FORGIVENESS IN CONTEXT

I am ready to forgive, but I need to know who I have to forgive. If they would just speak up and acknowledge what they have done, they would be giving us the opportunity to forgive. It would be more noble if they were to do that. There will be reconciliation only if there is justice (Berryman 1993:800).

These words were spoken before the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, set up to investigate the human rights violations which occurred in Chile between 1973 and 1990. In pleading for "the opportunity to forgive" the speaker makes it clear that for her, forgiveness cannot be unilateral; rather it depends upon a quality of interaction between at least two parties. For this speaker, forgiveness and justice are not mutually exclusive, but rather are very closely aligned. The precise nature of the relationship between these two constructs has long been the subject of debate amongst scholars. Here, I shall argue that as justice does not exist as an abstract quality within the judge¹, but is obtained through interaction and confrontation between the judge and the judged, the process of forgiveness, too, is social and dynamic. Hannah Arendt (1958) argues that forgiveness extends beyond "a relationship established between me and myself" (p. 238). Is this because the forgiving of others only arises in social situations, that is to say in situations where the potentially offending or offended individual is in the company of others? Or alternatively, is forgiveness an essentially social phenomenon not merely because it potentially arises only in social situations, but because it requires two or more parties in order for it to be enacted?

In this article, we shall contrast two models of forgiveness: negotiated forgiveness and unilateral
forgiveness. The principles which underlie these models differ in important ways. In the former, forgiveness transpires through actual dialogue between the wrongdoer and the wronged. Here, the former identifies his or herself with the harming action and seeks forgiveness for it. At minimum, this entails three steps: 1) confession, 2) ownership and 3) repentance. First the wrongdoer must admit that he or she has committed the offending action. Second, s/he must take responsibility for the action, or "own" it, with all of its consequences, without providing excuses. Third, the offending party must express remorse for what they have done. (We will discuss each of these steps and their implications in more detail presently.) Many people who have suffered wrongs might be willing to forgive those who inflicted harm on them, if those people would admit their wrongdoing, take responsibility for it, and show contrition. In the absence of such steps, however, the wronged party might refuse to forgive, believing that the essential preconditions for such an act have not been met.

Unilateral forgiveness, in contrast, is a process which is contained entirely within one individual; it neither engages with nor is in any way dependent upon the position of the wrongdoer. It is, rather "an unconditional gift given to one who inflicted the hurt" (Enright 1994: 64). The story of Gordon Wilson, the father in Northern Ireland who forgave his daughter's killers as she lay dying in his arms, is illustrative of unilateral forgiveness, which has as its endpoint the substitution of agape for anger (Enright 1991: 146). In this article, we will examine the differences between negotiated and unilateral forgiveness, exploring the practical and moral implications of each.
Developmental Models of Forgiveness

While forgiveness is a subject about which most people think they know something, or about which they at least have strong implicit views, its attraction as an academic subject is relatively limited. Scholars who are most likely to be interested in this area come primarily from the disciplines of theology and philosophy (e.g., Downie 1965; Floristan and Duquoc 1986; Johnson 1987; Lang 1994; North 1987; Shriver 1995); rarely has it been the object of scrutiny for psychologists. One of the earliest exceptions to this was Jean Piaget, who, in his famous study on the world of children's morality (1932), briefly turned his attention to questions of forgiveness within a developmental context. Piaget contemplated the relationship between justice and forgiveness, which he regarded as cognitive developmental equivalents (Enright 1994:67). For Piaget, both constructs hinged on mutual respect, or reciprocity. While Piaget did not develop his ideas on this subject very extensively, he did help to establish the basic groundwork for the debate which remains into the present day.

More recently in the field of developmental psychology, few have researched the problem of forgiveness as extensively as Robert Enright and the Human Development Study Group at the University of Wisconsin. Enright and his graduate students have studied the problem of forgiveness over a number of years (Enright, Santos and Al-Mabuk 1989; Enright and the Human Development Study Group 1991; Enright, Gassin and Wu 1992; Enright and the Human Development Study Group 1994) proposing a cognitive developmental model of forgiveness which mirrors, but is distinct from, Kohlberg's moral cognitive developmental model of justice reasoning. While Enright's model of "forgiveness progression" does not claim to have the formal
structural properties of stages (hierarchy, invariance, universality) of Kohlberg's, it is nonetheless similar to it, as each subsequent forgiveness style or "soft stage"\(^3\) is a "developmental advance over former styles because each higher level requires more adequate and complex social perspective-taking" (Enright et al 1992: 107). According to Enright, the most advanced stage of forgiveness, arguing from a position of Stage 6 justice reasoning (Enright et al 1992:107) is Stage 6, "forgiveness as love." Here, the person who has been offended forgives the offender "because it promotes a true sense of love... forgiveness is no longer dependent on a social context, as in Stage 5" (p.105). A person operating from a position of Stage 6 understands that "principles take precedence over societal functioning" (p.107), and follows Kohlberg's position that persons are ends in themselves.

Enright's model of forgiveness differs from that of Piaget in significant ways. While Piaget stressed the importance of ideal reciprocity ('do unto others as you would have them do unto you') as the basis of forgiveness (i.e. in forgiving others, we offer them the respect we would like them to show us), Enright replaces reciprocity with what he calls identity. The principle of identity, a corollary of concrete operations, posits that when there are two groups with an equivalent number of items, their equivalence remains even when the items are rearranged into new figures. Thus, what was once equal remains so, despite what might be appearances to the contrary. Enright applies this principle to the social realm, arguing that persons who began as inherent equals will remain so; the commission of a wrongdoing does not jeopardize this equality. From this, Enright argues that forgiveness rests upon the principle of social unconditionality, "the understanding that a person as a human being is not altered when surface features change" (Enright 1994:72). Enright offers the following critique of the Piagetian
principle of reciprocity as the foundation of forgiveness: if forgiveness is understood as a supererogatory act, then one who forgives requires, through his or her example, that others follow suit and go beyond their obligations. Thus, he argues, "forgiveness based on ideal reciprocity ... thwarts both mercy and justice" (1994:71).

The adoption of the identity principle leads Enright to assert that forgiveness is "one person's response" (1992: 102); it is both unilateral and unconditional (1994:64). If an offended party recognizes the offender as an equal, regardless of any wrongdoing they may have done, then forgiveness is not dependent upon a dialogue or negotiation between the two. In contrast, Power (1994) argues that it is forgiveness based on the principle of ideal reciprocity which "puts the forgiven in a position that allows the two to interact as equals" (p.83). Here, the dialogue itself is constructed as an opportunity for both offender and offended to experience themselves and the other as equal beings. Moreover, it provides an forum for accountability, without which justice is put at risk.

Enright claims that forgiveness as a moral act does not make sense when performed outside of a presupposed justice context (1994:75): why else would someone feel they had been treated unfairly if they did not have a model of justice? Enright's developmental model focusses on structures of reasoning; the highest stages of development require the potential forgiver to "focus on mercy or the forswearing of personal justice" (1992:104). Principled morality is based on ideal role-taking or moral musical chairs (Kohlberg 1984:299); from this it follows that high
stage forgiveness reasoning requires an actor to forswear "personal justice." What is less clear is how universal claims of justice, those which extend beyond the merely personal, are met when acts of injustice are neither confronted nor challenged.

Negotiated forgiveness is built on a recognition of real differences between real people; by insisting on an actual meeting between opposing sides, it enhances the opportunity for the articulation of those differences. Thus, negotiated forgiveness conjoins the principle of ideal reciprocity with that of pragmatism, as it functions as a means through which estranged parties can learn to co-exist peacefully. Ideal reciprocity might provide a wronged person with an answer to the question of why they should expose themselves to the very party which has inflicted harm upon them. But strictly speaking, one could apply the principle of ideal reciprocity to a situation, and merely imagine the position of one's opponent. Negotiated forgiveness extends the principle of ideal reciprocity into the realm of action, and concerns of justice remain at its center.

Forgiveness: Unconditional or Negotiated?

Lang (1994) identifies "two different and irreconcilable models of forgiveness: (p. 109). In the first of these models, forgiveness has strings attached to both the past and the future. Lang describes this as "forgiveness as a type of probation" (p.109). The second model is similar to the one proposed by Enright: "forgiveness as unilateral - where that act is unconditional, fixed and
complete at the moment it is granted" (p. 109). Implicit in Lang's construction is an association between the unilateral nature of forgiveness and its completeness. Here, the act of forgiveness is entirely independent of actions of the wrongdoer, in the past, present or future; in this sense, and this sense only, it is complete. But a negotiated forgiveness provides an opportunity for a different kind of completion; here, and only here, do wrongdoer and wronged-against come together in a joint effort to confront the past, and in so doing, to move beyond it. As Nelson Mandela has explained "without these enemies of ours, we can never bring about a peaceful transformation to this country" (quoted in Shriver 1998: 2). Many forgivers experience a need for those they have forgiven for their act to be complete.

Unilateral forgiveness addresses only one party's engagement with what is essentially a social phenomenon. A potential forgiver does not engage with the position of the offending party, as such, but rather is motivated in his or her actions by a recognition of an inherent equality between him or herself and s/he who has caused suffering. In as much as the reasoning behind the offender's action is encountered, it is at the level of abstraction; the person who has suffered imagines what the position of the other might be. In identifying forgiveness processes or "cognitive, affective, and behavioural strategies involved in formulating a moral response" (Enright 1994:66), Enright does discuss the usefulness of "viewing the offending person in context, seeing the pressures he or she was under at the time and viewing his or her developmental history" (1994:66). Contextualization of behaviour is, thus, a strategy which can assist individuals in arriving at unilateral forgiveness, but it is not integral to it. Crucially, the bestowal of forgiveness is not dependent upon encountering, much less understanding or even accepting, the position of the wrongdoer.
This is in direct contrast with negotiated forgiveness, which stands or falls on the principle of understanding. It is true that even in negotiated forgiveness, the construction of the position of the offender by the offended is ultimately an abstraction of the latter's. This is inevitable: our understandings of one another are always products of our own interpretations and way of seeing the world. However, when an encounter between parties has occurred, there is, at least theoretically, a greater chance that the construction of the offender's position by the offended will bare a greater resemblance to the former's position than if such an encounter had never taken place. Why is this important? If the act of forgiveness is to be a bridge between the hurt of the past and the hope of the future, then there must be some indication that the offending action will not reoccur. Without this, the future can hold little more promise than a perpetual reenactment of former wounds.

It is uncertain what effects unilateral forgiveness will yield on the future behaviour of a wrongdoer. Enright emphasizes that "when a person forgives, he or she seeks nothing from the other, in the concrete or the ideal" (1994:69). Forgiveness is not bestowed upon another because it is thought that in so doing their behaviour will change. While it is possible that the unconditional nature of the offended's acceptance of the offender might produce in the latter a transformation - instigating a moral redemption of sorts - this cannot be a motivation in offering forgiveness, in the sense that Enright uses the term. Whether or not unilateral forgiveness is likely to encourage the wrongdoer to repent, and thus to produce positive future outcomes, must be irrelevant to its consideration by one who has been wronged, and therefore to our evaluation
Forgiveness as Change of Heart

Vaclav Havel describes the challenges faced by his country in its transition to democracy:

We have to try to face our own past, to name it, to draw conclusions from it, and to bring it before the bar of justice. Yet we must do this honestly, and with caution, generosity, and imagination. There should be a place for forgiveness wherever there is confession of guilt and repentance (Michnik and Havel 1993:22).

Havel's statement mirrors the prerequisites of negotiated forgiveness outlined earlier; if forgiveness is to be possible, wrongdoers must confess the acts they have committed, take responsibility for the suffering they have caused, and repent.

However, this third step, the expression of remorse, is potentially very problematic. While it may be most desirable for one who has inflicted suffering on another to show repentance for their actions, to require that they do so might be to encourage a display of disingenuous feeling. Interestingly, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in considering applications for amnesty from those who have inflicted abuse of human rights on their fellow citizens, "does not require anyone to show remorse for their past actions, to apologize, to be repentant, or to take any responsibility for the consequences of their actions" (Villa-Vicencio 1998: 6). This has been controversial, and has come under strong attack from many corners, including from members of Mandela's own government.
This view [that expression of contrition is not necessary for the granting of amnesty] implies that a perpetrator of apartheid abuses could hypothetically come before the Commission and unrepentantly relate a horrifying tale of murder, torture and misdeeds, which would automatically qualify him or her for amnesty (Asmal et al 1997:17).

Charles Villa-Vicencio, Research Director of TRC, explains the logic behind this policy: it is difficult to legislate remorse.

Saying sorry involves more than sentimentality. It involves more than tears. It is never cheap. This inclines some to balk at the emotional words associated with public apologies... It is important to say mea culpa. It cannot, however, be legislated. Nor should it be assumed that it will be accepted (Villa-Vicencio 1998: 7).

One is confronted with a King Lear-like dilemma: is the one who displays their repentance on demand necessarily the most contrite? It is important to remember here that the goal of the TRC is not national forgiveness, but rather national reconciliation. States can offer amnesty to perpetrators of criminal deeds, but they cannot offer forgiveness. While the process of 'moral reconstruction' is in the hands of society, it is related to but distinct from 'the intimate pardon which only an aggrieved person can give' (Boraine et al., 1994:12). Echoing the words of the Chilean woman quoted in the opening of this article, a widow testifying before the TRC proclaims "No government can forgive - they don't know my pain - only I can forgive, and I must know before I can forgive" (Boraine 1996:41). For these two women, knowledge and acknowledgement are prerequisites of forgiveness.
North (1987) refers to the "change of heart [on the part of a wronged person] which is the essence of forgiveness" (p.503). But this change of heart is not something which simply happens, and nor does it come easily. Rather it is something which is worked for, and is only sometimes achieved, on the part of a wronged person. However, according to North, "the value of forgiveness lies in the fact that it essentially requires a recognition of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action" (p.499); this is the condition which necessarily precedes the offended's "change of heart." Enright cites North as philosophical support for his argument, identifying a similar "gift-like quality of forgiveness" (Enright 1994:69) which is reminiscent of the unconditionality central to his own work. But North's position is very different from that of Enright in that it rests upon "the recognition of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action" (p.499) - a recognition not only by the wronged but by the wrongdoer as well. Thus a position which might ostensibly resemble Enright's - i.e. the essence of forgiveness is the change of heart on the part of the wronged person - is very different from it, because it is founded upon the wrongdoer's acknowledgement of their action(s). But is acknowledgement of wrongdoing, in the absence of remorse, sufficient grounds for its forgiveness?

Lauritzen (1987) argues that forgiveness rests upon a change of heart by the wrongdoer:
... in a situation where the offender has experienced no change of heart, there simply appears to be no reason to relinquish one's resentment; indeed, to do so could well have the effect of encouraging the wrongdoing, since the wrongdoer may be emboldened by his deed (p. 145).

Moreover, "to reestablish a relationship of moral equality in the absence of a change of heart is to accept the offending party in his identity as offender" (p. 150). There are circumstances in which forgiveness "can be morally objectionable" (p. 145). For Lauritzen, any forgiveness which stops short of a wrongdoer's recognition of their action puts the claims of justice at risk. Significantly, Enright argues that forgiveness must be "chosen from a host of alternatives" (1991:141). Within the "interpersonal strategy" a forgiver must balance the claims of justice and mercy. "An imbalanced mercy-seeking strategy" Enright writes, "might include condonation that ignores injustice" (p. 141). Clearly, this is not something which Enright wishes his model to promote. And yet, because of the gift-like nature of unilateral forgiveness, it is not necessary that injustices be put right, or even mutually acknowledged, for forgiveness to transpire. Ntsiki Biko, widow of the murdered South African activist Steve Biko, questions "how can you forgive without proper justice having been done? ...justice must be done first" (Biko 1996:67-68). For her and many like her, without justice there can be no forgiveness; it is the former which makes the latter possible. And there can be no justice if those who cause suffering are not made accountable for their actions.

Bringing together the positions of North and Lauritzen, I suggest that forgiveness is indeed based upon a change of heart, but a change of heart not only of offender or offended, but of both parties, in consultation with each other. Enright's claim that the most developed style of forgiveness is one which transcends social context, ignores the "contextual nature of psychological truth" (Gilligan 1983:49). Attending to the context of people's lives, trying to understand who they are and why they do what they do, is an important first step to realizing
forgiveness. We are selves who live in contexts; it is those contexts that form the meaning of our lives. Forgiving an action is in measure influenced by our ability to understand it (even if the offense is not something which we imagine ourselves doing). Accepting one's adversaries for who they are - a precondition to understanding their actions - can only come about in dialogue with them. Forgiveness, then relies upon an extension to others of the respect one would like to receive for oneself while acknowledging that those others are different from oneself. To understand why one has been wronged, one must first understand the world of the wrongdoer. This is more than a strategy for arriving at forgiveness; it is central to it. If one ignores the contextual nature of personal truth, then there is no possibility of understanding others, and without this understanding the promise of an enduring reconciliation is jeopardized.

While a negotiated forgiveness might be a preferable option to one which is unilateral for the reasons outlined above, it might also be more exacting for both parties involved. Those who have experienced severe abuse of their human rights, for instance, may not be either willing or able to face the person or persons responsible for their suffering. This is even more likely to be the case if the suffering has involved the loss of a loved one. No one can be forced to forgive another; on this both models are in agreement. Forgiveness, if it is to come at all, can take a very long time. Historian Timothy Garton Ash suggests that the time scale for reconciliation is measured in generations, rather than months or years (Alban 1998); a similar observation might be made about forgiveness. Moreover, forgiveness is not a certainty, but a possibility. There are some actions which may be deemed unforgivable, under any conditions. Those who have been made to suffer are entitled to withhold their forgiveness, and it is not necessarily a sign of their lack of developed stage reasoning that they should do so.

That some actions may be unforgiveable is important to acknowledge, not only for injured
individuals who may feel pressure to forgive what they cannot, but also for the maintenance of the moral code. Simon Wiesenthal recounts a story in which he has been beckoned to the bedside of a dying Nazi soldier, who confesses to him the details of an episode in which three hundred Jews were burned alive.

"I know that what I have told you is terrible" says the soldier. "In the long nights while I have been waiting for my death, time and time again, I have longed to talk about it to a Jew and beg forgiveness from him. Only I didn't know whether there were any Jews left..." An uncanny silence ensues between them. "At last" writes Wiesenthal. "I made up my mind and without a word I left the room" (quoted in Golding 1984-5:121).

Significantly in the story retold here, Wiesenthal is being asked to forgive on behalf of the three hundred others who have died. The words of the poet Zbigniew Herbert echo: "do not forgive, because it is not within your power to forgive in the name of those who were betrayed at dawn" (quoted in Michnik and Havel 1993:25). Wiesenthal does not feel capable of granting forgiveness: the wrong committed is far greater than any one person can absolve. Moreover, he might well feel that despite the obvious pain that his withholding of forgiveness causes this dying man, it is important for the maintenance of the moral code that some atrocities remain outside the boundary of the forgivable.

Enright analyzes a similar situation rather differently. He describes the case of a Holocaust survivor who had been at Auschwitz and who had lost all of her family. She says categorically "I don't think it is ever possible to forgive them" (Enright et al 1991:142). Enright characterizes this response as a function of cultural conditioning, which in this case mitigates against a motive for forgiveness. Significantly, however, he does not explore the moral implications of this survivor's withholding of forgiveness. From Enright's perspective, to construct forgiveness as perpetuating injustice is to confuse forgiveness and reconciliation (1992:103-104). "Forgiveness
is an internal release and involves one individual. Reconciliation, on the other hand, involves two people who are behaviourally coming together" (p.104). In contrast, a model of negotiated forgiveness posits a distinction, but a possible coexistence, between forgiveness and reconciliation. We shall return to this connection in our discussion of truth and reconciliation commissions. However, if forgiveness and reconciliation are understood as existing on the same continuum, and are not, as Enright suggests, discontinuous, then it is possible, at least theoretically, to identify instances in which forgiveness might perpetuate injustice.

It is, then, not obvious that forgiveness is necessarily a desirable end in and of itself. Nietzsche (1887), for instance, regarded forgiveness as characteristic of slave morality. An important question is why is it good to forgive, if and when it is? The unqualified love which unilateral forgiveness promotes does not in itself constitute a moral good. People who extend forgiveness unilaterally might do so for reasons which are ultimately self-serving, what Enright terms "a self-healing strategy" (1991:141); these have little to do with morality. For instance, they might do so because it places them in a position which they feel is somehow superior to that of the person who has wronged them. Or alternatively, they might forgive unilaterally because they feel drained by the continued hurt and anger which consumes them; the act then provides a release for them. These reasons for forgiving are understandable, but they are not necessarily moral; rather, the benefits derived seem to be limited to the psychological well-being of the wronged individual.

In contrast, forgiveness which is based on change of heart by both offended and offender, is not only compatible with justice, but indeed promotes it. "Setting the record straight" - acknowledging that wrongdoing has occurred - is not only an historical but a moral end. Justice presupposes that there is an existing body of facts. Before justice can be enacted, these facts must
first be established.

According to Enright, "People reasoning at the two lowest stages tend to confuse justice and forgiveness because something is required of the offender before 'forgiveness' is granted" (Enright 1994:65). Far from being a sign of confusion, requiring an offender to confess, own, and repent their wrongdoing before offering them forgiveness is to extend toward them a peace offering which is grounded in justice. Although Enright sees the setting of this precondition as characteristic of low stage reasoning, it is the founding principle of truth commissions established around the world. Alex Boraine, one of the people responsible for the creation and running of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), describes the first purpose behind the establishment of the commission: it is, he argues, essential to the pursuit of national unity. "The well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society." Wrongs have been committed and must now be confronted. The Truth Commission's work is to establish who did what to whom and why. All of this, for the peace of the nation. Is this really only stage 5 reasoning, because it aims at restoring social harmony (Enright 1992:105)? Boraine explains that the TRC recognizes "a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu" but not for victimization." (p.37) First the facts must be established. This in turn creates the conditions under which understanding becomes possible. Only then, and sometimes not even then, can forgiveness proceed.

Desmond Tutu heads South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. When asked what the purpose of the commission is, he echoes the words of Boraine: the goal is "to assist in the healing of a traumatized, divided, wounded, polarized people." (Index on Censorship 1996:39). But why must the wrongs of the past be confronted? Why doesn't Tutu, an Archbishop of the
Anglican Church, promote a unilateral forgiveness? He explains:

... there are some people who have tried to be very facile and say let bygones be bygones: they want us to have a national amnesia. And you have to keep saying to those people that to pretend that nothing happened, to not acknowledge that something horrendous did happen to them, is to victimize the victims yet again. But even more important, experience worldwide shows that if you do not deal with a dark past such as ours, effectively look the beast in the eye, that beast is not going to lie down quietly... Forgiveness and reconciliation are not cheap... (Index on Censorship 1996:39-40).

One cannot forgive wrongdoing without first understanding the wrongdoer. Understanding is essentially dialectical, comprised of both reaching out to others and looking deep into one's self. If the first component of this is absent, if there is no contact with the wrongdoer, then the prospects for genuine understanding are reduced. Forgiveness does not always follow understanding, but a forgiveness which is not based on understanding will be incomplete.

A young woman observing relations between victims and torturers in Nicaragua, writes in her journal:

There is no forgiveness apart from justice. To grant pardon, those on the receiving end must recognize their actions as being wrong, in need of pardon. The complete act of forgiveness is a two-way street, involving both the forgiver and the one being forgiven. The act is not complete unless it is both given and received.... It requires on both sides the exercise of judgment ... to determine injustice and to act together (forgiving, being forgiven) on behalf of justice. (Amanecida 1987:93-94)

We are social beings; the act of forgiveness, which reestablishes severed ties between us, must be built on a recognition of our interconnectedness. The forgiver and the forgiven need one another for justice to be enacted.
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Endnotes

1. This is distinct from justice reasoning, which clearly is an intrainsdividual phenomenon (Kohlberg 1981, 1984).

2. A third model of forgiveness, which I call "positional forgiveness" also exists. Here, one who has been harmed engages with the position of the offender, while avoiding any direct contact with them. As individuals embody social positions and values, an opponent's motivations may be discernible through an investigation of their belief system, which may or may not entail conversation with them. For instance, one who engages in "armed struggle" does so not only as an individual, but as a member of a group, and this position can be confronted, understood, and potentially forgiven. Positional forgiveness combines elements of negotiated forgiveness (engagement with the motivations of the wrongdoer) and unilateral forgiveness (it involves only the harmed party), but it is distinct from them. This article shall restrict its discussion to negotiated and unilateral forgiveness.

3. Although Enright alternatively refers to his progression sequence as "styles" (Enright et al 1992: 104-106) and "stages: (Enright 1994:65) of forgiveness, for the purpose of consistency, I shall adopt the latter terminology - except when citing others - while acknowledging that his claim is to soft, and not hard stages of development.

4. Strictly speaking, this comment is not accurate, as the TRC has no provision for "automatic amnesty." Rather, there are three requirements which must be met for amnesty to be granted: 1) the deed(s) under consideration must have been politically motivated; 2) full disclosure must be made; and 3) the deed must fall within the period of the mandate of the Commission (1960-1994) (Villa-Vicencio 1998:6-7). Still, the general argument being made by these authors stands.

5. The African word ubuntu is used to indicate a combination of "compassion" and "recognition of the humanity of the other" (Asmal et al. 1996:21), similar to the principle of ideal reciprocity.