
Introduction.

In his Foreword to Richard Nice’s translation into English of Bourdieu and Passeron’s *La Reproduction as Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (Bourdieu and Passeron, (1977 [1970])) Tom Bottomore noted that the book expounded ‘the theoretical ideas which have guided the research on cultural reproduction over the past decade or so’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: v) of the Centre de sociologie européenne (CSE) in Paris. He recognised that the book was the product of the collective activity of a group of researchers and that it demonstrated ‘the continuous interplay between theory and research’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: v) and the overcoming of the division between ‘thinkers’ and ‘researchers’ which, in the view of some, was ‘a major failing of sociology as a science’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: v). He considered that it may well be that this division can only be transcended effectively, not by the ‘intermittent launching even of large scale research projects’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: vi) but, as he commented somewhat enviously,

[...] by this kind of long-term involvement in the exploration of a particular broad domain of social life, by a group of researchers who acquire to some extent the qualities of a “school” of thought. (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: v-vi)

For Bottomore, the secret of the success of CSE as a ‘school’ lay in its concentration over a sustained period of time on clearly demarcated objects of analysis – those associated with education and culture. There are, however, alternative explanations, both of which emphasize, instead, the *a priori* affective or cognitive dispositions of the group, generating its particular categories of research objects. Leaving aside the undoubted ‘charisma’ of Bourdieu, the Weberian connotations of which Bourdieu would have been anxious to disown, there is the possibility that there existed an elective affinity between the members of the group and that its collective identity was collectively constructed socially. There is the other possibility, which does not exclude the first, that the coherence of the group was attributable to the corporate acceptance by members of a distinct methodology or of a distinctive philosophy of social science. The nature of group identity and of the relative significance of social or intellectual coherence were themselves of surreptitious interest in the group’s reflections on the emergence of photographic clubs or of epistemic communities.

Participants in the corporate endeavour of CSE have reflected on the nature of the collective exercise over which Bourdieu presided. Yvette Delsaut explored the issue in one of Bourdieu’s last interviews, published posthumously as the appendix to the Bibliography of his work for which she was responsible, with Marie-Christine Rivièrè (Delsaut and Rivièrè, eds., 2002). She recollected that the coherence of the research group had an affective base:

When I worked with you, there were real bonds and common goals between people. I recall a period at the Centre: we were all young (you were not much older than us, you were just our elder), all the boys more or less had a slight south-west accent, like you, for talking sociology; it was amusing.¹ (Delsaut and Rivièrè, eds., 2002: 186-7)
Bourdieu agreed:

Oh well yes, it was like that, a collective […]² (Delsaut and Rivière, eds., 2002: 187)

and when Delsaut suggested that Bourdieu had set the tone for a manner of behaving with each other within the group (‘not being effusive, etc’), Bourdieu responded by introducing his own concept of *habitus* to explain that he had not needed to impose this manner because

[...] it was more or less common to all of us and no doubt it was that which had brought us together (I’m thinking of the affinities of habitus).³ (Delsaut and Rivière, eds., 2002: 190)

Delsaut had been one of Bourdieu’s students at the University of Lille in the early 1960s and had been associated with the CSE from its origins. It is significant that the late exchange between Delsaut and Bourdieu has an element of nostalgia and that the concept of *habitus* is invoked to explain the social phenomenon which generated it. By contrast, Remi Lenoir’s recollection of his experiences of working with Bourdieu deploys the more developed concept which Bourdieu articulated in 1979 in ‘Les trois états du capital culturel’ [the three forms of cultural capital] (Bourdieu, 1979). *Habitus* is now used to describe an acquired disposition more than one which is inter-generationally transmitted. It has become ‘instituted’ as a characteristic detached from its originally ‘incorporated’ mode. Lenoir became Director of CSE in 1996/7, having previously, since 1992, been Director of CREDHESS (Centre de recherches et d’études en droit, histoire, économie et sociologie du travail [centre for research and studies on law, history, economics and the sociology of labour]) at the University of Paris I, where he was Professor of Sociology. He had gained his licence in Sociology in 1966, by which time the essential nature of the CSE had been established. He wrote a posthumous tribute to Bourdieu entitled: ‘Scientific habitus. Pierre Bourdieu and the collective intellectual’ (Lenoir, 2006). He argued that Bourdieu’s

[...] commitment to collective research never faltered, and he supported it through the training of researchers, through the priority he gave to the mutual monitoring of work and to discussion, and through the creation of a community of intellectuals. (Lenoir, 2006: 25-6)

For Lenoir, it was Bourdieu’s style of research management that inculcated a common commitment to a distinctive methodology. As Lenoir elaborated:

According to Bourdieu, the ‘collective intellectual’ resembles the sports team in terms of the spirit that drives it (in this case the ‘scientific spirit’, in the sense that Bachelard used the term), the collectivist attitudes implied by its activity, and the form of apprenticeship involved – constant, intensive and regular training. The combination of these elements gives rise to gestures and syntheses which are constantly,
incessantly repeated to the point where they become a *habitus* (what Bourdieu called the *scientific habitus*); [...] (Lenoir, 2006: 26)

As a relatively late arrival in the CSE, it was this ethos of the research centre that Lenoir acquired or absorbed. He had not participated in the constitution of this ethos on the basis of a shared social origin but had accepted it as he witnessed its effects in research practice.

Delsaut was, retrospectively, sceptical about the collectivity of the group. She felt that it was inadequate or imprecise to describe the Centre as a collective. It was

 [...] a collective, undoubtedly, but with one very visibly instituted key attraction.4

(Delsaut and Rivière, eds., 2002: 187)

Bourdieu was the dominant point of reference, always the *primus inter pares*. She was ambivalent about the consequences. On the one hand she acknowledged that the group gave her confidence that she would not otherwise have possessed, but there was also a sense in which the ethos of mutual support became, in Bourdieu’s terminology, a form of ‘censure’ preventing members from breaking rank and fully expressing their individualities. For Delsaut, this was an emotional censure. By contrast, Lenoir makes no reference to any downside associated with Bourdieu’s style of management. For Lenoir, adherence to Bourdieu’s scientific habitus was primarily the strategy of a professional sociologist in spite of the fact that Bourdieu’s philosophy of social science specifically entailed the operationalising of an epistemological break which would disclose primary experience by subjecting scientific objectification to scrutiny.

We can suggest that Delsaut and Lenoir almost represented ‘ideal-types’ of ‘first’ and ‘second’ generation individuals in relation to the developing collective identity of CSE. The purpose of this paper is to seek to place Boltanski and his early work within this framework. There are some necessary methodological caveats in relation to this exercise. Firstly, space in this article and some inaccessibility of texts both ensure that the analysis offered is selective rather than comprehensive. Secondly, I need to make it clear that my analyses are entirely dependent on my reading of texts and are not informed by any other anecdotal evidence which, in recollection, might still be offered by participants. Thirdly, I deliberately attempt to avoid *ex post facto* interpretation, seeking to understand mutual influence between Bourdieu and Boltanski as it seemed to develop rather than as it might now be seen through the lens of Boltanski’s later work and, in particular, the critique of Bourdieu offered in *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (Boltanski and Chiapello, (2005 [1999: 549-50]). My selected focus is a consequence of my contention, generally accepted, that there was a crucial change in Bourdieu’s thinking at about 1972 as he allowed himself to explore fully the implications of the ‘post-structuralist’ position which had been dormant throughout the 1960s. Without seeking to assess the balance of dominant and dominated between the thinking of Bourdieu and Boltanski, I try to add a new perspective on this change by examining the likely effects of Boltanski’s independent work. I suggest that the balance which Bourdieu tried to achieve in his “The Three Forms of Theoretical Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1973), extracted in translation from *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique* [outline of a theory of practice] (Bourdieu, 1972),
between the acquis of structuralism and ethnomethodology can be better understood in comparison with Boltanski’s different attempt to resolve the problems associated with analysis of everyday experience.

1960-65.

We know the circumstances of the beginning of Boltanski’s association with Bourdieu from Boltanski’s own footnote in Rendre la réalité inacceptable [making reality unacceptable] (Boltanski, 2008). He writes:

It was through the medium of my elder brother, Jean Elie, who was a friend of Pierre Bourdieu whom he had met in Algiers at the time of his military service, that from the beginning of my studies at the Sorbonne I had had the opportunity to establish relations which were more close than is normally the case between students and professors with this new ‘assistant’, recently returned from Algeria.² (Boltanski, 2008: 180)

The salient points here are, firstly, that Luc Boltanski’s introduction to Bourdieu was initially social, or the consequence of a social network. At the same time, that introduction came while Boltanski was pursuing his studies in sociology at the Sorbonne. He was, in other words, at a mid-point between the two ‘ideal-types’ – affectively involved in the CSE but also belonging to a new cohort of professionally qualified sociologists.

Boltanski was quickly involved in the work of CSE. The 1st edition of Un Art Moyen [a middle-brow art] (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel & Chamboredon, 1965) offered, in an appendix, a year-by-year chronology of the research which had been used in the writing of the book, starting with a seminar on ‘the image in industrial society’ in the academic year 1961/2, under the direction of Raymond Aron. The research undertaken in 1962/3 included an ‘enquiry on press photography’ undertaken by Boltanski, the report of which was published in the book as Chapter II of Part II, with the title: ‘La Rhétorique de la figure. Image de presse et photographie’ [figurative rhetoric. Press images and photography]. The research undertaken in 1963/4 included an ‘enquiry on a sample of 150 professional photographers’ undertaken collaboratively by Boltanski and Chamboredon, which was published in the book as Chapter V of Part II with the title: ‘Hommes de métier ou hommes de qualité: les photographes professionnels’ [tradesmen or men of quality: professional photographers]. Other enquiries for that year included one undertaken by Boltanski alone on ‘two photography schools’, and two in collaboration with others: on the suppliers of photographic film, with Chamboredon, and on the legislation on photography, with Jacques de Félice. These were not directly presented in Un Art Moyen (although findings from Boltanski’s work on photographic schools were incorporated into ‘Hommes de métier ou hommes de qualité’). While these photographic enquiries were taking place, Bourdieu, Boltanski, and Chamboredon produced a CSE working paper on La banque et sa clientèle, éléments d’une sociologie du crédit [banks and their clients: elements of a sociology of credit] (Bourdieu, Boltanski, and Chamboredon, 1963). During these same years (1960-4), Bourdieu was seeing through the press the major texts presenting his research in Algeria⁷;
publishing articles arising from that research, undertaking his research on celibacy and the peasant condition in his own Béarn and publishing findings from it in both *Les temps modernes* and *Etudes rurales*; and, finally, co-ordinating, with Jean-Claude Passeron, all the research enquiries on student culture at Lille and other French universities which were summarised and analysed for an internal CSE paper as *Les étudiants et leurs études* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964a), and revised for publication as *Les héritiers* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964b, 1979), both in 1964. Additionally, work with which Boltanski does not appear to have been associated was commencing in the Spring of 1964 on surveys of museums and art galleries. This work was represented in Bourdieu’s ‘Les musées et leurs publics’ in December (Bourdieu, 1964c) and the outcome of the team projects was published in 1966 as *L’Amour de l’art* (Bourdieu, Darbel, and Schnapper, 1966).

Within the collection of projects undertaken in relation to photography in CSE between 1961 and 1964, Bourdieu was responsible, in 1961-2, with his wife, Marie-Claire, for an enquiry into ‘photography in a rural milieu’ (which was that of his native Béarn), and, in 1962-3, for an enquiry which took place in parallel in Paris and Lille on ‘opinions and attitudes in relation to photography’ which was also related to a survey, with a sample of 692 subjects, undertaken in Paris, Lille and a ‘small provincial village’ on ‘photographic practice and attitudes in relation to photography’. These clearly coincided both with Bourdieu’s work for ‘Célibat et condition paysanne’ [celibacy and the peasant condition] (Bourdieu, 1962d), and for ‘Les étudiants et leurs études’ [students and their studies] (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a).

We also now know, of course, from the posthumously published *Images d’Algérie* [images of Algeria] (Bourdieu, 2003) that Bourdieu had himself been an enthusiastic photographer, such that his researches into practice were reflexive – something which had not been obvious from the few ‘illustrative’ photographs included in *Travail et travailleurs en algérie* [work and workers in Algeria] (Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet and Seibel, 1963) and in ‘Célibat et condition paysanne’ (Bourdieu, 1962d).

*Un Art Moyen* was published in March, 1965. In his introduction, Bourdieu discussed some of the themes which gave coherence to the different projects in train in CSE and to the development of his thinking in relation to them. It has to be remembered that there is an ambivalence whether this represents an *a priori* mapping of the field of research or a *post hoc* summation of generalised findings. There were two inter-related issues. In general, Bourdieu was anxious to explore the nature of the relationship between subjective experience – the accounts of their experiences given by people in everyday life – and objective analysis – the accounts given by sociologists of those experiences. This general, methodological problem was highlighted by the attempt to analyse sociologically the practice of photography because sociological discourse tended to operate with an imposed stratification of research objects. Bourdieu insisted that in every society throughout history there has existed a ‘hierarchy of legitimate objects of study’ which has involved the exclusion, ‘under the guise of objectivity’ (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 1) of some modes of experience. Research on photographic practice was, therefore, an attempt to advance the study of hitherto unconsecrated objects. It constituted an attempt to retrieve
everyday practice but, importantly, this did not involve forfeiting an understanding of the objective framework within which subjective actions occur. Research on photographic practice was to be a case-study of the immanent effects of indigenous objectivity as opposed to one seeking to extract extraneous or endogenous objective meanings. There is continuity from Bourdieu’s writing up (in *Travail et travailleurs en algérie*, Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet, and Seibel, 1963) of his Algerian researches where he struggled to sustain a dialectic between the ‘spontaneous sociology’ of interviewees and the structuralist interpretations of experience offered by anthropologists, as well as from his own account of his native Béarn where he experimented with the implications of his research performance as professional objectiviser of his personal experience (Bourdieu, 1962d). As Bourdieu put it succinctly:

> [...] the description of objectified subjectivity refers to the description of the internalization of objectivity. (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 4)

As a new social phenomenon, photographic practice appeared to be uncontaminated by the legacy of consecrated rules of art. Technology had appeared to provide an instrument for the production of naive experience. As Bourdieu put it:

> Nothing is more directly opposed to the ordinary image of artistic creation than the activity of the amateur photographer. [...],

As such, therefore, it was amenable to analysis without the traditional accretions of aesthetic judgement associated with other forms of creative activity, and yet, he continued,

> [...] even when the production of the picture is entirely delivered over to the automatism of the camera, the taking of the picture is still a choice involving aesthetic and ethical values: [...] (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 5-6)

That which suggests itself as really photographable’ is a function of pre-existing group or class constraints, with the result that photographic practice has to be understood in relation to social dispositions. In spite of the irrelevance or non-existence of traditional categories of objective, scientific analysis, the assertion is that inherited structures of objectivity are unavoidably embodied in the most commonplace practices. Bourdieu was seeking simultaneously to oppose intuitive, narrative spontaneity on the one hand and abstracted, detached objectivism on the other. Within this general approach, the contributions to *Un Art Moyen* were intended to be explorations of the phenomena of photographic practice, conducted without predispositions.

Although he was critical of Durkheim’s attempt to ‘treat social facts as things’ on the grounds that this identified the pursuit of ‘science’ with objectivism, Bourdieu nevertheless operated with a substantive disposition which tended to analyse the social function of photographic practice in a way which was analogous with Durkheim’s analysis of religious practice. Part I of *Un Art Moyen* is dominated by Bourdieu’s personal concerns and his attempt to integrate analysis of photographic practice with his consideration of the transition from rural to urban
society and from traditional to modern culture which he had explored, within the discourse of social anthropology, in respect of Algeria and the Béarn. Chapter 1 – ‘The Cult of Unity and Cultivated Differences’ - offers an interpretation of the findings of his two photographic enquiries, and these findings are given primacy in that the text carries an appendix which provides a summary of the data from his Paris/Lille project and the content of the questionnaire deployed (not reproduced in the English translation) whereas the research apparatus and statistics from the other projects are not provided. In Chapter 2 – ‘The Social Definition of Photography’ – Bourdieu again draws heavily on his field work in Algeria/Béarn to rehearse the critique of Kantian aesthetics which he was to articulate further in *La Distinction* ([distinction](#)) (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]), contending that the appreciation of photographs of ‘working-class’ people ‘refers to a system of norms whose principle is always ethical’ (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 86). It is only in the short introduction to Part II that Bourdieu tries to fit the findings of the other teams of researchers into a meaningful whole. The ‘great mass of users of photography’ ‘realize the social function of photography in their behaviour without perceiving it as such’ (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 101). In other words, social scientists understand causes and effects in social actions of which agents are unaware as much in respect of photographic practice as in respect of the pedagogical process analysed in “Les étudiants et leurs études” – later to be labelled ‘méconnaissance’. However, there are those who ‘either by choice or by professional obligation, cease to give it this immediate and unquestioned attachment.’ (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 101). These are the people whose attitudes and motives are recorded in Part II of *Un Art Moyen*. By implication, these are the people who distort traditional, inter-personal values and introduce artificial distinctions. There are collective norms which shape the primary attitudes of ordinary people, but these are different from the socially constructed norms by which ‘professionals’ reinforce a separation from primary experience in the interest of acquiring social privilege. ‘Professional’ photographers are instruments of the disenchantment of the Durkheimian collective consciousness.

In spite of his denial of predisposition, it was precisely in terms of this Durkheimian prejudice that Bourdieu framed the reports on the other enquiries which were to be presented in Part II. After expressing his own position, Bourdieu continued:

Consequently these studies primarily have the function of verification, because, if the foregoing analyses are true, the social function of photography is precisely the reality with which the various groups are struggling, and which resists their onslaughts just as much as they seek to force it. (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 101)

Bourdieu even proceeded to make it clear that the findings of the enquiries were pre-appropriated by his interpretation such that it was always a question of verification rather than possible falsification:

But the meaning of this confrontation could not have been understood if we had not grasped the concrete form which it assumes in each individual situation and the
functions which it takes on for each of the groups involved. (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 101)

And this comment received a footnote in which Bourdieu argued that each enquiry into different professional groups ‘necessitated a different mode of composition’ and different authorial orientations but that

Nevertheless, each of the concrete studies must be understood with reference to the others, inasmuch as it describes a specific response to a common problem. (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1990: 101)

Part II of *Un Art Moyen* contained a chapter by Robert Castel and Dominique Schnapper which manifestly reinforced Bourdieu’s position; a chapter by Jean-Claude Chamboredon which explored the social origins of aesthetic ambition in respect of photographic practice; a chapter by Gérard Lagneau on the characteristics of advertising photography; the single-authored chapter by Boltanski (‘La rhétorique de la figure’); and the chapter co-authored by Boltanski and Jean-Claude Chamboredon (‘Professional Men or Men of Quality: Professional Photographers’) which examined the relationship between professional ethos and individual disposition in relation to photographic practice. Finally, there was a conclusion to the whole book, written by Robert Castel in which, drawing upon Freud’s differentiation between ‘phantasy’ and ‘fantasy’, he reflected on the nature of sociological analysis of photographic practice understood as a psycho-pathological phenomenon.

Boltanski’s single-authored contribution to *Un Art Moyen* seems to have derived its emphasis from the contemporaneous semiological studies of photography undertaken by Roland Barthes. ‘La rhétorique de la figure’ presents the findings of interviews undertaken with photo-journalists employed by *France-Soir* (a daily) and *Paris-Match* (a weekly). It considers the implications for photographic production of the need in a daily newspaper to represent immediate events and, in a weekly magazine, to offer ‘stories’ less constrained by such direct correspondence. There are some photographic representations of reality which have to be suppressed on moral grounds by the representational dailies, but the ‘photographe de presse doit retenir tout ce que son journal (et la bienséance) l’autorisent à traiter’ [press photographer must retain everything that his newspaper (and decency) authorise him to treat.] (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1965: 174) The censure which is exercised derives from the mode of communication, as differently instituted in dailies and weeklies with their different styles consequent upon their different social functions. The censure is not exercised directly by the social positions or aspirations of photographers as individuals. In his theoretical discussion, Boltanski refers the reader to Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ which had been re-published in French in 1959, but the main influence on the article was clearly Roland Barthes. The photographs of *Paris-Match* operate through ‘connotation’ more than representation and Boltanski quotes Barthes’s definition of ‘connotation’ as advanced in his ‘Esquisse d’une terminologie de base’[outline of a basic terminology]. Boltanski notes that this was a paper which had been distributed as a photocopy in the seminar given by Barthes in 1962-3 in the VIth section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études (which was to become the Ecole des
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales). The clear impression is that Boltanski had attended these seminars in which Barthes explored issues which he was to publish as *Éléments de Sémiologie* [Elements of Semiology] in 1964 (Barthes, 1967 [1964]). Boltanski deploys Barthes’s terminology, but he is not convinced of its legitimacy in respect of press photography. He explores the possibility that the photography of the dailies might be realist whilst that of the weeklies might be ‘symbolic’ and concludes that it is a vain endeavour


Boltanski differs from Barthes in insisting that the code of photographic communication is not intrinsic or autonomous but, rather, is the consequence of constructive activity whereby photographers, like writers, harness elliptical meanings which are shared in local communities. Boltanski derives the idea of such ‘ellipsis’ from Sartre’s *Qu’est-ce que la littérature?* [what is literature?] and he refutes Barthes’s suggestion, made in his ‘Le message photographique’ (Barthes, 1961), that the objects of photography are ‘[...] the elements of a really stable lexicon such that they can easily be constituted as a syntax’13(Barthes, 1961 quoted in Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1965: 187). Although Boltanski was clearly interested in Barthes’s semiological work, ‘La rhétorique de la figure’ suggests that he wanted to understand sociologically how ‘codes’ function and was not satisfied with the abstract study of these codes without reference to the social dimension of their operation. Semiological analysis, perhaps, was appreciated in so far as it could help to explain how social groups consolidate themselves, but not as a study of signs. We know that Bourdieu had lectured on Kant and de Saussure at the University of Algiers in 1958-60 and also that, in the introduction to *Ce que parler veut dire* [what talking means](Bourdieu, 1982), he admitted to having once written a piece on de Saussure that he then disowned. The transition from *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique* [outline of a theory of practice] (Bourdieu, 1972) to *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977) is partly demonstrated in a revised attitude towards de Saussure. Bourdieu certainly regarded the Saussurean separation of *langue* from *parole* as indicative of a typically structuralist assumption that agency operates by reference to a regulatory framework which can be separately and objectively analysed in independence from the strategic deployment of words in everyday verbal practice. Bourdieu was to develop his theory of strategic social action, as distinct from rule-dominated behaviour, in *Esquisse*, by analogy with Saussurean linguistic theory. By contrast, Boltanski seems to have been inclined to regard language as the *medium* which pragmatically constitutes and consolidates social structures. ‘La rhétorique de la figure’ does not analyse the products of press photographers in direct correlation with their social conditions or social position-taking. It analyses their products in relation to the socially constructed codes of their specific professional contexts. These codes constitute the rules governing their practice with which they concur or which they are constrained to obey. These rules are constituted by their ‘patrons’. The ‘codes’ constructed by the socially dominant patrons are not universal in a Barthean sense. They mediate the production of press photographers such that it is not possible, however, to suggest the kind of direct correlation
between photographic practice and social condition that Bourdieu was seeking to establish. Boltanski’s conclusion offers a hint that he was already not unaware that his situation as an aspiring professional sociologist was analogous to that of press photographers. Given that Boltanski refers retrospectively to Bourdieu as his ‘patron’ (Boltanski, 2008, 15) and offers an extended footnote in defence of the designation (Boltanski, 2008: 179), the concluding paragraph of ‘La rhétorique de la figure’ has, perhaps, a self-regarding dimension. Boltanski cites respondents who mention that their practice is determined by the will of their patron. He does not take this to refer to the domination of persons, however, but suggests that the ‘patron’ is a convenient way of personifying the origins of group norms within the profession. The internal negotiation of norms feeds into a larger negotiation by which newspapers construct the functional definition of reality for their time. As Boltanski expresses it:

But it is only within the particular journal as a group context that the necessity to produce standardised and coherent formats imposes the uniformity of those norms which then can be grasped as a system. These multiple, professional groups in the end find unity in the common obligation to comply with social norms and, in conformity with these norms, to construct contributory meanings from the expectations of the public which consumes them and which, through them, learns to consume the current reality.¹⁴ (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, Chamboredon, and Schnapper, 1965: 198)

Bourdieu was seeking, in Un Art Moyen, to establish that the social position-taking of photographic professionals inhibited the possibility that the democratisation of image-making secured by a new technological apparatus might actualise a greater degree of egalitarian social solidarity. By contrast, Boltanski’s work suggested that the norms constructed by professionals mediated between the poles of individualism and collectivity posited, somewhat metaphysically, by Durkheim in his ‘Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives’ [individual and collective representations] (1898, in Durkheim, 1924). Boltanski suggested that the normative structuration was achieved immanently within observed social behaviours, using networks of semiotic signification which were to be analysed functionally rather than as autonomous systems.

1965-70.

The second edition of Un Art Moyen was published in 1970. It excluded the single-authored contributions to Part II of Lagneau and Boltanski as well as Castel’s conclusion. This exclusion may simply have been to render the argument of the book more coherent and consistent, but the effect was to suppress the element of dissent from the dominant, Bourdieusian interpretation. As well as publishing the first edition of L’amour de l’art, les musées d’art et leur public [The Love of Art] in 1966 (Bourdieu, Darbel, and Schnapper, 1966), and its second edition, augmented to encompass European institutions, in 1969
(Bourdieu, Darbel, & Schnapper, 1990 [1969]), Bourdieu had, in the interim, been focusing on the problems of structuralism and, more generally, the epistemological problems of social science. With Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron, he published, in 1968, *Le métier de sociologue* [the craft of sociologists] (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1968) which tried to offer a blueprint for a reflexive methodology which would secure scientific validity for sociological explanation by deploying procedures outlined by Gaston Bachelard. The construction of a science of social behaviour involves the deliberate detachment of ‘facts’ from their everyday contexts and, equally, the deliberate consolidation of a differentiated discourse within which these ‘facts’ could be discussed and, finally, confirmed within a self-referencing epistemic community. Additionally, Bourdieu and Passeron produced their summation of CSE’s educational research of the 1960s, published as *La reproduction. Éléments pour une théorie du système d’enseignement* [reproduction. Elements for a theory of the system of education] (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970), in which they tried to offer a systematic framework for understanding the continuous contingency of pedagogic practice. Bourdieu wrote several important articles in this period. Each of these can be seen to be indications of his struggle to disown ‘structuralism’ without forfeiting what he took to be the benefits of its achievements. ‘Condition de classe et position de classe’ [class condition and class position] (Bourdieu, 1966a) articulated the view that class differentiations are immanently constructed by agents and are constructed differently in different social contexts, in opposition to the assumed practice of structuralists seeking to extrapolate universal and uniform modes of behaviour from situationally diverse phenomena. In ‘Champ intellectuel et projet créateur’ [intellectual field and creative project] (Bourdieu, 1971 [1966a]), Bourdieu insisted that historical intellectual production is to be understood as a process in which creators constructed the ‘fields’ within which their works were produced and consumed. The task is to understand that process of immanent construction, but he was aware that undertaking that task in the present is itself, comparably, an immanent construction. He sought a refuge from the symbolic violence of anachronistic readings of the past by implying, in as yet undeveloped form, that the academic gaze has to be situated. At the same time, however, Bourdieu recognized the benefits of structuralism. In ‘Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge’ (Bourdieu, 1968), he began by celebrating the fact that structuralist research had introduced analytical rigour by analogy with the mathematized natural sciences. This had countered the incipiently narcissistic affectivity or intuitionism of what, in *Travail et travailleurs en algérie*, he had somewhat derogatorily called ‘spontaneous sociology’.

During the period of production of the first edition of *Un Art Moyen*, Boltanski appears to have been assigned a task which arose fortuitously as the result of an approach to CSE made by three Swiss researchers. They had prepared for the Swiss National Exhibition of 1964 an account of Swiss society which aimed to represent its daily life and to enable Switzerland to reveal itself to itself. They did not have the leisure to develop their research further and they asked for the assistance of CSE in writing up their findings. Bourdieu would have welcomed the opportunity because it pursued further in relation to an European state the line of enquiry which he had opened up in his Algerian fieldwork in reflecting on the process of emergent state self-definition there after the demise of the identity imposed by French colonialism.
Boltanski seems to have relished the opportunity to approach the problem in his own way. The outcome was *Le bonheur suisse* [Swiss well-being](Boltanski, 1966). Boltanski shows himself to be well aware of the methodological difficulty of avoiding stimulating responses from informants whereby they represent the ways in which they want to be represented ‘scientifically’ by detached observers, but there was a more specific issue which concerned Boltanski. He expresses as a question the possibility that the industrial development of western European countries might have had the consequence of toning down ‘the differences between nations and of developing, within each nation, the differences between social groups and social classes’ (Boltanski, 1966, 16). The characteristic perception which followed is important. Boltanski commented that

> The necessity of living and surviving in an universe dominated by the rules and values of the economy makes adherence to these norms and values obligatory to the detriment of national or regional differences. (Boltanski, 1966: 16)

The consequence was that Boltanski set himself the task of analysing the ‘social definition of the Swiss’ rather than ‘Swiss national character’. This would avoid any essentialist definition of Swiss identity and allow for an analysis of the ways in which the trans-national norms of capitalism were inter-acting with the self-perceptions of the Swiss which were still maintained in terms of a ‘national’ identity. The approach, in other words, was consistent with the inclination shown in ‘La rhétorique de la figure’ to take the immanent interaction of capitalist and traditional norms and values as the object of study rather than to proceed from an *a priori* (Bourdieusian) judgement which seemed to assume that emergent norms necessarily betray primary experience.

In spite of the differences between Bourdieu and Boltanski which, perhaps, were registered in the removal of ‘La rhétorique de la figure’ from the second edition of *Un Art Moyen*, there was no public indication of disagreement in the second half of the decade. Boltanski was part of a team which presented the findings of CSE research at a colloquium in Caen in November, 1965, devoted to educational reform, entitled ‘Une étude sociologique d’actualité: les étudiants en sciences’ [a contemporary sociological study: science students], published in 1966 (Bourdieu, Boltanski, Lemaire and de Saint Martin, 1966). The reported research clearly pursued the enquiries which had led to the publication of *Les Héritiers* [the inheritors] in 1964 (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964b). Whereas in that text Bourdieu and Passeron had analysed the nature of student choice and performance in respect of the study of Sociology and Philosophy – a clandestinely self-regarding analysis – the new research reported on ‘foundation year’ and ‘first year’ science students. ‘Une étude sociologique d’actualité’ argues that the open selection in science subjects relative to those in the Humanities is, however, not what it seems. It amounts to a ‘false democratisation’ in that it reflects docility rather than choice. These research findings confirm those of *Les Héritiers* because the argument is that working-class students ‘opt for’ the apparent cultural neutrality of the sciences precisely because they feel excluded from the prevailing culture in the Humanities. The article also suggested that the attitudes adopted by professors towards different
categories of student helped to construct and consolidate the hierarchy of expectations displayed by the student responses.

The concentrations on science students and on institutionalised discrimination in this research presentation do not match exactly Bourdieu’s prime concerns, but they were aspects which Boltanski pursued. He undertook research on child-rearing in two locations - in a town in Picardy and in the Parisian suburb of St.Denis – in 1967. This was published in 1969 as *Prime education et morale de classe* [early years education and class morality] (Boltanski, 1969b)\(^ {17}\). Boltanski acknowledges that the work was directed by Pierre Bourdieu and that it was part of a larger project under his direction within CSE

on the attitudes of members of different social classes in respect of medicine and, more generally, in relation to the body.\(^ {18}\) (Boltanski, 1969b: 16)

We too readily forget that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus was linked to that of hexis. Probably derived from Merleau-Ponty’s *La structure du comportement* [the structure of behaviour] (Merleau-Ponty, (1965 [1942]), Bourdieu considered mental and physical adaptation as inseparable. There is no reason to doubt Bourdieu’s commitment to this project, but it was not often manifested in his publications. By contrast, Boltanski here advances a shared position in his own particular fashion. Referring to the period at the end of the 19th Century, he suggests that the attempt to control the child-rearing practices of mothers was ‘part of a much larger enterprise aimed at a specific goal’ which was ‘to regulate private life’ and which claimed to ‘substitute ‘obligatory manners of behaving’ for ‘habitual” ones’\(^ {19}\) (Boltanski, 1969b: summary of Chapter 1). This substitution, attempted by the medical profession, mirrored the general substitution proposed by Durkheim of a rationally secured organic solidarity in place of the mechanical solidarity obtaining in traditional societies. It was conceived to be the role of the secular educational system to enforce this substitution. Referring back to the article which he had written with Bourdieu and Chamboredon in 1963, Boltanski comments that

The relations between sick persons and doctors are not without analogy with those which specialists in a great lending bank entertain with their clients. Like the doctor, the credit specialist criticises at the same time “the ignorant client who knows nothing” and “the client who thinks he knows everything”.\(^ {20}\) (Boltanski, 1969b: 53, fn.2)

In other words, social domination is secured by an appropriation of analogous claims to superior knowledge across a range of professions. Boltanski devotes a section to an analysis of the language of medical literature, changing historically at around the time of the revolution achieved by Louis Pasteur, from advice to instruction. Recommending Raymond Williams’s analysis of ‘keywords’ in his *Culture and Society* (Williams, 1958), Boltanski suggests a comparable form of linguistic control in operation in the medical field:

The people are on the side of disorder, savagery, that is, simultaneously ... on the side of nature and instinct and on the side of tradition and habit.\(^ {21}\) (Boltanski, 1969b: 49, italics in original)
Boltanski’s thinking about medicine and the spuriously democratic openness of science education came together in *Prime éducation et morale de classe*, and, as in ‘La rhétorique de la figure’, the instrument of social oppression is thought to be the norms of professionals articulated in deliberately obfuscating language. This is not to say, however, that Boltanski wished to celebrate ‘popular thought’ or ‘popular knowledge’. This labelling, he argues in his conclusion, runs the risk of giving credence to the idea that in relation to medicine and, perhaps, also to culture generally, the lower classes possess

> [...] something intrinsic belonging only to them – independent techniques and knowledge which are different from those of the superior classes, [...]22 (Boltanski, 1969b: 135)

This would be to autonomize popular culture in a way which would be as misguided as the dominant cultural inclination to autonomize ‘high’ culture. In a way which anticipates a proper response to the critics of Bourdieu’s *Distinction*, Boltanski insists that, in a hierarchical society,

> the models of thought, and, *a fortiori* knowledge, always circulate from top to bottom but never, inversely, from bottom to top.23 (Boltanski, 1969b: 135, italics in original)

but this does not imply that, in mitigation, popular culture should be de-relativised and idealised. As he puts it:

> In effect, it is not open to us to suspend the question of the origin of popular beliefs, since all the elements which make up popular knowledge, even integrated into new forms, always retain something of the complete systems from which they have been derived. What is more, structural analysis which denies the study of the conscious relations which social subjects entertain with their beliefs, in the same way, risks missing the sole principle of cohesion, if not coherence, particular to ordinary language which resides entirely in the manner in which members of the popular classes perceive and deploy their knowledge.24 (Boltanski, 1969b: 137)

Importantly, Boltanski was articulating, against structuralism, his conviction that social science has to study the conscious relations of social subjects, especially as they are rendered conscious linguistically in relation to dominant discourses imposed by dominant institutions.

1970-72/3.

The ‘events’ of May, 1968 occurred, of course, between the field work for *Prime éducation et morale de classe* and its publication. Bourdieu had tried to set up a meeting of an Estates-General which, by analogy with the meeting prior to the French Revolution, would attempt to give a voice in the development of state policy to those currently excluded from it. A key question during the ‘events’ was whether the practice of academic social science might facilitate or inhibit populist social movements. Members of the CSE reacted differently to the failure of the student revolt. There was much agreement that detached, structuralist sociological research formally reinforced the conservatism of the academic profession. The problem, however, was to know how to avoid conceptual oppression while still retaining the
capacity to offer analyses of social phenomena which would qualify as ‘scientific’. Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron had already tried to offer the necessary epistemological preliminaries for winning, constructing, and confirming social scientific facts in *Le métier de sociologue* by suggesting that this process should occur within an epistemic community which was itself socially constructed and reflexive about its construction, but, in September, 1972, they wrote a preface to a second edition in which they resisted revising the text and announced that they would not produce the further volumes which had been intended. They were agreed in being afraid that such a venture might encourage ‘the canonization of the routinized precepts of a new methodology …’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991: x [1972]). I have argued recently that this, in fact, was precisely what Passeron thought that Bourdieu was about to do. Passeron proceeded to develop the position which he fully articulated in *Le raisonnement sociologique* [sociological reasoning] (Passeron, 1991) but which he first outlined in a doctoral thesis at the University of Nantes, entitled *Les mots de la sociologie* [the words of sociology] (Passeron, 1980). Sociological concepts are not a-historical. Established concepts have to be understood in relation to the situations which they sought to analyse. New concepts have to be developed in the light of this understanding and in relation to new situations. Passeron was interested in the words used by sociologists. Bourdieu chose to develop a methodology which has been labelled ‘post-structuralist’. He sought to overcome the shortcomings of structuralist detachment by arguing that subjecting social scientific objectivity to sociological scrutiny would release praxeological understanding – the understanding of primary experience as practice. I have suggested elsewhere that he was attempting to use this second order sociological analysis as a device equivalent to phenomenological reduction, as a heuristic mechanism for releasing pre-predicative experience in accordance with Husserlian eidetic reduction. He first provided a critique of some of his earlier, ‘structuralist’ analyses of Algerian society in *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique* (Bourdieu, 1972) and gradually developed an apologia for a post-structuralist methodology in the English version of the same text, published in 1977 as *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977). Bourdieu contended that not only do observed persons act strategically rather than in accordance with ‘rules’ separately constructed by scientific observers, but that scientific observers are themselves strategic agents. He had taken the path to a methodological individualism in which his science could only lay claim to being his personal objectification and no claim to a-personal objectivity. A sense of existential integrity had prevailed in which he could not fully renounce the intellectual gains he had acquired through structuralist research. The reflexivity which became his methodology had to accommodate his earlier structuralist formation. By contrast, Boltanski does not appear to have experienced the same kind of epistemological angst, linked as it was, for Bourdieu, with a fear or sense of guilt, that he had become or might become a transfuge, a betrayer of his class origins. Boltanski continued to work within the collective framework which Bourdieu had established, continuing to acknowledge the direction of his ‘patron’, but he did so with his own particular orientation. With Pascale Maldidier, he published, in 1969, ‘Carrière scientifique, morale scientifique et vulgarisation’ [scientific careers, scientific morality and popularisation] (Boltanski and Maldidier, 1969) which suggested that the attempts of scientists to popularise their knowledge could be seen as devices to consolidate a differentiation between professional and everyday knowledge.
Complementing *Prime education et morale de classe*, this text sustained Boltanski’s investigation of social domination in terms of imposed professional norms. ‘Taxinomies populaires, taxonomies savants: les objets de consommation et leur classement’ [popular and scientific taxonomies: classifying objects of consumption] (Boltanski, 1970) was a critique of some recent studies of food consumption. Boltanski indicated that these studies which sought to analyse ‘indigenous taxinomies’, showing the effects of ‘systems of naming and classification’ on the perceptions of ordinary people, often failed to reflect on ‘the nomenclatures’ used in their enquiries. (Boltanski, 1970: 34). The mention of ‘naming’ and ‘nomenclature’ is significant. Boltanski’s conclusion amounts to a version of the need for an ‘epistemological break’ which Bourdieu was proposing, but there are nuances of difference:

Sociology which, in studying them, gives a theoretical and explicit form to systems which social agents produce and manipulate implicitly, ought however to require vigilance of its practitioners and force them to submit to the same rigorous analysis the taxonomies which they use and routinise by sometimes exempting themselves from providing a theory or working out its critique.27 (Boltanski, 1970: 44)

The use of ‘vigilance’ is reminiscent of the epistemological vigilance recommended in *Le métier de sociologue*, but this is presented as a requirement for ‘sociology’ in abstract, rather than as a necessary reflexive task for every sociological practitioner. It is a requirement for the profession, rather than, as it was becoming for Bourdieu, an ethical duty for researchers as individuals and citizens.

Boltanski’s concern with the distinguishing effects of the language employed by professionals was pursued in respect of medicine in ‘Les usages sociaux du corps’ [the social uses of the body] (Boltanski, 1971), and, with Bourdieu and Maldidier, he articulated further the comments on the conservatism of professional academics which had been made in ‘Une étude sociologique d’actualité’ in 1966, in an article confusingly entitled: ‘La défense du corps’ [the defence of the corps].28

**Beyond 1972/3.**

The publications of 1973 intimated new research directions within CSE, perhaps reflecting the end of the collaboration between Bourdieu and Passeron. Boltanski’s analysis of the multiple position-taking of professors in the Institut d’Études Politiques, Paris – published as ‘L’espace positionnel. Multiplicité des positions institutionnelles et habitus de classe’ [positional space. The multiplicity of institutional positions and class habitus] (Boltanski, 1973) was explicitly located in the context of a collection of projects, directed by Bourdieu, to examine the production and reproduction of ‘dominant ideologies’ in society. Boltanski focused, again, on the influence of professional norms, but the investigation of multiplicity coincided with the work in progress on the French ‘patronat’ – the leaders of French industry – which Bourdieu was finally to publish within *La noblesse d’état* [state nobility] (Bourdieu, 1996 [1989]) but which generated key texts exploring the conversion of capital between fields, such as (with Bourdieu and Monique Saint Martin) ‘Les stratégies de reconversion. Les classes sociales et le système d’enseignement’ [reconversion strategies. Social classes
and the educational system] (Bourdieu, Boltanski and Saint Martin, 1973) and (with Bourdieu) ‘Le titre et le poste.  Rapports entre le système de production et le système de reproduction’ [titles and jobs.  The relations between the systems of production and reproduction] (Bourdieu and Boltanski).  If there had been any sense that Boltanski’s aim to represent everyday experience meant that he was espousing ethnomethodology, readers were vigorously disabused in ‘Erving Goffman et le temps du soupçon’ [Erving Goffman and the time of suspicion] (Boltanski, 1973).  According to Yves Winkin (Winkin, 1983), this had been intended as an introduction to the French translations of Goffman’s *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* and *Relations in Public* together as *La Mise en scène de la vie quotidienne*, [the presentation of everyday life] (Goffman, 1973) in 1973, but was ‘ultimately considered too critical for inclusion’ (Winkin, 1983: 110).  It is the exact nature of the criticism, most forcibly presented in an extensive appendix, which is important.  Boltanski’s view is that, confronted with the same problem as the ethnologist of traditional societies which, in words he quotes from Bateson, is how to ‘restore the experience of agents who live it and for whom it appears “natural”’ (Bateson, 9-10, quoted in Boltanski, 1973: 146), Goffman

chooses to borrow from the indigenous language of the groups and classes which he is analysing, their categories of thought and words and, by systematic and controlled redeployment, makes quasi-conceptual use of them [...]29(Boltanski, 1973: 146)

Behind Goffman’s apparent ethnomethodology, in other words, Boltanski finds a covert set of structural binary linguistic oppositions which are disguised by the appropriation of indigenous terminologies.

It was in relation to the use of language that Boltanski sought to expose the tensions between everyday experience and scientific observation.  When the collaboration between Bourdieu and Boltanski appears to have been at its height in 1975 when Boltanski was a prime assistant in launching the *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, it was the co-authored ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ [the production of the dominant ideology] (Bourdieu and Boltanski, 1975) which, for Boltanski, pursued the insights of both ‘L’espace positionnel’ and his critique of Goffman, and, for Bourdieu, provided a way into a critique of Heidegger’s ontology (Bourdieu, 1975) which, perhaps, can also be seen as his reflection on the legitimacy of his own ontological post-structuralism.

The intellectual tension which had been so creatively fruitful clearly could not be sustained.  There is a valedictory flavour to Boltanski’s reference to Bourdieu at the end of his foreword to *Les cadres* [elites], published in 1982:

Finally it seems somewhat strange to say what goes without saying in thanking Pierre Bourdieu here, so many years of collaboration with him having left their mark on this work.  May he simply, in the hundreds of pages which follow, find a sort of homage in action or, to borrow a concept from him once again, a homage as *practice.*30 (Boltanski, 1987 [1982: 11, italics in original])
Conclusion.

In a chapter of her book on *Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics after Anti-humanism*, entitled ‘Negativity, Agency, and the Return to Ontology’, Diana Coole concluded that

[...] a key element of phenomenological investigation is that it must interrogate the presuppositions that underpin any account of politics. No matter how apparently empirical or banal, every account makes assumptions about the nature of being, and one of the tasks of critical theory is to elicit and scrutinize these inasmuch as they support ideological claims and political judgments or explanations. (Coole, 2007: 159)

I contend that Bourdieu pursued the route developed by Merleau-Ponty from his reading of Husserl through towards phenomenologically reflexive political engagement.

In a section of his *Phenomenological Sociology. Insight and Experience in Modern Society* devoted to ‘Alfred Schutz and the domestication of phenomenology’, Harvie Ferguson commented that

Schutz’s primary interest, [...], was firmly rooted in the natural attitude, with the reality that appeared to us as something simply ‘there’. Transcendental phenomenology, he claimed, was misdirected and superfluous. It was not that the philosophical problem of consciousness, rooted in the Cartesian *cogito* was to be solved sociologically; rather, that problem simply did not arise within a sociological framework. (Ferguson, 2006: 92, italics in original)

Boltanski absorbed the collective ethos of CSE for almost twenty years, but, in the last analysis, his individual difference had to emerge from under the canopy provided by his patron. He was in the situation vis-à-vis Bourdieu that Ferguson describes in respect of Schutz and Husserl. A judgement between Bourdieu and Boltanski is linked to the question of the durability of phenomenology and to the question of the future potential of political commitment of the kind which Coole attributes to Merleau-Ponty.
Quand je travaillais avec vous, il y avait de vrais liens de projection entre les gens. Je me rappelle d’une époque, au Centre, on était tous jeunes (vous-même vous n’étiez pas beaucoup plus âgé que nous, vous étiez juste notre aîné), tous les garçons avaient plus ou moins un petit quelque chose d’accent du sud-ouest, comme vous, pour parler sociologie ; c’était marrant.

Eh bien oui, c’est comme ça, un collectif […] il nous était plus ou moins commun et que c’est sans doute ce qui nous avait rapprochés (je pense aux affinités d’habitus).

[…] un collectif, sans doute, mais avec un point d’attraction très visiblement institué.

C’est par l’intermédiaire de mon frère aîné, Jean-Elie, qui était un ami de Pierre Bourdieu, dont il avait fait la connaissance lors de son service militaire à Alger, que, dès le début de mes études de sociologie à la Sorbonne, j’avais eu la chance d’établir, avec ce nouvel ‘assistant’ récemment revenu d’Algérie, des relations plus proches que ne le sont habituellement celles d’un élève avec son professeur.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to trace a copy of this paper.

Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet and Seibel, 1963, and Bourdieu and Sayad, 1964a.


Bourdieu, 1962c

Bourdieu, 1962d

In Benjamin, 1959.

de chercher à dresser un inventaire systématique de la symbolique utilisée dans Paris-Match, comme des rapports d’opposition et d’homologie que ces symboles pourraient entretenir les uns avec les autres.

les éléments d’un véritable lexique stable au point que l’on peut facilement les constituer en syntaxe

Mais c’est seulement à l’intérieur du journal particulier comme groupe que la nécessité de produire des réalisations standardisées et cohérentes impose l’uniformité de ces normes qui peuvent être saisies alors comme système. Ces groupements professionnels multiples trouveraient finalement leur unité dans l’obligation commune de se plier à des normes sociales et de fabriquer, conformément à ces normes, des significations tributaires des attentes du public qui les consomme et qui entend consommer à travers elles l’actualité de son temps.

les différences entre nations et de développer, à l’intérieur de chaque nation, les différences entre groupes sociaux et classes sociales

La nécessité de vivre et de survivre dans un univers dominé par les règles et les valeurs de l’économie rend obligatoire l’adhésion à ces normes et à ces valeurs, et cela au détriment des différences nationales ou régionales.

It seems likely that this text correlates with another text of the same year which I have not been able to retrieve – La découverte de la maladie (Boltanski, 1969a).

Sur les attitudes des membres des différentes classes sociales à l’égard de la médecine et, plus généralement, face au corps.

[…] la diffusion de la puériculture n’est, en effet, qu’un élément à l’intérieure d’une entreprise plus vaste, dirigée vers un but unique, régler la vie privée, et qui prétend substituer aux « manières d’agir habituelles » des « manières d’agir obligatoire »

Les relations du malade et du médecin ne sont pas sans analogie avec celles que les spécialistes d’une grande banque de prêt entretiennent avec leurs clients. Comme le médecin, le spécialiste du crédit critique tout à la fois « le client ignorant et qui ne sait rien » et « le client qui croit tout savoir »

Le peuple est au côté du désordre, de la sauvagerie, c’est-à-dire à la fois […]du côté de la nature, de l’instinct, et du côté de la tradition, de l’habitude. (italics in original)

[…] quelque chose en propre et qui n’appartiendrait qu’à elles, des techniques et des savoirs indépendants, différents de ceux des classes supérieures, […]

les modèles de pensée, et, a fortiori les savoirs, circulent toujours de haut en bas mais jamais, à l’inverse, de bas en haut (italics in original)

Il n’est pas permis, en effet, de laisser en suspens la question de l’origine des croyances populaires, puisque tous les éléments qui composent le savoir populaire, même intégrés en des arrangements nouveaux, conservent toujours quelque chose des systèmes complets dont ils ont été arrachés. Qui plus est, l’analyse structurale qui se refuse à l’étude des relations conscientes que les sujets sociaux entretiennent avec leurs croyances risque, par la
même, de laisser échapper le seul principe de cohésion, sinon de cohérence, propre aux vulgates et qui repose tout entier dans la manière dont les membres des classes populaires perçoivent et utilisent leur savoir.  
25 In my introduction to Passeron, 2013.
27 La sociologie qui, en les étudiant, donne une forme théorique et explicite aux systèmes que les agents sociaux produisent et manipulent implicitement, devrait pourtant porter ceux qui la pratiquent à la vigilance et les inciter à soumettre aux mêmes analyses rigoureuses les taxinomies qu’ils utilisent et routinisent en se dispensant parfois d’en fournir la théorie ou d’en opérer la critique.
28 Bourdieu used this article as Chapter 4 of Homo academicus (Bourdieu, 1984): ‘The Defence of the Corps and the Break in Equilibrium’. The changes of emphasis introduced by Bourdieu deserve close attention. I believe they tend to reinforce the argument I am making in this piece.
29 prend le parti d’emprunter au vocabulaire indigène des groupes et des classes sur lesquels porte objectivement ses analyses, les catégories de pensée et les mots dont, par un usage systématique et contrôlé, il fait une utilisation quasi conceptuelle […]
30 Il me semble enfin presque étrange de dire ce qui va sans dire en remerciant ici Pierre Bourdieu, tant les années de collaboration avec lui ont laissé leur marque sur ce travail. Qu’il trouve simplement, dans les quelques centaines de pages qui suivent, une sorte d’hommage en acte ou, pour lui emprunter, encore une fois, un concept, en pratique. (italics in original)

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