the book, and offers a potentially conclusive challenge to the entire Muslim scholarship on globalisation studies:

Muslim countries and Muslim governments have a duty to ensure that globalisation will not result in the marginalisation of their countries as happened with the Industrial Revolution and Industrial Age. We cannot afford this at this time. If once again we miss the opportunity to keep pace with the radical and rapid advances now being made with technology and the sciences, and the changes they cause to the world’s perception of things, the new ideas and concepts in human and international relations; if we miss all these and fail to handle them, then we will not only be marginalised, but be dominated and hegemon[ised] permanently. (Mahathir 2002: 53)

Thus, critical examination of the available evidence demonstrates that while the West has seen globalisation as representing a sea of opportunities – no matter how selective and shallow - Muslims have generally regarded it as a threat to their culture, economy and existence. The analysis also suggests that globalisation is not considered to be the first phenomenon of this kind; the advent of capitalism, accelerated by modernisation and Westernisation, provided precedents (Mahathir 2002). This suspicion harks back to the Crusades and to the colonisation and Western imperial domination of the Muslim world (Najjar 2005), commencing with the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries via the medium of mercantile capitalism, whose expansion was advanced by a rising bourgeois class.

In the Ottoman state, the representative Muslim state of the time, it was regarded as obligatory for all sources of wealth to be dedicated to the preservation of the stability of society and the power of the ruler, the main protector of the ‘community of the faithful’, rather than the empowerment of the individual. In accordance with Islamic tradition, the primary concern of the empire was always the fiscal interest of the state and the protection of the domestic consumer as opposed to the capitalist economy, which was driven by profit and the interests of an absolutist monarch or ruling elite. Hence, all economic activities were regulated by the state in order to achieve this goal (Guida 2007: 14). The government strictly regulated the supply of raw materials, the delivery of surpluses to the palace (preventing agents from seizing them for themselves), and the prices at which produce was sold (Inalcik 1994). However, the main point of divergence with European capitalism was the esnaf (guilds), which were specifically established to ensure the subsistence and harmony of society through the creation of a web of mutual assistance and solidarity. This system discouraged overproduction: wealth accumulation through uncontrolled profit was managed by the strict supervision of production, which did not permit any change in the style and quality of the produce. If a member of a guild became too rich, his fellows would expel him, considering his greed to be immoral (Guida 2007: 15). Through such tight supervision, the state ensured that the surplus was directed towards the government, rather than ending up as profit in an agent’s hands. The state also controlled sales on the market by fixing prices, in consultation with the guilds, and by buying produce at a specially
allocated place at a fixed profit of ten percent, or in exceptional circumstances, twenty percent (Faroqhi 1994: 589-598).

While these measures curtailed profiteering, fraud and, most importantly, speculation, which was strictly forbidden in Islam, they also obstructed the development of capitalism, which relies on competition, cheap labour and the competitive production of goods for the world markets (Inalcik 1994: 49). Above all, it prevented the formation of the sort of oligarchic elite crucial for the formation and advancement of capitalism. The idea of profit for its own sake, without social considerations, had no precedent in Islamic tradition, and Muslim jurists rejected it as un-Islamic. This all changed with the process of modernisation and reform, as will be discussed in the next chapter. The reforms heralded early Neo-Islamic practices that in the nineteenth century expedited the series of treaties known as the ‘capitulations’. These granted Europeans access to the vast Muslim markets across the Ottoman Empire, which they flooded with cheap exports, leaving Muslim products lagging even further behind. The effect is still evident today, while the relationship with Neo-Islamist continues to flourish as purposed by intra-Muslim conflicts around the globe.

The hereditary right to land ownership was also prohibited by Islam. The classical model of the Ottoman state had tight monitoring and regulatory mechanisms, which supervised relations between peasant and master. The landowners were ruthlessly and efficiently regulated by the state; they were unable to use the land as private investment and were prevented from passing it on to their heirs, thus disabling the

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64 The ‘capitulations’ were treaties granting commercial privileges, which were awarded by the sultan to foreign residents. They not only conferred trading rights, but also exempted foreign residents from the jurisdiction of local courts.
formation of an aristocratic elite that could establish and preserve such a system. Equally, they did not have ultimate power over the peasants: they owned neither the peasants nor the land, but simply possessed customary rights to their produce (Mazower 2001: 32). In the words of an Ottoman document that refers to these Islamic principles:

The land, which was in the [hands] of [the] reaya (peasantry) at the time of the conquest, was settled upon them once more with ownership held in trust for the Muslim community. (cited in McGowan 1981: 54-55)

Mazower (2001: 33) observes that the result of this arrangement was that ‘the peasants themselves enjoyed more control over their lives than their counterparts in most of Europe’. Ultimately, state intervention obstructed the formation of a landowning class, and thus another of the main requirements for the successful establishment of capitalism was left unfulfilled. By jettisoning the main features of the new economic system, the Ottomans stalemated the penetration of capitalism. However, these conditions were to change permanently with the reform of land ownership, which heralded the demise of the old Ottoman land regime and its replacement by new privately owned estates. The new owners comprised not only newly enriched Muslim notables, but also local and European Christians. The rise of what are known as chiflik estates is among the most bitterly contested of issues in Ottoman historiography (Stoianovich 1992: 15-39). It is unclear whether they were caused by the opportunities afforded by the international economy and the emergence of mercantile capitalism, or were procured through the corruption of oppressive tax-farming landlords. In either case, the outcome was a deterioration of living standards among the peasantry, as well as the erosion of the Ottoman state’s centralised control over the rich, unruly and disloyal class of local notables (Mardin 1989).
This brief historical overview is crucial to an understanding of the impact of economic globalisation upon Muslims. The debate on the link between globalisation and Neo-Islam, is discussed in the following section. This explains in more detail why it is important to consider globalisation, in its historical dimension, as an imperialistically driven capitalist force, with the nation-state system as its ideological underpinning. By implication, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, which was precipitated by the break-up of Yugoslavia, needs to be placed in this context. This is for two reasons: first, it was the last stronghold of socialism in Europe and, perhaps, the world; secondly, it was a compound multinational state that prospered because of its diversity of cultures and viewpoints. The following section on the state-versus-globalisation debate, followed by a discussion on the existence of an Islamic precedent to the process of globalisation, provides more detail.

2.3 The state-globalisation relationship

In discussing the relationship between the state and globalisation, the most vexed question is that which revolves around theories of the state and state sovereignty. The main question this debate raises is whether the state is in retreat (Reich 1991; Strange 1996; Camilleri and Falk 1992; Held et al. 1999; Beck 2000), has become an agent of globalisation (Cox 1997; Hoogvelt 1997; Gordon 1988; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Waltz 1999), or has acquired an even more active role as the author of globalisation (Panitch 1996; Wallerstein 2000). In addition, there is a totally opposing view, which sees globalisation as a redundant concept (Zysman 1996). In relation to the state-globalisation issue, Hobson and Ramesh (2002: 6) advance the debate by organising their research around a diametrically opposed discourse. On the one hand, they identify a ‘structuralist’ approach that rests on ‘the assumption that
the capitalist world economy forms global structures which require states to adapt to its constraining logic’. On the other hand, they group opposing views into an ‘agent-centric’ approach, which maintains that ‘globalisation remains weak to the extent that the national sovereign states remain strong’ (Hobson and Ramesh 2002: 7). Their findings conclude that the debate over the relationship between the state and globalisation ‘tends to promote a zero-sum conception of power in which there is a trade-off between global structures and states-as-agents’ (2002: 7). However, rather than adopting such an approach, they suggest a ‘collective-sum’ approach, due to the fact that ‘states enhance their power “through” or “with” global (and domestic) forces’ (2002: 10). In other words, states are ‘spatially promiscuous’; 65 so that ‘globalisation makes of states what states make of it’ (2002: 22).

The nation-state and globalisation are entangled in a mutually reinforcing relationship; the tenacity of the nations-state has not been diminished vis-à-vis the forces of globalisation (Clark 1999; Mann 1988; Weiss 1998; Wade 1996; Kennedy 1993; Strange 1988).

Koehane and Nye (2000) assert that the state-centred paradigm is the approach best suited to the globalisation debate because the nation-state still possesses a dominant and resilient structure. Hardt and Negri (2000: 10-11) argue that globalisation consists of the history of imperialism and nation-states, which have created a ‘fluid, infinitely expanding and highly organised system that encompasses the world’s entire population’. Luke (2008) considers nation-states to be the main building blocks of globalisation, and their

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65 Hobson and Ramesh (2002: 10) have formulated the interesting concept of ‘state promiscuity’, which in effect takes the state away from a traditionally structuralist notion of a fixed territory, outflanked by global capital. They challenge this view by stating that the nation-state resides within a ‘vortex’ of global, regional and domestic spatial realms, and that its unique socio-spatial location enables it to mitigate the logic of the global capitalist structure and conform to its requirements. They further assert that even though the nation-state cannot physically move across territory, it still has an outflanking power – part of the globalisation process – due to its ability ‘to dip into the global realm to circumvent, or adapt to, constraints faced at domestic, regional or global levels’.

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government apparatus as the only driving force that can endorse and legitimise the process. Nationalism serves as a mandatory tool in the institutionalisation and perseverance of the nation-state mechanism as a global system. A glimpse of contemporary nationalist practices around the world confirms that the idea of the nation-state is still present; it does not seem to have been weakened by globalisation. Irrespective of a shrinking world, divisions along the lines of national identity still persist (Geertz 1998; Ignatieff 1997). As a consequence, the fact that physical barriers between countries are proliferating around the globalised world does not come as a surprise.

The main progenitors of these new barriers seem to be national governments, with their divisive policies. Israel’s new wall in the occupied West Bank, and the mined fences it has built around the Gaza Strip and those separating the country from Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, are well known. However, many other walls have either been completed or are in the process of being built around the world: for example, India has recently finished a 4,100km-long wall with Bangladesh; Thailand has walled off its border with Malaysia; China is intent on physically keeping North Korea at a distance from its booming economy; and Iran is similarly constructing a concrete wall along the Baluchistan border with Pakistan. Perhaps the most assiduous barrier-builder, however, is Saudi Arabia. Alongside its $8.5 billion fence along its Yemeni border, the Saudis have constructed ‘a state-of-the-art wall guarding their frontier with Iraq, which includes face-recognition software and even automated weapons’ (Prospect 2007: 8). This is an important factor to remember when Saudi Arabia’s role as the leading neo-Islamist regime, which endeavours to subordinate other Muslims to its neoliberal doctrine, is discussed in chapter five.
It is interesting to note that walls are mainly being erected in areas with a Muslim-majority population. At first glance, this seems extraordinarily surprising, because the concepts of division and alienation essentially contradict Islamic fundamentals. However, closer investigation reveals that these physical, concrete borders are not an entirely novel phenomenon but are, in fact, a fortified continuation of the national borders drawn up during the imperial expansion of the European Great Powers. While for Europe, the emergence of ethno-nationalism offered its peoples the opportunity to define themselves under the flag of the Enlightenment, for Muslims it was a completely new socio-political structure, leading to their eventual enslavement. These borders, which were built with the endorsement and often at the instigation of the governments of the Muslim states in question, are an important factor in the understanding of the significance of the nation-state concept in the study of Islam and globalisation, as well as serving to contextualise the recent Bosnian war and the atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims. This is because the nation-state, and by implication nationalism, in a Western ethno-liberal sense, are alien and relatively novel to Islam. Kedourie (1993: 68), who has written several influential works on the development of nationalism both in Europe and in regions outside the European-Christian cultural arena, confirms that nationalism is not a universal phenomenon

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66 The notions of unity, brotherhood and participation in the community are present in almost every area of Islamic belief. In the Qur’an, for example, this is stated unambiguously in the following verse: ‘[H]old firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember the favour of Allah upon you – when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favour, brothers’ (Qur’an 3:103, translated by Ibrahim Walk). The Qur’an further reinforces the mutual benefits of cooperation and assistance between diverse cultures (Qur’an 49:13).

67 Mazower (2001: 17-18) also considers ethno-nationalism to be a detrimental factor in the development of the newly emerged Balkan states, following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the region. He writes: ‘For just as Europe gave the Balkans the categories with which its people defined themselves, so it gave them also the ideological weapons – in the shape primarily of modern romantic nationalism – with which to destroy themselves.’
but ‘a product of European thought in the last 150 years’. Thus, it transpires that nationalism is a recent phenomenon for Europe too.

Nevertheless, Europe is still considered the ‘home’ of nationalism, and although its progress was painstakingly slow at times, it has developed evenly in every direction within the region.\(^{68}\) In European nations, it was considered a tool of liberation from the chains of religion and a medium of cooperation and coexistence for peoples sharing common beliefs and values. Aside from historic conflicts such as the First World War, which the following chapters demonstrate was more a product of the imperialist greed of the elites rather than the animosity of Europe’s peoples, European nations generally benefited from the emergence of the nation-state on both a domestic and international level. In modern times, these beneficial effects have become even more prominent. A case in point is the European Union, a project which – although often disputed, criticised and generally considered as unfinished\(^{69}\) – has, nonetheless, brought great cultural, commercial and financial betterment to its member states, primarily due to the funds it makes available to them.

By contrast, the Muslim world was from the outset at odds with ethno-nationalism. The underlying reason was not lack of recognition of diversity in Islam. Based upon Qur’anic revelations, Islam acknowledges and, in a way, cherishes cultural pluralism. Moreover, Islam orders people to cooperate, to help one another according to its precepts of goodness and piety, and not to harbour evil or malice (Qur’an 5: 2). This principle was fully endorsed by the Prophet Muhammad on the local level, regardless of the religion of one’s

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\(^{68}\) The only exception to this rule was the repressed nationalism of Bosnian Muslims, a subject that is analysed in detail in the following chapters.

\(^{69}\) There are xenophobic political parties, such as the UK Independence Party, the British National Party, the Dutch Freedom Party and the Freedom Party of Austria, that hold anti-European views, but these remain minority parties, never gaining more than a handful votes, insufficient to penetrate mainstream politics.
neighbour. Ramadan (2001: 198), for example, describes Muhammad asking Ibn Thabit, one of his companions, to learn Hebrew for the sake of understanding and communication. This principle was extended to the international level in cases where neighbouring countries developed mutually beneficial economic and political relations with the Islamic world. However, based upon historical analysis and contemporary evidence, it can be seen that the principle of modern ethno-nationalism was not devised to serve as a tool of cooperation for Muslim countries. It was, rather, a European export in the form of an ideological and strategic weapon bestowed upon the Muslim elites to ensure European colonial supremacy following the end of the Ottoman Empire.

The ruling Muslim elite was trained and encouraged to govern in a colonial style, a tried-and-tested recipe with a proven track record across many continents. Armstrong (2001: 141) sees in this a process of modernisation in which ‘Islamdom [sic] was quickly and permanently reduced to a dependent bloc by European powers’. As a result, an increasing resentment of Western ideas, and the ultimate rejection of westernised segments of the Muslim population, became the most common feature of almost every Muslim society. It was the rise of the nation-state, in a liberal European sense, that created the cleavage in Muslim societies, giving birth to a battle between modernists, who embraced the ideology of nationalism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, and hardliners – a battle that continues to this day. The rancour of the hardliners grew to the point where they considered modernists to be apostates, who deserved to be subjected to the most severe penal code. For example, Lazzerini (1988: 156) quotes the Russian Muslim religious leader, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, as denouncing the modernists’ secular beliefs in the following terms: ‘Whoever believes in God and Muhammad must be
an enemy of the modernists. For them the Shari’a demands the death penalty.’ Davutoğlu (1994) sums up the challenges faced by Muslims in the wake of the conceptualisation of the liberal nation-state system:

Perhaps the most radical changes in the institutionalisation of the state in Islamic history came with the end of caliphate. This turning point and the following stage of the imposition of the nation-state system in Muslim lands created an imaginative and structural confusion among the masses. The demarcation and internal consistency between umma, Dar-al-Islam and dawlah (the Islamic State) was lost while new political structures as nation-states populated by Muslims faced a comprehensive problem of political legitimacy. (Davutoğlu 1994: 193)

The nation-state’s lack of political legitimacy among Muslims stemmed from its lack of historical precedence and the absence of Qur’anic textual reference. Traditionally, Muslim scholars and leaders have always looked to the Qur’an and the Sunnah (a living commentary on the Qur’an through the Prophet’s deeds and utterances) for guidance over the permissibility of certain actions and adoption of new concepts. The Qur’an does not refer to the concept of the nation-state in any shape or form but contains instead a great number of references to ‘society’. Hence, the concept of the nation-state has never been truly developed in the Muslim tradition. There was only a rudimentary form of a city-nation in Madinah (or Medina), which was under the constant threat of attack by Muhammad’s opponents. For this reason, Muhammad established a society on the basis of a partnership between Jews, pagan idol-worshippers and Muslims, which was legitimated by a treaty commonly known as the Sahifat al-Madinah (the Medina Constitution). Medina was a pluralist nation-city, comprising Muslims and non-Muslims, united in the common goal of defending the city under the name of Ummah Wahadah or the ‘One Ummah’. Whether the concept of the ‘ummah’ in early Muslim history refers only to Muslims or whether it includes Jews and others is a point of divergence among scholars. Nevertheless, the all-
embracing essence of Islam, regardless of race or culture, is a commonplace. Examples from Islamic history testify to the overall inclusion of non-Muslims, commonly referred to as dhimmies (‘People of the Book’), with whom successful economic and cultural cooperation was an essential part of life under any form of Muslim rule.

In sharp contrast, when Europeans developed the concept of the nation-state, inclusiveness and acceptance of diversity became obsolete. A multiplicity of cultures, races and religions in one state was not tolerated, and demands to ensure the exlusion, and often extinction, of the ‘other’ led to bitter and destructive warfare (Toynbee 1957; Hayes 1960; Carr 1983). This intolerance was primarily channelled towards Muslim minorities (Ekmečić 1996). Muslims in the nation-states that emerged in the Balkans following the Ottoman withdrawal from the region were either expelled or killed, as related in chapter three. To form a European nation-state with a majority Muslim population was beyond feasibility in such a system. This is the reason why Bosnian Muslims never succeeded in forming a nation-state after the Ottomans abandoned them, while their neighbours – the Serbs and Croats – successfully established their own nation-states, as explained in more detail in chapter four. With the formation of nation-states, other Muslims fell prey to an expansive European imperialism, arising from the desire of each newly defined independent polity in Europe to demonstrate its might (Kohn 1948: 16).

For this reason, those Muslim scholars who first came into contact with the concepts of the nation-state and nationalism were highly suspicious of these ideas. Since their very first contact with nationalistic ideology, Muslim scholars and thinkers pondered over its compatibility with Islam. Pioneers of Muslim modernism generally rejected any
analogy between Islam and the modern European nation-state;\(^{70}\) the exceptions to this rule were those Muslim intellectuals who occupied high ranks in the colonial service or were promoted by the Europeans (mainly British imperialists), who reiterated the imperialist view that nationalism was a European product it was necessary to inflict upon the Muslim world in order to reinforce colonial rule.\(^{71}\)

\(^{70}\) Particularly famous Muslim thinkers and philosophers opposed to the ethno-liberal nation-state were Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837-1897), his disciple and colleague Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Abduh’s student and aide Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1936). They rejected the idea of Islam as a tool to establish nationalism or imperialism, instead of a community of all peoples, a ‘league of nations’, in which recognition of artificial boundaries and racial distinction are only intended for the sake of convenience, an identifying reference rather than restrictive social borders for the members of the thus-defined community (Amin 1988, 1991). For more on the writings of al-Afghani, see Keddie (1983). Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was another pioneering modernist who rejected the idea of Western nationalism and its temporal and spatial attributes. He insisted that neither unity of language and country nor identity of economic interests binds Muslims together, but advocated the idea of the spiritual unity of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam (for more on the thought of Muhammad Iqbal, see Vahid 1964). Nevertheless, at the All India Muslim League meeting held in 1930, Iqbal was the first to advocate a separate national state for the Muslims of India, following which he was knighted by the British. This event placed him in the group that was viewed with suspicion by their contemporaries, as explained in the following footnote below.

\(^{71}\) Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) is perhaps the most immediate example. He was a member of the judicial service in British India. He was knighted by the British and reached the highest rank then open to Indians. Khan cooperated with British in many fields, for example by founding the Anglo-Oriental Muhammedan College, where he lectured on Islamic issues, even though he held no formal Islamic training. His British contacts and frequent visits to the UK meant he was often seen as an agent of the West and frequently denounced for introducing innovative Islamic practices that were deemed illegitimate (for more on this subject, see al-Mahdi 1983: 231; Ahmad 1983). Innovation or bi’da is equated with heresy in Islam. This classification occurred in the ninth century, when all four fiqh (Sunni schools of jurisprudence) closed the gates of ijtihad (the rational extension of Islamic law) and basically ‘froze’ a great majority of Qur’anic and Sunnah interpretations. Another example is the above-cited Muhammad Iqbal. Although he was at first an opponent of the ethno-liberal nation-state, Iqbal was later in favour of territorial and national identification and very much an apostle of British imperialism, which he saw as ‘a civilizing factor’ in the Islamic world (Kurzman 2002: 7). Perhaps this is why the modernist interpretations of Iqbal are rejected as ‘imported solutions’ by other Muslim thinkers, such as renowned Yusuf al-Qaradawi (2003, revised edition). Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) was another example of this group. As the founder Pakistan, he developed the ‘two nations theory’ and regarded Islam as merely a cultural denomination (Zakaria 1998: 228). Jinnah was severely criticised by two of his country fellowmen, Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni, who replied by writing Composite Nationalism and Islam (1938), and Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979), amongst others. The latter changed his views on the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, after which he proclaimed himself an amir (a political leader with religious overtones), and formed a political party, Jamaat-i Islam, which although opposed to the secular views of Jinnah and his followers, nonetheless advocated a separate Muslim state.
To give a flavour of the debates, it suffices to turn to Beduizzaman Said Nursi (1932), a Turkish/Kurdish theologian and scholar, who founded the spiritual movement Nur (Light): 72

The idea of nationalism has greatly advanced this century. The cunning European tyrants in particular awaken this among Muslims in a negative fashion, so that they may divide them and devour them. Furthermore, in nationalism is a thrill of the soul, a heedless pleasure, an inauspicious power. For this reason, those occupied with social life at this time cannot be told to give up the idea of nationalism. (Nursi 1932: 383)

Nursi (1932: 385) perceived nationalism as a source of manipulation and ‘a variety of European disease’ that the imperialists spread to cause division so that ‘Islam would break up and be easily swallowed’. A few decades later, Sayyid Qutb (1964) – a Muslim thinker who at times has been misunderstood – adopted a not-dissimilar position. He also rejected the idea of a state-imposed nationalism:

The homeland of the Muslim, in which he lives and which he defends, is not a piece of land; the nationality of the Muslim, by which he is identified, is not the nationality defined by a government; the family of the Muslim, in which he finds solace and which he defends, is not a blood relationship; the flag of the Muslim, which he honours and under which he is martyred, is not the flag of a country; and the victory of the Muslim, which he celebrates and for which he is thankful to God, is not a military victory. 73 (Qutb 1964: 135)

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72 The movement was founded about seventy years ago. Although a relatively recent phenomena, it represents one of the most popular of global movements, with the fastest growing membership.

73 It is important to emphasise that both Beduizzaman Said Nursi and Sayyed Qutb were writing in reaction to the great changes caused by modernity, and the forms of opposition and interplay it provoked. Nursi created the Letters Collection in the light of the emerging nationalist movement in Turkey, personified by the Young Turks, who were bitterly opposed to any religious idea – the Young Turks were ultra-secularist and wholeheartedly supported by Europe. Because of his allegedly reactionary opposition to the nationalist regime and foreign intervention, Nursi was harassed by the police and the military, prosecuted by the courts and proclaimed a heretic by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) in Turkey. The actions taken against him were sanctioned by the legal authorities, which took him to court for violation of the constitution and the penal code, and the organisation of religious opposition. Similarly, Qutb was highly disillusioned with Nasser’s secular Arab nationalism following the overthrow of Egypt’s crony monarchist government. Together with the Muslim Brotherhood, he rose against Nasser, but was soon prosecuted, imprisoned, tortured and eventually executed. His works, the Resale-i Nur Collection and Milestones,
In more recent times, however, Muslim scholars have remained divided on this issue. There is a faction that is still antagonistic to the idea of the nation-state and nationalism, perceiving it to be ‘a creed, a school and a pseudo-religion which the West created to fill an ideological vacuum’ that existed in Europe; it was offered to the local populations as ‘a new religion and a new god, which was welcomed by thirsty devotees’ (Naqaweh 1984: 17-18). Secular nationalism continues to be seen as a neo-colonial ploy, part of a Western conspiracy to destroy Islam through Westernised agents who stress national rather than Islamic unity (Tibi 1998: 100; Tamimi 2000: 26). For example, Sudanese Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi (1983: 242) rejects the term ‘Islamic state’ for the reason that the ‘state’ is a deceptive notion, which as far as Islam is concerned is ‘a misnomer, since Islam does not stop at any frontier’. In their Khilafah publication (1996), Hizb-ut-tahrir, a transnational Islamist organisation, rejects any notion of the nation-state, condemning it as a Westernising concept imposed upon Muslims through globalisation and interfaith dialogue.

Opposing these exclusionist views stands the integrationist model that is advocated by more moderate scholars. A good example of this group is Doi (1987: 56-57). He advocates that Muslims who have moved from the Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) to the West adopt the common concerns of the country they live in so that they can fully participate in public life. Basing themselves on this idea, a group of prominent Muslim scholars in the West have issued a fatwa (religious ruling) for Muslims serving in the US

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74 In this sense, it is important to mention some Western writers who also saw nationalism as a form of religion and a product of modernity. Kohn (1948) and Hayes (1960), both very prolific writers on the topic of nationalism, agree that nationalism is primarily an ideology which possesses both simplicity and a natural sentiment, for which reason it appears the perfect substitute for religion.
and British armies, which proclaims that they have a duty to fight for their adopted countries even if it means combating other Muslims (Murphy 2002). This model stresses the importance of citizenship and allegiance to nationhood, echoing the aforementioned Medina Constitution, which sought the allegiance of non-Muslims to the Prophet in the event of an external attack. In the same fashion, Ramadan (1999) reminds the growing Muslim population of Europe of the fundamental Islamic teaching that urges Muslims to engage with and participate in society as a whole, not only in order to bring about the general betterment of both Muslims and the host society, but also to pave the way for the emergence of a European Islam, in the same way as an African or Asian Islam has developed. From some perspectives, however, a truly European Islam seems a long way off, due to the diversity of the migrant Muslim communities in Europe and the fact that indigenous Muslim populations, such as the Bosnian or Albanian Muslims, lack a structure of coherent European leadership. More fundamentally, the migrant Muslim communities come from a variety of political backgrounds and are often influenced by political views from ‘back home’. Due to this, the construction of their places of worship are funded by individual Muslim governments in a way that defines the entire atmosphere of a given community; it may seem a paradox but it is quite common in Europe to speak of a Bengali, Pakistani or Turkish mosque. However, the inevitability of the current system of nation-states, which Muslims are party to, prompted the most prominent contemporary Muslim scholar and activist, the late Shaikh Zaki Badawi, to pioneer the idea of a ‘British Islam’ and ‘British Muslims’.

As the debates above show, this topic continues to be a source of heated academic and public argument amongst Muslims, particularly in the current globalised climate. In
October 2006, for example, the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (IFID) held a well-attended and fiercely debated seminar entitled ‘Islam and State: Rethinking Muslim Politics?’ The major bone of contention was whether Muslims should embrace the concept of the nation-state, and if they do, what type of state it should be. In other words, contemporary Muslim scholars were once again encountering the challenge of justifying scriptural interpretations of the concept of an Islamic state as opposed to that of a nation-state. The debate, as usual, was waged between Neo-Islamists and Islamists, or to borrow Esposito’s (1991) categorisation of modern Islamic movements, progressives/neo-traditionalists versus traditionalists/radical revisionists. Another contemporary example of this debate comes in a selection of modern Muslim thought on Islam, the state and democracy in a postmodern globalised context compiled by Bennett (2005). As well as being extremely well documented, it also offers a wide-ranging overview of Muslim governing practices and the national challenges provoked by modernity and ethno-nationalism since the early nineteenth century. The recurrent issue of the conceptualisation of Islam in relation to the ideas of state and nation surfaces again in a work jointly compiled by Ahmed and Donnan (1994). Its thematically and geographically wide-ranging essays endeavour to explain the challenges of governance that Muslims faced within their separate national boundaries following the colonial retreat.

Based on the available evidence, therefore, it can be concluded that nationalism and the concept of the nation-state in general are a direct consequence of globalisation. Observed from an Islamic perspective, globalisation is a continuation of the process of modernity that engulfed Muslims at the start of the nineteenth century, following the Ottoman retreat and ensuing European expansion. Hourani (1983) writes in an exemplary
fashion on the impact of the growing European influence over Muslims, examining the reasons for the Muslim retreat in the face of European liberalism. This engagingly written work has turned into an indispensable classic on the problems modernity poses for Islam. Since modernity has metamorphosed into the process of globalisation, this book represents an essential contribution to an understanding of the place of Muslims in the contemporary socio-political arena. The nation-state was, in this sense, one of the first manifestations of modernity that Muslims came into contact and tried to come to terms with, and the challenges and efforts persist to this day. Observed from the point of relationship with Neo-Islam, nineteenth-century modernity can be regarded as the starting point of contemporary globalisation.

The best illustration of this claim is to be found in Kurzman’s (1998, 2002) anthology of works on Islam and modernity. The essays are organised chronologically in two sourcebooks: the first (1998) hosts contributions from a wide range of Muslim scholars who deal with the challenging topics facing Muslims from the 1940s onwards; the other, organised in the same way and published a few years later (2002), deals with matters not dissimilar to its antecedent but concentrates on the way these issues surfaced a century earlier, from 1840 to 1940. The latter serves as a useful contextual and historical background to the first publication. It can be immediately observed that military, political, economic and cultural themes were as much recurrent features for nineteenth-century Muslim scholars as for their contemporary counterparts. For this reason, it is important at this stage to analyse the question of ‘Islamic globalisation’ as a historical precedent for the contemporary process, in order to facilitate comprehension of the relationship of globalisation to neo-Islam.
2.3.1 Islam: the antecedent to globalisation

The question of the exact starting point of globalisation is as vexed as the question of what the term stands for. From an analysis of the literature, it appears that globalisation is generally taken to be a novel phenomenon. However, there are those who beg to differ. Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006: 7) acknowledge globalisation as a current that has existed throughout human history. Their work contains a timetable of major events from the time human history began, and bears the indicative title, *Historical Milestones of Globalization*. Dividing the process of globalisation into six sub-realms of economic, political, socio-cultural, security, military and environmental sectors, they examine the impact each historical trajectory has had on the development of the respective human epochs. Noting the important contribution of historical events, such as the advent of Christianity and subsequent advent of Islam, Columbus’s discovery of America and the French Revolution to the development of modern globalisation, they conclude that globalisation is an evolving phenomena that has grown over the past centuries in various forms and thus ‘cannot be hailed as a new concept developed only in the latter part of the 20th century’ (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann 2006: 7).

One of the most cited scholars, who pioneered the analysis of modern globalisation’s historical precedents, is Wallerstein (1984, 2000). He has traced globalisation back over the years to the spread of the global exchange of goods and money and the emergence of the spirit of capitalism. For Wallerstein (1974: 11), globalisation represents ‘the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global division of labour’. This capitalist world system has been locked in conflict with a socialist world system ever since. Other scholars share the opinion that globalisation equates with the
growth of the global spread of capitalism, and place its origins either in the expansion of European capitalism in the sixteenth century (Waters 1995: 2-4) or in the nineteenth-century market capitalism of the industrial revolution (Lamy 2006). Hirst and Thompson (2003: 17) point to the unprecedented internationalisation of contemporary economic activities, concluding that – in contrast to previous proto-globalisations – current policies are less open to the free exchange of goods, people and services than they were between 1870 and 1914.

The turn of the twentieth century represented the commencement of an era of proto-globalisation of international trade and investment that has important parallels with the contemporary era (Gilpin 2000; Zeiler 2001; Williamson 1996). The most evident analogue to today’s globalisation is the quintessential role the Great Powers played in harmonising global policy (Hirst and Thompson 2003: 17). The information revolution has empowered globalisation, adding a further historical dimension; it has endowed globalisation with a ‘new form of sovereignty’, giving it the potential to encompass the entire world and placing it under the unremitting authority of neo-imperialism and its system of nation-states (Hardt and Negri 2000: 10-11; LaFeber 1999). The political attitude of the most powerful states since the nineteenth century is extremely important to bear in mind when discussing the break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the crucial role they played in the internationalisation of the conflict (analysed in chapter six). The suppression of a potential Bosnian nation-state at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as well as the creation of an international protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1992-95 war, were the results of the joint policies of the Great Powers that predetermined the political development of the Bosnian Muslims, as is further explained in chapters three and four.
Many other scholars have attempted to pinpoint the timeline that marks the beginning of the globalisation process. They have located the origins of globalisation in the rise of the European imperialist powers. For instance, Rennen and Martins (2003: 138-139) consider the invention of steamship in 1807, the steam locomotive in 1825 and the electronic telegraph, introduced gradually between 1830 and 1850, to be the starting point of an increasingly global interconnectedness and, by implication, the origin of globalisation. Holton (1998: 48) maintains that the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863 as one of the first global NGOs represents the beginning of globalisation. Similarly, Scholte (1999: 17) argues that the establishment of the first global regulatory agency, the International Telegraph Union, in 1865 provided the foundation for contemporary globalisation. Meanwhile, Robertson (1992) makes an interesting claim – he asserts that globalisation ‘took off’ between 1875 and 1925, according to the following benchmarks:

… the time-zoning of the world and establishment of the international dateline, the near-global adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the adjustable seven-day week; and the establishment of international telegraphic and signalling codes. (Robertson 1992: 179)

As far as the research on Islam and globalisation is concerned there are two points that merit special attention. Firstly, all the available evidence shows that, in an effort to pin down the exact period in which globalisation emerged, scholars have based their research within Western parameters. It has already been pointed out that a great majority of globalisation studies are indeed exclusively based on the Western experience and follow a Western blueprint. Robertson (1992) even uses the prevalence in the world of social features with Christian connotations to determine the driving force behind the process of globalisation. Similarly, Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006) cite the success of the West in
halting the advance of Islam in Europe by breaking the siege of Vienna in 1683. In this regard, Waters (2001) summarises succinctly the wider implications of this apparent European monopoly over the history of globalisation:

Globalization is the direct consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet via settlement, colonization and cultural replication. It is also bound up intrinsically with the pattern of capitalist development as it has ramified through political and cultural arenas. However, it does not imply that every corner of the planet must become Westernized and capitalist but rather that every set of social arrangements must establish its position in relation to the capitalist West – to use Robertson’s term, it must relativize itself. (Waters 2001: 6)

Secondly, it transpires that the periods stated above are as relevant for Muslims as they are for the West. However, they need be observed through a reverse perspective. For instance, by 1850 a great majority of Muslims had suffered either persecution or been killed or expelled from the Ottoman territories by the European powers; in 1856 the Ottoman Empire, the last site of Muslim political and cultural dominance, took out its first international loan; by 1875 it was completely bankrupted and placed at the mercy of newly emerged European capitalist creditors; and by 1925 the last Muslim caliph was informed by means of the modern telegraph system that he had been overthrown, leaving almost the whole Muslim population of the planet as colonised peoples\(^75\) and economically enslaved by debt. Thus, the idea of globalisation – according to a Western blueprint – as the free exchange of people, goods and information, contributing to greater convergence and cooperation, is a paradoxically partial picture: for Muslims, the opposite was the case. The story of Muslims in the Western-defined ideological and chronological framework of

\(^{75}\) The only exception was modern Turkey, but its founders remained only nominally Muslim, and Islamic dogma had no place in their approach to governance. Critical examination of the historical events testifies that they only retained references to Islam when it became apparent that Islamic practices and faith could not be eradicated amongst the general population. The evidence also points to the fact that their references to Islam remained essentially rhetorical.
globalisation is one of expulsion, exclusion, limitation and subordination to the colonial and neo-colonial mode of rule. Examination of the available evidence demonstrates that, with the development of globalisation, Muslims were penned into newly created national enclaves and, for the most part, deprived of the freedom to travel – the colonial structure imposed a strict visa system as opposed to the free movement of people that existed during the time of the Ottoman Empire.

A good illustration of the situation comes from Sir Adolphus Slade (cited in Yalman 2001), who served in the Ottoman navy during the 1820s and who admired the Ottoman legacy and its sense of justice. Placing it in implicit contrast to the West, he wrote:

The Osmanley [sic] has enjoyed by custom some of the dearest privileges of free man, for which Christian nations have so long struggled. He paid a very limited land tax, no tithes, needed no passport, encountered no customs or police. From the lowest origins he might aspire without presumption to the rank of pasha. (Slade, cited in Yalman 2001: 270)

Indeed, it seems that so far as Muslims were concerned, globalisation, defined as the exchange of people, goods and services, started far earlier, perhaps even with the advent of Islam in the seventh century. The message of the Qur’an and a deep belief in God seems to have inspired early Muslims to pursue expansion in all fields.76 For instance, it was a Muslim who made the first attempt to fly – Abbas Ibn Firnas was witnessed experimenting with his flying machine over Cordoba in the ninth century. Ibn Idris, who was the chief consultant of King Roger II, designed one of the first maps in the twelfth century, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century Mimar Sinan (‘Architect Sinan’) was building

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76 The Qur’an starts with the command: ‘Ikra!’ (Read!). Muslim jurists and scholars take this as an order from God to pursue knowledge and intellectual expansion. This revelation is further emphasised and placed as an imperative upon Muslims because it was revealed to Muhammad who was illiterate.
earthquake-resistant mosques using lead sheets to absorb shock waves (Al-Hassani 2007). For many researchers, the famous map of Piri Reis is proof of a Muslim presence in America long before the endeavours of Columbus: it comprises a map of America, as well as extremely accurate measurements of the distance between America and Africa. Fell (1980) claims that the preponderance of the voyages embarked upon by Columbus and other Spanish and Portuguese explorers towards the other side of the Atlantic were undertaken in light of Muslim geographical and navigational knowledge.77 Similarly, when Vasco da Gama rounded Africa in 1498, his navigator was his Arabic chief aide, Ahmed Ibn Majid. Rourke and Williamson (2002: 24) believe that 1498 marked the beginning of globalisation, since it ended the Arab and Venetian monopoly on the spice trade. Travel and exploration seem to have been commonplace among Muslims, and trade seems to have been an important driving force behind their voyages. Long before Muslims became an indispensable labour force for the West, they were transforming the agriculture of Sicily and Andalusia, introducing a great variety of new crops, dried fruits and pasta, as well as novelties such as forks, soap, paper, compasses and the clepsydra or water-clock, which paved the way for the invention of the mechanical clock (Goody 2004: 29, 56, 64).

Globalisation is considered to be an important medium for the exchange of ideas and flow of information. Studies in philosophy, mathematics and the sciences were made possible in the West through translations from the Greek, partly by way of earlier Arabic translations (Lopez-Baralt 1994: 509). The European Renaissance and its classical revival

77 Al-Masudi’s (871-957) work, Muraj al-Dhabah, for instance, was written with data compiled by Muslim traders from across Africa and Asia. Rocks found in archaeological surveys in Nevada bear the Arabic inscriptions ‘In the Name of God’ and ‘Muhammad is the God’s Prophet’, and are believed to date back to the seventh century. For more on this subject, see Fell (1980: xiv, 190, 400, 403).
were, therefore, much indebted to Muslim scholarship. Islamic architecture also proved a significant influence on the Gothic architecture of Europe, while the influence of Arabic literature had a far-reaching impact on Europe, not least as a source for European masterpieces such as Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, Marlow’s *Tamburlaine* and Racine’s *Bajazet*. Furthermore, Enlightenment philosophers such as Montesquieu and Voltaire looked for inspiration to the East in order to voice their disapproval of absolutism at home (Goody 2004).

Militarily speaking, Muslims were also highly sought-after as allies. It was this military supremacy, as well as their values of freedom and justice, that prompted Greek peasants from the Peloponnese to welcome and support Turkish troops when they reconquered it from the Venetians in 1715 (Stavrianos 1965: 181). Throughout the sixteenth century, it was often reported to the Ottoman capital that Christians in the Balkans ‘do not want any other domination in preference to the Turks’ (Stavrianos 1965: 181). As Mazower (2001: 60) observes, ‘the Ottoman rule was bringing Balkan Christians not only religious autonomy but increasing prosperity as well’. In effect, the scattered Balkan peoples were unified through Ottoman power for the first time in centuries. The Christian Orthodox Church, far from being crushed, was able to recover from its chaotic and fragmented phase under Byzantine rule and expand its power through the Balkans and into Anatolia (Runciman 1968: 180). The Catholics too sought an alliance with the Ottoman dynasty, which resulted in ‘the sacrilegious union of the Lily and the Crescent’, when the French king, Francis I, signed a treaty with Suleiman the Great (Mazower 2001: 8). This alarmed Britain’s Elizabeth I. Threatened by ‘Catholic’ corsairs in the Mediterranean ‘Islamic Lake’, she sought an alliance with the Ottomans, using the argument that ‘Protestants and
Muslims were alike haters of the “idolatries” practiced by the Spanish king’ (Goody 2004: 41-42). The Venetian ambassador of the time, Marco Minio, observed that the Gran Signore, as the Ottoman sultan was commonly known, ‘seems to have in his grasp the keys to all Christendom’ (Valensi 1989: 44).

Referring to Muslim global expansionism, Mazower (2001: 8) points out that it was precisely this universal reach, efficiency and power that attracted as well as repelled, tormented and frightened ‘its squabbling neighbours in Christendom’. ‘Seeing how many go from us to them’, commented Sir Henry Blount on the subject of Christian converts to Islam, ‘and how few of theirs come to us, it appears of what consequence the prosperity of a cause is to draw men unto it’ (cited in Mazower 2001: 22). While the pious Catholics in Italy were told to ‘pray for the undoing of Islam’, the historians busied themselves in depicting the Muslim bonanza as ‘the latest incarnation of the Islamic peril and the present terror of the world’ (Matar, cited in Mazower 2001: 21). Armour (2006: 78, 215) likewise observes that ‘the Ottoman rule has for too long been seen through the prism of Christian prejudice against a Muslim-dominated state’, creating a sense of hostility towards Islamic pretensions to universal dominion. Setton (1992: 4) asserts that the ‘Muslim threat’ at

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78 The terms ‘Muslim’, ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turk’ are used interchangeably, and this is especially evident in the Balkan region where this practice has continued until the present day; Muslims from the Balkans are referred to as ‘Turks’, albeit in a derogatory way. To instigate the persecution of Bosnian Muslims during the 1990s war, they were rhetorically described as a remnant of the extended Turkish/Ottoman Empire that had been expelled from the Balkan territories almost a century previously. The remaining Muslims were considered an alien body that had to be either exterminated or permanently returned to their place of their origin – Turkey. That is why, during the war, and even in its aftermath, the Serbian media celebrated the extermination of the ‘last Turks’ in the Balkans. For their part, the Bosnian Muslims, under the leadership of late president Izetbegović, ironically lived up to Serb and Croat expectations; they re-adopted Ottoman imagery and Islamic vocabulary. Armour (2006: 78) comments on the unambiguous ‘Muslim connotations’ found in the terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Ottoman’. He states that ‘[s]ince the expansion of Islam was the raison d’être of the Empire, the … Ottoman Empire must be seen as a Muslim empire rather than a Turkish one’. For further discussion on the idea of ‘Muslims’ and ‘Turks’ as synonymous, see Lewis (1982: 32).
Europe’s door had to be either expelled from the ‘Christian’ states or strictly controlled, in the same way as were the small settlements of Jews.

A critical examination of the evidence suggests that Muslim advances were often downplayed, with the result that the global reach of Muslims in almost every field is little known. In many ways, the Islamic globalisation of the past resembles modern Western-led globalisation, but the most striking difference lies in the modern pace of dissemination of information, thanks to the development and global reach of contemporary information technologies. However, the main reason why Muslim global activities are so little known is the fact that the West could not tolerate Islamic advances in any sphere of activity, and mobilised to prevent them. The evidence shows that this was undertaken by means of the Ottoman reforms, which became an essential part of the process of modernity. The impact of modernity on Islam, and the failure of Muslims to adapt to its parameters, has already been alluded to. In this regard, Armour (2006: 215) concludes that the Ottoman Empire was besieged by a range of internal and external foes, the by-product of direct external assault. He further states that the consequence was a kind of ‘arm-wrestling’ amongst the opposing factions and a number of futile attempts at a pretence of ‘modernisation’:

The Ottoman Empire offers a conspicuous example of failure to modernise, despite fitful attempts in that direction and despite having every incentive to reform in the threat of partition. (Armour 2006: 77)

This observation requires elaboration. The more the empire met the essential preconditions for modernisation, the deeper it sank into irreversible decay. This twofold impact was mutually reinforcing: it created a highly unfavourable situation for the general population, who grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Porte’s position, while, simultaneously, the
image of the all-potent ‘Sublime Protector’ began to die. Todorova (1997: 91-94) maintains that the shift in both popular sentiment and the balance of power caused respect for the Ottoman Empire to diminish in Western cultural and diplomatic circles. The old tone of awe was replaced by degrading observations. The quest for theories and hypotheses behind the Ottoman capitulation became the latest literary infatuation, offering perfect cover for an anti-Muslim discourse. It was time to reassert the religious and racial vigour of Christendom after centuries of Islamic domination over the ‘Old World’. Any Muslim legacy had to be denied and disassociated from Western civilisation. In the words of Halecki (1962):

> From the European point of view, it must be observed that the Ottoman Empire, completely alien to its European subjects in origin, tradition and religion, far from integrating them in a new type of culture, brought them nothing but a degrading foreign dominance which interrupted for approximately four hundred years their participation in European history. (Halecki 1962: 77-78)

History was reinvented, and the reason for the Muslims’ impotency was ascribed to ‘Oriental inefficiency’, an inherent incapacity or ‘organic degeneracy’, since ‘the Turk is a Moslem, and the soul of the true Moslem is indifferent to progress’ (Moor 1913: 226). These self-fulfilling prophecies appeared to conspicuously correspond to the realities of the day: the Ottoman reforms, rather than facilitating healthy recovery, sent the ‘sick man of Europe’ into terminal decline. To the great joy of Christian Europe, he eventually gave up the struggle and collapsed entirely:

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79 The topic of Orientalism will be discussed further in the following chapter.
80 Chapter three demonstrates that Ottoman decay was the result of a series of attacks, generated from within, in order to meet the desired goal of the destruction of the empire.
The Asiatic Turks had blighted their European subjects by imposing Islamic rule upon them. They had tried to invigorate their own racial stock through conversion, but had ultimately been unable to prevail over the biologically superior European breed they ruled. Now the Turk will make his way back to Asia as he came, centuries ago, little changed by his association with the peoples of Europe – whom he has kept as he found them, in a medieval condition, with all the barbarity of medieval Europe … and unthinking faith (Moor 1913: 199-226).

However, Armour (2006: 215) claims that the empire was ‘not so much sick as mugged’. McCarthy (2001: 3) also argues that the Great Powers deliberately imposed unfair trading terms on the empire, with the aim of weakening it both economically and militarily. Consequently, due to lack of adequate funds, it was soon forced to yield in the face of a host of internal and external foes. An analysis of the historical evidence reveals three immediate results of the aggressive intervention of the Great Powers: a waning of the Islamic faith and its religious institutions, a dwindling economy and the proliferation of a European Romantic nationalist discourse. The tactics combined a religious strategy, since many Ottoman subjects were Christians ‘for whom the governments of the European powers, if not their citizens, professed sympathy’, with an expansionist strategy as the Great Powers sought opportunities for economic profit (Armour 2006: 215, 154). Similarly, Goodwin (1999: 303-304) states that the reforms of Selim III, Mahmut II and their successors, with the exception of Abdülhamid II (as discussed in chapters three and four), effectively ‘forged the link between domestic policy and Great Power approval which was to dog their sultanates’. This acted as the trigger for the advent of modernity from which globalisation flowed. From its origin, globalisation was characterised by the fundamental asymmetry between the Muslim world and the West, in terms of level of integration, competitive potential and share in the benefits of economic growth. Thus, when
determining the starting point of globalisation, there is consensus between Western and Islamic views, although they initially seem at odds. This is because the results of the globalisation process are located at the extreme ends of a sliding scale.

### 2.4 Conclusion

This chapter analysed globalisation from the Muslim angle, and explained the links with neo-Islam. With the regard to the research question, this chapter laid foundations for understanding the construction of neo-Islamism as well as provided historical framework for the changing political and economic interplays on a global level encompassing Muslims. This process - dubbed ‘globalisation’- was described as fragmented, incomplete, discontinuous, contingent and, in many ways, contradictory and puzzling. (Held et al. 1999: 431; Giddens 1999: 5; Findlay 2000: 169). In essence, however, it was a neoliberal capitalistic economy aiming at global reach. Due to the discrepancy in levels of technological development, diffusion and integration have been applied selectively. While it is true that some areas have experienced unprecedented prosperity, parts of the world have been excluded from growth, with the result that economic progress has been a mixed blessing (Castells 2000).

The available evidence supports the conclusion that globalisation policies are grounded in a set of homogenous rules, creating a self-replicating logic that has influenced people’s life throughout the world, albeit disproportionately. Globalisation does affect everywhere and everybody, but it is inclusive and exclusionary at the same time, with some countries, regions, economic sectors and local societies disconnected from the global processes of accumulation and consumption; the benefits of globalisation affect only
certain units of the world’s economy and certain participating forces. Competition in the
global arena takes place between companies, but national governments create the
conditions in which they operate, according to the remit laid down by global trade and
financial institutions. As Kobrin (1997: 147-148) observes, the heterogeneous spread of
globalisation is not meant to encompass the entire earth; rather, it comprises only certain
segments of economic activity in both developed and developing countries.

An analysis of the research on the topic demonstrates that the Muslim world was
denied a place in the profitable global network, although, as Ernst shows (2003: 3), it may
no longer be possible to speak of a ‘Muslim world’ in a meaningful way as if it were an
entity somehow separate from Europe and America (that is, the West) – at least outside of
neo-colonial contexts. It was Islam’s universally inclusive message and its ability to adapt
to local settings that made it such a successful global religion (Leaman 2002). The advent
of Islam introduced the concept of the ‘ummah’ or global community, which managed to
transcend man-made borders. Hence, it is astonishing to note that the Muslim world,
responsible for a golden Islamic civilisation that in a relatively short period of time spread
to the four corners of the earth, transforming it into a truly global phenomenon (an Islamic
globalisation), is absent in the modern process of globalisation. While it contributed to the
Western Renaissance and Enlightenment, and to the development of science and literature,
laying the foundations for the industrial and scientific revolutions in the West, it remains a
seemingly distant and inaudible entity following the spread of modern-day globalisation.

Yet the sweeping process of globalisation intimately concerns Muslims East and
West, often in a detrimental fashion. It seems hard to grasp such a contrast between past
efficiency and present-day economic apathy and stagnation without seeing it in terms of
power, inequality and conflict. This is why it is essential to historicise globalisation, in the context of the expansion of capitalism and institutionalisation of the nation-state, from a Muslim perspective. These features never truly developed in the Muslim world because of the lack of Islamic reference points and precedents. Moreover, the nature of this new system was such that it could not be accommodated in the Muslim empire without causing its dismemberment. A critical examination of the available literature and historical analysis points to the combination and interplay of global strategies, which brought about two simultaneous and diametrically opposing results. On the one hand, Christian Europe grew stronger, thanks to the emergence of mercantile capitalism, colonial trade and, more importantly, nationalism and the development of new nation-states after the Thirty Years War (Mazower 2001: 9). The advances of the Great Powers began the process known as ‘modernity’, which, as it kept unfolding, began to be hailed as ‘globalisation’. On the other hand, when the modernising recipes were exported to the Muslim world, they brought about its fatal institutional degeneration and eventual collapse. The last place of Muslim dominion was the Ottoman Empire, which disintegrated in the wake of modernity spurred by the Neo-Islamic reforms that will be further detailed in the next chapter.

The success of globalisation depended on essential preconditions in the Ottoman Empire. These were premised on the participation of neo-Islamists in the so-called ‘New World Order’, a concept that is often regarded as the framework for the emergence of globalisation and therefore seen as an equally ‘novel’ phenomenon. However, when analysed from an Islamic perspective, it appears that this idea had its genesis in the Ottoman military reforms of the eighteenth century, which were promulgated under the name ‘Nizami Cedid’ (‘new order’). Its detrimental impact upon the empire’s Muslims is
common knowledge, and continues to have far-reaching consequences today. What exactly this term stands for and how it impacted Bosnian Muslims, however, is – literally – unknown. The attitude of the Great Powers towards Bosnian Muslims, as well as the Bosniak’s relationship with the emergent Turkish nationalism and the newly acquired ethnic identities of their Serb and Croat neighbours needs to be contextualised within the emergence of the New World Order. The 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted a mere continuation of this process. In order to grasp its impact and reach, and the significance it had on shaping responses and developments in the Bosnian conflict, the following chapter critically examines the relationship between neo-Islam and the New World Order.
CHAPTER THREE

NEO-ISLAM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ‘EASTERN QUESTION’ FOR BOSNIAN MUSLIMS

This chapter presents a selective analysis of the historical accounts concerning the introduction of the New World Order that was underwritten by the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms. It examines the hypothesis, of particular relevance to the overall argument of this thesis, that Bosniak national development was jointly thwarted by the Tanzimat reforms and Western determination to prevent the formation of an independent Islamic polity in Europe, denying Bosnian Muslims a separate nation-state. By analysing the impact of the reforms on the Bosniaks, this chapter introduces the historical context in which the most violent manifestation of the break-up of Yugoslavia – the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina – took place. With the regard to the research question, it demonstrates that the Dayton Agreement, which lies at the heart of the current political stalemate in which Bosnia-Herzegovina finds itself trapped, was a hangover from these reforms.

Section one sets out the historical context of the chapter, while the second section briefly outlines the relevant scholarship on the New World Order, historicising the concept by placing it within its nineteenth-century setting. The third section juxtaposes the privileged position of the Bosniaks in the Ottoman Empire with their subsequent treatment by the proponents of the Ottoman reforms, the Tanzimatçılar, and the Great Powers. Section four gives an account of the reforms and their impact on local Bosniak autonomy, and section five explores their bitter results. The sixth section describes the promulgation of the edict that launched the reforms, the Tanzimat Fermani or Güllhane Hatt-ı Humayun, which eventually led to Ottoman bankruptcy and the ultimate triumph of absolutist
Tanzimat centralisation. Section seven analyses the persecution suffered by Muslims in the newly formed nation-states, and the eighth section concludes this analysis of the ‘Eastern Question’ with an investigation into the overall impact on Bosnian Muslims and their place, or lack of one, in the New World Order.

3.1 The historical context

The concept of the ‘New World Order’ is frequently paired with that of globalisation and associated with the post-Cold War world. Just as many scholars claim that globalisation is a contemporary manifestation, so they also assert that the New World Order is its incumbent framework, and thus arose alongside it. However, this chapter argues that the New World Order is not a novel Western project, but evolved out of a broader map of historical networks, in which neo-Islam played an indispensable role. From a diplomatic perspective, the New World Order represented a re-arrangement of the political relationship between Islam and the West, and, as such, appeared to offer a long-deferred solution to the ‘Eastern Question’. The ‘Eastern Question’ had emerged as a by-product of the nineteenth-century process of capitalist globalisation that gave birth to the concept of the nation-state (as elaborated in the previous chapter). This chapter builds on the preceding discussion by examining the impact of the mutating world order on the development of Bosniak ethno-national consciousness.

Perhaps the most concise definition of the ‘Eastern Question’ was offered by Guernsey (1877: 364). He claimed that it consisted of a riddle: how to manage the bounty of the dying ‘sick man of Europe’, as the Ottoman Empire was described, around whose bedside ‘all the other Powers were watching, each determined that none of the others
should gain the greater share in his estates when he died’. The existence of a vast number of Muslim subjects in the dwindling empire continued to pose a major problem that threatened to derail the establishment of the new order; Islam was perceived to be a barrier to its successful implementation. An article printed in 1858 in *Littell’s Living Age*, under the title ‘Turkey’, concluded that any reorganisation of the Ottoman state ‘logically and inevitably involves the destruction of Mussulman [sic] power’. The slow and painful annihilation of the empire’s Islamic foundations commenced with the military reforms introduced in the *Lale Deviri* (Tulip Period).\(^{81}\) Aside from being impractical, however, the reforms were both expensive and destructive, with far-reaching consequences for the peasantry and a disastrous impact upon the empire’s Muslim subjects in general.\(^{82}\) The first direct attempt by Neo-Islam to participate in the establishment of the New World Order was initiated in the *Tanzimat* period that ran from 1839 to 1878.\(^{83}\) These years were particularly significant for Bosnia and Herzegovina: by 1839 all the countries in the Balkans had gained some form of autonomy, if not outright independence, except Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by 1878 all the Balkan countries were incorporated in the European system of nations-states as fully fledged independent polities, except Bosnia and Herzegovina, which became a protectorate under Austro-Hungarian administration.

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\(^{81}\) The Tulip period ran from 1817-30, and was expedited by the military reforms that followed.

\(^{82}\) The manuscript *Ahval-i Bosna* (*Conditions in Bosnia*), written by Muhammed Emin Isević in the early nineteenth century, illustrates the deteriorating economic and social situation precipitated by the reforms. Although the author’s main concern was Bosnia and Herzegovina, his detailed account is, nevertheless, descriptive of the situation in the entire Ottoman Empire. Isević was a Bosnian intellectual from a judicial family. His unique manuscript, which is housed in the library of the University of Istanbul, was authenticated by Ahmed Aličić, who translated and annotated the document, and wrote an introduction to it. This work is an exemplary analysis, and represents crucial reading for those who want to gain a better appreciation of the impact of the reforms on the Bosnian population, especially regarding its repercussions on Bosnian Muslims. See: Aličić’s (1984) *Ahval-i Bosna Manuscript from the Early Nineteenth Century*.

\(^{83}\) ‘*Tanzimat*’ literally means ‘ordering’ or ‘setting in order’, and refers to the Edict of Gülhane in 1839 which decreed the first Ottoman parliament of 1878.
Elements within the Ottoman Empire who wished to see the establishment of the New World Order started to undermine the empire’s foundations. A considerable number of historians have noted the internal process of decay but failed to observe that it was brought about by deliberate manipulation, ensuring the succession to the caliphate of weak and incompetent sultans. This was achieved through the hidden workings of gender power. From the seventeenth century onwards there was a widespread practice of confining the young princes to the harem (the private areas of the palace), with the result that they gradually lost direct control of the affairs of state (Guida 2007). Successive generations of Ottoman princes were deprived of adequate education and worldly experience; they lacked any exposure to the realities of the political world and were prevented from assuming an active military or administrative position (Inalcik 1993). The political vacuum was frequently filled by by their mothers, who proceeded to play a powerful role in the affairs of state.

These women were often of European descent and seldom exhibited any discernible loyalty to the Muslim empire.  Writing about the characteristics of the young princes from the seventeenth century onwards, De Leon (1871: 609-10) argued that it was through the harems that ‘the influence of Christian civilisation and intimate intercourse with Europeans [created that] full-blooded Turk of today [who] looks more like an Englishmen than any other nationality’. Being more inclined towards their ancestral roots, the mothers of the sultans became influential players, exercising official authority to the benefit of the ‘new

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84 Pierce (1993), in her valuable study on the role of women in the Ottoman state, asserts that – contrary to the Orientalist fantasy of sexual licentiousness – the imperial harem was not only a regulated institution with a carefully structured environment, but at the same time both the centre of Ottoman power and, more significantly, of female power. She also points to the origins of these women: they were mainly freed European slaves who maintained ties to their places of origin in various ways.
order’. A case in point is Nakshidil Sultan, a cousin of Napoleon’s wife Josephine, a confidante and stepmother of Selim III and mother of Mahmut II. Both these sultans initiated the ‘new order’ or ‘Nizami Cedit’. Nakshidil Sultan is recorded in the historical literature as being the main contact through which the reforms were channelled and was considered to be the mastermind behind the reorganisation and murderous competition that dominated the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II. Although nominally a Muslim, she died a devoted Catholic; a Catholic priest was allowed to cross through the ‘Felicity Door’ of the harem for the first time in its history to attend to her on her deathbed. However influential, these women could not have acted without a network of supporters, otherwise known as the Tanzimatçılar (literally, the ‘bearers of the reforms’). These were high officials, committed to the reform process, who replaced the weak sultans by gradually assuming the prerogatives of state (Mumcu 2007). This is important to remember when discussing the introduction of the reforms, which, although proclaimed by the sultan, were actually implemented by powerful ministers, who were themselves often pawns in the hands of the Great Powers, as discussed in the forthcoming sections. Although nominally Muslim, the Tanzimatçılar ‘with eyeshades, Morse, perfect French and an unusually deep knowledge of the empire’s affairs … were thoroughly disloyal’ to the Ottomans (Goodwin 1999: 313) and the greater Islamic cause the empire embodied. They were early neo-Islamists.

At this juncture, it is important to emphasise that this thesis makes a clear demarcation between the terms ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turk’, and rejects their use as synonyms. Although committed to the Islamic ethos, the Ottomans promoted a multicultural and pluri-religious state, in which each group was able to maintain their own identity within the empire’s ethnic tapestry. In other words, the description of ‘Ottoman’ served to indicate a
citizen’s allegiance and was not used as an ethnic substitute. The Turkish Tanzimatçılars, on the other hand, were campaigners with a narrow nationalistic approach, who rejected the idea of diversity – especially if ethno-religious. They insisted on building a Muslim-Turkish nation, comprising local Muslims and those Muslims expelled from the lands the Ottomans lost in Central Asia and Europe through reforms or disadvantageous truces, as discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Since the project of the New World Order was intolerant of the idea of a multicultural state, the erosion of the Ottoman Empire was an essential prerequisite for the mushrooming of a whole array of mono-ethnic polities. In its inability to preserve multiculturalism, the Ottoman Empire is reminiscent of Yugoslavia. The effect of neo-Islam on the Yugoslav break-up and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be explained by setting it in this historical context, bearing in mind the international dimension of competing strategic interests. Yugoslavia broke apart amidst the re-invention of the New World Order in the 1990s, which witnessed the intensification of ethnic conflicts and rejection of multicultural states. Thus, the ‘new’ New World Order turned out to be simply a continuation of the old.

3.2 Islam and the old concept of the ‘New World Order’

Studies of the New World Order often portray it from an essentially Western angle, either omitting any correlation with Islam or placing its dogma in direct opposition to Islamic doctrine (Hill 2010; Lewis 2003; Huntington 1996; Barber 1995). As enthusiasm over the end of the nuclear arms race waned (Rivage-Seul 1995) and financial ‘low-intensity conflicts’ started to brew across the less-developed world, the New World Order became

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85 George Bush Jrs’s vision for the future as embodied in his well-known 1991 speech was generally taken as a signal for the commencement of a New World Order ‘where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law’.
synonymous with the interventionist paradigms of Western political elites (George 2006; Kaldor 2007), either as a platform for organised transnational networks (Slaughter 2004) or as a tool for formulating policy and maintaining the balance of power (Keen 2007). The contextualisation of the debates concerning the New World Order is important, as the dilemma of Western intervention dominated the entire policy discourse during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Simms (2001: 309-311) considers the controversial response of many left-wing intellectuals towards intervention in Bosnia as ‘a postmodern malaise’, which served as ‘an invincibly sceptic critique of the New World Order. If the US was about to intervene, this was symptomatic of western hubris; if she did not, this proved that war on Iraq [in 1991] had been waged solely for oil’.  

The New World Order became a euphemism in certain intellectual circles for illicitly pursuing a Western neoliberal agenda – waging, supporting and intervening in wars for the sake of profit (Grupp 2009; Duffield 2007; Engdahl 2004; Chossudovsky 2002; Rivage-Seul 1995). Chomsky (1997: 25) asserts that the New World Order implied an explicit continuity, being ‘new’ only in so far as it entailed ‘adapting traditional policies of domination and exploitation to somewhat changed contingences’. He claims that, with the end of the Cold War, there were several attempts to call for a New World Order, but these simply reflected the old power relations between rich and poor and the widening gap between North/West and South/East. Basing his view on an examination of the political actions of Churchill, Nixon and Reagan, Chomsky (1997) claims that their policies held

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86 One of the striking features of the debates on the New World Order was the rise of criticisms of the position of left-wing scholars and intellectuals. It was often argued that they took a hypocritical or relativistic stance, enjoying a self-adulatory image as inheritors of the legacy of the Enlightenment, alongside a tacit feeling of superiority when compared with their less fortunate counterparts from the Third World. For more on this subject, see Žižek (2002: 60).
far-reaching implications; they prepared an international platform for a neoliberal system guided by a free-market oligopolistic elite. The importance of the formation of this elite for the promulgation of the doctrine of neoliberalism is discussed in more detail in chapter five.

At this point, it is important to point out that throughout the centuries such groups have established common patterns of governance, capable of maintaining the world system. Hill (2010) has produced an incisive analysis of the continuity of the international system based on a procedural world order. In a recent work, he uses his insider knowledge of statecraft at the highest level\(^\text{87}\) to give a sophisticated account of the cumulative processes that led to the systematic establishment of the New World Order. He sees its embryonic form in the formation of the nation-state at the end of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia. He is not the first high-ranking official to place the New World Order in the historical context of the creation of the nation-state: a leading British foreign office diplomat, Robert Cooper (1997), has interrogated the concept in an article with the suggestive title, ‘Is There a New World Order?’ He proceeded to answer this question in the conclusion of his paper: ‘This essay is intended to say many things, but especially to say one big thing. That there is no New World Order is a commonplace’ (Cooper 1997: 324). In the enviably superior tone of someone privileged enough to be privy to classified information, Cooper asserts that there were never any actual political attempts to create a global order that would supersede the one already created by the system of nation-states. When there was a perceived ambition to do so on the part of Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1990, Cooper (1997: 322) states that the West decided to defend its own interests: ‘[T]he

\(^{87}\) Charles Hill is a diplomat-turned-academic. He was a senior adviser to George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Ronald Reagan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
Gulf war was a war of interests, not a clash of ideologies.’ Cooper’s statement is important as it illustrates how Western intervention has been conducted in the same fashion ever since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. By maintaining within its sphere of influence a multiplicity of states containing oil supplies, and hindering their ability to purchase advanced technology, it thwarted any possibility of economic advancement in the region. Cooper (1997) is clear on this point:

The reason for fighting this war was not that Iraq had violated the norms of international behaviour. Some mistook the Gulf War for a war for principles or a collective security action – and indeed the political rhetoric at the time fostered this impression. In fact, it was a collective defence of shared interests by the West. The Gulf War was fought to protect an old order, not to create a new one. (Cooper 1997: 322, my italics)

Cooper’s account (1997: 315-317) also upholds the idea that the Cold War was a delusion based on an ‘absurdity in strategic logic’ and the presumption of East-West enmity, which helped create a simplification of the balance of power. The ultimate ideal was to achieve order through the hegemony of a single state power, as witnessed ‘in dreams of the restoration of Christendom or in proposals for world government’ (1997: 313).

Cooper’s claim, as a high-ranking policy practitioner, is highly significant because he refers to the New World Order as a platform for unified global governance, in concurrence with the scholarly analysis mentioned above. His analysis becomes even more illuminating when his choice of terminology is dissected: while ‘dreaming’ refers to a disabling illusion, the term ‘proposal’ indicates legitimate claims. That is mainly due to the fact that when the imperial world system was dismembered, the idea of a united Christendom was replaced by the actuality of a system of nation-states. With the empires gone, there was a need for an institution that would safeguard the multiplicity of nation-
states as the final step towards the ultimate hegemony of the New World Order. Cooper (1997: 319) believes that the most suitable organisation to fill this role was the United Nations, which was ‘thus conceived to stabilize the order of states and not to create a fundamentally new order’. In order to prevent any challenge to the interests of the Great Powers, the UN was equipped with a special power of veto, illustrating the fact that its specific duty lay in the maintenance of the status quo in the international balance of power. Supplied with the machinery to operate a system of nation-states defined and guided by the interests of the Western powers, the UN became the main gatekeeper of the ‘new’ New World Order.88

This thesis argues that this conceptualisation of the New World Order is significant for the research question, especially in regards to the analysis of particular legacies of the Ottoman rule and the construction of neo-Islamist influences in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in two ways. Firstly, it was the Islamic component in the country’s composition that provoked the Great Powers into denying the Bosniaks the right to form their own nation-state in nineteenth-century Europe. This begged the question, if the world system is based on the web of nation-states, but the Bosniaks are without one, what then is their place within it? The nineteenth-century solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina was to impose a protectorate, as detailed below. Consequently, if the new order is but a continuation of the old, it is within this context that the search for explanations of the controversial peace solution that concluded the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

88 The UN system is supervised by agents of the Great Powers in the form of military/peacekeeping forces or various international organisations, nowadays popularly called INGOs (international non-governmental organisations). The contemporary terminology for all forms of UN and UN-related institutions is the ‘international community’.
must begin. In both instances, Islam was the crucial component that defined the place of Bosnian Muslims in the New World Order: in the nineteenth century it served to de-nationalise Bosnian Muslims and distance them from Europe, whilst in modern times it has served to elucidate their national place in the contemporary European setting, albeit under the pretext of neo-Islam, as discussed in more detail in chapter six. Secondly, the predominant tendency in the international political system is to maintain the status quo. The UN peacekeeping operations serve as a good illustration. Since 1948, the UN has launched sixty peacekeeping operations, out of which fifteen are still active today.\textsuperscript{89} Out of these active operations, thirteen are on territory with majority Muslim populations\textsuperscript{90}; the only one in Europe took place during and after the break-up of Yugoslavia, which ended with the genocide of the Bosnian Muslims. Taking the case of Bosnia as ‘tangible proof’, Ramadan’s (2001: 277) view is representative of the position of most Muslim scholars: ‘[A] clash is going on, and … the West is clearly at war against Islam.’\textsuperscript{91}

However, this thesis takes a slightly different view. While the European-biased rejection of Islam is unquestionable, the West’s calculated neutrality during the 1992-95 Bosnian crisis must be situated within the context of the maintenance of the New World Order. A Muslim nation-state on European soil was not envisaged as part of the scheme. Islam, however, contrary to the claims of many scholars, participated in the project. One way to understand the participating neo-Islamic elements, and to begin to unravel the

\textsuperscript{89} For more information, consult the official UN website: https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
\textsuperscript{90} See the official UN website: https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
\textsuperscript{91} Ramadan (2001: 277) explains: ‘One may speak of simplification, a thousand analyses and theories can be referred to, one can explain and explain again, but one will not be able to convince them. Nothing in light of the objective data surrounding the conflict – ethnic cleansing, arms embargo, unprotected “safe havens”, the Russian position, strategic interests and the conniving passivity of Europe and the USA – fundamentally contradicts the thesis.’
continuing conundrum of the Bosnian Muslims, is to fully appreciate the far-reaching impact of the Ottoman reforms and the way they formed an essential part of the creation of the New World Order. Their repercussions were so profound that they still affect contemporary Turkish political and military affairs, perpetuating conflicts between Muslim modernists and traditionalists (Johnson 2007). The same is true for their impact on Bosnian Muslims and their fight for a nation-state that has lasted to this day. In order to comprehend the severity of the reforms and their damaging impact, it is essential to outline the privileged position Bosniaks held in the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent degradation they suffered at the hands of the Tanzimatçılar and Europeans during the autocratic rule of ethno-liberal modernisation.

3.3 The Bosniaks: between the Ottomans and the Europeans

*Bosna Vilayeti* (the Ottoman Bosnian province) was never a classical colony of the Ottoman Empire (Smajlović 1991: 29). When the Ottomans eventually conquered Bosnia in 1463 (some parts did not succumb until 1528), Sultan Fatih Mehmed II granted Bosnia and Herzegovina unprecedented autonomy because of the *en masse* voluntary acceptance of Islam on the part of Bosnian Bogumils (see chapter one). The sultan’s grace stemmed from the fact that they had enabled him to fulfil his worldly duty of spreading and preserving Islam, a mission he could only successfully accomplish by establishing a deeply rooted faith in the conquered provinces. The Bosniaks replied to the gesture with loyalty, equipping the empire with its most able military and political men. In turn, they were allowed to enjoy a *de-facto* autonomy (Glenny 2000: 74).
Bosnia had a very particular administration that differed from any other region within the Ottoman Empire: it was ruled by a council of âyans (local representatives). Its peculiar position even persuaded the imperial court to adapt its laws and regulations in relation to the governance of provinces so as to fully incorporate the Bosnian reality into the laws of the empire (Zulfirkarapašić 1994). For example, local leaders of Bosna Vilayeti were the only provincial leaders in the region who were not answerable to the grand vizier of Rumelia (the Balkans) but reported directly to the sultan. When Bosniaks boycotted or challenged some decree from the Porte, their representatives were invited by the sultan himself to attend negotiations. The sultan would be present at the talks, whereas in other rebellious parts of the empire, such as Albania, the negotiations were conducted through the grand vizier, or rather his large army would be sent to extinguish the rebellion.

This is not to say that the relationship between the Bosniaks and the Ottomans was entirely without its problems. Cerić (1968) has found that between 1621 and 1824 there were twenty-seven open conflicts between the Bosniaks and the sultan’s armies – the so-called ‘anti-vizier’ rebellions. Nevertheless, each time, a delegation would be sent to the Porte and the sultan would usually grant the Bosniaks’ requests, the major one being the preservation of Bosnia’s autonomy and Bosniak prerogatives. The rationale for maintaining this relationship was the fact that both entities were united through Islam, a fact that compelled them to preserve their mutual interests.92 However, there were differences in the perception of these interests: while the Ottomans’ interests lay in safeguarding the borders of the empire by maintaining the balance of power in its westernmost province, the

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92 Albanians shared Islamic interests with the Ottomans, but they never enjoyed autonomy similar to that of Bosnia.
fundamental necessity for Bosniaks was to sustain a livelihood for their community. In other words, if Bosnia and Herzegovina were attacked, they would defend it, not in order to preserve the empire and the Islamic faith but to protect their lives and their families.

This is especially important to remember when considering the impact of the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms were aimed at the centralisation of the Ottoman state apparatus, which up to that time was composed of a widespread network of decentralised, self-managed deputies such as millets, wakfs (charitable endowments) and guilds. One of the measures essential to achieving stronger central government and tighter state control was the creation of a centralised army, which ultimately led to the abolition of the janissary guilds in 1826 under Mahmud II, the son of the aforementioned Nakshidil Sultan. The impact on Bosnia was such that it not only caused the dismemberment of its army and shattered the livelihoods of Bosnian soldiers, but it effectively curtailed its autonomy. The Bosniaks, therefore, bitterly opposed the reforms; the ‘anti-vizier’ rebellions from 1826 onwards were transformed into fully fledged wars, and became the longest political and military battle the empire ever waged against its subjects. Glenny (2000) describes the extent of the bitterness of the dispute:

Men of the Tanzimat attempted to reconcile economic change with the reform of the millet. The experiment was doomed to heroic failure. Nowhere was the problem they addressed more acute than in the vilayets of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the early nineteenth century, chronic poverty, strained social relations, arbitrary official cruelty and bitter resentment towards Istanbul flowed through the Ottoman Empire like poisoned blood, but no other province could match Bosnia and Herzegovina for the severity of its symptoms. (Glenny 2000: 73)

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93 The economic importance and implication of these guilds is discussed in chapter two.
The Bosnian āyans were determined to reject the reforms because they viewed them as a foreign imposition that would lead to an erosion of their rights over the land that had belonged to their ancestors for centuries. Sučeska (1995: 33) explains that the Bosniaks considered the reforms to be ‘directed not only against their own privileges but against the fundamental principles of the Islamic faith …, especially against the interests of Bosnia’. They represented an attack on the autonomy that had been granted to Bosnian Muslims at the time of their initial contact with the Ottomans. The Tanzimat reforms not only threatened the āyans’ prerogatives, but also considerably weakened Bosnia’s military position from within. Bosnia Vilayeti was a remote western province, and its vulnerable position at the outskirts of the Ottoman Empire meant that it was forced to endure constant attacks from external foes. Experience had taught the Bosniaks that a weak Bosnia meant they had little chance of survival. Their vehement resistance, however, compelled the Porte to take sterner measures against the rebels. In 1827 a special decree from the imperial court ordered Abdurahman Pasha to leave his seat in Belgrade and go to Sarajevo to aid the war effort. Abdurahman was successful in crushing the local janissaries, killing seven of their leaders and cruelly punishing the others in an attempt to instigate fear and obedience (Karatay 2006: 374; Djurdjev 1960: 1261-1275). This is very significant because, until that time, Ottomans had generally dispatched Bosniaks to deal with Serbian revolts. Taking a wider perspective, however, it can be seen that these reforms spelled the destruction of the Ottoman Empire’s military might, and with it, its economy.

The Europeans, for their part, misunderstood the Bosniaks’ struggle to protect their lives, faith and land as signifying unconditional devotion to their Ottoman masters. For Europeans, the Bogumils’ voluntary embrace of Islam and subsequent piety was a
consequence of ‘very particular circumstances that seem to have been frequently overlooked [which meant] that the whole of Bosnia became Mahommedan [sic], and is still in the hands of Moselmin [sic]’ (Fraser’s Magazine 1876: 226). The author was referring to the Bogumils’ voluntary, collective embrace of Islam,\(^{94}\) which had been puzzling European scholars and travellers ever since it was discovered that Bosnia and Herzegovina was populated by an indigenous Muslim population. The Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a recurring topic, generating a number of hypotheses that continue to have a tenacious hold. Owing to the Islamic presence, Bosnia was regarded as ‘the most barbarous of the provinces of Turkey in Europe, standing savage and oriental in between the Adriatic shores and the more advanced cultures of Serbia and Croatia’ (Irby 1875: 643). Geographically speaking, Bosnia was in Europe, but it was its ‘cultural Orientalism’ that distanced it from a wider European consciousness (Said 1988). In European cultural memory, Bosnian Muslims had a reputation of being ‘Mohammedan fanatics’, and were regarded as perpetuating an unjust Islamic rule in the Balkans.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore, was imprinted in the European collective memory as the westernmost border of ‘Turkey in Europe’; at the slightest sign of Ottoman weakness, this was the first province that had to be attacked, ravaged and ‘redeemed’ from perceived ‘Mohammedan’ oppression (Freeman 1876; Guernsey 1877). According to European sources at the time, it was in Bosnia and Herzegovina proper, more than four centuries ago, that Christian subjects ‘were first drowned in the flood of Mahometanism [sic]’, and greedy Bosnian renegades were seen to …

\(^{94}\) Islamisation is discussed in more detail in chapter four.
Greed and a concern for safeguarding their privileges were commonly presented as the main reasons why the Bosniaks had accepted Islam en masse. The argument most frequently used was that the bulk of Bosnian landowners became apostates in order to retain their wealth, whilst the great majority of the population remained ‘faithful’. This explanation became a common part of historical accounts and still persists today; most contemporary historians maintain this socio-economic hypothesis as a bona fide cause for the mass conversion of the Bosnian population. That fact that it fails to account for the spiritual reasons for embracing Islam and to explain why Islam has continued to flourish in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even during the time when Muslims became subject to persecution and death, has frequently been overlooked. The following chapter deals with the Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in more detail as part of its analysis of the lack of national development of Bosniaks in a political sense. At this juncture, it suffices to point out that none of the original European reports on Bosnian Muslims mention the significant pre-Ottoman Islamic presence, or the symbiosis between Bogumilism (the unofficial medieval religion of the Bosnians) and Islam, as the main rationale behind their unconditional acceptance of Islam at the time of Ottoman conquest.

Beneath this derogatory discourse lay the insatiable European demand for the resources indispensable for its industrial development, such as high-quality timber and iron, both of which were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina in large quantities (Glenny 2000: 74). The reforms instigated by the Tanzimatçular were warmly welcomed by the Great
Powers because they granted concessions to foreign companies, allowing them to extract minerals and cut timber, at the same time as forbidding domestic business activity in this area. English companies started working the mines, extracting copper and iron ‘not only in large quantities but also of excellent quality’, with the best Bosnian iron being equal to that of Sweden; meanwhile, felling Bosnian timber proved ‘a source of wealth to many Austrians and Frenchmen who have embarked in it’ (JRJ 1876: 640).

As a consequence of the entrepreneurial prerogatives conferred upon them, the Europeans adjusted their discourse. The Ottomans were now frequently referred to as ‘Turks’ and represented as a separate group within the Muslim world:

Unlike the Saracens or Arabs the Turks, from the beginning, were the most tolerant of human beings. They never practised that fanaticism which compelled conquered Christians to adopt their creed or perish by the sword, as is popularly stated. On the contrary, they allowed the largest liberty and treated non-conformity in religion with an indifference worthy of [a] French philosopher or an American citizen. (De Leon 1872: 606)

The revised tone of the travelogues and correspondence is important to note for two reasons. First, differentiating Turks from other Muslims accomplished the task of rescuing nascent Turkish nationalism from the image of the Ottoman ‘sick man of Europe’ and distanced it from other nascent Muslim-Arab nationalisms. Secondly, it helped secure acceptance of the nascent Turkish nation as a legitimate part of the emerging ethno-liberal geopolitical structure of a new enlightened Europe, devoid of multicultural empires and comprising a system of homogenised nation-states. This strategy of favourable reportage was particularly important because a renewed Turkish nation was intended as a homeland for the many Muslims expelled from the European and Central Asian lands the Ottomans
lost to the Great Powers during the attempted resolution of the ‘Eastern Question’. A
legitimate Muslim-Turkish nation would host and subsequently assimilate the incoming
Muslim population. The Europeans, in effect, rewarded the Tanzimatçılar for their
willingness to administer reforms under whatever terms the Great Powers decreed and to
supervise the expedited Ottoman withdrawal from the territories to be occupied by the
Great Powers or their newly created client states.95

This discourse also operated on the geostrategic level of imperial rivalry, creating
various spheres of influence among the European powers, helping ensure the supremacy of
one over another. Analysing the tone of the discursive strategies deployed in literary works
produced in the English language, Hopkirk (1992: 361) suggests it was ‘Russophobe-
Turcophile’ – that is, it elevated the Turks and demonised the Russians in accord with
Britain’s foreign-policy agenda of curtailing Russian expansionism during the ‘Eastern
Crisis’.96 A vast number of explorers, writers, essayists and members of the Western
intelligentsia followed the progress of European foreign policy closely. When diplomatic

95 A useful example that can serve as an illustration of the symbiosis between the Great Powers and the
Tanzimatçılar comes from a ‘sympathetic writer’ reporting on the Turkish withdrawal from the battlefield
through Bulgarian territory. The author asks his readers to regard him as an ‘accurate witness’ because he
believes that he has the ‘faculty of keen observation’ and no ‘conscious prejudice, except in a favour of a
good fighting man’, so his account of astonishing Turkish tolerance can be fully trusted. ‘I have said that the
Turks are barbarians and that they are ruthless savages when their fighting blood is up; but there is no
inconsistency between this attribute and the attribute of the contemptuous good-natured humanity, or rather
perhaps tolerant ingenuousness, when nothing has occurred to stir the pulse of the savage spirit’ (Forbes 1877:
643, 650).

96 The following quotation is a good example of the way the narrative was adjusted. It still retained an
Islamophobic continuity, but transmitted this through a more measured intonation, offering an altered view of
the Turks: ‘I feel thankfully indebted to the Porte. And I do not, like many other people, consider gratitude to
be a burden, but to be a dear obligation. I learned to esteem highly the noble personalities of the Turkish
national character … It is true that Turkish people remain far behind in what we call civilisation … These are
my personal views, my individual sympathies. Sympathies, however, are no centre for attraction of the
politics of the world: but self-interest is. And though for a long time the conservation of the Turkish Empire
was a dogma of the politics of European equilibrium, and it is still so in foro consentia, it does not follow that
Europe is in love with the Turks, but only that it abhors the increase of the Russian preponderance’ (Kossuth
1878: 94, italics in the original).
efforts took a different course, the language of their reports and travelogues adjusted itself accordingly. In this respect, these literary works represented a political statement reflecting the ‘new imperialism’ driving Europe’s aggressive territorial aggrandisement during the period of the ‘Eastern Question’. Moreover, these accounts of adventure and travel found great popularity throughout Europe from the 1860s onwards, with a readership that was fast developing into a mass reading public, which found this genre highly congenial. In effect, this vein of travel writing functioned as a channel of propaganda for pro-imperialist political views (Akilli 2009).

In relation to the influence of foreign policy on public opinion, the shift in sentiments towards the Turks on the part of Europeans was also significant for Bosnian Muslims. Encouraged by the pro-European reforms, the European powers embarked on a crusade to reclaim Bosnia from Islam. Although Oriental in appearance and customs, Arabic and Persian were unknown languages to Bosnian Muslims as ‘the Bosnian oligarchy speaks nothing but Slave [sic], and [they] are not remarkable for any deep knowledge of the Koran [sic]’ (Freeman 1876: 75). Arthur Evans, a British missionary-explorer who reported directly to the British Imperial Office, was particularly influential in this regard. He popularised the theory that the Bogumils were early Protestants, noting that ‘Slavonic Mohammedans’ were not opposed to re-converting to the faith of their forefathers.99

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97 The ‘new imperialism’ refers to the period of aggressive territorial acquisition by European imperial powers, roughly between the early 1870s and the First World War. For detailed accounts of the new imperialism, see Cohen (1973) and Smith (1982).

98 This was specifically true of trends in Britain, whose authors generated the largest numbers of travelogues. For full-length accounts of the emergence and growth of a mass reading public in Britain from the 1870s onwards as a result of concurrent technological, social, economic and political developments, see Altick (1957) and Blake (1989).

99 Evans, assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina on a fact-finding mission in 1877-78, wrote in his Illyrian Letters: ‘An active leader among the Begs answered as follows the question whether he would imitate some of his associates, who were already receiving baptism from Bishop Strossmeyer and his priests: “Not yet, but
Referring to the papal persecutions of the Bogumils, Evans underpinned his Islamophobic views with a critique of Europe’s malaise:

Europe has mainly to thank the Church of Rome that an alien civilisation and religion has been thrust in their midst, and that Bosnia at the present remains Mahometan [sic]. (Evans 1877: iv)

The subject of re-Christianisation was dealt with anachronistically, creating a historicised image of opportunistic Bosniaks who had notoriously accepted Islam to preserve their property. Irby (1875: 646) claimed to speak from personal experience after residing a number of years among ‘Slavonic Mussulmans’, ‘who are not indisposed to embrac[ing] the Christianity professed by their forefathers, and … preserve with care patents of nobility of their Christian ancestors”.100 It is important to point out that these reports were generated at a time of national awakening in the Balkans, when borders were being drawn up for the emerging nation-states. In this respect, their task was to blend historical, anthropological, military and political perspectives, establishing a framework in which to explore the question of whether, in the event of revolution or nationalist revolts (for which the

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100 Adelina Paulina Irby was a Norfolk-born schoolmistress who spent most of her adult life in Sarajevo, with the aim of ‘enlightening’ the local Christian population through the foundation of a school for Orthodox girls in 1869. She first travelled to the Balkan region in 1867 with her friend Georgina Mackenzie. Their visit was recounted in a book, subsequently published in two volumes under the title, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey-in-Europe (Irby 1877). This travelogue is a detailed report of their journey, during which they recorded the habits of the peoples of the Balkans. The most striking feature of the work is its extremely Islamophobic tone, Muslims being described as savage illiterates; by contrast, Christian schools were run by a ‘remarkable Serb, Mother Katerina, as the subject of education, indeed, actively concerns all the Christian Slavs’ – but not of course Muslims. Another time, the travellers met with scary ‘Muhamedan [sic] tax-gatherers’, and the travelogue further offers detailed descriptions of the ruins of a church converted into a mosque, whose ‘stones still bear the sign of the cross’, and of the way Slav Muslims ‘tolerate accumulated filth of one sort or another, under windows, under divans, in short everywhere’ (1877: 303, 305, 306).
Christian population was carefully being psychologically prepared and militarily equipped), ‘such men [Bosniaks] may turn back again as easily as their forefathers turned in the first instance’ (Irby 1875: 75).

Irby’s missionary work in Bosnia in 1875 and 1877 is noteworthy in that it culminated in a particularly Islamophobic book, endorsed by the British prime minister, William Gladstone, who wrote a foreword to it. This formal authorisation serves as a cogent example of the symbiosis of such travel writing with the official political views it reiterated. It lent further support to the claims of anti-Muslim propaganda, with its aim of purging Europe of the Islamic presence through the establishment of a New World Order, in which the expelled Muslims would find a homeland in a redeemed Turkish nation-state. Irby is also significant in a contemporary way: a street in the centre of Sarajevo still bears her name. Even when neo-Islamists, who will be further discussed in chapter six, gained control of the city government, they kept this street name, even though they renamed almost all the others, especially those from communist times. Logically, discarding Irby’s name should have been a natural course of action for neo-Islamists, given her notoriously Islamophobic views. This seemingly small, overlooked lapse is important on two counts: it supports the argument of this thesis that the Muslim identity of Bosniaks is not a satisfactory explanation in itself for the cause of the 1992-5 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the subsequent violent repercussions against Bosniaks; more immediately, it serves as convincing evidence of the participation of neo-Islam in the establishment of the New World Order in the nineteenth century, which is manifest today in the synthesis of neoliberalism and neo-Islamism (analysed in chapters two and five).
When it became apparent that the re-Christianisation of Bosniaks was for the most part impossible, Europeans assigned them the image of unruly and disobedient Muslims. They were described as a disruptive and rebellious ‘large Muslim element [that] represents a great difficulty’ (Irby 1875: 647), despite the fact that it was also ‘very fanatical, very hostile to the Stmboul [sic] government’ (Godkin 1877: 124). This was an admonition directed at the Bosniaks for their resistance to the reforms propagated by the Tanzimatçular, which incorporated conditions agreeable to the European powers. More importantly, it clearly demarcated the insubordinate Bosnian Muslims from the cooperative Turks. Due to their demonstrable disobedience, Bosniaks were proclaimed as ‘immediate oppressors’ over people of their own race; their image of savage brutality separated them from the Turks, as Bosniaks were not ‘Turk by blood but artificially turned Turk’ (Freeman 1876: 75), a sad peculiarity that apparently made matters even worse.\footnote{Freeman (1876: 75) reported: ‘A foreign conqueror may command a certain kind of respect which a native renegade certainly cannot. In some cases, it is a certain softening of tyranny when one’s tyrants are one’s countrymen; but that rule can hardly apply to the dominion of such a caste as this’ (my italics).}

The Bosniaks were not integrated into the European system of nation-states but remained confined to the sidelines as demonised figures of ‘fanatic Mussulmans [sic]’, who were still venerating Christian patron saints but who ‘nourish blind and savage hatred against their Christian fellow-countryman’ (Irby 1875: 646).

To summarise, Bosniaks represented the ‘Oriental other’ – a euphemism for Islam and Muslims – and were to be mistrusted on all levels. Islam, therefore, influenced both the way the Bosniaks saw themselves and the way their immediate neighbours perceived them. It was the internalisation of Islam in this remote European province of the Ottoman Empire that meant that Bosniaks had ‘the most developed sense of their own national identity in
the entire Empire’ (Glenny 2000: 77). This highly developed sense of identity was unusual among the inhabitants of Europe at the time: the Bosniaks shared a religion with the Ottomans but were separated from them by their language, which they shared with their Christian brethren, along with their culture and, to some extent, traditions. However, the Bosniaks did not consider themselves as partners of their Euro-Christian fellow countrymen, but as the sole European ally of the ‘Commander of the Faithful’, in the person of the sultan, who represented the unifying power of Islam. Europeans perceived the Bosniaks through an Islamic prism too; however, they did not see them as part of a unique European diversity but as a reminder of the Muslim stronghold on Europe’s doorstep, and ultimately as a foe. This dichotomy in perceptions is important to bear in mind when discussing the unsuccessful attempts of the Bosniaks to build a nation-state of their own, the lack of support from the Great Powers, and the efforts of the Turkish Tanzimatçılar to erode their autonomous prerogatives by expediting the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman military reforms signalled the commencement of these trends.

3.4 The Tulip Reforms and the beginning of the ‘Eastern Question’

The Tulip Reforms or Lale Deviri refer to the reorganisation of the Ottoman military in the period from 1718 to 1730. Based on the historical record, this thesis argues that the military reforms were conceived in Bosnia with the arrival of a French officer, the Comte de Bonneval. De Bonneval was a controversial yet relatively obscure figure who crossed the frontier into Bosnia in 1727, accepted Islam and went on to Constantinople where he became a high-ranking official known as Humbaraci Ahmet Pasha (Fullarton 1857: 126; Berkes 1964: 47; Bowen 1971: 291-192). Prior to this, he was engaged in numerous battles
against the Ottomans, fighting alongside their opponents at the Bosnian borders, and appeared well acquainted with the empire’s internal upheavals and martial ability. What prompted de Bonneval to switch sides and embrace Islam or the sultan to welcome him into his administration is not known, and curiously there are very few documents available that would shed light on this important figure who initiated the Ottoman reforms. What is known is that as soon as he was accepted by the Porte, de Bonneval, or Ahmet Pasha, opened the first military academy, the Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun.

Aside some initial military victories over Russia, however, the new military training produced little in the way of immediate results. The Persians defeated the Ottomans and Ahmed Pasha personally signed a dubious truce with Nadir Shah of Iran in 1732. The treaty satisfied neither the Turks nor the Persians, and the fighting continued for another fourteen years (Seyrek 2006: 136-137). In other words, rather than ending the war, the inauspicious truce brokered by Ahmed Pasha prolonged it. The extended engagement at the Persian frontier had a negative impact on the Bosniaks. Of the 5,200 Bosnians who answered the sultan’s call to arms, only five hundred returned (Pelidija 1994: 123). A critical examination of the historical events, and the lack of an easy explanation for the reasons

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102 For example, de Bonneval was a good friend and military companion of Eugene de Savoy, a Hapsburg prince, who fought the Bosnians for a number of years. When de Savoy finally managed to enter Sarajevo in October 1697, he butchered a great many of the population and set the city and all its mosques on fire. His prime targets were Muslims. For more on this subject, see Ademović (1997).

103 There are very few resources on this subject. There are two books published in French that belong to rare book collections and cannot easily be obtained. Moreover, their authenticity is questionable, and it appears that works originating from the pasha himself are no longer extant. The titles of the aforementioned books are Mémoires du Comte de Bonneval, cidevant Général au service de Sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique (Londres, 1737, 3 vol. in 8; réimprimés en 1738, 1755 et 1806) and Anecdotes Vénitiennes et Turques, ou Nouveaux Mémoires du Comte de Bonneval by M. de Mirone (Utrecht, 1740, 2 vol. in 8). There is an English translation by John Sparrow (1734) entitled A Complete History of the Wars in Italy. Recent years have seen a renewed interest in de Bonneval, especially in relation to his eccentric character and the opulent lifestyle he followed as an Islamic convert. For short articles about him, see Irimia (2009) and Fabre (2008). Apparently, there is one more publication, a Swedish translation, but this is currently unobtainable.
behind the reorganisation of an already successful military force, lead to the conclusion that Ahmed Pasha’s actions represented a deliberate attempt to weaken the Ottoman military, which up until that time had been the key to the empire’s martial and economic strength.

Following this military disaster, the Ottoman Empire’s lack of manpower provided an opportunity for Russia and Austria to attack its weakest point – its most remote province, Bosnia. In the 1736-39 war with the Russians, ten thousand Bosniak men were mobilised, out of whom only one fifth, or more precisely 1,340 officers and soldiers, returned home (Pelidija 2006: 11). At the same time, Bosnia was ravaged by plague and host to a huge influx of refugees from those territories the Ottomans had lost through disadvantageous agreements. The Austrians, who did not appear uninformed about this situation, violated the Treaty of Passarowitz\textsuperscript{104} and invaded Bosnia. The well-known Austrian friend of Ahmed Pasha-Bonneval, Eugen de Savoy, launched a renewed attack on Banja Luka in 1737, hoping it would quickly surrender due to its reduced manpower and the ravages of the plague. He did not anticipate that Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha would mobilise the youth and organise the city’s defence with great vigour, skill and determination (Pelidija 2006: 152-163) – although it was the women who contributed the most to winning this battle (Novljanin and Hadžinesimović 1994). Writing about the conflict, Pelidija (2003: 49) asserts that this was not a fight for to preserve the power of a remote Porte, but rather a

\textsuperscript{104} The Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac in Serbia) of 1718 was a result of the war of 1714, which the Ottomans lost to the Austrians and Venetians. The Austrian prince Eugene de Savoy teamed up with the Venetians and attacked the Ottoman Empire via Bosnia. His chief aide was the Comte de Bonneval, with whose help the prince managed to inflict huge losses on the Ottomans at Peterwaradin. However, the Bosnian defence further west firmly held its ground. Nevertheless, Bosnia was to pay the price for the Ottoman losses, and the strip of land it had successfully defended, part of its traditional territory around the river Sava in the north, was confiscated as part of the terms of the treaty and lost to Bosnia permanently. On its southern border, Venetians managed to get further inland, and occupied the Dalmatian coast, which now forms Croatia’s south-western border with Bosnia.
patriotic act by the people of Bosnia, ‘representing one of the first pages written about Bosniaks’ self-determination, courage and patriotism. With this victory, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina remained intact until the present day.’

The fatal battle at Banja Luka was the first important military move in a series of strategic actions planned by the Great Powers and the Turkish reformers in a bid to stifle the Bosniaks’ drive for national existence and the preservation of their homeland. There were two complementary reasons behind the decision to choose Bosnia and Herzegovina as the site for the initiation of the reforms. It was the most densely populated Muslim province in Europe and, as such, served as a firm boundary within which to test the mechanism by which the Great Powers intended to establish a New World Order of homogenised nation-states, where Muslims would either be given a new national identity and absorbed into one of the newly emerged nations or ‘Turkified’ and expelled to what remained of the Ottoman Empire. Even if this strategy did not succeed completely, it did not fail either, since careful manoeuvring by the reformers and the Great Powers reduced Islamic influence and sowed the seeds of Islam’s future withdrawal from Europe. From this time on, the reformed Ottoman Empire began its steep military decline, suffering an increasing number of defeats, and was forced to surrender provinces into the hands of Great Powers.

The first serious Ottoman defeat was sealed by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on 21 July 1774. For this reason, the treaty is considered to be the starting point of the ‘Eastern Question’ (Anderson 1991). It had two major consequences that were relevant to the building a New World Order based on a loan economy and devoid of an independent
European Muslim polity. \(^{105}\) Firstly, the Crimea – an *eyelet* populated by indigenous Muslims who had accepted Islam in the twelfth century – was lost at the cost of millions of lives. This is significant because the Crimea was in many ways similar to Bosnia: the local population had voluntarily converted *en masse* and, as with Bosnia, Islam was internalised with a certain ease due to a pre-Ottoman Islamic presence, a topic that is developed more fully in the next chapter on Bosnian Islamisation. The Ottoman withdrawal precipitated the killing and expulsion of Crimean Muslims, even though they were part of the local population and their Islamic roots predated the Ottoman conquest. This treaty was also pertinent for the Bosniaks: after the defeat, violence against Muslim populations became the norm rather than the exception, and Bosnian Muslims would have suffered a similar fate to that of the Crimean Muslims had it not been for the interference of international forces that inadvertently saved them from extinction. Secondly, for the first time in their history, the Ottomans were ordered to pay compensation. This added to their indebtedness, which rapidly gained momentum, as illustrated in the next section. The Turkish reformers’ only response was to usher in further changes (Shaw 1971: 4-8), eventually destroying the empire. For Bosniaks, this meant that the struggle for independence would suffer further defeats as Islam, albeit in its Bosnian character, was perceived to be part of the problem.

### 3.5 Crushing the Bosnian independence movement

The 1831-32 Bosnian independence movement ended in fiasco. However, it triggered the longest political struggle ever to emerge in the Ottoman Empire. A Bosnian officer, Husein-kapetan Gradaščević, the ‘Dragon of Bosnia’, refused to accept the reforms,

\(^{105}\) For more on the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca’s text, see Anderson (1970) and Hurewitz (1956).
mobilised about four thousand supporters and marched on Travnik, the seat of the appointed Turkish vizier, where he defeated the guards and occupied the city (Malcolm 1994: 119-122; Imamović 1998: 333-337; Karatay 2006: 374-375). Aličić (1982: 174-189, 1996) narrates how, on the imprisonment of the grand vizier, the Bosnian âyans elected Gradaščević as governor and proclaimed Bosnia an autonomous province. The vizier, however, managed to escape and find refuge in Austria, which gladly offered a helping hand, setting a future precedent for Austro-Turkish cooperation on the northern borders of Bosnia, including joint raids against the Bosnian leaders (Rothenberg 1966: 130).

In the meantime, a serious revolt broke out in Albania, around the border with Kosovo. Gradaščević went to Kosovo, but it remains unclear whether he assisted the Ottoman army or the rebels. What history does record, however, is that the Turkish vizier betrayed his promise to appoint him governor of Bosnia. Moreover, the vizier succeeded in pitting the Bosnian âyans against each other, most notably persuading Ali-aga Rizvanbegović and Smail-aga Čengić to turn their backs on the idea of Bosnian autonomy. The Turks were determined to annihilate Bosniak resistance and sent an army of thirty thousand men to Bosnia to fight alongside the troops of the two renegades. Gradaščević was finally defeated and exiled to Turkey, and Rizvanbegović was awarded with the newly detached province of Herzegovina, which was separated from its sister Bosnia for the first time. This would set an ominous precedent for future attempts to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina with the help of suborned clients in government positions. Having said that, Serbia received few of the Bosnian nahiya (districts), leading to the birth of the dream of a ‘Greater Serbia’ that has loomed over Bosnia and Herzegovina to the present day (Imamović 1998).
This was the first time that a Bosniak uprising was wiped out and their requests rejected by the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, however, the Turkish reformers remained reticent about the increased autonomy of the Christian millets, which, with the aid of the Great Powers, had developed ethno-national programmes and were marching towards full independence. An array of secret societies had been set up to operate clandestinely across the region. The Greek secret society, Philiki Etaria (Friendly Society), was formed with Russian and French support in 1814 in Odessa, with a view to laying the ground for insurrection. According to Glenny (2000: 27), the Greek War of Independence was the result of ‘a conscious plan to destabilise the Ottoman Empire’. Greek independence was finally achieved in 1829, following a revolt sponsored and orchestrated by the British agent and poet Lord Byron (Blind 1869). The influence of this society also persuaded Ali Pasha of Janina, a disobedient Albanian governor, to convert to the religion of his Orthodox wife and initiate an Albanian revolt (Mazower 2001: 90-91). Once he had denounced Islam, he qualified for Western support and was aided by the Habsburgs. Meanwhile, Napoleon III supported the Romanians’ maximalist programme – ‘the unification of the two principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) under a foreign prince’ (Glenny 2000: 65) – and in 1830 a member of the British royal family was enthroned in Romania. Ćubrilović (1930) details the host of secret societies operating in Bulgaria and Romania, agitating for Serbian independence. Added to which, Lord Derby, the British prime minister, was a personal friend of the Montenegrin Prince Nikola, and offered to help him in his bid for independence for Montenegro by securing a strategic port that up till then had been under Bosnian rule (Bliss 1896).
When the Bosniaks sought independence, however, the Great Powers remained silent. A few of the Bosniak historians who deal with this issue assert that denying the Bosniaks their own nation-state while granting it to others was a paradoxical but coincidental process that was not motivated by conscious policy but emerged as a result of Bosniak political immaturity (Maglajlić 2002: 6; Imamović 1998: 336). This view seems apologetic and misinformed; the earlier discussion demonstrates that all the nationalist movements in the Balkans were dependent on Great Power support and the tacit approval of the Turkish Tanzimat ministers. Suppressing the national autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina whilst granting it to others is convincing evidence of the symbiosis between the Great Powers and the Tanzimat reformers and their determination to establish a New World Order in Europe, devoid of an independent Muslim nation-state. Bosnian Muslims did not qualify for Great Power support as they were considered to possess an Ottoman-Muslim heritage and, therefore, did not belong in Europe. The withdrawal of the Islamic presence from European soil served as a prerequisite for the establishment of a ‘new Enlightenment’ in Europe.

The emergence of a nascent Turkish nation was supposed to signal the end of the multinational Ottoman Empire and, by encompassing and territorialising Europe’s Islamic component, solve the ‘Muslim problem’ of ‘Turkey in Europe’. In other words, rather than being given the tools and opportunity to build a nation of their own, Bosnian Muslims were to be removed to, and assimilated in, the nascent Muslim-Turkish nation. The reform that was next in line was the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun (Noble Reform Edict), also known as

106 Albania is included in this claim as it was never officially a Muslim state because Albanian allegiance to Islam was considered to be doubtful – they denounced Islam twice in the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Albanian case is explained in more detail in chapter four, which develops an analysis of the inverted principle of Muslim nation building in Europe.
The next section analyses the way in which this reform instigated permanent changes in the fabric of the empire.

3.6 The reform edicts: en route to bankruptcy

Sultan Abdülmecit I was only seventeen years old when Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Britain and a confirmed Europhile, decided that the sultan should endorse reforms essential for the reorganisation of the empire. As discussed earlier, the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire followed a pattern whereby incompetent sultans were the nominal rulers but the real executive power lay with Tanzimat ministers such as Reşit Paşa, the leading reformer behind the Tanzimat ideology. Together with his two protégés, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, Reşit Paşa was determined to rein in the Bosniaks’ autonomy. The Tanzimat-ı Hayriye was announced at the Gülhane Gardens of the Topkapi Palace in November 1839 before a large gathering of foreign ambassadors and government officials. The Europeans present were pleased to witness ‘a sole intent to regenerate religion, government and the nation’ through the guarantee of equal treatment before the law for all Ottoman subjects (Seyrek 2006: 168). It is important to emphasise that the reform edict was initiated in the midst of the Middle East crisis; the British and French were making and breaking local governors in the region, vying for control of the strategic benefits offered by the Straits of Tiran. British ships had been patrolling the Persian Gulf for some time, while the French had annexed Algeria in 1830. In 1833 Mehmet Ali of Egypt and his son Ibrahim of Syria fought off the Ottomans with British and French assistance, and were eventually left in control of the Middle East. Both countries effectively became eminently exploitable client states of France and Britain:
[They were] sufficiently small to be easily influenced, sufficiently multifarious to preserve easy checks and balances in the region, and sufficiently westernised to offer both markets and supplies to European commerce and manufacture. (Goodwin 1999: 299-300)

The Tanzimat-ı Hayriye did not deal with the problem of a shrinking empire, nor did it tackle any of the root causes of the dissatisfaction with the imperial court that was provoking rebellions across the empire. Instead, it concentrated on the Ottoman economic system, introducing the right to own and inherit land, and a regular system of assessing and levying taxes. Mazower (2001: 43) states that the Porte was specifically compelled by the British to relax the laws on land ownership – up until then the private possession of land was forbidden (as detailed in chapter two). Most importantly, the Noble Edict jettisoned the sultan’s power, installing ‘the rule of law above any other rule within the Empire’ (Goodwin 1999: 169). A body called the ‘Council of Justice’, comprising ministers appointed to deal with all the legal aspects of the empire, was placed above the caliphate itself. The council was portrayed as an independent entity, but ministers were generally only appointed to the council if they were committed to Tanzimat ideology. By accepting the conditions of the edict, the sultan essentially agreed to acknowledge that the ‘rule of law’ took precedence over his own authority, and ultimately over God’s, even though he officially remained the head of the caliphate. Consequently, the direct viceregency, and with it the accountability of the ruler to divine power (Qur’an 6: 156), was suspended, and divine law was transferred from the public domain to the private sphere. In this way, the Tanzimat-ı Hayriye marks the turning point in the separation between state and religion in the Ottoman state. This fundamental change opened the way for the replacement of the other Islamic principles upon which the empire was established with the creation of nation-
states and the reformation of land ownership, trade and the exploitation of natural resources. All these changes were the necessary prerequisites of a New World Order based on capitalism and a secular nationalist ideology.\footnote{The historical evidence shows that the Christian states were never secularised, in the sense in which it was imposed upon the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Islam, the separation of the divine and civil orders are the very essence of Christianity, based on Christ’s command to ‘Render unto Caesar what are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s’ (Mark 12:17). Nevertheless, the secularisation process among Christian countries was gradual, and remained a mostly incomplete process. Generally, the secularisation programmes were accomplished through nationalistic rhetoric and doctrine, which were carefully prepared for the consumption of the masses. The awakened sense of national character was fed with various nationalistic propaganda materials, and subsequently moulded by the clergy and intelligentsia. By contrast, however, the newly enriched capitalist merchant class was growing more international and becoming more interconnected through socialising at international events and private social clubs. It was this international elite who, maintaining their supremacy above the peasantry, remained immune to the nationalist epidemic that swept the lower classes. They became the gatekeepers of the new system. The Western Christian secularisation process was officially installed in 1878 – the same year the Ottoman Empire was basically dismembered.}

It was only after the successful adoption of the \textit{Tanzimat-ı Hayriye} that the Ottoman Empire was regarded as a part of Europe and European legal scholars accepted it into ‘the Christian family of nations’ (Freeman 1877: 1). The \textit{Tanzimat-ı Hayriye} gave generous legal rights to the empire’s Christian subjects, who were placed under the protection of the Great Powers, mainly through the offices of missionary activists (Cilacı 1990). The reforms were presented by the Turkish reformers as a way of preventing further interference by the Great Powers, notably Russia, Britain and France, in the internal affairs of the ‘Sublime Porte’. However, a major part of the reform edict was the agreement to allow the Great Powers to monitor the treatment of minorities to ensure that the empire’s non-Muslim subjects enjoyed full equality under the law, and this served them as an excuse to gain an even more aggressive grip on the empire (Sousa 1933: 162; Seyrek 2000: 169).

Bosnian Muslims, however, refused to adopt the Noble Edict, provoking Reşit Paşa into a great rage. He instructed Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha to crush the remaining Bosniak
resistance, and his two protégés chose a close acquaintance, Omer Pasha Latas, to launch a massive assault on the rebels (Glenny 2000). Omer Pasha was a Serb convert from the Lika region on the northwest border of Bosnia and Croatia, then under Austrian occupation. In a trajectory similar to that of de Bonevall, he had left the Austrian army under mysterious circumstances, switched sides and attained high rank in the service of the sultan. His story of conversion, followed by swift professional advancement and the aggressive implementation of the Ottoman reforms, is indicative of a historical pattern, whereby both domestic and international forces sought to undermine the Ottoman Empire and remake Europe into a region devoid of any potent Islamic influence. More immediately, Omer Pasha impacted Bosnian relations with Serbia, which became strained during the nineteenth century due to constant Serb rebellions. Serbian dissatisfaction with the decaying Ottoman Empire was reflected in vitriolic retaliations on the local Muslim population, as detailed in the following section.

Omer Pasha entered Sarajevo in 1850 and ruled with the utmost cruelty for seven consecutive years, during which time he succeeded in systematically crushing the entire Bosnian aristocracy, driving its most influential members from state office and awarding all the positions of authority to non-Bosniaks (Šišić 1939: 17). In order to exact ferocious retribution against the Bosniaks, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha dispatched a special murtad (traitors’) unit to Bosnia, which was made up exclusively of ‘hard-drinking desperados from Poland and Hungary, most of whom could speak neither Turkish nor Bosnian and whose attachment to Islam was questionable’ (Glenny 2000: 82), alongside a large regular army and two thousand Albanian irregulars. The lack of discipline and brutish behaviour of the army and the irregulars, who embarked on a spree of plunder and pillage, turned the
whole of Bosnia into ‘one enormous prison, [where] every rank of mullahs, kadis, begs are wandering around the streets in chains or dragging around materials to repair roads’ (Šišić 1938: 17).

Omer Pasha’s rule in Bosnia left deep scars and, in a broader sense, the Bosniaks never truly recovered. They had little chance to, as the Tanzimatçılar were eager to abolish the autonomous prerogative the Bosnian Muslims had been granted by the Ottomans. Fra Ivan Jukić recorded that the damage inflicted was such that the Bosnian Muslims would not recover for another hundred years (cited in Cerić 1968: 108), while Irby (1875) triumphantly told her receptive European audience:

The Bosnian beg, par excellence, is a chained monster with drawn teeth and cut claws. He was decidedly too big a megatherion of our age. Omer Pasha, the Croat [sic], a renegade, did a good deed for humanity in the Turkish service, when he thrust him back among the fossil curiosities of history. The brute force of the savage is broken, and he has acquired no other. (Irby 1875: 646)

Crushing the remaining resistance in Bosnia left ‘Turkey in Europe’ a weak and tottering power. The last obstacle to the reforms was removed and the implantation of the New World Order could begin. Von Ranke (1853) summarised the fragile predicament of the Ottoman Empire, left at the mercy of the Great Powers and the Ottoman reformers:

\[108\] Despite her long experience of living in the Balkans, Irby mistakenly referred to Omer Paşa Latas as a Croat. He was originally from the region of what is now called Croatia, but ethnically he was a Šerb because he was an Orthodox Christian. No Orthodox Christian would take on Croatian nationality, nor would any Catholic become a Serb. The demarcation between Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism was a sharp and non-interchangeable ethnic delineation between the emerging Croatian and Serbian nationalisms, as discussed in more detail in chapter four. This quotation is useful as a classic example of the difficulties in differentiating between the various Balkan peoples using the absolutist terminology of modern European nationalism, which, even for their most ardent supporters, proved too much of a challenge and ultimately resulted in confusion.
If we enquire into the causes of the internal decline of the Turkish Empire, and regard them under their most general manifestation, we must affirm that it is owing to the fact that the empire is opposed to another section of the world immeasurably superior to itself in power. That other section could crush it in atoms in a moment; and while suffering it to exist for reason of its own, yet by a secret necessity, it exerts upon it an indirect and invisible influence. (Von Ranke 1853: 365)

The existence of a passive, manageable Ottoman power ensured, in effect, ‘English supremacy in the East’ (Godkin 1877: 111) by creating an obstacle to Russian ambitions. The Russians’ return to the Balkans and the Black Sea, which had been ensured by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, coupled with the Austrian Dag Nah Austen (‘Eastern Advancement’) policy, was anathema to Britain. It tried to obstruct potential Austro-Russian cooperation that would enable Russia to take over the most precious part of the Ottoman heritage, Constantinople. Russia had already satisfied some of its imperial appetite by conquering the Ottoman Central Asian provinces of Bokhara and Khokan, with the fertile cities of Tashkent and Samarqand, which were rich in silk, cotton and woven fabrics, among other commodities.109 However, the most attractive reward Russia fixed its eyes upon was India:

Besides the conquest of Central Asia, Russia seeks to establish a port on the Indian Ocean; she already has a project for a railway to India and the subject of navigating the Oxus and Jaxartes has long been under consideration. (Knox 1873: 224) 110

109 Samarqand was once the favourite city of Tamerlane, and is nostalgically represented: ‘The shadow of the Black Eagle is over the land of Mohammed, and all the prayers of the faithful cannot dispel it … for the first time in twelve hundred years the chant of the muezzin was broken by the sound of the Russian bells.’ For more on this subject, see Knox (1873: 223).
110 The Oxus and Jaxartes are the two major rivers of Central Asia that flow around the borders of what is now Uzbekistan. The Oxus (Amu Darya) runs along the southern border of Uzbekistan, separating it from Turkmenistan and Afghanistan; the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) roughly follows the border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. At the time when the excerpt above was written, the water from some parts of the river would sometimes evaporate for a few months, making navigation impossible. This, however, was the period of the newly discovered steam engine, for which water was a sine qua non. For an interesting account of Russian imperial ambitions and her diplomatic and military activities in the East, which caused tensions with Britain
This was the reason for British engagement, as India was known as the ‘jewel in the British crown’, and was to remain so for as long as it served British imperial purposes. Britain was more than aware that the Russian way to India led through Constantinople, and that it could easily gain influence in the city through calling on the Balkans to swear allegiance to the Orthodox Church. Indeed, to preserve its predominant position in the Balkans, Russia proclaimed itself as the ‘Protector of all Slavonic Christian brethren’ and cultivated the image by encouraging a ‘pan-Slavist’ movement in Europe through the consolidation of a ‘seventy-five million [strong] Slavonic race in one great united Slavonic Church’ (Von Kanitz 1872: 221). Russia’s public pretext was to ‘subjugate Mohammedan nations and destroy Islamism’ (Putnam 1854: 548). Writing about Russian imperial pretensions, however, Mazower (2000: 87) observes that far from supporting the Balkans and its Orthodox Christians, Russia’s ‘enlightened despots envisaged substituting Christian imperial rule for Muslim – the replacement of Sultan by autocratic dynasties ruling over ever vaster polyglot realms of their own’.

The immediate result of British engagement was further Ottoman wars with Russia, with the Ottomans wholly dependent on British support. The most important of these engagements was the Crimean War of 1855 and the Siege of Sevastopol, in which the British, aided by the French, fought alongside the Ottomans and defeated Russia decisively. The scale of the victory was such that the Crimea, the only region that guaranteed Russia an exit to the warm Mediterranean waters, was returned to the Ottoman Empire, ‘because all alike dreaded the appearance of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean’ (Bliss 1896: 473). Coming to the empire’s aid gave the Christian powers the excuse they needed to compel the

over India, see Knox (1873: 224). See also: An Old Diplomatist (1878: 397-401), and Appendix V, which contains excerpts of letters to Emperor Alexander warning of the threat Napoleon posed to Russia.
Ottomans to issue another *Tanzimat Fermani* (reform edict) ‘necessary for a modern civilised state’ (Mowat 1918: 177). In Paris, in 1856, under cover of the argument for the need for more religious justice, the Western Powers forced the Ottomans to initiate two very important reforms. Despite their detrimental effects on the empire, the Ottomans abolished the poll tax and farm tax, and gave foreigners the right to obtain private property (Seyrek 2006: 171). In return, ‘the Sublime Porte was admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System of Europe’ (Mowat 1918: 177). These were extremely important measures as they sowed the seeds of bankruptcy in the empire.

In light of the reduced tax revenues and growing fiscal demands associated with the implementation of the often-costly reforms, the only way the *Porte* could obtain fiscal revenue was through currency devaluation. Even though this had been a tool intermittently employed by the Ottomans from the sixteenth century onwards, the devaluations associated with the reforms, beginning with Sultan Mahmud II, were especially severe. Imperial mints struck ten series of coins and steadily decreased the silver content from 5.9 grams to less than a gram (Pamuk 1997: 970). The weak currency, coupled with the internal political rifts between Ottoman and *Tanzimat* forces, shook public confidence; local merchants took to using the imperial mint as a token currency for low-value purchases, while foreign currencies with a more reliable silver content prevailed for larger purchases and foreign trade (Gerber and Gross 1980: 351-358). The measures ordering the currency devaluation formed the essential preconditions for the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the wide use of foreign currency spread foreign influence in the empire and created a shift in allegiance among the local merchants, especially those from non-Muslim *millets*. It was through such contacts that the British and French channelled their geostrategic interests,
granting European citizenship to those merchants who proved loyal to their cause (Owen and Giráldez 1997: 90-99). The fiscal burden created by the ill-devised devaluation policies was aggravated by the exigencies of the Crimean War, and the Porte was compelled to take its first overseas loan in 1853. An examination of the sources and critical analysis of the chain of historical events reveal this decision to be of the utmost importance: the loss of fiscal sovereignty was the first step towards the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the new capitalist order of Europe, leading to its territorial incision and eventual extinction and replacement with a Turkish nation-state.\footnote{Even though the Porte often found ways to fund the costly reforms, it just as frequently could not pay for them, neither could it produce enough trained bureaucrats (Armour 2006: 173). More importantly, it was starved of cash due in part to its weak currency and the abolition of the internal tax system, and in part to the fact that the Tanzimat government spent its funds liberally. Whilst struggling to pay for basic expenditure, it continued to build modern infrastructure, such as railways and telegraph systems, as well as lavish palaces. The funds for these grand designs came from loans obtained from banks in London, which they freely supplied at top rates of interest. In this way, the Tanzimatcilar greatly aided the Great Powers’ destruction of the Ottoman Empire, further testifying to their symbiosis and common objectives.}

A further examination of the available documents leads to the conclusion that the loans offered to the Porte were distinctly disadvantageous. The onerous conditions were such that, in some instances, the interest rates were as much as sixty percent of the borrowed equity (Shaw 1971: 94). By 1860, the government was paying a fifth of its meagre revenue on interest alone, a figure that had climbed to fifty percent by 1875 (Jelavich 1983: 285). Britain was by far the most active supplier of loans to the Ottoman Empire. Between the years 1853 and 1876, the brokers Dent and Palmer of London arranged more loans to the imperial court than any other company, and Palmer’s influence was such that he could organise the removal of any grand vizier who refused to contract a further loan (Glenny 2000: 88). These financial steps were backed by the deliberate policies of the British government, which subsidised Ottoman bonds by offering a high return of
nine-to-ten percent, compared with the half-price returns on unsubsidised investments in domestic industry and public utilities (Glenny 2000: 86).

In addition to the British efforts, the most obvious concerted policy intervention on the part of Great Powers concerned the tariff system that forbade the Porte to raise the uniform import duty on goods from Western Europe. The ‘capitulations’ or trade agreements the Great Powers forced on the Porte forbade it to derive any revenue from foreign imports larger than five percent, simultaneously forcing it to increase export tariffs on its own products to the ‘punitive rate of twelve percent, on top of the various internal taxes levied for the transportation and sale of goods within the Empire’ (Glenny 2000: 86-87). Starved of cash, the Porte continued borrowing, throwing itself further into debt. With the quadrupled interest rates, the bubble eventually had to burst, and the imperial court was forced to accept the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. This international body, made up of a consortium of European powers, earmarked the revenue from government monopolies and taxes for the Porte’s foreign creditors. Thus, the Ottoman Empire immediately lost twenty-nine percent of its real income (Armour 2006: 219).

In the years that followed, the vicious cycle of debt and borrowing, weak currency and foreign influences disabled the Porte, and in 1875 it was pronounced bankrupt. Critical examination of the available evidence suggests that the only reason it continued to exist was that the so-called ‘Muslim Question of Europe’ still persisted. A British diplomat of the time, who wrote under the pseudonym of ‘An Old Diplomatist’ (1878), offered an insider’s perspective on the conditionality of the modernisation of ‘Turkey in Europe’:
[T]he Mussulman [sic] element is determined to resist, the only consequence of concessions at Constantinople will be to produce a revolution there, which will overturn the Sultan and his Government, and inaugurate a religious war, which must make the task of reform [easier than] ever. (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 398)

To ensure continuation of the reform process, Abdülhamid II promised to instate the first Ottoman constitution of Meşrutiyet I (a constitutional monarchy). In return for being created sultan, he announced the Kanun-i Esasi (Ottoman Constitution) on the 23 December 1876. At the same time, he pronounced himself ‘Caliph of the Muslim world’ in the hope of countering nationalist aspirations amongst his Christian subjects and to inculcate a sense a loyalty in his Muslims ones. He departed from the Tanzimat ideology and thus diverged from the political practice of his three predecessors and his Tanzimat ministers, as exemplified by his immigration policies for the Bosniaks (discussed in chapter four). His Islamist move, however, was ‘disquieting [for the] British in India, French in North Africa, and Russians on the Black Sea; and disquieting to his own domestic opposition, secular, westernised and progressive’ (Goodwin 1994: 315). The Great Powers responded by orchestrating Christian revolts in the Balkans during its war with Russia. This broke down the central control of the Porte and encouraged the demand for independent nation-states. In the nationalist revolts that sprang up across the Balkans, Muslim populations – Turkish or indigenous – were the first to be attacked. The attempt to eradicate the remaining Muslim obstacle to a Christian Europe inevitably led to the establishment of the New World Order. The next section concludes with an analysis of this process.
3.7 Eliminating the ‘Muslim Question’ in Europe

‘The rearguard of Mohammedanism [sic ] in Europe maintains its last stronghold in the Turkish vilayet of Bosnia,’ concluded Irby (1875: 643, 651). Irby developed into the most famous (Islamophobic) European champion of the poor Christian rayah (Ottoman subjects), dedicated to publicising their ‘true tale of bitter wrong and suffering … in this almost unknown country’. Although Bosnia was, in fact, well known to Europeans, Irby was correct to observe that by 1875 Bosnian Muslims, albeit considerably weakened, were still in control of their affairs of state. It was for this reason alone that Bosnia was seen as ‘the last Muslim refuge in Europe’ (Gölen 2006: 376), and perhaps it is why an obscure person called Wesselitzky Bogidarović was sent on a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bogidarović first appears in the historical record as a Russian secret agent, and then as a leader of the Bosnian rebels (Treitschke 1915: 30), beginning a series of revolts that lasted from 1875 to 1878.112

As well as Bogidarović and Irby, the year 1875 also brought the aforementioned Arthur Evans to Bosnia, as well as a plethora of international secret agents who appear to have been intimately engaged in Bosnian political developments. The concentration of foreign agents preceding the revolt, which developed into a massacre of the Muslim population, is significant: it set the precedent for all future conflicts that occurred across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1992-95 war can be seen as a continuation of the international involvement that began in the nineteenth century; the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina similarly followed hard on the heels of an influx of agents of foreign

112 Even to this day, historians are debating the cause behind the 1875-78 Bosnian revolt, whether it was just a rebellion of Christian subjects or an uprising of all the dissatisfied peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of religious affinity. Critical examination of the available evidence supports the conclusion that the uprising was an operation that was carefully planned by the Great Powers in conjunction with local leaders.
intelligence services, which began to pay attention to Yugoslavia once the crisis in Bosnia escalated (as detailed in chapter six).

By the spring of 1875, Bosnia and Herzegovina was encircled on all sides by the different parties in the conflict. From the east, volunteers from Serbia entered Bosnia under the command of Prince Milan; Prince-Bishop Nicholas of Montenegro led the rebels to Herzegovina; and members of the Bulgarian secret society, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee, which was sponsored by Russia and based in Bucharest, crossed the border to the north (McCarthy 2001; Millman 1980). The Austrian emperor, Francis Joseph, also travelled to Bosnia in 1875, with the purpose of stirring up unrest. During his journey he allegedly received many petitions from Bosnian Christians complaining of Ottoman oppression and asking for protection. He gladly obliged by issuing orders to the imperial forces in Dalmatia to prepare to march across the Bosnian frontier (Stavrainos 1963). Guersney (1877) recounted that spies were sent to incite the local population to insurrection and spread the rebellion further to the east, towards Bulgaria and Serbia, forcing the local Muslim population to leave:

> The plan was to set fires at Adrianople [Edirne] and Phillipopolis [Plevna], each in scores of places, to burn other towns mainly inhabited by Mussulmans [sic], and force all Bulgarians rayahs to join the uprising. (Guersney 1877: 368)

Nevertheless, the 1875 revolt in Bosnia was unsuccessful. According to Bishop Strossmayer, leader of the Bosnian Catholics, whose name is still engraved on a main street in Sarajevo’s city centre, Serbia and Montenegro went to war prematurely, contrary to the advice of the Russian prince Gortschakoff:
[Gortschakoff] informed Prince Milan [of Serbia] that Russia was unprepared; that ... she counted on taking Constantinople [in three years’ time]; and that only then would she call on the Slaves [sic] of the South to plant the Greek cross on the Dome of St Sophia. (Strossmayer, cited in Ćubrilović 1930: 84)\(^{113}\)

Moreover, the rebels who came to instigate insurrection among the local people met with little success. Even the actions of the Tanzimat government in Istanbul, raising more taxes to help the revolt, which alienated the empire’s Christian subjects still further, did not help.\(^{114}\) McCarthy (cited in Karpat, 2004) argues that the rebellion was forced, and the majority of peasants wanted to carry on living their lives peacefully on their farms: ‘[T]hey did not want to rebel, nor [mount a] defence against [the] rebels. They did not want to fight, but they were forced to do so’ (McCarthy 2004: 142). Travelling to Bosnia on the eve of the revolt, a British colonel, James Baker (1877: 628), recorded that the Muslims were living in harmony with their Christian neighbours, except where religious passions were stirred up by outsiders, and noted that he ‘never saw a country which looked less like a seat of rebellion; the people were peaceful, prosperous and contented’. This observation is important to remember as it bears a remarkable similarity to an observation made by another British officer on the eve of 1992-95 conflict (see chapter six).

Baker (1877: 628) further stated that foreign agents were sent in to specifically manufacture rebellion and compel the otherwise peaceful Christian peasantry to join the ranks of the rebellion, ‘and in abject terror some few unfortunate Bulgarians did join the

\(^{113}\) St Sophia is now the famous Blue Mosque in Istanbul. According to legend, Mohammed the Second, the victorious conqueror of Constantinople, refused to remove the cross from St Sophia’s interior but had it walled in and the crescent placed over it. It is believed that the cross remains concealed to this day, waiting for the Christians to re-conquer Istanbul and uncover it.

\(^{114}\) Guersney (1877: 365) claimed that ‘in the summer of 1875, the pecuniary needs of the Sublime Porte were more than usually urgent, and the tax-gatherers were more than usually exacting’.
ranks of the many ruffians that gathered in the hope of plunder, and we know the sad result’. The ‘sad result’ the colonel refers to were the series of insurrections that subsequently emerged across Serbia and Bulgaria. These were violently crushed by the Ottoman vizier, Ahmet Pasha, in 1876, triggering a public outcry in Europe against the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’. This event was significant in that those leaders who managed to stay alive retreated to Vienna and Bucharest, the respective seats of their operations. They quickly spread the news across Europe as proof of Muslim barbarity. This situation presented itself as another opportunity for the Great Powers to intervene, with the excuse of the alleged protection of the empire’s Christian subjects. The fact that the rebellions had been sponsored and engineered by the same Great Powers – who had done nothing to prevent Ottoman retaliation despite having the power to do so — was completely ignored by all the reports.

This event irretrievably destroyed the previously peaceful environment of the Balkans, and had three major impacts on the future political development of the ‘Eastern Question’. Firstly, it reversed the attitude of the Christian population, who became more receptive to implanted ideas of insurrection, and secondly, it provided a way of legitimating the open involvement of Russia and the other Great Powers in the Balkans, as they could now offer immediate protection to the empire’s Christian subjects. These two powers subsequently joined Bulgaria and Serbia in issuing a declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the pogroms of Muslims that followed every rebellion were transformed into justified retaliations for the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’, and became the norm amongst local rebel leaders and foreign agents. In this way, the rebellions in the Balkans graduated from
political statements into attacks on the Muslim populace, causing a mass exodus of local Muslims.

McCarthy (2004) suggests that a pattern developed that occurred in all subsequent rebellions:

First, Ottoman Government officials were attacked, then government buildings were sacked and destroyed, and finally, but sometimes almost immediately afterwards, [the] Muslim population [was] attacked as well. As I said, every single one of these revolutions worked the same way. (McCarthy 2004: 142)

As a consequence, studies of the Muslim population in Bosnia between 1875 and 1878 indicate a significant population loss, most notably a steep decline in the number of young adult males. McCarthy (2004: 141) contends that the 1875-78 Bosnian rebellion was ‘such a trauma, it cut off a significant part of the body of the Bosnian Muslims, [and] disorientated and disabled society’. He argues that the rebellion also had regional implications that spread throughout the Balkans, causing the deaths of more than thirty thousand Muslims and the displacement of more than a million, uprooted from their homes and forced to take refuge in Turkey (McCarthy 1995: 109-134). According to the list compiled by the Ottoman consul-general, in the Serbian province of Niš alone, more than four thousand Muslims were killed and members of the landowning āyans – very few of whom remained alive – were expelled and dispossessed, losing more than 800,000 donums

\[115\] The Bosnian Muslims did not leave in large numbers. Although many were internally displaced under very harsh conditions, relatively few indigenous Bosnian Muslims migrated to Turkey. This is discussed further in chapter four. Those who left were mainly Ottoman officials and Muslim refugees from other parts of the Balkans. For more on this subject, see Pinson (1993: 54-83).
of their landed property.\textsuperscript{116} Similarly, in Bulgaria, out of a population of a million and a half Muslims, 800,000 were either killed or starved to death, and thousands were massacred by Russian troops during 1877-78. In Bosnia, the Muslim population had been reduced to about a third of its original size by 1879 (Jelavich 1983: 340-341). Those Muslims in the Balkans and Central Asia who remained alive were expelled, and Ottoman Turkey received a steady stream of Muslim refugees: five million from the Balkans, nearly 1,400,000 Crimean Tartars, and a further 600,000 Circassians from the Caucasus (Jelavich 1983: 286). The Tanzimat ministers prepared for the large influx of Muslim refugees by establishing the Muhacirin-i Islamiyye Komisyonu Alisi (the High Commission of Muslim Immigrants), whose role was to permanently resettle the new arrivals.\textsuperscript{117}

Scholars have generally noted that ‘whenever Christians rose against Ottoman rule, the first to die were usually the local Muslims’ (Armour 2006: 55). McCarthy (2004) attempts to explain the reasons behind attacks on Muslims:

\begin{quote}
Muslims were attacked partly out of hatred, partly out of desire to seize Muslim property, partly out of desire to force the expulsions of Muslims, leaving regions populated by only the rebels’ people. (McCarthy 2004: 142)
\end{quote}

Karčić (2001) has pioneered the study of the exodus of European Muslims from a regional perspective, within the context of the ‘Eastern Question’. He offers the first regional examination in the Bosnian language of the common history of the majority of Balkan Muslims, pointing to the lack of awareness of the collective aspect of their disadvantageous

\textsuperscript{116} A copy of the full list of those who were killed or who lost their property, originally preserved by the British diplomatic representative in Belgrade, appears in Karpat (cited in Arbid and Kancal 2003).

\textsuperscript{117} The Muhacirin Commission was set up to resettle the Muslim immigrants, who started pouring into the Ottoman Empire from the 1870s onwards. Muslim emigration was encouraged by the governments of the new nation-states, who established harsh religious laws banning Muslims from practising their religion. For more on the forced migration of Muslims from the Balkans, see Karpat (2004: 122-146).
treatment. In his exemplary work, he contextualises the twentieth-century massacres committed against Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims as a continuation of those that occurred during the ‘Eastern Crisis’, and attributes dislike for Muslims to the general Islamophobic attitude prevalent in Europe during the nineteenth century, claiming that this attitude has been sustained up to the present day. His arguments concur with those of other scholars who claim that the project of the Enlightenment ‘reserved no place for Islam’ amongst its huge repertoire of signs, symbols and methodological prescriptions ‘for the fledgling national identities in the former “Turkey in Europe”’ (Canefe 1983: 107), nor were indigenous European Muslims allowed to form a separate nation (McCarthy, cited in Karčić 2001: 49).

This thesis builds on these arguments, adding the proposition that the active role neo-Islam played in building the New World Order in Europe – albeit through its adoption by the Turkish Tanzimat officials – has to be acknowledged. The Tanzimatçılar formed an alliance with the Great Powers, expediting Muslim eviction from the lost Ottoman lands and preparing to accept these Muslim refugees, who would be taught to substitute Turkishness for Islam, as the following chapter elaborates. At this point, however, it suffices to state that at the same time as the Tanzimatcılar were promoting pan-Turkishness, the Great Powers were boosting anti-Turkish independence movements across the Balkans. The removal and subsequent attempt to ‘Turkify’ Bosnian Muslims, as well as other indigenous Muslim population in the Balkans, was not primarily a result of blatant savagery, but a conscious attempt to establish a new European order, in which the imperialist conflict with the Ottomans was presented as a form of sacred battle between Christianity and Islam, so that all Christians could join in the fight against the common
Muslim enemy (Obradović 2002: 98; Đorđević 1968: 309-326). Once Europe was purged of Islamic influences, and its Muslims transferred to Turkey, there would be no obstacle to establishing a New World Order devoid of a Muslim nation-state on European soil. Consequently, the local Christian intelligentsia and clergy, the main propagators of modern ethnic liberalism, encouraged the development of an attitude of intolerance towards Islam amongst the peasantry (as detailed in chapter four).

With this in mind, the Turkish Tanzimat ministers attempted to destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina, following their defeat in the 1877-78 war against the Russians. When the Russian army arrived at Yeşil Köy, a district on the outskirts of Istanbul, the Ottoman army surrendered and signed the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. The agreement, which sealed the Russian victory, stipulated – among other demands – the formation of a separate Bulgarian state and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Montenegro occupying Herzegovina and Serbia appropriating Bosnia. However, this treaty conflicted with Britain’s interests; anxious to protect its Indian possessions and remain involved in the ‘Eastern Question’, it sent its warships to the Dardanelles to support the Ottoman fleet. Lord Derby, the British premier, solicited public support:

We have in that part of the world great interests which we must protect. … It is said that we sent the fleet to the Dardanelles to maintain the Turkish Empire. I entirely [deny] it. We sent [the] fleet to maintain the interests of the British Empire… (Lord Derby 1879: 362)

He was telling the truth; it was not concern for the predicament of the Ottoman Empire that prompted Britain to offer a helping hand to the ‘sick man of Europe’, who was by now on his deathbed. An enlarged and strategically well-positioned Bulgarian kingdom presupposed the penetration of Russian influence into the Balkans, and it was for this
reason that Britain refused to acknowledge the Treaty of San Stefano\textsuperscript{118}. Moreover, in February 1878, Sultan Abdülhamid II abolished the Ottoman parliament, reinforcing the adoption of his role as caliph. Both of these developments alarmed the British, who annulled the Treaty of San Stefano, and thus inadvertently preserved Bosnia and Herzegovina. In July 1878, declining to invite the sultan to participate (Goodwin 1994: 312), the Great Powers, led by the British, signed a new agreement that became known as the Treaty of Berlin. The secular, westernised and progressive Tanzimat ministers endorsed the treaty, by which the Ottoman Empire lost literally almost all of its territory in Europe and the Black Sea region. The treaty also proved costly, as the empire was ordered to pay sixty million roubles in war compensation to Russia (Seyrek 2000: 184).

The treaty coincided with British and French invasions of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. To celebrate the occasion, the British prime minister, Lord Beaconsfield, purchased shares in the Suez Canal and proclaimed Queen Victoria Empress of India (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 392). In the territory the Ottomans lost in the Balkans, all the newly emerged Slav states were classed as separate nations and awarded independence, except one – Bosnia. Bosnia’s status remained undefined, and in accordance with Article 25 of the 1878 Berlin Congress, it was placed under the administration of the Austro-Hungarian

\textsuperscript{118} The Treaty of San Stefano virtually annihilated the Ottoman Empire, and thus its signatories were able to boast that they had removed the ‘sick man’ from Europe. However, the diplomatic agreement was undermined by imperialist rivalry and was bound to arouse opposition from all quarters. Austria complained that the new Bulgarian principality violated the stipulation in the Budapest Treaty that no large Balkan state was to be established; Bulgaria would become a Russian outpost, giving Russia access to the Aegean Sea and control over Constantinople. This would eventually enable it to form a base on the Gulf of Alexandretta, making it easy for it to reach India. The British were alarmed. The Greeks, too, were opposed to San Stefano. They had attempted to enter the war, as they were vulnerable to attack from the sea, but were forced to remain neutral by the threat of a British blockade. Naturally, they were bitter when the war ended and Bulgaria was rewarded, while they received nothing.
Empire. Although this was presented as a temporary measure, the fate of being an international protectorate has dogged Bosnia and Herzegovina to the present day.

3.8 Conclusion

Bosniaks occupied a privileged position in the Ottoman state and enjoyed unprecedented local autonomy, due to their unconditional collective submission to Islam. Although the Ottomans cherished their relationship with the Bosnians because of their belief in Islamic unity, they treated them as linguistically and culturally distinct fellow-subjects. The Ottomans therefore recognised the Bosniaks’ ethnic distinction, and consequently referred to all other non-Turkish speaking Muslims from the Balkans as ‘Bosniaks’.¹¹⁹ This was the case until the Tanzimat reforms, which triggered the most acrimonious opposition ever on the part of Bosniaks to the embrace of the Ottoman state. This was due to the fact that the reforms represented an open attack on local Bosnian autonomy: ‘the ancient regime found its temporary defender in nationalism and its enemy in a modernising absolutism’ (Glenny 2000: 78).

The task of the Tanzimat reforms was to establish a New World Order based on a web of nation-states and maintained by an elite system of mercantile capitalism. The Islamic system of self-administered religious communities (millets) employed by the Ottomans was perceived to be an obstacle to building a New World Order, which conjured up a completely different arrangement, introducing secular ideas and initiating the

¹¹⁹ During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, the term Bošnjaci (Bosniak) encompassed all Slav Muslims living in the following regions: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Lika, Krbava, Slavonija, Sandžak, some of the border regions around Smederevo Sandžak (Užice in Serbia), including the western part of Kosovo (up to the town of Mitrovica), as well as regions in what is now Montenegro such as Plav and Gusinje, and Podgorica. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Mušović (1992).
separation of church and state. For Islam, this idea proved almost impenetrable; the ruler was not only head of state but also the ‘protector of the faithful’ – both caliph and chief imam. Moreover, Qur’anic revelations and the tradition of the Sunnah do not only preach religious dogma, but also lay down social, political and economic norms, offering an entire blueprint of how to manage both the state and personal life. In this respect, Islamic values were considered incompatible with the traditions of Christian Europe, and the two could no longer be envisaged in the same territory (Bandžović 2006a). Those officials promoting modern ethnic politics aimed at reorganising the Ottoman Empire in line with the European system of nation-states by provoking national movements, exclusively among the Christian millets, in order to remove the ‘sick man’ from Europe.

The Bosniaks were primarily seen by modern ethno-liberals as part of the legacy of an Ottoman Muslim millet system and, as such, considered to be simply debris around the Ottoman ‘deathbed’. While all the other ethnicities from the Balkans were encouraged to conform to the liberal concept of separate national units and to participate in the nation-building process, the development of Bosniak nationality was forcibly curtailed by the ‘reformed’ Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. In their approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, both maintained a totalitarian and autocratic attitude – the Bosnian Muslims were expected to decamp ‘back’ to Turkey, the geographic national unit to which the Ottoman Empire was eventually reduced. To further repudiate the continuous presence of the Bosniaks on European soil, a whole set of biases and stereotypes were reproduced in foreign reports. These were upheld by the Tanzimatçılar, with a view to demonising the Bosniaks as fanatical and disobedient Muslim subjects and so expedite their ‘repatriation’ to Turkey.
When the Berlin Congress was convened in July 1878, the treaty’s signatories – the Great Powers and the Tanzimatçular – unanimously concluded that Bosniaks were not to become a nation and Bosnia was not to become a nation-state but a protectorate under Austrian administration. Abandoned in no man’s land, Bosnia constituted the greatest part of the ‘Eastern Question’, and up to the present day has suffered the adverse effects of these decisions. The implications for the formation of a Bosniak ethno-national identity, and their place in the so-called New World Order, are discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

TANZIMAT ‘TURKIFICATION’ AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF BOSNIAN MUSLIM IDENTITY

The analysis in the previous chapter demonstrates that nation-building projects in the Balkans were dependent on the international climate and Great Power support. Nation building in this region consisted of the creation of a number of nation-states, each exclusively identified with a single religion, and each harbouring territorial aspirations and dedicated to the assimilation and persecution of Muslims (Bandžović 2006). This chapter builds on this analysis by revisiting historical circumstances, as well as the situation in the more recent past, and explores the turbulent phases of the attempt to build a Bosnian state and sense of national identity. As such, it represents a contribution towards finding an answer to the research questions of why debates on the Muslim identity formation of Bosniaks continue taking place with undiminished vigour. Closely related to this, it will explain why Bosnia is the only one of the six former Yugoslav republics to exist as a protectorate and not a nation-state.

This thesis posits that the reason behind the lack of international recognition for Bosnian Muslim national legitimacy lies in the lack of systematic research into the complexities of the phenomenon of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a widespread claim that the Ottomans brought Islam to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Bosniaks then wholeheartedly embraced (Malcolm 1994: 51-69). By default, Islam became a rationale for the identification of Bosniaks with Turks (the defeated and dismembered Ottoman empire metamorphosed into a Turkish nation-state). Bosnian Muslims came to be
regarded as the standard-bearers of an ‘imported religion’, ripe for ‘export back’ to Turkey when the conditions were right – as, for example, during the nineteenth-century uprising of the Christian *millet*. However, this account is incorrect: there is historical evidence collected by Bosnian scholars that testifies that not only did Islam appear no later than Christianity among the Bosniaks (Hadžijahić, cited in Smajlović 1990: 20), but it was, in fact, established in the Balkan region centuries before its first contact with the Ottomans (Hadžijahić *et al.* 1977; Balić 1995; Ibrahimi 2008). This has resulted in the peculiar position the Bosniaks occupy, both historically and in the present day.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section sets the theoretical framework for the investigation into the ‘inverted principle’ of Bosniak nation building. This term refers to historians’ failure to recognise the effort the international powers put into building nations out of the Balkan’s Christian *millet*, while simultaneously thwarting the national development of the Bosniaks. Scholars have misconstrued the adoption of Islamic values, representing it as the culprit for the delay of Bosniak national development. Section two analyses the Islamisation of Bosnia, arguing that it was the pre-Ottoman introduction of Islam into the region, as well as its symbiosis with the Bosnian Bogumil religion, that aided the development of a specific Bosniak ethnic fabric. The Bosniaks could have developed into a viable nation had it not been for the Great Power-approved ‘Turkification’ approach of the Ottoman *Tanzimat* leaders. An example of the suppression of a potential Bosniak nation is seen in the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, which is examined in section three. Section four describes the attempts to squeeze Bosniaks into either Serbian or Croatian nationalities during the period between the two world wars, and depicts their struggle to balance the competing claims of their neighbours. Section five deals with Bosniak success
in gaining some sort of national recognition by discussing the emergence of a ‘Muslim nation’ in socialist Yugoslavia, and section six summarises the international endeavours to thwart the national development of the Bosniaks.

4.1 Towards a theoretical rationale for the inverted principle of Bosniak identity

The Balkan Muslims did not have an appropriate system in place to facilitate their transformation from *millets* into national entities in the nineteenth century. The lack of political legitimacy was reflected in their undefined, fragile national awareness. Hence, where ‘Turkification’ failed, Balkan Muslims were nationalised as separate ethno-religious minorities within the newly emerged larger nations, as happened with the Pomaks in Bulgaria¹²⁰ and Torbeši in Macedonia; others, such as the Bosniaks, who resisted both assimilation and ‘Turkification’, were either converted to Christianity or ethnically cleansed – hundreds of thousands were slaughtered or expelled during the nineteenth-century outburst of ethno-nationalism (Mušović 1992: 104; Memić 1996: 165-166). The persecution of, and pogroms against, Muslims from the former Ottoman provinces reflected common European practice. Ekmečić (2004: 654) asserts that until the Berlin Congress, Christian states did not tolerate the existence of a Muslim minority within their borders, nor were there specific laws ensuring Muslim safety once a new nation-state was formed out of former Ottoman lands.¹²¹ After Turkey, Muslim Albania was the last nation to emerge from

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¹²⁰ Even today the Bulgarian Pomaks are a repressed community. Even if institutional discrimination against Pomaks is now rare, the Bulgarian state continues to refuse to recognise them as an ethnic minority. State officials seek to identify them as Bulgarians who happen to practice Islam, rather than a separate ethnic group. For a detailed discussion on this subject, as well on the post-cold war situation in Bulgaria, see Ramous (2005). For more general information on the Pomaks, see Radushev (2005) and Brunnbauer (1998).

¹²¹ This is in stark contrast to the ‘reform edicts’ – the *Tanzimat Fermani* of 1839 and *Islahat Fermani* of 1856 – that not only granted legal equality to Christians but facilitated the preferential treatments of non-Muslims, who were placed under the protection of the European powers (Karpat 2004: 77-126). When the
the Balkan region. The Turks succeeded because of unflagging British support for the 
*Tanzimatçular*, stemming from a fear of Russian penetration into the Mediterranean 
(Schevill 1995: 340). Albania, meanwhile, was awarded nationhood due to its defence of 
Italian interests in the Mediterranean, and more critically because of the ‘light way the 
religion hung over an Albanian’ (Mazower 2001: 17).

In dealing with the question of Muslim nationhood in Europe, many scholars note 
the absence of national awareness amongst the Muslim peoples. Bieber (2000: 13) observes 
a ‘delay’ in the development of Muslim national identity in Europe, claiming that it was 
only the declining Ottoman Empire’s loss of its power to protect the interests and identity 
of Muslims that led to ‘the development of ethnic and national identity among the 
Muslims’. In other words, Ottoman Muslims were unaware of their own ethnicity and 
linguistic origin until the Ottoman state began to crumble. This argument seems to

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Ottomans signed these agreements, why did they not ask for the same assurances of protection for Muslims in 
the lands they lost? 

122 Official Albanian allegiance to Islam was always doubtful. Islam was first denounced in Albania in the 
fifteenth century by Scanderbeg, an Orthodox *devşirme* (convert), who was called the ‘Champion of 
Christendom’ (Destani 2001: 97). The second time was during the nation-building process in 1827-29, when 
Ali Pasha of Janina, a disobedient Albanian governor, converted to the religion of his Orthodox wife and 
initiated a revolt (Mazower 2001: 90-91). It was only after he abandoned Islam that Albania qualified for 
Great Power support. During the nation-building process in Albania, the Bektashi Sufi order was especially 
popular. It was widely believed that the Bektashi deviated greatly from normative Islamic practices and 
beliefs. Its adherents were totally opposed to the creation of an Ottoman national identity in the last days of 
the empire, and formed anti-Turkification movements. In fact, some Bektashi sympathisers of prominent 
public standing worked diligently to create a modern Albanian nation-state by separating religion from 
national identity. They further popularised the slogan, ‘We are not Turks, nor Giaurs [infidels], but 
Albanians’. Albanians were famous for saying that the only religion of an Albanian is Albanian. They were 
often connected in historical analysis to esoteric freemasonry. For example, in 1879 Shemsedin Sami wrote a 
book entitled, *Albania: How It Was, Is and Will Become*, in which the following quotation can be found: 
‘[T]rue and good Albanians and those who want to save Albania have to always put the nation before the 
faith; his brother is not his co-believer, but his co-national. The real Albanians are true brothers with each 
other; their brotherhood should be [so] strong [that] nothing can … divide or penetrate them. True Albanians 
must be like the franksmasons [sic] and Bektashis that are true brothers to each other’ (cited in Jazexhi 2007). 
See also: Birge (1994).
contradict evidence that testifies to an awareness among Ottoman Muslims, specifically among Bosniaks, of belonging to a separate ethnic group.

Discussing the ‘arrested national development’ of Bosniaks, to borrow Burg and Shoup’s (1999: 18) phrase, the arguments can be succinctly grouped into those made by Bosnian scholars and those by international ones. Bosniak authors offer different reasons for the failure of Bosniak nationhood, although they all argue for the distinct cultural and ethnic identity of Bosnian Muslims. They generally assert that Bosniaks maintained a high level of consciousness of their own ethnicity but lacked an innovative intellectual and political plan as to how to achieve an independent Bosnian state or adapt to modern conditions (Filandra 1998: 51; Cerić 1968: 123; Sućeska 1995: 34-44). Bosniak authors generally burden the Bosnian Muslim national conscience with an alleged insufficiency of political maturity as the bona fide reason for their failure to attain an independent state, without ever asking why it was possible to achieve this in neighbouring states with very similar conditions. Nor do they appear to objectively analyse the political realities of the time in the Ottoman Empire (as outlined in chapter three).

International scholars, on the other hand, pinpoint the Bosniaks’ historical links with the Ottoman Empire and their attachment to Islam as the reasons for their lack of national identity (Irwin 1984; Velikonja 2003; Zacharay 1999; Donia 1994). Pinson (1996: 90) believes that the lack of development of a Bosniak nationhood can also be explained by other factors, such as not having a pre-Ottoman Islamic history, institutions or historical period in their collective memory that they could identify with. This claim contradicts the historical evidence analysed in the forthcoming section.
The above theories tend to generate an uncritical scholarly response, which stems not from insufficient knowledge but rather from an inadequate and perhaps distorted comprehension of the inverted principle of Bosnian-Muslim national identity. This scholarship can be categorised in three main demographic groups. The great majority of contemporary Bosniak scholars appear unable to emotionally detach themselves from the fetish of the Ottoman-Turkish legacy to critically examine the crucial role the Tanzimatçılar played in the failure of the Bosniaks to build a nation-state. The second group comprises Turkish scholarship on Bosnian Muslims, which seems, astonishingly, sporadic and almost non-existent when it comes to a critical examination of the Bosnian phenomenon. This is most probably due to a Turkish academic adherence to ‘political correctness’ over the interpretation of the Tanzimat ideology. The best-known contemporary work to deal with the Bosnian Muslims is Babuna’s (2000), but even this skips the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman period and mainly concentrates on their history from the Austrian occupation onwards. The other significant account is that of Yorulmaz (2007), which talks about post-conflict Bosnia as seen through the lens of a visiting Turkish academic. Karpat (2004: 124) also notes the lack of comprehensive studies on Bosniaks in the Turkish language, calling it ‘puzzling, given the keen and sympathetic interest of contemporary Turks in Bosnia’ and the presence of the many millions of descendants of Bosnian refugees who migrated to Turkey in the last two centuries. More objective and revealing information may be found in the archival sources, but it appears that for the large part these have not been systematically organised or sufficiently explored.

There is a trend in international scholarship towards selectively applying a theoretical framework concerning the ‘a-national’ nature of Islam to some regions but not
others. The widespread misconception, even prejudice, that Islam thwarted the national development of the Bosnian Muslims, underlies the lack of originality, comprehensiveness and objectivity that afflicts much of the research on Bosnia. These theorists take the consequences for the starting point of their analyses; they explain the symptoms rather than the causes that emerged from the wider context of international realpolitik. For example, if Ottoman credentials and Islamic association are presented as the main obstacles in the transition from millet to modern ethno-national community, why it was that Turkish nationalism or the various Arab nationalisms were not hampered by their Islamic and Ottoman pasts? Chapter two demonstrated that embryonic Turkish and Arab nationalisms actually blossomed as a result of the reforms, as part of a national awakening on a global level.\textsuperscript{123}

Having said that, while Islam might be an ‘a-national’ religion only in the Western liberal sense, it certainly recognises human diversity as a motif of harmony and cooperation amongst people of all faiths, rather than a force for division, exclusion and intolerance (Qur’an 5: 48, 49: 13). In the case of the Bosniaks, it was the embrace of Islam that helped them preserve the unique ethnic features they developed during the Middle Ages. However, explicit investigation of the social and cultural implications of Bosnian Islamisation is non-existent, and this part of Bosniak history remains largely inaccessible and under-explored (Stoyanov 2000: 258). This is mainly because research into the early embrace and

\textsuperscript{123} The simple reason for the blossoming of these nationalist movements was that they served the geostrategic interests of the Great Powers and enjoyed their undivided support. The words of Beduizzaman Said Nursi, who accompanied Sultan Mehmed Reşad on his ‘Rumelia Journey’ in June 1911, serve as an illustration. This was the last visit to the Balkan provinces by the Ottoman sultan, and a last attempt by the Ottomans to secure social peace in the face of the upsurge of various Balkan nationalisms. When two Balkan Muslim scholars of modern science asked Nursi whether religious zeal or national zeal should be the stronger, he replied: ‘With us Muslims, religion and nationality are united, although there is a theoretical, apparent and incidental difference between them. Religious zeal and Islamic nationhood have completely fused in Turk and Arab and may not now be separated.’ For more on the ‘Rumelia Journey’, see Vahide (1992: chapter 6).
establishment of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been conceptually problematic for many Balkan historians (Bringa 1995: 15). Studies on the spread of Islam, or the lack of such analyses, lay at the heart of recent tragedy in Bosnia (Handžić 1999: 18). Discussion on Bosnian Islamisation is extremely important for an understanding of Muslim identity formation as it explains the way Islam was established in Bosnian society. The next section aims to close this gap in the study of Islam in Bosnia, arguing it was the process of earlier Islamisation that upheld the specific pre-Ottoman ethnic features of the Bosniaks.

4.2 The origins of Islam in Bosnia

As far as the process of Islamisation is concerned, the most important event is the appearance of Sari Saltuk, who is thought to have arrived in the Balkans, with about forty Turkmen tribes, and to have settled in Dobrudja in 1261. Sari Saltuk is portrayed as a tireless missionary, spreading Islam across the Balkans, and a cult emerged around his legendary character (Kiele 1995). Çelebi (1896: 133-137, 659), in his well-known Seyahat-nâme (travelogue), wrote in great detail about Sari Saltuk being secretly visited by crypto-Muslims from all over the central-eastern parts of Christian Europe. During the month of Ramadan, they would break the fast, perform communal prayers and celebrate *Eid* together, after which they would return to their countries. Çelebi (1896: 137) further observed that he was also well known amongst the Christians under the name of Sveti Nikola (St Nicholas).124

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124 On the northern shore of Lake Ohrid in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia lies the Sveti Naum monastery, where Christian pilgrims worship at the tombs of the Orthodox saint Sveti Naum. Interestingly, however, during the Ottoman Empire, this was a place ceremonially visited by Muslims, who were convinced that it was the tomb of Sari Saltuk (Ocak 1984: 12).
When Sari Saltuk died, he was venerated as a saint, and there is thought to be a total of twelve different places claiming to be his türbe and tekke (tomb and shrine), spreading from Eastern Anatolia right across the Balkans.\(^{125}\) One of those places believed to be Sari Saltuk’s shrine is Blagaj Tekke on the River Buna near Mostar in Herzegovina (Hafiz 1995: 212-220) – this was also a meeting place for the Bogumils, a medieval Bosnian Christian religion, which was symbiotically related to Islam.\(^{126}\) Akalın (1998: 229), who researched the cult of Sari Saltuk for his doctoral thesis, asserts that there were in total twelve medieval kings who asked for his tabut (coffin), the Bosnian king being one. This was almost two hundred years before Bosnia would officially become a Muslim entity as part of the Ottoman Empire in 1463. Moreover, a hagiography from the collection of Sokolović (1972), confirms the request of the early medieval Bosnian king to be sent the tabut with Sari Saltuk’s remains.

Islam was introduced and established in the Balkans a few centuries before the first arrival of the Ottomans (Hadžijahić et al. 1977; Balić 1995; Ibrahimi 2008). Hadžijahić (cited in Smajlović 1990: 20) cites material evidence demonstrating that amongst the great majority of Southern Slavs the appearance of Christianity was no older than that of Islam, especially in Bulgaria, which ‘already had Muslim inhabitants even before the Christianisation of the Bulgarians’. Pope Nicolas I (858-867) made unambiguous reference to Islam and the availability of the copies of Qur’an:

\(^{126}\) For more on this topic, see Bušatić (2006: 13-15), Handžić (1999: 7-46), Bašagić-Redžepašić (1900) – see particularly page19 for a description of the Janissery Decree, which testifies to the mass conversion of the Bogumils to Islam.
You are asking what to do with the blasphemous books, which – as far as you are concerned – are disseminated in your area, and you have got them from Saracens. Of course, they are not to be kept anywhere, because as the sacred scripture says ‘evil talk spoils sound spirit’ … therefore turn those harmful and blasphemous books into ashes (Nicolas I, cited in Smajlović 1990: 22).

Another important document testifying to the pre-Ottoman presence of Islam was left by Abu Hamid al-Andalusi, who stayed in Hungary between the years 1150 and 1153 (the Royal Historical Library in Madrid holds his original manuscript). The grand mufti of Zagreb obtained a copy, and Omerbašić (1988) subsequently translated and published it in the bimonthly magazine Behar. It transpires from the text that Abu Hamid visited a country situated at a distance of ‘forty days on foot from Hungary’, which Hadzijahić (1974) finds corresponds to present-day Mačva in eastern Croatia and Srijem in north-eastern Bosnia. In these scripts, Abu Hamid wrote about his encounter with two large groups of Muslims, who were living under the protection of the Tsar of Hungary: the ‘Muslims from Horaz’ and the ‘Sakalib Muslims’ or Slav Muslims. Both of those groups were in the service of the Tsar; while one group were soldiers enjoying full confessional rights as a reward for fighting the Byzantine army, the other was exclusively engaged in minting coins.

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127 Horaz is now eastern Uzbekistan.
128 The term is thought to represent an Arabic name for the Slav slaves who later embraced Islam.
129 It is known that the Saracens were running successful coin-minting workshops up until the fourteenth century. The black Saracen head on Hungarian coins originates from a certain Jakobus Saracenus, who in 1371 bought a number of forges, and perhaps to reinforce his Saracen ancestry, engraved a Saracen’s head on his mint (Smajlović 1990: 28). Some of the Hungarian coins bore an Arabic inscription. Coins with Arabic inscriptions were also discovered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hadžijahić (1990) points out that silver coins dating from the time of Caliph Mervan II el Himara (circa 744-50) were found in the villages of Potoci and Bijelo Polje near the city of Mostar. For a detailed description of the discovery in 1938, see Dizdar (1938) and Appendix VI. There were other discoveries of coins that date back to the expansion of the Arab and early Turkish empires towards the Balkan Peninsula. These were minted in gold or silver and were engraved with different verses of the Qur’an in Islamic calligraphy, with the motif of the ‘standing caliph’ (Spink and Sons Numismatics 1986: 15, 16, 30 31, 42, 46).
Klaić (1971: 25-37) was the first Yugoslav historian to analyse Abu Hamid’s manuscripts and validate their provenance by comparing them with Byzantine sources, such as the manuscripts of Kinam and Honijat. She confirmed that the information offered by Abu Hamid corresponds to the records of Kinam and Honijat, which speak extensively about the lengthy wars waged between Hungary and Byzantium, during which time the king of Hungary kept a Muslim army. The Byzantine emperor even approached the king with a view to brokering a peace agreement in return for a considerable number of imprisoned Muslim soldiers (Omerbašić 1988: 12). Klaić (1971: 37) concludes that these soldiers could only be Muslims from the Srijem region and northern Bosnia who had been seized and imprisoned during the war. These Muslims were known under the name of *Kalisija* or *Halisija*; the etymology of the village called Kalesija near Zvornik in north-east Bosnia testifies to the fact that *Kalisija* Muslims were present there.

Near the same town of Zvornik are two other towns whose names indicate that they were named after Muslim Saracens: the Bosnian villages of Saraci (which later became Sarači) near Zvornik, and Saracija (later Saračica) near Mali Zvornik. Another town whose etymology bears evidence of an early Muslim presence is Pečenegovci near Prnjavor, named after the *Pečenez* Muslims who migrated from Asia Minor towards the Balkans in the ninth century. In the twelfth century, the *Knez* (ruler), Melek-Dok Damald, held the Neretva River valley (Herzegovina). Both his father and grandfather were of Arabic origin. Damald’s grandfather, Dhu’l-ayn, was also known to inhabitants of the southern Balkans (Balić 1995: 38). The Islamic presence is clearly documented through the three generations

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130 The *Pečenezi* were also known as the Patzinak, Pacinace or Pezengi. For a more detailed discussion on these early Muslim migrants to the Balkans, see Yücel (in Karatay et al. 2006: 185-214).
of Damald, and Melek-Dok Damald may be one of the first known Muslim rulers in this region. In fact, Bosnian and Slav inhabitants of the Neretva River valley were in communication with the Arab world; according to Balić (1995) and Hadžijahić (1974), these contacts occurred in the second half of the ninth century, and continued to intensify into the Middle Ages. They had links as far afield as North Africa, Sicily and Syria, where the Fatimids ruled (Balić 1995: 38). Obolensky (1971: 37, 77) suggests that Muslim expansion from the Arabian Peninsula towards the Adriatic Sea occurred in 876, with the siege of Dubrovnik, and from thence they spread to the lower Danube. Following this conquest, the Arab Muslims decided to enter the Balkan interior, moving towards the Bosnian region through the valley of the Neretva River in Herzegovina, where it seems they settled permanently. This explains the origins of the Damald dynasty in the Herzegovina region.

The son of Abu Hamid-al Garnati (1080-1169) was the mufîti (religious leader) in the Hungarian kingdom, particularly in the valley of the lower Danube River, which at that time was densely populated by Saqalibs (Slav Muslims) (Obolensky 1971: 39). In the city of Aleppo in Syria, Yakut al Hamawi (1179-1229)\textsuperscript{131} met Muslim students from Bosnia. This shows that the relationship between Muslim Slavs and Arabic Islamic culture continued into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Hamawi further records that Srijem (the north-west border of today’s Bosnia) hosted thirty large Muslim villages in the valley of the lower Danube River (Obolenksy 1971: 39). In addition, old European chronicles refer to Muslim residents from these regions as Saracens or Bezermeni (Balić 1962: 62). Norris (2001: 6) argues that Hungary, as one of the three chief centres of early Islam in Europe,

\textsuperscript{131} Yakut al Hamawi was the author of the great geographical dictionary, Mu’gam al-buldan.
represented an important geographical starting point for the spread of Islam in the Balkans, especially in the Bosnian region.\textsuperscript{132}

It seems that the Bosniaks were not only on the receiving end of migrations but were migrants themselves. For example, in early medieval times, there was a village called \textit{Bosna} (Bosnia) with about eight hundred residents (Balić 1965: 91) in Tunisia. A similar Bosnian settlement also existed in Syria, and from the early period in Turkey, there was a village also called \textit{Bosna}.\textsuperscript{133} This is perhaps the provenance of the two black Saracen heads on the medieval Bosnian coat-of-arms.\textsuperscript{134} Kovačević (2007) reports that Solovjev (1956), in his study of Bosnian coats-of-arms, claimed that the same symbol is engraved on the tomb of Queen Katarina (the last medieval Bosnian ruler) in Rome, symbolising that her country had become Islamic. Although Katarina spent the rest of her life in Venice, her children and her brother, Stjepan Hercegović, who became known as Ahmed Pasha, accepted Islam even before the Ottomans spread through the whole region of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jahić 1979: 229-230). In fact, most of the petty nobility and city administrators willingly surrendered their possessions to the Ottomans and converted to Islam (Bašagić-Redžepašić 1900; Filipović 1970; Handžić 1997; Handžić, M. 1999; Moačanin 1999). The reason behind their conversion was their Bogumil faith.

\textsuperscript{132} Handžić, M. (1999: 18), on the other hand, states that Islam disappeared from Hungary in the thirteenth century, after the introduction of laws that required the Christianisation of all Muslims, so there is no continuity between the first period of Islamisation and the time when a more consistent Islamisation took place from 1453 onwards. The academic debate on this issue remains inconclusive.

\textsuperscript{133} Nowadays, there is also a part of Istanbul called Yeni Bosna (New Bosnia). The Bosnian migration to Turkey intensified in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and there are large settlements around Izmir, Adana, the town of Ayvalik, and of course Istanbul, in quite a few of the large suburbs in both parts of the city (Halilović 1991: 29).

\textsuperscript{134} Cf. Appendix VII. They are arranged at the top end of two keys that are placed in a criss-cross position. The appearance of Saracen heads on the medieval Bosnian coat-of-arms is a mysterious historical fact of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has not been explained to the present day. Andelić (1973: 214) was the medievalist who succeeded in advancing this study the most. He discovered an identical Saracen’s head to the one on the coat-of-arms on a medallion in the Gothic bifoldium of a palace near the city of Travnik.
4.2.1 The symbiosis between the Bogumils and Islam

The open, official Islamisation of Bosnia – as opposed to concealed Islamisation – started in 1463 when Bosnia first fell under Ottoman rule, continued through to 1528 when the last part of Bosnia became officially Ottoman, and lasted with similar intensity until about the eighteenth century. It was a relatively smooth, voluntary, collective process that seems to have occurred due to the symbiosis between Bogumil beliefs and rituals and Islamic traditions. The term ‘Bogumil’ means ‘Beloved by God’, but could equally well be translated as ‘awliya of God’, as in the words of Ayoub (2004: 154), ‘the Qur’an also uses the term to refer to the righteous who are the intimate friends of God’.

Bogumils, also known as the ‘Bosnian Heretics’ or ‘Good Bosniaks’, are the most contested phenomenon in the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were continuously persecuted by the Orthodox Church, which was established in neighbouring Serbia, while Bosnia was raked by papal crusades operating from Hungary during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Non-allegiance to either the Eastern or Western form of Christianity made Bosnia the only-known confessionally independent medieval kingdom in Europe that openly rejected the prevalent religious hierarchy. In the thirteenth century, Bosnia developed as the most prestigious heretical centre in Europe, a place where all known heretics of the time would come, either to find refuge or to further their education. The Bogumils had close ties with their ideological brothers, the Cathars in France and Lollards in England, but this area remains under-investigated.\footnote{135 The nature and type of this ‘heresy’ also remain unknown. It is useful to remember at this juncture that Islam was also referred to as a ‘heresy’ in the Christian vocabulary of the time. The available sources on the Bogumils mainly derive from their enemies – that is, from the papal archives and ‘heretic manuals’ published at the time. Bogumils were the main protagonists of these manuals of torture issued to the papal delegations, mainly Dominicans and Franciscans, who were sent on a mission to exterminate ‘heresy’. They succeeded in} However, the attacks on
the Bogumils did not destroy them, but only reinforced their distinctive sense of identity, and this developed into an urge to not only protect their religion but also their national independence. They thus demonstrated pre-nationalistic features well ahead of their time (Ćorović 1925).136

There are no extant documents describing the Bogumil heresy, and since they generally lived as crypto-Christians (Klaić 1971; Vilar 2007), the scholarship has tended to consider them as a deviation or particular form of Christianity. For this reason, they are often called the ‘Bosnian Church’.137 Some scholars have argued in favour of the Manichaean and Paulician nature of the Bosnian Church,138 whilst others have taken them to represent early Protestants, especially during the nineteenth century when the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans spurred futile attempts to re-Christianise the Bosniaks (Brockett 1870; Evans 1877), as analysed in chapter three. However, Imamović (2001) asserts that the Bogumils had been associated with Islam since the second caliph, Umar Ibn Khattab (586-644), when a delegation of Balkan Bogumil elders pledged alliance to him. Thus, when the Ottomans entered Bosnia in 1463, Ayvaz Dedo, the Bogumil djed

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136 Writing about the medieval Bosnian state and the Bosniaks as devoted Bogumils, Ćorović (1925) argues that they developed certain nationalist features way ahead of their time: ‘The Bogumils have significantly developed national characteristics. Persecuted by papal inquisitions and the Hungarians, they were feeling that the Hungarian belligerence, together with Catholicism, not only threatened their religion but their national independence too. That is why they selflessly defended both, and called their Holy house [the] ‘peoples’ [house]’ or ‘Bosnian’, and … exclusively referred [to themselves] as ‘Good Bosniaks’ (Dobri Bošnjaci).’


(elder), along with his followers, openly submitted to Islam at Mount Ayvatovica, which still retains a special place in Bosniak spiritual life.

There were many similarities between the Bogumils and the Muslims: they rejected icons, church hierarchy and every form of priesthood, the worship of the Virgin Mary and the institution of baptism, as well as the belief in purgatory and transubstantiation (Arnold 1896). They further discarded the belief that Christ was crucified (Jalimam 2002: 170-180). They fasted for at least a full month (Arnold 1896: 199), and prayed five times a day and five times at night, with frequent kneeling (Arnold 1896: 36). They also used the symbol of a crescent and a star, which resembles the iconography of the Turkish flag (Vilar 2007), and refused to venerate the symbol of the cross, calling it ‘a tree of shame’ (Pilar 1927). Solovjev (1948) examined the primary sources of the Bogumil medieval elders and postulated that Bogumils generally repudiated the symbol of the cross. Commenting on the fact that cross was occasionally engraved on medieval Bosnian tombstones, Solovjev (1948: 95-99) states that these did not belong to Bogumils, but were erected during the Ottoman period to stress adherence to the Orthodox Christian faith.

These medieval tombstones are the most distinctive of all the surviving cultural features of medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina testifying to the early Islamic presence. They are called ‘stećci’, and about sixty thousand still remain. Donia and Fine (1994: 23-24) assert that all three local denominations erected these tombstones. Truhelka (1942) and Ćurčić (cited in Solovjev 1948: 90) disagree; they both note that stećci are found almost

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139 On Christ’s crucifixion, the Qur’an (4: 157) reveals: ‘That they said (in boast), “We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah”; but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them.’ For an extremely well-analysed and fascinating discussion on the crucifixion from a Muslim perspective, see Ayoub (1992).

140 Cf. Appendix VIII

141 Cf. Appendix IX
exclusively in the geographic areas that belonged to the Bogumils, and are far less prevalent in other areas, especially those areas under the explicit control of a Catholic bishop or the Orthodox Church. Moreover, medieval Serbia meted out especially harsh treatment to the Bogumils (Vaknin 2007), contributing to the separation of Bulgarian and Bosnian co-religionists. Many medieval tombstones in Bosnia and Herzegovina are engraved with ornaments and motifs in Islamic style. Imamović (1998: 41) mentions motifs such as a crescent and star; these symbols can be seen at the Mount of Bukovik, one of the hills surrounding Sarajevo, engraved on tombstones clustered around each other near a spring on one of the highest peaks. Such remote locations were usual for Bogomil burials, as well as for their ancient places of worship, the *dovišta* (Djedović 2006; Pašić 2005; Suljkić 1997).

In their mysticism, the Bogomils resembled the Islamic Sufi orders, where worshippers seek out secluded, remote places to practice *dhikr* (recitation of the names of God) and meditation; they worshipped on the remote mountainous peaks with their *pir* (also *shaikh* or saint) – this was a title given to Sufi masters, although Markotić (1964: 52) mistakenly translates it as referring to the ‘thunder-god’. Thus, when the Sufi sheikh of the Mevlevi *tariqat* (order) arrived with Mehmet Fatih’s army at the foot of Mount Igman near Hodidjed, today’s Sarajevo, the last Bogumil *djed* (elder) presented him with his holy stick (Imamović 1998), providing yet more evidence of the symbiosis between Bogumilism and Islam. Malkić (2009: 220) states that this holy stick was preserved for over five centuries in

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142 According to Pilar (1927), the Bulgarian Bogumils later converted to Christianity, whereas the Bosnian Bogumils embraced Islam, and the reason for these asymmetrical conversions was the geographical rift and loss of connection between the two, which was spurred on by Serbian persecution of the Bulgarian Bogumils. 143 For more on Islamic pre-Ottoman features in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak, which was previously part of the Bosnian Ottoman province and later became part of southern Serbia, see Džogović (2006: 7-20).
the Mevlevi Tekke in Sarajevo, but vanished when it was demolished in 1958. In addition to Islamic symbols, the tombstones sometimes include interesting texts. In this, they resemble Islamic tradition and bear certain similarities with Islamic tombstones (Malkić 2009: 217-223). Studying Bosnian tombstones and comparing them with Turkish ones, Boşdurmaz (2011) emphasises that Bosnian tombstones differ, having some unique characteristics in terms of their shape and the text engraved on them, which they preserved from their medieval ancestors. Vego (1962: 160, 199) asserts that two Bogumil tombstones from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries mention the word ‘Sracin’, which he believes to be a literary corruption of ‘Saracen’.

Dizdar,144 in his most notable collection of poetry, Kameni Spavač (Stone Sleeper)145 (1973), created a powerful mythopoeic meditation on Bosnian culture in all its historical manifestations. Its main theme is a quest to trace and decipher the roots of Bosnian Muslims. The medieval stećci and the Islamic messages engraved on them are the muse that inspires the poet. Buturović (2002: 35-53) observes: ‘The Stone Sleeper is especially germane for Bosnian Muslims, insofar as it “authenticates” their identity in a space-time that predates – and thus challenges – the one at the root of their official ethno-national identity.’ The Stone Sleeper alludes to the Islamic inscriptions on the stećak as showing that the Bosniaks may well have been Muslims even before the Ottoman arrival.

144 Mak Dizdar (1917-1971) is commonly hailed as the most eminent poet of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
145 His most notable collection of poetry, Stone Sleeper [Kameni spavač] (Mostar: Prva Književna Komuna), republished in 1973, is a powerful mytho-poetic meditation on Bosnian culture in its historical manifestations. Its main theme is epistemological, representing a quest to trace and decipher the roots of Bosnians, and especially Bosnian Muslims. The poet was inspired by medieval tombstones (stećci) and the scripts engraved on them. They are considered to be the heritage of the Bosnian Bogumils. Buturović (2002) observes: ‘Stone Sleeper is especially germane for Bosnian Muslims, insofar as it “authenticates” their identity in a space-time that predates, and thus challenges, the one at the root of their official ethno-national identity.’ For detailed discussion for the parabolas and symbolism of the poems, see Buturović (2002: 35-54).
Jones (2004: 717) describes this as an ‘act of constructing a Bosnian identity through the country’s medieval past – an identity of the heretic faithful, persecuted but impossible to exterminate’. The challenge it represents for Bosnian Muslim identity is best illustrated by a poem in the collection called ‘A text about a text’, in which the meaning of a medieval text written in the Arabic style, from right to left, is debated by the five people who discover it:

Those who insist on reading from right to left

Are wrong all along –

A third one says half crazed

And half amazed

Look it’s a secret from the darkest days of old

Rising it seems from the depths of our murkiest dreams

Its signs are like writing

Seen in mirror –

Mutters a mouth calm and cold

The fifth with clenched fists and trembling fingers tries to hold

This mirror of clear redeeming grace

But it slips to the floor

For in it that instant he recognises

His own ancient

Forgotten face.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ The poem is adapted from Buturović (2002: 41-42). For the purposes of space, the poem is abbreviated, but it can be read in its entirety in Buturović’s article.
This overview relates the significance of the pre-Ottoman Islamic presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fact that bears particular significance for the question of the identity of Bosnian Muslims; they consider themselves to be the heirs of the Bosnian Bogumils, and thus indigenous inhabitants of Bosnia. This is especially important to remember when discussing the rise of modern ethno-nationalism in the Balkans, which thwarted the national development of Bosniaks by casting them in the role of remnants of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire. During the nineteenth century, with the exponential rise of ethno-liberalism, Bosnia became the chief battleground for the clash between centralisation and the preservation of local autonomy, which the Bosniaks saw as the only way to protect their culture, language and identity (Karpat 2001: 75-126). As Bosnia failed to be incorporated into the European system of modern nation-states, Bosniaks were represented as Turkish converts occupying Christian land; the ultimate expectation was that they would either decamp back to Turkey or ‘revert’ to the faith of their alleged Christian ancestors. The fact that the Bosniaks preserved a regional identity that differentiated them from Muslims elsewhere in the Balkans was disregarded, and their further national development was forcefully suppressed. On the other hand, the Christian millets were guided into a previously unawakened national awareness by the diligent efforts of the Catholic and Orthodox clergy (Velikonja 2003; Perica 2003: 203-225), under the auspices of the Great Powers (Mazower 2012).

Although the development of national consciousness amongst the Christian population was a painstakingly slow process,147 the Orthodox and Catholic population were

147 Zulfikarpašić (1994: 109) relates an anecdote about the Yugoslav writer of Croatian origin, Tugomir Alupović. When instructing his mother to adopt the term ‘Croat’ to describe her identity, she replied: ‘Please, son, do not change the religion! What Croats are you talking about? We are no Croats, we are Catholics!’
gradually persuaded to abandon the usage of the term ‘Bosniak’, which they had previously adopted to describe their identity (Cerić 1968: 124). In this way, the category of ‘Bosniak’ only remained in usage among the local Muslim population (Cerić 1968: 124). However, following the Berlin Congress in 1878, they too stopped identifying themselves as Bosniaks, ‘because it was not a sufficiently descriptive term to identify the Muslim ethnic component’ (Hadžijahić 1974: 92). This was because all other Muslim minorities were nationalised into their host countries, while Bosnia was not accepted as a recognised nation-state. To fill this gap, a Turkish profile was applied to Bosnian Muslims, and Balkan Muslims in general, through the joint efforts of the Great Powers and the local Christian populations. The term ‘Turk’ became a synonym for Muslims – any Muslim community in the Balkans was, by implication, of Turkish nationality.

The Turkish Tanzimatçilar ignored the fact that the Bosniaks were not a part of the Turkish ethnic tapestry and deliberately emphasised the ambiguity between the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Turkish’. The Tanzimatçilar maintained their persistent intention to ‘Turkify’ the Bosniaks, both in the aftermath of the Berlin Congress and during the subsequent Austrian occupation in 1878, when they called for a peaceful transfer of power, urging the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meekly accept their new ruler (Filandra

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148 All the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina were referred to as ‘Bosniaks’ of varying religious affiliation. It was only in the nineteenth century that nationalism added an additional dimension to religious identity. As late as 1925, high-school textbooks for year four in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes described the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina as follows: ‘Bosniaks too belong to the population [inhabiting the area] around Mount Dinara within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. By Bosniaks, we refer to the inhabitants of northern Bosnia. They are a hard-working, brisk, dogged and somewhat strongheaded people. There are Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic Bosniaks; the former are the largest group and the latter are the smallest. The Muslims are the [ancestors] of [the] Bogumils, who in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries accepted Islam.’ (Our Kingdom and the Balkan Peninsula 1925: 69).

149 For more on this issue, see the ‘Study Analysis’ from the Centre for Social Studies (1970: 167, 178, 251).
1998: 29). The events surrounding the Austrian occupation and subsequent annexation relate to this thesis in four major ways. First, building on the analysis of the previous chapter, they demonstrate the contribution of the Tanzimatçilar to the carve-up begun by the establishment of the New World Order, which caused the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the formation of new nation-states. Secondly, they offer an insight into the nationalist policies of the Tanzimatçilar concerning the Bosnian Muslims, and serve as a cogent example of the rifts between the modernists and Islamists that were such a recognisable feature of Muslim attempts to come to terms with modernity, as argued in chapter two. The dichotomy in the international political approach to Bosnia in the nineteenth century was a feature that resurfaced in the recent conflicts of the 1990s. Thirdly, the Austrian occupation provides a good picture of the political immaturity, perhaps even naivety, of the Bosnian Muslim political leadership, which stemmed from the fact that their thwarted national development impeded the possibility of Bosniaks playing any future political role within region. Lastly, with the regard to the research question the Austrian occupation points to the way future conflicts involving Bosnian Muslims would be concluded. The following section offers more a detailed discussion of the implications of Austrian involvement in the suppression of the Bosnian Muslims’ national development.

4.3 The Austro-Hungarian annexation and occupation of Bosnia

Article 25 of the Berlin Congress of 1878 ceded Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austro-Hungarian rule, despite the fact that Austria was not eager to formally occupy the region. The main reason for this reluctance was the high level of instability in Bosnia and

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150 It is thought that the Austrians paid two million Turkish pounds in return for the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina (Rizvić 2000).
Herzegovina caused by the insurrections of local Christians and their hostility towards the Muslim population. Austria had already satisfied some of its imperialistic appetites and did not want to lose the advantage it had gained vis-à-vis the other Great Powers; it conducted a considerable amount of trade with the Balkans, monopolised commerce on the Danube and controlled the postal and telegraph systems, which were crucial for the rapid transmission of information:

Austrian steamers, directed from Trieste, took possession of both the coast[al] and foreign trade of Turkey. The Danube traffic was monopolised by a company subsidised from Vienna. The foreign and internal postal system, except at Constantinople, was almost completely in the hands of the Austrian Lloyd’s and controlled by Austrian officials. (Littell’s Living Age 188: 771)

Furthermore, Austria had built uninterrupted rail networks connecting northern Germany with Tbilisi, Salonica and Mitrovitza in southern Serbia, and had almost finished construction of the Bosnian line, running all the way to Vienna. It also had ambitious plans for connecting Constantinople with Salonica, which, being only 670 nautical miles from Alexandria, would make it the quickest route between East and West.151 A secure railway network, connected to strategic ports, would ensure Austria’s imperialist dominance. Moreover, before the unification of Germany, Prussia’s Prince Otto von Bismarck supported Austria’s extension to the east through the policy of ‘Drang Nach Osten’ (the extension of its Eastern policy). Skilfully encompassing German imperial pretensions, Bismark openly declared that Austria must become the Oester Reich or ‘Eastern front’ (An Eastern Diplomat 1897: 570-578).

151 The only other quick route was the Italian one from Brindisi, which was only 150 nautical miles further from Alexandria than Salonica. However, the Italian route was at the time too dependant on France to be completely safe for use by the other Great Powers (‘Servia’ 1878: 223).
Mazower (2001: 106) points out that the Austrians began to fear that once the ‘Eastern Question’ was resolved, Europe would inevitably turn its attention to the ‘Austro-Hungarian question’. This thesis argues that this would have been the expected course for the European Enlightenment forces to take, as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire left the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the only multicultural domain in Europe – a situation the new international arrangement could not tolerate. Britain was the most sensitive to Austrian dominance, due to Austria’s potential to establish good relations with Russia, which was seeking to seize India (see chapter three). Indeed, a great number of English-speaking literary ‘explorers’ embarked upon a writing crusade – this time turning their vitriol on Austria, using their favourite tried-and-tested trope, religion. The ruling Hapsburgs were portrayed as the mercenary of Roman Catholicism, whose greed had led to the Islamic penetration of Europe.\(^{152}\) Citing the persecutions of the Bogumils, these writers often used Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of how ‘the abhorrent supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Tongue’ (‘Servia’ 1878: 223) led to the success of Islam. The British were also apprehensive of emerging German imperial pretensions: ‘[Bismarck] did all in his power to encourage Austria to enter the Slav trap prepared for her in Bosnia’ (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 403).

When the Treaty of San Stefano was dashed aside in favour of the Berlin Treaty, it was seen as the result of Bismarck’s adroit diplomacy, whereby the Austro-Hungarian Empire was to be coaxed into occupying Bosnia – an agreement that, two years earlier, it had refused to sign on moral grounds (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 403). Austro-Hungary, in

\(^{152}\)The persecution of the Bogumils by the Catholic Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was often cited as the main reason why the Ottomans were successful in spreading Islam in Eastern Europe. ‘[T]he papal pretensions to supreme authority over all Christian churches, which the Crusaders of the West imposed with such violence and cruelty, paved the way for the triumph of the Ottoman invaders’ (‘Servia’ 1878: 223).
fact, had made good use of the valuable intelligence pouring through the cables and postal routes it administered across the Balkans, and under a calculated diplomatic pretext, it attempted to avoid plunging into the midst of the Russian-sponsored, hostile pan-Slavism it knew it would encounter once it was pronounced official governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it eventually succumbed to Bismark’s diplomatic influence, and agreed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, on condition that formal suzerainty remained in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. Even a nominal Bosnian connection to the decaying empire was a guarantee that Austrian existence would not be threatened by any of the Great Powers as long as the Ottoman Empire remained intact. The Germans were content, as the Austrian buffer in the Balkans enabled their further imperial expansion towards the east.

While the Turkish Tanzimatçilar may have welcomed this move, the Bosniaks were living in ‘anxiety because they felt that events of deep importance for their future and their survival were occurring’ (Rizvić 1990: 11). Kreševljaković (1937: 18) recounts that the Bosniaks’ response to Austrian occupation was twofold: one group was complaisant, justifying the Turkish action as a last-resort response to pressure from the Great Powers; the other group, however, displayed bitterness, pledging that ‘the Sultan can give away Istanbul if he wants but not Bosnia, and even if he orders us to surrender to the Austrians, we will not do it’. This is an important point, because an almost identical divergence of opinion occurred over the signing of the Dayton Agreement: one group was supportive because it was said that the Americans had threatened to bomb the Bosnian army if they did not withdraw from positions claimed by the Serbs; the other group portrayed this ultimatum as a hoax, and maintained that the war should be fought to the end, when it would be clear which ‘side’ was victorious.
With regards to the Berlin Treaty, it seemed that the Bosniaks were neither properly informed nor, apparently, aware of the schism within the Porte. It was not the sultan himself who signed the treaty but the Tanzimatçilar, who appeared to be his representatives but were, in reality, representatives of the ‘Enlightenment project’, according to which, Islam was to be confined within the borders of a future Turkish state. The Great Powers did not consider Sultan Abdülhamid II a viable enough ally to participate in the new carve-up; he was accused of pan-Islamic tendencies and of attempting to revive the Ottoman Empire by mobilising the Muslims within his tottering domain. For this reason, he was not even invited to the congress. In vain, the Bosniaks attempted, for the last time during the nation-building process, to defend Bosnian autonomy, but Bosnia’s destiny had already been decided by others, and the agreement proceeded with a seemingly unstoppable momentum that anticipated the course of all future settlements. The signatories to the treaty unanimously concluded that the Bosniaks were not to become a nation, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was not to become a state but a protectorate, a pattern that would be reproduced a century or so later.

Bosnians of all confessions turned to armed resistance against Austria.\textsuperscript{153} However, Donia (2006) argues that despite the claims of unity, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was already divided on this issue: while Catholics were not motivated to rise up against their co-religionists, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, encouraged by charismatic religious leaders, declared their brotherhood and took up arms, albeit for different reasons.

\textsuperscript{153} Donia (2006: 103) found evidence of this appeal for armed resistance in the personal collection of a colleague: ‘You fellow Bosnians, Christians and Latins [Orthodox and Catholic], for the honour of the homeland in which you have experienced centuries of tranquillity, go with your Islamic countryman into battle and expel the enemy. Defending the homeland is the duty of all people who live in it.’
Meanwhile, Bosnian Jews, although paying a ‘war tax’, were completely disenchanted.\textsuperscript{154} Nevertheless, the uprising turned into the outbreak of war proper. A timely report from the region (\textit{Editorial Section 1878: 795}) recorded that attempts by the Austrian troops to enter Bosnia ‘provoked strenuous resistance, and severe engagements have occurred between the troops and the insurgent Bosnians, the latter numbering over one hundred thousand men’.

To help the Austrian troops suppress Bosnian resistance, the \textit{Porte} dispatched reinforcements of four battalions under the command of Hafiz Pasha. This act is convincing evidence of the determination of the \textit{Tanzimatçilar} to reorganise ‘European Turkey’. The Bosnians’ fierce resistance delayed the entry of the Austrians for an entire three months. They also caught and imprisoned the Turkish commander, and even proclaimed a ‘people’s government’, electing the imprisoned commander Hafiz Pasha as its leader. Still unaware of the real intentions of the \textit{Tanzimatçilar}, they hoped through this act to gain the support of the \textit{Porte} – a further indication that the Bosniaks were out of touch with the realities of the day, a pattern that has continued throughout the history of their political struggles.

The main reason for this political naivety was that a mature political understanding of the tenor of the times required the development of a national awareness; in all the other Balkan regions, this was diligently encouraged by external forces, but the Great Powers took pains to ensure that such an awareness was absent from the Bosniak political stage. In other words, the Bosniaks did not lack awareness of their separate ethno-national identity, but they were neither presented with the opportunity nor given the appropriate tools to build a modern nation. Most critically, they lacked the Great Power support needed to achieve

\textsuperscript{154} Serbs, by that time, had developed a sense of Serbian nationalism, and were disappointed that Serbia was not given any role in Bosnia. This was different from the Bosniaks’ patriotism – they were defending the only country they had, as articulated by the appeal from their leaders. See: Donia (2006: 44-55).
national recognition, because unlike those who were fighting for the ‘rights’ of Christians, Bosniaks were fighting for the ‘rights’ of Muslims. Consequently, the Bosniaks were outnumbered and defeated by the joint Austrian-Tanzimat forces, with the tacit approval of the Great Powers. The subsequent Austrian retribution affected the entire country. Austria’s vindictiveness intensified Bosniak emigration to the Ottoman lands, which had already begun with the persecution of Muslims that followed the rebellions of the Christian millets, as detailed in chapter three.\textsuperscript{155} The Tanzimatçilar welcomed these migrations because it corresponded to their targets of Turkification of Bosniaks as explained further below.

4.3.1 Tanzimat ‘Turkification’

The Ottoman approach to Bosniak migration reflected the fundamental rift in its state apparatus. Whilst the Tanzimat faction favoured migration as an extended tool of ‘Turkification’, offering to transport the Bosniaks by boat from Salonika, the Islamist side was against mass migration because the Bosniaks’ presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina ensured the survival of the Muslim ummah in Europe, affording a glimpse of hope for the future return of a revitalised Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{156} This ambiguity in Ottoman migration policy lasted until 1882, although it would continue to linger in various forms until the full annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. However, in 1881 the French occupied Tunisia, and in 1882 the British colonised Egypt. In response, Sultan Abdülhamid II

\textsuperscript{155} Some migrations were encouraged by an array of Austrian-sponsored spies and agents, until the fear of Serbian predominance in Bosnia, and by implication Russian penetration, forced the Austrian government to change its policy and actively discourage Bosniaks from migrating. Rizvić (2000) cites Osman Nuri Hadžić as reporting, in the early days of the Austrian occupation, that Austrian agents visited unsophisticated Muslim villagers and spread rumours that that sultan would give land and a sum of money to all those who ran away from the Kafirs (infidels) and moved permanently to Turkey. For more on this issue, see Rizvić (2000: 14). See also: Hauptman (1967).

\textsuperscript{156} There are two relatively long documents signed by fourteen ministers in the Ottoman cabinet: \textit{Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat} No 3/7, 27 April 1879 and \textit{Yıldız Sadaret Hüsusi Maruzat} No. 163/29, 6 January 1880 (\textit{Başvekalet Arşivi} [Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office]). The second document cites four reasons against the Bosnian Muslim migrations, mainly based on the prevention of Austrian consolidation of power in the region.
initiated the ideology of pan-Islamism, based on the idea of a political *ummah*, united through the caliphate, with a view to encouraging Muslim cultural resistance to European (including Russian) imperialism (Karpat 2001: 3, 14). In addition, in 1882 Baron von Kallay, the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s minister of finance, who was in effect the governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903, created the office of *re’is ul-ulema*, the supreme religious head of the Bosnian Muslims (the *re’is ul-ulema* still continues to play an important political role in Bosnia). This action empowered the Bosnian Muslims; they were given a representative and a political voice, and as a consequence the mass migration temporarily abated.

Both of these events urged the sultan to liberalise his migration policies and take expedient measures to encourage all the Muslims of the empire’s old domains to migrate to the Ottoman state, in order to increase the number of Muslims who could be rapidly mobilised and politicised. The sultan was further prompted to encourage Bosniak migration by the anti-migration measures imposed by Kallay, who, fearful that the Serbs might become the dominant group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, introduced a series of preventative measures, as well as incentives for those Bosniaks who had already emigrated to return.\footnote{Many Bosniaks who emigrated to what was left of the Ottoman state wanted to return, mainly because their economic situation led to hunger and a high mortality rate, but also because of the language barriers they encountered in Turkey. The migrants were looking for ways and means to return, but were discouraged by the Ottomans and the Austrians. Austria had placed harsh conditions on return, and generally did not allow it. For example, anyone who spent more than five years outside Bosnia, or who became a foreign national, or who left Bosnia without obtaining special permission was considered an ‘illegal alien’ and not allowed to return. The Porte also prohibited the return of refugees and migrants to Bosnia by issuing only a limited number of passports and asking for repayment of the money distributed to the refugees as a precondition to return. Moreover, it was looking for ways to resettle the Bosnian refugees at the borders of newly emerged Christian states, as Bosnian Muslims had proved to be good and reliable soldiers, able to guard the shrunken Ottoman borders, which, from the Berlin Congress to the end of the First World War, served as a target for neighbouring client-states of the Great Powers. For more on the forced migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Šehić (1980), Kraljačić (1990), Juzbašić (1990), Laveleye (1885: 124-127).}

To counteract these, Abdülhamid II ordered his aide and cabinet member, Ibrahim Dervish
Pasha (who, according to my interpretation of the documents, was a *Tanzimatçı*) to prepare a memorandum with recommendations for measures to induce migration. Dervish Pasha, focusing on the oppressive policies of the newly independent neighbouring countries rather than on Bosnia itself, concluded that immigration was the only solution and it was a religious and humanitarian duty to help Bosnian Muslims to emigrate (Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office, 19 May 1894). He was appalled by the Islamic interpretations used by the Bosnian *ulema* (religious scholars), who were advising against emigration by citing a *hadith* (a sacred saying attributed to the Prophet): ‘*hubb al-watan, min al-iman*’ (‘love of the homeland is love of the faith’). He recommended that the Islamic scholars of the *Porte* transcribe the ‘real’ meanings of the *Sunnah* and *hadith* and distribute them throughout Bosnia.

In the battle between the Bosniaks, Ottoman Islamists and the *Tanzimatçılar* over the accurate Islamic interpretations of verses in the Qur’an and the *Sunnah*, the real conflict was nested within the protection of narrow ‘national’ interests. Evidence of this is found in a widely quoted memorandum from the *şehbender* (consul) in Ragusa (Dubrovnik), which helped the Ottoman cabinet formulate its final views on migration from Bosnia. The document suggested that intensified migrations of Bosniaks could be used as a tool to increase the Muslim population and counterbalance the ratio of Armenian and Greek inhabitants in the Ottoman lands (*Bosna-Hersek Belgeleri* [Archival Bosnian Documents], Doc. 39, 17 March 1901: 168-181). It also reminded the *Porte* of its long-term interests in keeping the Bosnian Muslims in Europe in readiness for the empire’s recovery, and recommended that rather than encouraging mass migration, the *Porte* should use diplomatic
channels to provide them with economic and cultural assistance (*Bosna-Hersek Belgeleri* [Archival Bosnian Documents], Doc. 39, 17 March 1901: 169).

However, all hopes for the revitalisation of the empire were dashed in July 1908 when Sultan Abdülhamid II received a telegram from the *Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress), an obscure political movement of exiles operating out of Macedonia, Paris and Geneva, and the only Muslim political society who enjoyed Great Power support. The telegram threatened the sultan with dethronement if he did not reinstate the constitution and cease his alleged dictatorship. Abdülhamid II placed great emphasis on his status as a Muslim ruler, and in this respect he departed from the practice of his Tanzimat ministers and his Tanzimat-oriented predecessors, who sought to play down Muslim exclusiveness in favour of the new doctrine of ‘Turkish-Ottomanism’, which soon became simply ‘Turkishness’. As seen earlier, to substitute ‘Turkishness’ for Islam was, indeed, the ultimate aim of the Enlightenment project for ‘Turkey in Europe’. Hence, it was the sultan’s emphasis on Islam, and the support he received from traditionalists and Islamists, that alienated *Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* members, who subsequently metamorphosed into the ‘Young Turks’.

In addition, the sultan’s call generated a plausible echo among Muslims living in the colonised lands of the former empire that was equally alarming for the Great Powers. The Great Powers sponsored a military coup by the Young Turks and their *Hareket Ordusu*

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158 As soon as the Young Turks came to power, they confounded civic and ethnic definitions of the Turkish nation: every citizen of the empire, irrespective of his or her ethnic background, was declared to be a Turk. Then, in the aftermath of the formation of the Turkish republic, they became the descendants of Turkish tribesmen from Central Asia (Bruinessen 2008). For a succinct overview, see Glenny (2000: 216-219).
(Army of Action), and Abdülhamid II was rapidly replaced by Mehmed Reşat.\textsuperscript{159} The Young Turks seized the parliament building and this gesture finalised the 1908 revolution.\textsuperscript{160} In response to the Young Turks’ coup, and out of fear that they would encourage Bosniak emigration even more aggressively, leaving Bosnia vulnerable to Russian penetration via Serbian influence, Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and further tightened the conditions for emigration and return.\textsuperscript{161}

The Bosniaks replied to the annexation with the ‘Memorandum of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina’, which they submitted to the Ottoman parliament in February 1909 (Bandžović 2010: 115). In the memorandum, they emphasised their centuries-old loyalty to the Ottoman state and Islamic values. They further expressed their astonishment that the Porte could consider accepting the shameful sum of £2.5 million in return for turning more than a million and a half of its Bosnian subjects into ‘Austrian slaves’. Finally, they affirmed their belief that the sultan would not allow such a humiliation of ‘the most loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire’ (Imamović 2000: 430). The delegation even went to Istanbul to discuss the repercussions of the annexation, but the Tanzimat ministers advised them to meekly submit to their lot. This is another convincing example of the symbiosis between the Tanzimat officials and the Great Powers in their quest to rid the new Europe of any influential Muslim presence. The Bosniaks’ memorandum, as well as their

\textsuperscript{159} Sultan Mehmed Reşad was a brother of Sultan Abdülhamid II. He spent much of his life in seclusion, until his brother’s forced abdication. After his dethronement, Abdülhamid II was placed under house arrest. Reşad was a gentle man, with an interest in Persian literature, and unfamiliar with geopolitics. Thus, he was little more than a puppet. Unable to govern on his own accord, he accepted direction from the leadership of the Young Turks, mainly from the grand vizier.

\textsuperscript{160} For a well-conceived and articulate account of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, see Deringil (1998). For an adventurous account of the events during the revolution, wrapped in a novel, see the narrative of Buchan (1999), a British intelligence officer.

\textsuperscript{161} For an interesting account of Austrian visa policies regarding migration to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, see chapter thirteen of Durham’s (2007) work. Bandžović (2010) also presents an extremely rich and well-documented review of the difficulties encountered by Bosniaks during the forced migrations.
hopeful visit to the *Porte*, once again testified to their political immaturity and lack of awareness of the geopolitical situation, a behaviour that was to be repeated in 1992-95, with the Bosniaks’ futile pleas for help to neo-Islamist governments during the massacres and persecution.

This politically immature reaction to Austrian annexation was mainly due to the fact that Bosnian Muslims were too deeply immersed in their everyday struggle for survival to be able to devote much time to studying the international diplomatic arena. More critically, there was a lack of viable and trustworthy information. The links between the Bosniaks who stayed and those who emigrated were, for the most part, broken; the only channels of information open to them were Austrian or *Tanzimat* in origin, and these sources were generally biased, coloured by their respective national interests. However, the result of their official visit to Istanbul alerted the Bosniaks to the geopolitical reality of the day. Upon return, the delegation authorised its representatives to bow to the inevitable and accept Austria’s suzerainty over Bosnia and proclaim allegiance to the Austrian emperor. This was the first time they had admitted the political reality, in which the Bosniak leaders had to maintain a careful balance between the Austrian ruler and rising Serb and Croat nationalism in a political arena where they had neither allies nor supporters. This would, henceforth, be the sort of diplomatic tactic they would deploy throughout most of the twentieth century, as analysed in more detail later in the thesis.

4.4 Extended ‘Turkification’ in the international environment 1878-1914

Following the occupation of Bosnia, and over the coming years, Austro-Hungary evolved into a considerable imperial power and adopted an expansionist policy. It was able to expand towards the east, thanks to German efforts. Germany too became stronger following
unification, and further cemented its membership of the club of powerful states. Its position was mainly due to the invention of diesel-, gasoline- and electricity-driven engines by Diesel, Otto and Siemens, which enabled German ships to travel more rapidly. Deutsche Bank and Georg von Siemens also built the Baghdad railway, running from Berlin through Vienna, Bosnia and the Ottoman Empire to the oil fields in Kirkuk, north of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{162} In order to sustain this project, it was important to maintain peace in Bosnia by granting the Bosniaks’ minor requests. One of these was the postponement of agrarian reforms that would confiscate Muslim arable lands and woodland to presumably distribute amongst the Christian population. The Bosniaks feared that land reorganisation would empower the Serbs. Granting a delay represented a manoeuvre by which Austria hoped to control the rise of Serbian nationalism and rebuff Russian influence in the region.

However, Austria’s speedy ships, coupled with its well-equipped and technologically advanced railway system, proved a source of discontent amongst the other Great Powers, most notably Britain. In order to rein in Germany’s expansionist ambitions, Britain expedited the marriage between the British Princess Royal and her German counterpart, Wilhelm II, who shortly afterwards became kaiser. Young Kaiser Wilhelm, encouraged by the British, began to dream of colonies and imperial possessions, but to realise this dream he had to remove Bismarck, who, by means of a skilful diplomatic policy of moderation had managed to create an equilibrium of complex alliances, securing Germany’s peace and economic freedom (Taylor 1967). Bismarck’s removal would be fatal for peaceful diplomatic relations.

\textsuperscript{162} At that time, oil was thought to only exist in Baku, Russia, Kirkuk and Pennsylvania in the US. For more on this topic, see Engdahl (2004).
Thus, by early 1914, the majority of imperialist powers had been thrown into turmoil, and they began to weave a tangled web of mutual defence treaties across Europe. This was when the years of careful nurturing of local despots and secret societies throughout the Balkans started to pay off. One of the foreign-sponsored secret organisations was the ‘Black Hand’, which operated from Belgrade. The Black Hand supplied Gavrilo Princip with a revolver, instructing him to assassinate the Austrian imperial heir, Franz Ferdinand, during his ill-advised visit to Sarajevo. Although the assassination was only superficially successful, it was adopted as a genuine *causus belli*, and by August 1914 all the Great Powers were at war. It is interesting to note that, during this period, the assassination of a political figure or even a monarch would not normally lead to war but instead result in the public execution of the perpetrator, as in the case of Emil Hoedel, who a few years earlier had attempted to kill the German emperor (*Editorial Record* 1878: 795). Why Ferdinand’s assassination was different is a matter of historical

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163 Operating through secret societies, Russia and Britain militarily and financially supported the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks during both Ottoman and Austrian reign in the Balkans, a tactic that was aimed at destabilising their respective regimes.
164 Princip was a Bosnian Serb and a member of the Youth Bosnia organisation.
165 Franz Ferdinand, an heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne, was ill-advised to visit Sarajevo in June 1914. His visit was cynically arranged on St. Vitus’s Day in June 1914, the anniversary that Serbs celebrate as a symbolic spiritual and moral victory, despite the military defeat they suffered at the hands of the Turks at Kosovo Field in 1389. In the Serbian collective memory, this battle represents their five hundred year-long enslavement under the Turkish heel. ‘The Field of the Blackbird’, as it is called in Serbian folk culture, is an indispensable mythological element of Serbian literary epics, and it always appears as the centre-point of the resuscitation of Serbian nationalism. It represents a powerful icon in Serbian religious mythology: Prince Lazar, who was killed on the battlefield, was later canonised. After his death, Lazar became the personification of all Serbian suffering, and was transformed into a central historical figure in the collective image of the Serbian ‘trauma’. The story was constantly retold and passed down the generations, thus preserving the pseudo-memory of victimhood (Volkan 2002: 87-97).
166 Equipped with a revolver from Belgrade and given clear instructions by the Black Hand, young Princip attempted to shoot the Austrian heir. In order to create the perception of a brewing crisis, and to ensure that a plan B was in place, the route designated for the state visit ‘was lined with a half a dozen aspiring young assassins, each more incompetent then the next’. However, Princip was presented with a fairly easy target when the chauffeur stopped the roofless royal car right in front of him. For a full account of Princip’s clumsy assassination attempt, see West (1936: chapter 1) and Johnstone (2003: 127).
speculation, but the British ruling elite, having secured the necessary funds for a war,\textsuperscript{167} correctly calculated that it was the right time to finally demolish the tottering Ottoman Empire, whose destiny had long been governed by British financiers and creditors (as outlined in chapter three). The British wanted to pull the plug on the emerging German oil pipeline to Baghdad and gain control of the oilfields of Mesopotamia and Kirkuk (Engdahl 2004; Nef 2007). In 1917 the British army marched into Baghdad and, with the use of poisoned gas, managed to secure the oilfields. The Ottoman Empire fell, and the continental European powers began to repay the debts accumulated during the lingering ‘Eastern Crisis’ with dead bodies.

The First World War caused the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, leaving a number of Balkan provinces available to be incorporated into the new system of nation-states. The problem was that some of these provinces were so insignificant that neither had they a fully formed sense of national consciousness, nor was their formation financially feasible. For example, the former Austrian colonies of Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to gain political recognition, established a separate legal entity called the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, with a national parliament in Zagreb. The formidable international challenges and internal difficulties, however, forced this newly emerged state to seek help from the victorious Great Powers, but more immediately from the Kingdom of Serbia (Čaušević 1995: 5). The plea for Serbian help was openly submitted to the Regent Alexander in Belgrade by a parliamentary

\textsuperscript{167} Engdahl (2004) claims that the US government helped Britain finance the war. The law creating the Federal Reserve was rushed through an almost empty Congress on 23 December 1913, only months before the outbreak of war. When the British government bought war goods in the US and paid in sterling, the American manufacturer sold the pounds on to the Fed, which did not exchange it into gold from the Bank of England but kept it as a reserve currency. The currency in circulation in the US at that time rose by about 45 percent, resulting in high inflation and circulation of cash.
delegation; the regent replied in the affirmative, and a few months later the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed. The name of the new entity reflected the balance of power in the political and national representation of the newly formed polity. What is immediately obvious is that in neither of the names of the legally established region is the word ‘Bosniak’ mentioned. This can be explained in two ways: first, the Bosniaks were already politically exhausted and economically impoverished, and therefore unable to represent themselves; secondly, it was part of the endeavour to form a new Europe without a Muslim national presence. As a result, Bosniaks continued to emigrate to Turkey, and those who stayed were transformed into a defensive, closed and almost lethargic community, serving as ‘living proof’ that Bosnian Muslims did not deserve to become a fully fledged national entity. Despite this, their quest for national status continued.

4.5 The Bosniaks: between the Serbs and the Croats, 1918-40

The enforced suppression of a Bosniak national character recommenced during the Austrian occupation and continued with increased vigour during the life of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, whose name was changed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. During this period, both Serbs and Croats laid competitive claim to national kinship with the Bosniaks, with the aim of dominating the South Slav state (Friedman 1996: 61-105). This is because neither a ‘Greater Serbia’ nor a separate ‘Greater Croatia’ would be viable without this centrally located territory (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977: 254).

168 The Yugoslav kingdom ceased to exist in 1940 at the start of the Second World War, when the Yugoslav royal family escaped to the UK.
169 Domination would either materialise through becoming a majority nation or via the legitimisation of territorial claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosniaks were assiduously courted and pressured to declare themselves as either Serbs or Croats. However, they persistently refused to do so.\(^{170}\)

To safeguard the identity of the Bosniaks and their economic interests, Mehmed Spaho,\(^{171}\) an influential lawyer, formed a political party in February 1919. Spaho proposed to call it the ‘Bosniak Muslim Organisation’ (Filipović 1996: 67-68), but reactionary elements within the Yugoslav Kingdom’s political elites fiercely objected, warning of the dangers of isolation (Zulfirkarpašić 1994: 110).\(^{172}\) Instead, using a tactical manoeuvre, Spaho named his organisation the ‘Yugoslav Muslim Organisation’, even though it was clear that its primary aim was not to represent the position of all Muslims in Yugoslavia but only that of Bosnian Muslims (Purivatra 1974: 483-489). Historical evidence points to the fact that it would not have been possible to represent a unified Yugoslav Muslim position, because the other Muslim communities within Yugoslavia were already assimilated into the newly emerged nation-states. This formed a political cleavage between the Bosnian

\(^{170}\) Bosnian Muslims refused to acquiesce to either claim; they disagreed with the Serbs over the agrarian reforms, but were also afraid to anger them by acquiescing to Croat overtures. There was a tiny minority within the elite that proclaimed themselves either Serb or Croat, but the majority of the masses remained Bosniak and Islamic, without any clear support in place to enable them to develop a modern national consciousness fit for a new nation-state. Some, however, called for Habsburg tutelage as the only way to protect Bosnian Muslims and the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Banac 1984: 300-364).

\(^{171}\) Dr Mehmed Spaho was the most prominent and influential political figure in twentieth-century Bosnia and Herzegovina. For a long time, he did not have a biography, and many researchers relied on Purivatra’s (1974) impressive book for information related to Spaho. In recent times, however, the scarce, sporadic and almost anecdotal references have been converted into two useful and well-documented biographies of Spaho’s political life: Kamberović (2009) and Črnovršanin and Sadiković (2007). For a picture of Spaho built from personal memories, see Đulabić (1994). For a useful overview about Spaho’s political legacy, see Filandra (2001).

\(^{172}\) See also the statement by Adil Zulfikarparšić, a Bosniak politician and prominent public figure who lived in exile in Switzerland until 1990, and is now deceased. Zulfikarparšić claimed that Spaho’s son, Avdo Spaho, confided to him that his father wanted to name the party the ‘Bosniak Muslim Organisation’, and that he could corroborate this claim with written evidence (Dilas and Gače 1994: 110). Avdo Spaho became a deputy leader of the Liberal Bosniak Party in the 1990s, a political party that fights for a Bosniak nationality ‘without a Muslim component’. In other words, this party views all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Bosniaks, regardless of religion, as was the case before the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, when Christians started to abandon the term ‘Bosniak’ as a description of their identity. For more on this subject, see Fočo (1994).
Muslims and other Muslim communities of the region, who saw their political interests bound up with the nation-states they lived in. In this respect, they did not need specific political representation, and did not rely on the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation; rather, they fought for their rights through the Islam Muhafazai Hukuk Cemiyeti (Islamic Society for the Preservation of the Legal Rights of Muslims). Thus, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation dealt specifically with the Bosnian Muslim question, focusing on resistance to the competing nationalist claims of the Serbs and Croats, with the aim of preserving a unified Bosnian territory. The party’s leaders accurately perceived Serb and Croat chauvinism to be inimical to the improvement of the economic and social position of Bosnian Muslims; their threat to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina would render the Bosnian Muslims a permanently ineffectual minority (Imamović 1998). The continued migration of Bosnian Muslims to Turkey did not help. In 1934, the Young Turk government in Ankara announced a ‘repatriation policy’ for the Balkans, claiming that they expected 400,000 Muslims from Romania, a million Bulgarian Muslims and 800,000 Muslims from Yugoslavia to ‘repatriate’ to Turkey.

Bosniak representatives, through the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, had to pursue a course appropriate for a vulnerable and insignificant political group. This entailed frequent switching of support to whichever ‘side’ was deemed to serve their best interests.

173 To illustrate, Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish Muslims politically identified with whichever nation they happened to remain in after the nineteenth-century territorial carve-up, and demanded only religious autonomy and the preservation of their landholdings.
174 The Turkish name suggests that most probably the Muslims in question were Turkish minorities. The party had a brief life, due to the emigration of the remaining Muslim communities from Yugoslav lands.
175 Muslims migrated to Turkey from Macedonia, Sandžak (South Serbia) and Romania in large numbers, and also to some extent from Bulgaria. The least voluntary population movements occurred with Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the fact that, despite their sympathy towards the Turks, Bosniaks never really identified with them in a national sense. See: Bandžović (2006: 186).
Although, from a contemporary perspective, this might seem a natural course to adopt, the Bosniak leadership was often accused of political inconsistency, especially if they withheld their support to either the Serbs or the Croats in any given situation. It became fashionable among Serbs and Croats to refer to Bosniaks as unreliable and opportunistic, and therefore unsuitable as respected political opponents.\footnote{Croats often accused Bosniaks of supporting any Belgrade government that benefited the Muslims. This was especially the case in 1921, when Bosniaks decided to help the Serbs achieve a centralised rather than federal Yugoslav state by voting for the Vidovdan Constitution (Meštrović 1960: 50-51). This was often used as an explanation of all Yugoslavia’s subsequent problems.} However, it was only possible for the Bosniaks to continue juggling between the two parochial approaches as long as Serbs and Croats remained in competition over Muslim loyalty. When in 1939 Serb and Croat political leaders found a mutually beneficial solution, they rapidly struck a deal and, taking no account of Bosniak views, divided Bosnia and Herzegovina amongst themselves in the Cvetković-Maček Agreement.\footnote{The Cvetković-Maček Agreement was officially put into effect on 26 August 1939, with the formation of the Government of National Agreement (Vlada narodnog sporazuma).} By proclaiming an autonomous Croatia (\textit{Banovina Hrvatska}) and the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agreement effectively meant the federalisation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Partition, and the ultimate elimination of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was met with vehement opposition from Bosniak leaders. Spaho even travelled to Belgrade to discuss these issues with the Yugoslav regent, only to be murdered in his hotel room in Belgrade (Kamberović 2009: 10-11; Đulabić 1994: 64-65).

Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, was unintentionally saved from extinction by the \textit{raison d’état} of the Great Powers. The British disliked the neutrality agreement that the Yugoslav prime minister, Stojadinović, had brokered with Hitler.\footnote{In his post-war memoirs, Prime Minister Stojadinović claimed that Yugoslavia would have been preserved during the Second World War, just as Switzerland was, if his political legacy had been adopted (cited in Đulabić 1994: 63). Glenny (2000: 473) has produced an excellent account. He calls Yugoslavia’s entry into the Tripartite Agreement a ‘diplomatic triumph’.} As a result of British
interference,\textsuperscript{179} the Cvetković-Maček government was overthrown, and the British secret service removed Stojadinović to Madagascar. Yugoslav patriots were unaware of the extent of international involvement in the revolt and unanimously chanted ‘better grave than the slave’, with little expectation that international intervention in their political affairs would result in the bombardment of Yugoslavia and subsequent German occupation. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina was inadvertently preserved intact, it was nonetheless dragged into a ruthless civil war. In an effort to protect their autonomy, and their lives, the Bosniaks sought German protection, claiming that Bosnian Muslims did not have Slav origins but were descendants of Germanic Goths (Redžić 1987: 10, 73). This appeal met with failure, and the Bosniaks became prime targets for both Serb and Croat extreme nationalist forces throughout the war. In response, they formed a Muslim SS troop with generous Nazi support, creating still further animosity, and atrocities were committed on all sides (Dželetović Ivanov 1987; Lepre 1997).

The Cvetković-Maček Agreement and its aftermath, however, are significant in another respect: in March 1991 Franjo Tuđman, the Croatian president, and Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian president, revisited this arrangement by agreeing the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ignoring the existence of the Bosnian Muslims.\textsuperscript{180} This resulted in the infamous Karadjordjevo Agreement, which the Serb and Croat nationalist leaderships

\textsuperscript{179} Due to their traditional imperialistic rivalry with Germany, the British encouraged the Yugoslav entry into the Second World War. They engineered a military coup in Yugoslavia through the British minister in Belgrade, Winston Churchill, and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), jointly offered assistance to a receptive audience led by the Yugoslav director of military operations and intelligence, General Yanković. He assumed the alias ‘L.R. Hope’ (‘Last Ray of Hope’). For an informative and concise article on Anthony Eden’s Balkan mission, see Morewood (2008: 34-41). For further reading, see Balfour and Mackey (1980) and Lawlor (CUP 1994).

\textsuperscript{180} According to the testimony of Stipe Mesić, Tuđman offered north-west Bosnia (the Bihać, Cazin and Kalduša areas) to Milošević, saying that ‘he did not need that part of Bosnia’. The interview with Mesić, in a programme called ‘Oko’, was aired on Serbian National Television (RTS) on the 23 February 2009 at 18.00 GMT.
saw as the solution to their historical disputes and a step towards the mutually agreed establishment of a Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia. Even today, this theory has its sympathisers among contemporary scholars.\textsuperscript{181} To escape possible slaughter, once again Bosnian Muslims turned to an external force for protection; this time, they appealed to the UN and the ‘international community’ – without success. The Bosniaks became the principle victims of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The unwillingness of the UN to intervene was only the tip of the iceberg; the real cause lay in the way Bosnian Muslim identity was misrepresented during Yugoslavia’s socialist period, as discussed in the next section.

4.6 The proclamation of a Yugoslav communist ‘Muslim’ nation

During the modern period, Serbs and Croats continued to pursue their competing claims to control over the Bosnian republic and its resources in the federal Yugoslavia. This continued until 1969, when Bosniaks were recognised as a separate nation and attained the right to share in Yugoslavia’s resources. As a result, they became politically influential in the region for the first time. It was also the first time in post-1878 history that Bosniaks gained national recognition. However, they did not assume their historical name, but were bestowed with the new national designation of ‘Muslims’, in accordance with the conclusion of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Conference of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 17 May 1968 that ‘the Muslims are a distinct nation’ (Purivatra 1970: 30).

\textsuperscript{181} Djokić (2007) is the prime example of this scholarship. He saw the failure of the agreement as a missed opportunity for Serbs and Croats to find a permanent solution to their perpetual disagreements. In his work, he analyses in depth the Cvetković-Maček Agreement without ever mentioning the Bosnian Muslims, except for a peripheral acknowledgment of their existence. Even during the launch of his book, when I asked him to elaborate on his views on the Bosnian Muslims, he refused to pay attention to the issue. This is further proof of the negation of Bosniak nationhood.
The category of ‘Muslim nationality’ – that is ‘Muslim’ in a national rather than religious sense – was used for the first time in the 1971 census.\(^{182}\) To separate the national meaning from the obvious religious connotation of the term, the Communist leadership decided to use a capital ‘M’ when specifying the ethnic group and a lower-case ‘m’ for religious purposes. Although specific care was taken to eliminate confusion, this designation immediately gave rise to three contradictions. First, the word ‘Muslim’ defines an adherent to Islam and literally means ‘one who submits to God’. Consequently, the fact that the atheist leadership, who vehemently opposed *tawhid* (Islamic monotheism) and rejected creationist theories, adopted a religious term to describe a nationality was exceptionally perplexing. Secondly, a follower of Islam who belonged to the Muslim nation would be categorised according to the ‘disturbing name’ ‘Muslim muslim’\(^{183}\). The third point of confusion was the puzzle of who actually constituted this ‘Muslim’ nation. In other words, was the identification reserved for Bosnian Muslims or could the other Yugoslav ‘muslims’ also belong to the Muslim nation?

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182 There were numerous other attempts to find a solution to the identification and classification of Bosnian Muslims. The census designation for Bosnian Muslims had been an issue ever since the post-war Yugoslavia was established. To illustrate, the 1948 census permitted Bosnian Muslims to declare themselves as ‘undetermined Muslims’ if they failed to class themselves as either Serb Muslims or Croat Muslims. The results showed that the great majority of Bosnian Muslims used the category of ‘undetermined Muslim’. In the 1953 census, this category was eliminated and the new one of ‘Yugoslav undetermined’ was introduced, which was mainly used by Bosnian Muslims and some others who found the narrow nationalist definitions repugnant. In the 1961 census, alongside ‘Yugoslav undetermined’, there was a new category of ‘Muslim (ethnic membership)’, which eventually replaced the previous category. What is apparent is that Bosnian Muslims continued to identify themselves by whatever designation would permit them to demonstrate their separation from any of Yugoslavia’s dominant national groups, in contrast to those Muslims living in the other Yugoslav republics, who embraced the national designation of, for example, Macedonian or Albanian. Even when they gained the right to declare themselves nationally as ‘Muslims’, many remained decidedly Yugoslav in their orientation, and when given a chance to declare themselves as an ‘equal’, separate nation for the first time in more than a century, a large number continued to use the ‘Yugoslav’ category (Jahović 1991, cited in Friedman 1996: 160). For the demographics of the population claiming Yugoslav national status, see Burg (1983: 22) and Bandžović (2010).

183 Hamdija Čemerlić, the provost of the Theological University, used this phrase in an interview in 1987 (cited in Tanasković 2000: 171).
As mentioned previously, there was a tendency towards assimilation on the part of Muslims living in the other Yugoslav republics: according to census patterns, more than eighty percent of Muslims in Serbia identified themselves as ‘Serbs’, seventy percent of Muslims in Croatia identified themselves as ‘Croats’, and more than ninety percent of Muslims in Macedonia regarded themselves as ‘Macedonian’ (Burg 1983: 21). Tanasković (1992: 67-73), therefore, states that the term ‘Muslim’ was intended for Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims of Slavic origin, who were born or lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak or Montenegro, and considered Bosnia and Herzegovina their ethnic state. To paraphrase, the term was intended for the indigenous Muslim inhabitants of the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman Bosnia Vilayeti – in short, Muslim Bosniaks. Indeed, just about the only campaigners for Muslim recognition were the Muslim political elites of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A good example is the Bosnian politician, Hamdija Pozderac, president of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1971 to 1974, whose contribution towards gaining constitutional recognition for Bosnian Muslims is immeasurable. 

The logical question arises as to why the term ‘Muslim’ was adopted instead of the term ‘Bosniak’. Some prominent Bosniak scholars claimed that no term but ‘Muslim’ should be used to describe the national identity of Bosniaks. Legitimising the Bosniaks

184 There were also Bosnian Serbs and Croats who supported the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims. Good examples are Branko Mikulić, a Bosnian Croat, and Milenko Renovica, a Bosnian Serb, who both fought alongside Muslim politicians for Muslim national recognition, as well as for greater autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina within a federal Yugoslavia. Ironically, the remaining family members of both politicians were ostracised by the neo-Islamist government, and they eventually emigrated to Croatia and Serbia, respectively.

185 Pozderac was also vice-president of the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, and was in line to become president of Yugoslavia just before he was forced to resign from politics in 1987.

186 For a personal insight into Pozderac’s devotion to the Bosnian cause, see Hadžišehović (2003: 171-178). He is important to mention for two interwoven reasons: first, he played an important role in curtailing neo-Islamist penetration in the 1980s; and secondly, he suffered demonisation once the neo-Islamists came to power. This is discussed in more detail in chapter six.

as a separate nation would send the message that they claimed ‘ownership’ of the republic, which neither Croats nor Serbs would countenance. Yet, recognising the Bosniak nation under the name ‘Muslim’ enabled nationalists elements within both Serbs and Croats to continue their separatist, antagonistic discourse, contributing to the political unrest preceding the break-up and final collapse of Yugoslavia.

One of the reasons behind the building of a ‘hollow Muslim nation’ (Redžić, 2000) was the lack of historiography and literature concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslav institutions of higher education. Their modules were burdened with Serbian and Croatian ‘spiritual imperialism’, forcing Bosnian Muslims into an unsustainable position by creating ‘a type of a unitary sandwich, in which they [Muslims] live in a vacuum, suffocated by that sandwich’ (Oljača 1979: 15). From the revolution of the 1940s onwards, the national existence of Bosnian Muslims was either negated or neglected, and the Communist leadership risked being regarded as unscrupulous in the position they adopted towards Muslims, hindering full affirmation of their national identity (Mikulić 1978: 372). Even though the Oriental Institute was established in the 1970s with a view to exploring Bosniak history and culture, its studies were very much confined to the Ottoman legacy. None of the other institutions of higher education contained a separate department for the history of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was studied as a part of the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia, which was deemed sufficient by the anti-Muslim elements within the educational hierarchy.189 Even when the Bosnian Academy of Science

188 Mikulić was president of the Federation of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1974 to 1978.
189 Some scholars were opposed to establishing a separate module dealing specifically with Bosnian and Herzegovinian historiography. For example, Milorad Ekmečić, a well-known Serbian scholar, opposed the establishment of a separate historiographic institution, although he wrote extensively on historical topics – for example, he was the only former-Yugoslav contemporary scholar to produce a comprehensive study in Serbo-Croat on the Bosnian uprising of 1875-78.
and Arts embarked on an ambitious seven-year project covering the history of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pledging to produce five books of five hundred pages each, it ended in fiasco (Filandra 1998: 281). Thus, the ‘Muslim question’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained for the large part unexamined. This had major repercussions for Bosnian Muslims during the 1992-95 war, in which they were the principal victims.

4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the path of Bosniak national development, or lack of it. It reveals that historical records testify to a significant pre-Ottoman Islamic presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and an analysis of medieval Bogumil beliefs and traditions shows that they possessed a symbiotic relationship with those of Islam. Although this claim would merit further study, the research in this thesis serves as an initial investigation into the widespread misconception that the Ottomans introduced Islam to the Balkans. The demographic and socio-political de-Ottomanisation of the Balkans is a complex question that, despite various interpretations during the post-communist period, begs for a multifaceted approach, liberated from ideological pressures and stereotypical historiography. This is particularly important for an understanding of why Bosnian Muslims were never recognised as a fully fledged nation. Since the rise of modern nationalism, they have far too frequently been regarded as the heirs of the old Ottoman Empire. This so-called ‘Turkish heritage’ was used as an alibi to deny Bosniaks national independence and curtail the autonomy they had fought for since the medieval crusades against the Bogumils, and achieved through their embrace of Islam in 1463, with the arrival of the Ottomans.
A great many scholars claim that it was Islam that obstructed the national
development of the Bosniaks. This thesis has found that such an explanation is
inappropriate – Islam aided the development of a separate ethnicity and identity, as did the
other religions in the region. Instead, it argues that the roots of the Bosniaks’ lack of a
national identity lie in the systematic, synchronised actions of the Great Powers and
Tanzimat leaders: on the one hand, the Turkish profile was applied to Bosnian Muslims,
and Balkan Muslims in general; on the other, the members of Christian millets were guided
into national awareness by internationally orchestrated nationalist campaigns, whereby a
harmonious coexistence with Islam was presented as inconceivable within the new ethno-
liberal setting envisaged for Europe. Muslims were neither accepted nor tolerated as equal
inhabitants of the system of nations-states, and they were persecuted or forced to assimilate.

This situation was readily exploited by Serb and Croat nationalists, who began to
lay claim to Bosnian territory. Bosniaks were depicted as ‘repatriating Turks’ through the
joint efforts of the Tanzimat leaders, European ‘de-Islamisers’ and the local Croat and Serb
leaderships. Creating a vacuum around the identity of Bosnian Muslims, coupled with their
resistance to the adoption of ‘Turkishness’ in the midst of a regional national awakening,
rendered the status of the Bosniaks that of an unwanted religious community occupying
Christian land. The political impoverishment of the Bosniak leadership continued
throughout the twentieth century, encouraging the expansionist tendencies of their
neighbours. The dominance of the Serbs and Croats was sustained in post-war Yugoslavia,
creating a ‘nationalised historiography’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to borrow a phrase
from Kamberović (2003: 67), which produced myth-building and the politicisation of
Bosniak historical evidence. The result was a dichotomous national interpretation of
Bosniaks as either Serbs or Croats, accompanied by schemes to appropriate and divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia’s neighbours twice almost succeeded in achieving this partition, in 1939 and 1991. Both efforts would have effectively destroyed Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, a complex constellation of international powers impeded the materialisation of these plans, and the geostrategic interests of global diplomacy overrode Serb and Croat intentions. As will be seen in the following chapter, the 1990s brought enormous political and economic changes in the arena of international affairs, and this influenced the response of the ‘international community’ to the Yugoslav crisis.
CHAPTER FIVE
NEO-ISLAM IN THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This chapter offers an analysis of ‘neo-Islamism’ – a novel concept that is used by this thesis to describe the proliferating Islamist movements with neoliberal agendas. It argues that the modern neoliberal order would not have been possible without the neo-Islamists’ contribution to the new political economy. This argument is intellectually grounded in the idea that neo-Islamism is an incarnation of neoliberalism. As discussed in chapter two, neoliberalism has emerged as a leading paradigm in the international arena, and this chapter analyses its impact on the socio-economic order. However, it is neither within the scope nor the parameters of the chapter to engage with the theoretical debates around the definition of neoliberalism, its benefits and disadvantages – that has been done abundantly well elsewhere. Rather, it seeks to examine the degree of, and rationale behind, Islamic involvement in the modern neoliberal exercise, which appears to have led to an ongoing process that could be described as the ‘Islamisation’ of international relations, as already described in chapter two.

The chapter develops the main argument of the thesis by explaining the way in which the symbiosis between neo-Islamised global politics and the neoliberal political economy influenced the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and determined the international and domestic response to the conflict. With the regard to the research question, this chapter provides a background for an analysis to what extent neo-Islamism construction shaped the events and the responses of the Bosnian leaders in the 1992-95 war. The purpose here is to

place the events preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian war in an international context, analysing their impact on the conflict and its aftermath. The chapter therefore proceeds in five sections: the first explains the context in which the neoliberal order emerged at the global level and later exported to Yugoslavia; the second defines the speculative character of the neoliberal economy and its implications for society; section three analysis the principles that form the basis of the Islamic economy and its social impact; the fourth section offers an account of the neo-Islamist response to neoliberalism, while section five concludes by highlighting their symbiotic relationship.

5.1 Setting the scene for the neoliberal doctrine

Neoliberalism, as an economic and political structure, emerged as the result of the revolutionary reconstruction that took place almost simultaneously in three key centres of global geopolitical power:191 the UK, the US and the former USSR. At all three focal points, the role of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and by implication the more conservative faction in the UK, seem to have been instrumental in planting the seeds of an emerging pattern of international relations dedicated to maintaining a well-established power structure (Castells 2000). Privatisation and deregulation in 1979 had severe implications for British society, particularly in regard to the rapidly widening gap between rich and poor (Newbery and Pollitt 1997). Despite opposition, President Reagan adopted identical policies in the 1980s (Chomsky 1997). The outcome was celebrated by the privileged elites, but went unacknowledged amongst the populace at large (Miller 1996:

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191 Neoliberalism in Chile, as discussed later in the chapter, emerged as a result of US sponsorship of the Pinochet regime.
Reagan, however, had the blessing of Pope John Paul II, whose political role in spreading free market liberalism is revealed by John O’Sullivan (2006), a pious Roman Catholic and one of Thatcher’s speechwriters. In his narrative, O’Sullivan emphasises the importance of the British example to both the US government and the Catholic hierarchy, and describes the way Christian rhetoric enabled the US president, the British prime minister and the pope to assert they were bringing ‘democracy’ to the ‘liberated countries’ of the former atheist Soviet bloc. President George W. Bush even bestowed the Medal of Freedom, America’s highest civilian honour, on Pope John Paul II for his ‘heroic’ efforts to topple communism – the emphasis appeared to be on the political-religious display. Indeed, the political use of religious metaphors was perhaps best exhibited in Bush’s well-known speech in 2001, in which he called for a ‘crusade’ against Islam.

The mobilisation of religious discourse amongst the neoliberal leadership in the West is relevant to the study of both neo-Islamism and the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Neo-Islamists in Bosnia mirrored this religious rhetoric when they deployed a tangled maze of Islamic verbiage to justify their economic deregulations and political platform, as explained in more detail in the following sections. Similarly, when analysing the impact of neo-Islam in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to note the Western deployment of a religious pretext for military intervention. The violence perpetrated against civilians in the Bosnian conflict rapidly came to be perceived as taking the shape of religious wars. The practice of dressing the hostilities in religious clothing was a convenient representation of the nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the presence of Islam alongside the

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192 According to Tremblay (2009), the militarisation of foreign policy using Islam continues. He argues that the incumbent US president, Nobel Peace Laureate Barack Obama, although avoiding the verbal symbolism used by his predecessor, is nonetheless following Bush’s example by announcing an escalation in the military occupation of Muslim countries.
two major Christian denominations. As illustrated in chapter two, Islam had already been presented as a potential threat to the stability of the Western world. Following this logic, it was only to be expected that it would clash with non-Muslim ‘others’ on European soil. National groups involved in the conflict were classified according to religious affiliation; the world’s media and the various ‘peace envoys’ dispatched by the ‘international community’ generally accentuated the religious affiliation of ‘Muslim Bosniaks’, and to a lesser extent, also referred to ‘Orthodox Serbs’ and ‘Catholic Croats’. Even though there was no empirical evidence to indicate that religious intolerance lay behind the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this belief was maintained throughout the peace negotiations that were brokered by international intermediaries and adopted by the local nationalist leaders (as discussed in more detail in chapter six).

Sections of academia propagate this idea that religious bigotry, a blending of neoliberalism and theology, was the *causus belli*. Other scholars argue that, on the contrary, it was the wars in Yugoslavia that opened the way for the spread of neoliberalism in Europe (von Werlhof, cited in Chossudovsky and Marshall 2010: 127; Johnstone 2003, Hudsone 2004; Chomsky 2005). Neoliberalism, however, was already well established in Europe and the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav crisis, rather than triggering the whole neoliberal mission, represented the attempt to secure this last link in the neoliberal chain in Europe. The successful dismantling of Yugoslavia’s self-governing, socialist economy represented the removal of one of the few remaining obstacles to neoliberal dominance on a global level. Russian acquiescence to the neoliberal dogma served as a crucial precedent. The incorporation of Russia into the neoliberal fold, under the guidance of Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to power in the former USSR in 1985, was perhaps the
most decisive factor in the global spread of the neoliberal agenda. The socialist principle of
distribution, albeit state-controlled, in the USSR presented the most viable challenge to the
omnipresence of the neoliberal doctrine embraced by the capitalist regimes of the US and
Britain. Once Russian opposition was dislodged, the Yugoslav countries could be easily
eliminated.

Gorbachev delivered a speech to the Council of Europe, two years before the Cold
War ended, announcing huge changes:

Perestroika is changing our country, advancing it to new horizons. That
process will continue [to] extend and transform Soviet society in all
dimensions: economic, social, political and spiritual, in all domestic affairs
and human relations. We have firmly and irreversibly embarked on that
road. This was confirmed by the resolution passed by the Congress of
People’s Deputies on the ‘Basic guidelines of domestic and foreign policies
of the USSR’. That document confirmed, in the name of the people, our
choice, our path of perestroika. I commend this resolution to your attention.
It has a fundamental and revolutionary significance for the destinies of the
country to which you yourselves refer as a superpower. (Gorbachev 1998:
205)

Closer reading of Gorbachev’s speech demonstrates that, apart from dwelling on the
coming of profound and all-encompassing revolutionary change, it did not once refer to a
policy that would provide a better and more prosperous future for the Russian people;
instead, by the careful choice of positive terminology Gorbachev succeeded in painting a
vague but optimistic picture of the times to come. Moreover, in an oblique fashion, he also
mentioned that – as is usual in totalitarian regimes – the decision had not been taken by
means of a democratic process but had been endorsed by the ‘people of our choice’, who
had passed the resolution at the Congress of People’s Deputies. Whether or not it was
Gorbachev’s intention, a new capitalist clique, empowered by global neoliberal forces, had
emerged from the old communist elite who had swiftly shifted allegiance from the socialist economy to capitalist financial interests. The transfer from a socialist to a capitalist mode of government by the self-same governing elites subsequently emerged as a global pattern; Yugoslavia serves as a good example of this practice.

Shortly after Gorbachev’s speech, the Soviet ‘superpower’ crumbled, leaving its newfound partner, the US, ‘the sole and dominant superpower, and all the other nations subordinated to it in one degree or the other’ (Friedman 1999: 11). However, it was not the US government per se, but corporate and financial elites within the leading global institutions who claimed the upper hand.193 In 1990 they elevated Gorbachev to the prestigious title of Nobel Laureate for his personal endeavours in fighting communism and building the new global agenda. In the same year, the Berlin Wall came down, signalling the demise of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and an end to the ideological division of the world. Many celebrated this event as heralding the birth of ‘globalisation’, only to recognise later that it bore the dominant features of neoliberalism.194 The search for a theoretical structure for a new system of international diplomatic relations began.

Neo-realist theories failed to explain the fact that a ‘new’ alternative superpower failed to emerge to offset the power of the US (Layne 1993; Walls 2002). The theoretical gap was filled by constructivist theories, introduced into the field of international relations by Onuf (1989), who held that the international political system is based as much on beliefs and ideas as on material forces. According to this view, state interests are fundamentally formed by ideas and social interaction, as ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992).

193 Cf. footnote 198.
194 Cf. chapter two.
In other words, ideas define and interpret the meaning of material power within the larger context of the material world (Tannenwald 2005: 19). ‘Study on international relations must focus on the ideas that inform the actors on the international scene, as well as on the beliefs of shared understandings between them’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2006: 162). However, in the hands of the prominent international organisations that controlled international dialogue and policy prescriptions, the norms of political behaviour became one-sided, institutionalised instruments (Finnemore 1996). Jackson and Sorensen (2006) explain why:

The international system is not something ‘out there’ like a solar system. It is a human invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and ideational kind. *It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place.* (Jackson and Sorensen 2006: 162, my italics)

The paradigms that gained prominence in international relations following the end of the Cold War need to be analysed using the parameters set by the constructivist theorists. The three sets of values most celebrated by the practitioners of the global neoliberal agenda are set out below.

5.1.1 Defining the new world

One of the first scholars to provide a lens through which to observe the new era was Francis Fukuyama (1992). Basing his approach on the doctrines of Hegel, he proclaimed the ‘End of History’ and the birth of the ‘Last Man’, whom he promptly emancipated to freely
indulge in liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.\textsuperscript{195} Fukuyama offered profit as the sole \textit{leitmotif} of the newly formulated ideology, which was increasingly referred to as ‘neoliberalism’. Boos (2000) criticises this view because it disregards the socio-cultural contexts of different societies, celebrating the swift enrichment of the privileged few – the shareholders who partake in the lucrative financial transactions. In other words, this ideology facilitates the monopolisation of the world market by the elite. Kimball (1992) observes that by ‘ending history’, Fukuyama wanted to signal the achievement of a state of fulfilment and ‘the final form of human government’ (Fukuyama 1992: xi), but this achievement was mainly reserved for the elite. Thus, the conclusion of Fukuyama’s process of liberation was ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ and the ‘total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism’, marking ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ (1992: xxi, xii, 212). In fact, it was the end point of human destiny.

About a year later, another American foreign-policy guru, Samuel Huntington, proposed his definition of the post-Cold War era: the structure of international relations predicted a future in which the ‘great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict would be cultural’ (Huntington 1993: 22). Although Huntington’s \textit{Weltanschaung} is, in a somewhat simplistic style, divided into seven different civilisations,\textsuperscript{196} the conflicts he predicts are very much those between the Judeo-Christian West and the Islamic ‘Rest’, fought in the spirit of free-market capitalism. This economic

\textsuperscript{195} See also Fukuyama (2006). In this article, the author defends his thesis and elaborates more extensively upon the concept of ‘neo-conservatism’ as a predominant feature of the new world.\textsuperscript{196} Huntington subsequently revised his ‘civilisational division’ to include a further sub-group in the book that emerged from this article, \textit{The Clash of Civilisations and Remaking of the World Order} (1996). This revision, however, served to further emphasise the weakness of his argument concerning the presence of ancient enmities between civilisations, since the omission of the original dichotomy points to the inconsistency of his thesis and exposes the hollowness of the entire hypothesis.
system is safeguarded by the West, primarily through its control of international institutions and its economic and military power (Huntington 1993: 26, 29). To preserve and maintain Western preeminence and the ‘universal supremacy of Western values of human rights’, Huntington’s policy prescription was the further increase of Western military power (1993: 47). His advocacy of the militarisation of foreign relations can be better understood if perceived from the perspective of his professional background: he was coordinator of national security planning and deputy to President Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brezinski, who played a significant role in the aggressive advancement of neo-Islamist power in the Middle East, as discussed later in the chapter.

The third paradigm of the new structure of international relations is indebted to the legacy of Joseph Schumpeter, whose 1942 theory was enthusiastically embraced by neoliberal campaigners. Schumpeter proposed the theory of ‘creative destruction’, a perpetual cycle of the destruction of old, less efficient services and products and their replacement by new, more efficient ones:

The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation – if I may use that biological term – that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in. (Schumpeter 1942: 82)

Thus, all three prophecies aimed to create global socio-economic stability through the supreme power of neoliberal theology, based on the pillars of free-market capitalism and the ‘creative destruction’ of market competition. The material impact of neoliberalism can
therefore be measured, and cannot be regarded as simply an ‘academic theory’, purporting to offer a form of impartial knowledge. Neo-liberalism is a political process that provides an ideological veneer for the post-Cold War view on the conduct of international relations:

Neo-liberalism is not a neutral description which generates a prescription for action – it is an ideology which serves particular interests and groups of people – and should be evaluated as such. As an ideology it serves to help determine ‘who gets what’ in the world economy, by legitimating certain structures, processes and behaviour, by reproducing a certain distribution of power and by laying out a framework for action based on particular intersubjective view of the world. [Neo-liberalism] has become the unquestioned ‘common sense’ of the world economy. (Tooze 1997: 227)

During the Cold War, there was growing rivalry between the self-proclaimed ‘free world’ of market capitalism and the state-run economy of Soviet Russia. The differences in the two systems had a multiplicity of manifestations on the international level, whereas on the domestic level, paradoxically, both of these systems apparently pursued similar policies concerning the management of private ownership, which was accomplished either through state intervention using the Bretton Woods institutions in the case of the former, or state-controlled income distribution in the case of the latter. The rise of uncontrollable corporate power was perceived as a threat by the democratic institutions of the West, whilst communist states considered it a bourgeois menace to their societies. To achieve equilibrium, and prevent the possible penetration of socialist ideas into their polities, the leaders of the market economies provided for the welfare of their citizens and supported policies that restricted the concentration of wealth by means of strong trade union movements – both of which, nowadays, seem somewhat distant, quaint phenomena.
The Yugoslav crisis was unfolding in the midst of the post-Cold War changes. Rather than assisting in overcoming the disputes that broke out, the Western response to the emerging conflict accelerated the break-up of Yugoslavia into mutually hostile and economically unviable statelets. This thesis contends that this was because Western capitalist elites were wary of the possible influence of the self-managed socialist economy of the former Yugoslavia on other states going through the transition to ‘economic democracy’. Their main apprehension was the potential adoption of the principal of just income distribution by the non-aligned states – Yugoslavia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, as the conflict took its toll and war appeared imminent, the corporate cadre appeared on the scene. By this time, most local policymakers, as well as their counterparts from the West, had already secured shares in financial portfolios. This is evident in the pattern of lucrative and strategic appointments they occupied, either as top-ranking government officials or decision-making corporate executives, or both simultaneously. Their counterparts in other ex-socialist and ex-non-aligned states followed suit, abandoning the economic model of self-management and embarking on the road to a ‘transition economy’. The protocols they followed closed the door on economic policies of state intervention and opened it wide to neoliberalism.

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197 See chapter one for a discussion on the Yugoslav economic and social structure.
198 A good example was the European envoy during the Yugoslav conflict, Lord Carrington – a British diplomat with numerous national and international appointments, an academic career and shares in the Carlyle Group, a major defence, arms and energy conglomerate. A local example is Zlatko Lagumdzija, the incumbent minister of exterior for Bosnia and Herzegovina. He shuffled back and forth between key state, corporate and academic positions, occupying the political scene for more than twenty years. Another good example is the first director general of the WTO, Peter Sutherland, who was previously a director of GATT, former attorney general of Ireland, chairman of British Petroleum and Goldman Sachs International, as well as being the special representative of the UN secretary-general on matters pertaining to immigration. He is also a member of the board of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and the foundation board of the World Economic Forum. For more of his appointments, see online at http://trilateral.org/memebship/bios/ps.htm. In a similar fashion, Paul Volcker and Timothy Geithner were shifted among a few key positions, and are presently serving under President Obama in the treasury department. This is not an exhaustive list, but it serves to indicate the pattern adopted by ruling elites across the world.
5.2 Digital cash makes the world go round

Once neoliberalism was established on a global scale, the corporate elites needed a structural environment, a form of ‘global governance’, that would incorporate all its cultural diversity. The main gatekeepers of the new system were the institutions of the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the transnational corporations (TNC), whose leaders teamed up in the powerful World Trade Organisation (WTO). These formed an ‘institutional trinity’, to borrow Chomsky’s (1995) phrase, which, through tight implementation of structural adjustment programmes and the effective manipulation of the world’s financial markets, controlled global economic relations and maintained the balance of power (Craven 1994). In exchange for loans, countries were forced to restructure in order to accommodate the uninhibited operation of private conglomerates and the sale of their natural resources. The end result was the unification of economies around a set of homogenous rules, which meant that capital, goods and services could flow in and out of countries according to the judgement of the market (Castells 2000: 136). Consequently, capital markets were deregulated and, hampered by the fewest possible national laws or regulations, capital was able to move freely around the world (Mohamad 1998: 2-6). Communication technologies enabled real-time trade in currency and capital assets on the global financial markets (Russell 2005). Advanced computer systems provided powerful mathematical models to manage complex financial products, performing transactions at high speed and leading to the explosion of cross-cultural financial flows that heralded ‘an era of financial integration around the planet as investors from everywhere sought opportunities of high return’ (Castells 2000: 136). A relentless flow of shareholders of no particular domicile marginalised the market regulators, galvanising what O’Brien (1992) calls the ‘End of Geography’.
In response, the World Bank coined a new term: ‘emerging markets’. This designation signalled a country’s openness to speculative investment – a trend that planted the seeds for the financial crisis that swept the economies of Latin America, Asia and Russia in the 1990s (Castells 2000: 137). What followed was a mutual agreement on economic policies between the World Bank and IMF, which postulated ‘that the best path to economic development was through financial and trade liberalization and that international institutions should persuade countries to adopt such measures as quickly as possible’ (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 224). The concept was simple: a system of market liberalisation allows financial capital to flow freely into a given market; it keeps feeding the system through foreign currency transactions until the currency reserves have been almost depleted, causing a speculative bubble; the forces behind this speculative venture pull their financial investment out, leaving the economy in ruins; then, following this series of events, the IMF and World Bank arrive with a rescue mission in the form of an emergency loan, with the condition that the national government agrees to implement the IMF prescription for economic health.

The conditions imposed on countries that sign up to these structural adjustment programmes include lowering budget deficits, devaluing the currency, limiting government borrowing from the central bank, liberalising foreign trade, reducing public sector wages and introducing price liberalisation, deregulation and the alteration of interest rates (Williams 1994: 85). In order to reduce budget deficits, precise ‘ceilings’ are placed on all categories of expenditure and the state is no longer permitted to mobilise its own resources to build public infrastructure (Chossudovsky 2003: 52). In other words, if the country is to maintain its infrastructure, it has to continue borrowing from its global creditors or start
selling off public enterprises and natural resources to foreign conglomerates or newly enriched domestic oligarchs.\textsuperscript{199} What this prescription effectively implies is that political and economic reforms internal to nation-states, such as privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation, have diminished central governments’ powers at the same time as they have liberated big business (Schmidt 1995).\textsuperscript{200} This is because the elites who monopolise the possession of capital are also responsible for its mobilisation and migration from certain markets, and they lay down the terms and conditions of re-financialisation, imposing policy prescriptions on national governments. Stiglitz (2003: 43-44), a former chief economist at the World Bank, writes that these conditions went beyond economics into areas that properly belong to the realm of politics, as ‘agreements stipulated what laws the country’s Parliament would have to pass to meet IMF requirements or “targets” – and by when’.

Some researchers argue that neoliberal strategy was first tested in Chile, following the formula of the Chicago School of economists, headed by Milton Friedman, and was exported to other Latin American and African countries, which embarked on austerity policies in the attempt to service their debts (Marshall 2010; Von Werlhof 2010).\textsuperscript{201} Russia and Eastern Europe also jumped on the neoliberal bandwagon in their transition to a market economy (Chomsky 2003; Castells 2000, 2004). China, however, never adopted neoliberal policies \textit{per se}, but developed its own mix of state capitalism and the free market – ‘a system of Leninist corporatism’ (Hutton 2007: 26). When the newly independent republics

\textsuperscript{199} Structural adjustment programmes have been extensively analysed – for example, see Kilick (1995) and Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995).
\textsuperscript{200} For the opposing view, which counters that the rise of regional and international trade organisations would eventually have strengthened the nation-state by reinforcing executive power and reinvigorating the rule of law, see Milward (1992) and Moravscik (1993).
\textsuperscript{201} There are other opinions too. Harvey (2005), for example, considers 1976 to be the year that marked the advent of neoliberalism in Britain.
of the former Yugoslav lands joined the trend, the neoliberalisation of Europe was finally accomplished.

O’Brien and Williams (2007: 224) argue that neoliberal austerity policies have had devastating implications for the populations of developing countries – and on any country that has joined the neoliberal scheme. They state that many developing countries’ economies were smaller and more impoverished in the 1990s than in the 1980s, for which reason the 1980s became known as the ‘lost decade of development’ (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 224). Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, debt in many of the developing countries was so great that their governments had few resources to spare for social services or development. George (2007) argues that within twenty-five years the debt stocks of developing countries increased nearly five times, from $540 billion to $2,600 billion, and further emphasises that over the same period these indebted countries had reimbursed their creditors almost ten times what they originally owed, so that by 2007 they were paying back $28,000 a minute in accrued interest. World Bank data (2010: 12) has corroborated this estimate of the increase in indebtedness of poor countries, which rose from $1,324 billion in 2007 to $1,373 billion in 2008, then to $1,459 billion in 2009. It still continues to rise, due to the unremitting pressure from creditors on national governments to adopt structural adjustment policies. With the debt crisis, countries in the developing world were ‘starved of international finance, [and] states had little choice but to open their [economies to] investors and trade’ (O’Brien and Williams 2003: 225).

The financial markets have been identified as the major source of the vulnerability of developing countries, ‘exposing large swathes of their populations to sudden falls in real incomes and depressing national growth rates’ (Wade 2006: 47). Acemoğlu and Ziliboti
(1997), in their detailed study on the impact of financial markets on wealth enhancement, note that agents from poorer countries do not enjoy the same access to the financial markets as those from rich ones, augmenting the inequality between nations. They conclude that richer countries have better financial markets than poor countries, providing more opportunities to diversify and encouraging greater investment, which in turn makes them even richer (Acemoğlu and Ziliboti 1997: 709-751). The global integration of financial markets means that interest rates must move together as a unit in real time. Hence, Matsuyama (2003: 4) argues, when poor countries are hit by a setback on the financial markets, they are unable to offset this through changes in domestic interest rates. This creates a disadvantageous environment, and domestic investment in these countries declines, creating a downward spiral of low wealth/low investment. As Agnew and Corbridge (1995: 177-178) observe, ‘markets can defeat even the most concerted efforts by a government, or even groups of governments, to defend particular exchange rates and interest rates’.

Generally, most studies agree that the poor are getting poorer and the rich richer, and global output is smaller than in the Bretton Woods era. The trade output is small because most of the exchange transactions are speculative rather than trade or long-term exchange-driven transactions. Cook (2010: 356) suggests that when shortages and crises occur, this is not due to failure of the world’s productive capacity, but ‘the result of financial-system manipulation by the world’s richest people’. A case in point is the speculative trade on the food market index, where options and futures funds push the price

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202 There are alternative explanations, but this is not the focus of this study, nor is there space to air this discussion in this thesis. For more on this subject see, for example, Leidler (1981, 2008), Hoover (1984), Kindleberger (2006). For an excellent overview of the various interpretations of neoliberalism, see Chorev (2007).
of food up artificially, creating a demand that triggers scarcity of food supplies.\textsuperscript{203} The transactions are artificial because the trade in commodities can occur without an actual transactional exchange taking place. Instead, the speculators place ‘put’ or ‘call’ options, betting on the price going either up or down, and the prices generally follow these speculative generic evaluations.\textsuperscript{204} Consequently, not only are these assets worthless in real terms, but the speculative transactions are also based on the manipulated value the bets were ‘hedged’ at, creating an uncertain outcome for investors and putting them at a potential disadvantage. This practice is repudiated by Islamic doctrine, a point to bear in mind in the examination of the neo-Islamists’ response to neoliberalism later in the chapter.

This type of deregulated market economy has had two immediate impacts: the de-industrialisation of societies (Hudson 2010) and an increase in the wealth gap, not only between rich and poor countries, but also rich and poor individuals within the developed economies. This has a bearing on the discussion of the neo-Islamist embrace of neoliberal policies, because Islam denounces the concentration of wealth and adopts two significant economic measures to achieve equity of income distribution, as discussed in more detail in the next section. The wealth gap is due to income disparities and high

\textsuperscript{203} For more on the concern over food prices and its impact on poverty, see World Bank Food Price Watch (February 2010).

\textsuperscript{204} Speculative capital movements are at the heart of the neoliberal economic system. According to data compiled by the World Federation of Exchanges in 2010, 22.4 billion derivative contracts with a value estimated in trillions of dollars were traded on the global exchange markets – a massive 25 percent rise compared with the year before. World Bank data, published regularly online, shows this volume greatly exceeds the global value of trade in goods and services. Despite the official definition, which states that these are financial contracts that ‘derive’ their value from an underlying asset, exchange rate, interest level or market index, trade derivatives have no real depository assets. They are just financial instruments derived from the speculative evaluation of interest rates, credit default swaps (deregulated insurance premiums), equities, bonds and the commodity markets. Most of the time, the sellers do not possess the ‘goods’, but simply the ‘legal tender’ to handle them, and the money exists only on computer screens. A good illustration of this are prison bonds: according to Forbes’ Tax Investor, these are the safest ‘investment’, because it is a growing ‘industry’ based on securely incarcerated prisoners, who will remain so until the debt of the lease has matured sufficiently (Anderson [online] 2010).
unemployment rates, and poses a risk to social cohesion (OECD 2008). Studying the income distribution in the world’s richest countries in the 1990s, Robinson (1993: 64) has noted that the scale of the gap is very striking if the subject under scrutiny is not the income of rich and poor nations, but that of rich and poor people. Applying a theoretical model that explores the phenomenon of inequality and explains why inequality differs across countries, Benabou (1990: 96-129) observes that those nations that pursue broadly similar neoliberal restructuring policy programmes tend to have the highest inequality ratio.

Weeks (2005) was commissioned by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) to measure trends in inequality, according to the Gini coefficient, in seventeen developed OECD countries. He observed two tendencies: firstly, the most striking trends towards inequality were demonstrated in four ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries (the US, UK, New Zealand and Australia), in which the Gini ratio was at its height during the 1980s and 1990s when the neoliberal policy agenda was pursued most vigorously (Weeks 2005: 8). Secondly, there was only an insignificant rise, or no rise at all, in the Gini coefficient of those countries whose governments had reduced levels of social protection associated with the welfare state but had not consistently adopted neoliberal policies (Weeks 2005: 9). In many developed neoliberal economies there was a tangible tendency for the wealth of the rich to rise sharply, accompanied by a meltdown of the middle classes (OECD 2008). This suggests that economic instability is inherent in neoliberal economic policies.

Political policies that champion redistribution have come to seem like anachronisms as, under the corporate flag of the neoliberal market economy, governments around the world continue to pursue policies of privatisation and market liberation. The result has been
twofold: on the one hand, employment cuts, large reductions in public spending, the collapse of pension funds, scarcity of jobs and their replacement by part-time or flexible work; on the other, a steep rise in top executive salaries and the demand for ultra-luxury products. Neoliberalism engages in the practice of reducing the resources for consumption through either neglecting the development of the infrastructure or transferring it into private hands, rendering it susceptible to monopolisation. This is mainly due to the lack of broad political support for policies that restrict the concentration of wealth.

The major impact of an economy organised in this way is the concentration of economic power due to the global character of accumulation (Burnham, P. 1994: 229). Robinson and Harris (2000: 11-30) argue that the mobility of capital and the global decentralisation of accumulation circuits have created a 'transnational capitalist class', which controls global decision-making through international neoliberal establishments. Rothkopf (2008) similarly demonstrates that there is an increasingly internationalised 'superclass' that has succeeded in monopolising the great majority of the world’s resources. It seems that the transfer and accumulation of wealth has been an ongoing process since the inception of capitalism, but that this has happened in stages. For example, in the 1940s, the British economist Rothschild, a relative of the well-known Rothschild banking family, discussed the tendency towards the concentration of economic power in the major international markets. He made the insightful observation that there was a predisposition for the growth of an elite group on a global scale:

\[205\] To illustrate, in April 2007 workers across the Pacific, from the Philippines, Sri Lanka and India to New Zealand, Fiji and Australia, united in a common protest over working conditions and inadequate payment. Meanwhile, Ford’s new CEO earned $39.1 million for four months of work in 2006. For more on this subject, see the World Socialist Web Site (2007).
The most violent aspects of the oligopolistic struggle are the attempts of the biggest oligopolistic groupings to regroup their forces on a world scale, and finally to strike out in order to change the world market situation in their favour. (Rothschild 1947: 318)

Friedman (1999: 5-6) describes the concentration of wealth and unrivalled power of neoliberal ideology as a one-size-fits-all ‘Golden Straitjacket’, designed by the ‘Super-empowered Individuals’ organised in the governmental ‘Electronic Herd’, where people’s political choices are reduced to those of either ‘Pepsi or Coke’. Islam has played a formative part in these developments. Before discussing the neo-Islamist response to the neoliberal ideology, however, it is important to explain the Islamic worldview in relation to the economy and society.

5.3 The Islamic socio-economic worldview

To speak of a significant Islamic contribution to the creation of a global neoliberal economic structure seems counterintuitive. Muslims, as much as anyone, are on the receiving end of neoliberal policies. In addition, the exclusive prerogatives of power and wealth concentration are, prima facie, incompatible with the Islamic world-view of tawhid\(^\text{206}\) and its higher purpose. Human beings are but God’s agents on earth, who have been assigned the role of enhancing life in all its aspects, whilst full sovereignty over life is entirely divine (Qur’an 6: 165, 2: 284). In the ideal Islamic vision, everything in the world exists for the benefit and welfare of all mankind. Hence, the fundamental principles of Islam focus on the establishment of a naturally just society, where everyone acknowledges their relationship with each other and behaves in a spirit of cooperation. The Prophet is

\(^{206}\) The tawhid is the important Islamic principle of the ‘Oneness of God’. It stipulates that God is one (wahid) and unique (ahad).
reported to have said: ‘I am witness to the fact that all servants (of God) are brethren’, and he urged his followers to live accordingly. Muslims have an obligation to expound this Islamic world-view and implement the values of brotherhood, equality, justice and benevolence – the *fard kifayah* (Sidiqqui 1996: 8).

The Islamic conscience is guided by a system of social ethics that prioritises the community (Ramadan 2001: 39). However, two mechanisms in particular are used to prevent the concentration of wealth and alleviate income disparities: the *qard* (loan) and the *zakat* (a ‘purifying’ social tax on wealth but not on revenue). A loan, according to Islam, is a charitable deed; almost all the verses in the Qur’an refer to ‘*qard hasan*’ as a medium through which to help fellow Muslims in distress. Similarly, almost all the *Sunnah* consider *qarda* as a *sadaqa* (charity), and it is highly encouraged (Bukhari, Sahih III207: 335). Borrowing, on the other hand, is discouraged, and advocated only as a last resort to alleviate dire personal stress. The Prophet was reported to have prayed: ‘O Allah relieve me of debt and enrich me from poverty’ (Al-Muwatta 15: 8/27). To relieve a person from the burden of debt is considered an act of charity, in the same way as it is *haram* (a sin) to die in debt, leaving the repayment to coming generations. The Qur’an (2: 280) also demands that Muslims do not saddle debtors with any undue burden, but give them extra time in which to repay, or pardon the debt altogether. The *qard* mechanism was thus institutionalised to help those in need and was not intended to evolve into a commodity, subject to business transactions.

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207 Imam Bukhari (full name, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ismail bin Ibrahim bin al-Mughira al-Ja'fai) was born in 194 A.H (810) and died in 256 A.H (870). He collected more than 300,000 *ahadeeth* and his huge collection is considered to be of utmost importance.
Zakat is the third of the five pillars of Islam and is part of the essential, sacred act of worship. The books of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) place chapters on zakat immediately after those on prayer in the sections devoted to worship. In a uniquely comprehensive study of zakat, Al-Qardawi (1999: 536) comments that it is ‘an unbreakable bond of association’ and is known as ‘the sister of prayer’. Zakat is the cornerstone of social security in Islam, a way to narrow the gap between rich and poor by facilitating the equitable distribution of wealth. Garaudy (cited in Ramadan 2001) explains that the objective of fixing the rate of zakat at two-and-a-half percent per annum is to prevent the accumulation of wealth:

This means that in 40 years (a generation) a private ‘property’ is entirely abolished and returned to the community (the social fund constituted by Zakat being consecrated to the needs of the community and to help the needy). Hence, no one can live an idle life solely [through] the inheritance of his family. (Garaudy, cited in Ramadan 2001: 149)

This form of charitable giving has effects on three levels: on the spiritual level, it purifies an individual’s faith and elevates them closer to God; on the individual level, it cleanses their spiritual consciousness and places them on a higher moral plane, going ‘beyond the mere material aspect to include the spiritual, psychological, moral, cultural and civic aspects of a person’s life’; and on the level of the community, it signifies social engagement, as the tax is levied for the benefit of mankind, ‘fostering solidarity and mutual cooperation among [the] members of Islamic society’ (Al-Qaradwi 1999: 550). Islam, therefore, tackles the problems of poverty and socio-economic disparity through legislation, social institutions and economic directives that have been put in place to achieve a just distribution of wealth and income:
Whatever [tribute] Allah gives to his Messenger from city dwellers belongs to Allah and to his Messenger and to near relatives and orphans and the very poor and travellers, so that it does not become something which merely circulates among the rich among you. (Qur’an 59: 7, translated by Tariq Ramadan 2001)

In terms of business transactions, Islam repudiates the practices outlined in the previous section, because the medium of exchange in Islamic terms is based on qimar, gharar and riba. Qimar, literally translated, means to gamble. Islam’s disapproval of gambling is made clear in the following verse:

O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] stone altars [to gods other than Allah] and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful. (Qur’an 5: 90, translated by Ibrahim Walk)

Since most neoliberal financial transactions are pure speculation rather than the exchange of tangible goods and services, they are equivalent to the transactions involved in betting, which is unequivocally prohibited in the Qur’an. Islamic jurists and scholars are unanimous on this, and shar’iah law regards speculative trade as a prohibited practice.

The Arabic word gharar\(^\text{208}\) is not the same as qimar (gambling) but is related to it. Gharar is adopted in Islamic finance to mean any transaction which is neither certain, due to lack of information on the item’s existence, nor transparent, due to either party lacking essential information concerning the transaction, nor probable, if there is doubt that either of the parties concerned would honour the contract. For a Muslim, there are two fundamental considerations when entering into a commercial exchange. The first is the adequate and accurate disclosure of all relevant information. This implies that the goods

\(^{208}\) In a literal sense, gharar refers to deceit, fraud, uncertainty, danger, peril, delusion or hazard, leading to destruction or loss.
intended for sale are the lawful possession of the seller and they are present and available for inspection. Hence, the speculative trade in forwards, futures, options and index commodities would be rendered invalid because of the fact that the goods are not present at the time of the transaction. Moreover, most of these transactions are not transparent and the buyer/investor is not given full information concerning the products, the absence of which renders a trade susceptible to prohibition. The second consideration concerns lack of knowledge about the future benefits of the business transaction that would mean the buyer/investor is placed at a disadvantage. Islamic jurists unanimously distinguish between the normal element of risk involved in any business transaction and highly speculative deals, with unknown future benefits, which are prohibited in Islam. A classic example cited by Islamic jurists from all five schools of fiqh are insurance premiums, which carry a level of uncertainty that may trigger a prohibition based on gharar, because the claim may or may not occur. Insurance itself is not considered to be a valid medium for commercial exchange. In addition, insurance is maintained by riba (usury or excess), as it is funded by investments in the bond markets.

*Riba* is the excess realised in a business transaction and is prohibited in Islam in all its forms. Generally, it is divided into two types: *riba al-fadl* (excessive surplus) and *riba al-nasiah* (excessive delay in payment). *Riba al-fadl* is usury or interest charged on a loan, a practice unanimously repudiated in Islam. Its prohibition is mentioned in a few places in the Qur’an, but is explicitly forbidden in the following four verses:

O you who have attained to faith! Do not gorge yourselves on usury, doubling and re-doubling it – but remain conscious of God, so that you might attain to a happy state. (Qur’an 3: 130, translated by Muhammad Asad)
Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, ‘Trade is [just] like interest.’ But Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So whoever has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in interest or usury] – those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein. (Qur’an 2: 275, translated by Ibrahim Walk)

God deprives usurious gains of all blessing, whereas He blesses charitable deeds with manifold increase. And God does not love anyone who is stubbornly ingrate and persists in sinful ways. (Qur’an 2: 276, translated by Muhammad Asad)

And what you give in usury, that it may increase upon the people’s wealth, increases not with God; but what you give in alms, desiring God’s Face, those they receive recompense manifold. (Qur’an 30: 39, translated by Arthur J. Arberry)

*Riba* was considered sinful even to the extent that God and Muhammad declared war on those who did not wish to abandon the practice of charging interest:

O you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to you] of interest, if you should be believers. And if you do not, then be informed of a war [against you] from Allah and His Messenger. But if you repent, you may have your principal – [thus] you do no wrong, nor are you wronged. (Qur’an 2: 278-279, translated by Ibrahim Walk)

*Riba al-nasiah* is a delay in kind or an artificial delay to the transaction that corrupts the nature of the business. It refers to an unjustified delay in *ayn* (possession) and *dayn* (non-possession/debt), since the basic principle in Islamic business transactions is that the goods and payments must be both present and exchanged at the time of transaction, unless the transaction is a loan mutually agreed between debtor and creditor. Imam Malik Al-Mutawwa (93-179 CE) collected a great number of *ahadith* (the plural of *hadith*) in his
work, *Al-Muwatta Book 31*, that corroborate that a promise to pay a debt or a receipt that promises future payment for a transaction that has already taken place is *riba al-nasiah* and prohibited. *Riba-al nasiah* has been extensively studied by Vardillo (2004), who takes the stance that modern paper currency is nothing but debt, created out of thin air and existing merely on a computer screen, and not only falls into the category of *gharar* but is also *dayn*, because it is ‘a promise to pay the bearer on demand’. The commercial exchange is thus rendered invalid because the money is not in the seller's possession.

Issuing a promise to pay on a paper receipt also adds to the delay on a transaction, triggering the prohibition of *riba*. On this basis, Vardillo has produced two works, *Fatwa on Paper Money* (1991) and *Fatwa on Banking* (2006), both of which examine the rationale for disallowing paying *zakat* with paper money, using paper money as a medium of exchange in commercial transactions and dealing with banks in general, as they are nothing less than pillars of usury. On the other hand, the former grand mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Tantawy, proclaimed a *fatwa* (a legal pronouncement) in 1989 that describes some forms of financial interest as tolerable, such as those paid by government bonds and those on ordinary savings accounts (as narrated in Mallat 1996). The Hidaya Foundation’s website, amongst others, also offers instructions on the permitted percentage payable for *zakat* on stocks, options, trusts, pensions funds and an array of other speculative investments. This is illustrative of a deep rift among Muslims living and operating in the modern world, a conflict that has dogged the *ummah* since the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

The concept of *riba* has posed a great challenge for Muslim jurists, scholars and religious leaders ever since the advent of capitalism, and most particularly at the time usurious practices were introduced into Muslims lands through the colonisation of the
former Ottoman territories in the early nineteenth century. Muslim scholars and jurists struggled to come to terms not only with interest-bearing institutions, but also with the non-Muslim rulers of their countries, who instituted national legal norms. In response, an Islamic reformation began to emerge in the field of political economy throughout the Muslim world. It attempted to dispense with the fixity and finality of the traditional fiqh, reviving *ijihad*, a call for independent thinking as opposed to the resort to *taqlid* (imitation) and slavish adherence to a particular school of thought. Leading reformers Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad ’Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida wanted to accommodate some of the forms of interest ingrained in the Western colonial system with Islamic principles (Homoud 1985: 115), while simultaneously promoting the pan-Islamic movement. Islamic rhetoric combined with non-Islamic principles was an important feature that was transferred from pan-Islamism to neo-Islamism, as illustrated later. Analysing the views of ’Abduh and Rida on *riba*, Saleh (1986: 29) suggests that they believed the first increase on a term loan would be lawful, whereas any further increase in the event of a delayed maturity date was prohibited. Mallat (1988: 74), who studied ’Abduh’s and Rida’s views on the permissibility of charging interest, concludes that neither were comfortable with interest yielded on deposits, but were prepared to see it as a *mudaraba*, a special partnership operating at a pre-arranged profit ratio known to both buyer and the seller.

These early reformers were extremely important as they represent the continuing bifurcation among Muslim scholars on the issue of Islamic finance, and specifically on the question of *riba*, an inevitable element of the capitalist neoliberal economy. One faction

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209 Since the tenth century, Sunni leaders have considered the apparatus of the *fiqh* as finalised. Thus, the gates of *ijihad* (the new interpretation of the main sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the Sunnah) were regarded by many jurists as closed. For more on *ijihad*, see Khan (2006).
adheres to the ‘modernist movement’, in which Muslim scholars (Badawi 1964; Rahman 1964; Ali 1975; Assad 1984; al-Najjar 1989; al-Namir 1989; Saeed 1999) promote the incorporation of Islamic principles into the debt-based, interest-charging economy. They find justification in four main arguments: firstly, the prohibition of interests on loans concerns individuals and not institutions, companies or governments; secondly, there is a semantic distinction between usury and interest; third, certain *riba* is permissible as it can be justified by a *hadith* in which the Prophet was recorded as paying his debts in excess, saying, ‘The best amongst the people is he who repays his debt in the best manner’ (Bukhari Sahih III: 339); and finally, Islam is not familiar with non-humanitarian loans, so in loan-operated economies, there is a need for Islamic bankers, financiers, scholars and jurists to re-interpret the rulings on *riba* in a more selective manner.

A second group of scholars (Uzair 1973; Sadiqqi 1983; Chapra 1985; Ahmad 2000), however, belong to the ‘neo-revivalist movement’. They base their approach on exclusivist interpretations of Mawdudi and Qutb,\(^\text{210}\) totally refuting the permissibility of charging interest in Islamic business transactions of any shape or form. The debates on *riba* continue to occupy contemporary Muslim discussions. A case in point is the First International Conference on Riba, convened at Kuala Lumpur in November 2010. As previously mentioned, Malaysia pioneered the production of contemporary Islamic works on global economics, and established an alternative currency, the golden e-dinar, based on the Islamic principle of gold and silver coins.

The Islamic mechanisms described above were put in place to create a just and equitable world. The presence of poverty, and the accumulation and concentration of

\(^{210}\) For more on both these figures, see chapter two.
wealth in individual hands, are calamities that Islam does not tolerate. To eradicate these practices, Muslims are encouraged to work for their income and to gain self-sufficiency through their own efforts. Ramadan (2001: 228-230) states that Islam offers a holistic approach to life: it emphasises the presence of God, the absence of a clergy and the individual’s responsibility for their own actions, and raises awareness of the individual’s relationship with God and the sacred dimension of the universe in the harmony of *rabbaniyya* (attaining the Hereafter through knowledge of the Divine).²¹¹

However, the Qur’an also warns that ‘people are prone to selfish greed’ (Qur’an 4: 128, translated by Arthur J. Arberry), and that ‘man is ever niggardly’ (Qur’an 17: 100, translated by Arthur J. Arberry). The socio-economic state of a wide spectrum of Muslim countries mirrors these verses, as the practices incorporated in Muslims’ everyday lives do not necessarily conform to the fundamental principles of Islam. Major Islamic players, such as the petro-monarchies of the Gulf, act without moral scruple, disrespecting sacred Islamic practices (Ramadan 2001: 136). The norms of governance of the majority of Muslim rulers, with a few exceptions, has incapacitated Islamic development, and many Muslim societies remain stultified by memories of former golden times, locked into archaic local traditions mixed with imperfect interpretations of the Qur’an. Neo-Islamism has thus merged with neoliberalism.

²¹¹ The individual is wholly accountable for their deeds and actions, which should always testify to the divine presence. This contemplative view must be constantly renewed in the struggle against the habit to neglect the omnipresence of *rabbaniyya*, ‘which consists of placing action in a permanent [relationship] with the remembrance of the Divine ordinances’ (Ramadan 2001: 80). To illustrate the sovereign dimension of divine authority and individual duty, Muslim scholars generally rely on the following verse: ‘Surely in the creation of the heaven and earth and in alternation of night and day there are signs for men possessed of minds who remember God, standing and sitting, and on their sides, and reflect upon the creation of the heavens and earth: “Our Lord, Thou hast not created this for vanity. Glory be to Thee! Guard us against the chastisement of the Fire”’ (Qur’an 3: 190-191).
5.4 The Islamic response to neoliberalism

The origins of neoliberal policies in the Muslim world date back to the era of oil wealth and the ‘oil crisis’ in the 1970s, the birth of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the subsequent rise of neo-Islamism. During this period, three milestones triggered a new framework for the Islamic ummah and shaped its development, under the patronage of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The first reason was the newfound Saudi wealth, which stemmed from oil production and its export to the West, and particularly to the US, with whom it built a strong relationship, the second was the death of the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1970, and the third, the burning of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem.

President Nasser, a co-founder with Tito and Nehru of the Non-Aligned Movement, was regarded as a champion of the Third World’s struggle against Western colonialism. For scholars who opposed the idea of neutrality, he was perceived as the Muslim leader responsible for the newly independent Islamic states, from Algeria to Indonesia, embracing ‘his brand of nationalism, secularism and socialism’ (Warde 2000: 90). Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were the Arab focal points of the Cold War, and they were sucked in as proxies of the two opposing ideological enemies. While Saudi Arabia advocated the doctrines of capitalism, using its control of the pan-Islamic movement, the

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212 US companies have been allowed to prospect for oil in Saudi Arabia since May 1933.
213 The Non-Aligned Movement was established by a conference convened in Belgrade in September 1961, largely on the initiative of Yugoslavia’s President Tito. The movement wanted to remain independent of the Soviet bloc and its state-run society, but it did not want to unite with the imperialist West, as it was very critical of Western colonialism. The movement’s administration was, and still remains, non-hierarchical, rotational and inclusive, providing all member states, regardless of size and importance, with an opportunity to participate in global decision-making and world politics. The movement was especially popular during the 1970s and 1980s, but with the end of the Cold War and with the prevailing capitalist hegemony, it lost its voice, and its member states were taken over by neoliberal structural adjustment programmes. For more on the Non-Aligned Movement, visit http://www.nam.gov.za.
Muslim World League and the pilgrimage to Mecca to reinforce its ties with other Islamic leaders, Egypt under Nasser promoted the struggle against colonialism both inside and outside the Arab world, without reference to religion. To undermine Nasser’s message of Arab and Third-World solidarity, Faisal therefore portrayed himself as a zealous patron of Islamic solidarity (Mortimer 1982: 170-188). The dramatic Egyptian losses during the war in Yemen, and its subsequent defeat in the 1967 six-day war with Israel, became common justifications for the claims, fuelled by Saudi Arabia, that the Arabs had been punished for straying from the true path of Islam (Mortimer 1982: 178).

When, in 1969, the Al-Aqsa mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem was set on fire, it presented Faisal with the pretext to call for the wider unity of the Islamic ummah. Under his auspices, the Islamic Summit was convened in Morocco, out of which the permanent Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was born the following year, the same year that Nasser died. The absence of his major opponent, coupled with the Saudis’ enormous oil wealth, left Faisal unchallenged. He was able to unleash his version of the Islamic response to the changing political arena. The availability of large disposable sums of money from Saudi Arabia, and lack of any other viable political option, persuaded otherwise secular Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan, to introduce the theme of Islamic solidarity into their foreign policies. They hoped to provide manpower for the Islamic cause in return for cash (Mortimer 1982: 218). On a strategic level, however, both countries had their own political agendas.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, president of Pakistan and zealous supporter of the Islamic cause, hoped to succeed in exporting ‘Islamic socialism’ to the network of supranational

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214 For more information on the history and function of the OIC, visit www.oic-oci.org.
Islamic institutions, in order to achieve his motto of ‘food, clothing and shelter’. The *raison d’être* of the Islamic state is to cover these basic needs so as to free the individual to worship, contemplate and work to attain spiritual development. The Turkish concern, however, was with the growing power of an increasingly militant left. The Turkish Workers Party had taken fifteen seats in parliament in 1965 (Rustow, cited in Herper and Evin 1994: 3-12). ‘As the left’s power grew in the 1970s, the state backed both hard-right nationalist vigilantes and Islamist groups against them’ (Tugal 2007: 9). Through a combination of Islamic rhetoric and concessions to, and increasingly open support for, pro-Islamic parties, the Turkish state was able to prevent the spread of the ‘socialist virus’.

When Nasser died, he was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who immediately embarked on a policy of ‘de-Nasserisation’, which included distancing Egypt from the Soviet Union by expelling Soviet advisers, abandoning socialism and implementing the policy of *infitah* or ‘open door’ – that is, ‘opening the door’ to foreign capital, allowing it to purchase Egyptian assets. The generous patronage of King Faisal resulted in lavish financial assistance, and the two countries embarked on an era of close cooperation (Warde 2000: 92). In order to derail the protests of the growing working class and leftist opposition movements, Sadat employed a rhetoric full of de-contextualised Islamic references and euphemistic slogans, such as ‘Islam is the solution’, designed to soothe rather than offer a viable remedy. It worked, as it often appears to do, the previous Turkish example being a case in point.

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215 For more information, see [www.bhutto.org](http://www.bhutto.org), a website dedicated to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom many considered a martyr (*shaheed*).
Muslim countries incorporated into the neoliberal system were forced to adopt privatisation policies, the main prerequisite for membership of the neoliberal club and access to the funds necessary for industrial development. Saudi Arabia, however, was not obliged by the same conditionality, and was therefore able to nationalise its oil company. Some scholars, Warde (2000) for example, praise this successful nationalisation in the midst of a global privatisation campaign and booming oil revenues. The rationale behind the move was that Saudi Arabia being an absolutist monarchy, which claims possession of all the assets in its country, nationalisation – in absolutist terms – is in fact privatisation.\textsuperscript{216} The oil prices rose during the Ramadan or Yom Kippur war\textsuperscript{217} in October 1973, quadrupling over the course of a few months. Sadat decided to use the Israeli and American dependence on oil as a weapon against them, and maintained the high price of petrol (Yergin 2001: 595). The Shah of Iran adopted the same policy, considering it to be consistent with the rules and logic of the free market, and professing concern about the West’s overconsumption of oil in an economic environment of high inflation and a falling dollar (Lenczowski 1980: 214). During this period, the balance of power between oil producers and consumers shifted. The former were enriched by huge oil revenues and gained greater control over energy policy, which enabled them to gradually nationalise their oil industries, transforming the foreign oil companies into hired service providers (Yergin 1991: 563-587). In this respect, Muslim countries regained their strength through the transfer of oil wealth – the largest transfer of wealth in the whole of the twentieth

\textsuperscript{216} Aramco was a US-Saudi joint-owned company, which was brought under Saudi control – that is, it passed into the hands of the Saudi monarchy.

\textsuperscript{217} The OPEC countries raised oil prices by up to 400 percent. However, according to some scholars, this was orchestrated by the bankers and neoliberal governments, particularly in the US and UK (Oppenheim 1977). For an interesting account of the 1970s’ ‘oil crisis’ and price rises, see Marshall (2009).
century.\textsuperscript{218} This promised a new relationship between ‘Islam and the West’, and the potential for Islamic solidarity in formulating policies \textit{vis-à-vis} the West and rising oil revenues.

During the oil bonanza, the oil-producing Muslim countries gained large amounts of hard currency that needed to be reinvested. Because the increase in petro-dollars challenged their economies’ capacity to absorb such large sums, this presented itself as a ‘problem’ (Saeed 1999). According to Ali (1986), the money was spent in three main ways: buying Western consumer goods, military hardware and industrial equipment; investing in development projects at home and abroad; and lending money to countries without oil. Indeed, the non-oil-exporting countries, who were mainly poor countries from the South, many of them Muslim, needed money to procure oil. Islamic obligations would suggest that the exchange between the two would be made in the most ingenuous and mutually beneficial way. In a sense, this is what happened, but with the difference that the oil-producing countries did not recycle the money directly but employed intermediaries: private banks in London and New York. The wealthy petro-monarchies in the Gulf invited Western bankers to administer their disposable hard currency in the form of loans that incurred interest rates, a practice unequivocally repudiated by Islamic law. All the pious Islamic references recited by a chorus of Muslim leaders, their official \textit{ulama} and subservient media belied the codes they really followed.

By divorcing the fundamental Islamic principles from their context, these so-called ‘Muslim’ rulers ‘offered a weapon of absolute force to banks’ (George 2005), and thus

\textsuperscript{218} For a good analysis of this question, see Chomsky (1995) and also Ramadan (2001).
were complicit in trapping poorer Muslim countries into a cycle of permanent indebtedness, as discussed earlier in the chapter. Algeria gives an exemplary illustration of this pattern: by 1990 it had an external debt of over $24 billion, and service payments were regularly absorbing more than half of all its export earnings (Howe 1992). The Saudi offer of loans via the banks prevented the creation of a different model of economic relations that might be Islamic but would offer advantages to both parties. By creating colonial-style dependence, perpetually accruable interest placed both the poor countries and the oil-producing ones in an unfavourable situation. Ramadan (2001: 137) criticises the way Islamic finance was conducted, calling it hypocritical, because scattered references to the glory of Islam disguised disreputable financial practices. Warde (2000: 90), on the other hand, claims that Islamic principles were firmly embedded within these Western banking practices, and it was precisely ‘this new global economy which has emerged with the end of the Cold War [that] has allowed Islamic banking to thrive’.

Many scholars recognise that oil revenues did help create a network of Islamic banks around the Middle East (Sidiqqi 2000; Ahmad, Iqbal and Khan 1983). Yet, analysis of the Islamicity of these banks reveals that they remained Islamic in name only (Saeed 1999). The high-risk involvement and profit-and-loss-sharing ratio that are essential elements of Islamic finance, and of any Islamic business transaction, simply could not be accommodated in the low-risk, high-return neoliberal economic model based on debt. Moreover, banks are usury-operating institutions that completely depend on the system of interest rates for their existence. The religious body that supervises Islamic banks, therefore, was required to conduct their neo-Islamisation in order to incorporate them into the neoliberal economy. To ensure that this move would be generally accepted, selected
scholars were called upon to supply its intellectual groundwork, a practice adopted from the proponents of neoliberalism (see section one of the chapter). Warde (2000: 93), for example, describes private property as ‘an economic pillar … that Islam shields against arbitrary confiscation of the state’, in order to emphasise Islamic commitment to free enterprise and private property. Yet, he simultaneously praises the Saudi state’s confiscation of the privately owned oil refineries (Warde 2000: 98). However, even if the transfer of ownership was only nominal, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the Saudi royal family is still worthy of Islamic critique. Similarly, in 1992-93 the Sudanese minister of the economy, a disciple of Milton Friedman and a former London banker, decided to implement the harshest of free-market remedies dictated by the IMF. He claimed he was committed to transforming the heretofore statist economy ‘according to free-market rules, because this is how an Islamic economy should function’ (Miller 1996: 144) – a prime example of straightforward opportunism wrapped in the flag of Islam.

Warde also attempts to justify the Saudi decision to maintain low oil prices in the wake of the 1973 ‘oil shock’, despite the fact that it missed an opportunity to break the political deadlock and achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth according to Islamic principles of social justice: ‘It was sparsely populated and did not need all the additional income’ (Warde 2000: 94, my italics). He also states that Saudi Arabia, along with the other Gulf states, was heavily invested in international markets, and economically and militarily dependant on the US. The fact of their increasing reliance on Western protection seems to be part of a scholarly consensus (Chaudhry 1997: 7). However, these states’ neo-Islamist elites required protection not against external opponents – by the late 1970s Muslim countries were in the main already incorporated into the established system, each with their
own neo-Islamist ruler – but against the dissatisfied masses at home, who were increasingly susceptible to socialist ideas coming from Russia and revolutionary messages from Iran. Hence, the ruling petro-monarchies significantly increased their purchase of Western weapons (Mortimer 1982: 180). These were to be used in defence of the Islamic ummah and the ‘People of the Christian Book’, preserving the ‘free world’ against the atheist menace of the ‘communist infidels’. Indoctrinated Islamic ‘freedom fighters’, or mujahideens, were dispatched to Afghanistan on a mission of jihad to fight the Russian occupying forces. Meanwhile, the Saudi monarchy chose to further invest its newfound wealth in US treasury bonds and place most of its deposits in American banks (Lenczowski 1980: 609). The fact that these are usury-earning establishments seems not to have bothered the official guardian of the two most sacred mosques in Islam.

To ensure an uninterrupted exchange of cash and petroleum between the two ideological partners, the Shah of Iran bolstered the oil markets by keeping prices as high as possible. In return, he was given a blank cheque to indulge in a lavish shopping spree, purchasing Western commodities, from weapons through to the most luxurious consumer items. The agreement lasted until the second ‘oil shock’ of 1979, when the Iranian Revolution, triggered by the economic upheaval, overthrew the Shah’s regime. As they enjoyed the status of Western protégés, the Shah and his trusted followers found refuge in the ‘free world’ of Western Europe. The same year, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, together with Pakistan’s General Zia, provided ‘Islamic martyrs’ to defend the Dar-ul-Islam against the ‘heathens’. Fearing that Iran’s anti-imperialist revolution held an electrifying example for its own impoverished population, Saudi Arabia called upon President Carter to deliver the following threatening message:
Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (Carter 1979)

As the Saudis were especially apprehensive about the revolutionary message coming from their major regional rival, they took steps to ensure that their neo-Islamist demagogic rhetoric was spread throughout the Muslim world. In Pakistan, Bhutto was hanged, having been found guilty by Pakistan’s Supreme Court of authorising the killing of a government opponent. He was succeeded by General Zia, infamous for establishing one of the most violent and oppressive regimes in the region, which he institutionalised through his version of shari’a law. His Western allies turned a blind eye to his despotism, as in the words of Lewis (2004),

[I]t is not the West’s business to correct them, still less to change them, but merely to ensure that the despots are friendly rather than hostile to Western interests. (Lewis 2004: 91)

A military coup d’état in Turkey in 1980, prompted by the proximity of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, violently suppressed the increasingly influential left-wing movements and embarked on ‘three years of state terror, during which executions, torture and imprisonment effected a permanent alteration in the political landscape’ (Tugal 2007: 9). Coups, as opposed to revolutions, are the preferred method for replacing disobedient regimes (Lewis 2004: 92-93); their results are predictable and usually more desirable, leaving room for the installation of a more cooperative dictator. The Turkish military dictatorship encouraged the Islamist parties, and the definition of the secular Turkish national identity in its 1982 constitution contained unprecedented references to Islam (Tugal 2007: 9) With the left effectively decimated, and the Islamists
appeased with carefully planned concessions, the military coup had ‘rendered neoliberal reform possible’ (Tugal 2007: 12).

Meanwhile, President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated in 1981; the indications were he was preparing to withdraw his obedience to Saudi-defined Islamic socio-economic concepts. He was replaced by Hosni Mubarak, whose son was subsequently groomed to inherit the presidential pedestal (Smiley 2007: 90), a safer way of transferring government ‘than fac[ing] the unpredictable hazards of regime change, especially of a change brought about by the will of the people expressed in a free election’ (Lewis 2004: 91). Meanwhile, in 1982 Saudi Arabia, having secured backing from its Islamist-secularist Turkish neighbour, sponsored the intifada of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, in an attempt to overthrow its ‘heathen communist’ regime and return its people to the true Islamic path. The uprising, however, was brutally crushed, with huge loss of life; the Syrian army flattened entire village with tanks, and hundreds of ‘brothers in Islam’ were imprisoned. Those who managed to escape, with the help of the Western foreign agents who had sponsored the intifada, fled to Europe, notably to the UK, France and Germany, where they enjoyed the protection of political asylum. Even though the intifada was extinguished, and with it the secret foreign operations,219 the uprising had seriously affected the Syrian economy, hampering its future growth. However, the leaders of other Muslim countries, from Morocco to Indonesia, with very few exceptions, gave their blessing to the neoliberal system, in the name of Islam. It is only after decades of misery and spiralling debt, that people are now starting to demand what is rightfully theirs – better living standards, justice and a share in their nations’ resources.

219 I incidentally met one of the rebels’ sons in London via my Bosnian friends’ network. He said that his father was saved at the last moment by the French embassy, which sent him to safety in Germany.
5.5 Conclusion: the symbiosis between neo-Islamists and neoliberals

With the regard to the research question, this chapter detailed the construction of Neo-Islamism. Although it might at first appear to be unrelated, the success of the neoliberal doctrine was sustained by the neo-Islamists. As illustrated above, the two seemingly opposed ideologies are in fact complementary, having far more in common than meets the eye. In both East and West, the attention of a media-saturated public is directed away from pressing social and economic problems towards allegedly inimical ideological beliefs. The fact that both feed on each other goes unreported for the most part. It often seems as if the neo-Islamists have ‘effectively conspired with the Western media and their Enlightenment rhetoric to create a culture war that perpetuates itself from one event to the next’ (Luticken 2007: 107). There was a brief period in the 1970s that raised Muslims’ hopes of constructing an independent, just and ethical economic system, based on the values of Islam and in tune with the contemporary world. However, it soon became obvious that the ‘transnational capitalist’ alliance is difficult to thwart. Institutionalised corruption and inefficiency has crippled various Muslim countries and caused them to deviate from Islamic principles. Islamic banks and credit institutions have been plagued by scandals. These institutions, established with the rise of neoliberalism, were Islamic insofar as they functioned according to the principle of participation in risk and not according to the guarantee of interest, but not in terms of the moral obligations prescribed by Islam. They played on the credulity of their customers and helped spread the doctrine of a liberal free-market economy.

Muslim countries, with the exception of Malaysia, have embraced the neoliberal policies of controlling wages, curtailing unions, imposing austerity, encouraging the
concentration of wealth amongst an elite and ensuring the unequal distribution of income. In all of these practices, they have bowed before institutional trinity of the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Due to the recipe of excessive market liberalisation, many countries plunged into severe debt. Aggressive privatisation programmes have pushed governments to change policy, and even to resort to disseminating misleading information. A case in point is Turkey’s AK Party, whose policies are presented with an Islamic veneer. For example, it has undertaken the task of forest privatisation, claiming it would only sell off tracts that had lost their ‘quality’ as forests. Real-estate speculators, however, describe how ‘there were 829 fires in the first seven months of 2003, which scorched 1,775 hectares of forest, qualifying them fit for privatisation’ (Tugal 2007: 21).

The absence of any supreme judicial body that could achieve consensus on economic principles based on Islamic values has seemingly created confusion. While it may be an advantage in terms of giving each country the freedom to adapt its system according to specific cultural demands, it also leaves room for a variety of misinterpretations. The neoliberal doctrine promotes speculative practices, facilitated by government policies that encourage the growth of a debt economy and the deregulation of financial markets that allow government bonds to float freely, accruing interest. This is not how an Islamic economy should function. Shari’a law explicitly forbids the corrupt practices of qimar (speculation), gharar (delayed exchange) and riba (usury).

The distortion of shari’a by neo-Islamists, and the introduction of the malpractices of speculative economic transactions, social oppression and the mistreatment of women should not be associated with the Islamic model. Likewise, the harsh consequences of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes should not be confused with the good
governance of a functioning democracy. The neoliberals remain in power because they have curtailed trade union movements, facilitated future profits through market liberalisation and, by means of the multiplying laws against terrorism, limited the civil liberties of their own citizens. The neo-Islamists remain in power through repression and advocating submission, coupled with their adherence to a neoliberal theocracy and the disenchantment with the very religion they invoke. Neoliberalism and neo-Islamism are two sides of the same coin – on the face of it, one side may appear more attractive than the other, but the value of the coin nonetheless remains the same. Admittedly, members of neoliberal societies enjoy a better life, but this is due to the laws of evolution: they began from an unequal position. For the West, neoliberalism was the next step for a well-developed, post-industrial capitalist region; for Muslim countries, neo-Islamism represented an enormous transformation at a time when they were still grappling with the legacy of colonialism.

Once the neo-Islamists had adopted the neoliberal economic programme, it was possible to export the model to other parts of the world. The first step for Western neoliberals was to identify local allies. Yugoslavia was a target for a number of reasons: it was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement; it adhered to anti-colonial policies; its economy was organised according to socialist distributive principles; it was secular; and Tito, the Yugoslav president, was a good friend and supporter of Nasser. Moreover, it was the last remaining country in Europe that was not completely incorporated into the global neoliberal system. Structural adjustment policies were insufficient, however, and the neo-

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220 For an excellent compilation of articles concerning laws against terrorism, see Scraton (2002). See also: McCulloch (2002).
Islamists’ assistance was essential. During the 1970s, Yugoslavia experienced its own Islamic revival. After decades of religious persecution, Islam entered a progressive period in Yugoslavia. Bosnian Muslims, who gained political and national recognition, lived through an exceptionally prosperous time. The next chapter deals with this period and the question of the Islamic rebirth of the 1970s, and analyses events preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia, including the arrest of a group accused of infiltrating Islamism into Yugoslavia. It also analyses the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the international response to the conflict.
CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF NEO-ISLAM IN THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

This chapter deals with the international aspect of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, analysing joint Western and neo-Islamist involvement in the conflict. The purpose of the chapter is to assess whether neo-Islamism construction shaped the events and responses of Bosnian leaders in the 1990s. It examines events, which, despite their significant impact on the international community’s choice of resolution for the Bosnian crisis, have been widely neglected in the available literature (outlined in chapter one). One of the subjects this chapter investigates is the resilient Western view of an apparently united Muslim community, working towards the common goal of the ummah. This is taken to be the rationale underlying any political actions on the part of Muslims and those who support them. Although deeply flawed, this approach persists in its failure to acknowledge that Muslim forces can be as brutal towards each other as those of its rival ideologies. This chapter is particularly significant because it represents a culmination of the observations made in the previous chapters, pointing to the repetition of internal Bosnian disputes that have kept Bosnia and Herzegovina in the position of an international protectorate.

The focus of the chapter is the Western and neo-Islamist penetrations over the two decades preceding the Bosnian war, as well as during the conflict. To facilitate a better understanding of the reasons behind the success of neo-Islamist influence, the first section examines the political position of Bosnian Muslims in the 1970s. One of the areas analysed in this section, which bears particular relevance for the thesis as a whole, is the relationship between Tito’s Yugoslavia and the Muslim states. Section two deals with the first neo-Islamist infiltration into Yugoslavia, recounting the events immediately preceding the war.
The original tape transcripts from the Sarajevo city archives are examined in more details in this section through the analysis of the neo-Islamist influences in the event known as ‘Sarajevo Process’. Section three assesses the efforts of international mediators and their intelligence networks to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnically. Section four examines the power of the neo-Islamist groups by analysing Saudi-Iranian rivalry as a prime example of a feud fought by proxies on the Bosnian stage. Section five describes the way clandestine operations contributed to the neo-Islamisation of the conflict, and section six concludes that the infiltration of neo-Islamist networks in post-Tito Yugoslavia was not part of a natural process, whereby Yugoslav Muslims attempted to come to terms with modernity, but an imported phenomenon that ultimately led to the break-up of the country and the partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to the derogation of the Bosnian Muslims themselves.

6.1 The rationale behind the Islamic renaissance of the 1970s

‘It is good that you have taken strict measures against the inflammatory activities of some clerical groups’ (Tito, cited in Tanasković 2000: 24). President Tito uttered these words of encouragement to a political delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising its most influential political cadres, during a visit to Bugojno, a town in central-western Bosnia, on Yugoslavia’s ‘Nation Day’. ‘If necessary,’ he continued, ‘those attempts should be rooted out with the strictest measures. Nobody can [hold] it against you’ (Tito, cited in Tanasković 2000: 24). When Tito delivered this speech on the 25 November 1979, he was referring to the preceding decade, which had witnessed a rise in pan-Islamic voices throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The 1970s and 1980s featured the remarkable but ambiguous political development of the Bosnian Muslims, which held two apparent contradictions. Bosnian Muslims, for the first time since the nation-building process of the nineteenth century, were recognised as a separate nation and given constitutional rights, making them equal to the other Yugoslav peoples. As detailed in chapter four, they were designated as ‘Muslims’, a religious title that was, nevertheless, supposed to represent the purely secular notion of their newly attained national status. The concept of the ‘Muslim nation’ was carefully designed to include only Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo. Indeed, Bosniaks were, for the most part, assimilated into secular society and looked to their Islamic heritage for their traditions and values rather than religious dogma (Bringa, cited in Shtazmiller 2002: 24-34). They were often declared as more educated, liberal and cosmopolitan than other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Goodwin 2006; Simms 2001; Hadžiselimović 2007).

However, in contrast to this process of secularisation, the same period witnessed a type of Islamic renaissance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent, other parts of Yugoslavia. It manifested itself in the reconstruction of mosques, increased religious education and a considerable number of Islamic publications (Karčić 1997: 570-574). The Islamic Religious Community began to distribute literature of general Islamic concern, as well as manuscripts in Arabic dealing with contemporary issues in the Arab Muslim world. Between 1969 and 1983, up to three thousand Yugoslav, mainly Bosnian, Muslims performed the annual hajj pilgrimage (Friedman 1996: 189-191). The social and economic

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221 Izetbegović reiterated this notion of a ‘Muslim nation’ when he expressed his concern for ‘all three million Muslims’. This figure equated to the number of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak (a province in the south of Serbia), and Kosovo (one of the two autonomous provinces of former Yugoslavia), but excluded many Albanian, Macedonian and other Yugoslav Muslims (Doder 1993:s 13).
position of members of the Islamic community had significantly improved. In 1977 the head of the Islamic community, the *re’is ul-ulema*, proclaimed:

> The material position of our religious employees has never been better. All imams are covered by health, pension and invalidity insurance. A large number of very beautiful mosques have been built – there are more than 500. (cited in Impact International 1997: 14)

Hundreds of new or renovated mosques and *masjids* were opened, to service the religious practices that until then had been suppressed and confined to the privacy of people’s homes (Karčić 1999a: 546). It was the first time since the Ottoman era that new mosques were built and long-forgotten *masjids* and *tekkes*²²² refurbished.

The mosques were ready to accommodate new Islamic cadres – many of the Bosnian Muslim students who had gone abroad to the Middle East, North Africa and Asia to pursue Islamic studies returned home to spread their newly acquired knowledge,²²³ some bringing with them an echo of international neo-Islamist doctrines. At the same time, institutions of Islamic education were established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Gazi Husrevbeg *madrasa*²²⁴ in Sarajevo opened its girls’ division in 1977 (Karčić 1999a: 546), and the faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo was founded in order to resume the tradition of Islamic higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina that had ceased after the Second World War. The faculty is the oldest, largest and possibly most prestigious Islamic educational institution in south-east Europe. By the end of the 1970s, Yugoslavia was the only European country that could boast an Islamic theological school, three thousand

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²²² *Masjid* are smaller mosques, and a *tekke* is a place of worship for the members of the *tasawwuf tariqats* (Sufi orders).

²²³ For example, in 1978, over 150 Yugoslav Muslim students pursued their Islamic education abroad. For more figures, see Smajlović (1978: 562).

²²⁴ The Islamic high school bears the name of the founder of Sarajevo, Gazi Husrevbeg.
mosques and several Islamic middle schools, as well as a number of Muslim periodicals (Ivanković 1984: 14).

The reason for this Islamic renaissance can be explained by two events that emerged coincidentally on the global and the local level. As previously discussed in chapter one, the Yugoslav Communist Party had considered Muslims to be a separate ethnic group since its 1937 political declaration on the issue, but it was unable to grant them more rights until the nationalist Serb and Croat factions disappeared from the political scene in the late 1960s. On the international level, these changes coincided with the proliferation of neo-Islamist networks. The state authorities endeavoured to curtail their influence by granting more religious and political freedoms to Bosnian Muslims. Funding for the rash of rebuilding and refurbishment of Islamic places of worship and education derived almost entirely from the federal Yugoslav budget and the League of Communists from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a significant contributor to the budget of the Islamic Religious Community (Hadžijahić, Traljić and Šukrić 1977: 163). More than half the cost of restoring the Gazi Husrevbeg mosque was absorbed by the Sarajevo local government and the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Burg and Shoup 1999: 47). The League of Communists from Bosnia and Herzegovina also subsidised the dissemination and preparation of manuscripts of interest to the Islamic community in Arabic, Persian and Turkish (Kamberović 2003).

The availability of international Islamic literature, coupled with the annual *hajj* pilgrimage, acquainted Bosnian Muslims with the experiences of Muslims abroad. This is

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225 See chapter one for an analysis of the Yugoslav economy.
significant as the same period witnessed the rise of neo-Islamism in other Muslim countries. It is further noteworthy because these contacts enabled Bosniaks to compare their far better living standards and liberal political environment with those of Muslims in other countries. Another channel of information about the external Muslim world was the practice of international student exchange. International students were commonplace in Yugoslavia because Tito practiced an open, independent foreign policy, beholden to neither the Soviet nor the capitalist bloc. As Tito was known, historically, as the founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia became an attractive destination for many students from other non-aligned countries, which were mainly majority-Muslim states (Tanasković 2000: 20-24). Tito’s warm relations with these Muslim states was the driving force behind the greater political acknowledgement of Bosnian Muslims and their enhanced position in the Yugoslav polity, as well as the main culprit behind the subsequent spread of Islamist tendencies amongst certain segments of the Bosniak population.

Tito’s ties to Muslim countries abroad, and his personal patronage and encouragement of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnian Muslims, have dominated debates amongst scholars, policymakers and the general public for a number of years. The relationship has been a source of many inspired hypotheses. This debate gained greater prominence in light of the victimisation of Bosnian Muslims, as well as their subsequent Islamisation that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The

226 I personally know a few people who were exchange students to Bosnia in the 1980s, and who recounted their experiences to me. I also had the opportunity to be a Bosnian student in Turkey a decade later. During this period, I travelled extensively in the Middle East, and was astonished to find that, even then, Muslim youth in Turkey and some Arab countries suffered from low living standards and an illiberal atmosphere.

227 From predominantly developing countries.

228 In 1948 Tito gave a historic ‘No’ to Stalin and officially broke away from the Soviet grip. For more discussion on Yugoslavia’s international position and domestic arrangements, see chapter one.

229 Tito founded the Non-Aligned Movement with Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.
elevated and relatively protected position of Muslims in Yugoslavia during Tito’s lifetime was often contrasted with their degradation after his death, the massacres committed during the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a federal state, and the tacit acceptance of this slaughter by the ‘international community’. Many Yugoslav Muslims, especially the Islamic Community of Kosovo, support the theory that Tito was a crypto-Muslim, believing this was the reason behind his inclination towards a resolution of the ‘Muslim question’ in Yugoslavia. As proof, they cite a book written by Ertuğrul, a Turkish author and Islamic publicist, called *Kendini Arayan Adam (The Man in Search for Himself)*, which alleges that Tito, at the end, confessed his Muslim faith. The evidence the author uses is a letter written by Salih Gökkaya, president of the Turkish Communist Youth Organisation, who visited Tito in Belgrade in the months before his death. During this visit, Tito is cited as confessing his belief in ‘God, the Prophet and the Ahiret [the world after death]’ (Ertuğrul 2005: 105). Furthermore, Tito curtailed Serb and Croat claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina by making it a separate republic within the Yugoslav federation in 1943. In return, the Bosnian Muslims were always the most ‘Titoist’ of ‘Titoists’. Even today, after the war, there is a coffee shop in the former Museum of Antifascist Revolution in Sarajevo that is called ‘Tito’, which is apparently one of the favourite venues for Bosnian youth.

There have been other scholarly attempts to explain the rationale behind the elevation of Muslims to the status of a nation and the endorsement of an Islamic revival in Yugoslavia. In general, scholars consider the advancement of Tito’s foreign policy and his quest for dominance within the Non-Aligned Movement as a credible reason for his interest.

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230 The international aspect of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed in more detail in the chapter seven.

231 For examples on modern Bosnian ‘Titoism’, see Bećirbašić (2008: 30-31).
in the fortunes of Bosnian Muslims. For example, Friedman (1996: 188-189) asserts that Tito was trying to woo Muslim leaders in the Non-Aligned Movement, using the ‘status of his own Muslims’, in order to increase his popularity as a leader and advance his foreign policy goals. She further claims that by elevating the status of Yugoslav Muslims, Tito attempted to endear Yugoslavia to Middle Eastern and North African Arab states so as to persuade them to support him against Fidel Castro, who was trying to dominate and radicalise the Non-Aligned Movement (Friedman 1996: 167). Cvić (1980: 110) maintains that, in order to further Yugoslavia’s foreign policy aims, Tito would always include a Muslim representative from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the delegation despatched to a Muslim country, and when Muslim foreign leaders paid a visit to Yugoslavia, Tito would host them in Sarajevo. Meanwhile, Bringa (2002: 32) argues that the Islamic revival, as well as the cultural and national elevation of Bosnian Muslims, was due to Tito’s extensive cooperation with the non-aligned Muslim countries, particularly the oil-producing ones, while Stanković (1983: 3) states that Tito ‘cleverly used his Muslims’ to his own advantage by acting as if Yugoslavia were ‘the second-strongest Moslem [sic] country in Europe, after Turkey’. However, Hunt (2004: 3) claims that Tito established the Islamic Theological University with the view to nurturing the compatibility of Bosnian Islams with the West.

While the arguments above appear persuasive explanations, they appear less plausible when subject to closer scrutiny. For example, none of the leaders of the non-aligned Muslim countries that Tito was associated with formally possessed a religiously
oriented foreign policy. On the contrary, these countries were socialist, more or less independent, and led by decidedly non-aligned political elites with secular policies. Furthermore, the Islamic revival in Yugoslavia occurred at the moment when the socialist non-aligned countries were facing internal problems, with the proliferation of neo-Islamist movements instigated by Saudi Arabia with a view to overthrowing the ‘heathen communists’. The context and timing of the Islamic revival suggests that these leaders, in contrast to the claims made above, would be less than impressed with a reinvigoration of Islam in Yugoslavia at a time when they were attempting to purge their countries of neo-Islamist networks. In relation to Hunt’s argument that Tito was concerned with the promotion of a brand of tolerant Yugoslav Islam to the West, it is important to point out two facts that nullify such a claim. Firstly, until the recent war, Bosnian Muslims were little known in international circles, especially in the West. For example, in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, published as late as 1987 (1047, 1057), Bosniaks were omitted from the map featuring the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia, and were mentioned only marginally, under the entry for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bringa (2002: 25) reveals that when she started her research into the Bosniaks in the early 1980s, she found astonishingly little information, and what she did discover proved ‘at best contradictory and at worst misleading’. This suggests that Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina was of too little significance, as far as the West was concerned, for Tito to expend much effort on its promotion.

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232 For example, Egypt under Nasser, Syria under Hafez al-Assad, the father of the incumbent Syrian president. The exception to this rule was Libya, but Gadaffi was outside the neo-Islamist sphere and was considered an ‘Islamic socialist.’
233 See chapter five.
234 Tito enjoyed a relatively amicable relationship with the West, and had no reason to try and prove himself to any Western leader.
Furthermore, the establishment of the Theological University in Sarajevo coincided with the rise of neo-Islamist networks around the world under the patronage of Saudi Arabia. As mentioned earlier, Bosniaks began to be exposed to the neo-Islamist trends in the wider Muslim world through their contacts as either students or as pilgrims. Tanasković (2000: 21) observes that Muslim students who graduated from the madrasah left in large numbers for the Islamic universities of the Middle East and Asia because the resources for training and educating future Islamic religious leaders in Yugoslavia, and by implication in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were non-existent prior to 1977 (Ceranić, cited in Frid 1971: 29). Even when the faculty was established, its educational capacity remained somewhat weak. Consequently, even in 1978, over one hundred and fifty Muslim students from Yugoslavia were pursuing Islamic studies abroad (Smajlović 1978: 562). There were also reports that some Bosnian Muslim youth, returning from their studies in the Muslim lands, ‘had ceased being communist’ and were dedicated to destroying communism (Stanković 1983: 2-3).

By the 1980s, neo-Islamists had consolidated their political power in a number of countries and had developed a neo-Islamist network comprising an array of organisations. Having spent many years in the Muslim world, the Bosnian students who returned were naturally influenced by the prevalent neo-Islamist atmosphere of the countries where they studied.235 It is interesting to note, however, that rather than capitalising on the elevated situation of the Muslim population back home, the students seem to have embraced international Islamist ideas. Cvitković (cited in Burg and Shoup 1999: 2), executive secretary of the Presidium of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Central Committee, claimed there were about three hundred returning Bosnian Muslim students preaching Islamist ideas at

235 Many students did not return, but remained in the countries in which they studied to serve as translators for Yugoslav enterprises (Burg and Shoup 1999: 33).
the time, and they were part of a transnational Islamist network. The neo-Islamist groups mainly used students to advance their political vision and ideology and, as discussed in the previous chapter, their prime targets were the non-aligned socialist countries that had not succumbed to the neoliberal regime.

By 1980, Yugoslavia was one of the last pillars of independent self-managed socialism in the region (as discussed earlier in chapter one). In this respect, it served as a prime target for both neoliberals and neo-Islamists. Neoliberalism did not have much success in penetrating Yugoslavia, and the knock-on effects of the global austerity measures imposed upon Third World countries during the 1970s were domestically insignificant. On the contrary, in Yugoslavia, the decade was marked by industrial growth and the development of coal and hydro-electric resources (Singleton and Carter 1982: 250). In fact, it was not until 1982 that Yugoslavia succumbed to the loan-economy, securing its second loan from the IMF on the usual conditions of trade liberalisation and institutional austerity (Woodward 1995: 52). The first loan had been taken out in 1979 to balance the trade deficit (Hudson 2003: 59), but it had had less significant repercussions upon the economy. Neoliberalism only materialised in Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, and emerged predominantly as the result of political skirmishes between supporters of self-managed socialism and advocates of market-oriented liberalism. Some scholars claim it was this fundamental rift between opposing domestic ideologies that opened the way for internationally operated centrifugal forces to initiate the the break-up of Yugoslavia (Johnstone 2003; Hudson 2003; Parenti 2002). In this respect, a discussion on
neoliberalism in Yugoslavia during the 1980s would be limited, if not insignificant, since at that time it met with little success.²³⁶

If neoliberalism was a late-comer to Yugoslavia, neo-Islamism was not; it appeared to be more efficient in spreading its dogma across the country. Thus, the neoliberal, neo-Islamist analysis above lends support to the conclusion that Tito did not encourage an Islamic revival because he wished to impress his non-aligned Muslim peers by the elevated status of ‘his’ Muslims, nor to convince his Western counterparts that Yugoslavia bred a more occidentally compatible brand of Islam. The liberalisation of the ‘Muslim question’ and the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims appear to have been part of a strategic manoeuvre to curtail neo-Islamist penetration; the neo-Islamists were seen as a Trojan horse that could potentially lead to the dissolution of Yugoslavia as an entity. For example, after the Islamic Theological University was established, it was placed under the patronage of the Islamic Religious Community, which was in turn closely monitored by the Communist Party leadership and infiltrated by agents from the department of intelligence (Bešlić 2003; Spahić 2004). However, despite these efforts, neo-Islamists did succeed in infiltrating the country, as will be seen in the next section.

6.2 Neo-Islamism in Yugoslavia, 1970-90

In 1975, Branko Mikulić, president of the Federation of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wrote to Tito informing him of the existence in Bosnia and Herzegovina of a

²³⁶ Analyses of the phenomenon have been made by, for example, Fyson, Malapanis and Silberman (1993), Woodward (1995), Hudson (2003) and Johnstone (2003), with the focus on the few years immediately preceding the war of the 1990s, because it is only then that neoliberal repercussions can be discerned.
group of ‘Muslim nationalists’. Even though the group referred to was a far cry from a neo-Islamist network, and was simply demanding a more fair representation of the part Muslim partisans played in eastern Bosnia during the Second World War, they were subject to draconian measures, due to the fear of Islamist penetration and the potential spread of imported neo-Islamism amongst Bosnian Muslims. The most prominent campaiginers for the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims, and for the elevation of the status of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were concerned that the activities of the proponents of so-called ‘Islamic clericalism’ or ‘Islamic nationalism’ were specifically dangerous for the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The concern was of equal gravity for Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats who considered Bosnia and Herzegovina their home. The events of the 1992-95 conflict proved their fears to be justified.

When the influence of the neo-Islamists increased during the 1980s, after the death of Tito, the Bosnian leadership launched a major purge, investigating several hundred people. They based their suspicions on a report entitled, ‘Political Islam in International Movements’, distributed by the intelligence unit of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (City of Sarajevo Archives, 16 September 1983). The title and content of

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237 In the former Yugoslavia, ‘Muslim nationalism’ was equated with Islamic fundamentalism or so-called ‘clerical nationalism’. The original of the letter can be found in the Sarajevo city archives (Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President’s Office, Classified. No 03-39/1-75, Sarajevo, 14 February 1975).

238 The group was led by Pašaga Mandžić, a member of the partisan antifascist movement. See the records of the 43rd meeting of the Extended Executive Committee of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina that took place on the 14 February 1975 (City of Sarajevo Archives, The Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The President’s Office).

239 ‘Political Islam in International Movements’ (the Yugoslav Communist Alliance, the Central Committee of the Communist Alliance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Commission for International Affairs and Cooperation with Labour and Progressive Movements in the World, Classified No. 01/1-11/3-83, Sarajevo District Committee Archives SK Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: September 16, 1983). The report was submitted on 23 September 1983, and classified under # 02/4-7-3.
the report were indicative of the Yugoslav government’s weariness of the heightened attention directed towards Muslims in Yugoslavia, and the possibility that external forces could attempt to influence domestic Muslim affairs. The report pointed to the OIC conference in Niger in August 1982, which had adopted a resolution committing it to research and examine the position of Muslims in countries that were not members of the OIC, referring in particular to the Muslims in Yugoslavia (that is, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo). Simultaneously, OIC consultations on the targets of ‘political Islam’ were held in Cairo, focusing on Islam in Yugoslavia. These concluded that the dissemination of Islam in Yugoslavia would facilitate closer contacts with the Muslim minority in the Balkans and Western European countries. The distribution of these reports launched the political saga known as ‘Sarajevo Process’, which I explain in more details below.

6.2.1 ‘Sarajevo Process’

On the 23 March 1983, members of the national security service of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina indicted thirteen people for spreading Islamic fundamentalism and attempting to create ‘an ethnically pure Muslim state in Yugoslavia’ (Stanković 1983: 1; Izetbegović 2001: 39-50). This is important to mention because, during the 1992-95 Bosnian war and its aftermath, the leadership was accused of covertly working to establish a Muslim state. It is of further significance that all thirteen were members of Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims), an Islamist organisation formed in 1939 on the model of the Muslim Brotherhood that had strong ties with the grand

240 The following were arrested: Alija Izetbegović, Omer Behmen, Hasan Ćengić, Ismet Kasumagić, Edhem Bičakčić, Rušid Prguda, Salih Behmen, Mustafa Spahić, Husein Živalji, Džemal Latić, Melika Salihbegović, Derviš Đurđević and Đula Bičakčić.
mufti of Jerusalem, Amin Al-Husseini. Among those indicted was Alija Izetbegović, who later became the president of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hasan Čengić, his chief aide and a major link in the covert supply of money and weapons during the Bosnian war.

Following the arrests, the presidency of the Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina convened a meeting. The most prominent members of the Bosnian leadership, comprising Muslims, Serbs and Croats, took part (transcripts from the City of Sarajevo Archives, 8 April 1983). The meeting was chaired by Hamdija Pozderac, the Bosnian Muslim politician who did the most for the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nation. It may seem surprising to find a prominent Bosnian politician, who was a Muslim and a devoted campaigner and advocate of the Muslim position, chairing a panel that voiced its concern about so-called ‘Muslim intellectuals’. Using Sarajevo’s archival documents, it is possible to reconstruct the activities of the neo-Islamist group and their main targets, as well as the major concerns of the Bosnian authorities. The most striking objective of the group seemed to be the destabilisation of Yugoslavia through the erosion of the policies of ‘brotherhood and unity’, in which Bosnia and Herzegovina played an important role, as discussed extensively in chapter one. Hamdija Pozderac accused the group of making demands for ‘an ethnically clean Bosnia and Herzegovina and attempts to organise an Islamic state as a way of expressing a moral concept of the religion’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.2: 2). He further claimed that with the aim to Islamise Bosnia and Herzegovina and create an Islamic

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241 Haj Amin Al-Husseini was known to be a Nazi supporter.
242 The meeting took place on the 8 April 1983 and the audio transcripts can be found in the Sarajevo city archives (32nd Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, City of Sarajevo Archives).
state, the group was well intertwined with the international intelligence networks via which links they maintained an informed liaison of the politico-social trends in the external Muslim world’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.2: 2). Hamdija Pozdrerac reiterated that the group’s long-term goal was to ethnically cleanse Bosnia and Herzegovina and seize control of the Islamic Religious Community in order to form an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This observation is very relevant for this thesis because it highlights neo-Islamist intentions that became a reality during the 1992-95 Bosnian conflict and its aftermath.²⁴³

Views of Hamdija Pozderac were underpinned by the report of the Minister for Police, Duško Zgonjanin, himself a Bosnian Serb. He presented a detailed account about the covert operations of various groups who worked diligently and covertly on dismantling Yugoslavia and eroding the inter-ethnic relations (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.4: 2).²⁴⁴ The Minister also revealed that this particular group was connected to the international operative centres in Riyadh, Istanbul and Vienna as well as collaborated with the anti-communistic émigré networks exiled in the West. He concluded in his report that the group was working on the ‘ politicisation of religious life, seizing the control of the Islamic Religious Community with the aim to establish an Islamic state on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.5: 3). Savo Ćečur, a Bosnian Serb and the President of the Legislature, reasoned that Bosnia and Herzegovina represented a multi-ethnic core of Yugoslavia and that ‘ destabilisation of Bosnia and:

²⁴³ The group took power over the Islamic Religious Community through a ‘coup’ against the more moderate faction in 1993. For the full story, see Peranić (1994). It also conducted the Islamisation of the Bosnian army and state (Bougarel 1999) during the conflict and its aftermath, as discussed in chapter one.
²⁴⁴ Minister of Police pointed out that the State Security Service discovered and foiled the anti-state attack operations of fifteen groups, which size varied from three to fifteen members. The groups were of various nationalistic affiliations whose primary aim was political destabilisation of Yugoslavia.
Herzegovina due to its multi-ethnic character would represent the greatest factor in destabilisation of Yugoslavia’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.7: 3). Raif Dizdarević, another Bosnian Muslim and the Chairman of Federal Assembly, characterized this particular group as a very different from the groups previously foiled in that it had supreme organisation, clearly designed political platform and political aim as well as support and connection with the foreign operative centers (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.19: 2). He further noted that the available information indicated an organised activity designed to undermine the fundamental pillars of the Yugoslav system, ‘pointing to an orchestrated political subversion’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.21: 3). Branko Mikulić, a prominent Bosnian campaigner and a Bosnian Croat, was also convinced that the aim of the group was incrimination of inter-ethnic relations by ‘eroding the brotherhood and unity’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.22: 5). To confirm this allegation he ordered investigation into all available scientific and political literature dealing with the spread of Islam (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.14: 2). Hrvoje Ištuk, a Bosnian Croat who was a Secretary of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, argued that this group differed in its approach to the political platform from the extremist and nationalistic groups in that showed no signs of impatience, but rather nurtured a long-term aim, which was the concept of Islamisation within the context of a long-term activity (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.11: 4-5). This observation is most interesting as Neo-Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued with the accelerated vigour through the 1992-95 war and its aftermath despite the efforts to curtail it, showing no sign it will abate in the foreseeable future.

245 Between 1982-1983 he was a Chairman of the Assembly. He was also Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia between 1984 - 1988, as well as the Chairman of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia 1988 – 1989.
The evidence submitted by the participants of the meeting reveals that the group enjoyed generous support from transnational neo-Islamist networks. These allegations are significant because they show that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationalised from the outset. Bosnia and Herzegovina became victim of a conflict between the geostrategic interests of various states and their agents, as characterised by the heavy presence of foreign intelligence networks on her territory.

As a result, the group stood trial. This took place behind closed doors, in order to prevent the further involvement of foreign operatives (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No. 6: 4). The Chief Public Prosecutor, Edina Rešidović, read out the indictment for treasonable activities against the state, and on the 18 July 1983 there began a saga that is remembered as the ‘Sarajevo Process.’ The indictment was based on Articles 114 and 133 of the Criminal Code of Socialist Yugoslavia: ‘association with a view to undermining the constitutional order,’ and ‘verbal delict.’ According to it, the group was charged with conducting anti-state Islamist activities posing a counter-revolutionary threat to the social order in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was claimed that their aims were contained in the ‘Islamic Declaration’, which appeared in a pamphlet called, A Programme for the Islamisation of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, whose author is believed to be Izetbegović (Izetbegović 1990).246 Since the early stages of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this document has been quoted on numerous occasions to either defend or condemn it; hence, it would be tedious to repeat overused citations. However, what has been arguably less emphasised is the fact that this political manifesto, in many respects,

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246 For more on the trial, albeit from a perspective sympathetic to the defendants, see Danilović (2006).
resembled the platforms of neo-Islamists elsewhere. It was written in 1970, when neo-Islamist seeds were being planted all around those countries controlled by ‘heathen communists’.

The pamphlet, however, was created as a theocratic-political appeal directed not only at its immediate constituency, but also at Muslims around the world. Its contents appeared to be similar to that of numerous other pamphlets and manifestos commonplace in neo-Islamist circles at the time. Interestingly, it was written at a time when Izetbegović was often travelling between Belgrade and Sarajevo to visit his friend, al-Hassanein, a member of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. A director of the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Saudi-financed charity used for covert arms supply, al-Hassanein’s contribution to the neo-Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was of prime importance. Avdić (2009: 7), an investigative journalist, asserts that the ‘Islamic Declaration’ was the ‘preposterous folly of foreign Islamists’ to which ‘Izetbegović “courageously” put his signature’.

It is rather obscure how the document itself came to be in circulation, and the evidence concerning this is anecdotal. The wide range of literature that liberally cites the manifesto does not appear to be interested in the origins of the document, nor in the international political trends at the time of its writing.247 As far as the evidence suggests, however, it was not widely available. The general public was informed of its contents through extensive media coverage that unanimously condemned the group’s attempted subversion (Presidential Archives, 1983, No. 30-49). The evidence suggests that the public

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247 The literature does not explain either why there was a thirteen-year gap between publication of the work and the trial. One reasons is perhaps that, after the Tito’s death, the forces actively attempting to weaken Yugoslavia were at their height.
was generally appalled by the entire incident, and was astonished and perplexed by the group’s anti-state activities, offering the accused neither sympathy nor support.  

However, it seemed that the group did enjoy significant support from neo-Islamist governments and organisations in the Middle East, Asia and the US. They used the trial as an excuse to demonise the Yugoslav communist regime. For instance, the Association for the Support to the Muslim Minorities in Eastern Europe in Pakistan, and later the Pakistani government itself, sent a note to the Yugoslav embassy in Islamabad entitled, ‘The New Terror Campaign against the Muslims in Yugoslavia’, in which they accused the Yugoslav government of discrimination against Muslims (Archives of the Republican Commission for International Affairs, 7 July 1983). A similar protest was presented by the Islamic Society in Florida, which published material related to the trial in both English and Arabic, accusing the regime of planning the extermination of Muslims. Alleged mistreatment of Muslims compelled the Egyptian media to call for greater help from the Muslim world to their Yugoslav brethren, and, to restore Bosnian Muslim spirituality, Saudi Arabia offered a donation for the repair of the Gazi Husrevbeg Mosque. This international campaign is significant in that its use of the so-called plight of Bosnian Muslims to instigate a vilification of the communist regime was similar to the tactics it deployed in the post-Cold

248 Friends and members of my family who remember the ‘Sarajevo Process’ report being at a loss as to how to comprehend the actions of the group. They were unable to grasp why some Muslims, albeit peripheral ones, were dissatisfied with their position in Yugoslavia. This was especially so in the light of Muslim national recognition, after almost a century of struggle.

249 Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, Republički Komitet za odnose sa inostranstvom [The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republican Commission for International Relations], Classified No. 94-387, Sarajevo, 7 July 1983.

250 Apparently, there were no strings attached to this donation. However, the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Islamic Religious Community, refused the offer. For more on this incident, see the notes of the conversation between Dr Ahmed Smajlović, the president of the elders of the Islamic Religious Community, and Milan Vučićević, the president of the executive committee for relations with the religious bodies (The Archives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Executive Assembly, Commission for Inter-Faith Relations, Classified No. 055-70/83, Sarajevo, 16 May 1983).
War environment to radicalise Muslims worldwide whilst simultaneously spreading neoliberal economic reforms. Critical analysis confirms that the politicisation of Islam and its utilisation for neoliberal purposes formed the essence of neo-Islamism, which was striving for absolute power and demanded absolute submission to the neoliberal theocracy.

After the trial, sentences ranging from six months to fourteen years were pronounced – a total of eighty-nine years in prison.251 Serb nationalists facilitated the early release of the members of this group, enabling them to compete for the Bosnian presidential chair soon after leaving their prison cells. In 1986 the Serbian Assembly for Freedom of Thought and Expression, led by Dobrica Ćosić,252 initiated a petition for the release of the ‘Muslim intellectuals’ from detention. To help their Muslims counterparts, twenty-three ‘Serbian intellectuals’ requested parole for the imprisoned neo-Islamists in a letter to the Yugoslav Presidium, describing the trial as a monstrous hoax that had been orchestrated to mislead the public and to incriminate those in favour of free speech.253 In addition, members of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) organised a banquet for the family members of the convicted group, in order to discuss ‘future Serb-Muslim relations.

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251 Izetbegović was convicted to fourteen years in prison, later reduced to six. The other Young Muslims also had their sentences reduced. For details on the length of the sentences and the judiciary process for the request for a pardon, see Danilović (2006: 226-231).
252 Dobrica Ćosić was the first president of the rump Yugoslavia from 1992-93. He is considered to be the ideological father of the infamous Memorandum SANU of 1986, a Serbian nationalist manifesto thought to be responsible for inciting ethnic intolerance and persecution. Evidence of the authorship of the memorandum is anecdotal, as the document was written and signed by the members of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU), and it remains unclear who exactly claimed ownership of its contents and how it was leaked to the public. It remained unfinished, but it is considered to be a driving force behind the rise of Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s, as its composition is charged with nationalistic rhetoric and it outlines an ethnically based national programme (Memorandum Srpske Akademije Nauka i Umetnosti 1989: 128-163).
253 See Danilović (2006: 228). By contrast to the pro-Muslim campaign preceding and during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Paradoxically, they accused Izetbegović of Islamic fundamentalism, the very reason why he was placed in prison.
in a *New Yugoslavia*. As soon as the group was released, Ćosić not only received them at his grand house, but also organised the first publication of the ‘Islamic Declaration’ by a Belgrade publishing house owned by Šešelj (Borogovac 1995: 23; Stojić 2004: 16-17). During the 1992-95 war, Šešelj became a hard-core Serbian ultra-nationalist, and is now facing charges of war crimes at The Hague.

The interest of the Serb nationalists in the Sarajevo Process and the plight of the accused is suggestive of the trajectories of both parties. Serb nationalists used the group’s Islamist rhetoric as a reason to promote Bosnian Serb secession from an increasingly ‘Islamic Bosnia’, claiming they would otherwise become either *dhimmies* (a minority under the protection of the Qur’an) or converts. The second, related reason, which they used when attempting to justify the crimes they committed against civilians, was the ploy that they were ‘defending’ Europe against Islamic penetration. On the other hand, the Serb nationalists’ ‘martyrdom’ propaganda propelled the Muslim group from the margins of society and endowed them with the image of credible and worthy leaders of the Bosniaks at the moment when the socialist system was crumbling and there were no real alternatives for the succession to the Bosniak political leadership. When the released members of the Muslim group seized power, they capitalised on the myth of alleged Muslim victimisation during the communist period, citing it as a major point of reference for Muslims suffering

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254 According to the account of Halid Ćengić, the father of Hasan Ćengić, the dinner was organised at the house of one of the SANU members. Ćosić sat next to Izetbegović’s daughter, Lejla Akšamija. They discussed the ‘new Yugoslavia’ in the New World Order, a Yugoslavia which seemingly would be without Croats and Slovenes. Izetbegović later talked about his friendship with Ćosić. It is unclear why they could not capitalise on their good relations to find an amicable alternative to war. For more on Halid Ćengić’s story, see Halilović (1998: 80).

255 Munir Alibabić, a chief investigator during the process, stated that he was shocked to have discovered so much information in relation to the trial to the Young Muslims at the museum in Pančevo. He said that the prosecutors did not have this amount of information at their disposal at the time.

256 Counting on the European bias against Islam, the common justification was ‘saving Europe from Islamic attack’. For an abundance of articles on this topic, see the website [http://www.serbianna.com/columns/](http://www.serbianna.com/columns/).
under the ‘heathen’ regime.\textsuperscript{257} It was time for a change, they claimed, and religion was thus
turned into an institutionalised asset, as with all other forms of cultural life in a neoliberal
setting. The neoliberalisation of Yugoslavia commenced, and was further endorsed through
the adoption of a loan economy and reduction of state welfare, as discussed in chapters one
and five. These neoliberal policies remained in place up to the outbreak of the Yugoslav
crisis.

The neo-Islamist group, augmented by those who opportunistically switched sides
from the communists, was allowed to found the first non-communist political party, a
Muslim one – a move that would previously have warranted a minimum of ten years in
prison.\textsuperscript{258} The subsequent electoral campaign of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA),
which the neo-Islamists organised with the help of Serb nationalists, who also claimed to be
‘victims’ of the communist regime, added weight to their legitimacy amongst the
population; they managed to win the great majority of Muslim votes at the first multiparty
elections in 1990.\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{257} The attack on Hamdija Pozderac and Branko Mikulić continued with the famous ‘Agrokomerc affair’. Fikret Abdić, the director of this exceptionally productive socialist enterprise, ended up in prison because of his alleged use of unsupported credits – a practice that was, in fact, widespread at the time among Yugoslav enterprises. This political process, orchestrated by the Serb nationalists and supported by the media, produced the desired results. Pozderac, Bosnia’s most important leader, who had done the most for the elevation of the status of Bosnian Muslims, and who was also a member of the Yugoslav federal presidency and next in line to become its president, was forced to resign, and died soon after. With his resignation, communists, especially Muslim ones, lost their credibility among the Bosniak population, and their place was taken by the SDA.

\textsuperscript{258} In addition, the parliament had to manage the ethnic post-communist reality of the region and, in its efforts not to exacerbate ethnic tensions, passed a law forbidding the establishment of parties under a nationalist pretext. The republic’s constitutional court overruled the prohibition imposed by the law of April 1990 (Pavković 1997: 113).

\textsuperscript{259} The first multiparty elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina with two rounds of votes in November and December 1990. The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) won 86 seats in the parliament, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) won 44, and 33 seats were allocated to the members of the Croatian Democratic Party (HDZ) (Nizich 1993: 16).
The dissolution of Yugoslavia could now begin: the Serb nationalists offered support to the Yugoslav People’s Army, positioning itself in the hills around Sarajevo; the international community emphasised the conclusions of the Badinter Commission\textsuperscript{260} and advised the adoption of a divisive ethnic roadmap; and the SDA elite prepared themselves for the neo-Islamisation of those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they agreed with their Serb and Croat counterparts would fall under their control.

6.3 War and the Great Powers’ negotiated settlement for the protectorate of ‘Bosnistan’

When, in early December 1990, the nationalist parties won the largest number of seats in the first multiparty election, they started negotiating the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{261} The first such plan of division was the Lisbon Agreement, also known as Cutileiro Plan, which carefully chosen SDA delegates signed with their Serb and Croat nationalist counterparts before the Bosnian war began in February 1992.\textsuperscript{262} Even though the ethnic partition was warranted by the signatures of all three nationalist parties, in essence nothing would have changed because the population would have been as mixed as ever.

\textsuperscript{260}A commission set up by the European Union to evaluate the situation in Yugoslavia on the eve of its break-up. For a critique of the Badinter Commission, see Johnstone (2003: 36-40).

\textsuperscript{261}According to the statement of Alija Delimustafić, minister of the interior during the war, which he gave at the war-crimes trial of of Momčilo Mandić (his counterpart from the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska) at The Hague, the internal division of Bosnia and Herzegovina had already begun before the war, with the mutual agreement of Izetbegović and Karadžić. For more on this subject, see Mijatović (2007: 18-22).

\textsuperscript{262}This was the first-known publically announced proposal to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was named after the Portuguese diplomat who presided, on behalf of the European Union, over the negotiations on Bosnia’s constitutional re-organisation, conducted in Sarajevo, Lisbon and Brussels between 13 February and 27 May 1992. The plan proposed Bosnia’s division into three ethnic gettoes: Muslim, Serb and Croat. The ‘Muslim canton’, as these gettoes were to be called, was supposed to contain a 56.5 percent majority-Muslim population; the Serb canton, in which Serbs would have a 61.5 percent majority, and the Croat canton, with a 65.7 percent Croat majority. For more on these figures, see Velikonja (2003: 238). For an overview of the Cuteliero Plan, see Hodge (2006: 28-29).
Colonel Stewart (1994: 64), a British army officer, observes that when he found himself in villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he realised that it would be impossible to divide the country as planned. Stewart’s account conveys an outsider’s pertinent reflection on the impossibility of peacefully dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethnic cantons. The only way to achieve ethnically homogenous units was through bloody ethnic purges; only a campaign of fear and persecution could force people to leave their homes. Nevertheless, the assumption that Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically divisible persisted, making its division the only criteria for ‘peace’ efforts during the war. Partition according to ethnic criteria remained an objective in itself, under the pretence that all three Bosnian nationalist groups, albeit supervised by the international community, were negotiating to stop the conflict. All the ‘peace plans’ that the international community suggested were underpinned by the insistence on irreconcilable national identities that helped embed the logic of partition (Campbell 1998: 80, 155).

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263 Six months after the failure of the Cutileiro Plan, another conference was convened in London to address the question that had apparently persisted since the Enlightenment in Europe: what to do with Bosnia and Herzegovina? (Borogovac 1995: 134). The paradox was that the UN, and many other countries, already recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign multiethnic state within its own borders, and any further negotiations about its status would annul this already established international recognition. Despite this, the rhetoric of division continued, and every partition plan took Bosnia and Herzegovina a step closer to a final split along ethnic lines.

264 The next plans for ethnic partition were the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. The VOPP was initiated in early January 1993. It involved division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ten semi-autonomous regions, and received the backing of the UN. In May, however, the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the Vance-Owen plan, and on 18 June Lord Owen declared that the plan was ‘dead’. For a thorough analysis of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, see Burg and Shoup (1999: 214-262). The Bosnian delegation was against signing the plan, and they also refused to sign it in Geneva. However, in March 1993 Izetbegović travelled to Geneva and signed it himself, without the consent of the Bosnian parliament. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan followed in July 1993. It proposed three ethnic states, joined in a weak federation, but the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were free to hold plebiscites to secede from the federation and join Serbia or Croatia at a later stage. The Bosnian Muslims were parcelled into four separate, remote, landlocked territories, with no easy access to the main routes in the region and no exit to the sea. Sarajevo would become a separate region, demilitarised and placed under UN administration for two years (Bercovitch 1995: 179-192). Although Izetbegović signed this plan too, the Bosnian parliament unanimously rejected it. A further doomed round of negotiations was proposed, dubbed the ‘Invincible Peace Plan’, the name of the British warship HMS Invincible that hosted the negotiations in September 1993. It was officially known as the Union of Three
It is interesting to observe that after each proposal for a new peace plan the conflict gained in its intensity. Moreover, as the negotiations took place, numerous crimes continued to be committed against civilians all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In one parliamentary session, President Izetbegović (1994) attempted to appease the public: ‘We have also succeeded in maintaining the focus of the world’s attention on Bosnia throughout, thereby making the task of the [aggressors] and criminals more difficult.’ However, the truth was that ‘focus of the world’ was elsewhere, and the crimes continued with the same, if not worse, ferocity. Every time an agreement was signed, a mass murder was committed, mainly involving Bosniaks, the principal victims of the conflict. This pattern did not seem to capture the attention of the international mediators; after each mass slaughter of Bosniaks, they would proceed to invite the Bosnian delegation to sit at the negotiating table with those under whose command the atrocities had been committed.

These prolonged negotiations with the aggressor, amidst the continuing commission of crimes against civilians, essentially equalised the status of the aggressors and the victims, creating an impression of civil war. This, along with the persistent nationalist-religious rhetoric, transformed the conflict into a perpetual battle between Islam and Christianity. For ordinary citizens, this meant that in addition to enduring constant shelling and sniper fire, they would continue to struggle to survive without food, electricity,

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*Republics Peace Plan. Its proposal rested on the idea of territorial homogeneity that was supposed to be achieved through a territory swap between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. For more details on this plan, see Silber and Little (1997: 306). When this failed, its main components were incorporated into the EU-sponsored Action Plan, presented in December 1993, but that plan also collapsed irretrievably in January 1994.*

*265 A case in point is the war between Bosniaks and Croats that started after Izetbegović, contrary to the advice of his delegation, signed the VOPP.*

*266 Based on personal experience and the experience of others who lived through the war.*
In such a climate, the peace talks continued with little to show for their efforts, until the reconfigured proposal known as the Contact Group Plan was put forward between February and October 1994. A new round of negotiations started, the Geneva Peace Talks, which eventually culminated in the Dayton Agreement, the signing of which, in 1995, put an end to the war through the final division of the country.

Thus, the international community dismantled the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton, and proclaimed Bosnia to be an international protectorate under the rule of the UN High Representative, who was assigned the upper hand in the decision-making process (as discussed in chapter one). The Contact Group consisted of the US, Russia, France, Britain and Germany, a Great Power quintet reminiscent of that of the late-nineteenth century ‘Eastern Question’. The reason why this proposal contributed to the implementation of a negotiated settlement of the conflict was the fact that Russia joined the negotiating table. As all the Great Powers were now present and the fate of the Yugoslav Republic could be settled, in much the same way as they had negotiated over the deathbed of the shattered Ottoman Empire. The ‘Bosnian issue’ was on the negotiating table again, and the old quarrels of the Great Powers were reincarnated. It was a continuation of the carve-up which began at the Berlin Congress, and the return to ‘the world of big power

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267 Only privileged people close to the SDA ruling elite were provided with special generators. This, coupled with the fact that every day people were forced to search for food and water, braving sniper fire and random shelling, ensured a watertight information blockade. There was one daily Bosnian newspaper, Oslobodenje, but it was not easily obtainable, at least not in Sarajevo, due to its position as an enclosed city, surrounded by hills from which bombs were raining day in and day out. People were afraid to leave the shelter of their homes. The situation was so bad that, during the first winter of the war, a grim joke appeared, which explained that the main difference between Auschwitz and Sarajevo was that Auschwitz had gas. Apart from the daily bombing, the worst thing was the virtual lack of food and humanitarian aid. These were stolen and sold on the black market at sky-high prices. People were far too preoccupied with their everyday struggle for survival to think about the politics driving the war in Bosnia.

268 See chapter three for an in-depth analysis of the international politics at the end of the nineteenth century, and the way it influenced the solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For Bosniaks, this signalled betrayal by those whom they trusted most: in Berlin, this was the Turkish *Tanzimatçilar* representatives, who gave Bosnia to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and prepared the way for the influx of Bosnian refugees to Turkey; in Dayton, it was the Muslim leadership who annihilated the Bosnian Republic and signed up to its ethnic division, blessed by the representative from the OIC who was present as an observer. During the ‘Eastern Question’, the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was essential to keep the balance of power, whereas at Dayton its division guaranteed a satisfactory settlement amongst the Great Powers. In fact, the behest to negotiate a resolution to the Bosnian war became the pretext under cover of which the Great Powers attempted to settle their current, and former, disputes. However, the international climate and the neo-Islamisation of international relations meant that Muslim allies were essential to advancing their respective interests in the region. The motives and mode of operation of both the Great Powers and the neo-Islamists are discussed in the next section.

6.4. The symbiosis between the Great Powers and the neo-Islamists

The operations of the Great Powers took place covertly through a web of interconnected security and intelligence networks, turning Bosnia and Herzegovina into a hive of foreign espionage agents throughout the war and its aftermath (Wiebes 2006: 2). In light of the joint

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269 This phrase is taken from a Canadian context. A Canadian functionary replied indignantly to the question of Canada’s probable reaction to the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, saying: ‘We are back to a world of big power politics and that is not kind to nations like Canada. We are just another troop contributor now, and no one is asking our opinion.’ (Hillmer and Oliver, cited in Schmidt 2001: 82).

270 For a more detailed analysis, see chapters three and four.
peacekeeping efforts, the various agencies were supposed to collaborate and share the information they gathered. This, however, was not always the case. This is not altogether surprising: research into the various crises that afflicted Bosnia and Herzegovina from the nineteenth century onwards reveals that rival foreign agents often played an indispensable role.²⁷¹ In the same way, during the 1992-5 war, Bosnia and Herzegovina played host to a large number of secret service operatives from around the world. However, it was only with the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that international intelligence networks paid any serious attention to the unrest in Yugoslavia (Wiebes 2006: 54). The evidence suggests that the majority of international intelligence services considered Yugoslavia as a subsidiary task, and generally engaged in it while focusing on different areas. The emergence of the Bosnian conflict quickly changed this attitude, and the entire territory began to swarm with spies.²⁷²

Following the fall of Berlin Wall, the overall intelligence climate, especially amongst the Western secret services, was somewhat chilled, with operatives increasingly withholding information from, and spying on, each other.²⁷³ For example, the Scandinavian peacekeeping unit, composed of Swedish and Danish peacekeepers, suffered casualties because the French intelligence agencies refused to disclose the location of Bosnian army

²⁷¹ The first major crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 was started by a provocateur from Russia. For more on this incident, see chapter three.
²⁷² For example, the French foreign intelligence service recruited 500 civilians in the five years from the start of the war. For more details on this subject, see Wiebes (2006: 69).
²⁷³ The European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was the most common cover for the intelligence personnel. It was agreed that the observers would not report to their national capitals but exclusively through the head of the mission to the president of the European Commission (the executive body of the EU). This was not the case, however, as many of the observers kept to a national agenda and reported back to their capitals via independently installed satellite dishes on the balconies of their hotel rooms (Wiebes 2006: 88). For information on the concentration of intelligence services in Yugoslavia immediately preceding its break-up, see Wiebes (2006: 70-89).
snipers.\textsuperscript{274} Moreover, the mindset of the intelligence personnel was still oriented towards a Cold-War-style East-versus-West scenario, and this was reflected in their reportage and in the national policies of their countries,\textsuperscript{275} and led to the occasional feud by proxies, whereby any information they obtained was used for vindictive purposes against the interests of their rivals.\textsuperscript{276}

Western and Russian intelligence, however, would have had limited operational capacity without their neo-Islamist allies. These were Turkish, Pakistani, Iranian and Saudi Arabian intelligence personnel, who were equally wary of each other’s presence, due to their allegiance to the respective Western or Russian intelligence networks. This was not only conducive to the old East-versus-West mentality lingering on from the Cold War, but also to the animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which offers the most telling example of the presence of feuds by proxy during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry not only reveals the complex political constellation of third parties involved in the war, but also indicates the blind spots of the available research to date.

\textsuperscript{274} The French established the most effective intelligence network in Sarajevo, but they refused to share information. Their service was able to locate Bosnian army snipers, as well as those on the Bosnian Serb side, and they were even capable of deploying ‘black teams’ to take out snipers at night. The French Direction de Renseignement Militaire had agents in the highest ranks of the government cabinets of all three warring sides. They also infiltrated the UN and UNPROFOR units. For example, an advisor of Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary General’s special representative, was a member of the French foreign intelligence service. See: Wiebes (2006: 80-81).

\textsuperscript{275} For more on the general Western intelligence mindset as regards the Bosnian war, see Wiebes (2006: 85, 52-55).

\textsuperscript{276} For example, Russian military intelligence exaggerated Bosnian Serb military power after the summer of 1994, ‘out of a wish to strike a blow at NATO hegemony and out of revenge for having lost the Cold War’ (Corvin 1995: 127). Similarly, the American administration, albeit for quite different reasons, exaggerated Serb military power during the same period (Wiebes 2006: 127).
6.4.1 The Saudi-Iranian feud by proxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Party officials in the inner circle of the SDA enjoyed close ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, benefiting from their economic and political support. Saudi finance was channelled through the aforementioned al-Hassanian, who became a member of a prominent neo-Islamist organisation, the Sudanese National Islamic Front. In 1990, he established an Islamic charity under the name of The Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) in Vienna, whose single largest donor was Saudi Arabia (Pomfret 1996: A01). Wiebes (2006: 158) states that, in 1991, President Izetbegović sent the Bosnian minister of the interior, his close ally and namesake, to Vienna to purchase kalashnikovs and ammunition with Saudi money channelled through the TWRA. Al-Hassanein, as TWRA director, opened an account at the Die Erste Bank, which was overseen by a five-man committee, comprising Al-Hassanein and four SDA officials; the committee initiated money transfers to Sarajevo months before the war began (Schindler 2007: 149).

In the same fashion, the TWRA opened offices in Zagreb, prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were manned by members of the SDA’s inner circle. Al-Hassanein was also stationed in Zagreb where he worked as a clerk at the Sudanese Embassy. The diplomatic employment of al-Hassanein is significant because Sudan was the

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277 The SDA had good relations with the majority of Muslim counties. The only exception was Libya, who was more inclined to be supportive to Serbia, perhaps due to the intelligence cooperation it had enjoyed with pre-war Yugoslavia.
278 Fatih al-Hassanian left Yugoslavia in the early 1980s and moved to Vienna.
279 The minister of interior, Alija Delimusatfić, had already established, prior to the war, a private company, Cenex, which was involved in smuggling weapons, as well as other miscellaneous trading ventures of dubious legality.
280 Alongside Fatih al-Hassanein, the other four members, who were SDA officials, had access to the account. Three were Young Muslims co-defendants: Hasan Čengić, Husein Živalj and Derviš Đurđević.
281 It was Hasan Čengić, who at that time worked as an imam in the Zagreb mosque, and Mustafa Cerić, who became a naibu re’is (temporary head) of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993. It was alleged that Mustafa Cerić became re’is ul-ulema through a ‘coup’ against the former re’is ul-ulema, Jakub Selimoski, a moderate Macedonian (Hećimović 2008: 3).
main transit link for the procurement and transportation of the weapons smuggled to the SDA party leadership (Kohlmann 2004: 46). The TWRA also opened offices in Istanbul, where it again maintained a relationship with its SDA confidants, who were government officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as being members of the supervisory body of the TWRA. The major focus of the agency was the neo-Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the putative mission of stimulating the spread of Islam, albeit a certain version of Islam, throughout Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. The research points to the collaboration between SDA confidants and the Saudi-nominated representative. It has been estimated that the TWRA sent about $2.5 billion to the SDA between 1992-95, in the name of Islamic aid to the ‘Bosnian brethren’, although the real balance remains unknown due to non-existent bookkeeping and a lack of accountability on the part of the SDA officials. Cash-filled suitcases, carried by individuals who enjoyed diplomatic immunity, were the main method of money transfer.

The SDA was also an addressee of the Saudi High Commission, which disclosed that over nine years it had collected over $600 million for its programme in Bosnia

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282 For example, TWRA staff in Istanbul had access to confidential material belonging to the embassy, and even carried its stamp in case they had to endorse some documents that were purported to carry the government’s credentials.

283 Izetbegović and his closest intimates were granted a blank cheque by al-Hassanein, who, throughout the war and its aftermath, remained the major link for transactions between the top circle of SDA officials and his bosses in Saudi Arabia – the TWRA’s single largest donor (Pomfret 1996: A01).

284 The TWRA had already started sending money to the SDA’s top officials a few months before the war. The operation was headed from the Zagreb Office by Mustafa Cerić, an imam in the Zagreb Islamic Centre, who was proclaimed as re’is ul-ulama in 1993. During the war, the money transfers intensified, with weekly cash payments of between $3 and $5 million, stowed in suitcases of carefully selected diplomats or SDA representatives. For the full names of the SDA officials who had access to the funds, and for more on the cash transactions, see Schindler (2007: 149-152).

285 In one instance, a Saudi royal emissary suddenly arrived at the Die Erste bank in Vienna clutching two large suitcases filled with $5 million in cash (Schindler 2007; Napoleoni 2006; Wiebes 2006).
Another two influential, well-funded Saudi NGOs were the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) and the Al-Muwafaq Foundation, both based in Sarajevo and both major financial sub-branches of the Muslim World League, the main arm of neo-Islamist ideology. It is noteworthy that despite the seemingly well-documented allegations that aid was sent to the Bosniak leadership during the war, ordinary citizens were, nonetheless, starving and facing daily danger of being killed or maimed, and Bosnian soldiers went without modern weapons, ammunition and even basic protective clothing. It is probable that Saudi Arabia aimed to score political points rather than expedite help to the Bosniaks. Aside from numerous conferences convened by the OIC to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only outcome was a draft resolution that, apart from the usual condemnations, contained neither specific commitments nor an action plan for the suffering ‘brethren’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The resolution that did emerge was a replica of the non-binding motion introduced by the OIC and approved by the UN General Assembly in August 1992, in which the OIC requested that the UN Security Council take further action to defend the Bosnian population and restore Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity (Bell 2002: 644). This call emerged in flagrant opposition to the ongoing ‘peace talks’ discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s division.

Despite the increasing suffering of their Muslim ‘brethren’ and the SDA’s political impotence when it came to obstructing the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Saudi government awarded Izetbegović the King Faisal Foundation

286 It was reported that the Saudi Commission was caring for 500 war orphans, and paying the utility bills for many Bosnian families impoverished by the war. The rest of the money remains unaccounted for (Whitmore 2002).
award for services to Islam in 1993, which he received with pride (Izetbegović 1995: 101). The award came at the time of mass killings and intensified persecution of Muslims, when those who survived were barely subsisting on a minimal amount of humanitarian aid, distributed on a monthly basis.287 The following year, thought to be the hardest for the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the hungriest for the civilians besieged in Sarajevo, the president visited his patrons in Mecca for a second time. Through his frequent trips to the Middle East and Saudi publicity, Izetbegović became a political icon in the Muslim world.

However, while some countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan, supported Izetbegović in order to cooperate with the Saudis and boost their Islamic credentials in the eyes of their populations, others offered their support in order to diminish Saudi influence. One such country was Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main rival in the Middle East. Iran supplied the SDA with war materiel, and the relationship between Iran and the SDA seemed exceptionally close.288 Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Iranian link pre-dated the conflict: in 1989 Yugoslav state security noted the suspicious presence of many Iranian nationals (Lučić 2001: 132), and the Iranian secret services had a distinguished record of cooperation with the Bosnian intelligence agencies, which were tightly controlled by the SDA. An agreement for the supply of arms and other war materiel seems to have been concluded at a meeting that took place before the war, in March 1992, which secured the shipment of Iranian weapons and ammunition to Bosnia (Schindler 2007: 138; Wiebes 2006; Napoleoni 2005).

287 For example, the monthly allowance of humanitarian aid distributed across households in Sarajevo was 100 grams of sugar and 250 grams of flour per head. As a young teenager I was responsible for the distribution of this aid in my quarter.
288 This was perhaps due to the influence of Hasan Čengić, the head of army logistics, who, due to his links with Iran, earned the title of ‘Minister for Iran’, and Omer Behmen, a Young Muslim confidant and close aide to Izetbegović, who spent much of the war as Bosnian ambassador to Teheran.
It appears that it was not until five months after the war had already begun that Western intelligence learned of the flow of arms to the Bosnian Muslims. By contrast, it was common knowledge at that time that the Bosnian Serbs had already received weapons (Čekić 1995: 86-88). An arms contingent destined for the Bosnian Muslims was discovered on 4 September 1992, when the CIA ambushed an Iran Air Boeing 747 at Zagreb airport (Wiebes 2006: 159). According to an additional source, the plane also contained forty Iranian ‘volunteers’, who had been dispatched to Bosnia and Herzegovina on a government salary of $4,000 a month (Gordon 1992: 3). Following this interception, Western intelligence officials initiated other investigations in Croatia, in which they learned of another Iranian arms transport to the Bosnian Muslims via Sudan and Slovenia to Croatia, which contained ammunition, mortars, mines and assault rifles (Pomfret 1996: A01). The reason for their interest was that all of the 125 tons of war materiel supplied by Iran was manufactured in Russia. News of the Iranian consignments spread quickly, eliciting various reactions. Lord Owen (1996: 47), an international mediator, reported that the Croatian president, Franjo Tudman, had informed him immediately, as Tudman seemed opposed to Iranian involvement in the Bosnian conflict.

In response to the discovery of the Russian-made weaponry, the Bush administration delivered its fiercest protests to Zagreb, prompting the Croats to heighten control of their airspace and halt all helicopter flights through its territory (Kohlmann 2004: 46). Following Tudman’s instruction to interrupt the flow of these ‘humanitarian transfers’, Izetbegović paid a visit to Teheran in October 1992, and was assured by President Rafsanjani that more ‘significant aid’ would be forthcoming (Gordon 1992). A month later,
another Iranian Boeing 747 landed in Zagreb, with 60 tons of ‘humanitarian goods’, followed by a $3.3 million donation from Ayatollah Ali Khomeini (Schindler 2007: 139).

Tudman’s initial objection to the continuation of the flow Iranian arms through Croatian territory, however, seems to have been successfully muted by Germany. The German secret services – the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) – were cooperating with their Iranian opposite number, whose officers were sent to Munich in 1992 for specialised training (Džamić 2001: 220)289 Germany had nourished a particular interest in the region since the Second World War, and chose Iran as an ally because it did not want any European, predominantly French or British, competitors challenging its influence in Croatia. Iran, on the other hand, was interested in gaining greater influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if only to frustrate Saudi penetration in the region, which in turn would improve the position of Iran in the Middle East. It was this mutually beneficial combination of interests that resulted in Germany putting pressure on the Croatians to agree to the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, Ali Akbar Velayeti, arriving in Zagreb in November 1992 to discuss the logistics of further armaments missions (Pomfret 1996: A01). Lengthy negotiations between the Bosnians, Croats and Iranians followed, during the next six months, over the nature of future Iranian consignments. It was agreed in subsequent meetings, attended by Rafsanjani and Izetbegović, that the Croats would continue to transport arms in exchange for Bosnian electricity supplies (Wiebes 2006: 164).290 They

289 Johnstone (2003) dedicates chapter four of her book to an analysis of German aims and aspirations during the Yugoslav wars. The account gives a general idea of the level of German involvement, although it needs to be read with reservations as it is based on the relativist principle that ‘all are equally guilty’.

290 This is significant to note as throughout the war most of Bosnia and Herzegovina was without electricity. The official response to Bosnian citizens was that the Serbs had cut the supply lines, which obviously was not the case. This further supports the belief that the government intended to create an information blockade.
also consented to abandon the obstructive practices they occasionally exercised, in return for the right to appropriate fifty percent of the total consignments.\textsuperscript{291}

Tudman, however, still appeared distrustful of any pact with the Iranians for two reasons: first, there was an unexplained personal animosity between him and Izetbegović;\textsuperscript{292} secondly, he was weary of Izetbegović’s chief aide and main link with the Iranian suppliers, Čengić, who was noted for advocating a deal between the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs against the Catholic Croats. Tuđman knew that this campaign was consistent with the views of the rulers in Teheran, who believed that Islam and the Orthodox Church, represented by Russia, had a common interest in fighting the West. The Croatian Catholics were counted as belonging to the West (Wiebes 2006: 179). The Iranian choice of geostrategic ally reflected its rhetoric, and it continued its close cooperation with Russia. Unsurprisingly, Tuđman was apprehensive of the possibility that the Bosnian Muslims, under Iranian influence, might sign a pact with the Serbs.

Perhaps, it was this anxiety that prompted Tuđman to travel to Turkey, an Iranian rival in the region, to secretly brief the Turks about the recent talks with the Iranians. Of the most interest to Turkey, and its American ally, was the news that the Iranians proposed to supply Croatia and Bosnia with old Russian weapons, on condition that the Bosnian Muslims arrange their transport (Wiebes 2006: 163). To assist with the transport, the Croats purchased Russian helicopters with money from an uncertain source (Bazola 1996: 36)\textsuperscript{293} –

\textsuperscript{291} On occasion, Croats would halt convoys of goods to Bosnian Muslims in Herzegovina. Sometimes, even genuine humanitarian goods, such as food and medicines, were not allowed to pass through ‘Croatian’ territory. For the percentage the Croats would skim off these convoys, see Owen (1996: 47).
\textsuperscript{292} Izetbegović wrote in his memoirs that from the day they first met, before the war, their ‘discords and disagreements’ were to last for years. For his account of the personal animosity between the two, see Izetbegović (2003: 84).
Austrian government agents reported that the TWRA was financing these consignments (Farah and Braun 2007: 50-51, 268-169). The discovery of the supply of Russian-manufactured arms by the Iranians to the SDA government was anathema to the Americans, British, Turks and Saudis alike, albeit for different reasons.

The Americans seemed very disquieted by these negotiations, because the Pentagon also planned to clear out the arms stocks of the former Warsaw Pact countries, using a third party – preferably a Muslim ally. As far as Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, was concerned, any country apart from Iran could supply arms to the Bosnian government (Wiebes 2006: 162). This was not down to the ideological distaste the Western administration felt for the Iranians, but to realpolitik, as all the weapons Iran was supplying originated from the old Anglo-American foe, Russia. It is possible that the US and Britain considered Iran a Trojan horse for Russian penetration into the region. Saudi Arabia, a major Anglo-American Muslim ally, was equally horrified by the involvement of its only remaining regional rival. After Iraq had been weakened by the tight economic sanctions imposed by the Saudis’ Western allies throughout the 1990s, the only other regional power that posed a menace to Saudi dominance in the Middle East was Iran.

Meanwhile, Turkey, another important Muslim and semi-European Western ally, was also apprehensive of Iranian influence for two reasons: Iranian relations with Hezbollah threatened to aggravate internal instability in the Turkish provinces bordering Iran, and the close relationship Iran enjoyed with the Bosnian government diminished
Turkey’s involvement in the resolution of the Bosnian conflict, a right that Turkey considered belonged to it by default, due its five-hundred-year-old Ottoman history in the Balkans. Turkey’s strategic importance rested on its strong presence in the Balkans, and it was for this reason that it interacted with international institutions and was a part of the security governance of the region from the very start of the process of dissolution in Yugoslavia (Tangor 2008: 161). A weakened position in the Bosnian security discourse would challenge Turkey’s political relevance in Europe.295

Due to all of the above reasons, the Russo-Farsi alliance had to be eliminated. To achieve this, Britain and America mobilised both of its readily available Muslim allies to approach President Izetbegović and offer their military assistance, on the clear condition that he immediately terminate any type of Iranian involvement (Wiebes 2006: 160; Cohen 2008: 408). The military goods would of course originate from the US, but would be supplied by Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Pakistan – in other words, by trusted neo-Islamist allies. This method had been tried and tested in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when Saudi Arabia provided a $500-million’s worth of arms to the mujahideen fighting the Russians (Napoleoni 2005: 190-191).296 The logic behind the offer was that if it worked in Afghanistan, why should it not work in Bosnia? It was thought that if Saudi Arabia approached Izetbegović with the American offer, he would be more likely to acquiesce. However, according to the former chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Pauline Neville-Jones, Izetbegović was ‘less tied to the apron strings of the United States

295 For Turkey’s relations with the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE preceding and during the break-up of Yugoslavia, with a special focus on Turkish policies concerning the crisis in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, see Tangor (2008: 160-220).
296 See also the US former secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s interview with Fox TV online at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=doxgN-V5Fg
than anyone else thought’ (Wiebes 2006: 160). Even the pleas of his main financial donors from Saudi Arabia did not dissuade Izetbegović from continuing relations with Iran, and he continued to simultaneously profit from both Saudi Arabian and Iranian assistance. Wiebes (2006: 176-177) reports that the British secret service was of the opinion that Izetbegović was a clever politician when it came to his personal interests, as it seemed he was prepared to play the parties off against each other.297

However, alarm bells rang when the SDA began to team up with Iranian intelligence personnel. The British discovered that the Iranians had developed an extraordinarily close working relationship with the SDA government, insinuating themselves with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree, and were providing not only financial support but also political direction.298 This also caused the Saudis alarm; they perceived it as a threat to their interests. For Britain and the US, it was a turning point that offered a more than adequate indicator that the Iranian link would not easily disappear from the SDA’s political menu. When it became clear that Saudi shuttle diplomacy had failed to coax Izetbegović to ‘America’s side’, the head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki al Faisal, paid President Clinton a visit, urging him to take the

297 Perhaps the best illustration of the skilful way Izetbegović used diplomacy is to be found in his memoirs, in which, rather than acknowledging the deep rift, he praises the unity of the Muslim world over the Bosnian case, misleading the reader into believing the truth of his assertion. He finds evidence for his claim in Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory: ‘Muslim countries ... provided significant political, material and military aid. Never, in the last hundred years, had the Muslim world been so united as in the case of Bosnia, claimed Samuel L. Huntington ... his assertion of the unity of the Islamic world in the case of Bosnia was accurate’ (Izetbegović 2003: 200).

298 The Select Committee of the US House of Representatives issued a report in which it warned that the Vevak and Pasdaran, the Iranian intelligence services, had ‘developed an extraordinarily close working relationship with the Bosnian intelligence service which it largely set up. In addition to training, the Iranians provided political direction and financial support.’ (25 October 1996:167). For more on this subject, see Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, (The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington DC Report October 1996: 165,167; 175-178). For more on the Vevak’s and Pasdaran’s European operations, see Schindler (2007: 131-137).
lead in providing military assistance to Bosnia (Wiebes 2006: 163). The US saw the Iranian entrée in the region as a threat to their vital interests, due to the danger of Russia lurking in the background. It readily accepted the offer, and started exploring avenues by which to win the hearts and minds of the Bosnian SDA leadership. Politically speaking, the affair activated the American attempt to recreate the balance of power in the region and ensure a geostrategic settlement in the interests of the Western allies. This exercise brought the Saudis into the equation, leading to the commencement of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s neo-Islamisation, under the aegis of the Great Powers. How this was done, and its implications for the role of Islam in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is discussed in the next section.

6.5 The Croatian arms pipeline and the ‘black flights’

The neo-Islamisation of the conflict began in March 1994, opening ‘the most curious chapter in the muddled history of U.S. attempts to end Europe’s worst bloodletting since World War II’ (Beelman 1997).299 In March 1994, Charles Redman, the US ambassador to Germany, established the Muslim-Croat Federation, ending the war between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Whilst it represented a fragile alliance against the Serbs, it was, nonetheless, the first step in the Anglo-American strategic manoeuvre towards better control over the conflict.300 The war between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims had disrupted the arms flow from Iran, mainly due to the distrust between the Iranians and

299 Maude Beelman is an extremely valuable source. Her observations hold weight due to her presence during the Bosnian conflict as an Associated Press correspondent. She was one of the first journalists to uncover the Serb-run concentration camps in northern Bosnia, and her merits are highlighted by her colleague Vulliamy (2012).

300 The creation of the federation came at the time when a third of Croatia and 70 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina were under Serb control. This offered a singular platform for the US to control and obfuscate Russian aspirations. For more on the Muslim-Croat Federation, see the testimony of its architect, Charles Redman, Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. (The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington DC Report 25 October 1996: 10-67; 133-137; 466-476).
Croats. However, with the establishment of the federation, the arms flow could be resumed. Re-activating the Iranian weapon supply should have been anathema to the Americans, but it seemed to have been well received, and even welcomed.

In April 1994, the US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, met with Imam Omerbašić, a religious leader of the Muslims in Croatia and a trusted SDA confidant, in Zagreb. Galbraith urged Omerbašić to purchase arms for the Bosnian army (Beelman 1997). The ambassador’s choice of interlocutor hardly seems a coincidence, since well-informed American sources knew that he was the main ‘Iran-link’ in Zagreb, and there is no doubt that the ambassador was briefed on this. Furthermore, based on previous experience, the Americans trusted that this conversation would be reported directly to the SDA leadership in Sarajevo, and that rumours would quickly spread beyond the bounds of confidentiality. The American calculations were correct: Omerbašić immediately relayed the news to the Iranian ambassador to Croatia (Wiebes 2006: 166). The message the SDA government picked up was that the Americans were giving the ‘green light’ to the arms-supply pipeline from Iran to Croatia (Williams and Lippman 1995). These impressions were confirmed when Galbraith asked his station chief to confirm to Croatian intelligence that the US did not object to Iran establishing an arms pipeline to the SDA-led government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Beelman 1997).

Both the Croats and the CIA station chief were stunned by American encouragement of Iranian arms shipments. Whilst the station chief checked with his headquarters to confirm there had been a shift in policy concerning the arms embargo in

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301 The New Republic article ‘Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the Real Story’ (28 October 1996), reported that the CIA pinpointed Imam Omerbašić as ‘an intermediary for Iran’. For the full story, see Craig (1997).
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tuđman personally visited Galbraith to obtain formal reassurance. Because the Croats themselves were divided on whether to permit arms deliveries to the Bosnian Muslims, the president wanted to know whether the US would object to the Iranian arms flow through Croatia. The ambassador gave him an answer that later became known as a ‘no-instruction policy’, a diplomatic way of saying the US would do nothing. Indeed, throughout the course of the Iranian shipments, the Americans took a hands-off approach, having no intention of either interfering with or obstructing the pipeline. Galbraith appeared to be working in its favour when he approached three different CIA officials to ask about the possibility of covertly arming the Bosnians. Moreover, in March, one month before the ‘no-instructions’ decision, he had wanted to know how much weaponry $250 million would buy, and in December 1994 he had asked the CIA station chief what he thought would happen if the US looked the other way when the Iranians supplied arms (Beelman 1997).

For all these reasons, the station chief in Croatia thought he had uncovered a terrible secret: the American ambassador was involved in a rogue operation to smuggle Iranian weapons to Bosnia’s Muslims in defiance of a worldwide arms embargo. What

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302 The Croatian minister of defence, Gojko Šušak, was a fervent supporter of the Iranian arms pipeline because of the opportunity it represented for ‘skimming’, whereby large quantities of weapons could remain in Croatian hands. On the other hand, Miroslav Tuđman, son of the president and head of the Croatian intelligence service, together with the minister of foreign affairs, Mate Granić, were both vehemently opposed to the resumption of supplies as they feared extensive Iranian influence, due to the aforementioned Iranian policy on an Islamic alliance with the Orthodox Church via Russia. For more on the personal views of the Croatian officials, see Wiebes (2006: 166-167).

303 When President Tuđman asked Galbraith about the American reaction to the Iranian arms flow, the ambassador cabled home, seeking guidance. The answer came back, approved by the president, ‘tell Mr. Tuđman you have “no instructions”’ – a way of saying that the US would do nothing. When Tuđman heard this, in April 1994, he was confused. The next day, Galbraith told him again: ‘No instructions – and this time pay attention to what I didn’t say.’ Still uncertain, Tuđman asked Charles Redman, a special envoy working on the Balkans war. ‘It means,’ Redman said, ‘we have no objections.’ See: Weiner and Bonner (1996) and Wiebes (2006: 167-177).
seemed to escape his attention was the fact that at every possible opportunity the supposedly classified information was, in effect, volunteered by Galbraith. Oblivious of this, the station chief spent hours at his computer terminal, tapping out coded messages to Washington, bluntly describing his suspicions about Galbraith (Weiner and Bonner 1996) – a state department official reported that the station chief was filing reports on conversations with the ambassador even when they had no relevance. As a result, the CIA and the networks of spies belonging to their partners intensified surveillance operations, observing and counting Iranian planeloads, which climbed to approximately eight flights per month (Wiebes 2006: 169).

Under the pretext of offering assistance in the form of intelligence on Serbian defensive positions to Croat and Bosniak forces, the CIA initiated surveillance flights. The spy planes were, in reality, gathering information on the Iranian consignments (Wiebes 2006: 174-214). Yet, spying was not the prerogative of the CIA operatives; others were concerned to uncover the slightest indication of American involvement in the Iranian link. As everyone was spying on everyone else, those who were spying on the CIA turned their attention towards the Iranian shipments too. Reports from a great variety of sources were pouring in, describing the size and degree of Iranian shipments, and the tacit American involvement. A ship, sailing under a Panamanian flag and carrying surface-to-surface missiles, 25,000 machine guns and seven million rounds of ammunition, was intercepted in the Mediterranean, and another operation in Slovenia, smuggling military goods worth $15 million, was uncovered (Napoleoni 2005: 190). Incidentally, more peripheral, opportunistic supplies of arms from quite unexpected sources were also intercepted – for example, a
Maltese battalion, which only possessed four mortars but had ordered four thousand mortar shells, obviously intended for future re-sale.\textsuperscript{304}

What remained largely under-reported, however, were the American night flights carrying weapons directly to the airfield in Tuzla, a town in north-east Bosnia. It is also possible that some air cargos were landing at the American-built airport in Visoko. The air operations were named ‘black flights’ because, in the main, it remained unclear who exactly was operating them. Some of those who witnessed these ‘black flights’ were of the strong opinion that they were carried out by private companies from the US, such as Tepper Aviation and Intermountain Aviation (Wiebes 2006: 193-194). However, the fact that they were specialised aircraft, adapted for night-time operations, pointed to Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a US-based mercenary company, well connected to the US State Department and the Ministry of Defense, probably due to the fact that the company was run by retired US army generals. More significant is the fact that the company won ‘Equip and Train’, a multi-billion military contract to train the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Isenberg 1997).\textsuperscript{305}

It is interesting to note that the State Department pledged $200,000 to train the Bosnian military at American facilities, while the largest single donor of armaments and of the entire military programme was Saudi Arabia, who granted funds in excess of $140 billion (Isenberg 1997). It is also important to note that, unlike the weapons procurement from Iran, the entire mission surrounding the ‘black flights’ was shrouded in secrecy, and

\textsuperscript{304} There were also Bangladeshi and Malaysian units involved in selling light arms and ammunition. In the meantime, Ukrainians were busy dealing in petrol, cans of coca cola and women.

\textsuperscript{305} The contract took place following the signing of the peace agreement at Dayton, which divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two parts: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The army of Republika Srpska was not included in the ‘Equip and Train’ military programme.
the US was adamant that it should be kept that way.\textsuperscript{306} The veil of secrecy illustrates that this was a controversial state of affairs, and underlines the disparity in the way the Americans dealt with allegations of their involvement in the ‘Iranian pipeline’ on one hand, and the ‘black flights’ on the other. The relaxed manner in which they volunteered information about, and proposed entanglement in, the Iranian arms shipments was in marked contrast to their aggressive efforts to cover up their association with the weapons being flown directly to Tuzla. This becomes even more puzzling when the fact that American officials felt relaxed enough to pronounce a ‘no-instruction’ policy concerning Iran’s smuggling operations, which was ‘still officially isolated as a terrorist state’ (Beelman 1997), is taken into consideration.

Careful analysis of the international context within which these two operations evolved, however, reveals that the ‘no-instruction’ instruction was a ‘red herring’,\textsuperscript{307} orchestrated by a close circle of officials from the National Security Council and the State Department (Weiner and Bonner 1996). It appears that they disguised it so well that even their colleagues at the CIA and the Pentagon were left in the dark. By issuing a ‘no-instruction’ guidance, and ensuring that knowledge of its existence spread expeditiously and widely by word-of-mouth, the Americans, together with the Saudis, created a smokescreen for the unrestricted operation of the ‘black flights’. By staging these flights concurrently with the Iranian arms shipment, they deluded the media, who busied itself in reporting a hoax. Even when they believed that they had uncovered a ‘covert operation’, the only

\textsuperscript{306} For example, when a Norwegian colonel, C.A Le Hardy, drafted a report for UNPROFOR, in which he described the specific high-spec capabilities of the intercepted flights, he concluded that they were characteristic of American advanced night-time technology. Apparently, it was said that the Americans were so alarmed by this report that they put pressure on Le Hardy to retract it and produce a new one (Wiebes 2006: 185, 192).

\textsuperscript{307} A ‘red herring’ is a fallacy in which an irrelevant topic is presented in order to divert attention from the original issue (Chossudovsky 2009).
discovery journalists were able to report was a ‘no-instruction’ fallacy, constructed by top State Department officials. In fact, the ‘no-instruction’ decision was a masterpiece of covert operations, representing a diplomatic victory that enabled the West to regain control over the conflict, put its firm signature on the Dayton Agreement, and portray the Dayton pro forma as the only possible resolution for subsequent conflicts, such as Iraq and Kosovo.308

This is how the then-deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, summarised the ‘no-instruction’ instruction at the Congressional hearing on the shipment of arms from Iran to Bosnia:

We bought time for a combination of American diplomacy, NATO airpower, and Croatian and Bosnian military victories to reach an historic peace agreement under U.S. leadership at Dayton. The United States is leading an international effort to arm Bosnia today. The Iranian presence there is down to a handful and is increasingly marginalized. (Talbott 1996)

In other words, the military and financial assistance of the ‘black flights’ facilitated the return of Anglo-American Muslim allies, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to a prominent place in the political picture, securing a balance of power that predetermined the way in which the Bosnian conflict was settled and Bosnia’s internal affairs reorganised. Redman (1996), a confidant in the ‘no-instruction’ policy and the mastermind behind the Muslim-Croat Federation, has affirmed that the decision not to overtly oppose Iranian shipments was crucial to all that followed in the Balkans. In answer to the accusation that the ‘no-instruction’ decision opened the door to Iranian involvement, Talbott explains:

308 Both countries have been proposed as candidates for ethnic division on the model of Bosnia’s Dayton settlement.
That door was already open. Had we tried to slam it shut, we might very well have also, as a consequence, shut down the relationship that we developed between Croatia and the federation. And that result could have – I believe almost certainly would have – kept us from ever getting to Dayton. (Talbott 1996)

An overlooked phenomenon is the significance of the Dayton Agreement on the international *realpolitik* of rival political forces. It was Dayton that enabled the resumption of Anglo-American geostrategic predominance in the Balkans, which they were in danger of losing to Russia through its proxy, Iran. This was only made possible by utilising the Saudi alliance. Saudi Arabia’s power and influence over the SDA leadership managed to bluff the Iranians out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its position in Bosnia and Herzegovina expedited the strategic goals of both Saudi Arabia and its Western partners: the Saudis fortified their stance as a regional power and furthered their aspirations to be the spiritual leaders of the Muslims in the Balkans, and the West was able to step in and obstruct the Russians and their proxies from penetrating further into the Balkans – a Russian ambition since the Berlin Congress.

At the Berlin Congress, Bosnia and Herzegovina, although converted into an Austro-Hungarian protectorate, was preserved from annihilation and allowed to remain intact in order to keep Russia at bay, thus closing the last chapter of the ‘Eastern Question’. By contrast, the settlement of the contemporary conflict required the division of Bosnia in order to solve ‘the problem from hell’, to borrow a phrase of a former secretary of state,

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309 When the US Congress discovered that Bosnian intelligence officials were still collaborating closely with the members of the Iranian intelligence service, it announced it would not allow the Saudi-sponsored military programme ‘Equip and Train’ to go forward until President Clinton certified that the Bosnian government had cut all ties. In addition, the US demanded that Bosnia dismiss its deputy defence minister, Hasan Čengić, who was suspected of being the driving force behind Bosnia’s cooperation with Iran. It was thought that he was under Iranian instructions to subvert the Saudi programme. See, for example, O’Connor (1997).
Warren Christopher (cited in Blank 1995). It was this division that created the balance of power, by way of the diplomatic compromises of the international community. In both instances, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina became an international protectorate, administered by a foreign representative with unlimited ruling powers, and its destiny subject to an imported resolution and not decided by its people.\footnote{For more on the peculiarities of the Dayton Agreement, see Chandler (2000).}

Owing to its openness to foreign influences, however, the problems evolving around Bosnia and Herzegovina, far from being indisputably resolved, were set aside and the war was transformed into a ‘frozen conflict’ (Boyd 1998: 48).\footnote{Former US General Charles Boyd (1998: 48) states that what the Dayton Accord did was to ‘freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire and prevent resumption of hostilities’.} The subsequent neo-Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought with it further ethnic divisions, and diminished still further the prospect of the Bosnian population enjoying long-lasting peaceful coexistence in a multicultural environment. On the international level, however, the Dayton Agreement ensured the maintenance of a form of peace among the rival members of the international community, even if it was only temporary.

\subsection*{6.6 Conclusion}

This chapter has dealt with international aspect of the 1992-95 Bosnian war: it has examined the infiltration of neo-Islamism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the three decades preceding the conflict, as well as critically analysed the Western deployment of calculated neutrality in adopting secessionist policies in an effort to settle the war. With the regard to the research question the chapter explored whether neo-Islamism construction shaped recent events and the responses of Bosnian leaders in the 1990s. Even though the Bosniaks
represented a well-educated, secular and sophisticated ethnic group during Yugoslav times, their political maturity in the democratic period was at an embryonic stage. This was mainly due to the rapid removal of former communist, mainly Muslim, cadres from the political scene by the SDA, the party that won the most Bosniak votes at the first multiparty election in 1991. The SDA justified its actions by portraying their removal as vindication for alleged victimisation under Muslim-communist rule.

As soon as the SDA and the other nationalists in Yugoslavia came to power, they started negotiating the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of these agreements had already been signed prior to the start of the war in 1992. The nationalists’ negotiations were supervised by the members of the international community, whose intelligence services only became interested in the break-up of Yugoslavia with the onset of the Bosnian crisis. The fact that Dayton was signed not only by Serbia and Croatia, but also by the Contact Group (the US, Britain, France and Russia), as well as a representative from the OIC, reveals the complexity of the Bosnian War and the significant level of international involvement in the management of its conflict and its resolution. In spite of the presence of the leading Western powers and their Muslim allies, the break-up of Yugoslavia turned bloodiest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Bosniaks became the principal victims of the war. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a hive of foreign and domestic espionage networks, working in collaboration with and against each other. Various interest groups formed, and the whole Bosnian war was conducted in a theatre of conflicting interests. The exit from the crisis was born out of the shuttle diplomacy of the neo-Islamist allies and a series of clandestine operations.
One such covert activity was the supply of arms. It appears that there has been no critical examination of the bizarre affairs surrounding these operations. Although the sheer size of the literature and media reports on alleged American involvement in arming the Bosnian Muslims is impressive, an examination of their arguments reveals that the copious content lacks any rigorous attempt to plausibly reconstruct the chain of events. The best illustration of this is the assertion that the US sided with the Iranians to arm the Bosnian Muslims, without any analysis of why it would collaborate with a state it had officially designated as terrorist. This assertion begs a number of further questions that have been left unexamined. For example, if these countries were collaborating, why would the US insist that Iran left Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the signing of the Dayton Agreement, risking the discontinuation of a multibillion-dollar military project?\textsuperscript{312} If the potential threat was terrorism, why did the West not pressure Saudi Arabia to leave as well, instead of allowing the Saudis to liberally propagate their version of Islamic practices and dogma?

Also, an explanation of the contradiction between the fact that the supposedly ‘best-kept secret’ of America’s tacit approval of Iranian arms shipments was revealed in almost every ‘slip of the tongue’ by the US ambassador, and the way the ‘black flights’ were kept in utter secrecy, is nowhere to be found. Although the data collected from leaked intelligence information is abundant, there have been no attempts to offer any explanation for the alleged US-Iranian alliance. Furthermore, all the available works consulted on this topic appear to follow the same pattern, for the simple reason that they are largely dependent on media reports. Even the literature that includes confidential interviews and

\textsuperscript{312} For more on the ‘Equip and Train’ military project, see footnote 305.
other publicly unavailable resources does not attempt to elucidate the American decision
not to forestall Iranian arms shipments.

The literature also fails to recognise the tensions and animosity amongst the various
Muslim countries that were acknowledged donors to the Bosnian Muslims. Rather than
representing the rancour that existed amongst the Muslim factions and setting it within the
context of a complex, antagonistic pursuit of realpolitik, the position generally taken places
the Muslim countries together in one harmonious basket, out of which they putatively, in a
unanimous fashion, afflicted terror upon the West. The Bosniaks, by virtue of the fact they
are Muslims, are depicted as harbouring the potential for developing a fundamentalist
alliance with their co-religionists. Careful analysis of the various texts points to three main
reasons behind these errors: firstly, the complexity of the contemporary international
context in relation to Muslim countries is often ignored; secondly, the history of Islam in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Bosnian Muslims remains a terra incognita, causing
many inadvertent misconceptions; and thirdly, a perpetual Western bias that borders on
Islamophobia, in which Muslims are seen as comprising a united anti-Western front, has
occluded the fact that the ‘Muslim world’ is as fragmented as the ‘Christian world’ or
‘Buddhist world’, if it is possible to speak of ‘worlds’ in this manner.

The Bosnian leadership during the war, nevertheless, did adopt an increasingly
overt Islamic discourse and orientation that played directly into the hands of the
Islamophobic peace envoys. These envoys referred to the leadership as the ‘Muslim-led’
Sarajevo government, and it did not refute this designation. The Bosniak regime’s decision

313 The exception to this would have been Schindler’s (2007) book, Unholy Terror, had he not abandoned his
argument to bias and Islamophobia.
to apply for Bosnian membership of the OIC in July 1991 only served to compound the Western perception of their ‘Islamicism’. The Bosniak leadership and the Bosnian army, despite its strong multiethnic component, had become largely ‘Muslim’ and organised according to ‘Islamic principles’ by the end of the war in 1995. Examination of the events, and the literature relating to them, suggests that the Islamic development of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not predestined but was determined by the politics of its leadership. It is also important to note that although the leadership were formally committed to a unified multiethnic state, the establishment of an Islamic state out of the partitioned Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a covert goal. To achieve a Muslim state, the Bosnian regime even accepted the huge territorial compromises proposed by the numerous doomed intervention plans of the international community. The international community proposed a secessionist amalgam to settle the conflict; it effectively endorsed the partition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, securing the annexation of two-thirds of the country to a ‘Greater Serbia’ and a ‘Greater Croatia’, and the formation of a Muslim national state from the remainder. To enhance its Islamist character, the Bosniak leadership retained tight links with transnational Islamist networks, resulting in the proliferation of neo-Islamist groups and activities, such as the secret supply of weapons.

The international community remained silent and ‘neutral’ in regard to the spread of neo-Islamist influences in Bosnia, just as it did over the massacres committed throughout the war. In both scenarios, calculated neutrality became complaisance about the commission of crimes. Throughout the entire discussion, one lesson is apparent: unless Western interests are fundamentally endangered, there is no viable solution for the Bosnian protectorate – it will remain another ‘frozen conflict’ in the Third World, just as it remained
the only unanswered problem of the ‘Eastern Question’. The final chapter will offer the conclusions of this thesis concerning what Bassuener and Lyon (2009) call the ‘unfinished business’ in Bosnia.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This thesis provided re-consideration of Bosnian Muslim identity and the development of political consciousness in the period up until and during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. In this regard, it set out to explore the consequences of the Muslim identity and neo-Islamism construction in the 1992-95 Bosnian war that was often cited as the dirtiest and bloodiest modern conflict on European soil since the Second World War (Vulliamy 2012). The prime question that motivated this quest, and steered the analysis throughout, seeks to explain whether the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the particular legacies of Ottoman rule and subsequent construction of the concept I have termed neo-Islam shaped events and the responses during the 1992-95 Bosnian conflict. An aim of this investigation was to assess the effects of the secessionist policies of the international community, whose numerous ‘peace talks’ were, essentially, concerned with partitioning the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The adoption of secessionist methods by both international and local forces expedited Bosnian settlement as an international protectorate, a mode replicated from the nineteenth century nation-building process which refrained to recognise Bosniaks as a sovereign nation.

Although the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started as an act of aggression, it was later transformed into an inter-religious conflict, largely due to the political stance of the local leadership, which was encouraged to spread nationalist rhetoric by the secessionist policies of the international community. Thousands of Bosnians who believed in the multiethnic, pluralistic and unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had their convictions shattered. Applying the doctrine of ‘moral equivalence’ to the Bosnian bloodshed, the
international community negotiated a ‘peace’ agreement that did not end the war but simply froze the conflict. Representatives of the international community agreed among themselves to run the country as an international protectorate, and endowed the internationally appointed Office of the High Representative supreme authority in the post-war semi-colonial Bosnian theatre.

The results of this investigation show that the once-celebrated model of Yugoslav multiculturalism and pluralist coexistence – the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – was dismantled by a combination of myopic international diplomacy and local nationalism. The ultimate result of these polices was the birth of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which divided Bosnia into two ethnically defined entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic. The operational dysfunction of the Dayton ‘peace plan’ is an intriguing subject, which is discussed in chapter one, but this thesis was not specifically designed to deal with this issue. Its focus has been the rationale behind the decision on the part of the international community to adopt this particular method of conflict resolution for the Bosnian crisis. However, the reasons for drawing up clauses that continue to cripple Bosnian state building and national development to this day could be usefully explored in further research.

The historical analysis conducted in this investigation has demonstrated that Bosnia and Herzegovina was frequently subject to international interventions in the past, both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of the research, it is now possible to reaffirm that the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be viewed as a continuation of the ‘Eastern Crisis’ at the end of the nineteenth century. At the Berlin Congress in 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only former Ottoman
province to become an international protectorate; all the others were declared independent nation-states. When the self-inflicted 1839-78 Tanzimat reforms, discussed in chapter three, ruined the Ottoman Empire and forced it to begin its retreat from the Balkans, the Great Powers sponsored a whole array of secret societies in the region to raise national awareness amongst the Christian intelligentsia and peasantry. This signalled the conceptualisation of a ‘New World Order’, established by the successful spread of the capitalist loan economy, as explained in chapter two, and the replacement of the old multicultural empires with a system of homogenised nation-states. The emerging states were exclusively Christian and exercised little if any tolerance towards Muslims. This practice was in accordance with nineteenth-century European law, which offered Muslims no protection (Ekmečić 1996), with the result that they fell victim to persecution, expulsion and the annexation of their territory, as discussed in both chapters three and four. Many Bosniaks were forced to acquiesce to organised emigration to Turkey. Once there, the Tanzimatçılar forbade their return, as they were forging a new Turkish nation comprising both local Muslims and those expelled from Europe and Central Asia, as analysed in chapter four. This treatment set the precedent for dealing with Muslims in most subsequent conflicts, right through to the pogroms against the Bosniaks in the 1990s.

Solving the ‘Eastern Question’ demanded a re-interpretation of Islam after the Ottomans withdrew from European lands. Those Muslims who stayed behind were not envisaged as part of the ‘new Enlightened Europe’, regardless of the fact they were already in possession of a compact, homogenised territorial unit, suitable for further development in a modern national sense – a case in point being the quasi-national independence of the Bogumils in medieval Bosnia, discussed in chapter four. The development of national
awareness required diligent guidance, but the Bosniaks were denied such Western-sponsored initiatives. The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that the Bosniaks did not lack self-awareness as regards their separate ethno-national identity, but they were neither presented with the opportunity nor given the appropriate tools to build a modern nation. Even when they attempted to attain national recognition through armed struggle, their resistance was severely crushed. Most critically, they lacked the support of the Great Powers in their attempts to achieve national recognition.

In the political carve-up that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia, the approach of the international community, led by the major European powers (the UK, France and Germany), remained unchanged. This needs to be observed in the context of the political continuation of nineteenth-century ethno-nationalism, which never recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign nation-state or incorporated the Bosniaks into the contemporary system of independent nation-states. The Bosniaks were consistently regarded as belonging to an Islamic past, and only partially allowed to find their place in the new Europe. Reduced to ethnic enclaves and observed through a neo-Islamist lens, they were confined to a deeply segregated international protectorate run by neoliberal institutions. As a result, they never truly achieved independence and are still fighting for national recognition as a fully fledged nation today. The historical analysis points to the fact that, in the absence of an independent Islamic polity, the Bosniaks’ success as an independent nation has depended on the centrifugal forces of an ‘enlightened’ Europe to either endorse or reject them. This association of factors represents a suitable subject for future investigation.

The research in this thesis could serve as a base for such studies as it adds substantially to an understanding of the symbiosis between neo-Islamist countries and the
most affluent Western governments, predominantly the Anglo-Saxon ones. A neo-Islamist and neoliberal alliance was conceived during the Cold War to rebuff Soviet penetration and establish a neoliberal economic hegemony, as detailed in chapter five. The governments of Muslim countries perceived to be unfriendly towards the West were often replaced by neo-Islamist regimes by means of military coups, revolutions or manipulated elections with predetermined results. Saudi Arabia, a major Western ally in the region and the least democratic Muslim country in the world, was enlisted to ensure that these regimes remained faithful to Western values and democratic principles. The research conducted in this thesis has confirmed that this partnership displays two main features, both of which are severely condemned in Islamic teaching. The first is the administration of interest-incurring loans to poor, mainly Muslim countries, under extremely onerous conditions, with the result that most of them are still deeply entrenched in their economic predicament. The second characteristic is the widespread adoption by neo-Islamist governments of the speculative capital movements that lie at the heart of the neoliberal economic system.

The most immediate outcome is that the volume of speculative transactions in the world now greatly exceeds the value of trade in goods and service. Trade derivatives, the name under which these transactions became better known, have no real depository assets but are simply financial instruments derived from the speculative evaluation of interest rates, credit-default swaps (deregulated insurance premiums), equities, bonds and the commodity markets. Most of the time, the sellers do not possess the ‘goods’ but only the ‘legal tender’ to handle them, and the money exists only on computer screens. Not only are these assets worthless in real terms, but they are also speculative exchange transactions based on the manipulated value that the ‘bets were hedged at’, thus they bear an uncertain
outcome and give a potential undue advantage to the ‘investor’. This practice is strongly repudiated in Islamic teachings, but appears to be tolerated and even promoted by neo-Islamists, as discussed in chapter five.

One of the objectives of an ideal Islamic society is the eradication of poverty at all levels and the creation of a prosperous life for all human beings. As discussed in chapter five, zakat is not only a tool that provides immediate relief to the poor, but aspires to extricate impoverished people from the category of the needy by providing them with the machinery and equipment for productive work, to enable them to eventually break the cycle of destitution and become self-reliant. Arguably, the creation of self-sufficiency is also the aim of those projects directed by neoliberal institutions towards the relief of poverty in the Third World. However, while this may appear to be the case as regards their general structure, at their core lies an essential difference with the Islamic approach. They lack the divine, spiritual component of the deed itself and do not ordain an adequate and equal social order. The main point of divergence is that a market economy views the betterment of material life as a goal in itself, whereas the Islamic system sees it as a means of spiritual elevation that liberates human energy from devotion to seeking bread and directs it toward worshipping and glorifying God.

However, accounts of discrimination, illiteracy, expedient justice, enormous poverty and the absolute prerogatives of kings and presidents in Muslim countries show how these Islamic values have been betrayed. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the victory of Western imperialism in a world in which the paradigm of nationhood – otherwise wholly alien to the ‘oneness of the Ummah’, as discussed in chapter two – has flourished, Muslim countries seem ‘reduced to a position of economic dependence and backwardness from
which they find it difficult to extricate themselves’ (Sidiqqui 1996: 98). The great majority have become integrated into a global economy that administers interest rates and employs excessive speculative practices (Sidiqi 2000: 59-81), *riba* and *qimar* (usury and gambling), both of which are explicitly prohibited and considered corrupt in Islam, as illustrated in chapter five. It is legitimate to enquire why countries with Islamic traditions are in such a poor state, and why unlawful commercial practices have become commonplace in their everyday life when these are not inherent in Islamic teaching. Many scholars – voices of the current Islamic reawakening – point to a lack of responsibility on the part of Muslim leaders. This study suggests that unless Muslim governments reject the adoption of detrimental neoliberal policies, social justice, in conformity with Islamic financial principles, will never be attained.

Taking all these findings together, it is possible to finally revisit the purpose stated in the title of this project: an evaluation of the impact of political development of Bosniak Muslim identity and the construction of neo-Islam in the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neo-Islam influenced conflict on two levels – domestic and international. On the domestic level, it served in two consequential ways: the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina finally occurred due to the affirmation of a Bosniak-Muslim identity and the Bosniak leadership’s acceptance of the reduction of the territory Bosniaks had occupied for centuries to those parts where they formed the majority, either naturally or through the exchange of population achieved by ethnic cleansing and genocide. With this ‘nationalisation of Islam’, the nation-building process of the nineteenth century, based on the principle of ‘nation equals state’, was concluded. Islam had found its place in Europe, but only in the form of neo-Islamism, which comprises an indispensable part of an
internationally dominant neoliberalism. In relation to this, on the international level, the impact of neo-Islam on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina served the purpose of creating the impression of a religious war and upheld the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory discussed in chapter five. Bosnia was a case in point. Unless, this thesis challenged it otherwise.
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