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**Abstract**

This study investigates the practices and discourses of groups and networks supporting migrants in the context of the construction of the European Union (EU) and the Europeanisation of immigration and border controls. Its main objectives are: (1) to engage in critical examination of the European political project and the discourse of European belonging that has sustained its construction and consolidation; (2) to observe whether novel contentious practices have emerged to respond to multi-scalar developments associated with harmonisation of immigration-related policies; and (3) to investigate narratives of pro-migrant groups and networks.

The project mobilises ethnographic research focused on pro-migrant organisations and networks in three European Union member states: France, Italy and the United Kingdom. It analyses testimony from participants involved in solidarity initiatives and assesses their perspectives on Europe and European belonging.

This study draws on insights from a range of disciplines including Political Science, International Relations, Security Studies, Historical Sociology and Migration Studies. It embraces an historical approach to European construction and an analysis of global influences upon the development of the EU. It addresses the tensions and conflicts that arise when national, supranational and global processes take their effect upon the European project, and the specific impacts in the area of migration and bordering.

This project concludes that a transnational pro-migrant movement is in formation in the EU. It is characterised by intensified cooperation and communication across borders, the development of new crossborder activist tools and tactics, increasingly complex transnational networks and the formulation of a mutually comprehensible analysis of the EU border regime. Yet this movement-in-formation has not been articulated and integrated around alternative visions of Europe and European identity. I argue that this is due to tensions and contradictions generated by the European project and I develop a critical reflection about processes of European construction and the production of ideas about Europe.
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Introduction

This study is concerned with investigating the practices and discourses of groups and networks supporting migrants in the context of the construction of the European Union (EU) and the Europeanisation of immigration and border controls. As an increasingly exclusionary discourse is produced by politicians of the EU and its member states, this research project sets out to explore whether counter-discourses are being formulated by individuals and groups involved in solidarity practices with migrants. The main objectives of this research are (1) to engage in a critical examination of the European political project and the discourse on European belonging that has been sustaining its construction and consolidation; (2) to observe whether novel contentious practices have emerged to respond to the multi-scalar political and institutional context brought about by the harmonisation of immigration-related policies in the EU and (3) to investigate the narratives produced by and in support of these solidarity initiatives.

Formulation of the research project

This research emerged from a range of personal and academic experiences and interests. I undertook European Studies as an undergraduate degree. During this course, one of my main axes of reflection was the way in which European societies have related to migration, especially that of a postcolonial nature. Over the course of these years, I began interrogating the role of the border in the construction of nation-states and national communities and critically reflecting on the dialectics linking citizenship and exclusion, mainly in relation to the experiences of non-national residents.

In the context of a degree in European Studies, these considerations found particular resonance: if the national form features a tendency towards exclusion, is there potential for the development of a progressive and inclusive social and political entity at the supranational level? What has been the impact of the EU on the lives of people residing within – or trying to settle in – the redefined space of Europe, and particularly those whom nation-states have tended to
exclude? Can a European supranational organisation claim to ensure a better provision of welfare and a greater guarantee of rights in the global era?

EU supporters have been quick to describe the Union as an internationalist project, confining to the past the excesses of nationalism and national rivalries and bringing people of the region ever closer. The dissolution of internal borders, following the 1995 implementation of the Schengen Agreement, has been celebrated as an embodiment of this new supranational unity, conjuring into existence a European area of ‘freedom, justice and security’ (Europa, no date).

Yet, a closer examination of the processes at work reveals that abolition of the EU’s internal borders has been matched by an attempt to reinforce external border controls and to repel migrants. Far from being peripheral to the European project, the harmonisation of immigration and border controls in order to secure the EU and control access to its territory has been seen as a condition for establishing a European free movement area and is central to European construction. This process has been so intense that it has been likened to a ‘war against migrants’ (Migreurop, 2013a). The term ‘Fortress Europe’ has also gained currency, primarily among activists and critical scholars, to characterise the process of reinforcement and militarisation of the EU borders, which involves the multiplication of border patrols, the construction of new walls and fences, as well as the increase in immigration detention facilities and in the use of deportation.

A powerful metaphor for those meaning to highlight the dynamics of exclusion in the EU and at its borders, ‘Fortress Europe’ does not however fully capture the complex developments taking place at the EU’s borders and beyond. Rather than hermetically closing the space of Europe and strictly keeping migrants out, the borders of the EU operate a process of differential and subordinated inclusion which also relies on advanced border surveillance systems and technologies (Bigo et al, 2011, p. 78). These, although less visible, are equally coercive modes of management of people’s mobilities. They allow the policing of EU’s border ‘from a distance’ and in an increasingly anticipative
and individualised fashion, through the gathering of personal information and biometric data about would-be migrants.

The bordering of Europe has relied on two complementary processes. On the one hand, the EU has been externalising its borders and has developed a regime of migration control that extends way beyond the limits of its territory, in particular through the establishment of agreements through which third countries agree to prevent ‘unauthorised’ departures. On the other hand, the external borders of Europe have been reproduced inside its territory. The multiplication and systematisation of immigration detention centres, producing areas of suspended spatiality where people are kept at the margins, neither inside nor outside the physical territory, are a striking example of this process. These developments are supported, and further articulated, across a highly complex topology of visas and residence permits, with associated rights and restrictions, which produce new modalities of differential inclusion. Following Balibar and Mezzadra (2006), we can consider these movements of border shifting as the most visible forms of a wider and more complex process of production of a ‘Europe of borders’ or, in Balibar’s terms, a ‘European apartheid’ (2004, 2009). This Europeanisation of exclusion has also been underpinned by the production of a discourse on who belongs (or does not belong) to Europe and what it means to be European – that is, a discourse of European identity.

In spite of the construction of this exclusionary regime, alternative discourses that acknowledge the legitimacy and necessity of migration, and sometimes radically defend freedom of movement, have emerged in segments of the European population. Instances of migrant-led acts of resistance and protest have also taken place across EU member states, often encouraged and supported by European citizens. During my work with pro-migrant organisations in the UK and France, I observed the diversity of migrant solidarity initiatives in both countries and noticed the formation of crossborder links between various groups operating in their national contexts, leading me to reflect on the possibility of new forms of solidarity emerging in reaction to the European border and migration regime.
It is in the context of these reflections, contradictions and interrogations that my research topic and questions arose more clearly: as an increasingly exclusionary discourse appears in Europe, can we identify the formulation of counter-discourses in those segments of the European public that are engaged in solidarity initiatives with migrants? Do they put forward alternative visions and understandings of what Europe and European belonging could be? And if so, what are they?

**Research process**

This background to the formulation of my topic is of importance because it informed the way in which I articulated and conducted doctoral research. Having been involved in pro-migrant initiatives myself, I developed this project with a number of preliminary observations in mind. In particular, I had become aware that there existed a number of key groups and figures within the migration solidarity field which engaged with the issue of the Europeanisation of migration frameworks and developed critical analyses of the official discourse on European belonging. The hypothesis with which I started this research – that alternative discourses on Europe would be produced by these individuals and their groups – was thus derived from my own involvement and experiences in the pro-migrant field.

In order to test this hypothesis I undertook a thorough examination of what I call the dominant discourse on the EU and Europe: that is to say, the narrative produced by ideologues of the Union about what Europe is, what the EU means in relation to this idea of Europe and who does and does not belong to what they consider as Europe. To do so, I investigated the history and nature of the European Union project and of Europe as an idea. This was broad in scope, because Europe is complex and multi-layered as an idea and a project. Looking at Europe in relation to migrants and migration also required me to go beyond representations of Europe as a delimited and bordered space.

The idea of Europe has long existed in relation to figures of otherness. Understanding contemporary forms of exclusion in Europe and the EU calls for an examination of the various European Others that emerged over time and of their relation to current patterns of marginalisation. On the other hand,
understanding the EU required me to look at the European political project as a particular formation within the contemporary world order, and in particular to reflect on its embeddedness within the global neoliberal agenda. These various angles of reflection allowed me to position myself critically within the fields of literature concerned with Europe and the EU, and to address my research questions in a more focused way.

I carried out fieldwork with pro-migrant activists in three EU member states, the UK, France and Italy. My fieldwork was based on ethnographic study of selected pro-migrant groups and campaigns with the aim of identifying how they addressed the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum frameworks and responded to the dominant discourse on Europe and European belonging. While I was interested in the formulation of counter-discourses, I also paid attention to the development of new activist practices in solidarity with migrants, in order to address how activist dynamics, tactics and repertoires of contention were being produced ‘in action’.

At an early stage in the fieldwork I noticed a dearth of references to alternative visions of European identity in the participants’ narratives and in the framing of their activism. At the same time, I identified the presence of a number of other discourses, still ‘in formation’, through which the participants articulated their solidarity claims. These relied on the mobilisation of novel identity narratives, including notions of regional identity. This encouraged me to reflect critically on my original research hypothesis as well as to review the focus of my fieldwork. As I explain in the thesis, I moved on to explore potential reasons for the lack of identification with ideas of Europe and to examine the other discourses articulated by the participants.

Interdisciplinarity

One of the main difficulties I encountered during this project was the complex and multi-layered nature of the phenomena under investigation. Understanding the European Union and its border regime requires engaging with the history of European construction. It entails examining the tensions and conflicts that arise when national, supranational and global processes take their effect upon the
European project, and the specific impacts in the area of migration and bordering. To do so, I had to gain familiarity with literature in a range of fields.

This project is located at the crossroad of a number of disciplines and research areas. Studies of migration and of Europeanisation have tended to be anchored in interdisciplinary approaches which recognise the complexity of both as social, economic, cultural, political and legal phenomena. In this research, I attempt to approach the question of pro-migrant initiatives in the context of the construction of the EU in a fashion that ‘grasp[s] and explain[s] them together, in their mutual imbrication’ (Wacquant, 2008, p. 114). I draw on insights from a range of disciplines and try to open up a space for dialogue between them. I mobilise material from political science, critical political geography, migration studies, political economy, historical sociology, critical security and border studies, social movement theory and sociocultural ethnography.

The ideological production of the category of the ‘migrant’ and its instrumentalisation toward the stabilisation of the European political project led me to bring together two main conceptual approaches. First, I drew on a materialist analysis influenced by Marxist theory, which pays particular attention to the relation between political formations and systems of production. Second, I kept in mind insights from a symbolic approach, which draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and remains vigilant to ‘the capacity that the state has to trace salient social demarcations and to produce social reality through its work of inculcation of efficient categories and classifications’ (Wacquant, 2008b, p. 3). I framed my study in a way that ‘elaborat[es] social-political problematics … across several interdisciplinary fields, in multiple academic contexts [focusing] on the fundamental relation between migration and the complex intersection of state sovereignty, citizenship, national identity and the social productions of (nation)-state spaces’ (De Genova and Peutz, 2010, p. 268).

Although I do not engage in theoretical discussions of Marxist and Bourdieusian concepts as such, they have informed my approach and analysis. I am particularly indebted to Bourdieu’s reflections on how symbolic boundaries intersect with the construction of inequality. Of importance to this aspect of my research are considerations on the production and reproduction of dominant
cultures, discourses and ideologies and their role in cementing and naturalising relations of domination and exploitation. This approach complements and broadens Marx and Engel’s (1979) thesis on the role of dominant ideology and Gramsci’s (1971) work on hegemony emphasising the way in which power relations are also structured and exercised in the symbolic realm and the ability of the state and those in power to shape common sense and to normalise social order. I also make reference to the Bourdieusian concept of *habitus*, which looks at the way in which everyday life activities and experiences contribute to the formation of the values, dispositions and expectations of particular social groups as well as at how these beliefs and behaviours are socialised into people’s practices beyond the level of ideology (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 66-7).

A political economy based upon Marxist perspectives was crucial in order to develop a critical understanding of the European Union. As I argue in the first chapter, the formation of the EU can be conceptualised as a structural and spatial adjustment to the process of neoliberal globalisation. In this sense, it is embedded within the contemporary capitalist global order, and articulated and organised around nation-states, which have also used the European project as an arena for national competition. The tension between national and supranational imperatives has produced friction and even contradiction. In order to address these paradoxes, I draw on the work of critical globalisation scholars from a number of disciplines, including sociology, political economy, anthropology and political geography, notably Saskia Sassen, Aihwa Ong and David Harvey, among others.

From the perspective of the ideological and discursive construction of European identity, my understanding of the role and importance of the figure of the migrant has also been informed by the work of Nevzat Soguk (1999). Drawing on Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis, he locates the category of the ‘refugee’ within the discursive space associated with stabilisation of the nation-state and argues that the figure of the forced migrant is a crucial element in the consolidation of national organisation. In this study, I reflect on how Soguk’s analysis of the construction of the ‘refugee’ in relation to the emergence and reproduction of the nation-state can be applied to the identity-building process taking place today at the European level.
I put forward the argument that, in the context of the contradictions and ambiguities of the European project, the harmonisation of immigration and asylum regulations has provided a useful arena for cooperation and entente among member states. It has been sustained by the formulation of a dominant discourse on European belonging and identity. Several scholars guided me in the elaboration of this argument, including Gérard Delanty’s work on the history of ideas of Europe, Liz Fekete’s concept of xeno-racism and Philip Marfleet’s analysis of the influence of Huntingtonian theories in the discursive construction of European identity. I have also reflected on accounts of the role of borders and bordering in the construction of the nation-state and national identity, including Benedict Anderson’s (2006) seminal work on ‘imagined communities’, Aristide Zolberg’s analysis of nation building and its links to immigration, studies of nationalism such as Linda Colley’s (1992) account of the construction of British nationalism and Michael Billig’s (1995) description of ‘banal nationalism’, as well as research conducted by scholars of racism, primarily Etienne Balibar (2002; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010) and Immanuel Wallerstein (2010). Sandro Mezzadra’s studies of processes of de-bordering and re-bordering were also of importance to this research.

In order to describe accurately developments taking place in the field of immigration and asylum in the EU, I explored a growing trend of literature concerned with the securitisation of migration and everyday life. I refer in particular to the work of Didier Bigo (2000; 2002) and Jef Huysmans (2002), who highlight the discursive problematisation of migration as a security issue, and the securitisation of migration through the routinisation of practices of policing and controlling of migrants. This is important to my topic for several reasons. The first is that securitising migration and migrants has been instrumental within a process of displacement of blame, crucial for the EU to maintain itself in the context of increasing popular discontent vis-à-vis the consequences of capitalist globalisation. The migrant as a figure of fear, silenced by patterns of structural exclusion and her/his framing as a security threat, is useful to politicians of the EU and its member states in their attempt to divert dissatisfaction from the failures of the neoliberal agenda. It is thus a key mechanism in the production of the dominant discourse which I aim to analyse.
At the same time, as argued by Gargi Bhattacharyya (2005), illegality and illicit movement are central to the functioning of the global economy. In order to explore this aspect of Europe’s relation to immigration, I also draw on insights from Edward Said’s seminal *Orientalism* (1978), which powerfully illustrates how epistemological, semiotic and linguistic categories penetrate all aspects of social and human life.

Secondly, the security approach has been of major importance in designing policies and tools deployed to ‘control’, ‘manage’ and ‘regulate’ migration to the EU. One of its main consequences has been to make journeys towards Europe increasingly dangerous for migrants. Securitisation thus comes at an enormous human cost, as illustrated by the steady rise in the number of deaths at the borders of Europe in the last two decades. Moreover, the framing of migrants as threat has contributed to a rise in practices of abuse (at times including physical injury) targeting those perceived as ‘not of Europe’ in EU member states. This recalls Balibar’s (2003) observation that it is the state which actualises racism: in this case, a particular discourse on who belongs and who does not belong to Europe has contributed to the increase in popular racism, by rendering particular groups actual ‘Others’. It is precisely in reaction to these new forms of violence against migrants that the participants became engaged in solidarity work with migrants.

Developing a critical conceptual understanding of how the construction of the EU in the context of the neoliberal global order shapes new forms of marginalisation and racism, which translate into practices of symbolic and physical violence towards migrants, was thus crucial to this project. The main challenge of the conceptual chapters of the thesis was to combine a wide range of disciplinary insights with a meaningful analysis of the EU, of the dominant discourse on European identity and of the new forms of racism that it produces, providing the context in which to undertake my fieldwork and to explore the contentious practices and discourses developed by the participants.

**A brief note on terminology**

In his *Reflections on Exile*, Edward Said (2008, p. 144) notices how “the word “refugee” has become a political one, suggesting large herds of ... people ...
whereas “exile” carries with it … a touch of solitude and spirituality’. Exploring the depth of estrangement experienced by exiles, he reminds us that behind each refugee lies the story of an ‘unhealable rift between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home; an essential sadness [that] can never be surmounted’ (2008, p. 137). In this sense, Said poetically reminds us that abstractions, including those used in research, can conceal the agency and experiences of those who are studied.

With Said, I believe there is no paradigmatic refugee or migrant. Yet, for conceptual and analytical purposes, this research still requires the use of categories. Throughout the thesis, the term ‘migrant’ (sometimes ‘forced migrant’) is favoured over others such as ‘immigrant’, ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’. This is because the latter are often used in official discourse as legal categories, applied to people recognised as ‘legitimate’ by certain states and which exclude the majority of those who fled their countries of origin. The category of the refugee, for example, has evolved with time in relation to different political projects (Legoux, 2004; Marfleet, 2006; Agier, 2008), in a way that has rarely reflected the experience of the ‘refugees’ themselves. I do not wish to distinguish between people who have left their homes following political and personal persecution and those who have been pushed out by extreme economic conditions leading them to seek ‘life beyond survival’ elsewhere. I do however employ the terms ‘immigration and asylum’ when referring to specific political developments taking place in the EU in relation to border controls and freedom of movement, since this is the designation used by the EU to refer to this domain as a ‘policy area’.

Though the use of the term ‘forced migrant’ imposes abstract concepts on the ‘lived exile’ experienced by thousands of people, the location of my thesis within a forced migration studies perspective aims to associate this project within an emergent field of scholarship in which migrants are subjects of their destiny and where, in spite of the constraints hindering their actions and freedom of movement, their autonomy and agency are recognised.
Thesis outline

In order to analyse these processes, and the forms of resistance that have emerged from the pro-migrant scene in Europe, in Chapter I, I develop a critical analysis of the European political project. The process of ‘Europeanisation’ has been characterised by a number of tensions and conflicting dynamics involving a range of actors and scales. These include not only the national member states and the European agencies allocated tasks to promote supranational agendas, but also local actors and other global powers. I propose to address these tensions through a historical materialist framework by, first, relocating the formation of the EU within larger historical and spatial dynamics and, second, developing a critical history of Europeanisation through the prism of capitalist relations.

In Chapter II, I focus on the construction of collective identities and the production of otherness. After critically reviewing the literature concerned with the relationship between identity, immigration and borders in the context of the formation of the nation-state, I assess the relevance of these approaches to understanding the identity-production processes at work in the EU. While recognising important differences between these distinct projects, I nonetheless argue that, rather than developing new ideas of ‘supranational’ belonging freed from exclusionary tendencies, the EU has been borrowing from nation-states’ ideological resources in its quest to inculcate a set of common interests and induce consent within its citizens. This, I suggest, is intrinsically linked to the EU’s difficulty in securing its legitimacy and assuring the survival of its capitalist project in a time of rising inequalities and popular discontent. It is this ideological struggle for meaning which I label the ‘politics of Europeanism’.

In Chapter III, I describe in more detail the elaboration of common EU policies in the area of immigration and border controls. I conduct an overview of key developments since the mid-1980s and discuss some of the characteristics of this process, such as the increasing securitisation of migration and the systematisation of detention as a means of managing mobility.
Chapter IV elaborates the methodological approaches associated with this project. I describe the process through which I translated my research questions and hypotheses into an operational framework for carrying out my fieldwork. I also offer further detail about my own position within the research project and my relationships with the participants.

The two final chapters bring us to the sites of my fieldwork. Chapter V presents participating groups and networks, and raises questions about new practices and structures they have developed in the context of the Europeanisation of immigration and border controls. It identifies a strikingly consistent narrative among participants, which details a process of growing transnationalisation of pro-migrant struggles in order to address the particular issues associated with the EU border regime. Chapter VI asks whether new forms of identity have emerged through the intensification of crossborder interactions among pro-migrant groups in the EU. In particular, it seeks to determine whether alternative discourses on European belonging and citizenship have been put forward by participating groups and individuals.
Chapter I

Globalisation, Territories and Borders.
The Case of the European Union.

Introduction

In this chapter I develop a critical analysis of the European Union and the process of European construction. While this may seem a straightforward task, an examination of scholarly literature on the EU reveals that important questions about its history and its relations with its member states have received little attention.

The main argument I put forward is that the European Community – later the European Union – should be studied in relation to the global political and economic forces that have shaped its development. This allows understanding of its origins and trajectory within the context of other global projects, such as the post-war American project to construct a ‘West’ and, more recently, the global neoliberal project.

In this investigation into the European project, I address aspects of history that have been largely concealed by dominant accounts. The official European discourse presents the EU as an internationalist project, which allows for the reconciliation of national differences and brings peace and prosperity to all. The relation between a critical history of the EU and the emergence of new forms of exclusion and racism will be explored in the next chapter.

Studying the European Union

Developing a thorough critical analysis of the complex process of European construction, characterised as it is by contradicting tendencies and conflicting dynamics, is by no means a straightforward task. The European Union and Europeanisation are seen to constitute empirical challenges for social and political science researchers, who find themselves lacking the appropriate tools to explain the development of this novel structure (Favell, 1998, p. 4). In the
words of Perry Anderson (2009, p. xii), ‘Europe, as it has become more integrated, has also become more difficult to write about: Europe, in that sense, seems an impossible object’.

Since 2009 and the ‘Eurozone crisis’, the subject of ‘Europe’ and disputes over the course of action required to save the region have been regular features of the media and public debate. Yet, as noticed by Durand, the key question of what the European Union stands for and what political and economic vision it represents for its member states and their populations remain ‘terribly obscure’ (2013, p.3). While European Studies has developed specifically to examine the emergence of the European Union and its impact on European member states, it has been argued that writers in the field overlook fundamental questions about the ontological and epistemological foundations of the Union (Anderson, 2010).

Magnus Ryner (2012, pp. 651-3) also argues that academic research on the European Union has been dominated by an instrumental and normative approach which produces a particular type of knowledge with a predetermined objective: pushing European integration forward. He claims that mainstream academia has tended to examine the trajectory of the European Union through a simplistic dichotomy that juxtaposes, on the one hand, a ‘rational scenario’ leading to the maximising of economic well-being through bypassing the nation with, on the other, ‘nationalist reactions’ characterised by emotional irrationality, which should be overcome in order to open up the way to European progress.

I develop a critical reading of recent European history and trajectory using a broad spatial and temporal context and relating them to other dynamics at work in the world. I step back from questions regarding the European Union’s internal institutional and political functioning, and instead offer a global overview of Europe as a project and its place in an increasingly globalised world. The main questions I am raising are: what have been the dynamics and mechanisms pushing forward the European institutional and political process since its inception in the post-war period, and how have these played out in the process of bordering the European territory?
To address this issue, I apply a number of broad conceptual issues related to the formation of political entities and space to the EU. These include (1) the re-scaling and re-spatialisation of territories and sovereignties in the era of neoliberal capitalism; (2) the role of borders and bordering in processes of identity formation and fixation, and (3) practices of othering and the production of outsider figures as a way of stabilising the neoliberal social and political order and securitising spaces and territories.

This framework is necessary to this project for several reasons: first, because the European project is a complex and multi-layered formation with a trajectory shaped by multiple factors and contradictory tendencies; second, in order to avoid replicating normative assumptions about the European project; last, because my investigation of counter-discourses requires an understanding of the dominant discourse against which they are produced.

**Space and scale in the era of neoliberal globalisation**

In this section I examine how territorial structures have evolved under conditions of neoliberal globalisation since the 1970s. I argue that the contemporary EU must be understood in relation to dynamics of spatial and scalar¹ reconfiguration that pertain to neoliberalism. The main challenge of a theory of spatial organisation under global capitalism is to account for the ‘immensely diverse’ nature of geographical settings (Harvey, 2010, p. 143) while at the same time identify their interdependency and the recurrence of patterns within this diversity.

**Naturalising neoliberalism**

In the last few decades an important body of scholarly debate has been concerned with the effects of globalisation on territorial arrangements and scales. The 1970s were marked by victorious ‘hyperglobalist discourses’ (Held *et al.*, 1992; 1999) claiming that the world had become a ‘global village’, brought

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¹ The notion of ‘politics of scale’ has recently been developed by scholars (Paasi, 2001; Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2004) to talk about changes in the way spaces are configured. In particular, speaking of ‘politics of scale’ means investigating the different levels (local, regional, global) at which territories, institutions and regulations are organised and operated.
together by the positive forces of market integration, and about to create wealth and prosperity on an unprecedented scale. This neoliberal vision also coincided with the neoconservative assertion of the advent of a ‘new world order’, a concept first used by American diplomat George F. Kennan to portray the post-WWII era and define the USA’s place within it. History however mostly remembers the ‘new world order’ described by Gorbachev\(^2\), which revolves around a strong UN; de-ideologising of relations between states to achieve better international cooperation; and a one-world economy.

An extreme expression of the post-cold war zeitgeist was Fukuyama’s prediction that we had reached the end of history: as the Western liberal democratic model was spreading globally, humanity’s socio-cultural evolution was reaching its stable and eternal endpoint (Fukuyama, 1989; 1992). The European Union held a central position in this globalist discourse. It was recognised as the most successful example of nation-states engaging in post-national collaboration and securing their peaceful co-existence and the welfare of their populations, in spite of the dark pages of European history that had just been turned.

However, three decades later, with the failure of the predicted growth of Africa, Asia and Latin America, growing evidence of the intensification of inequalities and poverty on a global scale and regular economic crises bringing to the light the inherent contradictions of the global neoliberal system (Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2010), enthusiasm about the positive effects of globalisation has been tempered. The scholarly debate, particularly among economists, shifted attention towards ‘assessing globalisation’ and trying to establish patterns and trends in global income distribution. This quickly became a field of intense dispute and irreconcilable theoretical assertions.

Until quite recently most academic studies (...) concluded that world inequality was and is still growing: then some more recent studies, using different methods and newly available data, began to suggest that the level of inequality in income is less than previously believed and has, since 1980 at least, been declining, a conclusion vigorously contested by others; finally others have proposed broader measures of welfare and

\(^2\) In his 7 December 1988 speech to the United Nations General Assembly.
development which suggest that the decline in inequality may have been continuing for a long time (Sutcliffe, 2004, p. 15).

What the vast majority of academic accounts do agree about is that there is such a phenomenon as globalisation. By looking at it as an existing and unquestionable object of study, literature produces an image of globalisation as an inescapable feature of modern times and as structural by nature (as happening independently of decisions and actions by groups and individuals). The challenge then is to identify how it operates and what its effects are. The theoretical naturalisation of globalisation as an unstoppable and spontaneous process, to which ‘there is no alternative’, has concealed its highly ideological nature and denied its association with the global project of neoliberalism that has become hegemonic (in the Gramscian sense) in the last three decades. It has also hidden issues of imperialist domination and hierarchies between states under global capitalism.

Similarly, the European Union is presented by mainstream academia and official accounts as a natural and desirable consequence of the history of the region (see Chapter II). Mainstream debates about inequalities and social injustices in the EU – and possible solutions – have rarely called into question the existence and aptness of the Union but seek answers within its framework and structures. As we will see, this might be starting to change in the context of heightened social and political tensions in the EU.

Neoliberal globalisation and the territorial state

One of the recurring questions of this scholarly debate about globalisation has been how and to what extent patterns of capitalist accumulation have affected state structures. Views on the issues range from those anticipating the death of the nation-state (i.e. Waters, 2001; Holton, 1998) to those asserting its continuous, if not strengthened, relevance (Wolf, 2001; Hirst and Thompson, 1996). Likewise, studies on the European Union range from those affirming the intra-governmental nature of the organisation to those anticipating its full supranational quality. Some analysts have arbitrated by claiming that the EU was a unique mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions and
decision-making processes, which was presaging the advent of a new era of multi-layered political structures.

A number of more critical accounts of globalisation and of the European Union have also emerged. As early as 1996, Scholte attempted to qualify the fervour around globalisation:

Globalization should not (as so often happens) be exaggerated or oversimplified. The process has not touched every person, location and sphere of activity to the same extent. It has not been inevitable, linear, irreversible or completed. Globalization has not constituted the sole or primary motor of contemporary history. Place, distance and territorial borders have not ceased to be important in the present time of globalization. The rise of supra-territoriality has not heralded the end of the state. Everyone has not enjoyed equal access to, an equal voice in and equal benefits from transborder relations. Globalization has to date not created a world community with universal prosperity, planetary democracy and perpetual peace. Nor ... has the process removed cultural differences from the world system (1996, quoted in Paasi, 2001, p.2).

Scholte argues that globalisation has differently affected various spaces around the world and led to a variety of alterations in the economic, social, political and cultural relations in these spaces. While the term globalisation might be used to refer to a set of phenomena deployed on a global scale, their effects are necessarily embedded in specific material and historical contexts, which will determine the way a given space reacts to and is shaped by such processes. Globalisation needs to be analysed and understood contextually, from a specific site, and through its concrete expressions and contradictions.

Over centuries, the relation between economic forces and politico-cultural systems has changed and taken various forms, such as the mercantilist city-states or the imperial colonial organisation of the world. These systems relied on particular ways of organising space and on specific politics of scale. The Keynesian regulatory order, which has dominated the politico-economic organisation of Western Europe since the end of World War II, was a specific system of accumulation and an efficient way to recompose some of the tensions

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3 In theoretical terms, a shift can be identified following the controversial ascension to power of G.W. Bush in 2001 and its subsequent declaration of a ‘Global War on Terror’. This, followed by the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq among other events, brought back themes and vocabulary of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ to the academic scene.
emerging from the dialectic between economic division of labour and social/political structures within the national framework. As put by Leyshon (1992, p. 253):

between 1945 and the early 1970s an attempt was made to regulate the world economy through a set of institutions which sought to create an international regulatory space, within which the power of money was subordinated to politically and economically sovereign states.

But as of 1970s, with the rapid acceleration of the processes of global neoliberalism, the Keynesian order and its focus on national welfare, nationally organised labour force and so on, has been subject to pressures and undergone changes. Economies have been liberalised on a global scale; they have become increasingly export-oriented and international capital is increasingly favoured in states' legislation frameworks.

In other words, the intensification of transnational capital and financial flows relies on a spatial organisation of the world that cuts across the legislative order of the nation-state as sanctioned by traditional borders. Neoliberal globalisation transcends state-based configurations and establishes new forms of territoriality on sub- and supra-level scales. Those vary in shape depending on their particular location yet follow the same neoliberal principles. Well-known illustrations of this can be found in the development of global commodity chains, financial markets, export-oriented production, sub-contracting, export tax breaks (e.g. maquiladoras) and so on (Saad Filho and Johnston, 2005; Harvey, 2005). These reflect capitalism’s drive to eliminate barriers to reach cheap raw material and labour forces as well as new investment and consumption markets.

But capitalism also demands discipline. It requires some form of geographical and institutional arrangement for its circulation and expansion: production needs a grounded location; financial flows occur between financial centres/global cities; they require communication and regulatory frameworks and thus authorities capable of implementing and stabilising them (Sassen, 2002, 2007; Harvey, 2005).
How have these tensions affected the organisation of territories and led to the emergence of new levels of economic and political organisation? I argue that global neoliberalism has impacted state structures by encouraging a multi-scalar re-organisation of territories and sovereignties.

**Neoliberalism and sub-national restructuring**

At the sub-national level, new forms of administrative units and internal borders have emerged. Ong (1999, 2000, 2006) speaks of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to refer to the flexible management of sovereignty which adjusts to the modalities of global capital: export processing zones (EPZ) and financial growth corridors are examples of the way in which states have reshaped their territories at sub-national level through the creation of special zones, with ‘extra-territorial’ jurisdiction.

Ong’s graduated sovereignty refers to the adjustments made by small and medium-states in response to the imperatives of global neoliberalism, in particular the need to increase their competitiveness internationally and the pressures exercised by neoliberal international regulatory institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (1999, p. 57). She labels these states ‘postdevelopmental’ because they have diverged from the national economic model characteristic of the ‘developmental state’ and moved to a mode of economic governance which administrates the economy in terms of zones, with associated differential rights and statuses, rather than as a whole within the space of the conventional national territory. Ong also explores the racialised and gendered dynamics of exploitation visible in the treatment of workers in zones of graduated sovereignty.

Ong looks at how these sub-national zones are connected across national boundaries through hierarchised transnational networks (of production, trade flows and labour). Her examination of growth triangles and sub-regional economic zones in Southeast Asia explores in detail how corporate patterns of investment, production and trade shape new economic territories within and beyond national boundaries (Ong, 2006, pp. 88-9). This sheds light on the
dialectical relation between local, regional and global processes of space reconfiguration.

Ong’s analysis can be usefully built upon to look at some evolutions in parts of Europe. There exists a number of ‘free zones’, including EPZ, in EU member states as well as in candidate countries, particularly former Soviet Union countries. The first EPZ in the world, the ‘Shannon free zone’, was set up in Ireland in 1959. While some of the wealthiest EU member states might have one or two free zones, the extent to which free zones of various types have flourished in countries on the peripheries of the EU is striking (Free zones in existence and in operation in the Community, as notified by the Member States to the Commission, 2014). Countries with high numbers of free zones include Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Greece.

These areas, where large businesses enjoy tax reductions and reduced production costs, and often do not need to comply with national labour regulations (including workers’ and trade union rights), are typically managed by politicians of the national states acting in favour of global capital. The EU, and in particular Germany (Spiegel Online, 2012) has been keen to encourage these type of developments and has offered funding for the establishment of EPZ in various Southern, Eastern and Central European countries.

The example of EPZ demonstrates the extent to which the European project has integrated neoliberal imperatives. More specifically, the EU is used as a formation through which Western nation-states have been able to internationalise some of their economic activities as well as to exercise internationalising (neoliberal) pressure on other member states (particularly countries from its peripheries). The emergence of sub-national zones where international capital is exempted from national (and even regular European) regulation is directly correlated to a process of accommodation of and integration in neoliberal globalisation. The insistence of Germany on the creation of such zones in less wealthy member states is a salient illustration of, on the one hand, the intimate relation between the pursuit of national interests and elements of economic internationalisation (rather than their opposition as
often argued) and, on the other hand, the hierarchy between member states inside the EU.

**Neoliberalism and supranational reconfiguration**

Processes of restructuring of space have also occurred at a supranational level with the advent of trading blocs and regional security agreements. Supranational formations have multiplied since the 1970s, and particularly in the 1990s, as a means to recompose industrial and social relations to accommodate patterns of production and accumulation under conditions of global capitalism. According to Milner (2002, p. 450), by 1997 more than 50 per cent of all world trade was conducted under the auspices of regional blocs. The European Union is often considered as the most advanced case of regionalisation, with more extensive plans for political and economic integration than any other regional grouping. These blocs tend to act in a dual fashion: on the one hand, they promote and reinforce regional structural competitiveness in the ‘global market’, and on the other they function as protective barriers against global competition (Sideri, 1997). In fact, these regional blocs function as selective barriers vis-à-vis different types of flows.

A good example of this is the differential treatment of the movements of capital and labour, for example at the Mexico/US border or at the border of ‘Fortress Europe’. Different regulatory frameworks are produced to control different flows. These trading blocs are deeply rooted in power relations and hierarchies. It is difficult to view them as a homogenous phenomenon heralding the end of national sovereign power, as is often argued. It is more useful to think in terms of power relations and matrices of hierarchies including multiple actors.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) grants access to Mexican labour and consumption markets for North American economies in exchange for almost no concessions. The predominance of corporate interests in the agreement has been described by Scheuerman, who observes that ‘NAFTA ... effectively grants states and corporations equal authority in some crucial decision-making matters’. Moreover, he adds, ‘in a revealing contrast the procedures making up NAFTA’s labor ‘side agreement’ deny similar rights to
organized labor’ (Scheuerman, 2004, pp. 268–9, in the notes). Rosenberg notes that the advent of NAFTA in 1994 effectively marked the end of Mexico’s statist road to development (Rosenberg, 2005, pp. 48-50).

This echoes Ong’s distinction between the developmental state, concerned with its population and territory as a whole, and the postdevelopmental state, which accommodates neoliberal imperatives through the implementation of a chequered geography of differential rights, based, among other things, on gender and racial discrimination. The overly female-staffed and rights-deprived maquiladoras are good examples of this. Sub- and supranational restructuring of space, authority and sovereignty tend to go hand in hand and should be analysed as complementary and dialectically dependent, rather than as mutually exclusive phenomena.

These insights are useful to study the process of integration in Europe, a territory which has undergone drastic spatial and scalar transformations since the mid-20th century and which has become the site of one of the most advanced forms of supranational collaboration in the world. In particular, they help us to reflect on the relation between globalisation and the nation-state, and on the complementarity between the progress of the former and the maintenance of the latter. As we have seen, incorporating and encouraging neoliberal imperatives has been used as a strategy by a number of states and their ruling elites to integrate themselves into the international order and to ensure their continuation and survival. It is also important to situate and contextualise analyses and to pay attention to the particular historical, political and economic experience and position of each state and region under examination.

**The European rescue of the nation-state**

I have illustrated the intimate relationship between spatial transformations in the EU and the process of neoliberal globalisation over the last three decades. I now go back further in time and examine the origins of the European Community (EC). This historical assessment of the development of the European project helps us understand some of its contradictions.
According to Milward (2000) in *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, the origins of the EC have been one of the most ‘ill-understood aspects of recent history and present political life’ (p. 2). This is, he suggests, because of the ‘assumption that [the EC] is in antithesis to the nation-state’ (p. 2). Milward convincingly argues that the evolution of the EC since 1945 – and its subsequent transformation into the EU – far from implying the replacement and eventual secession of the nation-state, has been an ‘integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an organisational concept’ (2000, p.3). In this sense, the post-war nation in Europe was characterised by an inherent instability insofar as ‘it had to be internationalised at certain points to survive’ (2000, p. 44). Therefore, the continuance of the European nation-state in the post-war era laid the basis for a new international organisation of the region. Yet, according to Milward, the sustainability of that order remains premised on the evolution of national economic life (2000). Since its early days, the EC has been marked by tension and even contradiction, reflecting the relation between national organisation of capital and the tendency towards its internationalisation.

This encourages us to reassess the mainstream history of the European Community/Union. According to official accounts, the process of European construction was initiated and pushed forward by its benevolent founding fathers. The official website of the European Union presents the ‘visionary leaders’ who offered ‘their energy and motivation’ so that European citizens could enjoy ‘a sphere of peace and stability’ which is embodied in ‘a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe’ (European Union, no date-a). A number of peer groups, such as the Jean Monnet and the Robert Schumann Foundations, as well as political organisations such as the European Movement and Christian-democratic parties, have participated in the elaboration and the diffusion of this dominant historical account (Constantin, 2011; Cohen, 2007).

The friendship between the founding fathers of Europe is generally presented as a symbol of the fraternity linking the people of Europe and the countries making up the Union. Yet it can be seen as a symbol of the elite nature of the European project, led by a small transnational group whose goals suited those of the North American government of the time, rather than as an illustration of a
popular unity linking the ‘people of Europe’. In this section, I develop a counter-history of the European project, which highlights the conflicting forces that have animated and shaped its trajectory (Constantin, 2011).

The origins of the new Europe

Western European economies emerged from WWII devastated, with severely decreased levels of industrial output in Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, France and the Netherlands, and growing social agitation due to high levels of unemployment and inflation (Harmon, 1971). The instability of Western European capitalism was all the more worrying for the European bourgeoisie as Moscow had made clear its intention to incorporate Eastern Europe (Marfleet, 2003). The North American government was also concerned about the prospect of revolutionary social movements spreading across Europe and of a Russian takeover of unstable areas of capitalist Europe.

In 1947, a policy planning body of the US State Department argued for North American support for a stabilisation strategy in Europe, stating that:

> the present crisis (in Europe) results to a large part from the disruptive effects of the war ... The Communists are exploiting the European crisis and further Communist success would create serious dangers for US security ... American effort in and to Europe should be directed ... to restoration of the health and vigour of European society... (Price, 1955, p. 22 quoted in Harmon, 1971).

These considerations, and others to which I come back to below, convinced the American government to put great efforts into the economic reconstruction of Europe. Their venture was formalised in the 1947 European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Aid Plan after then-Secretary of State George Marshall. The conditionality attached to benefiting from the Plan was that European states had to join the Organization for European Co-operation (OEEC): this reflected the desire of the American government to restructure European economies on a regional basis, so as to avoid the resurrection of rivalries between nationally-tied firms and capital of the interwar period (Harman, 1971). The aim of the OEEC was to promote multilateral trade between participating countries by reducing tariffs and quota restrictions.
From its inception, the idea of a European economic area was highly political and ideological. Rather than a natural process of supranational reconciliation, it was a project born out of political and economic power relations at work on a global scale in the post-WWII era. It was by no means a self-evident and uncontested process; rather, deeply entrenched European nationalisms and popular resistance constantly threatened to bring about the failure of the pan-continental project of economic collaboration pushed forward by the USA government and some of the European elites.

*The ambivalent American founding fathers of Europe*

Before continuing this history of European construction, it is interesting to reflect on the strategic objectives of the USA in relation to Europe. According to Layne (2003), the construction of Europe is above all the result of hegemonic pressures emanating from the USA. He claims that North American post-WWII initiatives in Europe were only partly driven by fears of Soviet hegemony over the region. If it had been the case, he suggests, North American involvement in Europe should have been over when the Soviet Union collapsed – if not in the 1960s, when the Europeans were able to deter Soviet military advance westward without the United States (Layne, 2003). Not only has North American military power not retracted from Europe, but NATO has undergone two rounds of expansion since 1991.

For Layne, ‘the Atlantic Alliance’s primary raison d’être, from Washington’s standpoint, was to keep America in -and on top- so that Germans could be kept down, Europe could be kept quiet militarily, and the Europeans would lack any pressing incentive to unite politically’ (Layne, 2003, p. 19). Layne claims that ‘Washington was not really so concerned that Western European governments would drift into Moscow’s political orbit, but it was very concerned that they would embrace the kinds of nationalist, or autarkic, economic policies that were anathema to America’s goal of an open international economy’ (Layne, 2003, p. 20). American strategists perceived that the USA’s economic interests would be endangered if ‘post-war Europe relapsed into its bad habits of nationalism, great power rivalries and realpolitik’ (2003, p.20).
The USA worked to produce a militarily de-nationalised and economically integrated, yet not politically unified, Europe. This fitted their post-war objective of a capitalist West, whilst preventing the emergence of new poles of power in the international system that could challenge their geopolitical pre-eminence. For Layne, decades later, the same hegemonic rivalries are still at play between the USA and Europe:

For the United States, a Europe that speaks with many voices is optimal, which is why the United States is tying to ensure that the EU's ‘state-building’ process fails— thereby heading off the emergence of a united Europe that could become an independent pole of power in the international system (2003, p. 23-4)

The tensions that characterised the project of creating an economically unified Europe have shaped its trajectory. I now look at some of the milestones of European construction which illustrates the way in which the contradictory tendencies between national and supranational organisation of capital led to a complex and multi-layered formation shot through by frictions and paradoxes.

Building the European Economic Community

In 1949, in order to push forward economic cooperation and integration in the region, the French government put forward two plans: the Pleven Plan, which called for the establishment of a supranational European army as part of a European Defence Community, and the Schuman Plan, which aimed to create a Europe-wide coal and steel industry.

The first plan failed due to a French veto, which reflects the contradictions of the European project and the instrumental approach to the Community by national governments. The Schuman Plan was accepted by five other Western European powers (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg). In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was inaugurated. Marfleet (2003) argues that ‘[the ECSC] reflected the awareness of national capitalist classes that they had growing interests which transcended frontiers but that each was located firmly within structures of a specific state’.
The conflict between the internationalisation of capitalist and its national organisation continued shaping the path of European construction. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) which established a European common market. One of the aims of the EEC was to overcome this conflict by encouraging crossborder mergers, supported by the establishment of a form of supra-state and further integration at European level of the European capitalist classes. However, this proved a difficult task and the desired Europeanisation of capital kept clashing with national state boundaries (Harman, 1991, p.11).

Nation-states would use the European arena as a means to pursue their own national economic interests. Though the trend of systems of production was to exceed national boundaries, the majority of firms continued to be owned and to operate from particular national bases. As a result, the EEC structure was unstable. According to Marfleet (2003), the EEC remained an intergovernmental organisation where needs and imperatives of still overwhelmingly national capital were protected without subordinating the interests of the state to a supranational vision (Marfleet, 2003).

As global capitalism kept internationalising, the contradictions between national and international organisation became increasingly problematic for European capitalist classes. The mere tariff-free arrangement provided by the EEC was not enough to ensure competitiveness in the world economy. In particular, the movement of capital had to be deregulated so as to promote intra-European investments. This also required that the investment environment across Europe be harmonised. In order to progress towards a free investment zone, the first plan to fix the exchange rate of European currencies was put forward in 1972, in the form of a ‘snake’ that linked European currency. The ‘snake’ plan failed abruptly when the main European countries withdrew from it in the wake of the 1973 crisis.

A second attempt at fixing exchange rates was made in 1978 with the European Monetary System of Valery Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. This arrangement was particularly beneficial for Germany, as tying the Deutschmark to weaker currencies would prevent it from rising so much as to make German
exports uncompetitive. This illustrates German financial dominance within the EEC as well as the competition between member-states that was taking place within the European project (Callinicos, 1997).

The Single Market

Following these failures, the debate on a monetary union was not re-launched until the mid-1980s. In 1986, the project eventually succeeded: the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in order to create a Single Market by 1992. The governors of the central banks of the twelve EEC member states set out a plan to establish the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which paved the way for the adoption of a single currency – the euro.

The EMU included the creation of the European System of Central Banks, which would be in charge of formulating and implementing monetary policies. The agreement around the EMU, as shown by Callinicos, essentially emerged as a compromise reflecting the interest of the two dominant economic powers in the EEC – France and Germany.

EMU was attractive to the French ruling class for two reasons. First, by strengthening the EC as an economic bloc it would allow European governments to act more independently of the US. The same objective lay behind French efforts, bitterly opposed by Washington and London, to encourage Germany in particular and the Community more generally to engage in military co-operation outside the framework of the US-dominated NATO. Secondly, EMU would reverse the shift in the balance of economic power in Germany’s favour that had occurred in the early 1980s (Callinicos, 1997).

Germany, which had more interest in furthering the political than the economic integration of the Community, originally vigorously opposed the EMU, but was eventually persuaded by the introduction of strict convergence criteria, laid out in the Maastricht Treaty.

Shortly after, in a similar push for further integration to resolve the contradictions of the European Community, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU), which replaced the EC. The EU is organised around a three-pillar system, which reflects the mixture of intergovernmental and
supranational arrangements co-existing in the Union. This structure testifies to
the ambivalent relation between the Union and its member states. The only
directly-elected European institution, the European Parliament, received very
limited authority over key policy areas – such as foreign policy, justice and civil
matters – which are all contained in pillars governed through intergovernmental
arrangements.

The establishment of the EU reflected the need for further integration between
European member states at a time when the global economy was changing. In
particular, it mirrors the global shift towards neoliberalism in the 1970s and 80s.
The re-launch of the single market project embedded neoliberalism into the
European Community/Union. As put by Stephan Gill:

The re-launch started with the turnaround from ‘Eurosclerosis’ to
‘Europhoria’ at the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit. The principle of
international market discipline associated with neoliberalism was then
institutionalised when the SEA was ratified in 1987 (2003, p.63).

Gill describes the essential trait of this new configuration as a market-oriented
European constitutionalism which further removes political decision-making
from democratic control and weakens social regulation at the national level. In
his words:

Maastricht and EMU seek to minimise the threat of currency turbulence
by moving to a single currency and by ‘locking in’ political commitments
to orthodox market-monetary fiscal and monetary policies that are
perceived to increase government credibility in the eyes of financial
market players’ (1998, p.5).

The progression and trajectory of European integration have been intimately
related to the contradictory processes of capitalist reproduction, accumulation
and expansion. A set of economic, social and political dynamics have been at
play in this process: the tension between the fixity and motion of capital, the
relationship between national states and capital, the opposition between
entrenched nationalisms and the pressure from (and resistance to) hegemonic
ambitions for Europe. This process also has consequences for the exercise of
democracy in the member states of the EU, as I come back to below.
The result by the early 1990s was, in Callinicos’ words, a 'bizarre European amalgam of supranational institutions and intergovernmental co-operation' (1997). This complex, possibly amorphous, framework of institutions, regulations and norms has been shaped by forces of global capitalism. While the narrative around the creation of the EU suggested that the ‘long awaited European super-power was finally taking shape, a series of developments soon punctured these dreams’ (Callinicos, 1997). The first crisis was the EU’s inability to find a solution to the war that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. No coherent European policy could emerge to respond to the situation. However, the shift to the EU did successfully embed neoliberalism in the structure of the Union.

The EU has been actively shaping and producing modes of capitalist development in the region and beyond. These produce tensions and contradictions which are manifested in the relations of the EU with the rest of the world – in particular its impoverished Southern and Eastern neighbours – as well as in internal European relations, characterised by an increasing gap in wealth and development between the richest (mostly Northern, Western and Central) and poorest (Southern and Eastern) states.

In the next chapter, I discuss the importance of the area of immigration policies as a field of political cooperation in this contradictory context. Before doing so, I look at processes of de-bordering and re-bordering in the EU.

**The changing borders of Europe**

**European enlargements**

The historical development of the EU has been characterised by contradictory tendencies resulting in a bizarre concoction of supranational, intergovernmental, national and local legal and institutional layers. In terms of its geographical scope, the European Community, later European Union, has grown from an original six members to its actual 28 member states through successive enlargements. In the 1980s, several Mediterranean countries
entered the EEC (Greece, Spain and Portugal). More recently, in 2004 and 2007, ten former Soviet Union countries from Central and Eastern Europe have joined the EU. The dominant narrative around enlargements has been that, as countries emerge from previous dictatorships, they are keen to develop democracy and to share in the advantages of the Western way of life.

Yet, looking at the accession procedures to enter the EU, a different picture emerges. The Eastern enlargements can be seen as a process of border extension which reshaped the relation between Western Europe and its neighbours in order to inscribe them within the economic and political neoliberal order. This neoliberal dimension is well illustrated by the privatisation and liberalisation process that took place in Central and Eastern European countries in preparation for their entry into the Union (Engelbrekt, 2002; Böröcz and Kovács, 2001). The Copenhagen Criteria, which refers to the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the EU, does not allow new countries to opt-out of certain policies.

Consequently, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU shaped domestic policy of accession countries. This process was marked by the introduction of neoliberal reforms such as ‘tax preferences for foreign direct investment and the generic structural adjustment policies’ (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001, p. 14). The extent to which the EU influences the political and economic life of countries of its periphery has even been likened to a ‘quasi-colonial regime’ (Kouvelakis, 2011; Kouvelakis, Durand and Keucheyan, 2014).

In it interesting to highlight that, until two generations ago, nine of the current EU member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) directly controlled between a third and a half of the world outside Europe. Before the 2004 Eastern enlargement, these nine states represented 90% of the overall EU population and were its most powerful members. Their possessions reached almost 75% of all territories in 1913 and 1933 (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001, p.11).

4 As well as Cyprus and Malta.
5 An important recent example is the opposition to the Syriza-led government in Greece, which has revealed the extent to which the most powerful member states in the Union dictate the economic and political agenda of less wealthy countries.
This illustrates the significance of colonial experience in the history of the EU. The sharing and pooling of the economic activities and sovereignty of these former colonial powers in the wake of World War II must also be understood in the context of the rise of independence movements across the colonised world. It is another aspect of how Europe rescued the Western European nation-states.

**The centrality of borders**

It is interesting to think about these developments in relation to Mezzadra’s analysis of how de-bordering and re-bordering spaces allow to ‘articulate radically heterogeneous geographic, political, legal, social, and cultural scales in the global dimension of current accumulation circuits’ (2010). This, according to Mezzadra, ‘is one of the most important tasks that confronts contemporary capitalism’ (2010, p. 122). It echoes reflections developed earlier regarding the re-scaling of territories under neoliberal capitalism.

Mezzadra speaks of a ‘postcolonial geography of power’ which is characterised by its ability to articulate different spatial and temporal zones of capitalism and translate them into the unitary language of capitalist value (2007, pp. 128-32). Global capitalism is an organisation of the world which incorporates the differences it encounters into one meta-system. Within this global system, it is the border which represents the ‘basic logical operator of articulation and translation’ (Mezzadra, 2007). Borders are crucial to the exercise of global capitalism and its local and regional embodiments. Process of un-bordering, de-bordering and re-bordering in Europe must be understood in that context and attention must be paid to their function in the neoliberal regime.

Balibar argues that capitalist modernity cannot be grasped without looking at the proliferation of borders and at their centrality in our social, political and economic experiences (2004). For Balibar (2009), Europe itself is becoming a ‘borderland’ – a space where capitalism constantly has to integrate, articulate and translate uneven realities of capitalist production – and hence has to produce and reproduce borders.
Thus, borders are not at the periphery but at the very centre of the EU project, which relies on maintaining and reproducing certain social and economic relations between its member states as well as with the rest of the world. The borders of Europe, the constant reshaping of their geographical location but also of their nature and function, play a crucial role in, on the one hand, articulating the space of Europe against neighbouring spaces and, on the other, producing zones of graduated sovereignty which reorganise production and labour markets inside and outside Europe.6

The European regional bloc has produced a ‘mega-border’ between the EU and the rest of the world and is also internally traversed by numerous borders, which do not strictly separate the inside from the outside as much as create grades and topologies of insertion and exclusion between people and countries.

**Bordered sovereignties: neoliberal governance and politics**

Another important consequence of the postcolonial geography of power and its multiple borders is that sovereignty and law, the two basic criteria of a modern political space, are being intensely reshaped. Sassen (2006, p.242) identifies the emergence of a global law, ‘centered on a multiplicity of global but partial regimes that address the needs of specialized sectors’, while sovereignty ‘remains a systemic property but its institutional insertion and its capacity to legitimate and absorb all legitimating power, to be the source of the law, have become unstable’ (Sassen, 2006, p. 415). This echoes Ong’s investigation of the heterogeneity of labour controls and working laws as expressed in the emergence of zones of exception and graduated sovereignty which she describes as ‘striated spaces of production that combine different kinds of labor regimes’ (Ong, 2006, p. 121).

Sassen (2006, pp. 141-96) argues that the intricate and multifaceted process of change in territories and sovereignties under conditions of advanced capitalism requires that we think about issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity in terms of a reconfiguration that reorganises capabilities of the state in different ways, and leads to a new balance of forces between various functions

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6 The evolution in the nature of the European border will be examined in the next two chapters.
of the state apparatus. She considers these changes to belong to a deep process that started in 1980s and is related to the spread and implementation of neoliberal policies. Neoliberalism, she proposes, leads to a structural evolution of the liberal state (Sassen, 2006). Sassen also rejects any binary, zero-sum game analyses. She argues that states’ experience of globalisation and their implication in processes of reconfiguration of traditional notions of territory and sovereignty have led to a structural rearrangement that entails both the strengthening and the weakening of different segments of their activities. This allows us to think of the European Union as a project of re-organisation of states’ capacities and to move away from the dichotomy opposing the resilience of the nation-state to the process of European integration.

For Mezzadra (2007), evolutions in state sovereignty produces zones where neoliberalism becomes a mode of governance and management of populations. Within the EU, some of the people most affected by these zones of exception and differentiated labour regimes are migrants. Even inside the European ‘mega-border’, they are kept ‘at the border’ through having limited or no access to rights. They exist and produce outside the realm of normal jurisdiction and are omitted from national labour controls and regulations. Economically, they offer an exploitable workforce for European employers. They play a part in the global production chain and their spaces of production, whilst inside the territory of Europe, are articulated to other, sometimes radically different, spaces through processes of differentiation and bordering which in this case relies on exclusion from residency/citizenship and associated labour protection rights. The question that this raises for my research, to which I come back to later, is that of how to create sites from which to claim more rights and equality in the context of neoliberalism as a mode of governance.

Another important aspect of neoliberal governance and politics, with consequences for the research project, is the increasingly clear association between neoliberalism and forms of authoritarianism. As seen, contrary to what both its supporters and many of its critics claim, neoliberalism is not linked to minimal government intervention and to a ‘rolling back’ of the state. Rather, neoliberalism has rolled back some of the interventions that had been dominant state functions in the context of Keynesian national states (as well as
developmental and socialist states). These include primarily interventions related to welfare provision and social support. However, neoliberalism has also enhanced state interventions aimed at implementing new forms of governance that are seen as more appropriate for the market-driven, neoliberal global order (Jessop, 2002, p. 454).

Since 2008 and the advent of the economic crisis in Europe, this structural reshaping of the state has been led with virtually no democratic deliberation under the banner of austerity. This lack of popular consultation illustrates the anti-democratic and increasingly authoritarian nature of the neoliberal state. It also indicates the overall inability of neoliberalism to garner popular consent and support. Moreover, wherever resistance movements and social struggles have erupted to oppose austerity, European states have engaged in intensified repression, including police deployment and the passing of laws criminalising protest (see AEDH, 2014; The Guardian 2012).

According to Ian Bruff (2012), this increasing authoritarian turn is not a clear break from previous neoliberal practices. It is, however, qualitatively different, because ‘dominant social groups are less interested in neutralising resistance and dissent via concessions and forms of compromises that maintain their hegemony, favouring instead the explicit exclusion and marginalisation’ of protesting groups (Bruff, 2012, p. 114). It seems that this authoritarian fix participates both in the (temporary) consolidation of the neoliberal order, by successfully neutralising protest through violent repression, but could also lead to its long term weakening as this strategy does little to secure popular consent.

A further useful concept to reflect on the transformation of the state under conditions of neoliberalism in Europe is that of the ‘neoliberal Centaur state’ put forward by Wacquant (2010). Wacquant argues that neoliberalism has profoundly affected the state not solely by influencing its policies but by impacting on its very architecture. Rather than a shrinking of government, he identifies the formation of what he terms the Centaur state, ‘liberal at the top and paternalistic at the bottom’ (2010, p.217). This new formation ‘presents radically different faces at the two ends of the social hierarchy: a comely and caring visage toward the middle and upper classes, and a fearsome and
frowning mug toward the lower class’ (p. 217). Those of the bottom of the ‘class and ethnic structure’ (p. 203) are faced with an increasingly punitive logic, coupled with particular forms of ‘disciplinary philosophy of behaviorism and moralism’ (p. 202).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have examined the relations between the European Union, its member states and capitalist globalisation. I have shown that the EU is a project that, contrary to mainstream accounts, has not led to the weakening or secession of member states, but rather has allowed their survival and integration into the neoliberal global order through a process of internationalisation of some of their economic activities and a restructuring of some of their functions.

In the next chapter I look at what I call the ‘politics of Europeanism’ that is to say the attempt by politicians of the EU and its member states to secure legitimacy for the European project through the formulation of a discourse on European belonging. I argue that in order to induce popular identification and consent toward the neoliberal project of the EU, its supporters have resorted to a discourse on Europeanity that separates ‘Europeans’ from ‘non-Europeans’.
Chapter II

Identity and the Migrant in the European Union

Introduction

I have argued that the EU must be thought of as a project reflecting the tension between the national organisation of capital and its tendency towards internationalisation. In the post-war era, European capitalist classes were aware of a growing need to pursue economic interests beyond their national borders, yet remained strongly anchored within their own state’s structures. The European Community was thus an arena for both cooperation and competition for its members.

In this chapter, I propose that in an attempt to solve some of these contradictions, a set of discursive and symbolic interventions were initiated by Eurocrats aiming at triggering a stronger sense of allegiance toward ‘Europe’. Crucial to this process was the formulation of a discourse of ‘Europeanism’ – a strategy that draws on traditions of nationalism in order to postulate a common identity and fate among the ‘peoples of Europe’ and to cement them into the European project. Europeanism is based on the idea of Europeanity, premised on an insurmountable difference between ‘European’ and ‘non-European’.

Identity in the European Union: the politics of Europeanism

‘You don't fall in love with a common market’

By the 1970s, the post-war Keynesian compromise was quickly losing ground to neoliberal approaches and the so-called ‘golden age’ of capitalism seemed to be coming to an end. In the USA, the hundred-year period of rising wages was permanently over, while privatisation of production and deregulation of markets were reaching unprecedented levels (Wolff, 2012, p. 146). In the UK, the 1979 appointment of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister inaugurated a programme of privatisation, market deregulation, liberalisation and trade union marginalisation.
The reorganisation of traditional economic sectors (and complete dismantlement of others) in the UK was paralleled by similar restructuring processes in other Western European countries (Marfleet, 1999). In line with neoliberal principles, member states were also trying to reduce government spending at a time when unemployment was massively on the rise. While the EC was the target of increasing hostility both from people of the member states and by segments of national capitalist classes, European politicians, such as Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors, remained firmly convinced that more integration was needed for European economies to survive the crisis.

In this context of growing Euroscepticism, pushing for further Europeanisation was rendered difficult and the issue of popular mistrust toward the European Union became an object of growing concern. The idea of a ‘legitimacy deficit’ of the Community gained currency and attention started being paid to ‘European public opinion’. The introduction of the Eurobarometer, a tool aimed at monitoring popular feelings toward the Community, is an instructive example of the rising anxiety of European architects and the challenges they faced in securing consent from the people of its member states (Marfleet, 1999). The objective of the Eurobarometer was in fact twofold. While the polling system was presented as a means to learn more about people’s opinions in order to inform policy, its creators also saw it as a performative tool that would ‘help reveal Europeans to each other’ (Signorelli, 2012, p. 14).

In other words, as further economic and political integration was encouraged by leading European politicians, a fear emerged that it would be limited unless people started feeling ‘more European’. This did not entail detaching people from their national allegiances. The EU is a project that exists and functions through national structures and institutions and does not call, in fact, for the secession of its individual member states. Rather, nation-states and their national narratives have to be brought together and integrated into ‘something larger’, which complements rather than replaces them. National politicians play a key part in mediating between the European Community/Union and their population.

7 Most notably in the British Conservative Party.
To an extent, this means that the European project can operate without the same degree of allegiance and support that people have demonstrated towards the nation-state. It does, however, require a level of legitimacy in its operationalisation and for its continuation. As argued by Fran Cetti (2010), ‘the survival of locally or regionally based capitals in an internationally hybrid world of instability, regional conflicts and economic convulsions demands, therefore, an inherently ideological operation to postulate a unitary set of interests in the attempt to displace social antagonisms and secure legitimacy’. But, as put by one of Europe’s architects, Jacques Delors, ‘you don’t fall in love with a common market; you need something else’ (quoted in Laffon, 1996, p.95). Yet, in a formation as contradictory as the European Community, what are the available ideological resources that can be mobilised in order to produce a sense of unity? As argued by Marfleet (1999):

The EC was not a nation-state in which an ideology of ‘belonging’ could be mobilised during periods of instability or crisis. It lacked a framework for nationalism: myths of common origin, a national religious community, a monarchy. The Community had been constructed upon nation-states which had emerged from centuries of local rivalry: there could be no reference point for an EC patriotism, no European Jeanne d’Arc.

I now propose to look at some of the strategies set out by the EU to stipulate unity and gain legitimacy. I suggest labelling this ideological struggle for meaning as ‘politics of Europeanism’.

The politics of Europeanism

One strategy deployed by Europe’s architects has been to insist on the need for a cultural European identity to emerge. In this vein, a set of symbols aimed at signifying a common European history and culture, and at triggering affection toward Europe among the people of its member states, have been introduced. These include a European flag, adopted in 1983, a European anthem (the prelude to the ‘Ode to Joy’ from Beethoven’s ninth symphony chosen in 1972), a motto (‘Unity in Diversity’) as well as ‘Europe day’, adopted in 1985 (European Union, no date-b). In addition, a set of cultural activities supposedly related to Europe was implemented and a number of cultural institutions aiming at promoting European ties were established. This new European culture brought
together an odd mix of populist initiatives, with little anchorage in the region’s history, and symbols of high culture, with little chance of triggering popular attachment. Delanty describes such attempts at producing European cultural identity as:

…pathetic exercises in cultural engineering: the Eurovision Song Contest, Euro-Disney, the Ecu, the Annual European City of Culture and the cultural apparatus of the new institutions was not the stuff out of which new symbolic structures could be built. (1995, p. 128)

Waever and Kelstrup (1993, p. 67) label this a ‘balloons and flags’ strategy aimed at making the EC more appealing and, maybe, at inducing a degree of affection towards it, but with little actual significance in terms of people’s actual identification with Europe. Delanty (1995) also argues that the mobilisation of emblems inspired from the traditional appendage of nationalism is largely inadequate and lacks both meaning and emotional impact.

As part of this existential quest for meaning, there was also a multiplication of narratives keen on tracing back the roots of the Union to ancient times, drawing on European past to present recent territorial transformations as the linear continuation of a European historical and cultural spirit in motion. A rather crude example was Jordan’s assertion that ‘Europe is a culture which occupies a cultural area’ (Jordan, 1973 as quoted in Paasi, 2001). But we can also note, particularly since 1989, a sharp increase in a ‘cultural and historical literature on the question of Europe’ (Nowotny, 2000). He claims that (2000):

From the medievalist Jacques Le Goff to Rémi Brague, professor of Arabic philosophy, the "postmodern" conservative Peter Koslowski and the left-wing liberal Massimo Cacciari, this literature shares a specific interest in a historiologically decipherable "identity", as well as in cultural-historical prototypes of Europe which are supposed to allow conclusions – or rather preconceived judgements – on the future shape of the EU.

A common trait of these types of research is that a set of historical events and ideas are drawn upon to create a coherent narrative of the construction of Europe as an entity. They also sanctify Europe, upholding it as a desirable model with universal validity. Tony Judt (2005, p. 798) praises ‘Europe’s emergence in the dawn of the 21st century as a paragon of international virtues:
a community of values held up by Europeans and non-Europeans alike as an exemplar for all to emulate’. Perry Anderson (2010, p. 47) also comments on how, in the UK, no group expressed better the mythology of Europeanism that was created to support and trigger popular affection toward the EU project than New Labour. In *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*, Mark Leonard invites his readers to share his dream: ‘[i]magine a world of peace, prosperity and democracy... What I am asking you to imagine is the ‘New European Century’...’ (2005, p. 85 quoted in Anderson 2011, p. 47). Mark Leonard goes on to add that:

> Europe represents a synthesis of the energy and freedom that come from liberalism with the stability and welfare that come from social democracy. As the world becomes richer and moves beyond satisfying basic needs such as hunger and health, the European way of life will become irresistible (2005, p. 85 quoted in Anderson 2011, p. 47)

For these authors, the history of Europe is one of enlightenment, attachment to liberties and social justice, and the European Union is the logical and praiseworthy expression of the values of the European space. These narratives form what I call the dominant discourse on Europe. They attempt to identify common historical and cultural features bringing together Europeans and produce a discourse on ‘Europeanity’.

*Europe and its Others*

In contrast to essentialist narratives, a number of scholars have elaborated critical reflections on the attempts at forming a European identity. Gerard Delanty (1995) claims that defining and representing Europe has always relied on representations of what it is not and of its boundaries/borders, and been characterised by the lack of European unity besides that achieved through adversity. He demonstrates that lines of exclusion/inclusion have always been at the heart of projects related to the idea of Europe and that Europe’s cultural and political identity has historically been articulated in and through its relation to Other(s), and through a process of constant reconstruction of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ reflecting particular sets of power relations at given points in time. Ideas of Europe have been characterised by their production of differences, on both geographical and ‘mythological’ terms.

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Delanty deconstructs the processes through which ideas of difference have been created and what has been included/excluded at different times and in different spatial contexts (following changes in the geography of Europe). He shows how these constructed ‘difference’/’Other(s)’ have been mobilised to define particular ideas of Europe. His conclusion is that these dynamics of exclusion are more than ever at work in the project of the EU:

who is a European is largely a matter of exclusion, and in the dichotomy of self and Other which constitutes the discourse of European identity, Europeanity is constructed in opposition with the non-European, in particular Islam. This sense of the uniqueness of the European is today emerging as a basis for a kind of supranational identity and citizenship which European integration does not have (Delanty, 1995, p. 9).

In a similar vein, Marfleet (1999) looks back at the history of the notion of European civilisation and identifies 18th-century’s Enlightenment as a turning point, when ideas of Europe started to take a specific political and cultural shape. These new ideas of Europe resulted from the experience of European bourgeois classes in the world and were hence closely related to colonial expansion, of which bourgeois merchants were the prime beneficiaries. The idea of a superior European civilisation provided a moral legitimisation for their colonial ventures and the oppression of people seen as inferior. Marfleet concludes that ‘[t]o this extent, the idea of Europe was one generated by those who wished to assert a universal mission for capitalism’ (1999).

Delanty and Marfleet show that this early ‘Europeanism’ already bore heavy contradictions in the context of the intense rivalries opposing European colonial powers. In effect, different ideas of Europe were mobilised by national ideologies in order to serve their own national interests. Delanty refers to colonial France’s concept of Europe as ‘a thoroughly French affair … proclaim[ing] “the superiority of the European religion, the white race and the French language”’ (Delanty, 1995, p. 71). In the first half of the 20th century, it is the fascist vision of a culturally uniform, unified European continent which gained prominence over other visions of Europe. Hitler’s ‘European New Order’, which would be imposed on the world by Nazi Germany, entailed the
supremacy of the ‘master race’ and the physical annihilation of those considered as ‘racially inferior’. For Delanty, this was ‘the apotheosis of the idea of Europe’ (1995, p. 112).

Throughout the Cold War, Europe’s obvious Other was the Soviet system and the notion of Western civilisation bringing together Europe and the USA against the Communist enemy was a crucial part of Western propaganda. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of its key ideological reference point, Europe yet again had to reinvent its Other so as to define itself. In this context, Marfleet (1999, 2003) looks at the part played by Huntington’s theory of a ‘clash of civilisations’ in the construction of a new sense of Europeanity. The ‘clash theory’ relies on a primordialist reading of history and of the world, seen as divided into hermetic areas of ‘culture’. Those belonging to other civilisations are constructed as absolute Others. According to Marfleet, it is in the mirror of this renewed otherness that European politicians have tried to anchor an ever-fleeting sense of a European identity in the post-Cold War era. A key figure in that discourse is that of the ‘migrant’: an ‘alien’ presence from a ‘different civilisation’, who has entered European soil. In the early 1990s, migrants and migration became increasingly important focuses of European debate and policies.

These observations are confirmed by the work of Liz Fekete. Looking at recent developments, Fekete (2001, 2009) examines the rise of ‘xeno-racism’,

a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe's doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the first place. It is a racism ... that cannot be colour-coded,' (Sivanandan quoted in Fekete, 2001, p. 24).

She evidences the intrinsic relation linking media, legal, discursive and physical practices of xeno-racism in Europe, and the strengthening of a shared sense of European belonging and identity as a basis for European citizenship. In doing so, she demonstrates the importance and the instrumentality of the (produced)
figure of the forced migrant as an ideological cog of the European discourse on identity and belonging.

European identity is thus created at its external and internal borders – in its regime of visa and residence permits, in its detention centres, in its discrimination toward migrants in its member states. As argued by Haynes, ‘it is here, in both the ideas and practice of immigration control, perpetuated both at the intergovernmental level and at the level of the EU, that the new ‘Europe’ is being forged, a much as in the debates and celebrations of internal unity’ (1999, p. 25).

This brings to mind reflections by Balibar and Wallerstein (2010), and other theorists of racism, who observe that racism, while a persistent mechanism of control and exclusion, evolves in its objects and articulations depending on the historical, social and political conjunctures within which it takes shape. Hence the move to a cultural racism does not mean either that the old racism has completely disappeared, nor that the fundamental structure and functions of racism have changed. This broad definition of racism encompasses several forms of exclusion and depreciation, not necessarily underpinned by biological theories of race. Instead, it looks beyond the specifically ‘ethnic’ and ‘biological’ forms taken by racism at particular points in history and analyses the origin and genealogy of the ‘race myth’.

In this sense, various forms of minority oppression leading to the racialisation of different groups (not just ethnic but also based on religion, gender, class and so on) are brought together under the concept of racism as a mechanism of naturalisation of differences and, in turn, of inequalities (Balibar and Wallerstein, 2010, p. 48). In fine, these different instances of depreciation and racialisation are not a juxtaposition of similar but independent processes, merely taking different objects. Rather, they constitute ‘a historical system of complementary exclusions and dominations which are mutually interconnected’ (2010, p. 49, author’s italics). Racism is thus a polymorphic process which fulfils an overarching function and is connected to ‘the whole set of practices of social normalisation and exclusion’ (2010, p. 49). Historically, racism as a mechanism of naturalisation of difference and exclusion has been closely related to the
constitution of nationalism and the production of the ‘imagined community’ on which the nation-state depends (2010, p. 48-50).  

Europe’s new racism primarily targets migrants coming from outside the EU. However, ‘internal enemies’ have also been identified. Roma people, who were the victims of aggravated persecution in the 1920s and 1930s, have faced new forms of extreme marginalisation in the last two decades. In Central and Eastern Europe, the post-1989 transition has led to such heightened racism and violence against Roma communities that Kenrick speaks of ‘a new genocide against Gypsies’ (1998, p. 12). Pogroms and mob attacks against Roma people have multiplied in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Slovak and Czech Republics. In 1993, the mayor of a Slovak village stated: ‘I am not racist, but some Gypsies you would have to shoot’ (Younge, 2013b). In Western Europe, Roma migrants have also been subjected to incredible levels of media hostility as well as to physical abuse. Most Roma people coming to claim asylum in Western Europe have been expelled, in spite of many of them being EU citizens. France in particular has engaged in policy of systematic deportation of Romani communities, under the pretext of removing ‘illegal camps’ across the country (BBC, 2010). This, ironically, took place while the EU was engaged in efforts to secure Roma rights in Eastern and Central European countries, which proves the full awareness of Western European politicians deporting Roma migrants of the persecution facing these communities.

**Europe’s new Orientalism**

What these reflections on the development of a ‘xeno-’ European racism point to is the emergence of a ‘new Orientalism’ (Marfleet, 2000, pp. 261-92), that is, the resurgence of Orientalism under a ‘revisited’ guise. Said (1978) coined the term ‘Orientalism’ to depict a way of speaking and thinking which produces, emphasises and stabilises particular sets of representations of the ‘Orient’ (a broad term to designate, essentially, the non-European). Underpinning

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8 The relationship between state and popular racism is well explained by Nell MacMaster in his book on *Racism in Europe* (2001). MacMaster argues that the ‘genesis of modern racist practices has been most crucially a top-down process through which élites have played the greatest role in initiating action or forming a wider public opinion’ (p. 8). He examines how the educated European elites translated the central ideas of racist theories into ‘popular forms and slogans’ (p.8) which fitted pre-existing political agendas.
Orientalist representations lies an ‘ontological and epistemological distinction’ (1978, p. 2) between a Western/European ‘we’, characterised by modernity and progress, and a backward, uncivilised and potentially dangerous ‘other’.

Crucially, Said insists on the fact that the Orient has been an integral and formative aspect of the construction of European culture and that it has ‘helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality and experience’ (1978, pp. 1-2). A discursive construction, Orientalism nevertheless transformed into a political tool of domination, which lent itself to European imperialist ambitions in the East and legitimised European control of the Orient. The discourse of Orientalism, Said contends, was essential to the way European culture ‘was able to manage and even produce the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively’ (p. 3).

The discourse on cultural difference and incompatibility structuring the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory and underpinning the xeno-racism described by Fekete is thus a renewed form of Orientalism, based on a similar ‘ontological and epistemological distinction' between groups of people and serving similar goals of naturalisation of inequalities. This new Orientalism still operates as a tool of legitimisation of domination and authority, by justifying structural exclusion and segregation on cultural/civilisational grounds and producing a certain image of the world that calls for specific interventions. On the one hand, beyond the borders of the Western world, this new Orientalism has paved the way for and been mobilised in support of (global) military campaigns, such as G.W. Bush and his allies’ so-called ‘war on terror’. Particular representations of the non-West have been crucial to justify a series of military interventions, portrayed as landmarks of a new era of global governance in the post-Cold War ‘new world order’, but which have served the purpose of neo-imperialist expansion. In order to do so, it has relied on and produced figures of the ‘oriental’ Other strikingly similar to those examined by Said and characterised by backwardness, unenlightenment and a natural disposition toward violence.

9 In the postcolonial, post-cold war era, imperialism is characterised, as put by Colas and Saull, by US hegemony ‘in a world of open doors (capitalist markets) and closed frontiers (territorially sovereign states)’ (2010, p. 2).
On the other hand, in an era of intense international migrations where the geographical separation between East and West is blurred by people’s mobility and global integration, this new Orientalism has also mobilised new representations which draw on figures of otherness present in the territory of the West and naturalised their oppression. The figure of the forced migrant, endowed with a range of characteristics pointing to the impossibility of his/her cultural assimilation into a supposedly consistent set of European values and principles is a key representation of this new Orientalism. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the main features of this revamped ‘oriental’ Other – whether in a faraway land that requires Western intervention or inside Western territory as a migrant – has been its association with Islam (Delanty, 1995). 10 This Islam is represented as dangerous, ubiquitous and homogenous and functions as the antithesis to ‘European civilisation’. In his study of the media coverage of Islam on French television from 1975 to 2005, Deltombe (2007) observes the production of an ‘imaginary Islam’. He claims that the purpose of the discourse on Islam has been to continue, under a renewed and more acceptable guise, to justify the rejection of an essentialised and phantasmal Other.

I now examine accounts of the historical formation of the nation-state and explore the importance of figures of otherness and processes of bordering in the development of the state. These historical insights evidence the parallels between processes of creating the ‘nation’ and attempts by European ideologues at producing a discourse of European belonging.

**The nation-state, national identity and borders**

Looking at the issue of modern state-formation, Anderson (2006) claims that since the French revolution, borders, as institutions, have defined the state (as a legal entity sovereign within a territory) and the nation, by delimiting and circumscribing national identity and associated rights to nationality and citizenship. Frontiers enact a process of differentiation, by conceptualising an inside and an outside, and inscribe it into law and jurisdiction.

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10 These representations also affect children of migrant origin, who are French, English and so on, but are ‘racialised’ and ‘orientalised’.

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The border is crucial as the place where the process of differentiation on the basis of a shared understanding of national identity is continuously performed – in a geographical, legal and imagined sense – in an attempt to stabilise the ‘inside’ in relation to the ‘outside’. It plays the role of arbitrator in the politics of belonging and exclusion that are at work in nation-states. However, inside and outside are not clear-cut, stabilised categories (Anderson, 2006; Balibar, 2004). Consequently, frontiers are often described as places of confrontation and negotiation.

Zolberg analyses the dialectical relation between state- and identity-building in the modern era by conceptualising the development of new states as a double process: that of state-formation, or how the state ensures its sovereignty over a given territory, and that of nation-building, concerned with the production of ‘a people’. Both are interlinked: the production of the people has to happen within the delimited boundaries of the state, so as to become the ‘nation’. Both, abutting each other, form the modern nation-state.

_inventing the French nation_

The dependency of the modern nation-state on identification with a national community of people upon which it exercises sovereignty can hardly be overstated. The history of the development of Western nation-states shows this was well understood by their architects. The case of France throughout the 18th and 19th centuries is illustrative in this respect: the production and diffusion of French republican nationalism throughout the modern French territory was carefully engineered and implemented. All institutions of the state were put at the service of this task, and many were in fact created for this purpose. The origins of the national military service, obligatory for all men, and of free, secular and compulsory primary schooling, taught in French following national curricula, can be traced back to this period, as well as the development of a national press, in French, which was used as a tool of communication by the state.

At the symbolic level, the renaming of streets after figures of the revolution and the republic, the public commissioning of republican patriotic arts and statues to adorn cities and buildings around the country, the adoption of _La Marseillaise_ as the national anthem and of Bastille Day as a national holiday, all date back to
the 18th and 19th centuries. They were part of a process of national identity building, happening in parallel with the formation of the French state. These efforts confirmed and actualised the victory of what is now perceived as ‘French language and culture’ over what were once autonomous, distinctive groups such as Occitans, Gascons, Savoyards, Basques or Bretons (Citron, 2008). Official national history however offers a unified narrative starting from the Gauls and largely ignoring these differences in regional experience.

A crucial dimension of nationalism was that it implied that the people of the nation-state identify with a set of values and traditions that define their own nation in opposition to Others. Individual nation-states relied greatly on such Others for the production of a national discourse and identity. European nationalisms were essentially created against one another. The idea of the French national self and its supposedly inherent cultural traits were fashioned in opposition to other European nations. In his account of the production of French nationalism between 1680 and 1800, Bell (2001, p. 84) notes a fanatical hatred of England, based on representations of English people as ‘barbarians’. National traits were also identified against internal Others. As mentioned, language was a key element in the cementing of a French national identity, especially after the 1789 revolution: linguistic minorities (and particularly German-speaking groups) began being seen as ‘enemies’. These internal minorities were used as ‘markers against which authentic national traditions could be recorded’ (Marfleet, 2006, p. 101).

Religion played a crucial role. In the case of France, the fusion between early expressions of a national sentiment and religion is clear. Catholicism was an integral part of the national identity in formation, in particular in opposition to English Protestantism. In French national mythology, the symbol of Joan of Arc and her fight against English domination embodies most famously the correlation between national and religious identities. Religion also participated in the identification of internal Others, and religious minorities faced persecution and banishment from the nation under construction. As early as the 16th century, French Protestants (the Huguenots) were deemed undesirable, as I come back to below. In 1764 Jesuits were banned from the territory. While the Huguenots were targeted for not belonging to the majority Catholic religion at a
time when religious conformity was being asserted by an increasingly powerful central state, the Jesuits, though Catholic, were perceived as having international affiliations, including strong links to the papacy, and deemed as too autonomous (Roehmer, 1997, pp. 165-82).

Creating Britishness

In her account of the forging of British national identity between 1707 and 1837, Linda Colley (1992) focuses on the twin processes leading, on the one hand, to the emergence of mass allegiance to an idea of Britain, and, on the other, to the invention of Britishness. She offers a thorough account of the form of top-down transformations that were instigated by politicians in London in an effort to trigger unity across the territories of England, Scotland and Wales. At the same time, she undertakes a detailed analysis of how the mass population reacted to these developments and of the sense of national belonging that consequently emerged among British civilians.

In particular, Colley explores the links between the transformations of state power in Britain and the prolonged struggles and wars with her historical continental enemy, France. Major institutions of the British nation-state – including the Bank of England, the City of London, a centralised and nationwide fiscal system and a massive military machine – were created as part of the war effort (1992, p. 3). War also changed the relation between Britain’s rulers and the ‘people below’ who had until then been expected to be ‘orderly, obedient and passive’. The demands of wartime (including new taxation and various forms of participation in the war effort) led to a rise in the political awareness of ordinary Britons (p. 370). In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the press rapidly expanded allowing ‘large-scale reporting of parliamentary debates’, bringing the language of political debate to the masses (p. 363). The series of debates in the 1830s around Catholic emancipation, parliamentary reform and the campaign against slavery, Colley argues, have to be understood as early examples of British national debate, triggering nationwide mobilisation and opposing various ideas of what constituted Britishness.

An interesting contribution is Colley's argument that the transition from a ‘passive awareness’ of the national project to ‘an energetic participation on its
behalf’ (p. 371) was not solely a result of authoritative recommendations from above. It was often a pragmatic step from people who expected to profit from it in some way.

Men and women became British patriots in order to advertise their prominence in the community, or out of ambition for state or imperial employment, or because they believed that a wider British empire would benefit them commercially, or out of fear that a French victory would damage their security and livelihoods, or from a desire for excitement and an escape from the humdrum, or because they felt their religious identity was at stake, or – in some cases – because being an active patriot seemed an important step towards winning admission to full citizenship, a means of coming closer to the vote and to a say in the running of the state (p. 371)

These accounts of the construction of Western nation-states show that huge efforts were deployed by putative ruling classes in order to trigger and develop mass popular feelings of allegiance toward the state. Western European countries’ emerging bourgeoisies devoted enormous energy to the production and stabilisation of nationalism as a project and as an ideology; that is, to the development of patterns of belief and practice which both elicit sentiments of identification towards the nation as a natural entity, and which make the national order of the whole world appear as inevitable (Eagleton, 1991 quoted in Billig, 1995, p. 37). Nationalism became the dominant framework of social consciousness. This echoes what Billig (1995) calls ‘banal nationalism’, that is, the ways in which ‘the nation is flagged daily in the life of the citizenry’ (p. 6). The process by which nationalism gained hegemony as an understanding of the self, the community and the world embedded and dependent on the nation-state was a long historical process that was by no means straightforward.

Colley also insists on religion as vital to the coming together and continued cohesion of this ‘essentially invented nation’ (1992, p. 370). In most Western European countries, religion ‘converted peasants into patriots’ (p. 369). As in France, religion was a crucial unifying force in Britain long before the onset of modernisation and the associated advent of mass education, the press and the liberal democratic system. According to Colley, it was ‘their common investment in Protestantism that first allowed the English, the Welsh and the Scots to become fused together (...) despite their many cultural divergences’ (p. 368). It
was also religion that made wars against France after 1689 so significant in terms of national formation, with the emergence of the threatening French ‘Catholic Other’. The fear of invasion by this powerful enemy was key in triggering a more ‘active loyalty’ towards the idea of Britain. This bonding together against a vilified outsider was particularly important for the less privileged classes of British society, as it enabled them to conjure a flattering and virtuous sense of their own identity as Britons (p.369).

**Valuable migrants**

This helps us shed light on the relation between migration and nation-building. As mentioned, in the 17th century, French Huguenots were considered as out of place in the nation-in-formation, leading to their exile from the country. According to historians, about 200,000 French Huguenots were expelled or fled the country (Soguk, 1999, p. 59). For Soguk, the mass displacement of Huguenots marks a key turning point in the relation between human displacement and statecraft in Western Europe. From the perspective of France, Soguk (1999) argues, the Huguenot displacement reflects one of the earlier attempts ... by increasingly centralizing and bureaucratizing governments to intervene in the pastiche-like landscape of people to transform, share, organize, and manage the relations of people in ways instrument to the transformations of the government of the state. (p. 67)

In other words, in pre-revolutionary France, the construction and consolidation of the central state correlated with the assertion of an 'authentic' French identity, closely linked to religious identity, a process which eventually led to the displacement of a huge number of people. The Huguenot episode also put forward a particular concept of territory as a bounded space under the authority of a state, containing a specific population (p. 72). It was both an expression and a projection of France’s sovereign territoriality.

Importantly, at the moment when France was expelling its Protestants, English authorities were inviting them over to England. It is estimated that at least 50,000 French Huguenots made their way across the Channel following the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France (Cottret, 1991, p. 15). While
there might have been a humanitarian dimension to the welcome extended by the authorities to ‘fellow Protestants in distress’, Zolberg (1989) insists that this reception was instrumental – ‘an astute move in the game of statecraft’ (p.7).

What seems clear is that the Huguenots, persecuted by Britain’s main enemy in Europe and in its colonial ventures, were economically and ideologically providential for England. Many Huguenots used to live in French towns where they worked as skilled artisans (including weavers, silversmiths and watchmakers) or professionals such as doctors, merchants, soldiers and teachers. Huguenots were seen as valuable for Britain’s trade and commerce in times of mercantilism and their skills and know-how were considered assets by the British ruling classes (Soguk, 1999, pp. 59-70).

Particular effort was deployed to attract these wealthy immigrant groups: in Marfleet’s words, these were ‘profitable strangers’ (2006, pp. 106-7). Besides contributing to Britain’s industry at home, Huguenots, who had been heavily involved in France’s overseas trade and settlement, continued working as slave merchants from Britain and contributed significantly to its colonial development. Huguenots also joined the ranks of the army and fought alongside the British against France (Soguk, 1999, p. 62) as well as in Ireland, where, ironically, British forces were involved in a repression of Catholics similar to that of the French state toward the Huguenots (Marfleet, 2006, p. 105).

At first, the Huguenots were not seen favourably by all. The British government was faced with widespread opposition to their arrival. This was in part to do with centuries of British national sentiment having been built on opposition to France and anything ‘French’. Huguenots were also seen to be competing with locals for jobs and contending with impoverished Englishmen for charity (Olson, 2001, p. 3). In this context, the British state engaged in a major ideological campaign, relying on the national press as well as churches, to defend the refugees in the eyes of the British public (Marfleet, 2006, pp. 107-8). The Huguenots were offered numerous privileges, including a right to free denizenship (a status which an ‘alien’ could purchase and which granted them with rights normally reserved for the King or Queen’s subjects) and to freely exercise their trade.
Over the course of the coming decades, other refugees were accommodated by the British state. In particular, Britain opened its door to aristocratic nobility leaving France in the wake of the 1789 revolution, presenting them as political refugees fleeing tyranny. Again, these refugees were of economic and ideological value to the British ruling classes. They were functional to the ideology of England at the time and to its attempt to present itself as a country of freedom, as opposed, in particular, to oppressive France.

As observed by Olson (2001, pp. 269–86), other Protestant communities who suffered economic hardship and persecution in Europe, such as the Calvinist Palatines who fled Germany for England in 1709, triggered much less affection than the Huguenots. Some of Britain’s ruling groups similarly attempted to trigger sympathy toward Palatine immigration, which they perceived as an opportunity to increase Britain’s workforce (Vigne and Littleton, 2001). The Whigs published pamphlets depicting the Palatines as ‘refugees of consciousness’ and victims of Catholic repression, and organised a nationwide charity drive in support of them (Otterson, no date, p. 10). However, the majority of politicians of the time, including the Tories and members of the High Church Party, were fierce opponents of Palatine immigration.

An important difference between the Huguenots and this new group of immigrants was their economic status. Palatines, unlike the wealthy urban Huguenot professionals, were mostly poor and unskilled rural labourers. Palatines also originated from a region which had little political significance for England at the time. With disputes over their religious authenticity and no prospect of their bringing significant economic gain, the Palatines met a significantly different fate than that of the Huguenots. Many were placed in emergency accommodation, including army tents, in London (Dickinson, 1967, p. 469), in what Winder describes as the ‘world’s first official refugee camp’ (2004, p. 79). In contrast, Huguenots had always been portrayed as industrious people fitting readily in the social fabric of London.

This exhibiting of poor refugees in London was strategically significant for what was to come next. Eventually, Palatine refugees were deported from England. While most Palatines wished to be transported to American colonies, they were
at first resettled within the British Isles, principally in Ireland. This served to boost the numbers of the Protestant minority in these areas, and the Palatines were also used as labour for agriculture (Dickinson, 1967, pp. 475-7). A few years later, numerous families were transported to American colonies.

**National history and migrants**

Another difference between the historical experience of the Huguenots and the Palatines is their respective representation in official English history. This example can tell us something about the construction of refugees in mainstream national narratives. As the nation-state project progressed, the writing of national history became of major importance to the European states. Earlier in the thesis, I commented on the multiplication of narratives of Europe that attempted to emphasise a common past bringing together the people of the EU member states. This process sought to emulate one that took place in European nation-states, primarily in the 18th and 19th centuries, whereby 'official' historians developed historical accounts that increasingly stressed the national character of people recognised as belonging to their territory. These accounts usually focused on particular cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic traits and contributed to the demarcation of the territorial as well as socio-cultural borders of the nation-state.

In the process of the writing of national history, Marfleet observes, instances of forced migration, which ‘leave a legacy that affects the wider society over extraordinarily long periods of time’ (2013, p. 15), are almost systematically absent: they are 'excised from mainstream history'. Marfleet associates this with the modern nation-state:

> Before the emergence of the modern State, migration was broadly acknowledged as part of human experience and was referenced in a vast range of literature. Texts of the Abrahamic religions, first set down in Antiquity, identified certain migratory episodes and their significance for belief and practice ... Seminal works of the Classical era, notably the Greek epics, celebrated journeys and those who undertook them. During the medieval period of the Common Era, migration was acknowledged in some of the most important texts of socio-historical writing, including monumental works such as Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah*. (2013, pp. 16-7)
For Marfleet, the exclusion of migrants from mainstream narratives is ‘a corollary of the national character of most modern historical writing’ (p. 17) – a symptom of the methodological nationalism that pervades historical writing. Following this logic, the Palatines disappeared from British official history. What is of interest, however, is that the Huguenots made a notable return to mainstream national narratives in the 19th century. In 1868, Samuel Smiles published a long account of the Huguenot presence in Britain, in which he describes in detail the causes for their flight from France and the hospitality they experienced in England. The opposition to Huguenot presence on the part of significant segments of the English population has disappeared from Smiles’ account. Instead, Smiles emphasises the warm welcome afforded to the suffering refugees, who proved worthy of the support they received:

The help thus generously given to the distressed refugees by the nation was very shortly rendered in a great measure unnecessary by the vigorous efforts which they made to help themselves. They sought about in all directions for employment, and being ingenious, intelligent, and industrious, they gradually succeeded in obtaining it (Smiles, 1968, pp. 317-8)

On the one hand, Smiles’ account of the Huguenot episode is instrumental to depicting the nation in a favourable light – as a generous and noble entity. Forced migrations are occasionally included in national histories when they are part of a narrative that fits the state project. On the other hand, Smiles’ depiction of Huguenots – characterised by their ingenuity, industriousness and love of freedom, qualities which England allowed them to fulfil – produces an image of the ‘good’ refugees, which the country can legitimately welcome, but also a model to invoke as a means of rejecting other migrants.

The examples of the Huguenot and Palatine migrations to England raise a number of key questions regarding the role of migrants in the constitution of the state and the production of a discourse on the nation. I now build further on these examples to develop conceptual insights regarding the correlation between state-making, identity formation, border demarcation and migration.

Statecraft and forced migration
As seen, the process of nation-state formation relies on the production of a national self that can be distinguished from others. The border is the place where differentiation is performed the most visibly as it separates the inside from the outside and is controlled in a fashion that claims to preserve the presumed homogeneity of the inside. Borders are a key ideological resource of the state, which is reflected by the emphasis put on the need for national management of migration flows, whereby the state stands as the sole authority in deciding who is entitled to enter and stay in the territory.

This illustrates the fact that the concepts of citizens and migrants can only exist in relation to each other. The inclusion (of citizens) as enshrined in citizenship law can only take effect in opposition to the exclusion (of non-citizen migrants) governed by migration law. Migration laws are thus central to the process of the formation of the identity of a nation and the definition of its membership (Dauvergne, 2007, 2008). Dauvergne claims that ‘migration law and citizenship law work in tandem to form the border of the national community’ (2008, p. 119). In this tandem, she argues, ‘immigration law does the dirty work’ (2007, p. 507), leaving citizenship law to express the values of liberty and equality characteristic of the discourses of Western liberal democracies – for those it includes.

Zolberg (1998) also asserts a close link between nation-state building and migration, but he focuses on state-formation as a ‘refugee generating process’. Zolberg starts his analysis with the transformation of empires into nation-states in Western Europe and continues by looking at the dissolution of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires in the 20th century. As with the Huguenots expelled from France, he associates nation-state building with the emergence of conditions encouraging the persecution of specific groups along racial, religious or social lines and thus to the displacement of large numbers of people both within and beyond the newly sanctified state borders. Through a historical comparative approach, he establishes a strong and intrinsic connection linking the creation of new states and the production en masse of migrants and refugees. For Zolberg, the majority of refugees in the modern era have been created by the national order of the world.
This analysis is taken a step further by Soguk. Like Zolberg, Soguk sees displaced people as being produced by the statist order of the world but, for him, they are also instrumental, if not necessary, to its stabilisation. The very notion of refugee and its associated imagery, Soguk claims, ‘strategically converge to point to the world of the definite, self-evident normality of states, of their clearly demarcated territories, and of the domestic communities of citizen-members’ (Soguk, 1999, p. 35). For Soguk, the main difficulty of the nation-state as a legal entity is not only to position its existence as self-evident, but also to resolve what he calls ‘maybe the most important problem of the sovereign state’ (p. 38) which is that its existence is dependent on its ability to claim to represent those who make up its domestic community of citizens. The most important problem of the state is thus to engage in ‘people production’, as mentioned previously, but to do so ‘without letting its contingency appear’ (Bhabha, 1993, p. 298 quoted in Soguk, 1999, p. 39). To do so, the sovereign state must relentlessly engage in what Soguk calls practices of statecraft, which successfully produce and reproduce the superiority of the ‘constellation of agents and identities – citizen/nation/state’ (p. 40).

These practices of statecraft amount to the production of specific problematisations of various fields of activities and social life that affirm and confirm the state and the statist ordering of the world. Moreover, in a world where the experience of living within sovereign national boundaries has been radically altered by the ‘volume, velocity and intensity of transborder, transnational movements’ (p. 42), the task of imposing a single organising logic and of presenting the nation-state as the exclusive guarantor of peace, democracy and justice, is rendered increasingly difficult. Statecraft nowadays is faced with the additional challenge of reshaping representations of the naturalised statist order of the world in a way that manages to accommodate the ‘international’ or ‘transnational’ as spaces of social life and activities.

The refugee as a historical figure, framed and produced by way of governmental and intergovernmental activities and through a specific discourse, is one of the main sites where the sovereign state can secure, affirm and perform its existence: ‘the name of the refugee ... serves as an alibi for the existence of the state. Vis-à-vis the name of the refugee, the state seems to
exist always a priori’ (Soguk, 1999, p. 50). The move from the mere name of the refugee to ‘refugee events’ as a field of activities is the moment when a specific problematisation occurs, and when practices of statecraft can be performed. This problematisation has given birth in the contemporary world-system to the international refugee regime, whereby states collaborate as independent sovereign entities so as to ‘manage’ the refugees produced by this same world-system. For Soguk, this regime is in itself a practice of statecraft, ‘that actively produces the power of states across borders’ and is more concerned with stabilising ‘various territorialised relations, institutions and identities that afford the state its reason for being’ than with helping those turned into refugees (p. 52).

The paradox of the refugee as a figure, following Soguk’s analysis, is that s/he who is initially seen as a disruption to the project of a neat organisation of the world into a patchwork of national states, coexisting harmoniously and without rifts or fissures, is ultimately not only accommodated by the international statist order, but in fact mobilised and exploited as a resource in the process of stabilisation of this very order from which s/he is excluded. This is precisely the act of problematising mentioned by Soguk: it is the operation through which a social occurrence is turned into a particular problem calling for specific solutions – an operation that moreover performs a process of normalisation of both the problem and its solution by positioning them as already given and self-evident.

The intrinsic link between national sovereignty (the result of statecraft) and migration is also explored in a different fashion by De Genova, who observes that ‘… a decidedly inverse relation may be detected between the distinctly waning fortunes and diminishing returns of nation-state sovereignty, as such, and the exuberant attention to ever more comprehensive and draconian controls that states seek to impose upon the most humble crossborder comings and goings – and settlings – of migrants’ (De Genova, 2010, p. 34). This observation highlights the ways in which the state turns to border and migration control in times of crisis and difficulty, precisely because of their propitiousness to the practice of statecraft and the exercise of sovereignty.
In a sense, the roots of the complementarity of citizen and migration laws identified by Dauvergne run deeper than a legal division of tasks: it has to do with the very ontology (its reason for existence) and epistemology (the knowledge generated around its existence) of the state and the associated concepts of nation and citizen. One of the sites of production and normalisation of the community of citizen-subjects, who together form the nation and are indispensable to the state as its foundational subjects, is localised precisely in the field of refugee discourse and practices. The field of collaboration between states to ‘find solutions to the refugee problem’ is by extension one of the sites where the international regimentation of the world into separate and sovereign states and their nation/citizens is performed.

Though I have concentrated on the theoretical framework developed by these authors, it is important to keep in mind that those processes happened and are happening in specific contexts, as exemplified for previously. The various national – and increasingly international – discourses on the refugee must be seen as historical occurrences, which reflect the material conditions in which they were produced and which evolve with them. While the representations produced, the imageries invoked and the vocabulary used in the field of refugee discourse evolve with the material and historical context in which they are projected or uttered, they serve a specific purpose which is constant and independent from the specific forms they assume.

**Silencing the migrant: vulnerability and deportability**

In *A Nation in Design*, Zolberg (2006) presents an analysis of how the discourses and practices of the United States in respect to migration have developed across time so as to accommodate the changing needs and interests of the dominant project of nation-building. This malleability reflects the relative ease with which people excluded from the community of the represented can be silenced. Migration and border control is particularly attractive as a site of statecraft because of the circumstances of people involved in forced migration. Having left behind their resources and networks, sometimes not speaking the language or finding it difficult to navigate the institutional or administrative
landscape of their new country, they are characterised by a level of structural vulnerability that makes them of particular ideological appeal for politicians.

In order to make this silencing possible, and to discipline on a number of levels (particularly in relation to labour) migrant subjects, the migration framework also relies on a number of mechanisms which produce and reproduce vulnerability. De Genova, looking at the deportation machine in the European Union, convincingly makes the point that deportation as an act is the occasional rather than necessary outcome of the larger condition of deportability (De Genova, 2002). This condition is shared by all non-citizens in a country, and in fact in some instances even by people who have become citizens through naturalisation (with the possibility of being stripped of their nationality under certain conditions). In the European Union, European citizens living in another EU country face a minimal yet existing degree of deportability while, at the other end of the spectrum of deportability, irregular migrants live in constant fear of being noticed, arrested, detained and deported – with few recourses if this were to happen.

De Genova (2002) highlights that, in spite of the vast variation between the degrees of deportability of various categories of migrants, all ultimately live in the precariousness produced by the possibility of this threat. This instability is a contributing factor to vulnerability, which successfully enhances and maintains exploitability and acts as a disciplinary mechanism for migrants. De Genova considers ‘deportability’ as the defining condition of migration and of the migrant in the contemporary global era, under which categories of people management and selective inclusion can be organised.

In the UK, this is well exemplified by working visas – visas linked to work contracts – for which termination of the work contract means the end of the right to stay for the visa holder. The pressure to stay in the position stipulated in the working contract at all costs, and regardless of working conditions, means that the visa holder (a migrant) is virtually prevented from putting forward claims or entering into negotiation with their employer. As put by Portes & Walton: ‘the [very] fact of crossing a political border weakens the status of workers’ vis-à-vis states and employers’ (1981, p. 50 quoted in Dale & Cole, 1999, p. 303).
illustrates how migration regimes delineate and shape ‘borders of production’ (Mezzadra, 2007). Irregularity is also a profitable condition. Bhattacharyya (2005) examines how illicit networks (of money, drugs, arms and, importantly, people) are central to the functioning of the official economy (2005).

More generally, migrants, as non-citizens, tend to lack access to legitimate means of expression and representation in the place where they live, temporarily or long-term. Nowadays, the increasing difficulty for refugees in even entering territories of nation-states, particularly Western nation-states, adds to these obstacles. Vulnerability is a crucial characteristic of non-citizens. It plays an important role in the appeal that migrants hold for politicians and ‘statesmen’ involved in statecraft endeavours. As silenced subjects, speaking on their behalf and creating certain forms of strategic knowledge (certain ‘regimes of truth’ which easily lend themselves to diverse interests) around them is a particularly attractive option for those involved in various political and collective projects. Irregularity also performs a key economic function.

The imagined community of Europe: ‘Fortress Europe’

I now bring together these insights in order to develop my analysis of the formation of a discourse on Europeanity. As seen, the trajectory of the European Community, and its evolution into a more integrated European Union, are the products of transformations in the historical relation between state and capital in the region and the world-system. I have argued that the EU is firmly inscribed into the global neoliberal project, which has entailed the internationalisation of some of its member states’ functions in ways that have allowed their survival as states, rather than their secession. I have also paid attention to how this process, while being a meta-development over the region that has affected all countries involved (as well as their neighbours), has embodied itself in particular ways in different national settings, and is rooted in power relations and relations of competition.

On the other hand, I have examined the way in which ‘migrants’ have been a site for the crafting and exercise of state sovereignty. They have also been a key ideological resource, mobilised toward the formulation of discourses of
belonging which have accompanied the historical consolidation of the state and the emergence of the nation-state in Western Europe. Here, I have suggested that state sovereignty should not be analysed in isolation from economic processes. Patterns of inclusion and marginalisation of migrants, and other internal minorities, reflect the assertion of state sovereignty in its correlation with different modes of production associated with the historical development of capitalism.

We have seen that new discourses of otherness have been produced in contemporary Europe. I have suggested that these Others are functional to attempts at creating and cementing a shared European identity. This process, I have argued, has mimicked the historical process of Western European nation building. By aggregating the patterns of marginalisation and racism existing in its various member states, the European Union has produced a regime of aggravated exclusion and marginalisation.

The term ‘Fortress Europe’¹¹, which has gained currency to describe the way the EU has engaged in processes of border reinforcement, thus appears as an adequate description of the new Europe’s ‘imagined community’. By this, I do not mean that the borders of the EU are quite as hermetically sealed as the term ‘fortress’ implies. Looking at the intricate functioning of the EU border regime reveals a complex reality of differential and subordinated inclusion, which produces a regime of labour management based on different statuses associated with varying degrees of precariousness, vulnerability and freedom and differentiated access to rights and resources following individualising, racialising, gendering and economic rationales. Thinking in terms of differential and subordinated inclusion allows an exploration of the way in which the traditional association of citizenship with national labour force and territory is evolving through the creation of new internal and external borders (De Genova, Mezzadra and Pickles (eds.), 2015, p. 25). It thus challenges the metaphor of a ‘Fortress Europe’ that strictly keeps migrants out. However, what the above exploration of the dominant discourse of European belonging points to is that, at the discursive and imaginary level, the representations produced about the Union rely on a process of socio-cultural bordering that aims at separating

¹¹ See for example Gabriele Del Grande’s blog Fortress Europe.
Europe from non-Europe and which in fact complements the image of a fortified space, policing and tightening its borders in order to preserve the territorial, cultural and ‘civilisational’ integrity of Europe.

At a time when more integration was required to allow the economic survival of European nation-states in the neoliberal world-system, the area of migration and border control also offered a providential field for cooperation to member states otherwise using the European arena for national competition. One of the key embodiments of European unity has been the establishment of the Schengen Area. Inside the EU, the Schengen Area brought about the suppression of national border controls between certain member states, making it possible for EU citizens to travel without showing an ID card or passport. This free-travel zone currently consists of 26 countries, including three non-EU member states (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). Only two of the EU member states, Ireland and the UK, have decided not to enter Schengen (though the Treaty has been absorbed into EU law) and three EU member states have not yet implemented it, mostly due to restrictions on the freedom of movement of their citizens imposed by the EU (Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania).

A closer look at this development reveals that, as in the process of formation of the territorial nation-state, the dissolution of internal borders within Schengen has been matched with a reinforcement of the borders with non-EU member states. Only those holding EU citizenship, which is derivative in that it can only be acquired through citizenship in one of the member states, can benefit from the privileges of Schengen and freedom of movement within the Area.¹² For those who are not citizens of a EU member state, the exclusion from national communities is now augmented by exclusion from the community of Europeans. Institutions and rules of the Schengen framework call into existence and embody the idea that Europeans share a common identity setting them aside from non-Europeans. As with the nation-state, it is in through a movement of identification and exclusion of the ‘non-European’ that the European is created.

¹² As well as, for limited periods of time and depending on national legislations, people on long-term residency permits and Schengen visas.
The particular patterns of marginalisation occurring in contemporary Europe also reflect its neoliberal nature. As discussed by several scholars, neoliberal capitalism cultivates the relegation and exploitation of particular groups in ways which have been gendered, racialised and ethnicised. For instance, Karen Brodkin (2000) examines how migrants arriving to the USA have been geared towards particular un- or deskilled sectors in a way that becomes justified through a discourse about racial and ethnic differences. She thus convincingly argues that ‘job degradation and racial darkening were linked processes’ (p. 241). Broadening these insights, she makes the case that race and gender are constitutive of neoliberalism’s relations of production and that the gendering and racialising processes allowing for the constitution of these particular class relations are sustained by state discourse and policies.

As I illustrated earlier, discourses of belonging are produced by political authorities in ways which assert their sovereignty but are also intimately related to particular economic interests. The imbrication of the EU in the neoliberal world order entails particular forms of insertion and marginalisation that reflect contemporary modes of production and the relation between capital and labour that they produce. In other words, the construction of the European self and its Others has been shaped both by the need to induce consent vis-à-vis the deepening of European integration (one might say, a form of supranational statecraft attuned to the imperatives of the neoliberal world order) and by the particular properties of the contemporary economic system. The combination of these various exclusionary tendencies have fashioned the ‘imagined community’ of Europe, one marked by exacerbated forms of marginalisation targeting groups and people considered ideologically and/or economically unattractive to the European project.

**Conclusion**

Since the 1970s, lack of popular identification with the EU has become an object of anguish for European elites. In this context, discourses aimed at ‘naturalising’ the Union as an organic entity resting on the shared history,
culture and identity of Europeans have multiplied. They rest on a notion of European belonging that absorbs and aggregates national otherness. The process of European identity formation conjures into existence new Others, suited to the creation of a ‘hyper-nationalism’ and results in the emergence of new forms of marginalisation and racism.

In the next chapter, I propose to look in more detail at the European regime of exclusion and particularly at the development of a harmonised immigration and border regime in the EU.
Chapter III

Hyper-statecraft: Building ‘Fortress Europe’.

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the development of a harmonised immigration and asylum policy in the EU. For the purpose of analysis, I distinguish between two phases in the development of the EU’s migration policies, correlated to the particular political-economic relations prevailing in Europe. In the aftermath of World War II, a ‘guestworker’ approach to migration prevailed in most Western European countries. As of the mid-1970s, following the crisis caused by the oil boycott, a major reorganisation of Europe’s migration and border regime started, which was further intensified with the fall of the Soviet Union. The perspective of the autonomy of migration, which argues that migrants’ mobilities have a key influence on the way states develop exclusionary measures, must also be kept in mind when analysing these developments.

Broadly speaking, the ‘guestworker’ migration period was characterised by migration from the semi-periphery of the world system into lower segments of Western European labour markets (Horvath, 2014, p. 116). Migrant labour was primarily used for industrial mass production in the context of Keynesian welfare states (Wimmer, 1986). The discourse on border policing was firmly embodied in the Cold War context and the main ideological dangers were potential spies and political adversaries (Horvath, 2014, p. 117). As of the mid-1970s, and even more after 1989, important changes took place, which I argue are linked to both the political formation of the European Union and the dominance of neoliberalism (two interconnected phenomena). They also responded to the intensification of migratory movements from the Global South (Marfleet, 2006) in a fashion that shows how migration policies both influence and are influenced by migrant mobility itself. I also examine how movements of resistance have emerged where states have promoted difference and marginalisation and developed exclusionary policies. I propose looking at these mobilisations in
solidarity with migrants by means of an approach that draws selectively on social movement theory.

**Bordering Europe: immigration and border controls in the EU**

A starting point to the analysis is that the importance of immigration and border control is continually asserted by EU politicians themselves. The task of harmonising migration policies and of commonalising border control has been the subject of much debate and the rationale behind the creation of a vast number of European bodies – from research and experts groups to specialised agencies such as Frontex. In 2002, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar stated that common migration policy in the EU was ‘the most important question in European politics at the moment’ (Migration News, 2002).

Let’s go back to the history of the EU project with a focus on migration and border control policies. The founding treaties of the European Communities did not mention any rules concerned with the harmonisation of control of borders, perceived as exclusively within the realm of national sovereignties. During the 'guestworker' epoch, the industrial need of Western European economies meant that large number of migrant workers were encouraged to come and work in Europe. At the time, the legal status of working migrants was not a salient political issue. Internally, the idea of the free movement of people remained secondary to the project of market development (Huysmans, 2002).

In the late 1960s and 70s, as the post-war boom came to an end, the situation started changing. There was a surge in political and media concern with immigration in Western European countries. Policies shifted from relatively permissive approaches to being increasingly restrictive and control-oriented (Fielding, 1993, p. 43; Huysmans, 2002, pp. 754-5). This move partly aimed at institutionalising migrant mobilities, which continued and exceeded Western states' formal regimes of labour. Simultaneously, as the European Economic Community underwent further integration, the idea emerged that a framework for the convergence and harmonisation of migration policy (conditions of admission and stay of so-called ‘third country nationals’) and border control policy (the implementation of migration rules via visa management, identity
checks, police borders and so on) across European member states was necessary. This was accompanied by the assertion of an increasing connection between migration and the destabilisation of public order (Doty, 1996; Huysmans, 2002).

As part of the drive to harmonise migration policies, the idea that citizens of European member states might be able to travel and work in other European countries emerged. Already, a distinction was made between the right of free movement of nationals of member states and that of nationals from third countries (Ugur, 1995, p. 967). Ugur considers that this decision paved the way for what was to become ‘Fortress Europe’ a few years later (1995, p. 977).

In 1976, the EC adopted the action programme for migrant workers and their families (Council Resolution, 1976), which was a first step toward common policies in the immigration domain. This Europeanisation process continued and accelerated throughout the 1980s, concurrently with a shift in the focus of immigration policies away from migrant workers’ mobility and towards increasingly politicised and exclusionary representations of migration (Huysman, 2002, p. 755). Migration became a central item of intergovernmental and European events; this ‘pre-structured … the development of migration policy within the EU’ (p. 755).

In the aftermath of the 1986 Single European Act and the establishment of the Schengen group, responsible for creating the conditions required for the implementation of the Schengen free movement area, further momentum towards the harmonisation of immigration issues occurred. The 1990 Dublin Convention on the determination of member state responsibility for examining an asylum application was a decisive step towards EU-level collaboration in the field of migration and asylum. The 1995 establishment of the Schengen Area was a crucial development that legitimised the call for further reinforcement of the external borders. Originally, the Schengen Agreement, which had been signed in 1985 between five of the EU member states, was only implemented by some of its signatories. With the 1996 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, all EU member states (except the UK and Ireland) agreed to sign and implement the Schengen Agreement.
This Conference led to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which incorporated the rules of Schengen within EU Law under the name of Schengen Acquis. Following this, the Constitutional Convention Draft Treaty considered immigration, asylum and border policies to be Community responsibilities. These policies were moved from the ‘third pillar’ of the EU (where unanimity of member states is required, thus remaining strongly inter-governmental) to the ‘first pillar’, where EU institutions play a greater role in the decision-making process and in adopting supranational legislations.

The trend towards supranationalisation and harmonisation of borders and migration policies continued and increased under the Finnish EU Presidency (2006). It introduced and generalised the notion of ‘EU Border Management Strategy’ (Carrera, 2007, pp. 2-3). The concept of Integrated Border Management was taken up as a guiding principle for EU action on borders, immigration and asylum policy. It prescribes an integration of the borders of the Schengen Area so as to ‘cover all border-related threats that the EU is supposed to be facing’ (p.3). The harmonisation of border management in the EU relied on coercive border control and increased inter-agency coordination. It highlighted the notion of securing the European territory and involved practical, financial and judicial cooperation between all member states.

The 2006 Schengen Borders Code standardised previous provisions regarding the Schengen Area external borders into a single regulation and further developed the so-called Schengen Acquis on internal and external borders (Peers, 2006, p. 145). In 2010, the Schengen Visa Code established a list of countries whose citizens would need a visa to enter the EU and a list of countries for which this requirement was waived.\textsuperscript{13} It also aimed to ‘facilitate’ the application of the Dublin II Regulation by establishing which country would be responsible for the examination of the asylum applications of third country nationals. The agency Frontex\textsuperscript{14} was established in 2004 as ‘a specialised and independent body tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member states in the field of border security. The activities of Frontex are

\textsuperscript{13} This only applies to short-stay visas, whilst long-stay visas and residence permits remained prerogatives of individual member states.

\textsuperscript{14} Legally: ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union’.
intelligence driven. Frontex complements and provides particular added value to the national border management systems of the Member states’ (Frontex, 2014).

Another development brought about by the Schengen Agreement was the creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS), a policing information network that was to compensate for any security ‘deficit’ that could be engendered by the removal of internal border controls in the EC/EU (Bigo, 2001, 2006). SIS constitutes a transnational database storing information concerning various ‘risk groups and individuals’, accessible by Europe’s police forces and security agencies. It contains personal information of people who committed crimes, records of asylum seekers and, following the wave of intensive ‘anti-summit’ protests in 2001, profiles of political activists.\(^{15}\)

While these developments have led to the establishment of a restrictive regime of border control in the EU and beyond, they have not and cannot stop migratory movement. As will be seen later, they make migration more perilous, as migrants have to negotiate and navigate controls and obstacles, yet they do not in themselves fundamentally challenge migration itself. This is a key argument from the autonomy of migration perspective, which sees migration as autonomous from the attempts at controlling it deployed by states. While the autonomy of migration perspective admits that migrants’ movements are influenced, shaped and constrained by states’ policies, it however points to the fact that migration is not simply responding to control and hence exist autonomously (Nyers, 2015, p. 28). From this perspective, border and immigration policies come as a response to movement and ‘the border regime does not transform of its own accord, but rather obtains its dynamics from the forms of migration movements’ (Bojadžijev and Karakayali, 2010, p. 3).

**Territoriality and the EU**

This continuous consolidation of the harmonisation of policies in the EU – inaugurated in the 1980s and rapidly developing ever since – has led to the effective supranationalisation of migration and border policies.

\(^{15}\) In Genoa and Guttenberg.
Many commentators have argued that the move towards supranationalisation of border management was necessary to match the new realities of globalisation and its impact on territory and the movement of people. The material definition of the border as physical demarcation is obsolete, they claim, and it is time to move away from a national understanding and to adopt a globalised and dynamic view of space and territories. In a world in flow, borders have stopped being lines and have become changing and diffuse webs of less tangible regulations. Customary understandings of borders as physical lines clearly delimiting the boundaries of states and their sovereignty are also perceived to be increasingly irrelevant (Carrera, 2007, p. 6).

The EU is presented as a case in point to show the obsolescence of traditional concepts of territory, sovereignty and identity. As we have seen, a complex matrix of rules and regulations concerned with the right to enter in the Union has been developed. It is matched internally by an equally intricate topology of residence permits, with associated rights and restrictions. It is also true that the ‘borders’ of the EU are continuously reshaped, both through successive enlargements and through subtler processes of reconfiguration. On the one hand, Europe is increasingly projecting its borders outside its territory and geographical delineations, in particular with the intensification of European authorities’ interventions in the policies of border control and migration movements of peripheral countries. Provisions for ‘extra-territorial processing’ of asylum claims, where transit camps are set up in strategically located countries in order to assess asylum applications before allowing potential refugees to enter Europe, are a striking example of this development.

On the other hand, the borders of Europe are increasingly reproduced inside its territories, with for instance the multiplication all over Europe of detention centres for migrants about to be deported. As many academics and activists have been enunciating, these camps, whether of transit or detention, are no longer exceptions or anomalies. Rather, they have become crucial institutions of the European Union and its migration policies.

Yet, as noted by Carrera (2007, p. 3), the legitimising rationale informing the border management framework very much echoes traditional views on the
border and mobilises bounded understanding of territories and identities. The border remains a territorial demarcation between those ‘inside’ and those ‘outside’, that is, between what is perceived as European and what is considered as not.

Art. 2 of the Schengen Borders Code defines ‘border’ on behalf of the European Community: external borders are conceived as ‘the ‘Member states’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal border’ (Carrera, 2007, p. 5). While non-physical lines and obstacles, which move with people as they undertake to exercise mobility through new technologies for tracking and managing individuals (visa controls, biometrics, European-wide databases and so on), have indeed been erected, the dominant conceptualisation within the EU still reinforces the principle of territoriality. The discourse of the EU with respect to borders and migration is thus one which reinvests the traditionally national idea of securitising the territory as one of the main prerogatives of sovereignty. It also recycles the old national dichotomisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between the citizen and the non-citizen migrant/refugee.

**Securitisation of migration**

The strong focus on border and immigration ‘management’ and on providing ‘integrated’ responses to ‘threats’ coming from migrants reflects a larger trend at work since the late 1980s, and particular since 9/11: the securitisation of migration. This refers to a tendency to problematise the phenomenon of people moving towards the EU within a security framework calling for security responses (including increased surveillance and control devices at the border but also within the ‘free movement zone’) (cf. Huysmans, 2002; also Bigo, 2000, 2002; Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2009). Within this problematisation, someone crossing a border is primarily a potential threat and the fields of migration and borders are conceptualised in close relation with those of counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking.
Peter Nyers (2010) looks at the consequences of framing the topics of migration and asylum through ‘the prism of security’ (2010, p. 413). Quoting Bigo, he claims that a ‘governmentability of unease’ has transformed global anxieties about migration into a mode of ruling supported by the emergence of a ‘ban-opticon’, whereby new highly advanced technologies rely on profiling in order to determine who should be under surveillance, should be controlled, detained or removed, and who is spared such interventions (p. 413). Prime targets of this ‘ban-opticon’ are those who Nyers calls ‘abject migrants’ (Nyers, 2003, p. 1070). ‘They are ‘others’ constructed through abjection and encompass asylum seekers, refugees, non-status migrants, undocumented workers and others deemed ‘illegal’ who are ‘increasingly cast as the objects of securitised fears and anxieties, possessing either an unsavoury agency (i.e., they are identity fraud, queue jumpers, people who undermine consent in the polity) or a dangerous agency (i.e., they are criminals, terrorists, agents of insecurity)’ (Nyers, 2010, pp. 413-4, author’s italics).

A set of tensions is at play in the emergence of this global security agenda against migration and migrants. On the one hand, global migrations are rendering internal and external borders less definite: it is precisely around this claim that the idea of a global threat calling for and legitimising the global securitisation of borders crystallises. At the same time, the intensification of migratory movements is closely linked to an increase in the economic, political and social pressures faced by the populations of many countries of the Global South. This is in part a consequence and an outcome of the failure of the world development agenda produced in parallel to neoliberal globalisation (Chapter I). The logic at work in the emergence of the global threat discourse thus relies on a process of displacement of blame. This process targets not only the people who face the failures of the neoliberal project, but the whole areas which have been sacrificed to it.

We can therefore talk of a double logic of ‘personification’ and ‘geographisation’ of blame. The causes of Bigo’s unease are pushed to the borders of the Western world and beyond. This logic is used as rationale for the global securitisation of migration controls. It is characterised by a new semantic field around the idea of an obscure, lurking menace, characterised by ‘tribalism’,
war-lordism’, ‘sectarianism’, ‘ethno-nationalism’ and so on. Regions of the world that are perceived as producing migrants are represented as an alien, backward hinterland, plagued by scarcity and anarchic wars, violence and terrorism.

Kaplan’s 1994 article ‘The Coming Anarchy’ – which was later published as part of a book and subtitled How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet (Kaplan, 2000) – is a striking illustration of this development. Kaplan relies on ‘personification’ of blame and argues that the dangerous and backward features of ‘dark’ Southern and Eastern societies will be brought into the civilised, advanced Global North through migratory movements. This argument is widespread in the mainstream press and media, which produce and project the figure of a deviant and dangerous global migrant threatening Western civilisation and culture.

This discourse has called for a security response to people’s mobility. As seen, states’ capacities to exclude and deport have taken on new forms (Nyers, 2010, p. 414). These include pooling together their national resources at a supranational level (as is the case in the European Union) and an increased reliance of surveillance technology and externalisation and privatisation of border controls. Externalisation relies primarily on the system of visas, which must be applied for and are issued in the country of origin, but also, for the EU in particular, on a much more comprehensive and complex set of regulations which tend to delocalise the external borders of the Union toward the East and the South, in order to better repel migrants. An increasing number of controls now take place outside the borders of the EU and many are conducted by private companies (for example, European consulates across the world increasingly subcontract the visa selection process to a multinational firm).

In 2004, a network of migration ‘liaising officers’ constituted of public servants from member states was set up in third countries, with the objective of fighting ‘illegal’ migration through pre-emptive profiling work (i.e., pre-identification of people, surveying fake documents, etc.) and with the goal of reducing controls at the points of entry themselves. Frontex also leads operations to intercept people at sea (as well as in mountainous regions, such as the so-called ‘green
The most efficient mechanism of externalisation remains, however, the sub-contracting of the ‘dirty work’ of migration law to third countries themselves (countries of origin or transit countries).

These agreements range from the implementation of measures to block migrants before they access the EU, to readmission accords signed with third countries, often as part of commercial and development aid agreements. These regulations regularly come as the footnote, one might say, of cooperation agreements concerned with other sectors than migration and asylum. In fact, at the 2002 Seville Summit, in the name of the fight against terrorism, the EU decided that every economic or commercial agreement between a member state and a third country should include a migratory clause setting up terms for readmission of nationals of the third country or non-nationals who have transited through this country.¹⁶

Migratory agreements have become the keystone of European foreign policy with its Southern and Eastern neighbour countries: the idea of readmission policy imposed on other countries through a clause added to other types of agreement has been integrated into the 2008 Asylum and Immigration Pact of the EU. This essentially means that, although readmission agreements remain bilateral, the EU compels member states to enforce them and to include them in their bilateral commercial and economic agreements with third countries (Migreurop, 2009).

**A war against migrants**

Thinking of these developments, with the work of Soguk on practices of statecraft in mind, I argue that this obsession with migratory controls also reveals ways in which the shortcomings of neoliberalism and development are dealt with.

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¹⁶ Or even in the case of Nigeria, any nationals at all, since it has agreed to readmit non-nationals who didn’t transit through it.
On the one hand, as seen, migratory movements are often (though not always and not only) linked to the rise of inequality and poverty, which are direct consequences of the failures of the neoliberal project and the associated development agenda. On the other hand, Europeanisation, as argued in the previous chapter, is a process of rescaling and re-composition of territory and sovereignty that reflects the changing dialectical relationship between various political, economic and social forces. It must be seen as part of a global network of organisations and institutions that have been to a large extent working in favour and on behalf of global capital. These organisations are faced with the difficult task of securing some level of consent towards and acceptance of the neoliberal policies and modes of governance they promote and embody.

Due to the weak identification with the European project among populations of its member states, they have to do so without the ‘back up’ of national identity and nationalism, which nation-states can rely on in times of crisis. Moreover, the ultimate recourse of the nation-state, that of going to war against real or perceived enemies, is not available to international and supranational institutions – at least not yet, or not in the same way.

Yet we regularly hear of a ‘global war on terror’ as well as increasingly of a ‘global war against migrants’: what do these ‘wars’ actually mean? To an extent, war as a means of subjugation and oppression, but also as a consent-manufacturing device orientated at the home population, is being deployed against migrants trying to enter the Union, though the means and technique of warfare do not rely on military confrontation but rather on individualised, advanced technologies. And, as the traditional martial resources of the state are not available to the Union, this confrontational posture against an ‘imagined enemy’ seems to be all the more needed.

The reaction of much of the West to the emergence of democratic revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt was informative in that respect and shed light on the contradictions between the discourse and actions of the European Union. As populations in neighbouring countries were entering battles for democracy, thus demonstrating their attachment to and belief in the values which Europe blames them for not having, the EU’s initial reaction was to deny credibility and
legitimacy to the popular movements. First it focussed on the dramatic consequences that the advent to power of some Islamic threat would have for the West. Second it inflated the ensuing migratory movements from Tunisia and Libya by describing them as of ‘biblical proportion[s]’ (Durham University, 2011). The EU reaction was to try to close the external borders as soon and as strictly as possible. Such was the crisis in the EU that some internal borders were de facto reintroduced (EurActiv, 2011).

This is an example of processes of othering that rely on particular representations of a European ‘civilisation being under threat (here the idea of a ‘biblical invasion’ against ‘Christian Europe’). On the one hand, these discursive interventions allow delineating Europe and, on the other, they serve as rationale for the way migrants at the borders of the EU as well as inside its territory are treated. The use of connoted metaphors was not anodyne at a time when the figure of the ungovernable, barbarian, terrorist migrant was losing credibility with the call for democracy reaching Europeans from across the Mediterranean Sea. This is another example of how Europe produces and mobilises new forms of Orientalism.

**Detention and deportation: managing mobility and regulating labour in neoliberal Europe**

A crucial feature of the EU border regime and its war against migrants has been the systematisation of detention and deportation as means of managing mobility in the context of difficult-to-solve contradictions and of the global evolution of modes of production. These are important aspects of the EU border regime, which tell us something about political technologies of neoliberal governance and the relation between labour and capital under conditions of global neoliberalism.

Coming back to the distinction made earlier between two phases of European border policies, it is important to note that, until the end of the Cold War, though they existed as political tools, detention and deportation were rarely resorted to and never as mass occurrences. Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti (2011) observe that deportation policies were only applied in cases of criminal conviction. In
stark contrast, the post-1989 era witnessed a major increase in both immigration detention and deportation. Rosenberger and Winkler (2014, p. 182) note that, in the case of Austria, between 1991 and 2000 more than 100,000 migrants were forcefully expelled from the country – an average of over 27 deportations a day.

Similarly, ‘before the decade of the 1980s, detention appears to have been largely an *ad hoc* tool, employed mainly by wealthy states in exigent circumstances’ (Flynn, 2014, p. 2). In the last three decades, detention camps, where migrants are placed either before they accomplish their migratory journey (for example, after interception at the border) or if they are detected as undocumented once inside European territory, have multiplied extremely rapidly all over the territory of Europe and beyond. In the last two decades, immigration detention has been widely institutionalised and has participated in criminalising those considered undesirable. In 2012, 570,660 migrants were detained in the EU (Migreurop, 2013, p. 2). In December 2013, the organisation Migreurop listed 420 closed centres for the administrative detention of immigrants in Europe and its borders (Migreurop, 2014).

These developments are inscribed in the process of harshening the policing of borders and mobility in Europe. I argue that this evolution must be analysed in relation to the changing political and economic context in which they have developed, namely a process of neoliberal restructuring of European states under the auspices of the EU. Wacquant’s concept of the ‘Centaur state’ (see Chapter 1), liberal towards the elite and punitive against those at the bottom of the social and ethnic ladder, is also of relevance here. While privileged groups’ mobility is made easier, at the other end of the spectrum poor and vulnerable migrants face growing obstacles in their attempts to travel as well as in the possibility of securing long-term residency rights in Europe. At the top, the elite’s mobility is functional to other crossborder activities of interest to the neoliberal regime, such as transnational investment, international trade and so on. At the bottom, punitive policies perform both economic functions, which I come back to below, and social control and disciplinary functions (Horvath, 2014, p. 119; Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti, 2011).
Detention and deportation also participate in crafting politics and the norms of political participation in Europe. In his seminal *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Agamben (1998) speaks of the camp as the site of production of homo sacer, a human life that is depoliticised and governable. Homo Sacer is what is left as excess to the formation of political structures. It is excluded from the usual realm of the state by ‘means of the suspension of the juridical order’s validity’ (1998, p. 18). This exclusion from the rule, however, means that homo sacer is in fact held in particular relation to the norm. Through the depoliticisation and exclusion of certain forms of life, the political formation and its norm exist.

The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. The particular “force” of law consists in this capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to an exteriority (p. 18)

Agamben looks at World War II’s concentration camps to develop his paradigm, yet his analysis of the camp as a permanent state of exception can usefully be applied to the contemporary context and to immigration detention. For Agamben, ‘the camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule’ (p. 96): what happens in the camp exceeds (is outside of) the juridical and political order. As a state of exception to the political norm, the camp is constitutive of it. In that sense, the decision to place certain individuals and groups, including migrants, in detention camps, says something about the constitution of political life, norms and sovereignty in particular contexts.

Agamben’s philosophical arguments about the camp as state of exception bring attention to the function of detention (and, by extension, deportation, which is premised on previous incarceration) as a mechanism that takes certain categories of people outside juridical order, political life, the possibility of public engagement and the realm of moral concern. While this analysis has been of prime importance to understanding the camp as a paradigm, it has also been criticised on a number of accounts. Agamben’s approach to sovereignty has been described as following a ‘tightly defined logic’ (Connolly, 2004, p. 49) that fails to encompass the ‘messy, layered and complex’ nature of ‘bio-cultural life’
Walters (2002, p. 23) describes Agamben’s state of exception as ‘crushingly dismal’, and neglectful of the possibility of resistance. He calls for further investigation of ‘the various ways in which camps have been contested, both by antiracist activists and by potential deportees themselves’ (p. 23).

Isin and Rygiel (2007) have also deemed Agamben’s camp ahistorical and essentialised, and thus inadequate to account for the nature of contemporary camps. They argue that, rather than looking at spaces of immigration detention and immobilisation as ‘spaces of abjection’, contemporary forms of enclosures are better grasped as ‘abject spaces’ where people are seen ‘neither as subjects (of discipline) nor objects (of elimination) but as those without presence, without existence, as inexistent beings, not because they don’t exist, but because their existence is rendered invisible and inaudible’ (2007, pp. 183-4). This echoes earlier observations about the structural vulnerability of migrants and the silencing of their experience.

In this thesis, I argue that Agamben’s philosophy remains central to understanding the making and functioning of sovereignty. However, I believe that in order to understand the way in which contemporary camps participate both in creating political norms and in reproducing the neoliberal system, other elements should be considered. In this respect, it is useful to examine Mezzadra’s response to Agamben.

Mezzadra discusses the modes of operation of what he calls the ‘Lager’, which he defines as ‘an administrative space in which men and women who have not committed any crime are denied their right to mobility’ (Mezzadra, 2003). The use of the term ‘Lager’ has been controversial in that it is strongly associated with the Nazi concentration and extermination camps of World War II. Mezzadra (2007) claims that, while the current camps and forms of global control should not be confused with the forms of rules that dominated under European fascism in the early 20th century, it remains important to point out that sites where people are deprived of their liberties though they have not committed any crimes have not disappeared from the contemporary political scene. Quite the opposite, as mentioned, they have been multiplying throughout Europe and
beyond, largely with the support of the EU. In this sense, besides its heuristic value, the choice of the term ‘Lager’ is also a political one.

In fact, even before the rise of European fascism, the camp as a means of population control, submission and utilisation had existed in several colonial contexts, including Cuba and South Africa. Colonial lagers were aimed at detaining the colonised labour force, where detainees’ body-power was used to the last of their resources before they were allowed to die. As Arendt (1973) notes, the first camps to be set up systematically inside Europe emerged after World War I, in the wake of the break-up of the empires. At the time their primary function was to detain men and women who, due to the geopolitical changes in the region, had lost any national citizenship and become stateless. In the example mentioned earlier, Palatine refugees were gathered into British army tents before they could be deported outside England. It is important to recall the colonial genealogy of the camp as well as its historical link with the formation of the nation-state, in order to establish what the camps proliferating around the world today might mean.

Mezzadra recognises the fundamental importance of Agamben’s work and concepts to understand the logic of the camp and the structure of sovereign power in the contemporary world, both analytically and for activist purposes (2003). Yet, he addresses some meaningful critiques to Agamben. One of them is concerned with the extent to which the ‘camp logic’ is exceptional in its character. Mezzadra argues that the form of domination pertaining to Agamben’s camp, that is one that includes so as to exclude, is ‘diffused throughout the comprehensive structure of society’ (2003). Further, Mezzadra (2003), citing Luciano Ferrari Bravo, contends that Agamben’s concept of bare life excludes the question of labour by focussing overwhelmingly on the camp as an exercise of state sovereignty. This fails to grasp the fundamental relation between contemporary immigration detention and the restructuring of labour markets and labour-capital relations under conditions of neoliberal capitalism.

The question of the relation between detention and labour markets has recently caught the attention of a number of scholars. A range of studies have examined the way in which deportation and detention policies have contributed to the
marginalisation and precarisation of migrants. This has been functional to the production of a cheap, compliant and disposable workforce. In her study of British migration policies, Anderson’s demonstrates that the toughening of migration regimes leads to the formation of a pool of ‘hyperflexible labour, working under many types of arrangements (not always “employment”), available when required, undemanding when not’ (2010, p. 300). Similarly, De Genova’s concept of deportability highlights the importance of the ‘indispensable disposability of ever deportable migrant labor’ (2010, p. 9) for the structuration of global capitalist regimes of production. In other words, current European immigration policies are congenial to the highly segmented, post-Fordist labour markets encouraged through the neoliberal restructuring of the EU.

Similarly, Mezzadra sees the detention centre as ‘a kind of decompression chamber that diffuses tension accumulated on the labour market’ (2003). In that sense, immigration detention is the mirror image of the extreme flexibility of contemporary capitalism: detention centres are ‘spaces of state oppression’ which participate in an attempt to control labour’s mobility. This historical tendency to immobilise some forms of labour (such as indentured and enslaved labour) has been examined by Moulier-Boutang (1998), who shows that controlling workers’ mobility has been essential to certain modes of capital accumulation. Contemporary Western European societies are illustrative in that respect and they have developed complex arrangements of visas, residency permits, regulations and technologies (including deportation and detention) that are instrumental to the fixation of labour in particular sites – either inside, outside or at the margins of its labour markets and economies. Therefore, while the act of ‘stripping life bare’ described by Agamben is a key operational logic of the camp, its function is difficult to understand outside a conceptualisation of the relation between state and capital.

To illustrate the functionality of labour im/mobility under conditions of global capitalism, an empirical example might be useful. Episodes of detention and deportation can often be seen as inscribed in what Tanya Golash-Boza (2012) calls the ‘neoliberal cycle’. Looking at the story of a young man from Guatemala, Eric, she shows how his family was originally compelled to leave their country for the USA due to the economic hardship they encountered
following the implementation of neoliberal reforms. Once in the United States, Eric's mother took up a low-paid job in the garment industry. Due to a visa overstay, Eric was eventually deported. Where neoliberal ideology officially claims that government intervention should be rolled back, it is here again patent that the coercive and punitive activities of the state are fully functioning. Previous to being deported, Eric was held in privatised detention facilities. As mentioned, the global (and European) migration regimes are characterised by their high degree of privatisation. In the UK for example, multinational companies such as G4S, the ‘mercenaries of migration security’ according to Rodier (2012), or Serco are responsible for the running of detention facilities as well as the management of deportations. This is what Claire Rodier (2012) has termed ‘xenophobia business’. Once in Guatemala, Eric started working for a US corporation, for a wage considerably lower than he would have received in the USA.

Hence, practices of detention and deportation are not anomalies to the system, destined to disappear. They participate in the constitution of a particular regime of labour-capital relationships and are integrated into the contemporary capitalist world-system. As shown by Moulier-Boutang, they can be located within a genealogy of administrative dispositives aimed at controlling the mobility of labour as part of the historical development of capitalism.

**The human cost of the EU border regime**

An overview of the mechanisms of the European border regime is required not only to apprehend its functioning and its embeddedness in other political and economic processes, but also because it is these mechanisms with which migrants come face to face when they undertake long and perilous journeys towards Europe. The human cost of the EU border regime has been huge. According to The Migrants Files (2014), more than 27,000 people have died while trying to reach the European Union between 2000 and 2013. It is worth noting than the EU itself does not keep a count of the migrants who lost their life during their journeys. An official from Frontex explained that the agency mandate was ‘to fight against illegal immigration, not rescuing people at sea. [Once] these people are dead, they are no longer migrants’ (Starr, 2014).
The harshening of the border regime (including the near-impossibility of obtaining visas for people who are fleeing wars and violence) means that many people resort to informal means of crossing borders, which might involve purchasing fake documents or buying the services of ‘migration guides’ or smugglers. To do so, migrants have to enter clandestine circuits where they find themselves at great danger and extremely vulnerable. Numerous cases of smugglers letting migrants die at sea, mistreating (The Telegraph, 2015) or even directly attacking the people who have paid them to be led to Europe have been reported (The Guardian, 2014). The EU has been keen to put the blame for the tragedies unfolding at its borders on these networks, yet their increase is directly correlated to the reinforcement of European borders. The more obstacles people face to reach safety in EU member states, the more they are pushed to resort to the services of increasingly dangerous clandestine migration networks.

On the other hand, several cases of EU and member states’ border police non-assistance of people at sea have been reported (Martin, 2014). Member states have shown extreme reluctance in engaging in rescue operations. In October 2013, following a record number of deaths in the Canal of Sicily, Italy inaugurated ‘Operation Mare Nostrum’, described as a military and humanitarian operation that aims to ‘safeguard life at sea and combat human trafficking’. This operation successfully rescued thousands of migrants. However, no EU country, apart from Slovenia and to a lesser degree Malta, contributed to the operation, which was eventually interrupted a year later. It was replaced by Frontex’s Triton mission, ‘focus [of which] was … primarily border management’ (ECRE, 2014).

Migrants who survive face push-backs and violence from border guards, and many people find themselves trapped in transit. According to Amnesty International (2014a): ‘[p]ush-backs happen when people are pushed back to the country they are trying to leave – or in some cases into the high seas – shortly after they cross the border, without an opportunity to challenge their forced return … The deportation of a group of people without looking at each case individually is a collective expulsion and is prohibited under international law’ (p. 20). Amnesty International (AI) has documented numerous push-backs
taking place at the EU’s South-Eastern borders, where Turkey meets Greece and Bulgaria, but also at the border between Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in North Africa.

In 2012, the Greek government built a 10.5-kilometre border fence at the Evros River. It deployed an additional 1,800 police officers along the border and opened new immigration detention camps. In 2011 and 2012, Frontex invested about €37 million to secure the Greek-Turkish border. Similarly, in 2014, in Bulgaria, a 30-kilometre fence has been erected along the border with EU support (Amnesty International, 2014b, p.24). The migrants AI spoke to reported violence and ill-treatment at the hands of law enforcement officials, as well as being held in inappropriate conditions for long periods of time. Border guards and law enforcement officials are armed with anti-riot equipment, such as rubber projectiles and tear gas (p.22) which are routinely used to repel migrants.

The deployment of border guards, surveillance technology and expulsions (both through push-backs and readmission agreements) means that a high number of migrants trying to reach the EU find themselves trapped in transit places – mainly countries neighbouring the EU (p. 25). Many of these countries have recognised track records of human rights violation and do not have functioning asylum systems. Libya practises indefinite detention in insalubrious facilities where beatings, whippings and other forms of violence are customary. Turkey also engages in the detention of migrants who have been pushed back (p. 25). Women migrants face particular forms of abuse (Gerard, 2014) and occurrences of migrant women being raped have been reported in Libya (Cordell, 2011).

The human cost, in lives and suffering, inflicted by the EU border regime on vulnerable people trying to reach safety is immeasurable. Occasionally, in the context of highly visible tragedies, such as the October 2013 shipwreck near Lampedusa which cost the lives of over 400 people, politicians from the EU and member states express compassion and promise ‘better border policies’ to prevent further catastrophes. Propositions for ‘improving’ border policies usually call for the implementation of search and rescue (SAR) operations, in order to
intercept migrants at sea and prevent further deaths. This does not call into question the ongoing process of securitisation of borders and criminalisation of migration. As in the case of Mare Nostrum, SAR are military operations which mix security objectives and humanitarian activities. This military-humanitarian response is problematic on several accounts. SAR operations do not fundamentally question the practices and policies of the EU which are responsible for pushing migrants towards perilous journeys in the first place. In fact, by associating SAR activities with a military perspective they confirm the perception of migration as a risk and a security issue. In this sense, SAR operations carried out by EU agencies and member states perpetuate the logic of migrant securitisation and criminalisation which underpins the EU border and immigration policies and pushes migrant into life-threatening journeys.

The problematic nature of SAR operations and of the adoption of a human rights discourse by border agencies such as Frontex runs in fact deeper than this, as illustrated by the example of Eurosur, the European Border Surveillance System. Eurosur was implemented in 18 EU member states and Norway in late 2013, in tight cooperation with Frontex. The System allows member states and Frontex to make use of pilotless surveillance drones, reconnaissance aircraft, offshore sensor and satellite remote sensing in order to track irregular migrations (Levy, 2013). Eurosur’s main objective is to further detect and police irregular movement, yet it also features a safe and rescue aspect and claims to provide safeguards for fundamental rights of migrants.

There was some original reluctance in adopting a human rights discourse among member states and agencies such as Frontex. During the discussions leading to the adoption of Eurosur’s Regulation, debates took place regarding whether humanitarian and safe and rescue aspects should be incorporated. Eventually, official documents about Eurosur present it as a system aimed at both preventing irregular migration and at ‘contributing to reduce the loss of lives of migrants’ (European Council, 2013, p. 3). The sensors, radars, satellite platforms used in the framework of Eurosur to detect, identify and trace both people and vessels are also presented as relevant responses to humanitarian

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17 For instance, the Meijers Committee of Experts on Migration Law lobbied to reinsert language about saving lives and discouraged the deletion of SAR and protection activities in the Regulation (Levy, 2013).
concerns. It is claimed that the deployment of surveillance technologies will have a positive effect on migrants’ lives and help reduce ‘the already unacceptable death toll of migrants drowning when trying to reach EU shores’ (European Commission, 2011). In other words, not only does the human rights narrative developed by EU and member states politicians in the context of immigration and border policies fail to challenge the securitisation logic that produces migrant deaths in the first place, it has in fact been used to justify and legitimise the very process whereby migrants’ journeys are made ever-more perilous and deadly.

**Solidarity with migrants: Conceptualising my research questions**

In a quest for a European identity that would gather people behind the EU project, politicians in the European Union and its member states have engaged in a concerted effort to promote difference and to implement a system of exclusion and marginalisation. This has resulted in an increase in popular racism vis-à-vis those deemed non-Europeans and a resurgence of nationalisms all over Europe.

One of the apparently contradictory outcomes of the ideological pursuit of European architects has been the way in which reactionary forces with anti-EU agendas grounded in conservative nationalism have benefitted from the discourse of Europeanism. The 2014 European elections saw the growth of far-right anti-EU parties in several member states (especially in Britain, France, Austria and Denmark). Of course, if one keeps in mind the insights presented in the previous chapters, the success of parties with nationalist and openly anti-immigration agendas does not come as a surprise. Rather, this is intimately correlated to the regime of differentiation and exclusion organised under the banner of the EU and Europeanity. Similar attributes and ideas to those previously mobilised towards the rejection of national rivals have been drawn upon to demarcate the imaginary borders of a ‘community of Europeans’. This process has reinforced and confirmed nationalist ideas and sentiments.

However, ideological campaigns promoting difference are not always successful and can produce contradictory outcomes (Marfleet, 2006, p.282). On repeated
occasions, attempts by states to formalise exclusion have led to campaigns of solidarity and public support towards non-nationals. This history of solidarity has gone largely unrecorded (p.283), a development closely related to the excision from ‘national memory’ of migrant presence and experience. Marfleet (pp. 282-3) reviews some of these episodes, starting with the strong defence of European refugees by the Chartist movement in the 19th century, at a time when the British government was encouraging an attitude of rejection towards exiles.

In the late 19th century, a large number of Eastern European Jews fleeing persecution from the Russian Empire arrived in Britain, settling principally in the East End of London. An anti-immigrant campaign was inaugurated by segments of the population. The British Brothers League was formed in 1892 with the support of (mostly Tory) politicians: it organised rallies and lobbied for the introduction of restrictive immigration controls. In reaction, a significant number of working class activists started to organise protests and marches. A large event was organised on 21st August 1894, in Whitechapel, London. A resolution stating that ‘the vast amount of poverty and misery which exists is in no way due to the influx of foreign workmen, but is the result of the private ownership of the means of production’ (cited in Cohen, Humphries and Mynott, 2002, p. 223) was passed.

A year later, a pamphlet entitled ‘A Voice from the Aliens’, written by (Jewish and other) trade unionists, and recently republished by No One Is Illegal, was circulated at trade unions’ and workers’ meetings in London and other British cities. It appealed to all right-thinking working men of England not to be misled by some leaders who have made it their cause to engender a bitter feeling amongst the British workers against the workers of other countries. Rather hearken to the voices of such leaders as will foster a feeling of international solidarity among the working people (Trade Union Congress, 1895).

In 1902, the Aliens Defence League was formed in Brick Lane to oppose the proposed anti-immigration Aliens Act. It held several rallies, some of which attracted several thousands of people (No Borders South Wales, 2009). Though
the Aliens Act was passed in 1905, the version that was adopted had been significantly revised under pressure from segments of the British public mobilised in favour of migrants (Henry, 2012).

Another striking episode of popular support toward non-nationals was the British response to the displacement of refugees from Belgium after German military attacks on the country. Offers of help abounded and an important number of voluntary relief workers were involved in receiving, accommodating and assisting the refugees. In this effort, British women played a particularly significant role. In her account of British suffragist and Quaker women’s activism in favour of displaced people, Storr (2010) revisits official narratives of the British response to the First World War and brings to the fore the importance of ordinary women’s engagement in the relief effort for refugees from other European countries. This was in stark contrast with the British government’s effort to reinforce its borders. On 5th August 1914, a revised Aliens Restriction Act was passed to ‘enable control of foreigners’ entry into Britain, deportation or internment of those already here and limitation of the areas where friendly foreigners could live’ (p. 24). Here again, popular ethics subverted the state’s attempt at promoting exclusion.

In The Guernica Generation, Lagaretta (1985) reconstitutes some of the stories and trajectories of the 20,000 children who were hastily evacuated from the Spanish Basque country to protect them from intense bombing on the part of Franco’s military and their allies. These children found refuge in several European countries, including France, Belgium and Britain, as well as in the Soviet Union and Mexico. Mostly from socialist, anarchist, communist or left republican families, these children raised concern among the ruling classes of other Western European countries (Lagaretta, 1985).

However, sustained solidarity campaigns by the public, particularly in Britain, managed to secure safety for the Basque children. This reflects the high level of popular sympathies toward the Spanish republicans in various European countries, which led to the establishment of various committees and solidarity movements, such as the Aid Spain Movement and the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief in Britain (Kushner and Knox, 2001, p. 105-8). In France,
research into working class memory reveals a high level of mobilisation in favour of Spanish republicans in industrial suburbs, including sustained efforts to welcome and support the refugees (Zaidman and Lenormand, no date). This spontaneous mood of solidarity took place as the (socialist) French government was placing Spanish refugees in internment camps and returning many of them to Franco’s Spain (Deschodt and Huguenin, 2001, pp. 147, 193, 355).

When, as of the 1980s, new patterns of exclusion spread across Europe, campaigns of solidarity with migrants also emerged. The French sans-papiers movement of the 1990s attracted significant levels of support both in France and across Europe. Starting as an appeal for the regularisation of undocumented migrants, it grew into a movement opposing immigration controls and calling for the freedom of movement. Their mobilisation was sustained for almost three years. It brought together citizens and non-citizens in a spirit of solidarity that acknowledged migrants’ individual agency and respected their autonomy. Its legacy continues to this day in the form of hundreds of sans-papiers collectives in France working with local and national organisations and proving able to mobilise quickly and efficiently to respond to particular situations. Other struggles inspired by the sans-papiers movement have grown across Europe, including in Belgium and Switzerland.

Hayter (2004) documents the case of Britain and records a number of successive organisations that have worked to advance the rights of migrants and to protest immigration controls and racial discrimination. These range from voluntary groups, charities and grassroots campaigns, to legal and religious organisations (Kimble, 1998, p. 34). Churches, for instance, were key actors in the Asylum Rights Campaign. With the rise of neo-fascist groups in the 1970s, pro-migrant groups and campaigns started embracing more systematically anti-racist and anti-fascist agendas, such as the Anti-Nazi League and the Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (Hayter, 2004, pp. 136-7). Hayter also mentions the multiplication of local and national campaigns to close particular detention facilities and oppose deportations (pp. 137-41). Such solidarity initiatives can be found across Europe. Patterns and forms of mobilisation vary from country to country, and in relation to the particular contexts in which they are embedded (Walters, 2006, pp. 25-6).
Similarly, forms of resistance and activism opposing the harmonisation of borders in the EU and the European regime of exclusion are developing. This PhD project’s objective is to investigate and analyse them in their context of formation. Indeed, these new solidarities with migrants respond to and are shaped by the political, economic and cultural circumstances in which they occur, including the assertion of an exclusionary notion of Europeanity and the construction of the EU harmonised border regime. In order to investigate and analyse these developments, I draw on insights from social movement theory, which I now turn to describe before addressing the issue of my fieldwork’s methodology in the next chapter.

**Social movement theory**

This brief overview of pro-migrant practices in Western Europe already points to their diversity and heterogeneity. Before starting my fieldwork, I needed to identify an analytical framework that would allow me to think through pro-migrant initiatives in a comparative way. This framework did not need to lead me to decisive conclusions, but rather to enable me to operationalise my research by entering my fieldwork with some explanatory tools and concepts in mind. Considering my fieldwork was concerned with forms of activist practices and discourses pertaining to a targeted political struggle, as well as with how they interacted with complex and multi-layered systems of authority in the era of globalisation, I was drawn to social movement theory (SMT).

I wrote my MSc dissertation on the World Social Forum as a possible site for the development of counter knowledges and had a level of familiarity with the tools and concepts of SMT. The flexibility of SMT allowed me to look at a wide range of discourses and practices, varying in shape, methods and location, whilst retaining a comparative dimension by conceptualising them as part of a continuum, linked by the commonality of their aims, rather than as isolated sites of actions, characterised by the specificity of their approach. Instead of considering my research as an exercise in applying SMT to the phenomena observed, I decided to use some of its tools and insights in a selective fashion, allowing me to shed light on particular aspects of pro-migrant activism in the EU.
Social movement theory (SMT) is generally thought to have two main variations. Firstly, the psychosocial approach whereby the mobilisation of people is seen as the direct result of their psychological or social circumstances. Secondly, as the study of social movements evolved as a field of analysis, resource mobilisation theory (RMT) (and its many variations) emerged as a way to incorporate into the study of social movements a number of factors and variables left out by psychosocial approaches (Oliver, Cadena-Roa and Strawn, 2002, p. 3). RMT puts the emphasis on the intermediary elements that explain the translation of individual discontent into organised contention. RMT pays attention to the organised resources available to a group and to its context of existence, and assesses the extent to which a group is able to attract and maintain membership.

Contrary to the psychosocial approach, social movements are not seen as the natural and necessary consequences of grievances. Social movement groups are considered to be actors engaging in strategic struggles and actions, and relying on particular structures and resources to articulate and disseminate their claims with the objective of mobilising people around them (Wiktorowicz, 2004a, p.9). As RMT developed, the importance of a variety of elements in the constitution and survival of movements was recognised and analysed. The role of informal institutions and social ties is also a focus of attention of RMT and many studies highlight the importance of these networks to recruit people to a cause (Mc Adam, 1986).

In the last three decades, SMT has evolved to incorporate new forms of social movement, often called the ‘new social movements’ (NSM), to its analysis. NSM theory focuses on the new organisational forms developed by contemporary movements, often characterised by decentralised, polypehphalous and reticulated structures (Freeman, 1983, p.204). NSM theory speaks of ‘social movement communities’ to describe the politicised actors who participate in promoting the particular discourse and objectives of a social movement, but who do so in looser, less formalised ways than traditional, formal organisations (Buechler, 1990, p.61). Wiktorowicz (2004a, p. 12) notes the relevance of this analytical model to study a variety of movements that have emerged since the 1970s. These include, among others, women’s movements (Buechler, 1990;
Staggenborg, 1998), lesbian feminists (Taylor and Whittier, 1992) and neighbourhood movements (Stoecker, 1995).

SMT, particularly that which focuses on NSM, has developed a number of conceptual tools in order to examine the emergence and development of activist and contentious political practices and to assess their success and limitations. Some of the tools which were useful to this research were the following:

**Opportunities and constraints**

The concepts of ‘opportunities’ and ‘constraints’ in relation to social movements emerge from the recognition that social movements do not operate in a vacuum. They exist in social contexts characterised by complex configurations of possibilities and limitations, which play a part in structuring a movement’s dynamics (Wiktorowicz, 2004a, p.13). Exogenous factors can be both a source of empowerment or of constraint for activists participating in social movement politics (Tarrow, 1998; Kolb, 2007, p.52).

These exogenous factors influence a movement and its choice of tactics and actions, as well as the degree of public exposure and visibility it can resort to. These concepts are used to describe the level of (formal and informal) access to political institutions and decision-making structures; the degree of popularity of the movement’s claims and objectives within the wider public; the type of political system the movement operates within; the level of political repression it is exposed to and so on. Often called ‘political opportunities and constraints’, it is worth noting that they also consist of cultural, social and economic factors (Kurzman, 1996; McAdam, Sidney and Tilly, 2001).

**Frames**

The concept of framing emerges from the observation that ideology is not the sole guiding reference for discourse and action and the only way people understand their political identities. The concept of frames looks at ideas as socially-created, organised and disseminated variables (Wiktorowicz, 2004a, p.15; Oliver and Johnston, 2001). The process of discourse construction results
in what SMT sometimes calls ‘packages’, which refers to the way in which movements formulate arguments by articulating various references and ideological resources in response to a problem (Wiktorowicz, p. 9).

Social movements exist and develop in social, political and cultural fields where multiple actors with various agendas and perspectives are competing over framing hegemony: they engage in contests to influence the way in which a particular issue or set of issues is interpreted and understood (Benford, 1993). This is the case between a movement and the dominant frame it opposes, but contests over framing also happen within movements, between activists holding different positions (e.g. violence vs. non-violence, pragmatism vs. ideologism, discussion with authorities vs. non engagement, and so on). Actors within a social movement often share a common understanding of the issue they are fighting against, but there is often less agreement over how to fight and over the strategies and tactics which are most relevant and desirable (Benford, 1993; Benford and Snow, 2000, pp. 625-27). A social movement is essentially an attempt at disputing the ‘official frame(s)’ in a context where mainstream discourses might themselves use framing relying on certain values that activists identify with (for example, going to war in the name of humanitarian or democratic ideas) and where the status quo will attempt to limit the institutional resources and the public spaces available for the spreading of alternative frames (Noakes, 2000; Wiktorowicz, 2004a).

When it comes to spreading a frame, the reputation of the ‘frame articulators’ can play an important role, as does the use of recognisable symbols and linguistic references ‘that tap into shared cultural experiences or collective memories’ (Wiktorowicz, 2004a, p. 18). Social movements sometimes mix themes specific to their ideological struggles with other references or elements (to do with revolutionary symbols or episodes, particular historical memories and so on). Selbin (2010) insists on the ‘power of story’, that is to say, the importance of developing a frame of analysis of both domination and reaction that successfully compels people to act on their indignation.

The narratives that activists develop are characterised by ‘associations and connections across time and space that people deploy to construct a
revolutionary imaginary comprising symbols, names, dates, places, grievances, stories, and means and methods, which they then draw on as they consider the world and their options’ (p.166). Selbin considers this imaginary as a necessary condition to the emergence of any form of resistance movement (pp. 161-83). In that sense, frames are crucial interpretative devices that operate as translators of grievances and perceived opportunities into the mobilisation of activists and resources towards a movement’s goals.

Repetories

The concept of the ‘repertoire’ (often discussed as ‘repertoire of contentious’ or ‘cultural repertoire’) of a social movement refers to the set of protest-related tools and tactics available to it in a particular context. Tactics, actions and tools that feature frequently in social movements’ repertoires include public meetings, demonstrations and rallies, vigils and sit-ins, petitions and lobbying of governmental institutions, press releases and media statements, strikes and pickets, boycotts, among others. Repertoires evolve over time, in response to opportunities and constraints, as well as to the framing strategies chosen by a particular social movement (Tarrow, 1998). New tactics are integrated into repertoires all the time, as the recent scholarship around Internet-based tactics and ‘hacktivism’ illustrates (Samuel, 2004; Krapp, 2005). The idea that, alongside ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ repertoires, a ‘digital’ repertoire is now emerging has also been discussed by social movement scholars (Earl and Kimpor, 2011).

An interesting dynamic of social movements’ cultural repertoires is that they are shared between social movements and activists. As a particular tactic or action proves successful, it becomes used by other social movements, including some whose goals might be different from those of the social movement which initially used the tactic (Tarrow, 1998). Repertoires can be empowering, in the sense that they provide possible tactics and strategies, but they can also be limiting and hinder social movements’ actors’ creativity by pushing them to rely on the most common tools and tactics (Tarrow, 1998).
Selectively applying tools from SMT to pro-migrant initiatives in Europe allowed me to explore and assess their practices and discourses in relation to their context of emergence and development and in a comparative fashion.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have presented an overview of the harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies in the European Union. By looking at immigration-related policies in Europe as falling within two broad chronological periods, I have put forward the argument that processes of bordering and border control are embedded in particular political-economic contexts to which they are instrumental and which partly determine the shape they endorse.

This migration regime has caused great prejudice to vulnerable people trying to reach Europe, by pushing them into dangerous clandestine networks and through the exercise of various forms of violence by border guards of the EU and its member states. However, history shows that although official agendas promote exclusion and racism, popular solidarity with non-national ‘others’ has long existed. In the next chapters, I will examine a number of initiatives promoting migrants’ rights and interests in the European Union. I will explore the new practices developed to oppose the EU border regime as well as the discourses and frames that have emerged from pro-migrant activism.
Chapter IV
Methodology

Introduction

In the previous chapters I have highlighted the way in which EU architects and politicians have developed a discourse that promotes difference and exclusion. I have also described the formation of a European immigration and border regime. Against this background, new patterns of resistance and campaigns of solidarity with migrants have been emerging. My fieldwork was concerned with investigating these and trying to identify how the dominant exclusionary discourse on Europeanity and the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policies have affected and shaped pro-migrant activism in the EU. My two main hypotheses were the following:

- Pro-migrant activism has evolved and developed new structures, tactics, frames and repertoires in the context of the construction of the EU border regime. In particular, the supranationalisation of migration ‘management’ has led to the multiplication of crossborder links and the emergence of transnational networks and campaigns.

- The groups and individuals engaged in pro-migrant solidarity challenge the dominant discourse on Europe and Europeanity and develop counter-visions of Europe and what it could be or mean.

Moving from my theoretical investigation to the fieldwork was a more difficult step than I had anticipated. Looking at how activism and solidarity around migrants’ rights have responded to the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum issues proved challenging because, among other reasons, few resources on the subject were available. In addition, translating the research topic into fieldwork was rendered complex because my research hypotheses and questions concerned a diverse field and did not call for specific groups or individuals to participate. In this chapter, I address these issues and how I tackled them.
**Ethnographic, narrative, multi-sited approach**

In order to grasp the emergence of new practices and discourses in the pro-migrant field in the EU, I used qualitative research methods. Qualitative research is particularly appropriate to develop ‘complex, detailed understanding of [an] issue. This detail can only be established by talking directly to people … and allowing them to tell the stories unencumbered by what we expect to find or what we have read in the literature’ (Cresswell, 2007, p.40). Qualitative inquiry also allows ‘understand the contexts and settings in which participants in a study address a problem or issue’ (p.40). Interactions among people cannot be captured by quantitative measures, and measures tend to be insensitive to factors such as gender, race, economic status and individual differences (p. 40).

There exist various approaches to qualitative inquiry. In this research, I combine an ethnographic approach with insights from narrative studies. My research’s focus on the development of crossborder and transnational connections, spaces and (potentially) forms of belonging also encouraged me to adopt a multi-sited methodology.

**Ethnography**

Ethnography is a qualitative design in which the researcher observes and interprets a group’s shared patterns of values, behaviours, beliefs and activities (Harris, 1968), as well as ‘issues faced by the group, such as power, resistance and dominance’ (Creswell, 2007, p. 70). Ethnographic methods require that researchers immerse themselves in the social setting they observe, in order to gain in-depth knowledge of their participants’ experiences and interactions in context.

[Ethnography] is a family of methods involving direct and sustained social contact with agents, and of richly writing up the encounter, respecting, recording, representing at least partly in its own terms, the irreducibility of human experience. Ethnography is the discipline and deliberate witness-cum-recording of human events (Willis and Trondman, 2000, pp. 5-6 – authors’ italics)

Ethnography is also adapted to examine how human experiences reciprocally participate in shaping the context in which they occur.
[T]he ethnographic enterprise is about presenting, explaining and analysing the culture(s) which locate(s) ‘experience’... the best ethnography also recognizes and records how experience is entrained in the flow of contemporary history, large and small, partly caught up in its movement, partly itself creatively helping to maintain it, enacting the uncertainty of the eddies and gathering flows dryly recorded from the outside as ‘structures’ and ‘trends’... Ethnography and theory should be conjoined to produce a concrete sense of the social as internally spring and dialectically produced (Willis and Trondman, 2000, p. 6 – authors’ italics)

Ethnography entails prolonged periods of fieldwork during which the experiences and groups under study are directly engaged with. Fieldwork is a means to reach deeper levels of understanding and to explore the situated meaning of practices and habits that might otherwise go unnoticed:

Fieldwork's stress on taken-for-granted social routines, informal knowledge, and embodied practices can yield understanding that cannot be obtained either through standardized social science research methods (e.g., surveys) or through decontextualized readings of cultural products (e.g., text-based criticism). One does not need to mystify or fetishize knowledge gained through long-term immersion in a social milieu to recognize its importance and value. Nor does one need to grant an unwarranted epistemological privilege to face-to-face interaction in order to appreciate the virtues of a research tradition that requires its practitioners to listen to those they would study, and to take seriously what they have to say (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997, pp. 36-7 – authors’ italics)

For this research, I undertook fieldwork over a period of a year and a half during which I engaged in participant observation and carried out a number of interviews in the various sites of my study.18 I understood fieldwork in a broader sense and constantly attempted to remain attuned to the larger context of the project. This meant keeping abreast of relevant policy development, reading newspapers, and following government and European debates on immigration.

In its early days, ethnography was an anthropological practice for the study of ‘other’ groups and communities. Since, ethnography has been adopted by a range of social science disciplines and its meaning and practice have evolved. Gupta and Ferguson (1997, p. 37) argue that:

18 Further detail on participant observation and interviews is provided later in this chapter.
Instead of a royal road to holistic knowledge of "another society," ethnography is beginning to become recognizable as a flexible and opportunistic strategy for diversifying and making more complex our understanding of various places, people, and predicaments through an attentiveness to the different forms of knowledge available.

This insight guided my eye and ear whilst conducting my fieldwork and encouraged me to pay particular attention to the construction of located knowledges and practices, but also to the way in which these travelled and were reconstituted in different sites.

Narrative approach

My methodological approach had to allow for the exploration of the political values and beliefs of the participants. It was important that it gave participants space to reflect on their personal experience, in a way that did not only fall back on political meta-discourses. Rather, I wanted to design an approach that would pay particular attention to the connections and tensions between individual stories, experiences and values, and larger, collective, political beliefs and narratives.

Narrative approaches suggest that ‘the stories people tell themselves and the others about who they are (and who they are not)’ are what constitute their identity (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 201-2). McAdams (2008, p. 244) considers the self as ‘both the storyteller and the stories that are told’. Further than this, narrative scholars have argued that people fashion stories to make meaning out of their lives (McAdams, 2008; Freeman and Brockmeier, 2001). Through constructing narratives, individuals attribute meaning to their actions (Bruner, 1990) and ascribe a sense of consistency and unity to their experiences (Cohler, 1982). As my research is concerned with examining the meaning that particular values have in the lives and activities of the participants, as well as the form of identity that emerges through their involvement in social and political activism, using tools and frames pertaining to narrative research seemed particularly pertinent and valuable.

Another significant contribution provided by narrative scholars relates to the importance of placing stories within a context. McAdams contends that ‘it is in
the realm of narrative identity … that personality shows its most important and intricate relations to culture and society’ (2008, p. 242). As put by Riessman (2008, p. 105): ‘stories don’t fall from the sky (or emerge from the innermost ‘self’); they are composed and received in contexts.’ In other words, stories are always told (by people and to people) and the act of telling occurs in social relationships. Thus, stories mirror the social context where they are enunciated and reflect norms of ‘tellability’. In the context of this research, which seeks to identify counter-narratives, thinking about how activists’ discourses might challenge (or fail to challenge) the boundaries of what counts as tellable in the particular site under examination is thus an important aspect of my investigation.

Narratives are formulated from particular ‘positioning’ or ‘subject positions’. Bamberg (1997) discusses how storytellers adopt particular emotional and social positions vis-à-vis their audience, and how, as protagonists in their own stories, they position themselves in relation to other characters. Positioning is thus relational: we position ourselves in relation to others, and others also position ourselves through language and in their own narratives. Our positions participate in and shape our way of seeing and being in the world, and hence our subjectivity (Willig, 2008, p. 113). At the same time, individual positions or subjectivities in turn shape the discourse that produces them (Rojas and Michie, 2013, p. 132). Listening to a narrative can thus tell us both about the individual stories behind it and about the broader context of its enunciation and the position of the participant within that context.

Andrews (2007) broadens our understanding of the relationship between narrative, positioning and politics when she argues that narratives of identity are always political ‘even when they are personal, as they reflect the positionality of the speaker’ (p. 9).

In the story which they weave, individuals reveal how they position themselves within the community in which they live, to whom or what they see themselves as belonging to/alienated from, how they construct notions of power, and the processes by which such power is negotiated. For individuals, political narratives are the ligaments of identity, revealing how one constructs the boundaries of, and the connections between, the self and the other (Andrews, 2014, p. 38).
Reissman observes that narratives and positions are always ‘strategic, functional and purposeful’ (2008, p. 8), even when and where their narrator might not have made a conscious choice in that respect. Narratives thus perform a critical social and political function, and participate in the discursive construction of a sense of identity – ‘of who is “us” and who is “them”’ (Andrews, 2014, p. 37). This furthers the relevance of a narrative approach for my study of activism against the European Union’s exclusionary discourse and border regime.

In spite of their relevance to analyse social movements, narratives were for a long time ‘barely … explored by social movement researchers’ (Fine, 1995, p. 133). This is partly to do with social movement theory’s emphasis on structural and interest-orientated analyses, sometimes to the near-exclusion of ideational factors and personal agency (Hammack and Cohler, 2011, p. 163). Bringing a narrative dimension to an analytical and methodological frame inspired by social movement theory allows me to address the ideational and cultural processes at work in pro-migrant activism and to develop a more nuanced understanding of how frames, interpretations, discourses and collective identities are constructed and negotiated.

**Multi-sited approach**

Multi-sited methodologies have largely been associated with ethnographic and anthropological studies. First conceptualised by anthropologist George Marcus in 1995, multi-sited ethnography is increasingly used to study geographically dispersed phenomena in an evermore-interconnected era. This methodological approach has been applied to topics such as capital and labour market flows, commodity chains, international and supranational institutions but also to migration and communication media and technology. Indeed, multi-sited ethnography gives researchers scope to follow flows and connections between stories, subjects and meanings across multiple sites. Beyond offering appropriate methodological tools to analyse the interconnections and movements of various social phenomena of the global age, multi-sited approaches also call into question their very subject of study by challenging the idea that communities and cultures can be seen as bounded, internally homogeneous and studied in isolation.
Multi-sited methodology’s focus on connections and influences makes it particularly appropriate for my research, and allows me to examine the creation of networks and links across geographically distinct sites, as well as to look at how engaging in such networks has affected the participants in their own situated context.

Online fieldwork

Adopting a multi-sited approach allowed me to observe the connections developing between the various research sites, and to compare how groups in different EU member states have responded to the Europeanisation of immigration controls. However, this research framework could still run the risk of analysing different case studies without fully grasping and exploring the formation of post- or trans-national spaces. In order to tackle this risk, I decided to undertake an investigation of the online (virtual) connections and communications undertaken by the participants. As will be explained, I conceptualised online and offline interactions as part of a continuum characterised by a dialectic relation, rather than as two separate dimensions of the trans-nationalisation of pro-migrants struggles in the EU (see Chapter V).

I now explain how I selected the sites, groups and individuals participating in my research. I had to reflect on two main questions: the first one was related to defining the fieldwork sites and the second with determining criteria to select specific groups.

Selecting countries

To address these questions, I reflected on which sites to include in my research fieldwork and undertook a pre-mapping of the migrant solidarity field in these sites. My previous experience working in the British and French contexts had allowed me to make preliminary observations regarding the forms of pro-migrant activities and activism in both countries. Being familiar with the dynamics and context of pro-migrant struggles in each of these sites, I had been able to discern some interesting convergences, as well as persisting differences.
The UK

The UK has opt-out from the Schengen Agreement and refused to abolish national border controls. It has adopted a largely instrumental attitude towards the Schengen project, by repeatedly using its powerful position within the EU to call for further reinforcement of external border controls while continuously refusing to join the Area. Moreover, the UK has constantly claimed its support for further European cooperation against ‘terrorism, crime and illegal immigration’ (see Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012, Ev. 87). Hence, while not accepting to join the European border system, the UK has considered it to be in its own national interest to push for further harmonisation of control and surveillance. As put by a London metropolitan senior police officer: ‘our security starts not just at our own borders, but at the Greek islands or the Finnish frontier’ (as quoted in Brady, 2007). It has been one of the main actors and investors in Europol (the EU law enforcement agency) and has made extensive use of Eurodac, the EU database where fingerprints of asylum seekers are stored, in order to send back hundreds of asylum applicants to other EU member states every year.19

In recent years, the media and political discourse around migration in the UK has taken an acrimonious turn, within which a particular type of anti-EU rhetoric has played an important role. The figure best representing this development (which is not new but has experienced a strong revival in the last two decades) is that of Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) created in 1993. UKIP combines an anti-EU rhetoric (on grounds of national sovereignty preservation) with a strong anti-immigration stance. UKIP supporters consider immigration as the main problem facing British society (see Financial Times, 2014). UKIP’s campaign for the May 2014 European election included billboards claiming that ‘26 million people in Europe are looking for work’ and adding ‘And whose job are they after?’ (The Guardian, 2014b). Throughout the election campaign, Farage also argued that the issue with immigration was not simply one of ‘quantity’ but also one of ‘quality’ and that certain categories of migrants, including people from Eastern European countries, brought with them a culture of criminality and that Britons should be ‘wary’ of ‘having Romanians moving into their streets’ (The Guardian, 2014c).

19 1,005, 1,162 and 1,011 in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively (UKBA, 2012).
The surging popularity of UKIP has impacted the broader debate around migration in the UK and influenced the discourse of other political parties. The Conservative Party, for example, has tried to match UKIP’s level of anti-immigration rhetoric, in an attempt to attract UKIP’s electors and avoid splitting its vote. Recently, in early November 2014, David Cameron called for a cap on unskilled European migrants, one of UKIP’s main slogans, which reflects the party’s distinction between migrations of different ‘qualities’. Cameron’s statement provoked controversy in the European Union, and German Chancellor Merkel responded that Germany would not touch what it considers to be the basic principle of free movement of persons within the EU (The Guardian, 2014d). The Tory party itself was divided over Cameron’s argument, with senior MPs standing against him. Ken Clarke, a former cabinet minister, affirmed that the free movement of labour was ‘not only (...) one of the principles of the EU, [but] the basis of any serious single market’. Indeed, a single market underpinned by free movement of labour is perceived as essential to ‘a modern economy’ (The Guardian, 2014d). These tensions are interesting examples of the contradictions generated by and within the EU, linked to the attempt to reconcile enduring national political structures and identities, and global neoliberal imperatives.

These contradictions have also affected other mainstream political parties. In response to Farage’s comments, some Labour members have also denounced the EU as damaging the UK by allowing free movement of Eastern European migrants. Ian Austin, a former aide to Gordon Brown, for instance, called on his party to apologise for opening the borders to Eastern Europeans in 2004 (The Telegraph, 2014). Choosing the UK as one of my research sites was thus of particular interest, in order to explore how these tensions played out at various levels of authority, as well as to investigate how activists developed practices and narratives to oppose the EU border regime in a context marked by the presence of both strong anti-immigration and vivid anti-European sentiments.

A final important point to mention in relation to the UK context is the country’s colonial history and its long record of anti-immigrant legislation. As early as the 1905 Alien Act, UK legislation introduced the notion of the ‘undesirable immigrant’ (Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
1905). This idea permeated post-war British immigration legislation, at a time when ‘labour shortage and anxiety about population decline prompted the … Labour Government to favour immigration’ (Cesarini, 2002, p. 64) of certain groups. In 1944, the Royal Commission on Population stated that immigrants ‘could only be welcomed without reserve if [they] were of good human stock and were not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the local population and becoming merged within it’ (cited in Marfleet, 2006, p. 179). Eastern European migrants were favoured and between 1947 and 1951, over 200,000 migrants from Eastern Europe were settled in Britain (Cesarini, 2001, p. 64). By contrast, people from Britain’s colonies and ex-colonies were treated with hostility and considered ‘problematic’ (Cesarini, 2001, p. 64). Yet, demand for labour was pressing, which eventually led to a lifting of immigration controls and the arrival of large numbers of people from the Caribbean and South Asia into Britain.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, an ambivalent approach to immigration from the colonies and former colonies prevailed (Marfleet, 2006, pp. 180-1). A series of legislative initiatives were adopted with the objective of excluding certain groups of people, in line with the state’s long record of colonial rule and associated racist representations. Yet, the British economy needed cheap labour. Large numbers of people were allowed to settle in the UK and, in spite of the official rhetoric of exclusion, regularisations and amnesties were common (p. 181). With respect to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, Marfleet even argues that ‘rather than restricting immigration, the new system speeded it up’ (p. 180). Nonetheless, these developments legitimised racist and suspicious attitudes towards people of African and Asian origin. In 1968, a new act was passed which inaugurated a ‘process of bifurcation between white and non-white parts’ of the Commonwealth (Cesarini, 2001, p. 66). The imperial and racist legacy permeating immigration law was sanctified with the 1971 Immigration Act which formalised exclusion on the basis of race by allowing immigration of ‘patrials’ – those with a British parent or grandparent – and denying entry to most others. This ensured that White Commonwealth citizens had access to Britain while Black Commonwealth citizens lost their right of entry (p. 66).
As a new era of increased forced migration was about to begin, these developments paved the way for the racialisation, marginalisation and criminalisation of migrants.

**France**

France presents an interesting point of comparison with the UK for a number of reasons. In the context of the EU, it has adopted a significantly different stance towards the Schengen Area. It was one of the five original signatories of the 1985 Schengen Agreement and has historically been at the centre of the dispositive. To understand the role played by France in Schengen, one needs to look at the hierarchy characterising relations between different countries within the Area. Indeed, while Eastern and Southern countries find themselves as *de facto* border guards for the whole Schengen space, Northern and Western EU member states have continuously pushed for the reinforcement both of the external borders and of mechanisms that displace responsibility such as the Dublin Convention. In this sense, the form of external ‘buffer zone’, which the EU has developed through its process of externalisation of border control is mirrored inside the Schengen Area through an arrangement that keeps migrants who have managed to enter the EU in the most peripheral spaces possible.

In spite of this privileged position within the Schengen mechanism, France has in the last few years been at the heart of a controversy concerning the possible (temporary) suspension of the free movement of people in the Area. Following the 2011 popular uprisings in the Arab world and the brief collapse of some control and surveillance devices related to ‘unauthorised departures’, France decided to unilaterally re-impose controls at some of its borders with Italy. Since, this theme has remained of importance in the French debate around migration. In 2012, during his electoral campaign, then-President Sarkozy called for France to exit the Schengen Agreement if the system was not reformed (BBC, 2012). Following his dismissal from the French presidency in 2012, and his momentary disappearance from the French political scene, Mr Sarkozy attempted a political comeback in Spring 2014, with the suspension of the current Schengen Agreement, and its replacement by ‘Schengen II’, as one of the main features of his programme (The Telegraph, 2014b). According to this
view, the Schengen Border Code should be reformed in order to allow the temporary introduction of border checkpoints and, in specific instances, the suspension of countries considered unable to properly ‘secure their borders’ from the passport-free travel agreement. While the tensions surrounding the debate have not reached the same degree of intensity as in the UK, it has nonetheless increasingly been pushed onto the mainstream political agenda. Here again, a number of contradictions regarding relations between national and European level authorities can be observed, for example with respect to the question of how much power EU institutions would retain over potential re-erection of national borders.

In a similar vein to what has been described regarding the British context, the extreme right of the French political spectrum and its anti-immigration rhetoric have gained increasing influence in the country. The rapid electoral gains made by the Front National (FN) and its anti-immigration, racist and Islamophobic agenda have impacted on the French political discourse at large and contributed to pushing it yet further to the right. This is by no means a new dynamic: already in 1984, then-Prime Minister Laurent Fabius was describing the founder and historical leader of the party, Jean-Marie Le Pen, as someone who ‘asks the right questions but gives the wrong answers’. Ironically, if one accepts the terms of the debate proposed by the FN, then the far-right party in fact brings the right answers to its own questions. Indeed, if the political class in France accepts that ‘there are too many immigrants’, one of the far-right party’s mottos, then surely their proposition to curb immigration is a possible solution. In this sense, the main success of the FN has laid in its ability to gain framing hegemony over various topics, first of all immigration.

In 2011, Jean-Marie Le Pen retired and was replaced by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. This has arguably brought a new aura of acceptability to the party, as its previous leader had been associated with collaboration during WWII and openly boasted about killings he had committed during the Algerian war. The FN also defends a largely anti-Europe stance, arguing that the EU steals France’s sovereign rights and calling for a return to a national border, national currency and the prevalence of national law over European legislation (Front National, no date).
Similarly to other EU member states, the debate around immigration in France has taken an increasingly Islamophobic turn in the last couple of decades (Amiraux and Mohammed, 2013). One way in which French Islamophobia has been expressed is through the systematic inflation of topics perceived as related to Islam (from dress code to eating habits and praying practices) in a way that produces a ‘public debate’ and frames it in terms of ‘national identity’, ‘civilisational defence’ and ‘cultural compatibility’. In such narratives, various (sometimes contradictory) notions of Frenchness and Europeanness are mobilised in order to identify and exclude the Muslim Other. France’s colonial past and the particular representations it mobilised, whereby French ‘universalism’ was faced with the duty to ‘educate’ and ‘enlighten’ less-advanced ‘Others’, still permeates France’s relation to its migrant population.

The year 2014 and the beginning of 2015 featured particularly strong tensions, with a growing focus placed on Muslim residents and citizens in the country as part of a wave of panic orchestrated in large part by the relentless emphasis put on young French Muslims going to fight in Syria and ‘coming back to continue the jihad’ inside the country by the French media (Lombard, 2014; Messina 2014). The recent attacks (January 2015) on the French ‘satirical’ magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, renowned for its provocative anti-Islam cartoons, added further fuel to the fire and were followed by attacks against mosques in the following days.

*Italy*

The UK and France are thus interesting contexts to compare with respect to the debates around notions of identity, Europe and immigration, and they present both differences and strong similarities. In order to integrate another perspective to my research, I was interested in addressing the situation in one of the EU ‘border countries’, which have been the most directly involved in the process of reinforcement of the Union’s external borders, insofar as these borders coincide with their national ones.

I had initially envisaged Spain as a third site for research, notably because a particular narrative regarding the country’s management of its Southern border has been instrumental to the formulation of a discourse about the so-called ‘soft
underbelly’ of the Union. In October 2011, as a means to engage in preliminary observations, I went on a ten-day trip to Madrid, where I met a number of pro-migrant groups and spoke with some of their staff and volunteers as well as independent activists, mostly of an anarcho-syndicalist background, enacting radical forms of solidarity with migrants through shared life in squats and collective artistic practices. This attempt at mapping the pro-migrant field in Spain, its linkages with other European pro-migrant groups and its involvement in European platforms or networks, was instructive, yet I came back with the feeling that I had not quite identified the type of transborder initiatives that I had been looking for.

Meanwhile, in Italy, the migration of North African and sub-Saharan migrants following the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings had become a widely discussed theme. Regime changes in Tunisia and Libya meant agreements regarding external migration controls were suspended and, hence, that a crack had opened in the EU border regime, which the member states were anxious to close again. Tensions were emerging both at the national and European levels. The extraordinary dimension of the situation led to an enlightening exacerbation of the contradictions and tensions of the EU border regime: as the political and humanitarian crisis in Lampedusa was deepening, the Italian government and the EU discourse were increasingly faced with the inconsistency between their discourse on rights and democracy and their migration and asylum policy. In parallel, an alarmist media discourse was being produced. In that context, a variety of practices of solidarity and resistance were emerging on the ground, on the island of Lampedusa and across Europe at large.

In November 2011, I began contact with a number of Italian organisations and activists involved in the pro-migrant field, and tried to understand what forms of solidarity and resistance were being shaped, and what links with European-level activism existed. I came across a large number of relevant initiatives and campaigns, including activists and journalists engaging in joint solidarity mobilisation with migrants. It seemed that an explosion of radical and innovative activist practices was occurring, and a series of activist and associative.20

20 In France, an association is a registered non-profit group registered under the 1901 French law on the freedom of associations. The term association and its adjectival form ‘associative’ are commonly used in French to refer to social and militant activities. For example, it is common to speak about associative
campaigns and actions were being prepared for 2012. I immediately came across a strong and sophisticated discourse on Europe and on the need to oppose dominant xeno-racist representations of the migratory phenomenon through the production of counter-discourses. I thus decided that my third research site would be Italy.

The reasons that led me to choose Italy as a third site thus differ from those that brought me to look at France and the UK. They were directly linked with the exceptional character of the migratory phenomenon at the time of my research and to the high level of relevant activist initiatives taking place in the country. As I will explain, my fieldwork in Italy was not concerned with Italian groups or branches from transnational networks. Rather, I decided to participate in and examine transnational events and campaigns that took place in the country during the summer of 2012.

These transnational events were bringing together activists from many different countries and backgrounds. However, elements of the Italian context remain useful to this study, in particular because the development of a corpus of immigration legislations in Italy has been tightly linked to the Europeanisation of immigration and border controls. Rather than an old immigration country, like the UK and France, Italy only became a destination for migrants in the late 1970s. Italy passed its first immigration law in 1986, just a year after signing the Schengen Agreement. Up to then, immigration was governed by administrative regulations and a series of ‘Public Safety Laws’ dating back to Mussolini’s fascist regime (Komada, 2011, p. 453). Foreigners merely needed to report their presence within three days of entering the country. There was a large undocumented population working in Italy and Law 943 of 1986 mainly aimed at addressing this situation by introducing quotas dependent on available jobs, as well as regularising foreigners already present and working on Italian soil (p. 455). The first comprehensive immigration legislation in Italy was the Martelli Law, introduced in 1990 to ‘integrate migrants into the labour force’ and ‘fight illegal migration’ (p. 455). The Martelli Law was directly related to the Schengen milieu or circle to refer to groups of organisations involved in a particular field of social struggles. The legislation on French associations is largely similar to that on Italian associazioni. Contrarily to the British charities, which are constrained by the Charity Commission in terms of their political agenda, French and Italian associations are free to put their political opinions forward.

21 This is well exemplified in the famous Fortress Europe blog (Del Grande, no date).
process and was Italy’s attempt to assure other EU member states that it was able to prevent the entry of irregular immigrants into the Schengen space (Rusconi, 2010).

In the second half of the 1990s, new reforms took place under pressure from EU member states which considered Italian borders ‘too porous’, particularly in the context of increased migratory movements from former Yugoslavia, Albania and Somalia (Rusconi, 2010). The 1998 Turco-Napolitano Law introduced more border controls and new repressive measures, such as the opening of immigration detention centres. The electoral campaign leading to the 2001 elections, which saw the arrival to power of a right-wing coalition, was largely focused on immigration and imbued by the xenophobic rhetoric of far-right parties such as the Lega Nord. The 2002 Bossi-Fini Law reformed previous legislation by introducing further restrictions. The 2008 return to power of Berlusconi led to further discriminating policies with the 2009 ‘Security Set’, which defines irregular migration as a criminal offense, thus calling on the Italian public (public workers, school teachers, and so on) to report the presence of undocumented migrants. Irregularity is punishable with fines and detention sentences. Assisting undocumented migrants is also prosecutable as a crime (Komada, 2011, p. 459).

Since its entry into Schengen and in the context of increased migratory flows, Italy has thus engaged in a process of continuous harshening of its immigration policies. This has been accompanied by a rise in racist attitudes and prejudice. According to the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), in 2009-10 Italy was the second country in Europe when it came to the occurrence rate of mistreatment, attacks and racially motivated acts of violence (Di Pasquale, 2009-10). ENAR denounces an overall ‘anti-migrant climate’ in the country and argues that it cannot be separated from the violent ‘xenophobic rhetoric’ (p.25) of politicians and state representatives. Recent incidences of racist violence in Italy have included attacks on migrant-run shops and pogrom-like assaults on migrant workers and Gypsy communities (for example in Naples and Padova), which have in some cases resulted in the death of those targeted.
Scholars have recently linked the persistence of xenophobic attitudes and racist violence in Italy to the legacy of the country’s colonial past. Ali Abdullatif Ahmida (2005) speaks of a ‘collective amnesia’ in respect to the colonisation of Libya. Mellino (2006) also observes a removal of Italy’s colonial past from the country’s official history and national memory. This was achieved by means of historical revisionism, in the context of a drive towards national reconciliation in the 1980s. Italian colonialism was intimately linked to Mussolini’s fascist rule and expansionist ideology. The denial of Italy’s race-based colonial and fascist ideology and its continuous legacy in the country today also correlates to a process of ‘caricaturisation’ and ‘banalisation’ of Fascism and fascist culture (Siebert, 2010). Latent racist representations violently resurfaced in the 1980s when the country became a major immigration destination. They still permeate collective representations of and attitudes towards foreigners. Besides non-European migrants, Italian racism has also targeted Roma and Eastern European people as well as Southern Italians.

Finally, as previously mentioned, another space I addressed during my fieldwork was that of virtual interactions and communications. Concretely, this meant that I carefully followed and studied the online activities of the participating groups and individuals through monitoring their public mailing lists, newsletters, blogs and websites. I come back to this in more detail below.

**Pre-fieldwork mapping and filtering**

Once I had reduced the choice of geographical sites to three countries, the issue of selecting particular groups and networks remained to be addressed. In order to select with greater clarity which groups should participate in my research, I decided to undertake a pre-mapping of the pro-migration field in these three sites. At first, I referred to relevant literature and conducted Internet research, in order to review the pro-migrant initiatives in each country to the largest possible extent. As I started this mapping exercise, I was immediately confronted with the issue of the huge heterogeneity of the groups supporting migrants or contesting migration regimes at national and/or European levels in these EU member states. While some groups work at policy level and/or lobby EU institutions in Brussels, others are concerned with documenting and
reporting on imprisonment practices in detention camps and centres across Europe, and many more, usually smaller, organisations or community groups focus on providing daily-life support to migrants.

Mapping the migration struggles field was also rendered more complex when considering the numerous and often spontaneous or individual migrant-led actions that have been increasingly emerging over the last couple of decades. These include forms of transborder activities that could be, and have in fact been, conceptualised as acts of resistance, yet were not necessarily forms of public or collective action. For instance, undocumented border-crossing practices, or the use of savvy knowledge about Schengen rules to bring someone over to a EU country, are forms of subversion to the migration and border control regime of the EU. Moreover, such acts often rely on complex networks of informants and participants and hence do possess a collective dimension.

These initial observations led to a series of questions. One of them concerned the extent to which the fieldwork should focus on migrant-led initiatives rather than pro-migrant initiatives at large (migrant-led or otherwise). This question was all the more interesting since, in recent years, a growing body of scholarship has focused on the issue of citizenship as practice (Isin and Nielsen 2008; Clarke et al eds., 2014) and a recent edited volume (Isin and Saward eds., 2013) brought this question to the very site of European citizenship. In such approaches, the focus is placed on how groups and people that might not be in fact endowed with the status of citizens nonetheless engage in ‘acts’ that can be conceptualised as pertaining to citizenship practices.

Moreover, an emerging trend of scholarship has been building on and assessing Mezzadra’s concept of ‘autonomy of migration’ as a departure point from which to look at migrants’ counter-tactics and strategies of subversion in response to the European and global border regime (Andersson, 2014). The concept of autonomy of migration has been developed to highlight the way in which ‘migrants’ mobility always exceeds the means used to control it (Andersson, 2014). Some ethnographic studies have shed light on the complex

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22 See in particular Mezzadra’s argument that migration is a social movement in itself (Mezzadra, 2003).
interaction between migrants’ practices and obstacles to mobility and the way these give rise to various forms of ‘abject mobility and temporary stasis’ that exceed the strict dichotomy between ‘full “autonomy” or definitive blockage’ (Andersson, 2014).

**Survival tactics vs. Political claims**

These various observations led me to raise questions about the relation between survival and politics. Which of these diverse and multiple pro-migrant undertakings could be considered as political acts? In which types of actions or groups could an (albeit still unstructured or emergent) alternative discourse potentially be located? Which could be understood as claim-making strategies or practices of resistance? Which, on the other hand, should rather be looked at as survival tactics? Is the distinction relevant or useful?

Using some of the tools developed by Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat proved helpful in thinking about these important questions. Bayat’s work was developed in the context of authoritarian Middle Eastern societies to look at ‘the silent, protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public – in order to survive and improve their lives’ (Bayat, 2010, p. 56). Bayat conceptualises these various practices, at the crossroads between necessary survival methods and acts of resistance with transformative potential, by the expression ‘quiet encroachment’. ‘Quiet encroachment’ is defined as the collective action of non-collective actors: it does not necessarily possess a leadership, a fixed ideology or a structured organisation, but it remains nonetheless a force of resistance that people embrace against the existing social order. It is ‘quiet’ and tends to be ‘action-orientated’ rather than articulated around unified discursive demands. In fact, Bayat says, ‘quiet encroachment’ is ‘marked by quiet, largely atomised and prolonged mobilisation with episodic collective action’ (Bayat, 1997, p.57).

Although this cannot be considered a “social movement” as such, it is also distinct from the survival strategy model or “everyday resistance” (p.90).

While there are clear limitations in applying tools developed in such different contexts to social practices taking place in Western European societies, the concept of ‘quiet encroachment’ was nonetheless useful to describe the day-to-
day life of migrants, many residing or working in Europe, sometimes undocumented or as non-status, yet organising to improve their daily conditions, and occasionally mobilising en masse.

Considering the importance of these ‘quiet’ practices and their links with public acts of mobilisation was particularly useful insofar as it allowed me to question the rigid separation between the collective and the individual, between survival and politics. While the lives of irregular migrants are deeply precarious, examples of non-status migrants visibly mobilising in Europe (and beyond) are also numerous. The European Union has been the stage of sustained mobilisations with a number of memorable solidarity events bringing together non-EU migrants and EU citizens. Among others, the European Social Forums (ESF) have called for active participation of migrant movements, sometimes organised in ‘Migrants Assemblies’, so as to carve a space of expression for non-citizens in the Forums. European-wide migrants’ strikes (called for in France, Italy, Spain and Greece) (the ‘Days Without Us’) were organised, and were particularly successful in 2010 when several Italian factories had to completely close due to lack of staff. While of importance and, sometimes, public impact, these nonetheless remain exceptional incidences. For example, both the ESF and the Day Without Us have happened at most on a yearly basis. In fact, for various reasons, the ESF and the Day Without Us have both stopped being held all together since the 2010 Istanbul ESF and the 2012 edition of the Day Without Us, respectively.

Bayat’s concept shed light on the continuity between quotidian but quiet actions and occasional occurrences of collective mobilisation and public presence. It was also useful to think about the work of organisations that I had come across in my research sites, which both engage freely and frequently in public actions in solidarity with migrants, but also work on a casework basis and provide material support to migrants in a less visible way. More importantly, it allowed me to identify criteria to select participating groups.

**Selection criteria**

In turn, with this conceptual representation in mind, I was able to look back with greater clarity at my initial research questions, concerned with the formulation of
alternative discourses and political models for Europe. Within the large field of migrants’ struggles, encompassing complementary and related practices yet as diverse as migrants’ ‘quiet encroachment’ (including mobility across borders, making their way through the Schengen framework and so on), joint direct actions and public mobilisation between migrants and citizens (sometimes organised on a transborder basis), and European-wide networks of organisations dedicated to the denunciation of the migratory regime and to the protection of migrants’ rights, I could now distinguish which type of case studies I needed to focus on in order to investigate my research questions.

It had become clear that it was mostly among more ‘established’ groups and organisations with on-going public activities, rather than among migrant communities as such, that I should explore the hypothesis of the formulation of alternative discourses and models. This choice also reflects the intensified structural exclusion and lack of representation faced by migrants in the European context. The mechanisms of silencing and invisibilisation that I have described in the previous chapters are involved in crafting the social reality that my fieldwork engages with. Consequently, looking for articulated counter-narratives brought me to particular types of organisations and campaigns. In practice, this did not mean that the participants could not be migrants; however it did mean that I selected them on the basis of their active and visible involvement in pro-migrant struggles rather than by virtue of being migrants. Due to the structural marginalisation faced by migrants, there were overall more European than non-European participants. This choice also reflects the argument developed in this thesis that the separation between non-Europeans and Europeans, on which the dominant discourse of European identity is based, has been constructed for instrumental ends and has relied on an excision from official accounts of the various historical links and solidarities that cut across what are now the borders of the EU. Starting from the perspective of a critique of the separation between ‘migrants’ and ‘Europeans’, I consequently avoid reproducing it in my methodological choices.

This consideration however led to another question; that of the relationship between organisations for migrants and migrants themselves. One of my early observations was that many of the groups I came across and which worked
across borders in the European Union seemed to have been initiated by European citizens in solidarity (sometimes in collaboration) with migrants, rather than by migrants themselves. The organisations I came across in France, the UK, Spain and Italy tended to have some form of organisational basis in one given EU country from which they extended their activities across borders through membership in European networks, common projects with other organisations, trans-European mailing lists and online activism, or being organised as a looser network of activists who meet in various European cities and lead solidarity actions with migrants. The relationship between these groups and migrants themselves is of a variable and not always organic nature. Understanding the paradoxical situation whereby some migrant solidarity groups do not always manage to recruit migrant members was an important fieldwork question, which arose at various points in time. Through the research process, this became a significant consideration, which raised a number of important questions regarding solidarity, representation and legitimacy.

I am not able to address this question in its full complexity here, but a number of related points will be mentioned in the finding chapters. A few of the reasons mentioned by the participants pertained to the different political backgrounds of migrants or to the fact that having had a migratory experience did not necessarily bring about a strong sense of identification with migrant struggles. Migration is above all an experience, which might define to some extent those undertaking it, but which cohabits with a wide range of other identity features, such as political affiliations, national belonging, gender, and so on.

Regarding previous political experiences, it was interesting to hear some No Border activists’ reflecting on difficulties related to working with people with national determination and independence struggle political backgrounds, in the context of a largely anarchist political discourse. While various groups would punctually organise to defend a targeted campaign (in the context for example of an anti-deportation campaign in favour of one of the group’s members), sustained mobilisation for the ‘cause at large’ was more difficult to achieve (Sean and Alex, 2012). This calls to mind Nairn’s reflections on ‘the Janus face of nationalism’ (1997), an expression he coined to describe nationalism’s ‘essential ambiguity’ (p.71):
...nationalism can in this sense be pictured as like the old Roman god, Janus, who stood above gateways with one face looking forward and one backwards. Thus does nationalism stand over the passage to modernity, for human society. As human kind is forced through its strait doorway, it must look desperately back into the past, to gather strength wherever it can be found for the ordeal of 'development' (1975, p.3)

Whilst nationalism has been associated in some historical periods and parts of the world with movements aimed at emancipation, self-determination and claiming rights, it also has, in other places and times, called for exclusion, racism and, in its extreme version, ethnic cleansing. This entails a series of contradictions which have affected the relationship between no-border-type movements and some migrant communities.

A final point I would like to mention regarding the selection of the groups participating in my fieldwork is that I was interested in including groups and networks engaged in radical and contentious politics over the European border regime, which have attracted little academic attention. While, as mentioned, there recently has been a growing body of scholarship concerned with migrants' (political) agency, research looking at solidarity with migrants has been scarcer. With the effective harmonisation of immigration policies in the EU, a number of large NGO platforms and lobby groups emerged (mostly in Brussels) and were the subjects of some studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g. Favell & Geddes 1999, 2000; Guiraudon 1997). The studies of such groups have led scholars to conclude that pro-migrant groups in the EU do ‘not to seek to mount a collective challenge to EU elites, but to build alliances with them’ (Geddes 2000, p. 3). A limited number of scholars have also paid attention to the development of new forms of contentious politics in solidarity with migrants, but they remain rare (Alldred, 2003; Walters, 2006; Mezzadra, 2010).

Yet my own experience and observations had made clear that there existed other actors interested in the defence of migrants’ interests in Europe, who were mostly ignored by scholars. Although this type of radical politics might seem to be at the extreme end of the political spectrum, I believe that their constant effort to keep discussions as open and as large as possible regarding a number of crucial points pertaining to the EU border regime, has in fact had an impact

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23 By which I refer to their political affiliation with anarchism which translates in a tendency to refuse being engaged in mainstream electoral politics and a call for a radical overturn of the state.
on the migrant solidarity scene at large. They hence are central to how debates around migration solidarity are orientated and framed. I decided that a significant part of my case studies would belong to such kind of organisations and networks. I nonetheless included some members from more conventional groups in order to offer a more representative and subtle outlook on the pro-migrant field in Europe and so as to be able to examine some of the divergences and gaps existing across these various groups.

In conclusion, my main selection criteria were that the groups and campaigns have some degree of structuration and public presence, and that they engage in solidarity activities with migrants that tackled the issue of the Europeanisation border and immigration controls. Simultaneously, I tried to include a wide range of organisations in terms of structure, politics and tactics. In the following section, I provide detail of how I approached participating groups and individuals and expanded my contacts in my fieldwork sites. I also discuss why I selected certain groups, and not others, during the research process.

**Participating groups and individuals**

Once I had undertaken this pre-mapping work, I approached the three countries of my fieldwork with the necessary tools and criteria to identify some initial groups or networks to participate in my research. I envisaged these initial groups as sites from which the fieldwork could then expand and decided to proceed through a snowballing approach: first, I would locate relevant groups in line with the criteria established, from which I would select a limited number of key participants. I would then ask this small initial pool to direct me towards other potential participants.

Using snowballing seemed relevant in several ways. Firstly, it allowed me to build on the knowledge of people actively involved in the field for many years. Secondly, considering my objective to approach more ‘radical’ groups of activists, who can be suspicious of outsiders, including researchers, being referred to potential participants was crucial in order to gain trust and secure the interviews. Snowballing was also appropriate because I had previous experience and contacts in the field: one of the downsides of this approach can
be that it is greatly dependent on the reliance of the people initially approached. In this case, having worked for several years with pro-migrant organisations and having undertaken the mapping process, I felt comfortable that I could use a snowballing approach with minimal risks in that respect.

Expanding my contacts in the UK

In the UK, thanks to pre-existing contacts, I identified two individuals as key persons or gatekeepers within two distinct trends of migration solidarity activities. One, David, works with the Migrants’ Rights’ Network (MRN), a London-based NGO that brings together migrant activists and a wide-range of migrant support organisations (from think tanks to academics, faith groups and public sector representatives) to advocate for a rights-based approach towards migration. The second person, Roy, was a No Border activist whom I knew from previous activism.

Both organisations corresponded to the criteria I had identified to select participating groups. In different ways and with distinct political affiliations, they had a public presence (through their activities but also through their websites and the publication of leaflets, pamphlets, reports and so on) and both were involved in pan-European pro-migrant politics though, again, with largely different approaches and strategies.

Migrants’ Rights’ Network

MRN was launched in December 2006 by representatives of some main migrant-led and pro-migrant organisations. The network aims to bring together migrant activists and pro-migrant groups from around the country in order to make connections between their work, strengthen their messages and make the case for policies more representative of migrants’ interests. MRN is primarily a national organisation that aims at intervening in the UK public and political debate, following the principle that joining forces would help getting pro-migrant voices heard. However, MRN quickly got involved in EU level activities through its participation in several European networks. It is a member of Brussels-based PICUM (the Platform for International Cooperation on

24 All names have been changed to preserve the identity of participants – see section on ethics below.
Undocumented Migrants) and MRN’s Director sits on PICUM’s board. It is also affiliated with ENAR (European Network Against Racism). Previously, MRN was also involved in UKREN (UK Race & Europe Network), a group set up to monitor developments in EU policies which impacted on race equality issues. UKREN then became the UK branch of ENAR. From 2009 to 2011, MRN coordinated an ENAR project on migrant integration policies involving six EU countries.25

MRN therefore constituted a relevant example of the ways in which a national group could get involved at the pan-European level by joining transnational platforms and projects. It constituted a relevant site from which to observe why and how such crossborder links were initiated and developed, as well as to explore how an organisation that coordinated work between smaller, often grassroots, local organisations in the UK articulated its work at the national and European levels.

No Border

No Border is a network of groups and individuals who fight against borders and immigration controls and believe in freedom of movement for all. In Europe, the movement emerged in the aftermath of the October 1999 EU meeting in Tampere, Finland, which ratified the Treaty of Amsterdam. At the time, protests and direct actions were organised in eight European countries to oppose the meeting and the consolidation of a ‘Europe of deportation and exclusion’ (No Border, 2004). In order to strengthen links across like-minded groups and encourage crossborder activism, the first European No Border transnational meeting took place in Amsterdam in December 1999. Activists from France, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium and Germany took part in this founding meeting. In 2000, the second No Border meeting was held in Poznan, Poland, and groups from Poland, the Ukraine and Spain joined the network. Since then, there have been many Europe-wide gatherings and protest camps, and many No Border groups now exist in several European countries.

25 All information in this paragraph obtained through MRN website as well as during interviews with MRN staff members (David 2012; Jack, 2012).
One of the most visible forms of protest organised by the network are No Border camps – protest camps aimed at highlighting and denunciating EU practices against migrants. Some of the No Border camps have targeted specific border points – for example several camps were held at the EU southern border such as in Marzamemi, Sicily (2000), Tarifa, Andalusia (2001) and in Patras and Lesvos, Greece (in 2008 and 2009, respectively) as well at the Eastern borders with camps held at the border between Germany and Poland (1999 and 2000), in Romania (2003) and at the border between Italy and Slovenia (2006), among others. A No Border camp was also organised in Calais in 2009. Other No Border camps have been held at the main centres of power of the European Union (Strasbourg, home to the European Parliament and Schengen Information System, 2002; Brussels, headquarters of the EU, 2010 and Stockholm, where the Stockholm Programme was designed, 2012) and near manifestations of the European border regime, such as airports and detention centres (Gatwick, 2007) so as to emphasise its deterritorialised and omnipresent nature.

No Border has been since its inception a transnational network with a strong focus on the issue of the Europeanisation of immigration and border controls and their effects on migrants. In the UK, people first started using the name ‘No Borders’26 in London in 2005. The movement grew out of meetings between activists to organise the 2004 European Social Forum and the Make Borders History protest at the G8 in Scotland. Local No Borders groups then developed in 11 cities and regions across the UK – including Oxford, Bristol, Leeds, Manchester, Nottingham, Scotland and Wales. The first UK No Borders network gathering took place in London in 2006. Since then, there has always been a UK network in one form or another, with some groups more active or present than others at different points in time and around different issues.27

Through the creation of the UK branch, activists have articulated their trans-European work with local activities aimed at providing direct and practical

26 The overall European and global network calls itself ‘No Border’, however in the UK activists have decided to label it ‘No Borders’ because it seemed more fluent in English. (Sean, 2012). In the thesis, I refer to ‘No Border’ when speaking about the European network and ‘No Borders’ or ‘No Borders UK’ when discussing activities from the UK branch.

27 All Information from No Border website and interviews with activists (Sean, 2012: Sean and Alex, 2012 and Alex, 2013).
support to migrants. At the beginning, the groups focused mostly on anti-detention and anti-deportation campaigns and supporting undocumented workers. No Border UK activists are currently focusing on five main campaigns: Calais Migrant Solidarity; anti-deportation actions; a campaign against the children’s charity Barnardo’s involvement in family immigration detention; an anti-immigration-raids campaign; and Stop G4S, a campaign against private security company G4S which, among other things, is responsible for managing detention centres, prisons and hundreds of court and police station holding cells. In 2012, UK No Borders organised a weeklong ‘No Borders Convergence’ in London, where activists, students and academics were invited to come together to exchange ideas, knowledge, experiences and tactics regarding people’s freedom of movement. The Convergence was also used as a platform to organise direct actions, including the blockade of a detention centre to stop a charter flight to Ghana, and a large protest at Barnado’s headquarters, in which many European activists attending the Convergence took part.

Besides the regular No Border protest camps, which bring together activists from across Europe, Calais is one of the sites where the crossborder nature of the network is most visible. Activists mainly from the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany have been present in Calais since 2009 under the name ‘Calais Migrant Solidarity’ (CMS). No Border/CMS activists engage in everyday solidarity work with some of the hundreds of migrants stranded in Calais, monitor police activity and try to block raids on migrant squats and makeshift camps. No Border/CMS tries to encourage migrant self-organisation: in 2010, they helped rent a warehouse for migrants and activists and, since then, they have tried to provide migrants with a safe space to sleep, eat and get together. No Border/CMS also organise the distribution of food, water and items such as warm clothes or firewood, but following their principles of self-organisation and solidarity, rather than charity, migrants are involved in the process – for example, by preparing food together. No Border/CMS activists

28 G4S used to hold a government contract for ‘forcible deportation’, which they lost after the death of Angolan asylum seeker Jimmy Mubenga as he was being deported by G4S guards in 2010.
29 More information on the campaigns can be found at http://notog4s.blogspot.co.uk and https://network23.org/antiraids/.
also try to involve local residents in solidarity activities, such as providing legal advice, food or clothes to migrants.31

MRN and No Border offer pertinent examples of how migrant solidarity groups and individuals can engage in trans-European work. While MRN favours participation in institutional platforms and networks, in order to try to impact on decision- and policy-making at the EU level, No Border is a grassroots network that embraces radical practices and politics which engage directly with the impact of the border regime on migrants’ lives and bodies.

At the beginning of my fieldwork in London, I conducted informal interviews with David ad Roy, in order to get their comments on the focus and scope of my research and to ask them to orientate me toward other groups and activists. Referring to these two key people was a way to mobilise their expertise in the field, as well as to ensure I retained the diversity I was looking for. Interestingly, I observed that MRN and No Borders were not hermetically isolated sites and had cooperated on a number of campaigns and activities,32 hence confirming my hypothesis that the migration solidarity field forms a continuum linking groups and individuals with a range of political positions and backgrounds.

Following advices offered by David and Roy, I went on to explore further potential sites. I identified a number of other possibly relevant groups in the pro-migrant field in the UK and eventually decided to conduct interviews and observation with members of Stop Deportation and No One Is Illegal in London. These two groups were particularly relevant because they were inscribed within trans-European networks and had developed critical understanding of and approach to the issues of the harmonisation of border and immigration controls.

Stop Deportation

The Stop Deportation network in the UK was an initiative by UK No Borders activists as well as students involved in the SOAS Detainee Support Group. It also included representatives from various groups and campaigns that had

31 Information on Calais obtained from the Calais Migrant Solidarity webpage and through interviews with activists (Sean and Alex 2012 and Alex, 2013).
32 For instance, MRN was invited to hold a workshop at the No Borders Convergence.
been working on deportation and detention, such as people involved in individual anti-deportation campaigns, Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns (NCADC). In 2009, these various groups decided to organise a joint open meeting in order to see how they could collaborate and coordinate their activities. They quickly realised that whilst a considerable amount of work was put towards stopping individual deportations, virtually no work was being done to oppose mass deportation flights. These specially chartered flights (or ‘charter flights’) were increasingly becoming the preferred method for the UK government to organise mass deportations to certain countries, such as Iraq, Nigeria and Afghanistan. At the same time, the UK was also participating more intensely in joint European deportation operations coordinated and led by Frontex. The Stop Deportation network was hence born in order to respond to this new reality and to coordinate cross-group actions against mass deportations.

The most active group in the network, based in London, combines direct actions with awareness raising activities in order to challenge and attempt to stop the practice of mass deportation. During the first year of its existence, the network organised numerous actions and protests (such as blockades at detention centres prior to charter flights) as well as conducting research into the policies and legal issues surrounding mass deportation. Stop Deportation produced a detailed briefing entitled ‘Chartered to Deport: The hidden reality of mass deportation flights’ and generated mainstream media coverage about these relatively new flights and the actions against them.

Since its early days, the network tried to develop transnational links with other European groups active on the issue of deportation with the aim of coordinating collective actions against Frontex-led charter flights. For example, in 2010, a coordinated action took place between UK, Irish and Belgian groups to

33 Joint European charter flights are flights exclusively reserved for the purpose of deportation and which make stop-overs in a number of European countries to pick up deportees before going to the final destination. Until 2010, one EU member states would ‘take the lead’ of the operation (i.e. provide a flight) and each member states involved would provide its own security escorts for its deportees. Frontex would coordinate between the countries. Since 2011, when Frontex’ powers and mandate were expanded by the EU, the agency has played a more important role in coordinating and organising flights.

34 Available on Stop Deportation’s webpage archive (Stop Deportation, 2009).

challenge a Frontex flight to Nigeria which stopped over in each of these countries. To start with, these links remained mostly circumstantial and informal. However, the label ‘Stop Deportation’ gained relative popularity and currency with some groups across Europe adopting it and appropriating its tactics. In December 2012, activists from Belgium, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany met in Brussels to strengthen the links between anti-deportation groups and campaigns, and organise more effective coordinated actions against charter flights.\(^{36}\)

**No One Is Illegal**

No One Is Illegal (NOII) is an international network of activists campaigning for the abolition of all forms of migration controls. It was founded as ‘Kein Mensch ist illegal’ (KMII, meaning ‘No Person Is Illegal’) in Germany in 1997, following the death of migrant deportee Aamir Ageeb at the hands of the German Federal Police. KMII took the form of a campaign and it quickly drew a large number of people and groups to join in an appeal to ‘help immigrants begin and continue their journeys towards obtaining work and documentation, medical care, education and training, and to assure accommodation and physical survival’ (No One Is Illegal, 2003) regardless of their migration status. Nowadays, KMII is still active in anti-racist and migrant solidarity activities in Germany (Kein Mensch ist illegal, no date).

Beyond Germany, the network quickly grew with groups adopting its name across the world.\(^ {37}\) In the USA, NOII took the form of a large sanctuary movement undertaken by religious communities in support of those threatened by migration controls. The network has been very active in Canada, with local groups in Ottawa, Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto. NOII groups have also formed throughout Europe, including in Spain (‘Ninguna Persona Es Illegal’), Sweden (‘Ingen Manniska Ar Illegal’), Poland (‘Zaden Człowiek Nie Jest Nielegalny’) and Holland (‘Geen Mens Is Illegaal’). In France, the slogan ‘Personne n’est Illegal.e’ was used in the sans-papiers movement of the 1990s and early 2000s.

\(^ {36}\) All information from Pat (2013) and Shock (2013).

\(^ {37}\) In the Anglophone world, such as the USA, Canada and the UK, No Person is Illegal became No One Is Illegal.
In the UK, a NOII group was created in 2003 by a small group of activists engaged in migrant workers and union work. NOII UK opposes migration controls and ‘rejects any idea that there can be ‘fair’ or ‘just’ or ‘reasonable’ controls, and the distinction between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘refugees’ and between the “legal” and the “illegal”’ (No One Is Illegal, 2003). NOII UK is small in terms of numbers, but it has been efficient at producing literature about migration controls, such as a manifesto, discussion papers as well as pamphlets on themes such as how to build migrant solidarity campaigns. Some of its founding members have also published books making the case for open borders \(^{38}\) and highlighting the relationship between controls and fascism (Cohen, 2006a; 2006b). NOII also organised several conferences bringing together trade unions and migrant community organisations, in an attempt to create links across groups and to reach a consensus against migration controls. The first such conference took place in Manchester in 2005, followed by one in Liverpool in 2007 and a third one in London in 2009. NOII’s work with trade unions was carried out under the slogan ‘Defiance not Compliance’ to encourage people to oppose the governmental attempts at forcing teachers, social workers, registrars in town halls and so on, to report undocumented migrants to immigration authorities. NOII also became involved in the campaign against the decision by UKBA to suspend London Metropolitan University’s ‘highly-trusted status’, which is required in order for the University to be eligible to sponsor new as well as existing student visas for foreign students from outside the EU.

NOII UK is politically close to No Borders UK and the two groups have recently merged their public mailing lists into a single list named ‘migration struggles’. However, whilst NOII has clearly stated its adhesion to the ‘open borders’ principle, it is not clear whether everyone in the group believes in the ‘no borders’ position (Hayter, 2004; Cohen, 2003). Generally speaking, NOII UK activists come from a socialist background, rather than an anarchist tradition, which may explain their focus on migrant workers’ rights and engaging with trade unions. Their affiliation with the larger, transnational NOII network means that they have been concerned since their inception with the issues of global and European border and immigration controls.

After identifying these groups as relevant to my research, I started by undertaking observation (participant observation as much as possible) in order to gain a general understanding of the themes the groups worked on, the debates taking place, as well as to identify key people whom I would interview. I decided to conduct a limited number of in-depth, loosely directive interviews, in line with the narrative approach I had chosen to adopt.

One of my criteria for choosing whom to interview from each organisation was that participants play a decisive role and have a strong presence within their group. Moreover, I also tried to select participants in a way that reflected the diversity of pro-migrant activists in terms of generation, gender, geographical origins and political backgrounds. In the UK, I selected nine key participants with whom I conducted ten separate interviews (see Appendix A for a table of all participants, with detail regarding their gender, age group and the political affiliations they claimed). I interviewed one of my MRN participants twice, several months apart, and held a joined interview with two No Borders participants whom I also interviewed separately.

Selecting participants in France

I followed a similar approach to selecting participants in France. Thanks to previous experience and personal relations, I contacted activists involved in Migreurop, a network of migrant solidarity organisations from Europe and beyond.

Migreurop

Migreurop is a network of 43 organisations and 37 individual members from across Europe, the Middle East and Africa. It was established in 2002, in reaction to developments in EU migration law at large but particularly in the aftermaths of the Sangatte events in 2000. For many European migrant solidarity activists, the tragedy of the Sangatte camp came as an emblematic illustration of the contradictory and dangerous nature of the new EU migration and asylum policies.
During the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence, a workshop on ‘the Europe of camps’ was organised by migrant solidarity organisations from France, Italy and Belgium. This is when the idea of Migreurop was born, as a European transnational network of activists and researchers documenting and denunciating the increase in immigration detention as a result of EU policy across the EU and beyond. From 2002 to 2005, when it was officially set up as a French registered association, Migreurop operated on an informal basis. In 2006, it started developing more formal structures and organising its activities around four main areas:

- Information gathering and sharing by member organisations
- Working on a broadened understanding of ‘camps’ and creating a common understanding of how enforced immobility is used as a regulatory device by the EU
- Raising awareness about this ‘Europe of camps’ as well as the resistance to it by all means possible – seminars, exhibitions, press releases, campaigns, etc., and
- Encouraging European level mobilisations and actions by reinforcing transnational and inter-organisational links.

Since 2008, Migreurop has been working through campaigns. Their first campaign was ‘Droit de Regard’ (‘Right to Monitor’) which demanded access to detention centres for civil society groups and individuals in order to document detainees’ living conditions, defend detained migrants’ rights and monitor and denunciate migrants’ human rights violations. The campaign put forward a series of demands addressed to both EU member states and the EU. It asked the Union to establish binding mechanisms to force member states to give civil society access to detention centres and to design control devices to check on member states’ management of these centres. It also asks that the Union compel member states to report at least once a year to the European Parliament about detention figures and conditions in their country. The initiative

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39 Camps, as defined by Migreurop, are at time a process rather than a physical space: the sidelining and the enforced grouping of migrants doesn’t only create closed detention centres. ‘Europe of camps’ means the entire set of devices that act as means of forced interruption of migration routes. Preventing people from crossing a border, from entering a territory, putting people ‘under house arrest’ either legally or through police harassment, locking them up to make sure to be able to send them back, locking them up to punish them for passing the border; these are some of the many forms taken by this ‘Europe of the camps’ (Migreurop, 2012a; 2012b; 2013).
later evolved into the Open Access Now campaign, led conjointly with the network European Alternatives. Other campaigns have focussed on readmission procedures or the place of migrants in Europe. In 2013, Migreurop launched Frontexit, a three-year campaign about Frontex, whose stated objective is the complete annulment of the agency’s mandate.

Migreurop also runs a European programme of volunteers through which the network assigns young activists to some of its member organisations (or occasionally non-member partners) to strengthen inter-organisational links and gather information in various countries. Originally, these exchanges were mostly taking place with EU groups, but recently volunteers were also sent to members in non-EU countries, such as Georgia and Serbia, so as to document the effects of EU migration policies beyond the Union’s borders.40

Migreurop is a clear example of pro-migrant organisations deciding to organise crossborder connections and activities in order to address the new issues brought about by the construction of the EU and its border regime in relation to migrants. It has become a reference point in France and beyond as regard developing a critical understanding of the processes of bordering and (de)territorialisation of the EU and hence constituted an unavoidable site from my research.

I started my fieldwork in France by having casual conversations with individuals involved in Migreurop. This was useful both to get feedback regarding the framework and relevance of my research project and in order to get recommendations as to whom to approach. I conducted an initial interview with the coordinator of the network, Laura, during which we discussed my research hypotheses and questions, as well as the pro-migration field in France and Europe. She advised me to get in touch with some key organisations and individuals involved in migrant solidarity work in the country and also pointed to a number of transnational campaigns in which Migreurop was participating.

40 All Information from Migreurop (2012a; 2012b; 2013; 2013a; 2014) and interviews (Tony, 2012; Laura, 2012; Marcella, 2012; Katia, 2012; Chantale, 2012; Michel, 2012 and Martina, 2014).
Thanks to Laura’s advice, I was able to identify two further organisations based in France that were actively involved in trans-European work: Gisti and Fasti.

_Groupe d’Information et de Soutien aux Immigrés (Gisti)_

Gisti was born in 1972, in the aftermaths of the 1968 movement and at the time when the first policies aimed at closing French borders to migrant workers were being designed. Until the late 1960s, migration to France was characterised by its ‘spontaneous’ and autonomous nature, whereby, mostly male, migrants from poorer southern European countries (Portugal) and North Africa (France’s ex-colonies) were able to enter the territory and benefit from subsequent naturalisation. As of 1969/70, the will of the French government to control migration and to make it better suited to industrial needs became apparent. The French-Algerian bilateral agreement of 28 December 1968 stated that the mobility and freedom to settle in France for Algerians, which was guaranteed by the 1962 Treaty of Evian, was to be replaced by a quota whereby only a fixed number of Algerian workers would be able to settle in France every year. This hardening of migratory controls also came in the aftermaths of the mass industrial strikes of May 1968 in which migrant workers played a crucial role. For the French conservative right, the fact that imported workers might stop acting solely as cheap labour and participate in the political and contention process was unacceptable. Police raids against foreigners and deportations of migrant workers became common.

From factories to universities, those involved in the 1968 movement staged huge protests against these governmental practices. The mass mobilisation against the deportation of student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit under the slogan ‘We are all German Jews’ remains an emblematic image of the 1968 movement, but demonstrations chanting ‘We are all foreigners’ were also numerous. The ties of solidarity between the French left and migrants, which had strengthened during the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 60s, proved their resilience. Left-wing activists, social workers and lawyers joined forces to offer further practical solidarity to migrant workers, helping them with

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41 Information and Solidarity Group for Immigrant Workers.
42 _Le Monde_ dated 20th June 1968 reported 161 deportations between 8th and 17th June 1968.
residency permits, housing and regularisation procedures, and so on. It is this movement that, a few years later, led to the establishment of Gisti as a registered association aimed at building on individual case work in order to lobby politically toward an in-depth reform of French immigration law. As such, the history of Gisti is intrinsically linked with that of migration policies in France.

For over 30 years, Gisti has systematically monitored and critically analysed any legal text pertaining to migrant rights and extensively used France’s national laws and international commitments to challenge government practices against migrants. Its work has influenced the writing of French migration law, although not always, as mentioned during an interview, in the direction the organisation had hoped for: ‘each time we opposed a governmental practices because it didn’t respect the law, the next decree would come to legalise this practice’ (Chantale 2012). Gisti considers the opening of borders and freedom of movement as the only solution to the contradictions generated by the modern world-system and the issues brought about by contemporary migration management.

Gisti has been informally involved in transnational European initiatives since as early as the 1980s. It was one of the original members of the Coordination Européenne pour le Droit des Etrangers à Vivre en Famille 43, a group set up in the early 1990s by organisations from five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Italy). This initiative was prompted by discussions around a possible European Convention on the right to family life, and the feeling of the time that it was possible to bring propositions to the European Parliament. Through this coordination as well as activist contacts, Gisti developed stronger inter-organisational and inter-personal links with groups and activists in other European countries. These connections helped identify the need for a transnational network and in 2002, Gisti was one of the founding members of Migreurop.44

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43 European Coordination for Foreigners’ Right to Family Life.
44 Information obtained through Gisti website (Gisti, 2015) and interviews (Chantale, 2012; Michel, 2012 and Nino, 2013).
FASTI is a federation of French local grassroots organisations supporting migrants (individually called ‘Associations de Solidarité avec les Travailleur-euse-s Immigré-e-s’ or ASTIs). It currently groups 40 ASTIs across France and describes itself as ‘feminist, anti-capitalist and third worldist’.

Local ASTIs started operating in the early 1960s in suburban slums around large French urban centres where many migrant workers lived. Originally, they were affiliated with the French Christian left and the Unified Socialist Party of the time. By 1967, 60 ASTIs had been established across the country and, during their first congress in Nanterre, in the suburbs of Paris, they established FASTI as their federation, designed to coordinate their activities at a national level and to focus on the political work that everyday solidarity practices did not leave much time for at the local level. In the early 1970s, as references to ‘the problem of immigration’ started to make increasing appearances in the French public and political discourse, FASTI was offered to join a governmental network of migrant support associations but rejected the offer, stating that this would be against migrants’ genuine interests. Since then FASTI has retained a critical and radical position in relation to the French (and later European) migration debate and related governmental practices. In the late 1970s, it was one of the only associations which had parity between French and migrants on its board – in breach of French law. After a change in law in 1981, which granted migrants the right to form associations, FASTI supported the emergence of migrant-led organisations, in line with its belief in autonomous, self-organised groups and actions. FASTI defends a vision of total equality between migrants and nationals; it fights against all forms of confinement and exploitation, for the right to vote for all, the cancellation of the third world debt and equal rights for women. It sees restrictions to people’s right to move as a crucial cog in the capitalist system of exclusion and inequality and summarises its views with the motto: ‘Liberté de circulation, liberté d’installation’.46 It actively

45 Federation of the Associations of Solidarity with Migrant Workers.
46 ‘Freedom of movement, freedom of settlement’.

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participates in the struggles of undocumented migrants (sans-papiers) and anti-deportation campaigns, and engages in advocacy work for refugee women.

Over the last few years, FASTI has put a greater emphasis on working jointly with organisations from other European countries. In 2004, it initiated and organised a European forum in Brussels to denounce the violation of international conventions as well as, in many cases, European national laws by the emerging body of EU migration law. As part of this forum, FASTI launched a new European programme, Séjour-Europe, focusing on migrants’ access to justice and asylum rights across EU member states. FASTI became a member of Migreurop in 2006 and has been particularly active in the network over the since the late 2000s. In 2008, it joined several of the working groups and became a board member. FASTI has now fully integrated within its working priorities the contestation of European policies and regulations.

After initial discussions and, whenever possible, sessions of participant observations with these groups and their members, I selected a further eight key people and approached them for interviews. Interestingly, while in the case of the UK the majority of the people I had spoken to were men, the situation in France was reversed with six of the nine selected participants being women.

**Campaigns in Italy**

Italy was the place with which I was the least familiar among my three geographical research sites. However, through closely following solidarity initiatives with migrants and conversations with participants in my research in France and the UK, I was already aware of a number of transnational campaigns taking place in the country, and particularly on the island of Lampedusa which, as mentioned, had acquired a symbolic importance with respect to both the regime of Fortress Europe and the migrant solidarity movement. In Italy, I focused on campaigns rather than on organisations and groups as such. I carried out my fieldwork in a shorter and more focussed fashion: instead of spending several months on site, as was the case in the UK and France (though periods of fieldwork in each site overlapped at times), I

47 'Staying in Europe' programme.
48 Information obtained through FASTI’s website (FASTI, 2014) and interview (Sonia, 2012).
arranged a six-week trip to the country, during which I spent two weeks in Lampedusa.

As mentioned, Lampedusa has received huge political and media attention in relation to migration, particularly in the aftermath of the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings of 2011. On the other hand, over the same period, the island has also attracted many pro-migrant and freedom of movement activists. Some came spontaneously in response to the media discourse emerging around the situation on the island, whilst others joined the various calls for solidarity released by Askavusa, a local association working for and with migrants. I planned my trip to Lampedusa so that it would coincide with a number of pro-migrant campaigns and actions. These included the flotilla Boats4People (B4P), which was making a stopover on the island on 19 July 2012, as well as 'Lampedusa in Festival', an annual film and cultural festival organised by Askavusa. Simultaneously, Amnesty International had set up a summer camp as part of its When You Don't Exist (WYDE) campaign, bringing together activists from 24 countries.

All these initiatives had a strong focus on the way in which European regional policies impacted local spaces and migrants’ experiences. While Askavusa had developed in-depth grassroots knowledge and understanding of the situation in Lampedusa, other campaigns, such as WYDE, were highlighting the increasingly comparable circumstances of various ‘hot spots’ of the EU border regime. B4P focused more specifically on the issue of migrant deaths in the Strait of Sicily, yet it clearly identified the responsibility for the situation at the EU level as well as with the EU member states.

*When you don’t exist (WYDE)*

WYDE is a campaign organised by Amnesty International (AI) to defend the human rights of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe and at its borders. Whilst AI has a long tradition of working on asylum-related issues in Europe, this was its first direct campaign on the issues of migration and borders.

49 ‘Askavusa’ means ‘barefoot’ in the local dialect and is used to indicate a direct contact, in this case referring to direct solidarity with migrants without the filter of governments, European or international agencies.
at large. The campaign was developed transnationally, across several AI’s offices, including its International Secretariat in London, its European Institutions office, its Brussels office and its national sections in different European countries. The idea of WYDE was instigated by the 2011 events in the canal of Sicily, when large numbers of migrants arriving from Tunisia were victims of severe human rights violations perpetuated by the Italian and other EU governments and Frontex. The production and dissemination of an apocalyptic and racist media and political discourse around migration in Italy and the rest of Europe also encouraged AI to design a migration-focused campaign. WYDE was launched in June 2012.

The aim of the campaign is to denounce the EU and its member states’ treatment of migrants and to call on all national and European authorities to respect the human rights standards they committed to through various national, regional and international conventions. Its main axes of work are documenting and denunciating what happens at the inner and outer borders of Europe, monitoring practices of detention in European countries, producing legal challenges to EU countries’ practices against migrants (including identity checks, lack of access to justice, etc.) and influencing the policy debate around migration at the EU level.

WYDE activities around borders have mostly focused on the Southern borders of Europe, with a weeklong activist camp organised in Lampedusa over the summer 2012 – with the support of AI Italy. The camp brought together AI activists from 20 European countries and from Israel, Tunisia, Morocco and Australia. Its three main objectives were: to express appreciation for the solidarity of the people of Lampedusa towards migrants; to organise visible actions addressing the EU and asking for migration policies reforms; and to condemn the Italian government’s response and in particular its mistreatment of migrants in 2011 and the readmission agreement it signed with the new regime in Libya, in spite of documented human rights abuses taking place in Libyan detention centres.  

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50 Information from the campaign’s website (SOS Europe, 2015) and interviews (Clara, 2012; Marco, 2012).
Boats 4 People (B4P)

B4P was a transnational campaign denouncing migrant deaths in the Mediterranean and the impossibility for migrants to reach Europe safely. It also aimed at enhancing solidarity between migrants, seamen and activists on both sides of the Mediterranean. The B4P project was born in July 2011, at an annual Italian anti-racist meeting organised by one of Migreurop’s Italian members, Arci, and attended by several European migrant solidarity and anti-racist groups. B4P’s objectives were to raise awareness about migrant deaths at sea and denounce policies which contribute to the detention of migrants and force them to engage in perilous journeys to reach Europe. Towards these aims, the flotilla focused on the following activities:

- Building a network of organisations and activists on both shores of the Mediterranean and beyond;
- Building a network of sailors to alert on violations of migrants' human rights at sea;
- Bringing charges against border guards, NATO or/and Frontex for violations of migrants' human rights;
- Organising sea missions to document, denounce and prevent violations of migrants' human rights at sea; and
- Promoting solidarity in the Mediterranean so that the area stops being ‘a mass grave for migrants’.

B4P took the shape of an activist flotilla, bringing together 17 European and African organisations. Migreurop as a network, as well as many of its members individually –such as Gisti, FASTI, Arci, FIDH\(^{51}\)– supported the campaign. The flotilla left Rosignano, Italy, in early July 2012, and sailed to Palermo, Pantelleria, Monastir and Ksibet Al-Mediouni in Tunisia, before reaching Lampedusa, its final destination, on 19 July 2012. At each stopover, activists organised workshops, press conferences and actions, or participated in activities and debates (for example the team took part in the planning session of the Migration session of the 2013 World Social Forum in Tunisia).

\(^{51}\) International Federation of Human Rights Leagues.
Lampedusa In Festival

Lampedusa In Festival is a festival that has been taking place annually on the island of Lampedusa since 2009. It consists primarily in a competition of anti-racist short-films that encourage, describe or discuss ‘encounters with Others’, the slogan of the festival, and migration experiences. The festival started in 2009, following a wave of protests in the ‘Center for Identification and Expulsion’ (CIE) on the island and the emergence of a support movement for newly-arrived migrants.

The initiators of the festival were activists from Askavusa Association, which was born as a migrant solidarity organisation out of the 2009 events. They launched the idea of a yearly event that would bring cultural activities to the island and would focus on communicating the historical experience of migration in the Mediterranean. However, over the years, the festival has become increasingly transnational: it now has organisers from a variety of places (across Italy but also from other European cities such as London and Brussels) and is run by Italian and international volunteers. Held on an annual basis, Lampedusa In Festival has become a regular meeting point for trans-European activists. 52

Considering B4P simply had a short stopover, during which several events were planned, I did not get a chance to carry out any long interviews with participants in the campaign at the time. However, I managed to hold a recorded discussion with one participant, and introduced myself to the coordinator of the campaign and another participant, with whom I had later interviews through Skype. Events that took place on that day involved B4P’s press conference as well as a symbolic gathering at the ‘Gate of Europe’, a monument dedicated to the memory of migrants who lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea. This monumental ‘gate’ is located on a cliff facing the Mediterranean Sea, on which thousands of migrants embark on dangerous journeys in the hope of reaching Europe.

52 Information obtained through Lampedusa In Festival’s website (Lampedusa in Festival, 2014) and interview (Nidal, 2012).
On the same day, the festival of the island was inaugurated with several debates and film screenings. By attending events organised by Lampedusa In Festival and B4P, at which participants in the various campaigns taking place on the island converged, I was able to observe various activities unfold, as well as to meet and establish contacts with some of the organisers. Over the course of the following weeks, I selected four key people participating in these campaigns, whom I interviewed.

Besides the interviews I conducted while on Lampedusa, I also developed contacts with several activists working with a Rome-based organisation called *Archivio Memorie Migranti* (meaning ‘Archive of Migrant Memories’ - AMM), which had been actively involved in the organisation of the Lampedusa festival that year. After exploring further AMM’s discourse and activities, I decided to include interviews with some of its members.

*Archivio Memorie Migranti (AMM)*

AMM is a Rome-based Italian organisation created in 2012. AMM was born from the idea of building a repository of migrant testimonies, bringing together migrant and non-migrant volunteers, researchers and people with media experience. The objective of the organisation is to register the traces of migrants’ experiences in the Italian and European collective heritage and to highlight the often invisibilised existence of a transnational memory. AMM’s activities are articulated around two main axes: research (aimed at documenting and recording oral and written testimonies) and audiovisuals (aimed at producing audio and video documentaries).

AMM works with participatory methods in order to bring out migrants’ stories and self-narrations and in order to share them with wider audiences such as schools, universities, migrant and diaspora communities. The organisation two main projects are its Lampedusa project and Welcome to Italy project. The latter is a documentary film in five episode made by migrants about their experience of arriving in Italy. The Lampedusa project aims at changing public perception of the immigration to Lampedusa through various means, including communication and advocacy.
An important aspect of AMM’s work in Lampedusa is its participation in
organising and holding Lampedusa In Festival as well as its contribution to the
creation of Documentation Centre of migrants’ passage. This Centre is
conceived as an open museum created from the grassroots, through the
involvement of Lampedusa residents and migrants in particular, where various
materials (from recording of stories to migrants’ belonging found in Lampedusa)
would be presented in order to keep a trace of migrant experience in the
Mediterranean. AMM is not a direct member of a European network, yet it is
very active in organising transnational, crossborder events such as Lampedusa
In Festival.53

Upon returning to Rome, I conducted interviews with two AMM members. I also
conducted an interview with a Migreurop international volunteer who was
spending six months in one of the network’s Italian member organisations. The
people I approached for interviews in Italy were mostly men, in contrast with the
situation in France.

Other participants

As mentioned, I envisaged the participants I first spoke with as gatekeepers
who could introduce and recommend me to other relevant people involved in
the pro-migrant field. Unsurprisingly, they also referred me to a number of
people who were not based in the geographical sites I had chosen to carry out
my research. In particular, David from MRN recommended that I speak with
someone working with Brussels-based PICUM, while I was directed towards No
Border activists in other European countries by No Borders UK participants.
Laura also advised me to speak with someone at European Alternatives
involved in Open Access Now, a campaign led jointly with Migreurop and which
demands access to detention centres for civil society and media
representatives.

While I had chosen particular geographical sites to conduct the research, I
envisaged them as starting points from which various trajectories could develop
and did not consider these sites as self-contained. I therefore contacted the
people that were recommended to me in other cities and countries. After

53 All information from AMM’s website (AMM, no date) and interviews (Sandro, 2012; Nidal, 2012).
reviewing the work of PICUM and European Alternatives, I decided to include interviews with affiliated activists in my research.

**European Alternatives (EA)**

European Alternatives is a ‘transnational membership organisation promoting democracy, equality and culture beyond the nation state’ (European Alternatives, 2015). The idea behind EA is that the nation-state has stopped being the adequate entity to ensure a democratic political process and an active involvement of citizens in public life. EA promotes alternatives and transnational forms of political engagement and identity. It calls for a federal EU as the appropriate response to the crisis of the nation-state and considers the notion of Europe as one with political and emotional appeal within which new understandings of citizenship and democracy can be developed.

EA promotes its vision through public events and a yearly festival, Transeuropa, as well as research projects, reports and campaigns. Though not strictly a migrant solidarity organisation, the situation of migrants in Europe has always been a preoccupation for EA and so has been the idea of thinking about Europe in terms of its ‘otherness’. Besides its commitment to equality for all, European Alternatives also sees working with migrants as ‘a test-bed for anyone who believes in transnationalism’ (Pietro, 2012). Its work around migration took place mainly through one campaign, Open Access Now, led in partnership with Migreurop. European Alternatives was mostly active in the Italian side of the campaign and was successful in gaining access to several detention centres.

**Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)**

PICUM was initiated in 2001 by grassroots organisations from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany who worked nationally in support of undocumented

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54 Pietro (2012) explained that the organisation was originally supposed to be called European Alterities, to emphasising the multiplicity of identities and roots they see in Europe. During the course of the interview, he also explained that the logo of European Alternatives was supposed to represent Europe as influenced by ‘the Mediterranean sea and North Africa; Russia and the Orient; and the Atlantic and the Americas.’

migrants in areas such as housing, healthcare, labour rights and education. PICUM was primarily concerned with ensuring that EU policies regarding migration conformed to member states’ obligations under regional and international human rights conventions.

At present, PICUM has the form of a network with 149 member organisations and over 150 individual members who offer what they call ‘humanitarian support and assistance’ to undocumented migrants in 38 countries across Europe and beyond. It provides a link between the grassroots level, where the experience of undocumented migrants and groups supporting them takes place, and the European level, where policies are designed. Its activities focus on reporting on issues affecting undocumented migrants by gathering information from the ground through its members, and monitoring legal and institutional developments at the EU level. It aims to influence EU policy debates in order to ensure undocumented migrants’ interests are considered. Several organisations in Migreurop, such as Gisti, have been members of PICUM.

In 2012, PICUM agreed to sit on Frontex’s new ‘Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights’, aimed at monitoring the agency’s work ‘from inside’. Following this decision, Gisti and many common members to both networks decided to revoke their PICUM membership – in particular as Migreurop’s new campaign against Frontex makes it a clear conflict of interests for groups to adhere to both networks. ⁵⁶

In the case of EA, I interviewed Pietro as he was visiting London. As for PICUM, I conducted an interview through Skype. I also had a prolonged email conversation with German No Border activist H., as well as a discussion through instant messenger.

**Collecting the data**

*Online data collection*

As explained, I chose the Internet as one of the sites of my research. This was important not only because it is an appropriate space within which to explore

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⁵⁶ All information from PICUM (2015) and interviews (David, 2012; Daniela, 2012 and Chantale, 2012).
the crossborder interactions between participating groups and individuals, but also because the participants maintain a strong online presence and use Internet as a means of communications and advocacy. In this sense, following carefully what was being posted and exchanged online allowed me to keep abreast of ongoing developments within and across the participating groups and activists. Internet presence and communication takes the form of blog entries, press releases, website updates, newsletters and so on.

Throughout the course of the fieldwork, but also before and after, I regularly visited websites such as those of MRN, No Border, Migreurop, Gisti or the blog Fortress Europe. Moreover, a number of these groups have newsletters or mailing lists. I am subscribed to MRN’s newsletter, which I receive weekly, and I am on the mailing list of No Border, as well as on that of Migreurop, through which I receive academic, activist and journalistic alerts daily from groups and individuals across Europe and beyond. I paid particular attention to the topics that were being addressed online, as well as to the way they were framed.

As discussed further in the next chapter, mailing lists offered a particularly interesting site to examine how ideas and principles are contested and agreed on, as they are interactive online spaces where people have the possibility to communicate but also to respond. It should be said that I did not restrict my examination of participating groups’ literature to what was produced online. As much as possible, I collected leaflets, booklets, and other printed material, for example when I visited the offices of a particular organisation or when attending demonstrations or other types of events where leaflets, flyers or pamphlets were handed out. Leaflets and flyers, and to extent press releases, tend to use hard-hitting vocabulary, and to require plain and straightforward expressions, in order to communicate their message in a way that is both concise and striking. They are powerful tools to examine the way activists and groups frame their activities and claims, the discourse they refer to and the political language they mobilise. Conversely, longer reports, or blog entries, tend to offer thoroughly developed positions. They might enter into detail of the approaches they reject, and why, and build careful arguments in support of their views. In this sense, they constitute a window into the larger political stance of the groups and individuals producing them.
Participant observation

Participant observation held a double advantage for my research. First, as has been established on multiple occasions, observing a social phenomenon from a relative insider position, rather than as mediated by some of its authors, allows access to a deeper level of analysis of the complex dynamics characterising social, human and political processes. Moreover, considering I had myself been active in some of the groups that became participants in my research, it allowed me to move smoothly from the status of ‘member’ to that of researcher. As will be detailed below, I made it clear and known to all those present that I was carrying out fieldwork and only followed it through when I had received a conscious agreement on their part.

In the UK, I attended No Borders meetings, particularly in relation to a conference the network organised in London in February 2012, which I also attended. I also participated in various demonstrations, actions and campaigns organised by No Borders and Stop Deportation. Direct engagement in the network’s activities and actions was particularly interesting as collective endeavours are sites of production of particular forms of knowledge (Casas-Cortes, Osterweil and Powell, 2008). Knowledge production is a social process situated in specific contexts and these actions are spaces where particular ‘encounters in action’, which can be conceptualised as knowledge-practices, take place. In the case of the No Borders network, their strong anarchist influence and their emphasis on non-hierarchical participatory debates meant that collective actions (ranging from meetings to campaigns and direct actions) relied on and led to the development of particular practices aimed at subverting and transforming accepted social and human relations and hierarchies.

Direct actions are particularly interesting in this sense. They can adopt different forms (from non-violent initiatives such as sit-ins, strikes, occupations, blockades, and so on, to more forceful ones including sabotage or property destruction), but are characterised by their refusal of mainstream political mediation. They thus must be distinguished from other political behaviour such as voting, lobbying and forms of negotiations. These actions have a tenuous relationship to the law and might involve a degree of law-breaking, when people put themselves in arrestable positions to make a political statement or obstruct
a practice they oppose (e.g. a deportation). Therefore, in groups engaging in
direct action, people tend to reflect on their level of ‘arrestability’: while a citizen
of the state where the action is carried out might be able to expose themselves
to the risk of an arrest, a migrant on a precarious residency permit or without
documents might not be in the position to do so. Someone who has previously
been brought to law for a similar type of action might also restrain from taking a
lead role for some time after that. Each activist thus endorses a different task in
the progress of the action, with a number of people backing it up through
organisational, press or communication work. In this sense, the divisions
generated by different legal statuses are subverted to organise webs of activists
acting in solidarity according to their individual possibilities. In a sense, De
Genova’s concept of deportability has thus been recognised and operated
informally by these groups.

Engaging directly in collective actions was particularly important when
researching a movement such as No Border. The network’s acute awareness of
hegemonic forms of knowledge means that some of its activists can hold a
suspicious position towards systems of knowledge production that they consider
as disconnected from activist practices – in particular mainstream journalism
and academia. Being a participant allowed me both to overcome this barrier
and to gain a deeper sense and experience of the way new relations and
practices of solidarity were developed.

I also went to several events organised by MRN, such as a TEDx conference in
September 2011 and a day-long conference on the outcomes of a European-
wide project on migrants’ empowerment. This allowed me to gain further and
updated eyewitness knowledge of the way MRN operates and perceives its
work and goals as well as to better grasp the way in which various aspects of
the European immigration and border legislation were discussed and
challenged.

In France, through several years as a volunteer translator for some of
Migreurop’s campaigns, I had already been exposed to many of the debates

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57 I had conducted some projects for MRN a few years before, but the organisation had undergone many
changes in size, scope and goals since.
and discussions taking place within the network and between the network and some of its partners. Observing while being involved in meetings and events allowed me to better grasp the interactions between members of the networks, the way in which they communicate with each other and the vocabulary they prefer using. It also gives space to experience nonverbal forms of communication, as well as dynamics that tend to not be discussed by the participants. As mentioned, a majority of the participants in France happened to be women in their early thirties. As a woman around the same age participating in some of Migreurop’s events, I enjoyed friendly relations with the participants and became partly integrated within their group dynamic, which meant that I was also able to get further access to the ‘backstage’ of the network. In this instance, my gender, my political proximity with these women and a number of affinities with them (outside the research itself) had an impact on the way I conducted participant observation and the very open access I gained to the everyday life of some of the network’s organisations. In turn, my own observations, analysis and interpretations have necessarily been affected by these factors as will be discussed below.

The observatory dimension of my stay in Lampedusa was also extremely interesting. It allowed me to witness ‘in context and in action’ the type of transnational links existing between activists from a wide range of countries. Volunteers from Migreurop, B4P members and members of the local association proved to be well acquainted, if not in person at least online, and displayed converging narrative frames of contention in relation to the European border regime. It was equally interesting to observe the more institutionalised campaign led by Amnesty International in relation to these grassroots contentious initiatives. More detail of these dynamics will be revealed in the finding chapters.

Most striking of all was the way in which the intricate and hence often uncatchable European border regime suddenly manifested itself in a material and corporeal fashion. Every day, on our way to the festival’s events, we would pass in front of the famous Lampedusa’s boat cemetery, a military-guarded wasteland where the carcasses of boats that had reached the shores of the island but were unable to sail again are kept. The two fully armed soldiers
forbidding passers-by to enter were a clear reminder of the process of militarisation and securitisation taking place around the island. During an early morning visit to Lampedusa’s cemetery, I found myself contemplating collective graves where the bodies of unidentified migrants dead at sea had been buried. Most of them were badly taken care of and one of them was still open – the cemetery guard casually replied that ‘it is the summer, we expect more to arrive’ when we asked him why the stone had not been placed back on the grave. Yet, a few meters away, a little bunch of flowers had been placed on the grave of an unidentified Tunisian migrant. This visit captured much of the violence and many of the contradictions of ‘Fortress Europe’.

My fieldwork continued in Rome, where I met again with several of the people whom I had encountered during the festival in Lampedusa. Towards the middle of August, it became clear that Romans enjoy going away for their summer holiday and the city became surprisingly quiet outside its most touristic parts. Some of the offices of the associations I wanted to visit were closed until September and many of their staff on leave. At first, I was disappointed by this state of affairs, but it unexpectedly led to a situation where social and human relations among those people staying in Rome over the summer intensified. For the rest of my stay, I met almost on a daily basis with different people I had known in Lampedusa. I participated in two demonstrations with migrant communities in Rome and was invited to people’s houses on multiple occasions, including for Ramadan celebrations. The majority of the people I spent time with were active in the migrant solidarity field and I gained huge informal knowledge about their working habits, their emotions, their values and their political stances through the moments we shared.

In that context, the wariness toward researchers that I had witnessed in Lampedusa, which I come back to below, had completely disappeared. Most of the time, friends and acquaintances spontaneously offered their opinions and perspectives. During casual conversations about our day, it was common that my interlocutors would mention a particular event because they considered it relevant to my research. There were also times when people explicitly asked me not to report some of the things we had discussed – something I was always careful about and which I fully respected. Because of the informal nature of our
relationship, which took place mostly outside working or activist environments, there were times when I engaged with people without being fully aware that I was in fact conducting observation. It is only retrospectively that I realised all these moments were integral parts of my research process.

This immersion also allowed me to grasp the importance of the topic of my research and to better understand the participants’ perspectives regarding why it was important and how it should be framed and discussed. Of course this was only partly surprising considering the circles I encountered were all active on the issue; yet the extent to which everyday conversations naturally turned to the topics of immigration, border controls, the representation and instrumentalisation of migrants, as well as more specifically to the impact of European immigration policies and the possibility of positive change, was striking. Following the advice of one of my supervisors, I had been keeping a fieldwork diary which had become a mix of academic and personal observations and thoughts. While the comments I wrote down were not structured in an academic fashion, they turned out to be very useful later on, in order to recollect various aspects of the fieldwork.

Positionality

This now leads me to discuss in more detail my position as a researcher within this project. I would like first to address my relation to the topic of my research in itself, and then offer some reflection on how various factors influenced and shaped how I collected the data.

The issue of freedom of movement became important to me many years ago, and particularly when, as a young adult, I started experiencing it for myself and came to realise moving was far from an obvious activity for the majority of the world. I spent the two years previous to starting my PhD project living in Syria, where many of my acquaintances encountered huge hindrance to their mobility. A few months after I started my research, the uprising in Syria started and, over the course of the next four years, I witnessed a huge number of friends being displaced and, for many, having to take the radical decision of embarking on extremely perilous, undocumented journeys to Europe. Not only did these
experiences further reinforce my own political positions, they also impacted on my position as a researcher.

In particular, my personal involvement in supporting close friends attempting to reach Europe meant that I developed an inner perspective on the difficulties and dangers associated with these crossings. I also collected a wealth of informal information about various aspects of a migratory journey. Without this being a ‘research strategy’, it did mean that when discussing various issues with activists and particularly people who turned to pro-migrant activism after experiencing a migratory journey, a form of closeness and complicity emerged. This proximity, and a feeling of shared understanding and compassion, came to shape the discussions we had and the way I related to the participants. Of course, I have not personally had the experience of undertaking one of these trips, yet I noticed on several occasions that a stronger connection often emerged with migrant participants if we had a chance to discuss my experience in Syria.

This was particularly the case in Italy. As mentioned, during the two weeks I spent in Lampedusa, I had the opportunity to develop strong relationships with some of the activists present on the island, several of whom had migrated by boat through Lampedusa a couple of years before. In a climate of media and political manipulation of the situation in Lampedusa, I was aware that migrants and activists, as well as in fact the inhabitants of the island themselves, were tired of being solicited and displayed a form of interview fatigue. Moreover, many also held a certain level of suspicion (if not hostility) towards outsiders arriving in Lampedusa as journalists and researchers. In my case, this was lessened by the fact that I was participating in activist events. Nonetheless, I was particularly careful not to use the fact that I was involved in the same activities and campaigns as potential participants to try to secure interviews or obtain information they were not in fact comfortable sharing. However, as we engaged in more informal and personal conversations, during which my experience in relation to the situation in Syria was mentioned, I felt that a relationship of mutual understanding and trust developed, which in turn made several people interested in formally contributing to my research.
My involvement in migration struggles also had other implications. In a recently published volume on methodology in social movement research, Stefania Milan (2014) remarks that students of social movements face a constant tension between objectivity and subjectivity, detachment and full participation. She also observes that scholars have increasingly focussed on developing the field of social movement research theoretically, but often at the expense of any deeper connection with the subjects of their investigation. Consequently, she adds ‘movement theorists often speak to themselves … and the field often produces work that is distant from, and irrelevant to, the very struggle it purports to examine’. The consequence is an ‘artificial divide between the practice of social change and the study of such efforts’ (Croteau et al., 2005, p. xii–xiii quoted in della Porta, eds., 2014). This observation summarises effectively why it was important to me that my research was empirically and ideologically grounded in a true connection with my topic and participants. Active and direct participation in pro-migrant struggles was one of the ways in which I hoped to avoid ‘speaking to myself’.

Throughout my PhD research, I thus had to negotiate a locus within my own research that allowed me to gain objectivity and critical distance whilst remaining a participant in the processes I aimed to analyse. While I remained aware and cautious of the risks associated with this position, I nonetheless do not believe that researchers could (or should try to) exist outside their own empirical reality: the European system of border management has participated in the death of dozens of thousands of people (over 3,000 in 2014 alone according to Al Jazeera, 2014) and neutrality does not seem to me a sustainable position, either intellectually or politically. The commitment of the researcher is a position that was defended by pivotal figures of the social sciences, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Paul Sartre. Bourdieu openly called for scholarship with commitment, disqualifying the conventional dichotomy between the two as ‘gruesome’ (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 3).

Besides my position as someone conducting research, other factors impacted on the way my fieldwork developed. As already mentioned, being a woman gave me access to particular sites and opened up possibilities for forms of relationships that might have been unattainable otherwise. Political positions
and values also determined some of the ways in which the participants related with me. This was particularly true when engaging with more radical groups, such as No Borders and Stop Deportation. My involvement in actions and my agreement with many of their positions definitely helped to bridge what could have been a distance or a form of mistrust.

*Interviews*

Through describing other aspects of my data collection process, I have already addressed a number of issues and questions that arose during my fieldwork and which also impacted the way interviews were conducted and my relations with the participants. I will complete this overview by discussing some elements relative to the interviewing process.

I carried out a total of 32 interviews – most of them took place in the three geographical sites and contexts I described, but some were conducted on Skype. Average interview length was between two and three hours, which was long enough to cover people’s activities and their affiliations in various networks and organisations, but also to address larger questions concerned with their worldview, commitment to certain ideals and visions of Europe. I came to the interviews with a set of questions (see Appendix B) but I would rarely ask them all, mostly because the participants often answered them naturally as part of another question. The work of ‘filtering’ that I had previously undertaken turned out to be crucial to conceiving and designing the interviews. Certain aspects of the research agenda had become more prominent, which allowed me to identify the key issues that came to structure my interviews and inform my choice of questions (and participants).

One of the central points was concerned with the extent to which working with migrants and for migrants’ rights had brought people to contest the dominant national and European frameworks of identity and belonging. Interviews were the opportunity to track the evolution of participants’ views on the nation-state, Europe and borders, and to explore which ideals they have built through their solidarity practices with migrants.
An important element of the interview process was the way in which my research questions and focus evolved during the course of the fieldwork. As mentioned, at an early stage, I realised that counter-discourses on Europe were largely absent. This was signified by the absence of spontaneous references to ‘another Europe’ or to possible alternative futures for the EU. In contrast, I started noticing mentions of other frames and other collective identities. I decided to reorient my research questions in order to explore why the participants were not comfortable (consciously or not) with framing their activism as a struggle for another Europe and what other frames and references they were adopting. This was an important evolution in my research project, which required me to reflect on my findings and incorporate significant observations to my research design as I was still in the process of conducting my fieldwork.

In England and France, language was not a problem since I fluently speak both. My basic knowledge of Italian allowed me to understand what the participants told me, but it was at times hard to communicate myself. On two occasions I conducted interviews jointly with an Italian researcher and friend, and she translated the questions I could not explain on my own to the participants. This researcher was also participating in activist events in Lampedusa and her presence did not unbalance the way the interviews were functioning. Besides, a number of the participants I interviewed in Italy had a level of fluency in either French or English.

Generally, I tried to transcribe interviews as soon as possible after conducting them - the same day if the interview was done in the morning or the next if it was in the evening. This allowed me to follow up immediately, where possible, by phone or email if there were any points that seemed unclear after listening to the recording. Besides formal and recorded interviews, I had multiple informal conversations with the majority of the participants: many of them would come back on particular points of the interviews after they had thought about it more and some sent me additional information or thoughts by emails. The formal interview was thus in many instances the starting point for a much broader and longer discussion, adopting different forms and often spanning over weeks or months.
**Ethics**

I received approval from UEL’s ethics committee in June 2012, and started my fieldwork shortly after this. I implemented a number of procedures in order to ensure that my research was conducted ethically, as well as to protect and support the participants. At the most basic level, I always made sure with great caution that everyone involved was aware of the fact I was conducting research, had been communicated the necessary information to understand the research project and its implications, and had consented to participate in it. When conducting the interviews, I individually informed each participant about my research, asked their permission orally and then provided them with a statement (see Appendix C) explaining my research. When necessary, we would go through this statement together so as to be sure everything was clear for the participant, and I would in turn ask them to sign a consent form (see Appendix D). All participants were provided with my onsite and regular contact details. After the interviews, I sent the transcript to the participants to give them a chance to go through it and let me know whether they approved me using the data.

I proceeded similarly for observation, but in this case informed consent was an on-going process, whereby I continuously reflected on my presence in the field and ensured that the participants were aware of my work and of being part of my research. When attending meetings or events, I asked one of the organisation’s members to introduce me (as a researcher) and to give me a chance to briefly present my research project to those present. On several occasions, I would orally restate my research and its content, and request consent again when I felt it had become necessary. I paid very particular attention to the issue of consent and tried to always remain attuned to the sensitivities and positions of the people participating in the fieldwork. This approach draws on established ethical procedures by field researchers and, for instance, the BSA guidelines note.

As explained, my fieldwork did not aim at observing or interviewing ‘migrants’ but activists. Yet, some of the activists I conducted fieldwork with had experienced difficult migratory journeys and, in some instances, I had anticipated that they might decide to speak about them during the course of the
interview, which could have been a distressing process. While on several occasions it did occur that participants with a migrant background addressed this issue, it never in fact led to a situation of distress. I assume that this is in part because, being involved in activism, they had already had multiple chances to reflect on their experience and had thereby built narratives allowing them to speak with more comfort about these difficult events.

Other ethical considerations concerned the tension between accommodating an insider position (as someone involved in migration struggles) and retaining a form of distance as a researcher. This position called for further ethical caution as it seemed unethical for me to instrumentalise my relationships for the purpose of my own academic research. However my genuine sympathy and commitment to migrant solidarity work allowed me, to some extent, to understand the perspectives of those involved and to refuse instrumental relationships. Moreover, taking into consideration the possible implications of my research on activists was of paramount importance to me, particularly for those groups involved in direct actions in support of migrants.

**Data analysis and coding**

My choice of mobilising insights from SMT guided my eye and ear while conducting the fieldwork, listening to the interviews and reading through my transcripts. I was particularly attentive to the way the participants positioned themselves in relation to the dominant discourse I have discussed, formulated counter-frames in order to narrate their political engagement and relied on particular repertoires of tactics. I also paid attention to the different contexts within which the participants were operating and how these were shaping and impacting on their practices and narratives.

My approach to data analysis complemented the ethnographic method I adopted. As mentioned, I was associated with a number of the pro-migrant initiatives that I was studying, and remained closely attuned to debates and actions discussed online through mailing lists, newsletters blogs and websites. I kept record of thoughts and comments emerging from my own activist practice, as well as from sessions of participant observation and online monitoring, in a
research journal, as recommended for qualitative research methods (Creswell, 2007, p. 178-80). As I wrote down these thoughts, I tried to identify recurrent themes and also noted comments regarding the way these emergent themes were discussed by participants. This allowed me to reflect on the differences and similarities in participants’ understanding of concepts and practices related to the European project, immigration and border control, and solidarity work. This journal was also used to reflect on how the interviews were going, and to keep track of the issues and thoughts that arose during and after the interviews.

I transcribed interviews as soon as possible after conducting them. After transcribing each interview, I read through the transcript and made a list of the main points raised. This allowed me to start observing patterns in the response. As I continued the fieldwork, I was able to identify themes, which I would compare with and reflect on in relation to the thoughts and comments recorded in my journal. I also kept track of how the themes emerged and developed within and across interviews in my research journal. In this sense, data analysis was an on-going process throughout the fieldwork.

Upon completing the fieldwork, I went through my journal, the transcripts and the preliminary lists of themes several times over. I identified the key themes recurring and colour coded them. I also determined sub-themes or sub-codes within each theme. Following advices from scholars, I did not initially discard any theme, as even themes that seem initially insignificant can become important as data analysis progresses (Coffey and Amanda, 1996; Braun and Clarke, 2006). I then organised quotes, comments and observations systematically according to each theme, and checked the themes and the comments and quotes associated with each across my different sources. This system allowed me flexibility and helped keep my approach to the data inductive. My concern with SMT made me pay particular attention to ideas and comments linked to concepts such as movement organising and collective identities, however I did not try to fit findings within a pre-designed approach. Rather I let the participants’ narratives lead me through the data. The strong data-driven dimension of my analysis is visible in the next two chapters, which bring activists’ voices to the heart of the discussion.
Being reflexive throughout the fieldwork, by keeping a research journal and engaging in transcription as I was interviewing, was crucial in guiding me through the fieldwork and in allowing me to make adjustments when necessary. For example, it is thanks to this on-going reflectivity that I realised early on that participants were reluctant to develop a discourse on Europe and the European Union beyond one that opposed its border and immigration policies.

In the process of colour coding and organising the data, I observed that a number of factors, such as the geographical site, type of organisation, generation and gender of participants, as well as their political affiliations, seemed to be influencing participants’ interpretations and analyses of the European project and its borders. After coding and organising the data according to my themes, I complicated the data by grouping the quotes and ideas that emerged within each theme according to these different factors. This follows Tesch’s idea that data have to be reconceptualised by putting them in different interpretative contexts – a process which he calls data de- and re-contextualisation (1990, pp. 115-7). I then compared the observations I made from the various ways of grouping data. This allowed me to identify strong convergences, as well as differences, between the various groups and individuals participating in my research. It provided the basis and orientation for my finding chapters.

The methodological choices I made in this research and the way in which I analysed and related to fieldwork data reflect my own position within this project, as a researcher and activist. Though I did not explicitly consider this project to be a work of co-research, the research process was embedded in an ethnographic and militant practice which meant my analysis and understanding were developed through interactions, cooperation and discussion with the participants. I therefore decided to keep activist voices at the centre of the discussion. This centrality given to participants’ interpretations is reflected in the finding chapters, by the way in which I build my own analysis around their voices, rather than putting their accounts at the service of my arguments.
Conclusion

This chapter has explained how I translated my research hypotheses and questions into an operational framework within which to carry out my fieldwork. The exercise of translating theory into a practical research design brings questions which I have tried to highlight and address. I explained my choice of a qualitative framework combining an ethnographic approach with insights from narrative studies, in order to develop an in-depth understanding of the values, behaviours, practices and beliefs of the participants in context.

I have also explained my choice of research sites and the criteria I used to select participants. Finally, I have reflected on my positionality as a researcher throughout the fieldwork process and presented some of the issues I confronted. In the next two chapters, I present and analyse the data I have collected during my fieldwork.
Chapter V

The Transnationalisation of Pro-migrant Struggles in Europe

Introduction

The two following chapters bring us to the sites of my research. They examine how pro-migrant struggles have evolved in the context of the construction of the European Union and its border regime in the light of the data collected during my fieldwork. One of my key concerns is to interrogate the extent to which a pan-European pro-migrant social movement is in formation in response to the incorporation of immigration and asylum policies into European legislation and to the formulation of an exclusionary discourse on 'European belonging'.

Here, I focus on the emergence of new solidarity practices. My hypothesis was that activists have been increasingly engaging in crossborder activities and transnational campaigns in order to understand better and respond to the Europeanisation of immigration and border controls. Whilst the meta-context of this research is that of the European Union, the nature of the EU project means that Europeanisation intersects in diverse and often contradictory ways with heterogeneous national and local frameworks.

I attempt to stay as close as possible to the fieldwork data and adopt, whenever feasible, the terminology used by the participants themselves, rather than imposing my own labels and titles. This can be challenging as these groups and networks define themselves in a variety of ways which reflect their various sets of beliefs and political positions. Whilst many groups accept working in favour of 'migrant rights', some refuse the notion of 'rights' insofar as it implies a legitimate authority able to distribute and to confiscate such rights. These latter groups prefer talking about 'solidarity' as a political praxis that asserts the common benefit of and need for struggle, for migrants and activists alike. Therefore, when speaking about the participants collectively, I favour using more neutral descriptions such as 'pro-migrant' or 'migration solidarity' groups, networks and campaigns. A table, with a list of participants, their age group and...
political affiliations, as well as the time and place of the interviews, features in Appendix A.

**Who? A Presentation of the Participants**

Detail of the origins and structures of each group, network and campaign I interviewed have been provided in the methodology chapter. This examination of their structures and resources reveals a diversity reflective of the pluralistic nature of pro-migrant groups and networks in Europe. The analytical challenge in this section is, in fact, to identify commonalities beyond this diversity. I therefore set out to investigate the mutual features and ‘bridging themes’ of pro-migrant groups, campaigns and networks in the EU. I also explore the ways in which they are qualitatively different from previous forms of solidarity with migrants and the extent of this difference.

During the fieldwork, I asked participants to provide details of the organisational structures of the groups and networks they were part of and the resources available to them. Participating organisations and networks are characterised by their heterogeneity, with groups ranging from established charities with paid staff to loose activist networks with little formal structure. Three of the participating groups are French-registered associations (Gisti, Fasti and Migreurop); AMM is an Italian associazione; MRN is a UK-registered charity; No Border, NOII and Stop Deportation are unregistered activist networks; PICUM is a Brussels-based NGO and European Alternatives calls itself a ‘transnational membership organisation’ that brings together local groups, which may or may not be independently registered under the national law of their countries.

The yearly income or budget of the participant groups and networks ranges from £0 to £849,070, with some of the smaller and more informal groups working without any budget and relying solely on the personal resources of their activists. These small groups might occasionally organise fundraising events in order to finance a particular project or action, but they do not receive any formal funding. As for other, larger groups, for the year 2012/13, only one organisation,

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58 By ‘bridging themes’ I mean quite literally themes and features that bring groups and campaigns together in spite of their diversity in terms of status, structure, culture, language and tactics.
59 2012/13 data.
PICUM, had a budget exceeding £500,000. Three of them (Stop Deportation, NOII and No Border) had either no budget or a budget of under £5,000, and five had a budget between £100,000 and £500,000 (MRN, Gisti, Fasti, European Alternatives and Migreurop). The three organisations with the least funds do not have any paid staff members, whilst the other organisations have between one and 10 employees. Most of the organisations with a formal membership (PICUM, Gisti, Fasti, Migreurop, MRN, European Alternatives) have over 100 members, and some have as many as 300. Structural participation also varies: some groups do not have any representative structures, in order to favour direct and horizontal decision-making, whilst others rely on more conventional structures such as assemblies, boards and committees.

These groups are also characterised by a diverse range of political values and backgrounds, which inform the stance they take on crucial issues pertaining to migration solidarity work. One of the main questions in this respect is that of freedom of movement. While some of the participating organisations and networks campaign for further respect of migrants’ rights without challenging the right of states and the EU to control their borders, others call for an opening of borders and some, particularly those from an anarchist background, are opposed to the very existence of borders at all. Some of the networks bringing together several organisations, such as Migreurop and PICUM, have interesting experiences relating to the discussion of common positions on such issues. During an interview with a Migreurop participant, for example, she explained that the network had not agreed on a common position on freedom of movement:

We took a common position against immigration detention three or four years ago, after some years of discussion around the topic as a network… Migreurop, it’s a wide range of organisations, forty-three members, so we don't always have the same opinion on everything… Some of our members have already taken very clear stances against detention and in favour of complete freedom of movement, I think the network as a whole will reach the same position soon but our members come from different backgrounds, they have different politics, a different relation to the state also… Some are more radical than others… But in general I think that in Migreurop, the open way in which we bring these topics to the table, the way in which those organisations which have already taken position share their arguments, will mean that a common

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60 Challenges associated with this strategy will be discussed later in the chapter.
position in favour of freedom of movement will be reached soon (Laura, 2012)

The struggle to reach a consensus is also an illustration of the importance of deliberation and participation mechanisms within the participating groups and networks. This is testimony to their understanding of democratic processes and of the importance they attach to participation in this respect. A good illustration of this is that, in almost all of the groups that have one, the general assembly meets more than once a year and directly elects the chairman/director.

Membership requirements also greatly fluctuate, ranging from complete inclusiveness (anyone endorsing the principles of the group is welcome) to formal selection processes. These factors reflect the various levels of formalisation that the groups and organisations participating in my research follow, which could be further explored by looking at the existence or lack of a constitution and of a formal working programme. In terms of the ‘generation’ of social and political movements that these various groups come from, it is worth noting that two were created in the aftermath of the 1968 protests in France (Gisti and Fasti); another two after the fall of the Berlin wall but before the 2000s (NOII and No Border); and the other five between 2002 and 2012 (MRN, Stop Deportation, Migreurop, AMM, European Alternatives and PICUM).61 Two of the participating campaigns (B4P and When You Don’t Exist) were both launched in 2011 while Lampedusa in Festival has been held since 2009.

Finally, an interesting point of contrast between the participating groups and networks concerns their relationships with public institutions. Three main types of relationship can be identified: collaboration (PICUM), challenging and attempting to bring about more democratic controls over institutions while remaining aware of some of the associated challenges (When You Don’t Exist, B4P, MRN, Migreurop, Gisti, Fasti, European Alternatives and, to some extent, AMM, although their focus on exploring narratives means they operate in a more symbolic realm) and a refusal of any kind of relationship (No Border, NOII, Stop Deportation). This division is not a fixed, rigid one, however. For instance, groups which normally refuse any relationship might pressurise public institutions at selected times. This, as I discuss later, is nonetheless a crucial

61 I have not included the campaigns in this data: only the nine groups and networks are considered.
element to keep in mind when seeking to understand the discourse of pro-migrant groups and movements in Europe.

Why and When? The Emergence of Pan-European Migrant Solidarity Struggles

This section looks at the process of transnationalisation of pro-migrant struggles in the EU in relation to the construction of the EU and the Europeanisation of immigration and border policies.

The harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies in Europe

When asked what pushed them to working at the European level and/or form European networks, most participants’ first response was the harmonisation of European immigration and asylum policies and their repressive effect on migrants. I have already discussed these developments in Chapter III. Here, I only briefly reiterate the milestones of the process of harmonisation of immigration and border policies in order to analyse how they have affected migrant solidarity initiatives in the EU.

The harmonisation, or Europeanisation, of legislative frameworks governing issues related to migration and asylum has been a key area of cooperation between EU member states at least since the 1985 Schengen Agreement. As mentioned, the rationale for Europeanising immigration and asylum policies was that free movement of people within the EU/ECC space could only happen if, first, all member states applied identical criteria regarding entry requirements into their territory for ‘third country’ nationals and, second, if the controls which had been waived at the EU’s internal borders were replicated and reinforced at its external borders. In preparation for the implementation of Schengen, originally planned for 1993 but which in fact occurred in 1995, the EEC drew up a series of measures, such as the ‘Common Manual’ for border guards and the ‘Visa Information System’, which regulated the management of the Schengen Area’s external borders as well as entry requirements and permitted duration of stays (Peers, 2012). These pieces of legislation, which had started as inter-governmental regulations, were fully incorporated into European legislation with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which enabled the EU to legislate on migration.
The Treaty of Amsterdam was implemented at the 1999 Tampere Summit, which was supposedly about creating an area of ‘freedom, justice and security’ but was strongly criticised by European civil society organisations for its secrecy, lack of transparency and the association it made between ‘immigration’ and ‘security’ (Bunyan, 2003).

Several participants admitted that it was not until the mid to late 1990s that they fully took account of what was happening at the EU level. They acknowledged feeling concerned following the 1985 signature of the Schengen agreement, in particular as it failed to address the issue of the status of third-country nationals and started to refer to the reinforcement of Europe's external borders (Chantale, 2012; Oscar, 2014), but it was not until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which created the EU and European citizenship as an exclusively derivative status (leaving out all EU residents who were not already citizens of a member states), that the discriminatory and exclusive nature of the Union was fully grasped (Chantale, 2012; Henry, 2012). Soon after Maastricht, the process of Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policies was initiated, boosted by the 1995 implementation of Schengen. This process encouraged closer collaboration between activists in different EU member states, both to exchange information in order to understand what the effects of these developments were and to share ideas about how to resist them. An interviewee from Gisti summarised this process, and emphasised the need to find partners across borders in the face of the lack of awareness among the majority of French associations about the developments at the European level:

At Gisti, there was a preoccupation since, I’d say, the late 1980s or early 1990s, regarding what would come out of the Schengen Agreement. Some of our members were paying close attention – in particular because they had informal links with Dutch and Belgian activists – to something which French people, at least the French associations, were not talking about, and which was the implementation of this Schengen agreement, which was going to reorganise circulation inside what was then the Schengen Area and which is now the whole of the European territory… and all the consequences it would have on the status of migrants in France… But it was really difficult to work with our traditional associative partners, because all this seemed very theoretical for these partners. It wasn’t there… Public authorities weren’t talking about it; there were virtually no debates at the Assembly. Contrary to what was happening in other countries, the French government never publicly announced the negotiations or what was being talked about in Brussels
about the implementation of this Schengen Area (…) But we quickly anticipated that from this system would come many things which would have rather serious implications, and that we had to be ready for what would come next. And it came with the Dublin Convention regarding asylum seekers, which later become the Dublin Regulation, which determines and governs the practice of most people working with asylum seekers nowadays. But the Dublin system was already being prepared in 1995, even though, at the time, the whole thing seemed completely unrealistic (Chantale, 2012).

While it might have been the case that, at first, these developments were going unnoticed in France, participants in Italy explained that, as one of the Southern border countries of the Schengen Area, the changes that the new controls at the external borders implied for their national legislative framework and practices were intensely felt. Within the new Europe of Schengen, Italy and other border countries were essentially set to become border guards for Western and Northern European member states, the very same countries driving the legislative developments in terms of migration and asylum and imposing their strict legal frameworks on other countries.62 One of my Italian participants summarised these developments as follows:

In Italy, until the mid-1980s, we didn’t have any immigration law. Issues to do with migration and residency were still governed through a decree from the 1930s, which basically gave administrative discretion on the matter. Of course, I am not saying that Italy was a heaven for immigrants. There were prejudices against people coming from North Africa and things like this, but it was localised, you know, and there was not generalised identity response to it… It was not a state-based, legal type of discrimination… But that changed very rapidly after 1995, when the Schengen Agreement was coming into place, and Italy was told it had to adopt immigration policies that were along the lines of those there were in Northern European countries. Not only did the law change, there was a discourse to go with it, and you could see the change in people’s attitude, you could see racist graffiti appearing on the walls. We still kept our Italian particularities, our historic division between the North and the South of the country, and a Sicilian person might still feel closer to a Moroccan person than to a Northern Italian… But, you know, there was definitely a new form of racist discourse in the media, by the politicians, that was being pushed forward, in the name of Europe (Nidal, 2012).

It was on the occasion of the 1999 Tampere summit that these diverse experiences were brought together by activists for the first time. Schneider and

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62 In Portugal, the first post-Salazar immigration laws were passed in the mid 1980s. They had to be strongly tightened under pressure from the EU in 1993, in preparation for the implementation of Schengen.
Kopp, two No Border activists and bloggers, remember the days leading up to the formation of the No Border network before 1999 as follows:

It all began with a meeting in Amsterdam, at the margins of a big demonstration against the EU summit in 1997 (...) The priorities and objectives of the political work in each country were gravely different, but what the groups had in common was the demand for practical, political intervention at the base i.e. grassroots politics. The new network was (...) concerned with systematically creating the preconditions for a Europe-wide collaboration, which purpose was in the first place to enrich the every-day activities in each and every country. Yet, although a regular exchange of information was arranged amongst the participants of the first network meeting, the initial zest soon died away. The practical intentions were too abstract, the criteria for the admission of new groups into the network and mailing lists were too rigorous and the communication amongst the participant groups, who had already known each other for years through successful crossborder co-operation outside the Net, was too hermetic. The actual potential of the alliance at first remained hidden behind a formalism, which in spite of growing confidence, still revealed little understanding of the necessities and possibilities of European-wide co-operation. However, this was about to change: in 1999 the network was renamed "Noborder" and relaunched with the European-wide protest action to mark the occasion of the EU's special summit, "justice and the interior", in Tampere. This latter was expressly dedicated to the aim of standardizing the asylum and migration politics in the European context. In the preparation some Noborder groups had managed to connect with promising contacts in France and, above all, in Italy. On this basis a common European day-of-action was arranged (...) to protest in a decentralized but coordinated manner against a new chapter in the politics of separation: (...) more exclusion, more control, more deportation (Schneider and Kopp, no date).

For these activists, the word Tampere became shorthand for the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policy. It came to stand for the very process whereby a certain Europe, based on a system of segregation and discrimination and a discourse of exclusion, was taking shape. In an email circulated on anti-globalisation lists by the organisers of the Tampere counter-summit in Finland, activists insisted that ‘Now is time to fight again not because the EU have a summit but because the political process of formation of a subjectivity is in action’.

It was a key moment in the history of many of the autonomous migrant solidarity groups: from then on, they started to consistently try to match the practices of

63 Excerpt from a call-out email sent by the organisers of the Tampere counter summit to an activist public mailing list in early October 1999.
national governments by making their tactics and activities similarly transnational (Alex, 2013; Sean, 2012; Laura, 2012). Following the Tampere counter-demonstrations, the European No Border network emerged. In another blog entry reflecting on the 2001 No Border camp in Strasbourg, Schneider, and No Border activist Lang, explains that what was needed was ‘a common European praxis; a praxis that could take on the unified European regime of frontiers’ (Lang and Schneider, no date). The reasoning behind the transnationalisation of No Border struggles was, as explained by a participant from No Borders UK:

When the plans to increase border controls in Europe became a matter of EU policies, our comrades realised that this would effectively mean the harmonisation of repressive and murderous policies. Resisting these developments meant working more closely with groups sharing similar views in other European countries. There was a strong momentum as many comrades had organised actions to protest against Tampere, so we built on this and established a European No Border network, with groups in many European countries. If the oppression Europeanises, the resistance has to do the same (Sean, 2012).

1999 was also the year when PICUM was established in Brussels. PICUM came about on the initiative of a group of grassroots organisations from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, which shared similar concerns regarding the lack of protection for undocumented migrants in the new European legal framework on immigration and asylum. These organisations had been working in their respective member states and lobbying their national governments on these issues; however, with the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policies, they realised that they needed to join forces to be able to be represented at the European level. A participant from PICUM explained that:

As the laws around migration were being transferred into the legal structure of the EU, groups in various member states realised that this issue, the issue of undocumented migrants, was left out of these juridical developments and that they would not gain any form of protection through the process of Europeanisation. We felt undocumented migrants and the problems they face had to be defended in the EU, and the best way for us to have leverage was to join forces and literally ‘turn up the volume’: make our voices louder by shouting together (Daniela, 2012).

Tampere was supposedly a summit on ‘freedom, justice and security’, presented as core tenets of the European project. But activists were quick to
denounce what they saw as a quest for European unity and identity at the expense of many other European residents: all those who did not have citizenship in one of the member states. European citizenship did not therefore move away from the exclusionary features of national identity discourses but, in fact, aggregated them and added an additional layer of exclusion for non-nationals. In a lecture in 1999, Balibar summarised the concerns and hopes of many activists regarding the new Europe in formation:

During the interminable discussion over the situation of immigrants and "undocumented aliens" in France and in Europe, I evoked the spectre of an apartheid being formed at the same time as European citizenship itself. This barely hidden apartheid concerns the populations of the "South" as well as the "East". Does Europe as a future political, economic, and cultural entity, possible and impossible, need a fictive identity? Through this kind of construction, can Europe give meaning and reality to its own citizenship – that is, to the new system of rights that it must confer on the individuals and social groups that it includes? (...) No, however (this is my conviction, at least), in the sense that the closure characteristic of national identity or of the fictive ethnicity whose origin I have just described is as profoundly incompatible with the social, economic, technological, and communicational realities of globalization as it is with the idea of a ‘European right to citizenship’ understood as a ‘right to citizenship in Europe’ – that is, an expansion of democracy by means of European unification (Balibar, 1999).

The reality of the harmonised immigration and asylum policy of the EU is not confined to its discriminatory legal framework and exclusionary discourse. It is also manifested in concrete practices and their reproduction and coordination across Europe. One striking example of the way in which these policies have been implemented was the establishment of the agency Frontex\footnote{‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member states of the European Union’} in 2004. Besides its larger objectives, described in previous chapters, the concrete tasks of Frontex include:

- Coordinating operational border security cooperation between EU member states;
- Carrying out risk analyses;
- Supporting member states in organising joint return operations;
- Assisting member states in the training of border guards;
- Conducting research on border security;
• Assisting member states when circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance arise;
• Deploying rapid intervention teams to member states;
• Providing the European Commission and member states with necessary technical assistance and expertise (Frontexplode, 2010).  

Coordinated anti-migrant operations led by Frontex have encouraged activists to transnationalise their work to be able to oppose such practices. There have been several pan-European campaigns denouncing the agency and its practices. In May 2012, the No Border network organised ‘Anti-Frontex Days’ in Warsaw, Poland, where the headquarters of the agency are located. On this occasion, activists from No Border groups in various European countries, as well as autonomous activists sympathetic to the campaign, converged and organised activities and workshops about Frontex, as well as a direct action at the agency’s headquarters (Sean and Alex, 2012; Alex, 2013).

Other examples include Frontex Watch and Frontexplode. The former is a website set up by activists from several European countries that documents rights violations committed by the agency (Frontexwatch, 2010), while the latter is the website of a collaborative anti-Frontex campaign aimed at denouncing the agency’s practices, and through which demonstrations were organised outside Frontex’s headquarters in 2008 (Frontexplode, 2010). In March 2013, Migreurop launched a three-year inter-organisational campaign called ‘Frontexit’, with the ultimate long-term goal of proving the agency's intrinsic incompatibility with the respect of migrants’ rights and bringing about the removal of its mandate (Laura, 2012; Tony, 2012; Emily, 2014). Shorter-term goals include coordinating research activities and actions between Migreurop’s members and partners in various countries, in order to gather detailed information about Frontex's activities and raise awareness about the violation of migrants' fundamental rights.

Another area of activism around Frontex concerns the mass deportation charter flights coordinated by the agency, which stop over and pick up rejected  

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65 This presentation also offers detailed information about the training organised by Frontex as well as the agency’s activities and the devices at its disposal – this information tends to be difficult to normally access due to the high level of opacity surrounding the agency.
migrants in several EU countries before deporting them collectively to either their country of origin or, in some cases, countries of transit. Groups opposing deportations in their national context have a long history of challenging removals and have displayed a wide repertoire of tactics (from using legal arguments to public campaigning and taking direct action) in order to oppose and disrupt them. Many participants expressed a similar opinion to that expressed by NOII (2007):

You may need a campaign when the law is not enough to stop deportation or removal. If the law was enough then you would not be in the situation you are in now. A campaign means fighting back politically. It means becoming active – not relying on a few emails or standard letters or even a good legal representative. It means organising and working with other people. It means demonstrations and pickets. Most of all it means publicity and going public (No One Is Illegal, 2007).

In reaction to Frontex-coordinated deportations, anti-deportation groups started networking in Europe in order to join forces and coordinate their responses. Coordinated actions, such as blocking the buses taking deportees to the airport and demonstrations at airports, aimed at delaying the same flight at various stopover points, started in 2010 with the first joint action between British, Irish and Belgian anti-deportation groups. One common slogan of the groups has been: 'Mass deportation, Mass resistance!' (Pat, 2012). One activist from Stop Deportation UK explains: 'We want to match what the governments and the EU are doing. If they coordinate deportations, we coordinate resistance!' (Shock, 2013).

In recent years, the Conservative-led UK government has been less keen to participate in European, Frontex-coordinated charter flights and is now managing its own charters (Sean and Alex, 2012; Pat, 2012). However, in other countries, particularly Northern and Western European ones, where the practice of coordinated mass deportation still takes place, synchronised actions bringing together groups from several European countries are increasingly used as a resistance tactic. In December 2012, anti-deportation groups from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK met in Brussels in order to discuss ways to further coordinate their activities with the aim of 'causing
maximum disruption and turning their evil techniques against them’ (Sean and Alex, 2012; Shock, 2013).

The process of harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies in the EU has involved legal, discursive and practical dimensions, which have caused grievances and triggered protest within pro-migrant activist and associative scenes in different European countries. The transnationalisation of resistance has either been seen as essential in order to ‘match the level of the attack’, or has organically developed in response to some of the transnational practices of the EU. However, some participating activists also reported that their awareness of the importance of activism at the European level was raised only when they were faced with concrete consequences of legal developments regarding immigration and asylum in the EU. Below, I present the situation in Calais in 1999 and Lampedusa in 2011 and show how these two particular manifestations of the EU border regime stimulated groups and campaigns into action by providing them with a framework which allowed for more effective mobilisation.

**Crises of the EU border regime**

This section examines two specific episodes during which the EU border regime experienced visible crises that revealed its nature and the contradictions it generates. I argue that these crises have been a key factor in the consolidation of the emerging European pro-migrant groups and networks, not only by offering validation for their analysis, but also because the crises provided them with opportunities to address the general public, as well as helping them to frame their discourse around shared, widely-known reference points.

**Sangatte and Calais**

In 1999, the opening of a migrant centre in the town of Sangatte, only a few kilometres away from Calais and the Eurotunnel, brought to public attention the concentration of ‘stranded’ migrants in this area of Northern France. This centre, designed to host a maximum of 900 people but which often accommodated over 2,000, was precariously run by the local Red Cross in an attempt to provide food and shelter to the many migrants stranded at the
French border and unable to continue their migratory journey to their chosen destination, the UK. The centre was closed in 2002 by then-French Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, after an agreement with then-UK Home Secretary, David Blunkett. This followed a relentless anti-immigration media campaign in France and even more so in Britain (Article 19, 2003).

The main arguments behind the closure of the Sangatte centre were that it had become a hub for ‘illegal migration’ to the UK and that having this centre encouraged more people to come (Article 19, 2003, pp. 6-8). The obstinate media coverage did not stop with the closure of the camp: when the UK agreed to receive, on temporary working visas, about 1,000 Iraqi-Kurdish migrants who had registered at the centre, the British right-wing press rose to denounce this ‘disgraceful deal’ and the government’s ‘loss of control over borders’ (p.7). Later attempts by other charities and activist groups to open centres or shelters for the hundreds (at times thousands) of migrants sleeping rough in Calais were all met with intransigence by the French government, which would send police to raid and shut down these spaces (Michel, 2012).

The Sangatte crisis in 1999-2002 acted as a wake-up call for many migrant solidarity activists in Europe. For Gisti, the Sangatte case was a turning point, which gave a concrete dimension to preoccupations the organisation had had since the early 1990s (Chantale, 2012). The way in which these concerns became embodied in Sangatte and Calais gave Gisti a focus around which to articulate its analysis of the new developments happening at the EU level in terms of immigration and asylum policies. Gisti’s members had been active in Calais since a few months before the opening of the Red Cross centre. By the time the centre opened, and the media controversy started, these members had witnessed the situation first-hand, and this experience had led them to develop a critical understanding of the immigration and border system-in-formation. By extension, the group as a whole was starting to formulate an analysis of these European-level developments and to realise that new forms of action were needed to challenge the consequences of the EU border regime. During an interview, Gisti/Migreurop Chantale summarised her organisation’s argument as follows:
We have the Schengen system, which organises the free movement of people within a given space, limited by the external borders of states that are members of Schengen. On the other hand, there is the UK, which is not part of Schengen but is a member of the Dublin system, which allows it to send back asylum seekers to any other Dublin country they have transited through – in this case, France. So people could travel relatively freely from the moment they entered the EU all the way to Sangatte and Calais, and then they became stranded. And even if they could pass, they would be sent back. For us [Gisti], the only cause of the Sangatte situation was this absurd system (Chantale, 2012).

Gisti also claimed that this ‘absurd system’ was not unique to Calais: it applied to many other ‘hot spots’ not only inside the EU but also at its external borders. The same contradictions arose wherever people were immobilised in the course of their journeys because of a border to which they were endlessly sent back – through the Dublin Convention or readmission agreements. In these instances, EU governments as well as international agencies such as the UNHCR or IOM ‘would refuse to recognise the possible presence of refugees among the migrants’ being stranded at border points’ (Chantale, 2012).

For Gisti, these phenomena were not accidental; they followed a pattern indicative of a certain model of immigration management by the EU. The contradictions of a system encouraging the free circulation of goods, services, capital and some but not all people were dealt with by using ‘immobilisation as a method’ (Chantale, 2012). From informal gatherings to administrative detention in immigration detention centres, Gisti began denunciating the use of confinement as a systematic and trivialised response to migration flows considered undesirable by EU countries. By signing readmission and other migration-related agreements with an increasing number of neighbouring countries (but also, increasingly, with countries further away), the EU engaged in a process of externalisation of its borders, which led to the multiplication of formal and informal migrant camps and gatherings beyond Europe’s territory (Chantale, 2012; Laura, 2012).

Through their experience in Sangatte and the analysis they produced of the EU border regime, Gisti activists confirmed that there was an urgent need for crossborder collaboration with groups and activists faced with similar situations elsewhere:
At that point, we looked into getting in touch with organisations in Europe which were facing the same kind of issues. We first met up with Italian groups, because of what was starting to happen in Sicily, and with Spanish organisations, as Andalusia was experiencing the same type of phenomenon with an increasing number of informal gatherings of stranded people... We spoke with people involved in similar cases in Greece... And we started to see where were the fixation points, and where we could act together (Chantale, 2012).

It is through such links, weaved first and foremost pragmatically and in response to an urgent need for information sharing and concrete joint action, that activists from various European countries came up with the idea of a more formal structure to coordinate activities around the EU border regime and its consequences. When the first European Social Forum (ESF) took place in Florence in November 2002 under the slogan ‘Against war, racism and neoliberalism’, pro-migrant activists made sure a session around migration was scheduled and they brought the issue of the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policies to the table. The creation of Migreurop, as a pan-European network of groups and activists involved in migrants’ rights and anti-border struggles, was the outcome of this ESF session. Later, in 2009, it was the situation in and around Calais that, once again, brought activists from different No Border groups to the North of France, and led to the establishment of the Calais No Border Camp and the Calais Migrant Solidarity network.

**The Strait of Sicily and Lampedusa**

The case of the Sangatte centre was one of the first episodes in a series of incidents where the oppressive, exclusionary and sometimes murderous nature of the European border regime was brought to light. However, migrant solidarity activists are aware that migrants trying to make their way to Europe constantly face extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. Gabriele del Grande summarised this on his blog *Fortress Europe*:

> This is the history that will be studied by our children who will read [in] school textbooks that in the 21st century, thousands died at sea around Italy and thousands were arrested and deported from our cities. Whilst everybody pretended not to see. At least 19,144 people have died since 1988 along the European borders (Del Grande, no date).

66 I also met Gabriele del Grande during the course of the fieldwork and had discussions with him, however I never conducted a formal interview.
By November 2012, at least 6,166 migrants had died at sea in the Strait of Sicily alone (Del Grande, no date). In 2011, at least 1,822 people lost their lives whilst trying to reach the shores of Italy or Malta, equating to 77 per cent of all deaths at sea in the Mediterranean that year. This means that an average of over 150 people a month, or eight a day, died in the Strait of Sicily in 2011. People transiting through Sicily were coming from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt to the islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria, Malta and the Southeastern coast of Sicily, as well as from Egypt and Turkey towards Calabria. The death toll in the Mediterranean rises every year: in 2014, the number of recorded migrant deaths between North Africa and Southern Europe reached 3,419 (Day, 2014).

In this context, the island of Lampedusa, off the coast of Sicily and only 113 kilometres away from Tunisia, has become the focus of acute media and political attention. Since the early 2000s, the island (the Southernmost point of Italy) has become a transit point for migrants trying to reach Europe. Its only migrant reception centre, with a maximum capacity of 850, was regularly housing around 2,000 people, leading to criticisms by the UNHCR in 2009 (UNHCR, 2009). In 2011, during the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings, tens of thousands more migrants arrived at the island in an attempt to get to mainland Europe. By August that year, it was estimated that almost 50,000 people had reached Lampedusa. Migrants were kept on the island, many living in the streets around the port, surviving mostly thanks to the generosity of the local population. Reception conditions on the island prompted severe criticism from various human rights groups and NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (2011), Amnesty International (2011) and the Red Cross (Zambello, 2011).

As seen, Italian politicians’ response to the situation consisted, on the one hand, of creating a sense of panic among the Italian and European public through alarmist declarations about a ‘human tsunami’ engulfing Italy and a ‘biblical exodus’ threatening the country (BBC, 2011) and, on the other, insisting that the refugees were only there temporarily and that the government would remove them from the island and the country, thereby ‘brining life back to normal’ (France 24, 2011). Media coverage of migration to Lampedusa was

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67 Statistics and information from Fortress Europe. These numbers are certainly underestimates as they only refer to registered deaths. A high number of missing people has also been registered.
quick to adopt this apocalyptic tone and relayed the anti-migrant rhetoric of the
government. Italian activists denounced the spectacularisation of migration as a
convenient distraction from the political crisis faced by the then-Italian
government, including the various scandals surrounding Prime Minister
Berlusconi’s private life. The small island of Lampedusa was the perfect place
to stage this spectacle. As one of the participants put it:

The Italian government needed a place like Lampedusa; a small island,
so small that it appears overcrowded even with a few thousand people.
Lampedusa is perfect to reify the spectacle of the invasion and this
serves the purpose of many actors. The Italian government, which needs
a distraction from its own failures; agencies like Frontex, which get an
excellent opportunity to justify their existence and increase their budget;
and even dictators like Gadhafi who gains political weight from appearing
as the guardian of EU borders (Nidal, 2012).

Activists immediately denounced the way in which the dominant narrative was
being built so as to manufacture popular anxiety and the perceived need for a
life-saving intervention by a charismatic leader, who could unite Italian society
and restore national cohesion in the face of this ‘external attack’ (Sandro, 2012;
Antonio, 2012). Berlusconi’s visit to the island of Lampedusa, in late March
2011, seemed to be specifically designed to serve this purpose (Sandro, 2012).
The then-Prime Minister paid a short visit to the island during which he
promised to ‘get all the migrants out in the next 48 to 60 hours’ and offered
‘solutions’ such as personally purchasing all the boats on the Tunisian coast so
as to prevent people from using them, and commissioning a TV series on the
island in order to boost tourism. He also decided to buy a villa in Lampedusa as
a proof of his ‘personal commitment’ to the fate of the island and its population
(BBC, 2011b).

But beyond their consequences for Italian political life and the Italian political
class’ attempt to capitalise on the situation, the events in Lampedusa brought
the whole EU migration regime into crisis. Italy was tied to EU regulations, in
particular to the Dublin II Regulations. The Italian government’s attempt to
diffuse the issue by granting migrants temporary Schengen visas allowing them
to travel to other EU member states was defeated, as other countries used
Dublin to send migrants back to Italy. In Spring 2011, France de facto re-
established controls on its border with Italy, effectively suspending the
Schengen agreement for one of the first times since its implementation in 1995. Checks were taking place not only at border points, but also upon arrival in French cities on trains and other means of transport coming from Italy. If undocumented migrants were found on board, the French police would send them back (Anafé and Gisti, 2011). The reliance of the border regime on neighbouring countries was also fully exposed: until then, Libya and Tunisia had been acting as border guards on behalf of the EU, through readmission accords between Italy and the governments of both countries. The EU was in effect using Tunisian and Libyan police forces to prevent ‘unauthorised departures’. With the uprisings in these countries, this system of border externalisation was brought to the point of near-collapse. Faced with this situation, EU member states and institutions responded with a series of incoherent and uncoordinated actions, many of which set countries against one another in a way that illustrated the absence of EU unity outside of agreement on a regional system of exclusion.68

The death toll in the Mediterranean Sea had been the focus of activist work for several years, but the escalation of state and media violence, both real and symbolic, during the ‘Lampedusa crisis’, had a revitalising effect on solidarity practices. As with Sangatte in 1999, the events brought to public awareness the ways in which the European border regime operated. It offered plenty of evidence of its human cost. Activists, who had been warning of alarming developments at the borders of the EU for several years, in particular regarding the activities and equipment of Frontex and the proliferation of surveillance technologies, were provided with additional material with which to denounce the dangers inherent in the process of securitisation of the EU borders.

A number of campaigns were launched to condemn and challenge the fact that national governments and European institutions failed to respect their international commitments and to ensure access to the right of asylum. Among these was Amnesty International’s When You Don’t Exist campaign. Until then, Amnesty International (AI) had refrained from working on the issue of migration per se, and had limited its campaigning activities to the issues of asylum and

68 It is worth noting that Italy and the EU signed new readmission agreements with Libya as soon as possible after the regime change. See http://www.migrationnewsheet.eu/italy-secret-agreement-with-libya-to-continue-so-called-push-back-policy.
refugee rights. This stemmed mainly from the organisation’s position regarding national sovereignty, according to which nation-states have the right to manage their borders as they see fit (Clara, 2012). However, given the gravity of the events unfolding in the Strait of Sicily in 2011, AI felt compelled to take action and respond to the worsening situation.

Though When You Don’t Exist does not focus exclusively on what happens at the borders of the EU (its other axes of work are concerned with the use of detention in the EU and the effects of differential legal statuses on the human rights of migrants), the events in the Mediterranean Sea were crucial to the launching of the campaign insofar as they provided AI with ‘momentum at the European level’ (Clara, 2012). This momentum was in part due to the intensive media coverage and public discourse around Lampedusa, but also to the fact that the issues and concerns surrounding migration and migrant rights were looking increasingly alike and becoming of growing relevance to the various AI branches in different European countries. The focus of the campaign was to ‘make visible’ the violations that migrants are subjected to “out of the public eye” and to reassert migrants’ right to ‘exist in Europe’ and have their stories recognised (Marco, 2012).

Work around challenging the dominant narrative by giving migrants a voice and a role in the production of the discourse around migration has been an important aspect of migrant solidarity campaigns. This is the main objective of the organisation AMM, which focuses on producing participatory narratives bringing together migrants and non-migrants in order to ‘acknowledge migrants’ passage, trace and experience in our collective history and memory’ (Sandro, 2012).

Similarly, the Boats 4 People campaign (B4P) was organised in reaction to the events that took place in the Strait of Sicily in 2011. The idea of the campaign emerged following an anti-racist rally in Italy in the summer of 2011, as a way to urgently denounce the practices of a number of actors at the EU borders (Ahmad, 2012; Nino, 2013). The campaign's criticisms and accusations were directed, first and foremost, at the EU and its migration regime, as well as at organisations that activists considered to be complicit in the stabilisation of this
regime and the reproduction of the privileges embodied by the EU borders, such as NATO (which let people die at sea during its military campaign against Libya), IOM and the Italian government. As one of the participants involved in B4P put it:

We wanted to mobilise people in the Mediterranean, both on the African and on the European shore, so that the Mediterranean becomes a place of solidarity and ceases to be a mass grave for migrants (Ahmad, 2012).

The B4P flotilla sailed for three weeks on a highly symbolic route across the Mediterranean, reversing the usual migratory trajectory from North Africa to Europe, and then back to Lampedusa. It encouraged the development of a tighter solidarity movement between the two shores of the Mediterranean. At each stopover, the flotilla brought together migrant and non-migrant activists, journalists and members of the public. In Tunisia, the crew of the Oloferne, the campaign’s boat, met with families of migrants who had died or disappeared at sea, and who were campaigning for their right to know what had happened to their relatives. The crew also met with refugees and migrants stranded in the Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia.

The aim of B4P was to relay to the European media, public and politicians the message of the various groups and communities affected by the EU border regime: a message calling for the EU to stop closing its borders in a way that was proving murderous and to give people the right to move freely. Moreover, the campaign was supported by various groups across the EU which could not join the flotilla but organised solidarity actions and events in sites where the EU border regime manifests itself, such as Calais and Strasbourg. In Calais for example, activists from the ‘Jungle Tour’, a group of cyclists who organise various actions to raise awareness about the situation of migrants among the local population, held a solidarity action with B4P with a vigil in memory of the migrants who had died in the Mediterranean Sea (Jungle Tour, 2012).

The importance of focal points of repression and resistance, such as Calais and Lampedusa, can be understood in relation to their ability to feed into an activist narrative about power and rebellion. In his discussion of revolutionary events, Eric Selbin (2010) raises the question of why certain episodes of resistance and
rebellion take place at particular moments in time and in particular places. He emphasises the ‘power of story’, that is to say, the importance of developing a framework of analysis of both domination and reaction that successfully compels people to act on their indignation. The narratives that activists develop are characterised by ‘associations and connections across time and space that people deploy to construct a revolutionary imaginary comprising symbols, names, dates, places, grievances, stories, and means and methods, which they then draw on as they consider the world and their options’ (p. 166). Selbin considers this imaginary as a necessary condition for the emergence of any form of resistance movement, whether or not it becomes a revolutionary movement as such (pp. 161-83). The composition of a cultural repertoire of claims, tactics, strategies and inspiration is a crucial element in the process of transforming individual indignation into collective mobilisation. The importance of such repertoires has long been a focus of analysis for social movement scholars, who highlight that, in order for a social movement to form, it must be able to offer a catalogue of tools and actions which are compelling and considered efficient in a specific context, as well as reproducible in other contexts (see for example Sidney, 1998; Tilly, 2004).

Calais and Lampedusa were sites that concentrated and made visible the consequences of the EU border regime. In this sense, they provided activists with adequate platforms for bringing together the narrative and analytical threads that they had developed and turning them into coherent and persuasive frameworks for speaking about and understanding the impact of border controls. Both sites played an important role in the constitution of a repertoire of grievances and claims by pro-migrant groups and activists in the EU. Moreover, as border posts, they possessed a specific symbolic power and became sites where groups and campaigns could challenge the mainstream representations of what Europe is or is not.

**What and How? Activities, Tactics and Tools of Pan-European Pro-Migrant Actors**

With the creation of the nation-state, political activities and claims became increasingly organised at the national level (see for example Camarani, 2004).
While I do not have the space here to examine whether and under which conditions the process of globalisation has led to the supranationalisation of political actions and practices, the analysis presented above does indicate that pro-migrant struggles in Europe have diversified their levels of action in response to the EU institutional and political context. Rather than a clear-cut shift to the European level, a multi-layered movement that brings together and coordinates local, national and supranational activities is taking place.

Over the course of my interviews, I asked the participants to explain the concrete ways in which they developed, strengthened and expanded pan-European links and practices. The sets of activities, tools and tactics they described fall into three broad but distinct categories: communication and decision-making, network-building and -expanding, and organising joint protests and actions. This classification is used for the sake of analytical clarity as many activities can fall within at least two of these categories. For instance, organising a pan-European campaign will often be an important element in the strengthening of a network but a set of new communication tools might be designed for the occasion and subsequently re-used for everyday communication. Therefore, though I categorise these tactics and activities following their primary intention, I also discuss their unintended consequences.

**Transnational communication**

Communication tools used by pro-migrant groups across Europe can be divided into two separate, yet sometimes overlapping, categories: on the one hand, groups and campaigns develop internal communication tools and, on the other hand, they design ways to communicate with the wider public, the media, relevant political institutions and other groups, focusing on other issues. As many scholars examining internal communication among activist networks have observed, mailing lists are the preferred communication tool for many activist groups and campaigns (Kavada, 2007).

These lists are designed in different ways depending on their purpose: most groups and campaigns have closed, issue-related mailing lists where partners working together on a particular topic will communicate in order to plan meetings, agree on practical steps and keep each other informed of progress.
and problems that arise. This type of communication, practical and internal, often goes hand in hand with online and offline communication tools, both traditional and new, such as phone calls and Skype meetings. Most groups will also have at least one ‘open’ mailing list, designed to exchange and share information related to policy developments in the field of immigration and asylum, migrants’ experiences and so on, as well as announcements about events, protests, demonstrations and other mobilisations organised in different countries. These open lists occupy a borderline position between internal and external communication: they are only accessible to those subscribed to them but subscription is usually opened to anyone and many groups will try to encourage people to sign up.

For example, since 2003, Migreurop has run a public mailing list intended for the ‘circulation of information and debates about the European externalization policies and detention centres for migrants’ (Laura, 2012). The list currently has 982 subscribers, which includes numerous groups. Subscription is open to all those who are interested in receiving and sending relevant information. The average number of emails circulated is just over 100 per month. However, Migreurop is organised through a number of working groups devoted to organising the network’s activities related to specific topics. All of these working groups have their own private mailing lists. People on the private mailing lists will tend to be on the general list as well.

Similarly, all No Border groups in Europe have set up and subscribed to local and national mailing lists where they exchange information relevant to their particular contexts, but there also exists a Europe-wide list, the ‘Action 2’ list, where information and announcements are exchanged between various European groups and activists. On 17 March 2013, the Action 2 list had 782 subscribers (again, many of these will be one person from a group who then filters and relays relevant emails to his or her own national and/or local lists). Circulation on the Action 2 list over the last six months of 2012 varied between 40 and 79 emails per month, with an average of 57 emails. It was created in

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69 Figure checked on 19 March 2013.
70 These are my own calculations based on list circulation during six months (July to December 2012).
71 For example, Migreurop has a group working on detention, another on externalisation, as well as several working groups working on the different aspects of its campaigns.
72 Personal study of circulation on the list.
October 2004 in order to coordinate a European day of action for migrants, which had been agreed on at the ESF in London that year. This followed the success of the first European day of action for migrants, which had been called for in the previous year at the Paris ESF. The first day of action, against detention centres and for the legalisation of all undocumented migrants, took place on 31 January 2004 and saw demonstrations in 40 cities across Europe (see archive of list emails: MeltingPot, no date). According to its organisers, it was an important step in the development of the networking process necessary for the Europeanisation of migration struggles.

The callout for the second day of action aimed to build on this success in order to further develop communication structures transnationally. It was directed at ‘all groups, networks and social movements, not only the ones working on migration-related issues’ (MeltingPot, no date). At the time, groups from Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the UK, Greece, Portugal, Belgium and Slovenia joined the Action 2 mailing list in order to communicate with each other about the demonstrations and actions they were planning in their local and national contexts. The Action 2 list remained active after the second European day of action and is used to this day by many migration struggle activists and groups to keep each other informed of developments in various European countries, as well as to circulate callouts for and reports about protests and actions.

It is worth noting that these large public lists (Migreurop’s and Action 2) are rarely used to discuss the concrete organisation of actions or to agree on practical steps, both because their public nature limits confidentiality and because they have proven unsuitable for this purpose (Sean and Alex, 2012; Laura, 2012; Martina, 2014). However, they can be used to call for the creation of a separate private list or for the organisation of an offline meeting, where particular actions and mobilisations can be discussed and decided.

These mailing lists play in key role not only in providing transnational communication structures but also in ‘Europeanising’ an issue. As a participant from Fasti put it:

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73 In particular, activists mentioned that mailing list were not suitable for democratic decision-making, where the inclusion of all could not be guaranteed.
If we face a problem and we need other activists and organisations to know about it quickly, in order for example to elicit a quick response, well if we send an email to the list, the local problem becomes immediately European (Sonia, 2012).

In this sense, European-wide mailing lists allow particular events and their impact to be highlighted and shared with broader activist networks. This communication process among activists and groups contributes to the construction of a more sophisticated analysis and a common discourse, based on and seeking to include the wide range of experiences and information related to migration circulated on the lists. It is often the case that emails posted on a list are replied to with complementary information, such as examples of similar occurrences or analytical additions.

Migreurop’s mailing list is a particularly good example of this deliberative potential. It is used by subscribers in an interactive fashion, whereby emails get replied to, and trigger discussions and debates among list users. An examination of six months of correspondence on the list has shown that an average of 16 of every 100 original emails prompted a reply, with the ensuing conversation threads eliciting an average of between four and five responses. These replies are important in the sense that they contribute to the development of an online debate, which helps in the formation of a broader analysis or discourse, in a comparable fashion to an offline discussion. It is worth noting here that these forms of transnational communication tools were first developed and used by the anti-capitalist movement and later appropriated at various levels and in various ways by other types of groups and networks. They are another example of the influence of the ‘global movement’ on activists engaged in various struggles in Europe and the West more generally.

An important related issue is that of the language(s) used in the process of sharing ideas and experiences transnationally. In the case of Migreurop, the mailing list has two recommended working languages, English and French, but also strongly encourages participants to translate their messages to other languages, particularly Italian and Spanish. As a network, Migreurop requires a vast amount of translation work in order to make communication and equal

74 My own study of Migreurop’s mailing list.
participation possible for all members. The network has groups of volunteers who are regularly called upon to provide translation into as many European languages as possible. Similarly, in the early days of the Action 2 list, a proposal was made to have a team of volunteer translators who would provide translation of important emails and callouts into different languages, both European and those most common among migrant communities, such as Arabic, Farsi, Urdu and so on. Though the aim of this was to be as accessible as possible, translation work has proven, according to some of the list's subscribers, to be a time- and effort-consuming activity. It is now generally preferred that people generating content provide translation to at least one other language themselves (Laura, 2012; Sean, 2012). Nonetheless, No Border retains a dedicated translation list, which is used for translating key texts such as callouts to transnational days of action, No Border camps and the like (Roy, 2012).

Groups and campaigns also engage in external communication, which requires different types of tools, platforms and activities. The more established and institutionalised groups, such as MRN and PICUM, often produce a regular newsletter to keep members and/or interested groups and individuals informed of their activities as well as of relevant political and policy developments. Like mailing lists, newsletters require subscription and do not, in this sense, attempt to proactively reach the general public. Newsletters are also not aimed at internal and interactive communication that triggers and contributes to the development of a common discourse and message. Rather, they circulate information in a single direction (from the organisation to the readers) and the organisation producing the newsletter is the only source generating content. Newsletters produced by the pro-migrant groups I interviewed focus on raising awareness about migration-related issues through an editorial process that involves selecting certain news and information and, in some cases, offers the organisation's own analysis.

PICUM first started distributing its newsletter in 2004. In 2011, the organisation decided to set up two different platforms for its public communication work. An electronic bulletin is now circulated on a fortnightly basis in English and a newsletter is produced every three months in six languages (French, German,
Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and Italian) as a summary of the previous six English bulletins (Daniela, 2012). The bulletin focuses on significant developments concerning migrants’ rights at various policy levels (national, EU but also UN). It also has a section on events, publications and PICUM’s member organisations’ activities. This format was agreed on as PICUM decided to have a more regular bulletin but could not afford fortnightly translation (Daniela, 2012).

Similarly, MRN sends out a weekly newsletter to over 5,000 email subscribers. It focuses on policy developments in the UK and the EU. It also contains MRN’s own analysis of current topics and links to MRN’s blogs about pertinent issues. This newsletter was quoted as a reliable source of information on the sector by other individuals working in similar organisations in Europe (Daniela, 2012; Pietro, 2012). It is worth noting that, in 2010, MRN decided to hire a communication officer in charge of, among other tasks, building the subscribers list to the newsletter and updating the website and blogs of the organisation in innovative and engaging ways. During an interview, MRN’s then communication officer said the number of MRN’s followers had increased tenfold since a rigorous and systematic communication strategy had been implemented (Jack, 2012).

External communication is also organised through events and publications. These are opportunities for pro-migrant groups, campaigns and organisations to spread their message and discourse to a wider public, which might not be familiar with the issues they are working on. This type of external communication often requires a thorough ‘re-framing’ process so as to make the analyses more accessible and engaging for people who are less familiar with the arguments put forward by the organisations. The different ways in which activists and groups frame their discourse depending on their audience is well-exemplified in the case of Migreurop’s ‘Map of the camps’. The map, of which five editions have been published so far (Migreurop, 2012b), visually represents the various centres and sites of immigration detention in Europe and at its borders. While Migreurop also produces written literature on the issue of immigration detention, the addition of a map has been a key tool to translate

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75 Figure from 2012.

Organising public events is also a common tactic used by groups and organisations to communicate their message to people who would not usually be on their mailing lists or read their newsletters. Events follow a wide range of formats, from academic-type seminars and panel discussions, workshops and stalls at festivals and conferences, to cultural events such as concerts, exhibitions and film screenings. When participating in events, organisations and groups tend to follow two broad strategies: on the one hand, they might participate in an event which is not directly related to migration with the aim of bringing the issue to the attention of a new audience. This can be seen as public communication work, through a process of mainstreaming migration-related issues into various other circles. In this respect, it is interesting to note that, for a few years, autonomous activists who then became part of networks such as No Border and Migreurop, were meeting at the fringe of other transnational events, such as the ESF. This allowed them to meet without necessarily having the resources to organise transnational gatherings themselves. It was also a way to make sure migration as a theme was represented at these events. In a similar vein, groups and organisations participate in trade-union conferences (NOII, Fasti, Gisti) and pan-European conferences (Migreurop, European Alternatives, PICUM).

On the other hand, groups and organisations also organise their own events, with a stronger and more direct focus on the issues they are concerned with. Most groups use a variety of event formats, depending on the target audience. Creative and cultural events are common and valued because of their ability to attract a public that might not attend more traditional, academic-type conferences (Laura, 2012; Emily, 2014; Sandro, 2012). Film screenings, photo exhibitions, performance arts and theatre plays are all also commonly organised...
or sponsored by pro-migrant groups. The When You Don’t Exist campaign, for example, was supported by several artists in order to ‘put [their] creativity at the service of the message of the campaign’ (Clara, 2012). In the summer of 2012, in Lampedusa, actor Mohammed Ba, a Senegalese migrant residing in Italy, performed a play about his migratory experience that was attended by activists, tourists and the island’s local inhabitants. The play conveyed a powerful message about the difficulties facing migrants trying to come to Europe, both during their journey and as they try to settle in European societies. However, its ludic and entertaining tone made it accessible to a wide-ranging audience that was not necessarily concerned with (or in fact sympathetic to) migration issues.

Many of the organisations and groups I spoke to appreciated the way in which these type of events could carve a space for the articulation and spreading of ‘human’ and personal stories. They contributed to developing alternative ways to relate to people undertaking migratory journeys. This recalls earlier observations (Chapter II) about the systematic excision of migrants’ voices and experiences from official history writing. Cultural, artistic and literally activities provide the opportunity for these stories to be told and heard. They are in this sense important elements of a symbolic but crucial struggle against exclusionary representations in Europe. However, some of the participants also said these events were often not enough in themselves to trigger a political and activist commitment (David, 2012; Sean, 2012; Antonio, 2012).

Building and expanding networks

I have distinguished between communication and network-building activities in the sense that network-building, both internal (consolidation) and external (expansion), has the clear intention of recruiting and retaining members. ‘Keeping a network alive’, Laura told me (2012), ‘is not a small task; it is a systematic and organised job. This job requires structures and tools, which allow equal participation of all and solidify the links between our various members’. The wide availability of online tools, which allow the active involvement of network members or fellow activists, is of course crucial in this regard. Laura (2012) added:
We are not a political party, we are an associative network, and what that means is that we do not have a centralised decision-making power and then members implementing them. Our network is a horizontal platform, which means we need tools to allow horizontality in our everyday work. And if you want a network to be transnational, you must develop transnational horizontal networking tools. (…) This is why we have our working groups, and we internationalise the daily life of the network, we have more and more Skype meetings so that our colleagues in other countries can participate as much as people here in France or nearby. And we also do a big work of translation.

Migreurop also organises yearly rencontres internationales ('international meetings') for its members. The first such meeting took place in Seville, Spain, in 2005. Given the network's wide geographical spread, it has since tried to hold these meetings in various countries inside and outside Europe and to cover the travel costs of representatives from its member organisations. There have been rencontres in Rabat, Morocco (2006), Paris, France (2009), Istanbul, Turkey (2010) and Cecina, Italy (2011). The rencontres are, above all, an opportunity for network members to meet each other in person and, therefore, play a vital part in the strengthening of the network. As the network's coordinator argued, 'meeting in person adds something qualitatively different: it does not mean we cannot work with people we have only met virtually, but something gets strengthened when there is face-to-face contact' (Laura, 2012). A number of partners and like-minded organisations are also invited, which has been crucial to the expansion of the network.

Some participants commented on the limitations of this kind of events. They generally take place on a yearly basis at most and, even where conscious efforts are made towards inclusion, they tend to exclude those who cannot obtain visas or whose individual situation prevents them from travelling (having children and so on). Though they can be successful at reinforcing links between groups, especially when organised in a grassroots fashion and in the case of densely-weaved networks such as Migreurop, but they can sometimes also feel like mere formalities, with few concrete outcomes. Referring to large meetings organised with the support of the European Commission, a participant commented that:

some of these things [European meetings] are definitely over-estimated. (…) We still go, but I find very little value in that sort of, err… (…) It is sort
of an external initiative: a “we need to share experiences, and we need to talk” (…). But it is always the same people, the Brussels people and a few more who are reps of big NGOs in member countries... Or maybe sometimes you meet groups that are so different to you that you don’t really see the usefulness of meeting them... On the other hand, some of the less formal ways of collaboration have a lot more added value to them... the problem with that is that it is very difficult to sustain them because you kind of, I mean, you obviously need funding for pretty much everything you do (Jack, 2012)

This quote touches on three important issues related to large transnational events: the risk that only a small cosmopolitan elite will be represented; the way in which the variation in organisational models across the groups can become an obstacle to collaboration; and the lack of autonomous resources available to most transnational networks and campaigns (della Porta, 2009, p. 34).

The limitations that these type of events may entail can be contrasted with the efficiency of what we can call encounters in action. Building and strengthening networks can come as a positive by-product of initiatives or activities organised with other primary purposes, such as protesting. The forging of links does not only take place on the day and at the site of the action itself, but also throughout the preparation process and in the aftermath of the event. Organising a coordinated day of action, for instance, might not lead to a physical encounter between the various groups planning an event in their national settings, yet it encourages people to be in contact with one another and to collaborate, hence producing and strengthening links and networks. Describing an ESF, Nicole Doerr (2006) notes that:

Often, representatives of local groups or activists from different countries came together at the transnational level with more open-mindedness and curiosity about each other’s histories than at the national level, where cleavages within and between social movements have consolidated along traditional fractures and personal enmities.

This is an interesting remark that gives an indication of the importance of groups’ participation in transnational events for the consolidation of networks. Almost all the participants in my research said they had partaken in at least one large transnational event, such as the World Social Forum, European Social Forum or a European Day of Action. In the section below, I focus on a number of events and actions that have gained prominence in the migration struggles
field in Europe and analyse their ability to disrupt dominant discourses and practices. While I primarily discuss how tactics are used and shared by activists with the intended purpose of protesting and disrupting, it is also important to keep in mind their networking potential.

**Transnationalising protest**

Certain forms of Europe-wide protest have by now become strongly associated with the migration solidarity field. An important example of this is the No Border camp. No Border camps deserve particular attention as a form of politics and activism which redefines the scope of protest action in the field of migration in Europe, whilst at the same time following a long tradition of protest tactics, that of the protest camp. No Border camps are also of interest, I would argue, because they have influenced the practices of other pro-migrant groups by bringing direct action to the migration struggle field. They also contribute to expanding the boundaries of acceptable discourse when it comes to the issues of migration, sovereignty and citizenship. Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the No Border camps, it is useful to consider the specificity of No Border as a network.

It would be difficult to qualify No Border as a ‘movement’, at least in the traditional sense, due to its largely decentralised, diffuse and transnational nature. Many No Border activists consider ‘No Border’ as a label that can be claimed by anyone subscribing to such politics, which tacitly implies a strong anarchist affiliation (Sean, 2012; Sean and Alex, 2012). This anarchist tradition is better understood in terms of the tactics, methods and practices used by the network, rather than as a strictly defined ideological position (Alex, 2013). No Border activists believe in horizontal, non-hierarchical structures of organising and reject the binary identities of citizen/non-citizen, legal/illegal (Sean and Alex, 2012). The network is a social and political site, that does not operate through a permanent membership model, but rather through a common thread of political beliefs and principles that links together a number of radical migrant solidarity groups and campaigns.

Pausing to reflect on the camp as a contentious political practice in the context of my research is particularly relevant, not least because of the symbolism
associated with camps in the field of migration. As mentioned, recent literature on migration controls and securitisation has focused on the camp as a ‘zone of exception’ paradigmatic of sovereign power (Agamben, 1998). The image of a pro-migrant camp is in this sense highly powerful. On the other hand, the camp as a tactic of protest and visibility (exemplified by peace camps but also, for instance, in campsites set up by homeless people in urban centres) also has a long history that has largely escaped scholarly examination. The camp must thus be examined as a political act establishing a site of solidarity that asserts the right to presence and belonging (hooks, 1990) and proposes a space for the existence of new political subjectivities (Walters, 2006).

No Border camps can be analysed within the tradition of camps as a political act: they are set up at particular geographical locations of symbolic relevance for the European border regime and emphasise the relationship between situational experiences and larger dynamics at work in Europe. They also aim to re-politicise the sanitised everydayness of repressive immigration and border controls by exposing their devastating consequences on people’s lives. No Border camps have taken place at physical borders, at immigration detention centres, near airports associated with forcible deportation and, as was the case with the Strasbourg and Brussels camps, at emblematic sites of EU power and decision-making. These camps can be looked at through Hakim Bey’s notion of ‘temporary autonomous zones’ (Walters, 2006) in the sense that they aim to create spaces that elude formal structures of control for a specific amount of time.

Typically, a No Border camp is a horizontal space of experience-sharing and political debate, where various workshops and discussions, as well as a number of planned and spontaneous direct actions and protests aimed at the ‘disruption of the running of the border regime’, are held (Alex, 2013). In addition to their protesting dimension, No Border camps are key moments in the consolidation of the network, with activists from the various groups operating under the label in different countries travelling to the camp. Whilst local and national groups have regular meetings, the camps are the most significant occurrence of network-wide (European) meetings, bringing people from different countries face-to-face to conjointly develop the analysis and tactics of the network as a
whole. They are also moments when the network expands by engaging with new activists, migrants and local communities and asserting a publicly visible presence through protests and actions in the cities and countries where they take place. The network has also adopted innovative tactics and technological tools to expand beyond the limitations imposed by geographical locations, as described by No Border activist Kuemmer:

[No Border] actions were expanded and the ideas spread. This resulted last summer in a border camp chain <noborder.org/camps/01>, which started in Tarifa in Southern Spain (Spain-Africa) and continued through Krykni (Poland-Ukraine), Lendava (Slovenia) and the internal border at the Frankfurt airport (Germany) (...). Permanently crossing borders, the noborderTOUR <no-racism.net/nobordertour> connected border camps with other sites of resistance, including Genoa and Salzburg, during a six-week tour. Connections were also made in virtual space: the "borderstream" <noborder.org/stream> on July 7 visualized three border camps that took place simultaneously as overlapping interventions, making pictures and moods from other actions during the year accessible at the same time. Strasbourg 2002 is now the first event organized by the entire noborder network as a joint action with anti-racist social movements, groups and individuals from 15 different countries (Kuemmer, 2002).

Organising transnational events, campaigns and days of action is a crucial objective for all the participant networks and groups in at least two ways: to stage various forms of public protest, and to forge and consolidate transnational links and alliances. Laura (2012) explains that inter-associative campaigns have become a key objective of Migreurop, which used to focus primarily on internal networking work, but has now realised the ‘complementarity there exists between strengthening the network inside, and expanding it outside’. The case of B4P is illustrative in this respect: the campaign was largely supported by Migreurop and its member organisations, but a number of other associations, groups and individual activists also supported it in a variety of ways. According to a participant in B4P:

B4P brought us closer to other activists and groups. We might have known them through emails but now we feel we have comrades. And new projects have come out of the campaign, like the Watch the Med idea. This campaign was just the start of something bigger (Ahmad, 2012).
An interesting effect of the transnationalisation of pro-migrant protests in Europe has been the sharing and mixing of tactics and strategies between and across groups and networks. For instance, B4P’s idea of a flotilla stopping over at various symbolic points of the EU border regime around the Mediterranean Sea, and staging symbolic actions and protests to denounce the effect of EU policies on people’s lives, inspired another campaign. The following year, in the summer of 2013, a group of activists planned a new flotilla project called Voices from the Borders between the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK. One of Voices from the Borders’ main members, a Dutch activist based in Amsterdam, was involved in B4P the previous summer and decided to initiate a similar campaign in his own context and with another set of partners. Administrative issues related to the boat have however postponed this campaign. This is nonetheless an interesting illustration of the ways in which tactics used by pro-migrant groups and campaigns travel beyond their original site and are re-appropriated and re-used in different spaces by other activists. This aspect is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Another example concerns the forms of actions that pro-migrant groups and activists stage. Organising ‘conventional’ symbolic actions (including demonstrations, rallies, sit-ins, and so on) has been a common. Pro-migrant groups have also proved creative in this respect: for instance, at the launch of the Frontexit campaign in Brussels, in March 2013, fake migrant raids were orchestrated. Migreurop activists staged street arrests in public spaces in order to make this practice visible to passers-by. However, some groups and networks, such as the No Border and Stop Deportation networks, have focused on more unconventional, direct (rather than symbolic) actions with the aim of actually interrupting immigration control practices (Sean, 2012; Shock, 2013). These include actions intended to disrupt, delay or stop immigration raids and forcible deportations, where activists attempt to physically block the arrest or removal of migrants.

Direct action does not primarily aim to pressure national and European authorities into stopping or changing their policies. Rather, it tries to interrupt the process through direct intervention, using various types of traditional and innovative protests, occupations and blockades. Such actions also often target
other, non-state actors, such as the security companies, travel agents and airlines complicit in forcible deportations. Tactics include the occupation of the company’s offices or calling for the boycotts of particular businesses.

This is another illustration of the way in which migration struggles in Europe have adopted some of the tactics emerging from the anti-capitalist or anti-globalisation movement. The relation between migration-related struggles and the anti-globalisation movement has not been an obvious development. In fact, early instances of transnational anti-globalisation political interventions largely left migration issues aside, as illustrated for example by the absence of specifically migration-focussed workshops in the earlier instances of the World Social Forum. This was mostly due to the fact that the ‘globalisation’ of immigration controls was not as obvious as that of trade and finance and is still characterised by a complex intertwining of national and supranational practices. Moreover, issues of privatisation or corporate governance seemed less significant in the field of immigration and asylum.

However, both analytically and practically, this gap has been significantly bridged. As analyses of the Europeanisation of immigration and asylum policies were developed by activists, a number of common features emerged. The EU border regime is a new type of power and decision-making structure, characterised by its elusiveness, lack of transparency and, as I commented on in Chapter I, increasing authoritarianism. Immigration controls have also been a crucial mechanism of the regulation of the labour market in neoliberal Europe. In addition, the securitisation and privatisation of migration have meant that large security and technology corporations have had a growing interest in the field. Consequently, migration has been firmly inscribed on the WSF’s agenda since at least its fifth gathering in 2005. In Europe, Sandro Mezzadra notes that the 2001 Genoa protests in Italy already saw the organisation of a large migrant rally, which he identifies as the first encounter between migrant organisations and the ‘global movement’:

... the demonstration on 19 July 2001, which opened the protests against the G8 meeting in Genoa with the slogan ‘Freedom of movement - freedom without boundaries’, has put the issues of migrants before the
The European Social Forum (ESF), the regional expression of the so-called Global Justice Movement, has thus been strongly influenced by anti-racist and pro-migrant themes and, reciprocally, anti-capitalist events and social forums have been important moments in the development of pro-migrant groups and networks working transnationally in Europe. One of the most important consequences of the link between pro-migrant and alter-globalist struggles, is that it has encouraged migration solidarity activists to inscribe their analysis within a larger reflection on the roles of borders globally, and to question their relationship with other global dynamics of domination and exploitation. I come back to this aspect of pro-migrant activism in the next chapter. Another effect has been the use by pro-migrant groups and networks in Europe of tools and tactics developed by anti-globalisation activists.

In this sense, the transnationalisation of migration struggles has led to the radicalisation of the ‘repertoires of contention’ used by pro-migrant activists and groups. For example, tactics originally used mostly by No Border-type groups, such as denunciating and seeking to cause ‘reputational damage’ to companies and businesses involved in the border regime and the ‘deportation machine’, are now commonly used by other, more traditional pro-migrant groups and campaigns.

It is also important to note two main factors that have encouraged cooperation and collaboration between pro-migrant groups and campaigns across the EU. First, as mentioned before, the convergence of analytical frameworks and real-life experiences due to, on the one hand, the Europeanisation of migration policies and, on the other, the influence of the anti-globalisation movement. These two developments, argues Chantale (2012) from Gisti, have led to a common language, making collaboration between groups and activists from different countries smoother:

Our first attempts (…) at working with European partners, it seems to me, were a lot more difficult... we felt, us French militants – and I am not saying this in full confidence but I think it was our impression – that we were very ahead of our partners in other countries. And I think that was
true, quite simply because we had a long experience of migration policies when many countries did not. Look at Spain and Italy for example (…). Another aspect, in countries with a longer immigration history, such as the UK for example, well it was extremely difficult to find a common language on how to campaign, for many reasons I haven’t all analysed. But I really think there was a shift, in the 2000s, in the relationships we were able to establish with our European partners. I think one aspect is that indeed migration policies have Europeanised and that similar issues started to emerge, when before we didn’t speak the same language because activists didn’t have the same references, the same type of governments, the same type of administrative practices (…) And there was also, as I mentioned with the European Social Forum and the World Social Forums, the influence of the social movements, that started developing in all domains, not only migration but a lot of domains – housing, women struggles… Well, many things: that’s what the social movement is… It started mixing people, mixing activists, making them meet, speak to each other… (…) And this created a sort of culture that enabled the emergence of a common openness, of common values, etc. And it really changed something because, I remember 15 years ago, in Spain, the only people who would work with migrants, well they were Christians and churches…

The second factor is that the European Union did provide some structures that facilitated meetings and communication between activists and groups in different European countries. For example, the support an MEP offered to Migreurop was an important material element in the development of the network, as members were able to meet in Brussels and benefited from this MEP’s access to information and contacts within the European institutions. In addition, communication and transportation structures and networks that have become available in parts of the globe intensely affected by globalisation, and that were further developed with the formation of the EU, have facilitated travel, conversations and encounters across European countries. Yet using opportunities emerging from EU structures themselves was not a straightforward choice for all participants, as I come back to later.

Choices of tactics and strategies are strongly linked to the political traditions as well as to the organisational structures and statuses of the groups and campaigns concerned: anarchist and radical-left groups were more inclined to use public protests, demonstrations and direct action, whereas more ‘institutionalised’, mainstream organisations favoured lobbying and awareness-raising. However, what came out strongly in the course of my fieldwork, was the constitution of an increasingly common repertoire of tactics and strategies,
which were used selectively in different contexts and for different purposes. Most groups and networks were using multiple tactics. Moreover, as seen, whilst groups and campaigns have increased their transnational activism and actions, these are combined and articulated in relation to other strategies (local and national). In fact, for many groups and networks, successfully linking local experiences of contentious politics and transnational dynamics was an important objective.

**Where? Online and Offline Transnationalisation**

The issue of the role of the Internet and online activities has been an important feature of the scholarly debate about contemporary activism and social movements. The Internet has often been described as an intrinsically positive tool leading to greater participation and democracy in the way movements interact and make decisions. The coined notions of e-democracy, e-participation, e-citizens and so on, are telling examples of the expectations that electronic and technological progress will bring about radical change and increase the opportunities of participation in the political process for individuals and citizens (Clift, 2003; Rose, 2005). This debate touches on important questions regarding the meaning and modalities of democracy: the fact that the Internet is a site where people can both be consumers and producers of information raises interesting issues regarding ideas of participative democracy and horizontal organisation, notions that many of the groups and campaigns I studied subscribe to.

However, as more critical scholars have argued, the online availability of information and the possibility for individuals to generate their own content is not enough in itself to tackle inequalities existing ‘offline’, particularly in terms of individual and collective resources (Margolis and Resnick, 2000). In terms of its ability to enable or generate more deliberation, as noted in the previous section, online exchanges do encourage debates among geographically disconnected activists and allow for the establishing and popularising of an alternative public sphere and alternative discourses. As Miriyam Aouragh (2012) puts it:
There is no doubt that the internet is an important medium since it offers ways to disseminate counter-hegemonic content and at times even allows new forms of political mobilization. By hook or by crook, activists must experiment with the internet to be effective (p. 518)

This is not to say that inclusiveness and equality are automatically enhanced on the Internet, nor that ideological and social barriers are more easily overcome online. But it does seem that for people already engaged in particular networks, using the Internet brings about more intense social relations (della Porta and Mosca, 2005). It is important to stress that, while the Internet influences the behaviour of organisations and individuals, the way in it is used is also strongly determined by habits and deep-rooted organisational cultures. In this respect, it is illustrative to look at some of the studies on the way in which political institutions use the Internet. For instance, in the Southern European context, Cunha et al. (2003, p. 88) note that political parties’ websites are characterised by their low interactivity and the quasi-absence of visitor-initiated and -controlled content, such as online discussions with political leaders or real-time debates. This has been confirmed by similar studies in other European countries (e.g. Gibson et al., 2003). In contrast, social movement activists and organisations have been found to be more experimental and interactive in their use of the Internet and online tools (della Porta and Mosca, 2009, p. 195). The transnational possibilities opened up by online communication are also more readily used among social movement groups than political parties and conventional political organisations (Bennett, 2003; Kavada, 2007).

During my fieldwork, I approached the issue of the use of the Internet by activists and organisations and asked specific questions about the importance of online resources in respect to the process of Europeanisation of pro-migrant struggles. I was interested in examining the extent to which activists were using online tools to develop crossborder links and coordinate transnational activities and practices. This was also an indicator of how integrated these networks were.

All the groups and campaigns reported intensively using the Internet and various online tools and stated that it was an essential resource for any form of communication across borders. Furthermore, for looser activist networks, the
Internet and online communication were also seen as a form of management tool, facilitating decision-making and organising within decentralised and looser organisational structures (Sean, 2012; Pat, 2012). Scholars have long praised these assets of the Internet, with Jackie Smith (1997) comparing its role for social movements in the Information Age to that of the factory for workers’ movements in the industrial age, in the sense that both provide an organisational infrastructure for their respective movements. While this argument ignores several aspects of workers’ organisation as well as the complex dynamics between online and offline interactions, which I will examine later in this section, it does illustrate the fact that the Internet is an absolutely key tool for transnational activism.

It also became clear during my interviews that the Internet meant different things for different groups. All the organisations, networks and campaigns that participated in my research have a website where information about them, their work and events is made available to the public. However, there is also a wide range of other online tools that are employed differently by different groups. As seen before, mailing lists, newsletters, blogs and social networking sites are all frequently used by these groups and campaigns, but they each serve different purposes and address different audiences. Besides websites, seven of the groups and campaigns had a newsletter to which people could subscribe; ten used social networks such as Twitter and Facebook; and five had open and public mailing lists for information and announcements. I have studied the level of interactivity and inclusion of these various online tools by examining whether the websites allow people to leave comments and participate in debates, as well as whether they offer translated material. Three websites allowed visitors to leave comments or post their own content and six offered information in at least two different languages. Mailing lists, as seen, are a highly interactive communication tool since people can easily respond to emails and start new discussions about any particular issue.

Having reviewed the different tools used by pro-migrant groups and activists in the EU, I would now like to examine three important functions of their Internet usage: mobilising, protesting and deliberating. A number of participants argued that the Internet offered new opportunities to mobilise people around the issue
of migration and migrants’ rights. The Internet allows the quick and efficient spreading of information related to the negative impact of immigration controls on people’s lives and can help bring to public attention phenomena that public authorities may be deliberatively trying to conceal, such as migrants’ living conditions in detention centres or events taking place in remote border sites. This allows the production and dissemination of alternative knowledge and discourses across borders.

Many participants spontaneously mentioned the Internet as a crucial space for encountering new ideas and experiences, as well as for the distribution of power among group and network members. Systems of open management and open publishing, for instance, are seen as key tools for the democratic mobilisation of all participants. Furthermore, Rory O’Brien (1999) argues that the Internet is not just used as an afterthought in order to publicise campaigns that have been designed independently. Rather, he suggests, ‘protests are increasingly conceived, planned, implemented and evaluated with the help of the Internet’ (p. 20). Increasingly, activists design protest tactics specifically for an online use, e-petitions being a case in point. E-petitions to stop forcible deportation orders have become a common tactic used by most anti-deportation groups and campaigns. Another interesting example is European Alternatives’ launching of an online Citizen Initiative, whereby if one million or more European citizens electronically sign in favour of a law, they can present a legislative proposal directly to the European Commission (Pietro, 2012). More radically, some activists have been using Denial of Service attacks, which typically entail sending repetitive emails to a website or email address until it crashes. For instance, No Border activists decided to take such actions against Frontex when the agency launched a photo competition about borders (Sean, 2012).

As previously mentioned, the Internet is also used as a space for deliberation and reflexivity, where decisions are discussed, debates take place and reflections are shared, all of which contribute to the creation of new collective identities and discourses. In this sense, it is a site of constitution and negotiation of collective, transnational identities. However, several scholars

76 Denial of Service: an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users.
(e.g. Breindl, 2010) have argued that the Internet mainly reinforces existing identities, rather than encouraging the emergence of completely new ones. Indeed, looking at the complex intersection and intertwining of online practices and offline realities brings a more nuanced and informative portrayal of the importance and limits of Internet-based space in the definition and negotiation of activists’ and groups’ identities.

The use of the Internet cannot be examined in isolation from other forms of communication and interaction. Face-to-face encounters remain crucial in the consolidation of networks and in the construction of virtual relationships. For many participants, online and offline spaces were not considered as alternatives to one another, but rather as complementary sites where further interactions can take place and be multiplied between geographically dispersed activists and groups. Moreover, concerns about the fact that the Internet could also exclude those who have less or no access to it were raised during several interviews. Thus, a critical analysis of the efficiency of online tactics in relation to offline actions is necessary, and many participants mentioned a number of issues in this regard. The most common criticism concerned the fact that online activities can give people a false sense of participation or be used as an excuse for less offline interventions. A good example of this dynamic was provided by activists from Stop Deportation, who claimed that whilst a selective use of e-petitions to oppose certain deportations could sometimes be an effective tactic, the systematic recourse to them had almost ‘killed the anti-deportation movement by absolving people of taking up real actions’ (Sean and Alex, 2012).

It is also interesting to note that, at first sight, less resource-rich and more informal networks often seemed more keen on experimenting with online tools and developing innovative Internet resources, whereas more established groups had a tendency to use it in a more conventional and less participative way. No Border activists, for example, often seek collaboration with cyber-activists, such as hackers, and engage with grassroots alternative news sites to develop their own activist channels of information and distribution, outside the realm of mainstream corporate media. However, this observation should be stated with caution and requires more research. A good counter-example is MRN, which puts a strong emphasis on creating an accessible, interactive and
inclusive website and on adopting creative online tools to engage its followers more directly.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind the strong influence of anti-capitalist activists in the development of online communication and protest tools, which also acts as a reminder that online transnational tools do not have anything specifically pan-European about them. Many of these tools were developed to coordinate transnational actions in the context of the alter-globalist movement. They have been adopted by activists and associations for the purpose of transnationalising their work and linking up, in this specific instance, with other European partners. Whilst emerging from an offline process of Europeanisation that is embedded in material encounters, practices and actions, they have also made further Europeanisation of migration struggles possible.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the emergence of new structures and practices among individuals and organisations engaged in supporting migrants and opposing immigration control in several EU member states. The complex nature of the European project has shaped a multi-layered context where multiple borders and controls – pertaining to the local, national, supranational and global levels – intertwine.

My hypothesis was that, as immigration and border policies were harmonised across EU member states, a pan-European network of activists in solidarity with migrants was emerging. The data collected during my fieldwork, through participant observation, interviews, reading of documents produced by activists, as well as a study of online interaction between pro-migrant groups across Europe, confirmed this hypothesis. I identified a clear process of transnationalisation of migration solidarity struggles, characterised by intensified cooperation and communication across borders, the development of new crossborder activist tools and tactics, increasingly complex transnational networks and the formulation of a mutually comprehensible and growingly converging analysis of the functioning and impact of the EU border regime.
In the next chapter I explore the discourses put forward by pro-migrant activists and organisations in the EU. I examine whether a counter-discourse on Europe is being produced by the participants. What visions of Europe are they fighting for? Do they formulate a narrative on European belonging that challenges the exclusionary notion of Europeanity in which the dominant, official EU discourse is rooted?
Chapter VI

Narrating Europe?

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the emergence of new crossborder practices and networks challenging the EU border regime’s mechanisms of exclusion. In this chapter, I want to focus on discourses and identities formulated by pro-migrant activists. The key question I examine here is the extent to which these transnational practices of resistance have been accompanied by identity discourses that challenge the dominant notions of European identity and ‘Europeanity’. This entails examining how activists participating in my research frame their struggles and what discursive identities are being formulated.

When I started my fieldwork, my key issue of concern was to observe and analyse counter-visions of Europe emerging from the pro-migrant movement. However, as I explain below, I quickly realised that Europe was largely absent from the participants’ narratives, other than as a system they either completely rejected or had no hopes to reform. I started discerning other frames and discourses: some were regional frames, others drew on long traditions of internationalist solidarity, and often they combined both these elements.

Practising Europe, feeling European?

Many pro-EU scholars and politicians have argued that it is through practising Europe that its citizens would become European: Europe would become a sort of habitus in the Bourdieusian sense and people’s aspirations, expectations and perceptions would eventually be ‘Europeanised’. The underlying assumption seems to take inspiration from the process of nation-state building and the associated nationalisation of politics and political consciousness. However, the political project of the nation-state and that of Europe feature important differences. As discussed earlier, Europeanisation has been a contradictory process that has by no means superseded the nation-state and which has led
to the emergence of new authoritarian practices. The possibility for democratic participation in European-level politics is also far from obvious.

The claim that European identities would come with the practice and experience of ‘Europe’ has been adopted by the European Union itself, which has encouraged the development of programmes such as the Erasmus student exchange schemes or the town twinning projects, in the hope that crossborder interactions between citizens of EU member states would form the basis from which familiarity, trust and a collective European identity would emerge and translate into support for European integration. The shallow nature of these efforts has been likened, as mentioned in Chapter II, to a ‘balloons and flags’ strategy (Waever and Kelstrup, 1993, p. 67).

In spite of increased transnational interactions and programmes in the European Union, popular support for the European political project and European integration has reached an all-time low in recent years, as illustrated by the results of the 2013 Eurobarometer or the 2014 European elections. Little critical scholarly attention has been paid to this apparent paradox, and mainstream commentators have tended to reiterate the idea that feeling European would come with time. Recently, a number of scholars have nonetheless attempted to unpack this phenomenon (Kuhn, 2013; as well as various academics involved in the EUROCROSS project, see EUROCROSS, no date).

One of the arguments put forward proposes that the discrepancy between increasing transnationalisation of European societies and the lack of European identification is due to the fact that only a small European elite has benefitted from the growing crossborder opportunities offered by the Union. In contrast, they argue, the majority of ordinary people do not interact across borders, and the transnationalisation of their environment takes on a threatening dimension. In this vein, Kuhn finds that ‘people who don’t interact across borders but live in highly transnationalised societies, such as Austria or the Netherlands, are even more sceptical towards European integration than people with similar lifestyles in less transnational societies, such as Malta or Slovenia’ (2013). Though these accounts uncover some of the issues relative to the Europeanisation process,
the underlying assumption remains that involvement in pan-European activities, if democratised and extended to all social groups, leads to the formation of a feeling of shared Europeanity.

I also started this research with a number of expectations. The formulation of my topic as an attempt to identify which contributions to the debate on European identity and belonging would be offered by pro-migrant crossborder movements assumed that such contributions existed. To an extent, I expected that ‘practising Europe’ would, at least in the case of my highly politically active participants, give rise to political discourses and propositions concerning Europe, the European Union and their fate. Considering the participants were all involved in pan-European campaigns and networks, I anticipated that they would engage in debates around the dominant concepts of European identity and citizenship. As I discuss below, these expectations turned out to be largely false.

**Polysemic Europe**

Before discussing excerpts from the interviews that illustrate the way in which the participants relate to Europe and the European Union, I would like to offer some preliminary comments regarding the use of these terms. These remarks held true in a large majority of my interviews.

One of the first difficulties I came across when investigating the participants’ relation to the EU and Europe as an idea and political project in general was that, while the participants were at ease with referring to particular policies of the EU and their impacts, discussing or imagining ‘Europe’ as a project was much less obvious. This was partly due to the polysemic use of the word ‘Europe’. During the course of my fieldwork, ‘Europe’ was used at times to refer to a geographical area, at times to a particular history, and at others to the specific project of the EU. These ways of understanding ‘Europe’ were also contested in themselves. Europe as a geographical area did not necessarily follow the current shape of the European Union, and the realm it was perceived to refer to changed from one interview to the other. At times, the region of
Europe’ crossed the Black Sea to embrace Georgia, Armenia and Russia, or stretched to the East to include the whole of Turkey.

Europe as a history was the subject of even greater discrepancy among participants. For a few of them the history of Europe was associated primarily with emancipation and enlightenment. For others it amounted to slavery and colonialism. In most cases, what the term ‘Europe’ had stood for across time and what it meant today remained unclear. In some cases, the dominant account of the history of the EU had made its way into the participants’ understanding of the post-war history of the region. However, this narrative on the EU as a project of peace, prosperity and tolerance proved hard to reconcile with their experience as pro-migrant activists. I come back to this point later in the chapter and reflect on how different participants understood these contradictions, in particular in relation to their political background. Most of the participants also used ‘Europe’ and ‘European Union’ interchangeably, which limited their ability to imagine other ‘Europes’, as I discuss in more detail below.

During the course of my fieldwork, this lack of clarity concerning the notion of Europe and the meaning and functioning of the European Union was evident in two main ways. First, I was struck by the dearth of references to a desire to change or improve the European political project. When I started investigating the issue of the participants’ political visions and identities, the term ‘Europe’ in any shape or form was conspicuously absent. Considering the strong links I have discussed between the participants and the European Social Forum, I thought that the idea of ‘another Europe’ would feature in the political narratives that I would collect through my interviews. Yet, with a few exceptions, the term was almost never used. Neither were reflections on how to expand or democratise European citizenship.

On a practical and methodological level, this meant that, contrary to my initial methodological preference of trying to stay as ‘low key’ an interviewer as possible and let participants develop their narratives themselves, I was often led to actively bring these themes to the table and to ask a set of direct questions related to the notions of European identity and citizenship. Moreover, I noticed a form of caution on the part of the participants whenever I enquired about the
European political project in a context other than one where its immigration policies were criticised. For example, when asking participant Emily ‘what is your position regarding the European Union?’, her spontaneous answer was: ‘It depends which aspects of Europe we are speaking about’ (2014). When, earlier in the interview, I had asked her to tell me about her organisation’s ‘European-level work’, she had not hesitated and immediately started to describe some of their activities and campaigns challenging EU policies toward migrants.

It is also interesting to observe that Emily translated ‘European Union’ into ‘Europe’ when answering my question. She also displayed a level of prudence: she asked me to specify with precision what aspects I was speaking about, as if the project as a whole could not be discussed. The divergences and tensions within the European project seemed so strong that it proved difficult for participants to ‘imagine the whole’ and to construct a coherent narrative reconciling these competing and contradictory trends. Similarly, when I asked Chantale about the debates around the European Union taking place in her organisation, she responded, ‘Well, I can’t really give a general answer to this question. Maybe around the time of the European referendum we spoke about it, but in general it would be difficult to say we do a lot’ (Chantale, 2012). Here again, the EU and Europe needed to be situated in order to be able to think about it or conceive it (this time by proposing to observe a specific moment in time, rather than examining one specific aspect).

From a methodological point of view, this also means that the extracts I recorded about European identity and citizenship were a lot more co-constructed than other parts of my interviews. As mentioned, I was often asked by participants to define Europe or to ‘specify which Europe I meant’ before they would answer. In this sense, the meanings of Europe and the EU that we discussed were produced as much by me as by the participants. This is an important point which, I argue, constitutes a research finding: the participants' difficulty in imagining Europe was both a cause and a consequence of their limited identification with the notion of Europe (as well as with associated notions such as European citizenship) and of the fact that they did not perceive it as a pertinent political site to formulate or frame their claims.
This brings me to a crucial finding that I analyse in further detail below: in spite of evidence of increasingly pan-European practices, the participants did not display strong levels of political affiliation with Europe nor a strong will to fight over the definitions and boundaries of European citizenship and belonging. As I show below, this is in large part due to the disconnection they felt with EU-level political decision-making processes, to a strong uncertainty regarding the nature and objectives of the European project and to a general feeling that there were little options for improvement within the framework of the EU in particular, and of a political project framed in European terms in general.

Another factor shaping the way that the participants related to and spoke about Europe was their political backgrounds. My group of participants, as discussed in the methodology chapter, was varied in terms of the kind of organisations and networks they were engaged with, the type of activities they carried out and the political affiliations they identified with. Before providing more detail on how these various aspects fashioned the participants’ relationship to Europe, I would like to make a preliminary observation. On the one hand, some of the activists I interviewed explained that they had decided to engage in pro-migrant struggles precisely because their political affiliations and their involvement in other contentious struggles had led them to conceptualise the instrumentality of immigration controls in relation to the exercise of sovereignty and to the economic modes of production prevailing in the European Union. They considered pro-migrant activism to be part of a larger struggle. For anarchist activists in particular, solidarity with migrants was integral to their anti-state and anti-capitalist politics. This in turn meant that they had developed a critical analysis of the European Union prior to engaging in pro-migration struggles.

On the other hand, other activists became involved in pro-migration solidarity after witnessing some of the human effects of the European border regime. Their indignation vis-à-vis the consequences of immigration control and policies led them to react and to engage in solidarity initiatives with migrants. In turn, their experiences of engaging with these issues fashioned their understanding of the European border regime and the EU.
These are not fixed trajectories and interviews often revealed a combination of personal and political reasons for undertaking solidarity work with migrants. They showed how the participants’ beliefs and values evolved with time and through their experiences. However, it is worth keeping this distinction in mind in order to develop a more nuanced analysis of how participating in pro-migrant activism has shaped the participants’ understanding of the European project.

**Contradictory Europe**

When trying to unpack further the issue of participants’ unease at talking about Europe, it became clear that, in some cases, this was the result of a certain level of confusion regarding what the European Union meant, what its aims might be and what options it might offer. This observation relates to arguments developed in earlier chapters regarding the uneven and nonlinear development of the European Union, leading to the emergence of an ‘amalgamous political formation’ (see Chapter I). It is also connected to the production of an official European history that has served to conceal some of the dynamics at work in the development of the European Community.

In turn, a number of contradictions emerged between the official discourse on Europe and the ‘lived experiences’ that the participants had gained through their activism. These paradoxes and tensions appeared to interrogate and challenge the participants’ perception of the European project. A participant from Migreurop illustrated this indeterminacy when she told me:

On the one hand, yeah, of course, I mean it was for peace, unity and all this. Was it for good for France and Germany, and France and Britain, that they weren’t fighting each other? Yeah, well yes, of course. But now what is left of this unity? Now, on the ground, we just see more and more exclusion (…) And of course we understand that this is linked to relations of power between global North and global South, and since the 1980s these are neoliberal relations, and this is not healthy… For my part, within the EU, as it is now, I don’t see how it could change… Seeing, you know, how migrants are spoken about and securitised, for example, you feel the European mind-set is very deeply rooted and the EU is making it worse really… This is my opinion, not that of everyone at Migreurop… (Laura, 2012)
This apparent confusion about the motives of the European project had serious implications for my research. In many cases, it meant that in the course of the same interview, a participant could refer to ‘Europe’ in several different ways. For example, as in Laura’s excerpt above, it was common for participants to display some level of attachment to the history of the European Community, perceived as originating from a desire to save the region from repeated episodes of warfare. But the same participant could later on fully reject the European Union on the basis of its exclusionary tendencies and/or of its affiliation with a certain type of social and economic relations, which some (though not all) participants explicitly called capitalist or neoliberal.

A number of participants considered that, since the end of World War II, the idea and project of Europe had been positive as far as it demilitarised relations between European nation-states. This indicates that the official narrative on the construction of the European Community as a project of peace and reconciliation had partly been accepted. Yet the participants also felt that the EU’s political future was locked and they could not ‘see how it could change’. Some of them reflected on this contradiction and tried to make sense of, or reconcile, these different accounts of Europe. Emily, for instance, realised that she had conflicting visions and experiences of Europe. She articulated these diverging understandings of the European project by proposing the idea of a ‘turning point’, when the European community was ‘hijacked’ from its original motives:

Again, at its origins, the European project was a factor of peace, then it was, you know, I think it was hijacked. The whole world was hijacked. What I mean is, originally it was created to put France and Germany in a more peaceful relation (…) It did work to an extent, we have had peace for 60 years. So my point is not that fighting the EU is about fighting this, what in Europe has preserved peace. But once again, the project has been put at the service of something so different, so… (…) the Europe of markets we can say. (Emily, 2014)

The idea of a turning point was used in several interviews as a means of reconciling conflicting analyses of Europe. It became a useful narrative device to structure a story riddled by contradictions and counter-meanings. Identifying a historical turning point was a way to fit within one story the multiple meanings associated with the political concept of Europe and to produce a narrative that
could contain both the hopes it was perceived to embody in the post-war period and the disillusion that came through their experiences (especially in relation to what participants had come to identify as a neoliberal and exclusionary European Union).

Several participants appeared to have been exposed to and partly convinced by the official narrative of Europe as a project of international reconciliation, rather than one of rescue of the nation-state. The distinction I made earlier between people who engaged in activism with migrants on the basis of a political education that had led them to develop a critical analysis of the functionality of immigration controls and those who were primarily concerned with the human consequences of the EU migration regime was important in that respect (though both approaches were not mutually exclusive). Those participants who were already critical of the European project found it easier to reconcile the experiences they gained as activists with their political and intellectual understanding of the EU. However, those who had accepted, at least to some extent, the dominant history of the European Community, were often confused or hesitant vis-à-vis the EU.

This also impacted on the way in which they understood their political objectives as activists. The question of whether the EU’s approach to immigration could be transformed or whether it was integral to the formation of the European project was often raised. No Borders activist Sean, for example, who comes from an anarchist background and has developed a structured and elaborate discourse on the nature of the EU, told me: ‘the racist Europe of Schengen and the neoliberal Europe of Maastricht go together, they go hand in hand, they serve each other and cannot be separated’ (2012). Activists with less deep-seated discourses were also pushed to reflect on the desirability of the EU as a result of their awareness of migrants’ experiences in the EU. Sonia pondered over this subject when she explained:

I don't see the end of the European Community, I mean the end of Europe as a community, as something beyond its member states, maybe not ‘the’ Community – you know what I mean – I don't see this as a solution... err... At the same time... err... I don't see the European Union as a solution either... it's more like the origin of many problems, especially for us. It’s complicated (laughs). I mean, I am not sure there is
really space to create the Europe of activists and struggles which we want here. So what do we do? Do we ditch Europe and look somewhere else? But where do we look? (laughs) It’s true of Europe, but I mean isn’t it true of the whole world? (Sonia, 2012)

Sonia’s account is characterised by a lack of certainty towards, firstly, the relationship between a more abstract idea of a European community, with prospective transnational or internationalist potential, and the European Union project and, second, the actual meaning and scope of the European Union and the possibility for it to accommodate and reflect alternative values.

Sonia articulated different positionings which were not easy to track for the interviewer: her reference to an ‘us’ seems to refer to a community of similarly-minded people and activists as well as, presumably, migrants. This ‘us’ is made up in part by European citizens, yet she constructs it as an ‘out-group’ in relation to the EU, for which she is ‘not sure there is really space’. This illustrates both her hesitation to identify with the forms of Europeanity proposed by the European Union and her difficulty in imagining other forms of European belonging. She seems more comfortable with identifying with a group that is not defined by cultural, national or regional belonging but by common values and aspirations.

As conversations with participants deepened, it appeared that many felt that the European project displayed such strong contradictions that, ‘politically speaking’, it had become an ‘unusable word other than using it to denounce its damaging effects’ (Martina, 2014). Martina suggested that the European Union had become so hegemonic in relation to the word ‘Europe’ that ‘Europe’ could not be used in activist discourses ‘as we risk being associated with what we are denouncing’ (2014). ‘Europe has become a segregating term’, Martina added. The metonymic use of ‘Europe’ to refer to the ‘European Union’ is widespread in public, media and political discourses, as well as among the participants.

This, again, is partly related to the attempt to create a legitimising narrative for the European Union that I have discussed. Martina also implies that, while the official discourse on Europe is underpinned by such an exclusionary element that it has become a ‘segregating term’, the possibility to develop alternative
European frames or discourses is limited. During the interview, I asked her whether she felt the same about her national identity (French). The answer she gave was interesting in terms of her perception of the limits of the European identity project:

Celine: Are you saying that the idea of a European identity is more ‘segregating’ than national identities, in your view?
Martina: Err, well, ok, national identities are of course segregating too. In fact, of course… err… we are not against European identity because we are for national identities, that’s one thing (…) but also (…) they [European societies] have a long history of contestation and disputes over the meaning of their identity… For example in France, I know how a right-wing person can use the idea of French identity and me, I know how, err, as a leftist, I can respond to him… I can refer to different moments of the French history, of its history of mobilisation, of political protest, to tell this person ‘look this is the France I am speaking about, like a revolutionary France, a social France ‘ (…) But for Europe, err, how to say, I don’t feel it, it’s not there inside me, this idea that Europe can be used as a means to propose great things. Frankly it just reminds me of colonialism when I hear people praising the great ‘European model’!
(Martina, 2014)

Martina explains that she is ‘not for national identities’, although what she in effect describes seems to be a form of emotional and intellectual affinity with her national history, which she does not feel towards Europe. In contrast with French history, where she can identify events that she feels close to, European history only reminds her of ‘colonialism’. Towards the end of the interview she reflected back on this remark. She told me that she was herself surprised to realise that, when trying to evoke a shared European history: ‘until recently, apart from episodes when Europeans were fighting between themselves, I can [only] think of moments when they were fighting others – and that’s about it!’ (2014). Martina’s account sheds light on the weakness of the European discourse in comparison to national frameworks of identity and belonging. At the same time, it also seems that the official European narrative has been sufficiently strong to convince many of the participants that the EU was a project about peace and reconciliation. Martina herself nuances her critique of European history when she specifies ‘until recently’.

Martina’s analysis illustrates some of the contradictions of the EU project and the discourse supporting it. In a sense, official attempts at developing popular
attachment to the EU aimed to create the sense of belonging that she feels towards her national identity. Ideologues of the EU have tried to formulate a narrative on the positive nature and history of Europe and to suggest that ‘Europe can be used as a means to propose great things’. EU architects thus share much with national ideologists. Yet, as previously seen, the scope of this ideological enterprise has been a lot more limited than in the case of the nation-state. European ideologists never aimed at producing the kind of identity and allegiance that would encourage people to fight and die for the EU. Though they have borrowed material from national ideologies, they do not require a similar level of loyalty.

This reflects the paradox of the EU as a form of supra-state that operates through and relies on its national members. Although the discourse on the EU and Europe pretends to rise above the contradictions of the nation-state, it assimilates and reshapes practices and ideologies integral to the concept of the nation-state, and incorporates them into a form of supranationalist discourse. While the EU official account about its origins has been broadly accepted, national identifications and frames of belonging remain strong.

Even for those who had accepted the narrative of the European Community as a project of peace and tolerance, the account whereby Europe had always been characterised by its high culture and enlightenment, which form the basis of a ‘European civilisation’, was unconvincing. Especially for participants from strongly politicised, left-wing backgrounds, the historical use of the idea of Europe in relation to global projects such as colonialism and slavery still dominated their reading of European history. Yet various other experiences could also influence their relation to Europe as a political idea or culture. For example, in the same interview, a London No Borders activist told me:

I was living in South America for a few years (...) I wanted to escape from everything I associated with Europe, with this country, with imperialism and capitalism (...) I saw Europe as involved in a system of wealth, privilege, power and nationalism that I really didn’t identify with… (Alex, 2013)

Later in the conversation, Alex continued explaining where his rejection of Europe came from in very strong and angry terms: ‘I see Europe as a problem. I
am really against Europe. I think Europe is shit and I think the history of Europe is shit...’.

Yet when we approached the question of his political identity, a contrasting narrative started to emerge, which mobilised other references to map a different European heritage:

A lot of my closest comrades have been people from these countries [Germany, Belgium, France] and we’ve come together on the basis of shared values, shared cultures to an extent. We are from different nations but we share a lot as Northern European activists … [No Borders has] certain values and ideas – (…) and I see this as an anarchist tradition, which is quite European (…) Certainly (…) anarchism is a tradition that’s mainly, well in large parts, European (…) (Alex, 2013)

Far from the traditional narrative on European identity and history, Alex expresses an alternative form of belonging, defined primarily in political terms, but which he associates with a certain European history. Earlier in the interview, when Alex claimed that ‘Europe is shit’ and that he was ‘really against Europe’, it was a different Europe that he was referring to, against which he strongly positioned himself. A little later in the interview, Alex recognised spontaneously the ambiguities running through his narrative and his position on Europe. He explained:

Yes I see Europe as a problem. At the same time, I also see myself as someone who has been exposed to a certain European cultural heritage or whatever, like earlier when we were talking about anarchism… I see these anarchist values and beliefs as being antinational, anti-state, anti-borders, but I also recognise the role of Europe, of some kind of European culture and identity, in forming those values… In fact, these are values that emerged in Europe against Europe. (Alex, 2013)

This turnaround in Alex’s discourse was striking since, a militant anarchist, he was one of the participants with the clearest and most deep-seated discourses on Europe. Where most participants were torn between different stories on Europe, he was clear about his dislike for Europe as a political project (in its EU form but also in a wider sense). Yet he also associated himself with a form of counter-Europe European history. His political identity and discourse were articulated in political terms rather than on the basis of a notion of Europe as an identity.
I have presented some illustrations of the contradictions and tensions running through the participants’ use of and references to the idea of Europe. I now present in more detail the different visions and representations of Europe that I gathered during my fieldwork. I suggest that, in spite of these paradoxes, an overall narrative can be identified among a majority of the participants, which points to a process of de-identification with Europe.

**Wither European identity?**

More than a lack of identification with the project of the European Union *in abstracto*, the narratives of some participants illustrated a process of disengagement. I have commented on the fact that some participants had developed strong (positive or negative) representations of Europe prior to engaging in pro-migrant activism, which were in large part related to their political backgrounds. But for the majority, what emerged from the interviews was a gradual process of growing detachment from a European-orientated political discourse.

This progressive disengagement occurred through the ‘practice of Europe’, that is to say through their experience of working at the European level and addressing aspects of the European Union. Here, I present excerpts from the interviews which illustrate the range of views on Europe that I collected and relate to the issue of de-identification with Europe. I start with the more positive views and move on towards a more complex picture of European representations.

**Europe as a myth**

I start with extracts from the one interview in which Europe was upheld as a desirable and accessible project. The participant, Pietro, is a member of the transnational network European Alternatives (EA). As mentioned, EA is a ‘transnational membership organisation promoting democracy, equality and culture beyond the nation-state’ (EA website). EA is not only or primarily a pro-migrant organisation, but it is one of the coordinators (with Migreurop) of an important and ongoing European campaign that aims at securing access to immigration detention centres in EU member states for civil society
representatives and journalists – the ‘Open Access Now’ campaign. As described in the previous chapter, coordinating data gathering and sharing information in order to draw a comparative analysis of the impact of EU policies in various national contexts has been a significant aspect of pro-migrant struggles in the EU (Chantale, 2012; Laura, 2012). EA has provided an important contribution in this regard and I decided to interview one of its members involved in the campaign in order to elucidate the links and connections the group makes between migration struggles and European struggles.

Pietro presented the campaign’s motives and goals in a different way to how the Migreurop coordinator described them. Migreurop’s framing of the campaign focussed on migrants and on the need to access detention centres in order to prevent the violations of their human rights taking place behind the centres’ closed doors. Pietro, on the other hand, framed the campaign primarily as a ‘media freedom and pluralism’ activity and presented it as a battle by journalists and citizens’ to exercise their ‘right to know’.

… we are trying to turn attention to the detention centres by involving journalists in demanding access to them: you involve the media and you turn it into a personal interest for the media, ‘I should have the right to go wherever I want’. (Pietro, 2012)

This difference in the framing of the campaign is illustrative of the different focuses of the two networks. EA, as indicated by its name, is committed to the idea of Europe and engages in debates about its meaning and value. For Pietro, ideas of freedom were integral to the European heritage and Europe was the perfect space in which to expand liberties. Pietro saw Europe as a political project with great potential for politicising people and bringing about change:

Celine: Why are you called European Alternatives?
Pietro: (…) We believe, and many people do too, that Europe is somehow the last utopia for people in this part of the world, (…), it offers a sense of value through which we can be connected as a political community and which we could fight for.

Celine: Why does it have this potential?
Pietro: (…) [Europe] is in a unique position: unique in having poetic and mythical origins; unique in having a history that can be re-read, revised,
and unique because it is not limited to any geographical space (...) All this, I think, we at European Alternatives think, puts it in a better position for being a reason for political mobilisation than any of the others containers.

Pietro displayed a strong feeling of belonging to a European community. He described this attachment to the idea of Europe in a sentimental as much as in a political fashion. When I asked him what Europe stood for in his eyes, he mentioned the myth of Europa being kidnapped by Zeus:

... Europa was stolen by Zeus, and when her three brothers went to look for her, they went in three different directions. And so you have to understand this as a pursuit, as a kind of project, rather than a defined space... This is Europe.

It is clear that Pietro had spent time refining a discourse on Europe and the EU. It is worth highlighting that the myth of Europa, while not an official symbol of the EU has frequently been referred to in relation to the modern European Union, and ‘can thus be considered not only a piece of toponymy, but also as a semi-official symbol or supranational personification of the European region’ (Dejaegher, 2011). A statue of ‘Europa riding the bull’ is located at the centre of the European district in Brussels. The scene is also represented in a mosaic in one of the European Parliament buildings, as well as on Greek two-euro coins. By alluding to this myth, Pietro located himself within a discursive and narrative field that is close to that of the EU itself. He also introduced elements of tension and highlights some the contradictions running through the European project and its discourse:

... we talked a lot at EA about the utopian aspect of Europe. For us it is clear that before Europe became all these bureaucratic institutions, it was a philosopher’s dream, a poet’s dream and also a long united history. Together with Napoleon, many people have wanted to unify Europe... (2012)

Still, for Pietro, indeterminacy is a key positive feature of the EU, making it a 'creative space' for political engagement and struggle for social and political change. In this sense, for him, Europe is a (in fact, the) convincing political motto of our epoch. He suggested that Europe was a strong political project
because his lack of a clear definition suited the conditions of contemporary politics:

You have to understand [Europe] as a pursuit, as a kind of project, rather than a defined space (...) We have to break from ideologies looking for specific historical agents; we have passed the age of ideologies. And I think that puts Europe in a better position for being a reason for political mobilisation than any of the others containers. Because there is no theory which can be proved or disproved...

(...)  
It is very possible to engage with the EU (...) somehow the more we have been involved in European politics, the more clearly it strikes us how open the institutions are and how actually desperate they are for suggestions and to involve citizens… (2012)

Pietro was clearly engaged in a struggle over the process of Europeanisation: his concern was as much about influencing the policy- and decision-making processes taking place in Brussels as about participating in the debate over the symbolic meaning of Europe. For him, ‘there are endless possibilities, right now we are winning many battles’ (2012). In this discourse, enlarging, reforming and bettering European citizenship were claimed to be possible, and the relationship between the European project and the people living in its territory could be influenced in a democratic manner. This optimistic, pro-Europe position was, however, in a minority among the participants. As I show below, for most of them, this sense of possibility did not exist (or not anymore).

*Pragmatic Europe: the unavoidable EU*

Other participants spontaneously addressed the issue of the future of Europe as a political entity. Daniela and David were both associated with PICUM, a Brussels-based NGO that acts as a mediator between small organisations active in their national contexts ‘where undocumented migrants' experience is most visible’, and the European level, ‘where policies relating to them are deliberated’ (PICUM website, no date). As with EA, PICUM is an organisation that was created specifically to work at the EU level. It is not surprising that its members evolve in a discursive field focussed on the issue of the EU and that the interviews with the PICUM participants featured numerous references to Europe – at least as a structure and a set of institutions. PICUM emerged to ‘develop expertise into EU level politics and support member organisations that
might not have the understanding, time and tools to engage directly with the Union’ (Daniela 2012).

As David noticed, there is a certain paradox in the very existence of the organisation: ‘PICUM is, of course, a sign that we engage with European politics but it is also a sign that EU politics are tricky and not easy to engage with for actors on national scenes’ (David, 2012). Although PICUM reflects a European dimension, the relationship to Europe described by Daniela and David was much less passionate than that depicted by Pietro:

PICUM came into existence to fill in the gaps that we noticed in European legislation after the Tampere Summit. We do advocacy to try to put the issue of undocumented migrants on the agenda. We monitor what is happening at the EU level and inform our members… We basically do what they cannot or don't have time to do in relation to European policy development… (Daniela, 2012)

When I asked Daniela how PICUM might be participating in constructing a certain Europe, she also offered a very tactical (if not technical) point of view that reveals an ambiguous positioning: ‘PICUM aims to put the recognition of undocumented migrants and the respect of their human rights on the EU agenda and influence EU policies and legislation in that sense’. Trying to push the conversation further, I asked her if she felt that PICUM was participating in a debate about the meaning of Europe, whom Europe included and what it was. Daniela first replied that ‘we have to participate in this debate because, at the end of the day, Europe exists and Europe is here to stay’. She then added:

I think you are trying to ask me if (...) working on this issue will change Europe, I mean the European Union (...)? Yes, of course we want to see Europe more respectful of human rights but, I mean, Europe is (...) I mean, it is very bureaucratic. There are (...) ways to work with the EU – this is what we do and we push for better regulations (...) So, of course, it is political work but, how to put it, it is very technical or, yes, bureaucratic … (...) it’s not always that clear…

In the case of Daniela, being located ‘so close’ to the European Union seems to be one of the causes for her limited enthusiasm, as if the weight of the technical and bureaucratic aspects she portrays had emptied the initiatives she carries out from political or radical meaning. She positions herself ‘next to’, yet not fully
‘inside’, a form of EU-related community. The feeling of being engaged in a struggle over meaning and definition that Pietro insisted on was weaker in Daniela’s narrative regarding her work and PICUM’s raison d’être. I tried to enquire about Daniela’s understanding of migrants’ rights as a political issue in Europe:

Celine: When I spoke with members of associations and networks like Migreurop or national groups like Gisti, which I know is a member of PICUM, they tended to describe their work as political, as activism. Fasti doesn’t hesitate to label itself as ‘anti-capitalist, feminist and third-worldist’, for example…
Daniela: Yes, I mean, I guess [PICUM] is not political in that sense (…) We have to work on the basis of a common denominator between our members. It comes out as a discourse around the need for the respect of human rights of undocumented migrants. Why? Because they are here. We don’t really speak about why they are here. We don’t have to have the same ideas on other, err, social or economic issues.

This raises an important point for this discussion: from what Daniela implies, working with the European Union supposes such a level of technicality and consensus in order to fit into the frames established as part of the EU decision-making process, that the freedom to be politically creative is reduced. This point was further developed in the course of other interviews. For example, when David spoke about the name of his organisation, the Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN), he made this comment:

Celine: How much do you think you have achieved with MRN and PICUM?
David: I tend to think of it as being where we want to be, where we got the best chance of being in a sort of three to four-year time. But I think that’s also been one of our problems. I mean… To work with Europe, to achieve results, we have adapted to… err… I mean, look, we have ‘network’ in our title and we use a concept of ‘rights’, all of which are modes of working in or with politics which actually belongs to the epoch of neoliberalism. It is about adapting to market conditions and getting the best we possibly can out of it… (…) Can you imagine the difference with the old socialist project, which assumed that you transform things, you change thing?! (…) Us instead, at MRN and PICUM, we are talking about the presumed equality of all these different actors all over the place, who are all mediated by a concept of rights which operates at an individual level, err, and that is a substantial adaptation.
The sense that working with the EU necessarily means adapting to its structures and adjusting one’s political discourse so that it fits within the essentially neoliberal nature of the Union is an important observation. This impression was also conveyed by Migreurop’s Oscar (2014), who said:

Working with the European institutions, it’s complicated. There is always the problem of being used to legitimate their existence and functioning methods. It is very important to think about whether and why we are going [to European institutions]. There can be something flattering, like: “Great let’s go, we’re invited by important people, ministries, the European Commission!”… But we really have to think about why we are going, what we are bringing there, and what we will be able to do. (…) I think sometimes we really have more strength saying things on the margins, outside of the institutions. (…) To take an example, we were quite a few at Migreurop to participate in a report for the European Parliament – for the Justice and Freedom Commission (…) We wrote a very detailed report (…) and … it was never made public! They realised that our arguments were too critical; it was not fitting into the language of the institutions… There is a certain language which we need to adopt and which we were not ready to use… (…) We were also asked if we wanted to sit as part of this consultative forum for Frontex – we refused because the rules were absolutely not propitious to a certain form of transparency… and we realised they just wanted us there to look as if they consulted with associations.

The two critical and interrelated issues here are: (1) the hegemonic frames of reference operating within the EU and which participants felt were preventing them from formulating their political positions and being listened to; and (2) the risk of being co-opted or instrumentalised by European institutions, which try to secure their legitimacy by inviting civil society organisations to the table without giving them the attention they expect. The participating groups and networks that had tried to work with European institutions seemed to oscillate between the choice made by David, i.e. to accept to ‘play by the rules’ (which amounted to dropping vocabulary and arguments considered as politically inaudible) and the position described by Oscar, where one runs the risk of being used as a legitimising token by institutions whilst not being truly listened to.

As noted above, the relationship between activists and the European Union is also determined by their political background. There seems to be an inverse correlation between displaying radical political ideas and being comfortable with addressing European institutions. In this sense, Pietro’s belief that we have
entered a ‘post-ideological era’ and that ‘old left-wing ideas of revolutionary change have to be left behind’ (Pietro, 2012) can explain why participating in EU politics was ‘less costly’ for him. This observation corresponds to an argument put forward by social scientists working on European-level politics according to which only elite groups are able to work within the modalities of EU level politics (Favell, 1999; Guiraudon, 2001). One of the main reasons for the failure of grassroots groups to successfully mobilise at the EU level is considered to be a lack of resources to organise transnationally. My research provides evidence of a new aspect of this question. The participants are actively engaged in pan-European networks: their issue vis-à-vis working at the EU level is more ideological than organisational.

This observation may also help us understand the apparently paradoxical relationship to Europe that Daniela describes, whereby, on the one hand, she defines and understands her work primarily in European terms but, on the other hand, does not feel engaged in a struggle over the meaning of Europe, nor exhibit any symbolic or emotional attachment to Europe. As a form of resolution, her own conclusion on the debate around European identity and citizenship offers a normative assessment of the EU as an organisation that should be reformed, which makes her values and her work more attuned:

… by working in making the legal framework of the EU more inclusive, (...) we might lay the foundation for tomorrow’s European citizenship. (...) I wouldn't say we have such a thing now but making the EU more open, rights-oriented... you know, people may engage more seriously with it in the future (Daniela, 2012)

Disenchanted Europe

I interviewed David, an activist born in the 1950s, at the beginning of my fieldwork. Our meeting made me particularly interested in examining the diachronic dimension of the participants’ relation to the idea of Europe. During the interview, David naturally told me a number of stories about his political past. Through these stories he offered me a sense of how his beliefs evolved over time:

You know, I am from a generation which believed in Europe. For me, it was about the possibility for new transnational relations to emerge and
we accepted that, at first, the engagement might be limited but we thought it would lead to...err... you know, our children not being first English or French or German but being first European... And from a political perspective, our idea...err... at least some of us on a certain form of radical left...err... was that eventually it would be creating a new field of political struggle...err... where we get things a bit more right than we had in our individual nation-states... Were we delusional? Or did it change? There are many reasons to think so. Sometimes I feel, especially since 2008 with the crisis, with Greece, that we have reached a breaking point in what can be achieved within the EU. But you know, this is my take on things – we have to push the current system to its full contradictions, only then will they learn. (David, 2012)

I was particularly interested in older activists’ accounts of their relation to Europe. Introducing a temporal dimension to the study helped to avoid rigidifying the idea of Europe, which was an important analytical and methodological challenge in my research project. Meanings are contested and evolve over time and contexts in relation to the material reality they are attached to. Ideologies with restrictive dimensions might be mobilised towards progressive projects in particular places and times. In Chapter II, I commented on Colley’s argument that ‘being nationalist’ in England in the 18th century could be a pragmatic choice for people seeking to expand their rights: articulating demands for equality at the national level and through a national discourse could be experienced as an emancipatory process.

This echoes a comment in my methodology chapter about Nairn’s concept of the Janus face of nationalism, as an ideology that is simultaneously looking back at the past and ahead to the future. In many European states, nationalist discourses were mobilised to support colonial expansionism abroad as much as to frame struggles for inclusion and citizenship at home. Nowadays, in various sites of the global South, in a context where the hopes and promises of independence struggles have gone unfulfilled, nationalism remains a dominant political frame and is often mobilised towards the implementation of repressive agendas. These contradictions highlight the need to situate ideas in the particular social and political contexts that give them meaning and endorse them with emancipatory (or otherwise) potential. Analysing the participants’ narratives diachronically was a way of tracing back the changing meaning of Europe over time in relation to the evolution of the EU as a project. Michel for example explained:
As I grew up, I wanted to be European. In the post-war years, it meant something. In 1968, we wanted to be the youth of Europe [laughs]. It meant something appealing, something potentially revolutionary [laughs]. Now? [negative head shake]... As for the EU, the little hope we had (…) got damaged… We started to see it with Maastricht, but I’d say I still had hope then, but most definitely with the referendum on the European constitution… (Michel, 2012)

Michel’s comment also emphasises an important point of contention for the participants and their relation to the EU – the idea that Europe was a move away from nation-states and national identities. David also said that he had hoped that ‘our children [would not be] first English or French or German but [would be] first European’ (David, 2012). As pro-migrant activists, the participants were critical of national structures in terms of their historical tendency toward exclusion. This was mentioned on several occasions as a main motive for identification with the European project, seen as a means of going beyond the contradictions and tensions of the nation-state. This evidences the relative persuasiveness of the mainstream history of the European Community.

Two issues came to challenge the idea that the European Union was a positive step away from nationalism. Firstly, whilst the participants contested the national form for its exclusionary agenda, many of them rejected the ‘global neoliberal’ model even more firmly. Several participants defended national systems of welfare, which they saw as better able to protect social rights and equality than anything the EU could provide. The idea that the EU was ‘better than the nation-state’ was called into question. The association between the EU and global neoliberalism (particularly visible, according to the participants, with the recent large-scale implementation of austerity measures) meant that its desirability was questioned. As put by David,

There is a contradiction at the heart of the European project: this sense that prosperity is dependent on being able to complete the European project in some shape or form, and because it has been essentially a liberalising project and it has presumed that resources spontaneously arise from a market, which functions more or less efficiently, and everybody has got an opportunity to buy into it, it has never been able to account for the fact that market fails and that there are special types of institutions which are needed in any society, whether it is in a national society or a local society or even more so in a trans-border, international,
cosmopolitan society, which do play that role of, at the very least, correcting the imperfections of markets, possibly even replacing them. (2012)

Also, for some participants, the fact that the European project was a clear breakaway from the national form was contestable. This was formulated by some anarchist and socialist participants, who were socialised in radical political circles and held firm anti-capitalist and, for anarchists, anti-state positions. During my conversation with two No Borders activists, Alex and Sean, the following exchange took place:

Sean: So you are not interested in Europe as an ideal, as a project that bypasses the state?
Alex: I think the European project is very similar to the nation-state…
Sean: Yeah, it is the same, just bigger, kind of thing…
Alex: Yeah, one thing you can't ignore when looking at the history of Europe is this idea in the post-war… a lot of rhetoric about leaving behind the conflicts within Europe in the 1930s, the wars in Europe… this kind of national conflicts… The whole 'we need to create a new united Europe to address these tensions between national powers and colonial nations’… I was… yeah the way I think of it, and at least some other No Borders [activists] think of it, is that the whole process served the same interests, the same elites, the same classes… (Alex and Sean, 2012)

Sean reiterated this point during another interview when he said that:

Well… there is the argument that says that (...) anything going beyond or weakening the nation-state project is good and so, if Europe is a regional entity weakening the nation-state, it should be defended… The weakness of that argument, the obvious elephant in the room, is that the EU is just a supranational level project, the same but bigger! Plus, it ignores the economic side of it – it is a capitalist project from the start, it can’t be reformed, it can’t ever be good. (Sean, 2012)

Similar arguments had been made in the early days of the European Community by scholars on the Marxist left (in the UK, for example, Harman and Callinicos, mentioned in previous chapters). Sean has been politically active for many years in anarchist and communist circles and has been immersed in the political culture and memory of these groups. His political background and education are reflected in his position. For Sean and Alex, as anarchists positioned against the state, the complicity of the EU project with the national one, encourages a strong rejection of Europe, an argument echoing Milward’s (see Chapter I).
For these No Borders activists the rejection of the European project lay in its very roots, as a project aimed at stabilising the capitalist order of the region. For several other participants, there seemed to be a moment when the ideological trade-off between supporting the EU as a move away from the nation-state and rejecting it on account of its neoliberal bias switched. Chantale explained:

Chantale: We had some discussions about Europe around the time of the referendum. I don't think that we had one clear line internally at the Gisti, but we talked about it because the big question was: is it better than the state just because it is post-national? Is it worth building post-nationalism at any cost?

Celine: Can you explain what this cost is?

Chantale: I mean, is it just supporting the implementation of a regional capitalist block driven by corporations and markets? (2012)

Again, this shows that, for many participants, a main problem in relation to Europe was ideological. This observation needs highlighting, especially insofar as the vast majority of scholarly accounts regarding European identity have analysed the lack of identification with Europe as an overall technical or material issue, emerging from a lack of concrete engagement with Europe. According to such analyses, it is the lack of experience or practice of Europe that leads people to perceive the EU as an irrelevant political space, rather than any feature of the EU itself. Bourdieu (2001) said that ‘Europe does not say what it does; it does not do what it says; it says what it does not do; does what it does not say. This Europe one constructs for us, it is a Europe that betrays the eye’. This is a more accurate representation of how the participants felt towards the EU than the mainstream account that focuses on the lack of people’s willingness to engage with Europe.

In the context of my research, the sets of contradictions that I discussed above have led to a situation whereby speaking of Europe and reflecting on European alternative identities has become a conceptual and ideological challenge. The EU has also been so assertive in its claim to represent Europe that it has become difficult to speak of Europe without the EU. At the same time, since the EU offers little space for alternative discourses, most participants were reluctant to frame their narratives in European terms, or to put forward propositions for a European future. This observation needs to be located in the context of the particular historical period of my research, that is the post-Eurozone crisis. In
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the decade following the mass protests of Seattle and the rise of alter-globalism, Europe seemed more able to offer a space for grassroots politics and internationalism. This internationalism was not that of the EU elites but rather that sketched by the European Social Forum and the series of protests held in Genoa (2001), Florence (2002) and other iterations of the ESF. It was an internationalism inspired from traditions of Marxist-inspired international solidarity, or influenced by discussions of radical cosmopolitanism as embraced by alternative spaces such as the World Social Forums. However, as mentioned, in recent years, the ESF momentum has declined and it has not been held since 2010 in Istanbul. This seems related to the exacerbation of the contradictions inherent to European project that came to the fore in the wake of the global crisis. Further investigation would be required to substantiate this claim. It is also plausible that the recent power struggle between the Syriza government in Greece and the EU, and the latter’s inflexibility and unwillingness to accommodate any form of alternative political and economic models, will contribute to the formulation of stronger anti-EU arguments on the left.

‘Giving up on Europe’?

For some participants, the only way to address these contradictions was disengaging completely from the concept of Europe, and from European level political claims and frames. In this section, I discuss this position and its variations.

Pat from Stop Deportation remarked that ‘we were born within the EU, it was always here for people my age’ and that ‘the EU, because it’s further away, seemed even more indestructible than the state’ (Pat, 2012). But at the same time, ‘when we think about it, it is not that old (…) And the Euro-crisis showed how close we could get from un-doing the EU’. Pat’s relation to the European Union is, as he observed, partly linked to his generational experience. In contrast to previous generations, such as David’s, for which producing the idea of a European community could have been an ideal to be fought for, younger Western European activists were born ‘within it’ and, hence, did not develop an attachment to Europe in the same way. ‘Europe’ was already there and it was also not something Pat identified with (‘it’s further away’). For people his age,
Pat claimed, not only did the Union always exist but so did a series of crossborder links between various countries and people of Europe (and, importantly, beyond). These, for Pat, have nothing to do with the EU:

Saying we have to keep the EU to keep openness is stupid. I mean, yeah, it’s not like we are open because of the European institutions, you know what I mean? I mean, ok I feel, err, how to put it, I feel like, err, I don't feel different from other European youth, but that’s because of, you know, my travels, you know, my friends here, there, we keep in touch through the internet, I follow activists in Spain, in Greece (…) But it’s not just Europe, you know (…) I felt this with my friends in Morocco and with the migrants we work with. We keep in touch, we speak about music, we play guitar, we speak about politics, this kind of things. Also, errr, you’ve seen this film by Ken Loach [Land and Freedom], err, you know the one with the English guy who goes to Spain to fight against Franco? See it’s the same as what I feel, and they didn't need the European Union! (Pat, 2012)

While for David, creating Europe might have been precisely about institutionalising such crossborder links, for Pat the EU has nothing to do with them. He refers to a form of cosmopolitan identity developed through his experience of travels, activism and through exchanges around shared pastimes (music) and ideas (politics). These form the basis of a network of people (including the migrants and activists he sympathises with) which is not defined by borders, nor by national or European belonging. Pat describes the constitution of a community of meaning articulated around political and cultural values and underpinned by the experience of heightened mobility and communication opportunities offered by the Internet and online tools. This community does not stop at the borders of neither nation-states nor the EU. His reference to Ken Loach’s Land and Freedom, which stages a young English communist's engagement in the Spanish civil war against fascism on the basis of his internationalist class consciousness and his opposition to authoritarianism, also points to Pat’s appeal for an identity based on ideas and political values and his rejection of what he perceives as bounded identity containers.

Tony, an international volunteer from Migreurop, commented:

…it took me a long time, in my head I mean, to give up on the EU – not its structures, I mean its existence. Not just because it basically exists
since I was born, but also because, for many of the people who brought me up, like my parents, like my teachers, the EU is positive, it is openness! How did it happen for me that I stopped believing in it… You know, it just stopped making sense at some point: I found myself working on the ground, participating in sans-papiers struggles, going to Lampedusa with Migreurop, and everywhere I have to fight this EU, this supposedly positive entity… All I see from it is more and more repressive measures… (Tony, 2012)

I tried to investigate further what Tony meant by ‘giving up on the EU’:

Celine: Can you explain to me what you mean by ‘giving up on the EU’? Do you mean you stopped addressing the institutions? Or you felt like it could never be changed?
Tony: Yes, yes, and something else. How to explain… In fact, in all honesty, I don't really care about Europe, being European. In the last few years, I have just changed in relation to that. You remember when L'Auberge Espagnole77 was released – sorry for the cliché [laughs]. See, then I was small, I thought 'it is great to be European!'. Well I don't feel this any more (…) I oscillate between a more local identity and a much more cosmopolitan identity. It is based on my travels, I have gone outside Europe now, many times, my experiences, my friends from Sciences Po who came from everywhere. So it made me wonder: why stop at Europe?

Tony’s discourse is that of an educated young man who attended one of the most multi-cultural universities in France. His experience also led him to travel and to experience sociality and politics beyond Europe. These are all particular positions that cannot be easily generalised. However, the experience of encountering otherness and questioning one’s own identity is not reserved to the more educated classes in European societies. By the very nature of their activism, the participants were working with individuals from very diverse geographical and social backgrounds.

In both these excerpts Pat and Tony deconstruct the political and social structure within which they live and were born through posited experiences. They display a developed degree of awareness regarding the constructed nature of their social and political context – and more specifically of the European Union. Both of them explain that this consciousness arose as they encountered people either from other European countries (and realised their

77 2002 French-Spanish film by Cedric Klapisch about a group of students on an Erasmus year abroad in Barcelona. Released under the English title 'Pot Luck'.
closeness did not need to be mediated by European institutions) or from outside Europe (and realised the identity discourse of Europe as a common cultural way of life did not correspond to their experience). Tony also explains that it is when he started getting involved in activism addressing European-level issues that he also started to disengage from the idea of Europe and to reject the EU. In these cases, it is ‘practising’ Europe – getting involved in activist struggles that exposed them to aspects of the European Union that might be willingly left out of dominant narratives – that led to giving up on Europe. Pat and Tony reached these conclusions through empirical experiences, which led them to take an ideological position rejecting the EU and its official discourse.

Direct confrontation with the consequences of EU policies in their field led some participants to full reject the European project. It is, as indicated by French participant Michel, a significant turn of events considering the ‘almost natural inclination’ that ‘we, leftist activists working against repressive border controls’, feel against ‘closed-up national structures’ (Michel, 2012). The participants describe it very clearly as a process of de-identification. These participants describe a process whereby the more they are concretely confronted with EU policies, the less they identify with it – both as a political project and as a space for identity construction.

As already mentioned, this disaffiliation with Europe has nothing to do (at least in the case of the participants) with a call for a return to nationalism; it stems from a rejection of the EU specifically for ‘being irrevocably unfair and exclusionary’ (Alex and Sean, 2012) and having ‘the same faults as the nation-state and probably more’ (Sean, 2012). Sean concluded his interview with a joke: ‘the good thing about being an anarchist is that I don't have to explain that I don't hate the EU because I prefer the state!’.

Participants’ reading of Europe also took on different forms depending on their geographical location and their perception of power relations running through the EU. Zak, a participant from Italy, had a particularly negative vision of the EU and of the historical and contemporary use of the idea of Europe, which he likened to a Northern ‘neo-colonial project’ (Zak, 2012). The derogatory use of the acronym PIGS that European mainstream media have coined to refer to
Southern European countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) was an object of both amusement and indignation for Zak:

For those in Brussels and in the North, we are PIGS and at the same time we are like Arabs, ironic no? (…) Northern Europe is trying to impose their cold mechanical way of dealing with humanity all the way to Lampedusa. (2012)

Not only does Zak describe the European Union as a project characterised by an ‘inhuman relation’ with Others, he also sees it as a source of negative influence for the Southern countries. According to him, within the EU, a Northern European narrative is imposed on other cultures and traditions. This is also a reflection of the uneven and combined development between the centre and periphery of the European Union and to the competitive relations between European member states (see Chapter I):

Europe uses us: they need border guards, they expand and let in new countries… but they don’t give their residents the right to travel, they just tell the new countries to not let the migrants in! They use all of us at the periphery and the few strong European states get the most of everything. Look at Greece! Isn’t it clear? Why would we want to be part of this? We will always be subalterns in their game. (Zak, 2012)

Again, this representation has to be situated and cannot be generalised. For example, Jack, a London-based participant from Eastern Europe, had a very distinct narrative. His understanding of relations between European politics and nation-states showed the importance of considering countries’ historical experience prior to entering the Union:

For us, I mean the newer countries that joined the EU, that sort of whole path to European membership was the project that ran for 15 years – that construction of identity, ‘we, Europeans’, ‘we are almost there’… because, for us, this was the ultimate sort of acknowledgement of our sovereignty (Jack, 2012)

Joining the European Union as a route to national recognition and sovereignty, and the impact this discourse can have on people’s relation to both the EU and the notion of Europe, is an interesting point that could be addressed by continuing this research project in other countries. Due to the scope of my research, and its focus on three ‘old’ colonial European powers and core EU
members, this perspective cannot be developed further here. Yet the issue of power relations within the EU and of the different national aspirations endowed within the ascension trajectory are definitely important variables to understand different and conflicting ideas of Europe. Zak’s comments reflect an analysis of the EU as divided between a core of powerful countries and a periphery, in which Southern countries occupy a subaltern place.

Jack’s quote illustrates the continuous relevance of national identification. Regardless of their feelings towards their national identity, most participants still formulated narratives on Europe through a local prism: Europe only becomes experientially and conceptually intelligible when it is related to particular local (or national) experiences and historical contexts. It is also striking that in both these accounts Europe is constructed as an ‘out-group’. Jack reflects on how the discourse on entering the ‘group of Europe’ was an unavoidable feature in the Eastern experience post-1989. This might imply that ‘being ripe’ for Europe was in that context seen as a positive goal, though I was not able to interview more participants from Eastern Europe to further examine this context. As an Eastern European national who has in effect grown up ‘outside’ of the EU, this representation of Europe as ‘out-group’ is understandable. But it is interesting to see that Zak’s narrative also produces a European ‘them’ (Europe, Brussels, the North), with which he does not identify and which he positions himself against (both as a personal ‘I’ and as a collective ‘we’ – the Southern countries). This local reading of Europe stands in sharp contrast with the transnational discourse of ‘unity in diversity’ articulated and pushed forward by the European elite. Though the participants were critical of nationally bounded entities, identity narratives vis-à-vis Europe were still mediated by local and national experiences and histories. I build further on the importance of local narratives later in this chapter.

The heterogeneity of the experience of Europe is an important factor which also impacts on activism at an organisational level. The complex relationships between member states within the EU, and between the EU and the rest of the world, are reflected by the conflicting dynamics participants encountered when working across different national contexts. Clara, from Amnesty International's
When You Don’t Exist campaign, reflects on the challenges of working within this framework, even for large international organisations such as AI:

Clara: It is difficult to coordinate pan-European campaigns and to make them relevant to all European countries when there is so little intra-EU solidarity. In our own work, we face problems, for example, regarding how partners from Western member states deal with partners from Eastern European countries (...) And there is a real issue at the heart of Europe, which is how the EU sees the outside world at large. An indicator is how few people the EU takes through resettlement programmes. Numbers are very low compared to many other countries and regions – even less well-off places. (...)

Celine: And how do you explain these relationships? Do you think they can improve?

Clara: well, I am speaking in my own name here, Amnesty doesn’t take positions on issues of sovereignty, but the whole set-up is fragmented between national powers and economies that still want to prevail economically but somehow need each other… How to put it… This lack of intra-EU solidarity in terms of immigration and asylum, the way Europe relates to the world, all of this, I think, reflects this competition. (2012)

These tensions further complicate transnational political activism. Clara brings concrete examples of this difficulty:

In a way, we are in a weird position because the EU provides us with new tools to advance migrants’ rights, like the Charter of Human Rights and then the possibility to go to the European Court of Justice. But these are little pockets within an overall more repressive and exclusionary framework than what we had before. We use them because they are here, but in doing so we stabilise the whole thing (...) Our campaign had to be supranational because the EU is such a big player (...) but it was not very easy to decide on a target. At the start, to gather information and mobilise our branches, we work in national contexts, but eventually our target is to address the European Parliament. (...) But even so, in the Union, things are getting worse: the role of the European Parliament is weakening. So it is hard to know if we’re doing the right thing. The whole system is full of problems. That’s why also we took a long time to design our campaign and why it changes as we go along. (2012)

**Mind the gap**

Do these contradictions and tensions make the subject of Europe one that cannot be grasped? How could the confusion and hesitancy of the participants become intelligible in such a complex context? In order to address these questions, it is first important to recall the ideological dimension of the relations
between the participants and the idea of Europe that has been revealed in this chapter. It is difficult to answer these questions without highlighting the strong awareness of capitalist social and economic relations referred to on recurring occasions during my fieldwork. Many participants used the terminology of capitalism and neoliberal globalisation comfortably, while some had a discourse that was strikingly influenced by anti-capitalist rhetoric without actually using that terminology.

The quote from Clara just above is a good example of this: she describes competing national economic interests linked through economic dependence in a way that is reminiscent of Marxist arguments, yet she never speaks of capitalism as such. This is also an illustration of the convergence of discourses against Europe and the influence of the alter-globalist movement upon pro-migrant initiatives, as previously seen. I now propose to ‘bring back’ capitalism and class to the study of social movements in order to further our understanding of pro-migrant activism in the EU.

**Understanding the contradictions: bringing capitalism and class back?**

As noted by Goodwin and Hetland (2013), recent scholarship on movements and political conflict has, ‘with very few exceptions, largely ignored the enabling and constraining effects of capitalism’ (p. 86). The authors add that ‘by the 1990s (…) a concern with capitalism had virtually disappeared from the field’ (p. 87). This is because, unlike old forms of political mobilisation, particularly workers’ movements, in which ‘issues of material deprivation and inequality are considered central’, these new supposedly single-issue social movements are ‘seen as revolving around “non-material” or “post-materialist” issues’ (p. 92).

In many ways, the pro-migrant movement in Europe can be seen as a paradigmatic example of such a ‘new social movement’, notably due to the tendency of some of its members to define its objectives in terms of human rights and the inclusion of migrants in current structures. Consequently, as explained previously, I had recourse to a number of concepts from social movement theory, which proved useful in analysing the tactics and the discourses of the groups and networks participating in my research.
However, my investigation of the relationship between the formation and trajectory of the pro-migrant movement and the EU quickly became problematic in the absence of an analysis of the impact of capitalist relations. Goodwin and Hetland’s reference to McAdam’s (1982 cited in Goodwin and Hetland, 2013, pp. 85-6) study of the US civil rights movement indeed shows that even non-class-based movements may be powerfully shaped by political-economic factors. In this case, I found myself short of tools within social movement theory that could convincingly explain the participants’ varying degrees of identification with, or rejection of, the EU and Europe as a project and an imagined community.

As part of the interviews, I asked participants if they would agree to respond to questions about their personal trajectory as activists – only one of them declined. When asked to give themselves a political label, three quarters of the participants described themselves as leftist, communist, (revolutionary) socialist or anarcho-communist. They expressed clear anti-capitalist views. Some others, who defined themselves as liberal or anti-racist, did not express any clear view on capitalism. One stated their belief in social democracy and ‘regulated capitalism’. Finally, one jokingly said he was a ‘reformed socialist’, opposed to neoliberalism but ‘resigned to play by its rules so to push against all its contradictions’ (David, 2012). These figures do not hold much quantitative analytical value insofar as I have not sampled the participants and have not tried to constitute a representative group according to ideological affiliations. Rather, as explained in my methodology chapter, my selection of participants attempted to reconstitute networks and to follow the links existing across various organisations and their members. Yet, the fact that a majority of the participants identified with political traditions characterised by a strong critique and rejection of capitalist social relations does highlight the importance of ideological positioning for my research. Political identities, in the sense of a recognised affiliation with particular traditions of political thought, were major factors that determined the way in which the participants understood the links between Europe, the EU and capitalism.

Looking at it from the point of view of capitalist social and economic relations, the contradictions that determine the participants’ lack of identification with the
European project become more intelligible. Thinking of the development of the EU through the lens of capitalist competition helped me to grasp the dynamics that brought about the complex institutional and legal framework of the EU. Recognising the close relationship between the Union as it stands and new forms of capitalism in the age of globalisation is crucial to understanding how the participants read the EU and why their political backgrounds impacted on their relation to Europe. David’s earlier observation, according to which working with the EU means ‘speaking the language of neoliberalism’, thus takes on its full meaning. Nino from Boats for People (B4P) offered a subtle analysis of this reality. When I asked him whether a counter-European identity was being developed through the transnationalisation of migration struggles, he reflected on the process as follows:

For me, we are more creating a new transnational class consciousness (...) We work mostly on themes, not on geographical regions. (...) The networks are separated by issues, not by territories. (...) We, who are we? The international volunteers, the people who work with Europe? We belong to a certain class, we studied, we are in the top 30% of the world population in terms of income. We work with the media, people from international organisations, government representatives and some business people. We are close to the field, but the way to make progress in our work with, or I should say largely against, the EU happens in relation to people who are part of a privileged class. (Nino, 2013)

An important way in which capitalism interacts with the pro-migrant movement in the EU, is that, in contexts like that of the European Union, which is strongly structured around capitalist social relations and where market ideology has become hegemonic, social movement activists have to frame their movement and its goals in neoliberal terms if they want to progress. They are thus faced with a situation whereby, to be successful, they must deny some of the very reasons that the movement emerged and accept the terms put forward by the structure they aim to challenge. Bourdieu’s (1999) intuition that one can oppose a ‘Europe that supports financial markets, and at the same time be in favour of a Europe that (...) blocks the way to the violence of those markets’ does not seem to hold true anymore. Sean’s argument stating that the Europe of Maastricht and the Europe of Schengen are part of the same process illustrates the deep reflection among activist circles regarding the relations between (neoliberal) capitalism and the bordering of territories, identities and labour
markets. Alex (2013) also argued that ‘one cannot understand the borders of the EU without linking it to the EU’s capitalist nature’. In close agreement with the points developed in the earlier chapters of the thesis, most of the participants were convinced that bordering Europe was in part the result of capitalist economic rationales. Tony (2012), for example, explained:

Borders do not stop people from moving when they need to. But they do two things: they make their trips more dangerous and that's why we say that ‘The Border kills’. But also they are what create illegality. And illegality I think is useful. It is useful to the economy because sans papiers [migrants] work for cheap. When we mobilised with the sans papiers workers in 2012, I realised that almost all the brasseries and restaurants we eat in in Paris rely on cheap, underpaid, exploited sans papiers labour.

For some of the participants, their awareness of the type of social and economic relations being promoted under the banner of ‘Europe’ and their refusal to ‘speak the language of neoliberalism’ (David, 2012) meant that Europe as a whole, as a term, was irremediably associated with a project that they rejected. As a result, their realisation of the nature of the European project led them to radically de-identify with it and to abandon any references to Europe, or hope for Europe as a political project.

As mentioned, this process of rejection of the EU and the discourse of Europeanity followed different paths. On the one hand, some of the participants started engaging in pro-migrant struggles with a well-formed understanding of the capitalist nature of the European project, and a global perspective on the function of immigration control, which was further confirmed through their experiences as activists. Others, however, shaped their understanding of the EU through their activism: they developed empirical knowledge of the functioning and effects of the EU that fed into larger reflections on the nature of the European project and narrative.

Another important contribution of ‘bringing capitalism back to social movement studies’ is that it allows understanding of some of the complexity of the pro-migrant movement in Europe by looking at it as a multi-class movement. The contrasting assessments of what interests the EU stands for, of the extent to which engaging with its structures is possible and easy, seems to be in a large
part determined by class positions and subjectivities. This is observable when looking at the socio-economic profiles of the staff members of EA or PICUM, who are paradigmatic examples of a highly educated, polyglot European elite. In contrast, organisations like the Gisti (Group of International Solidarity with Immigrant Workers), Fasti (Federation of Associations of Solidarity with Immigrant Workers) or No Borders, which claim affiliations with communism and anarcho-syndicalism, assert a strong working-class subjectivity, even though their members may not be materially working-class. In this sense, the pro-migrant movement’s difficulty in creating and consolidating a consistent shared identity can be understood as an illustration of the divides recurrent in multi-class movements.

Finally, if we reintroduce capitalism to this analysis, the issue of the state also comes back to the centre of the study. As discussed in previous chapters, the integration of EU member states into the European Union did not lead to their secession or obsolescence as nation-states, but rather allowed their survival in the era of neoliberal globalisation. Though neoliberalism displays a rhetoric of ‘forcing the state back’, it has relied on a process of restructuring of states’ functions and on the assertion of what I have called the ‘neoliberal authoritarian state’ (Chapter I). The EU, a supra-state pooling together national resources, has thus been characterised by a form of supra-authoritarianism. Just as the European ideology of exclusion brings together and aggregates national ideas of difference and otherness, states’ penchants for an ‘authoritarian fix’ to the pitfalls of neoliberalism have been exacerbated and exaggerated at the European level.

This is manifested, for example, in the tools and mechanisms of exclusion and control I have commented on in Chapter III: from Frontex to police liaison networks, new technologies of profiling and controlling and the deployment of military-like equipment in its border areas, the EU is increasingly authoritarian. This has been the cause of grievance for activists participating in my research. Anarchists in particular were quick to identify the process of aggravation of states’ authoritarianism that was unfolding at the EU level. The fact that this symbolic and physical violence has been heavily exhibited in relation to immigration controls and targeted at migrants (among other groups) has also
been one of the reasons why some of the anarchist and socialist activists opposing the disciplinary state became involved in migrant solidarity activities.

Social movement theory has paid attention to the way activists and people involved in contentious politics operate in the globalised context. SMT scholars have produced important analyses of the alter-globalist movement, the World and European Social Forums, and they have been able to develop a transnational perspective on the emergence of networks working on human rights, gender issues or indigenous rights, among others. However, SMT’s understanding of contemporary struggles and transnational organisation has overwhelmingly focused on their cultural and sociological aspects. Whilst SMT’s tools have been useful to my research, in particular in order to grasp network dynamics and to understand how alter-globalist movements have shaped and facilitated various forms of pro-migrant activism, it lacks an understanding of capitalism and its modes of operation that successfully locates these struggles within a larger economic and political context. In particular, by ignoring the way in which capitalist modes of production have affected the state and its functions in the global era, SMT proved limited in order to explore the alternative narratives of belonging put forward by the participants. I now move on to analyse some of these counter-frames within the context of the political economy of the development of the European Union introduced in the previous chapters.

**Local solidarity as identity**

*It’s not Europe, it’s movement*

Recalling Nino’s sense that ‘we work mostly on themes, not on geographical regions’ is an interesting point of departure to further examine the shape and identity of the European pro-migrant movement. As I have shown in the previous chapter, crossborder activism was triggered into action by the transnationalisation of immigration and asylum frameworks initiated by the EU. This, I argued, has encouraged the development of pan-European links across various groups, networks and individuals working in favour of migrants in different European countries.
Yet, when trying to see whether their interaction and cooperation had brought about alternative forms of European identity, I realised counter-narratives on Europe were absent. I have argued that taking into account issues of class and capitalism shed some light on this lack for several reasons. Reintroducing the issue of capitalist relations and their history to the heart of this analysis also allows for development of a political geography of migrations that accounts for intra-EU relationships and for the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world. Indeed, looking at the EU not, as the official discourse would have it, as the expression of a particular and bordered European identity and culture, but as a space where a set of social and economic relations are developed, and where forms of marginalisation are both practised and contested, also encourages us to rethink and remap activists’ practices.

When I discussed with Michel (2012), who has been active in migration-related struggles since the mid-1980s, whether a transnational social movement was emerging in Europe, his answer was to unsettle the frame of analysis and propose a different reading of the ‘map’ of Europe in its relation with the world:

... in a way, I think, the only reason why we are talking about Europe is because there are lines of movement, of migration, that are converging toward Europe, for various reasons to do with imperialist and capitalist relations. They converge here, and we are here, we respond here, from where we stand. But these lines start way before the borders of Europe. Following them would take us all around the world. Ideally, our network would expand all the way – and in all these places, we will also find Europe and have to confront Europe, because Europe is present all around the world as a global power... (Michel, 2012)

This quote is significant: it highlights one of the mechanisms through which many of the participants understood their position and their identity as activists. Here, Michel dialectically links, on the one hand, an identity that does not identify with geographical areas and borders – either national or European – and that is characterised by movement and, on the other hand, a need for a situated activism that tackles European anti-immigration policies as they are manifested ‘here’. I now give examples of this process and analyse it further.

One of the points that surprised me while conducting interviews with Migreurop members was that, while their organisation was called Migreurop, no discourse
about Europe seemed to be formulated besides that of opposing its increasingly repressive immigration policies. The network in fact describes itself as Euro-African. I raised this question with one of its members, Laura:

Celine: You are called Migreurop but you describe yourself as a Euro-African network. Why do you use ‘Europe’ in your name?
Laura: (…) there’s a reason for it. I mean, the reason why we called ourselves Migreurop, though I wasn’t there at the time, it was because we were created to work around the issue of migration to Europe and of the European immigration legislation. So of course in that sense Europe is central. But our work completely exceeds the borders of Europe (…) for two reasons. First, we work with a holistic notion of migration that includes departure as much as arrival. Migrating means also leaving, and so many people forget this. It is not an obvious process. (…) The other reason is that Europe controls the movement of people way beyond its borders through the process of externalisation that I just spoke about. For our colleagues in the South, there are direct consequences in their countries, everyday, and we are also here to denounce them. Basically the EU is creating a big line of division, a wall, in some places an actual real concrete wall, between its member states and the rest of the world. In terms of people’s movement I mean – people from the global South coming to Europe. The fight is to keep creating links, connections, lines of solidarity and contact. The solution will not come from just one or the other of these spaces. (Laura, 2012)

Here again, the identity underpinning Laura’s view of her work is one concerned with bridges, links and contacts, which connect migrants’ places of departure, follow their paths and extend all the way to their point of arrival – this Europe that builds a wall around itself. The goal is to destabilise this wall, in its concrete as well as intangible forms, which implies refusing the boundaries of the identity proposed by the European Union. Migratory movement and its trajectories are what shape the activist identity asserted by Laura. Building a collective identity that links localised struggles tackling the European border regime thus brings activists to explore spaces that go well beyond the EU itself. It is also a reflection of the increasing externalisation of European policies, as well as of the globalised nature of contemporary migratory phenomena. Solidarity with migrants arriving in Europe encourages recognition of the original reasons that they were displaced, that is an analysis of the nature of global relations and their impact on various groups of people in their original places of residence. This was also eloquently articulated by Alex when I asked him to expand on the relationship between European activism and larger geographical spaces:
Celine: You say you really don't have any interest in Europe but No Borders has called for European days of action, the set-up of European networks of resistance, there are European mailing lists…

Alex: That's a good point and we have always had this difficulty within No Borders. Like, here, we call ourselves No Borders UK, which is a contradiction in itself. But it comes from a recognition that our struggles are on the ground and hence in a given political context, against concrete policies, which aren't defined by us. (...) The way I think of it, and at least some other No Borders [activists] think of it: we are not interested in creating a new Europe, or a tolerant Europe or whatever Europe. I am not interested in this idea of Europe as a territory. In terms of theory, Deleuze speaks of the notion of territorialisation – so here of Europe as a political project linked to a territory with borders and boundaries around it. And, at No Borders, I think we're thinking much more in terms not of territory but of lines of movements. When I am talking about a network, it is about the routes around which people move, routes of movement. The places they have to flee because of neocolonial wars and capitalist exploitation. I think that's a much more accurate representation of what we are trying to create. It is not about a European territory or about a different kind of European territory; it is about a space defined by how people move… (Alex and Sean 2012, emphasis added)

These descriptions of forms of identity that are located and mobilised in particular contexts and, at the same time, interconnected in a fluid manner along lines of movements reveal an interesting dialectic between territorialisation and de-territorialisation, between the local and the global, and the possibilities for both to be reconciled through challenging global and European policies in a concrete situated way.

The issue of local solidarity was of prime importance to many of the participants. This was true in at least two ways. Firstly, as put by Sean (2012), because ‘when working against such big actors and policies, we have to see every small achievement as a victory to keep going’. This also reflects No Borders commitment to direct action and to the belief that ‘better stop one deportation than spend hours speaking with politicians who won’t change a thing’ (Pat, 2012), a belief that is widely supported within anarchist groups. But it was not only true for activists who agreed that concrete actions, however small, helped the struggle to keep momentum in a context where the EU ‘seems so far’ (Pat, 2012). Other participants mentioned, for example, that ‘at Migreurop, we are not sure whether to do advocacy at the EU level is a good
use of our time when there are urgent actions that can be taken in our own
direct contexts’ (Emily, 2014).

A second important point in relation to local-level activism is that the local level
is where spontaneous solidarity is the most visible. Transnational activism is
then seen as a way to bring out, expand and radicalise such practices.

In Calais, at least before the situation got hyper-politicised by media and
politicians, the local population engaged in ‘banal solidarity’ in plenty of
ways. There was spontaneous food distribution, Calais residents were
bringing blankets and warm clothes to migrants. It is important to
highlight and encourage these practices, to try to replicate them
elsewhere. It is a shame how the representation of Calais that came to
dominate has focussed on the opposite because the local reactions were
a lot more diverse than what we hear [now] (...) The situation in Calais
has been getting worse since 1999 and, more than ten years later, we
observe that the local associative response is still there. This everyday
solidarity is something to emulate. It shows that self-organisation can go
a long way as long as the media doesn’t come to - sorry for the
expression - create a mess (Oscar, 2014).

In the next section, I will reflect on the identities created through the
‘networkisation’ of local solidarity practices and show that, in some cases, it can
lead to the emergence of larger claims to common belonging, which can be
seen as a potential starting point for collective identities to arise.

Mediterranean identity

Oscar’s observation about local practices of solidarity is revealing: in calling
them ‘banal’, he also points out the fact that they are rendered invisible beyond
their direct environment. This is both because they are spontaneous and non-
organised responses at the local level and because the media ‘create a mess’
and offer representations that tend to ignore them. Another context in which
such dynamics were very obvious was that of Lampedusa. The similarity was
striking both in terms of the many local actions of compassion and support
towards migrants arriving on the island and in terms of their invisibilisation by
the mainstream media and political discourse. I have already discussed the
particular staging that took place around Lampedusa and the way in which an
emergency situation calling for a ‘life-saving’ intervention was produced. In that
context, Lampedusa residents’ activities of solidarity with migrants were mainly
ignored in dominant representations of the situation, something that the residents resented.

On my first day on the island, I spent time speaking with local residents, as a way to get a better sense of people’s feelings toward the situation. I wanted to see for myself if the depiction dominating journalistic accounts held true. Most of what I had read in mainstream newspapers had relied upon, and was framed by, various declarations by Italian politicians, such as the former mayor of Lampedusa, Mr De Rubeis, who claimed in 2011 that ‘we are at war and my people are ready to take the law into their own hands’. Right-wing politician and businesswoman Mrs Santanché had also declared that the inhabitants of Lampedusa were ‘under siege’ (Struggles In Italy, no date).

The stories I heard from the Lampedusani I spoke with were radically different. They featured great compassion towards the migrants (‘they are poor people like us’, told me an elderly woman), as well as anger towards the Italian and European authorities for having turned the circumstances of their arrival on the island into such an ‘unmanageable mess’. Responsibility regarding the difficult situation that had taken place on the island in 2011, when migrants burnt the detention centre, which was followed by clashes with the local police, was primarily identified at the governmental level. At the same time, European legislation stating that asylum claims have to be heard in the first point of entry to the EU (the Dublin Regulation) were criticised as an example of the lack of solidarity in Europe and the authoritative behaviour of Northern European states.

In contrast to this lack of European cooperation, the people I spoke with highlighted their own popular ethics and sense of solidarity: numerous episodes of clothes distribution and food sharing were related. A woman shared with me her pride of having introduced some migrants to Sicilian dishes. The stories I heard struck me by the strong desire they revealed on the part of Lampedusani to represent themselves as a people of tolerance and openness. A convincing narrative revolving around the idea of a Mediterranean identity forged at sea, precisely in the in-betweenness of that sea, and bringing its two shores together, was formulated. One of the subplots of this narrative revolved around
fishing: for centuries, the island’s economy had relied primarily on fishing (though tourism has become the first source of income in the last 20 years). The practice of fishing came with that of encountering Others, and particularly Tunisian fishermen living a mere 70 miles across the sea. In that context, calling on an ancestral tradition of solidarity with the other shore was used as a popular frame of contention to oppose the treatment of migrants by ‘Europe’.

While these traditions and practices are local, their formulation in terms of a Mediterranean culture gives them a larger dimension and the potential to be replicated in various sites in Southern Europe. Within Europe, the sense of a common Mediterranean historical experience was further reinforced by the perception that the Southern European countries were now sharing the same fate and were relegated to the same peripheral position within the EU. The excerpt of my interview with Zak, cited earlier, and his bitter mention of the PIGS acronym, is a good example of this impression of a shared destiny, which contributed to cementing his sense of ‘Mediterraneanness’. In this context, positioning himself as Mediterranean was used by Zak as a way to propose a counter-narrative based on a counter-positioning to the official discourse on European identity and to the role he perceived as assigned to him in this respect.

The discourse around the Mediterranean is all the more interesting because it has been relayed, appropriated and mobilised by activists. It features in the leaflets and campaign literature produced by pro-migrant associations, such as Lampedusa’s Askavusa, which is also part of a network called ‘Mediterranean Hope’. It was also a prominent framing reference for the Boats 4 People (B4P) campaign, which calls for ‘Freedom and Solidarity in the Mediterranean’. Activist Gabriele del Grande, who created the blog Fortress Europe, said in an interview, ‘I’m not just an Italian; the Mediterranean Sea is part of my identity and it has two shores: North and South. It’s my sea, these are my people, and we have to show solidarity’ (cited in Zafeiri, 2014).

This echoes an expression I heard several times, that of a ‘two-shored Mediterranean’ (used numerous times during the public meetings in Lampedusa, as well as in leaflets produced by B4P). This term was referred to
in order to emphasise the common features between, in this case, South Italy and North Africa, and to refuse the idea that ‘the sea becomes a border’ or, worse, ‘a collective grave for migrants’. Here again, using this term is an act of positioning that challenges the European map and shifts frames of belonging towards the South and towards migrants’ countries of origins. This act of counter-positioning is thus a way to assert a common destiny between migrants and activists, and to redraft identities along inclusive lines. For French activist Chantale, there is also a sense that Mediterranean culture ‘works better’ in activist circles than notions of Europeanism:

Celine: In relation to your work as part of migrants’ rights transnational networks, do you feel there is a common European militant dynamic, with a shared vision of Europe?  
Chantale: not... well... let’s say that as I have been in this domain for a long time, I have the feeling that I have seen it emerging, well, let’s say something a little bit common (...) among the organisations we work with. (...) In a sense we had to learn (...) to work with partners from other European countries but, also very early, as soon as 2005, Migreurop crossed the Mediterranean. We had Moroccan members and then we very quickly extended South. So learning to speak with other European partners was not that different from learning to speak with non-European Mediterranean colleagues. We all had to learn to speak other languages, to be confronted with other types of reaction, other relations to power… In the end, we still find it easier to work with Mediterranean partners than with Northern partners, I would say. Anyway, we did a lot of learning… This, from Europe but also importantly from beyond, it did converge little by little into a cultural identity within our network and similar associations. For Europeans, especially Western Europeans, somehow the more West or the more North you get the more so, it had a lot to do with learning that we are not the centre of the world. (2012)

It is interesting to see that Chantale starts by identifying a nascent European collective identity, in reaction to my own formulation of the question, yet she quickly rectifies to include non-European Southern countries, which eventually leads her to identify a stronger closeness to ‘Mediterranean’ partners than Northern European partners.

When I asked Nino from B4P why the language they chose to frame their campaign revolved around the idea of the Mediterranean, he first responded by saying it was ‘mostly because it is the space on which the campaign focuses… and that's because of the number of deaths in the Mediterranean’. Then he
offered an interesting hypothesis as to why notions of the Mediterranean had more mobilising potential than that of European solidarity:

There are two things in fact. The first one is that the Mediterranean is not related to one political entity – be it a state or a supranational authority like the European Union. So the Mediterranean doesn’t have enforced borders: it is an open space, one which can include many different people. When I say Mediterranean, I include; when I say Europe, I exclude. That’s one thing. The other one, I mean, it is linked to this, but of course the Mediterranean is a divided and segregated space politically – it includes Palestine and Israel, Turkey and Cyprus, Algeria and Tunisia – but at the same time it has not been used, there hasn’t been a real dominant discourse developed about the Mediterranean. And that gives it flexibility, it gives us freedom to define it, to expand it, to make it synonymous with solidarity and freedom, as we said in B4P. We cannot do this with the term European, even with the term African, they are terms with borders… (Nino, 2013)

In an email conversation, Gabriele del Grande (2013) also highlighted how ‘powerful the concept of the Mediterranean is’ because ‘it literally speaks of being in between’. Similarly, one of his colleagues, Ali, in an informal conversation in Rome, reflected on the ‘spirit of freedom of the Mediterranean’. He explained to me that, where Europe meant to him closing, the Mediterranean had inscribed into its name the idea of travels, of crossing, of encountering, of sharing. As Italians, he claimed, these experiences were important cultural and historical features, which the dominant discourse of Europe was trying to erase.

There is strong symbolic and political potential in this appropriation of the idea of the Mediterranean. In 1998, Driessen pointed out that:

the Mediterranean is not only a political, demographic and economic divide, but also an ideological and moral frontier, increasingly perceived by Europeans as a barrier between democracy and secularism on the one hand, and totalitarianism and religious fanaticism on the other (p. 100).

He observes what he calls the deepening of the ‘Mediterranean divide’ (p. 100), which has been directly linked to the process of European integration and the erection of Europe’s Southern border. In this sense, defining one’s self as
‘Mediterranean of the two shores’ is in direct opposition to the bordering and othering process enacted by the EU. For some of the participants and people like Ali, supporting migrants, challenging borders, and refusing to ‘be European’ were all part of the same struggle. What also was most striking to me was that the sense of Mediterranean solidarity and identity, one not constrained by borders, was able to travel much further than the Southern parts of Europe.

Transnationalising local solidarity

Indeed, as part of my monitoring of European pro-migrant initiatives, I started to notice how references to Lampedusa, as a symbol of resistance and solidarity, and to the idea of Mediterranean solidarity, were used in very different contexts and celebrated as examples to replicate. An interesting illustration of this can be found in the sustained series of protests that have been taking place since May 2013 in different German cities under the original name of ‘Lampedusa in Hamburg’. The protests started in Hamburg but quickly spread to other cities, giving rise to a series of ‘Lampedusa in …’ and leading to a session called ‘Lampedusa in Berlin, Hamburg and Bielefeld’ at Lampedusa in Festival in 2014. Migrants who transited through Lampedusa and now live in Germany, where they struggle to obtain status and a decent level of living, have been organising with German activist groups, and notably the German No One Is Illegal, to claim their right to a dignified life and to denounce the situation of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea.

The expression ‘Lampedusa in Germany’ first refers to the trajectory routes of those involved in the protests, but also, as H., one of the activists involved in Lampedusa in Hamburg, explained to me by email, ‘we want to be linked to Lampedusa not just as a place where tragedies occur but as a place where solidarity takes place’ (H., 2013). In other words, Lampedusa has become one of the symbols of resistance to anti-immigration European policies and of the possibility of renewed concepts of solidarity based on a regional, yet non-geographically bordered identity defined as ‘Mediterranean’, in reference to a cultural and historical tradition of exchanges and tolerance.

This challenges the geography of borders and separation promoted by the EU. Where migrants are spoken about as an exterior presence in the debate on the
EU, the use of the narrative around Mediterranean identity in sites as far away as Germany insists on the interiority of a migrant presence, and claims their possibility of belonging. It is a statement against the EU's practices of bordering, othering and marginalisation: activism brings what has been produced as geographically (but also in the symbolic realm as socio-culturally) external to Europe inside its territory. Pro-migrant activists and their discourses thus operate as bridges between various European sites and between what has been deemed as ‘Europe’ and ‘not Europe’.

In addition to referring to ‘Mediterranean solidarity’ in various contexts to mobilise people, the Lampedusa and Mediterranean experiences have also encouraged similar reflexive processes on a ‘life together before borders’ (H., 2013) in other sites in Europe. As mentioned, after the success of the B4P flotilla campaign calling for ‘Freedom and Solidarity in the Mediterranean’, a group of activists in Western and Northern European countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, France and England, decided to organise a similar project. A flotilla leaving from Rotterdam would sail to the UK, following the migratory routes of people trying to reach England from Northern European harbours. The trip would both denounce the situation of migrants trying to cross the North Sea and the English Channel but also try to recall a regional past before borders, when the area was characterised by a strong interconnection and integration. The links with the Mediterranean situation are clearly asserted in the literature produced by the campaign and circulated on the campaign’s blog ‘Voices from the Borders’ (2013):

At the heart of Europe, the border between the United Kingdom and its neighbors of the European Union reminds us of what is happening in the Mediterranean between the North shore and South shore. (...) It is important for the associations of the countries bordering the English Channel and the North Sea to build relationships (...) and networks that can analyze the border situation together, and raise public awareness in those areas (...)

Some of the people involved in the project (which has not yet taken place at the time of writing due to various material issues) were also active in Calais, as part of the Calais Migrant Solidarity group, which is, as explained by Alex, ‘an international radical solidarity group (...) where we are mostly Northern
Europeans – coming from Holland, Belgium, France and the UK’ (Alex and Sean, 2012). In that particular space, the cradle in a sense of the ‘old Europe’ or, as put in the previous excerpt, ‘the heart of Europe’, new narratives of identity outside the official idea of Europe were also emerging. Yet, there again, it was not the idea of ‘another Europe’ which was prevailing but, rather, frames orientated towards a local sense of solidarity calling on a history of togetherness that is perceived as having existed before mobility was constrained by the reinforcement of national and European borders (in this case the Schengen border between the UK and continental Europe).

One of the stories that came out in an interview with one of the activists involved in Calais and in the organisation of the Northern flotilla was also informative in this respect. Michel explained that:

Mobility is part of the history of our region and its countries [Netherlands, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom]. For centuries, the educated classes would spend months or years travelling around them to discover their respective culture, arts, and so on. We are just asking to democratise this tradition, to not let it be just for the rich of this world. (2012)

Michel was referring to the ‘Grand Tour’, which upper-class and, later, with the advent of railways, mostly male bourgeois European youngsters would take in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. The Grand Tour followed a particular itinerary, usually leaving from England to Belgium, the Netherlands or France. The route would then take the travellers to Paris or to Germany and, after passing through Switzerland, would go as far south as Florence, where the travellers would be schooled into Renaissance arts. It would usually finish in the German-speaking parts of Europe (such as Vienna, Dresden, Berlin and Potsdam) or Holland and the Flanders.

This comment features a level of ambiguity. Wittingly or not, Michel’s observation relies on a particular perspective and betrays a gender and class gaze, as it draws on the historical experience of bourgeois young men of Western European countries. Indeed, originally an aristocratic undertaking, the Grand Tour became a bourgeois preoccupation in the late 18th century. Billinge (2011) comments on how the Tour participated in the reproduction of England’s
privileged classes: ‘[p]rivate tuition, sometimes private school, university and the grand tour constituted the processing machine through which [the upper classes] fitted their offspring for wider service’ (p. 62). The Grand Tour was an illustration of what Marx considers as the contradictory character of the bourgeoisie, as a class that is both exploitative and creative. It was undertaken by youngsters who embraced the spirit of the Enlightenment and its associated elite cosmopolitanism. This development was integral to the historical context of the rise of industrial capitalism and of the growing colonial expansion of Western European states as their empires’ reach extended across the globe.

A literary description of the Grand Tour features in E.M. Forster’s Room with a View, the first part of which stages a group of Britons on a holiday to Italy. In the novel, Forster comments on the class snobbery and arrogance of some of his characters, who look down on Italian people and those they deem lower-class tourists. Forster himself travelled through Europe, as well as to parts of the British Empire. A conscientious objector during the First World War, he volunteered with the International Red Cross and served in Alexandria, Egypt (British Humanist Association, 2014). He also spent time in colonial India in the 1920s. Though writing in the high times of British imperialism, Forster’s prose features great sensitivity to the circumstances of others and a sense of compassion challenging the differences promoted by the ideologies of the time. ‘Only connect’, the epigraph to his 1910 novel Howards End (which appears at various points in the story and, in chapter 33, as ‘connect – connect without bitterness until all men are brothers’) testifies to the empathetic cosmopolitanism that characterises his work.

His novel A Passage to India, from 1924, depicts the interaction between white colonisers and the people and cultures of the places that they brought under their control. In his work, Forster subtly comments on the way that these travellers, both those undertaking the Grand Tour and imperial travellers, were part of an apparatus of domination yet nonetheless sometimes developed cultural appreciation of other worlds. The paradox bringing together capitalism, colonialism and cultural appreciation is in fact observable in other historical episodes. Earlier in French history, Napoleon’s Egyptian Campaign (1798–1801) was an instance of extreme colonial aggression, yet was characterised by
an appreciative exploration of Egyptian society and history. The term ‘Egyptomania’ was coined to describe the renewed interest of Europeans in ancient Egypt (Brier, 1992, pp. xi; 43-68).

The angular vision developed by Forster, which some scholars have correlated to his particular position as a homosexual man in a moralistic bourgeois society (Moffat, 2010), indicates the possibility of human encounters beyond the representations underpinning capitalist and colonial ventures. In a fashion somewhat similar, and in spite of the contradictions of his statement, participant Michel tries to put the memory of this experience at the service of new forms of solidarity. He calls for the revival of a form of regional togetherness through a ‘democratisation’ of a local history of travels, which he advocates should include migrants.

To further discuss the idea of replication of discourses and actions, I want to recall once again the attention that the participants paid to recognising that the border regime manifests itself in different ways, depending on where one is located, and thus calls for various forms of actions, discourses and mobilisation. This was in part seen as a result of the incompleteness of the European harmonisation process, but also as a consequence of the new mobility of the EU border (as illustrated, for example, by the ‘externalisation’ discussed in Chapter III) and the variety of roles assigned to different countries and sites in the complex system of the European border regime.

For example, replicating the B4P format of a flotilla in the North Sea and the Channel seemed appropriate because the ‘border between Schengen and non-Schengen spaces creates similar points of immobilisation’ (Chantale, 2012), as well as because ‘the sea as a terrain for activism and denunciation still needs to be invested’ (Nino, 2013). At the same time, it is widely recognised that challenging the border regime can and must adopt as many forms as there are obstacles faced by migrants: geographical but also legal, social and economic. Struggles thus take different forms and mobilise different local discourses. Yet, according to David (2012), they are also linked through ‘a utopian cosmopolitanism’.
This sense of cosmopolitanism, of international solidarity, was understood not as a mere generalisation of particular experiences but, rather, as the expansion of the meaning of local struggles beyond their direct context and their connection at the transnational level, while recognising their particularities. This is reminiscent, again, of the approach to global solidarity proposed by some of the activists and scholars related to the World Social Forum. While local identities and experiences are crucial to mobilise groups and organisations in particular situations and events, the discursive and narrative principles that lead their overall political engagement is better understood in internationalist terms.

Indeed, most of the participants made this clear to me during the interviews and insisted on their belief in radical forms of cosmopolitanism. For example, Laura (2012) concluded a short biographical account of how she started being an activist for pro-migrant issues by saying: ‘we are all citizens of the world!’, whilst Sonia (2012) said: ‘we are all similar human beings – beyond all borders’. As for Zak (2012), he finished our interview jokingly, by singing a phrase from a French song: ‘Citoyens du monde, partisans d’un monde sans frontières!’ (‘Citizens of the world, partisans of a world without borders!’). Reflecting on this issue, Chantale (2012) noticed that ‘here, our references seem a lot more internationalist than European’. For Tony (2012), working together with migrants’ associations beyond Europe was a means to ‘bring alter-globalism back from the grave beyond its purely Western bases and open it truly to the rest of the world, and especially North African and African people’. In other words, ‘it can, it must be the beginning of a new internationalism’ (Tony, 2012).

This indicates that, while there has been a transnationalisation of activist struggles at the European level, which shadowed the development of a repressive European border regime, the forms of solidarity invoked did not have anything specifically European to them. Rather, they were dialectically linking local and global identities in patterns that were not bound by notions or representations of Europe or Europeanity.

What also comes through in this analysis is the influence of previous traditions of internationalism on pro-migrant activists. At the time when the seminal rallying call ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ was first used, the world was going
through a phase of intensified colonial expansion and nationalisms were being advanced throughout Europe. Yet, in this ostensibly unpropitious context, spaces for international solidarity opened up and new forms of internationalism were established. These movements encouraged people to confront seemingly insurmountable tasks, such as opposing the First World War, on the basis of crossborder solidarity.

These traditions have provided ideological frameworks and guidance to recent counter-capitalist and alter-globalist movements, which have drawn both on formal texts from Marxist, communist and anarchist literature, as well as on the popular memory of earlier struggles. This memory remains and is circulated in activist circles, but also through families, community groups and practical experiences of resistance. The incorporation of pro-migrant activism in the broader frame of alter-globalism, and the participants’ political activity in other groups such as trades unions, anarchist federations and so on, has led them to absorb, more or less consciously, elements of this radical tradition and culture. The notion of international solidarity was readily mobilised by groups and activists that inscribed themselves into a radical left tradition inspired by working class struggles and Marxist literature. The term was also used by anarchist activists, though ideas of radical cosmopolitanism or ‘solidarity without borders’ were sometimes favoured. Through this exposure to earlier anti-capitalist practices and thoughts, the participants increasingly move towards positions from which they contest the latest phase of neoliberal capitalism. In this process, they mobilise various insights from previous international solidarity traditions that are reshaped and reassessed in the light of their new experiences and struggles.

The functioning of the European border regime, and the system of selective and differential inclusion that it operates, means that the poorest and most vulnerable migrants are systematically geared towards the most subordinate positions within European economies. As they engaged in pro-migrant activism, participants developed analyses of the complicity between particular forms of border controls and the stabilisation of neoliberal modes of production and accumulation. In this sense, several participants explained that they considered migrants’ struggles as critical sites from which to fight capitalism in the
neoliberal area. While in the dominant discourse the migrant has been constructed as a figure of fear and threat at the regional level, in activist circles migrants’ struggles are increasingly associated with the possibility for reviving proletarian internationalist/cosmopolitan solidarity. The migrant could thus become a central historical figure of contemporary anti-capitalist struggles.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have explored the discourses and collective identities developed by the pro-migrant activists participating in my research. My initial hypothesis was focussed on revealing counter-discourses and alternative notions of what a non-exclusionary European identity and citizenship could be. However, I realised that Europe as a framing concept or reference point for the formulation of activist identity was largely absent. In order to explain this research finding, I had to modify my research agenda and the questions I asked the participants during the interviews, so as to investigate the reasons why Europe was not referred to, as well as to explore the other narratives and collective identities that were being formed.

Whilst examining this dearth of Europe, a number of issues to do with the nature of the European project and the discourse of exclusion sustaining it emerged. These observations reveal that, in the case of the participants, not identifying with the EU featured an ideological dimension, an aspect that is often overlooked or denied by mainstream scholarship. More specifically, as their initial intuitions about the EU were further confirmed, or as they absorbed a more radical discourse through their encounter with other activists or realisations they gained in the field, the participants became increasingly aware of the neoliberal nature of the European project. They also developed an understanding of how neoliberal Europe brought about racialised patterns of marginalisation and exploitation, to which immigration and border controls were integral.

I have argued that, whilst SMT has developed important tools and concepts that proved useful to my research, and in particular with respect to grasping the transnationalisation and network character of pro-migrant struggles, it has some
important limitations. I have called for bringing class and capitalism back to the analysis in order to understand some of the paradoxes of the pro-migrant movement in Europe. This proved necessary to develop a better conceptualisation of how the dominance of a neoliberal framework within the EU impacts on the practices and discourses of the participants, and to reflect on relations between activists and the state in the age of globalisation.

The discourses mobilised by the participants to frame their activism and challenge the dominant exclusionary narrative on Europeanity brought together local experiences and transnational struggles in a fashion that challenged the geography of borders and othering of the EU. ‘Mobilising local histories of tolerance’, ‘democratising mobility’ and ‘cooperating as citizens of the world’ were three major narrative threads around which new positions and identities are being developed in the field of migrants’ rights and freedom of movement in Europe. They are linked through the processes of mobilising, generalising and connecting local practices and histories at a transnational level, and were inspired by long traditions of internationalism. They enabled activists to develop counter-positions from which various local and regional sites of resistance emerged. These sites are interconnected and form a network extending throughout Europe and beyond, underpinned by the cosmopolitan and internationalist ideal of a ‘world citizenry’.
Conclusion

The hazards of research

This research project is concerned with the emergence of new practices and discourses of solidarity with migrants in the context of the European Union. The research questions were formulated after spending several years volunteering and working with pro-migrant groups in France and the UK, as well as living in Syria, where I witnessed the struggle of several friends trying to find ways to travel to Europe. These experiences had led me to reflect on the emergence of an increasingly exclusionary discourse in the EU, coupled with practices of marginalisation and segregation against non-Europeans (as well as others deemed 'illegitimate'). All appeared to be part of building an ever-harsher border regime.

My involvement with pro-migrant groups had also allowed me to observe that new forms of solidarity were taking shape. As ‘Europe’ and its citizens were being constructed from the top down as a community of exclusion, I set out to investigate how pro-migrant activists challenged and contested these new internal and external borders. I started my research project with two main concerns. First, I wanted to examine practices of solidarity with migrants in Europe and, in particular, whether and how they had been affected by the harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies. My hypothesis in this respect was that the increasing coordination of anti-immigration policies at the supranational level was being matched by a crossborder restructuring of migration struggles in order to better respond to these new developments. Second, I wanted to explore the narratives and discourses developed by pro-migrant activists and, more specifically, the vision(s) of Europe that they were formulating to challenge the EU's dominant discourse on migration.

To carry out this investigation, I borrowed a number of concepts and tools from social movement theory (SMT), which proved useful in examining how networks are formed and how they operate. SMT allowed me to conceptualise the diverse initiatives and groups I was studying as part of a continuum, in spite of their variety in terms of structures, activities and political backgrounds. It also allowed
me to study these groups in a comparative way. I conducted multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork in three European countries over a period of year and a half, and used a mixture of qualitative research methods in order to develop an understanding of the practices and discourses of participating pro-migrant activists.

My fieldwork confirmed that a clear intensification of crossborder interactions, pan-European initiatives and transnational campaigns was taking place in the field of migration solidarity in the EU. However, in the course of my fieldwork, some of my initial research hypotheses were challenged. I observed that the idea of ‘another Europe’ was altogether absent from participants’ narratives. Where I had expected to discover counter-ideas of what Europe and European identity meant, I came to realise that alternative visions of Europe were lacking.

This observation led me to make an important adjustment to my research project. My key issue of concern evolved from exploring counter-narratives of Europe to understanding why Europe was missing from pro-migrant activists’ accounts. As I continued my fieldwork, I formulated a new research hypothesis: I suggested that the dearth of alternative discourses on Europe among participants was connected to the nature of the European project and the contradictions it generates.

Revisiting the European political project

This unexpected outcome of my fieldwork started to make sense when I analysed it in light of a critical understanding of the process of constructing Europe. Whilst the official discourse on the origins of the European Community emphasises its internationalism and describes it as a project of peace and stability, I attempted to develop a counter-history of Europeanisation that revealed the contradictions of the European economic and political venture.

Drawing on theoretical insights from a range of disciplines, I put forward the argument that the European Community was first and foremost a project aimed at rescuing the capitalist nation-states of Western Europe in the post-war period. This was done by internationalising some of their activities at a time
when national capitalist classes realised they needed to pursue economic interests beyond their national borders. In this sense, the European project has been marked from the start by a tension between cooperation and competition, reflecting the contradictory nature of capitalist development and accumulation. I also examined the way in which, in the last three decades, the European Union has been increasingly embedded in the global neoliberal agenda.

In this context, ideologues and politicians of Europe have developed a discourse on European belonging in an attempt to trigger identification with Europe and secure popular consent toward the Community. I have termed this ideological quest for meaning the ‘politics of Europeanism’. In the late 1980s, as the global economic recession exacerbated the contradictions inherent in the European Community and as the project of harmonisation became more urgent with the rise of neoliberalism, this ideological pursuit became more intensive.

This discourse, I argued, borrowed from the ideological and symbolic material of European nationalisms. The construction of nations as ‘imagined communities’ relied on the formulation of narratives of belonging based on the assertion of a shared historical past and particular socio-cultural traits, as well as on the identification of those deemed as ‘not belonging’. In the same vein, the ideologues of Europe engaged in defining and identifying those whom they considered as not fitting in the community of Europeans. Europeanism was premised on the notion of a civilisational and cultural difference and incompatibility between Europeans and non-Europeans. ‘The migrant’ became a key figure of otherness in this ideological strategy, which has contributed to creating a climate of hostility towards non-Europeans and to a rise in racism at the hyper-state, local state and popular levels. Immigration became a key field for political cooperation among EU member states to the extent that, in the course of a decade (from mid-1980s to mid-1990s), a supranational regime of border and immigration control was established.

Taking into account this critical political economy and history of the European Community, and acknowledging that the production of new forms of marginalisation and otherness had been integral to the process of European
integration, helped me understand the lack of reference to Europe in the participants’ narratives.

The contradictions generated by the friction between cooperation and competition in the development of the EU led to what Callinicos (1997) described as ‘a bizarre European amalgam’ which many participants struggled to make sense of. The participants’ relation to the European project was also determined by their political backgrounds. On the one hand, some participants engaged in solidarity activism with migrants precisely because they had conceptualised the links between the construction of a capitalist European regime and racialised forms of exclusion. On the other hand, some of them, who initially seemed to have absorbed elements of the dominant European discourse, became increasingly disengaged from it as their activist experiences made them witness and understand some of the contradictions of the European project and its border regime.

**Revisiting social movement theory**

Rather than formulating alternative discourses on Europe, the participants articulated narratives underpinned by other frames of belonging. A particularly striking example was that of the notion of ‘Mediterranean solidarity’, which put forward the idea of an inclusive, tolerant regional identity bringing together the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This discourse disrupted the dominant European geography of exclusion and borders and displaced frames of belonging so as to include migrants’ countries of departure and transit. It relied on a historical account of a ‘life before borders’ and on the popular recollection of encounters at sea, in particular around fishing. This narrative is one of transnationalism from below, which mobilises oral memories and popular ethics to develop new forms of solidarity with migrants.

The discourse on Mediterranean solidarity echoed across Europe. In some sites, it was used in a fashion that symbolically brought inside Europe what had been constructed as its outside. In others, it inspired activists to revisit their own local and regional history to explore similar accounts of mobility before borders. These situated discourses were linked and connected through notions of
international solidarity and world citizenry, which drew on earlier traditions of internationalism and dialectically connected local and global struggles. The pro-migrant activists I interviewed put forward identity narratives characterised by their fluidity and the connections they made between different sites of struggle. Many of them identified with an internationalism from below, which followed the lines of movement of migrants and rejected geography-bounded affiliations.

The complexities and fluidity of the discourses put forward by the participants were difficult to apprehend through SMT. Whilst its insights were useful to investigate ideas of networking and of ‘a community of meaning’, which were important observations that came out of my fieldwork, its focus on clearly defined and integrated identities proved too static to understand the participants’ fluid, complex and multi-layered narratives of belonging and resistance. Moreover, the disengagement of SMT from the study of capitalism and its effects on social movements, and its overemphasis on cultural factors, meant that it also failed to grasp the intricacies and contradictions of the European Union, particularly the relationship between national member states and supranational developments, which I analysed through a political-economic approach to Europeanisation.

One of the questions that this raises is whether pro-migrant activism in Europe can in fact be considered a social movement. Because its conventional frames of analysis are not satisfied by the lack of an integrated European framework structuring pro-migrant initiatives, SMT seems to lead us to the conclusion that it is not. Yet my fieldwork has shown that migration solidarity activism in the EU features a high degree of interaction and communication, a dense process of networking, as well as the production of sophisticated ideological and conceptual frameworks.

What originally brought the participants together was a common concern vis-à-vis European immigration and border policies. But by engaging in crossborder activities with activists in other countries, they gradually developed a shared language to speak about and challenge the EU border regime. The extent to which the participants could communicate with and understand each other across local and national contexts was striking: from Lampedusa to Calais,
Paris to London, a mutually comprehensible and increasingly converging analysis of the EU’s practices and discourses of exclusion had emerged. Hence, pro-migrant activism in the EU is a significant social and political phenomenon, which might be described as a proto-movement or a movement-in-formation.

In order to understand this phenomenon, an analysis of capitalism and an understanding of mobility, and of the relation between the two, have to be injected into social movement theory. An analytical framework that recognises the way in which the journeys undertaken by migrants undermine the European border regime and its immigration control needs to be developed. Migrants’ journeys create networks that extend across the globe, embracing the countries they leave, those they passed through and the places in Europe that they attempt to reach. These networks traverse and destabilise the boundaries of the nation-state, both in territorial and symbolic terms. The movement of irregular migrants is itself a challenge to the regime of borders and exclusion developed in Europe and beyond. By engaging in solidarity campaigns with migrants in the EU, my participants explore the causes, trajectories and consequences of peoples’ engaging in journeys towards Europe. The discourses they developed were often coupled with a critical analysis of global capitalism, North-South relations and the relation between neoliberalism and forced displacement. Their initiatives addressed these various insights and required analytical tools capable of grasping these complex dynamics, their interactions and their evolutions.

**Further research**

Thinking ahead about further avenues of research that have emerged from this project, I identified a number of areas that could be examined to extend our understanding of the relationship between ‘Europe’ and social movements, as well as to further our analysis of migration solidarity struggles. Some features of the theoretical framework I have developed in the thesis may be usefully applied to other places and times and can be of value to scholars of European Studies and of social movements. They highlight some key contradictions of the European project from the perspective of a European movement from below,
which may be pertinent to studying not only pro-migrant activism in other sites of the EU but also other social movements in Europe.

This study focused on three ‘old’ European countries. One of the findings that emerged from the research indicated that there was a dialectical relationship between local and transnational struggles: whilst activists sought crossborder links and coordinated their resistance to the EU border regime, the nature of the European framework meant that these transnational interactions were articulated around situated practices that engaged with local manifestations of the border regime. In this context, it would be interesting to bring my research questions and hypotheses to other sites of the European Union, particularly Central and Eastern European countries. As one participant mentioned, the accession path of countries that recently joined the EU shaped their populations’ representations of Europe and endowed them with different aspirations. At the same time, some of these countries have become the Eastern border of the EU and have been encouraged to develop strict immigration and border policies, which have disrupted local circulation, cultural and trading systems. The EU has supported the construction of detention centres and has trained border guards, in particular through Frontex, so as to reinforce the ‘green border’. Mechanisms such as the Dublin Convention mean that migrants who are detected whilst passing through Central or Eastern European countries, on their way to Western or Northern Europe, are sent back to those countries.

These developments are reminiscent of those I discussed in respect to the formation of the Italian immigration regime. However, the very different historical trajectories of Central and Eastern European countries, which belonged to the ‘Soviet enemy bloc’ until three decades ago, raise important additional questions. In particular, they would require an analysis of how the dominant discourse of Europe has legitimised the implementation of an immigration regime that, on the one hand, dislocates popular and historical relationships and, on the other hand, rearticulates territories and identities in order to include them within ‘Europe’.
Moreover, in the context of the eastern enlargement of the EU border regime, a range of pro-migrant groups and campaigns have emerged. Migreurop, for example, has been cooperating with organisations in Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia, among others. Similarly, since its inception, No Border has denounced the construction of the Eastern border of Europe. No Border camps have been held at the border between Germany and Poland (1998, 2000), at the Eastern border of Poland (2002), in Slovenia (2001), Romania (2003), at the border between Greece and Bulgaria (2003, 2005), in Finland, at its border with Russia (2004), and in Ukraine (2007). There are interesting possibilities for further investigation of my research questions in these sites.

Another avenue for research that I would like to take forward concerns the discourse on Mediterranean identity and solidarity. The idea of a 'Mediterranean of the two shores' was strongly put forward by participants in Italy in order to express their rejection of a European discourse of belonging based on difference and separation. Where European integration was pushing a 'Mediterranean divide', the participants claimed that their identities lay in the in-betweeness and the connections symbolised by this Sea. This discourse resonated beyond Europe’s Southern borders and has shaped activist practices and narratives in Germany and other Northern and Western European sites. I would like to examine whether and how a discourse on a Mediterranean identity has been developed in other Southern European countries to challenge the EU's discourse and practices in relation to migrants' journeys across the sea. Informal conversations with pro-migrant activists in Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Spain indicate that the idea of the Mediterranean is also mobilised in these sites, albeit in different ways shaped by the historical and local context of each country. In some places, it seems that the notion of Mediterranean belonging has been strongly connoted by its use in the context of Euro-Mediterranean partnerships and that it is more difficult to associate it with potential discourses of resistance. This would require further fieldwork in order to explore pro-migrant activists’ identity narratives in other Southern European countries.

It would also be of interest to 'cross the Sea' and to conduct research with migration solidarity groups on its Eastern and Southern shores. Looking at how the idea of a Mediterranean identity is understood and whether it is mobilised in
the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean could indeed shed more light on its potential for crossborder solidarity beyond Europe. On the one hand, it has been suggested to me during one interview that the idea of the Mediterranean appears to be a dubious concept to some North African activists. Several reasons were mentioned. One participant commented that there was a perception that the idea of the Mediterranean was a strategy on the part of the West, and was seen as a discursive device to integrate Israel into the territorial and political fabric of the region. It was also suggested that other local and regional identities, such as pan-Arabism or religious-affiliated identities, were more readily mobilised in the field of international solidarity. Yet, as activist struggles converge across borders, ideas are also shared, discussed and appropriated. The Tunisian activists who participated in Boats4People, for instance, have engaged in the Mediterranean solidarity narrative and might have found it of use in their own campaigning work. In 2013, Tunis was the location the World Social Forum, which featured discussions on migration-related issues and Mediterranean solidarity. The 2015 WSF will also be held in Tunisia and will also have several sessions on the impact of EU immigration policies and proposals for freedom of movement. Activists from Lampedusa In Festival, B4P, Migreurop and No Border attended the 2013 WSF and will be present at the 2015 iteration. This illustrates how the discourse on a two-shored Mediterranean is translated into solidarity practices and the weaving of links between pro-migrant activists across the sea. Studying this development in more detail, in terms of its potential and its limits, would be of great interest to further our understanding of migration solidarity networks. In a similar vein, a participant who had participated in No Border camps in Greece mentioned that Greek activists had been calling for a reconnection with Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan neighbours based on a specific reading of the regional history and the shared cultural traits of the various countries of the area.

Finally, I believe that some of the findings and observations regarding how the participants related to the idea of Europe could be explored further in relation to other social movements. The particular subject that the participants engaged with, that of migration and borders, might have led them to deconstruct the dominant discourse of Europe and European belonging in a more systematic way. Yet the contradictions generated by the European Union and the lack of a
European framework that could integrate activist practices might be similarly problematic in the context of other political and social struggles. The heated negotiations currently occurring between the recently-elected Syriza-led government in Greece and representatives of the EU has shed further light on the capitalist nature and inflexibility of intra-EU relations. These developments have encouraged activists – and to some extent the larger public - to reassess the official account of Europe as a project of brotherhood and solidarity among its member states. They highlight a need to re-examine the process of construction of the European Community in a critical way. In this context, the critical history of Europeanisation and of the idea of Europe that I have developed in this project could be further explored and could be relevant in the study of other forms of contentious politics in the EU and their relation to the Union.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Table of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of participant</th>
<th>Organisaton, campaign or network</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Place of interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 David</td>
<td>MRN</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50-60yrs old</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>(30 January 2012 for preliminary discussion) 27 June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Roy</td>
<td>No Borders</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30years</td>
<td>Anarchist</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>(15 February 2012 for preliminary discussion) 29 June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rachel</td>
<td>Through MRN (MRC)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50-60 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing liberal</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>2 July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jack</td>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>4 July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Henry</td>
<td>NOII</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50-60 years old</td>
<td>Socialist revolutionary</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>14 October 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Alex</td>
<td>No Borders</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30-40 years old</td>
<td>Anarchist</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>15 December 2012 &amp;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78 All names have been changed for confidentiality.
79 This is the political affiliation that participants claimed during the interview, if any.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pat</td>
<td>Stop Deportation M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Anarchist</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>25 January 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shock</td>
<td>Stop Deportation M</td>
<td>30-40 years old</td>
<td>Anarchist, socialist</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>12 February 2013</td>
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**PARTICIPANTS IN FRANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Marcella</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, communist</td>
<td>Paris/Roma</td>
<td>5 August/12 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Katia</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30-40 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>6 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sonia</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, feminist, anti-racist</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>7 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chantale</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40-50 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, communist, anti-racist</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>17 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Michel</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40-50 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, socialist</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Laura</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>6 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Martina</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>Poitiers</td>
<td>6 October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Emily</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>Paris/ Skype</td>
<td>8 October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Oscar</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40-50 years old</td>
<td>Anti-racist</td>
<td>Poitiers</td>
<td>13 October 2014</td>
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**PARTICIPANTS IN ITALY**

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Hassan</td>
<td>Lampedusa in Festival / AMM</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Lampedusa</td>
<td>22 July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Clara</td>
<td>When You</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-</td>
<td>Lampedusa</td>
<td>20 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Contact Method</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Marco</td>
<td>When You Don't Exist</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40-50 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Lampedusa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Antonio</td>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Lampedusa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Tony</td>
<td>Migreurop</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Nidal</td>
<td>Activist associated with AMM</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30-40 years old</td>
<td>Anti-racist</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sandro</td>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30-40 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ahmad</td>
<td>B4P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Nino</td>
<td>Migreurop / Fortress Europe</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Left-wing, anti-racist</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Gian</td>
<td>Migreurop / Fortress Europe</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Anti-racist</td>
<td>Skype and email</td>
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**PARTICIPANTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES OR EUROPEAN NETWORKS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Location(s)</th>
<th>Contact Method</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Daniela</td>
<td>PICUM</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30-40 years old</td>
<td>Liberal, left-wing</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td></td>
<td>17 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Pietro</td>
<td>European Alternatives</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 October 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>Lampedusa in Hamburg</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20-30 years old</td>
<td>Anarchist</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td></td>
<td>Several exchanges 2013-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Exemplar questions for the interviews

General questions about the organisation/group/campaign:

1. Can you present the organisation/group/campaign you are part of?
2. What are its core values and mission?
3. Which activities do you conduct?

Particular questions depending on the type of organisation. E.g. for a network:
4. Can you tell me about the origins of the network?
5. How did it come about? What were the motives?
6. How do you operate as a network?
7. How are members represented?
8. How often do you meet and under which circumstances?

Europe and European connections:
9. How would you describe the current migration system in the EU?
10. How do you engage with these issues?
11. Do you work with organisations in other EU countries?
12. What sort of cooperation do you carry out?
13. How do you coordinate this work?
14. What are, according to you, the most successful ways to defend migrants’ rights in the EU presently?
15. Do you sometimes ask organisations in other EU countries for support to address issues which come up here? Why?
16. What is your relationship with your EU partners? How does it differ from other (e.g. national) partners?
17. Do you discuss issues related to the EU with your colleagues/comrades?
18. What is the EU for you?
19. What sort of migration policies would you like to see in place in the EU?

Activist background

1. How long have you been active in the field of migrants’ rights?
2. Why did you first get involved in migrants’ struggles?
3. Why do you think it is an important issue?
4. Would you mind describing your political affiliation?
5. How does you see the relation between migration solidarity and your broader political values?
6. Are you part of other political groups/networks?
Appendix C: Request to participate in the research project

About the Research Project

Project Description: This research is looking at the way organisations and individuals mobilise around migrants’ rights in the European Union and studying the aspirations, concerns, practices and discourses of these groups and people.

Project Title: Contesting Europeanism: discourses and praxes of migrants’ organisations in the European Union.

Project aims and objectives: My research is exploring counter-discourses to the mainstream idea of Europe that is being formulated and pushed forward by the main institutions of the EU, and which is defined by strong exclusionary tendencies. By looking at the work of people and organisations fighting for the rights and equality of migrants (who are the most striking example of a group excluded from European membership by the mechanisms of European citizenship) I am hoping to find alternative visions of Europe. I am also intending to see whether and how Europeanisation of migration policies in EU countries has been, if at all, matched by an increase in pan-European cooperation between people working for migrants’ rights. I am interested in both factual knowledge that people working in that field might hold regarding transborder projects and activities around migration, as well as individual beliefs and values which push people to get involved in migrants’ rights organisations and actions.

About your participation

I have approached you because I would value the information and opinion you might be willing to share with me. However, you have no obligation to accept to participate in this research. Before you decide whether you wish to be involved, the paragraphs below describe the confidentiality policy I will be following and re-state your right to stop your participation at any time should you decide to do so.

Confidentiality of the Data: This research project will assure the anonymity of the participants who wish to remain unnamed as well as confidentiality of data gathered from the interviews. Unless the participant explicitly asks to be named, pseudonyms will be used to safeguard the participant’s anonymity. Interviews will be transcribed and will not contain any personal information or data. All interviews will be coded without revealing your identity or personal data. The voice recording will be safely stored in a digital medium such as a CD or mp3 file and it will be guaranteed that only the researcher and the supervisor of the research will have access to listen to the interviews. Notebooks containing interview codes and other field notes will also be safely stored and the researcher and supervisor of research will be the only people to read the notes and transcriptions. On conclusion of this research, data and notes collected will be kept on a digital medium, such as in the researcher’s personal computer or other CD or mp3 file, which will be safely stored. The documents will have a password known only to the researcher.

Disclaimer: You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time during or after the process of interviews. Should you choose to withdraw from the research, you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to provide the researcher with a reason for doing so.

Many thanks for considering taking part in this research project.
Appendix D: Consent form for participants

University of East London
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
University of East London
Docklands Campus
University Way
London E16 2RD

University Research Ethics Committee
If you have any queries regarding the conduct of the programme in which you are being asked to participate please contact the Secretary of the University Research Ethics Committee: Ms D Dada, Administrative Officer for Research, Graduate School, University of East London, Docklands Campus, London E16 2RD (telephone 0044 208 223 2976 e-mail d.dada@uel.ac.uk)

Principal Investigator
Celine Cantat
United Kingdom Mobile: +44 (0) 750 3755 170 E-mail: celinemcantat@gmail.com
France Mobile: +33 (0) 6 67 62 79 34
Italy Contact Number (to be confirmed)

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to consider in deciding whether to participate in this study.

Project Title

“Contesting Europeanism: discourses and praxes of migrants’ organisations in the European Union”.

Project Description

This research is looking at the way in which concepts of European citizenship and identity are presented at different levels in the European Union. I have worked on identifying and describing the dominant discourse, that is to say that put forward by representatives of the European Union and its member states, and the official media. I am now trying to uncover alternative concepts of European belonging and membership. I am focusing on the practices and the discourses emerging from migrants’ organisations. The main questions I am interested in are:

- How do migrants’ organisations and migrants’ solidarity networks relate to the dominant discourse on European identity and citizenship?
- Which challenges do they pose to it?
- Can we identify normatively efficient counter-discourses to Europeanism in the work of migrants’ organisations?

Confidentiality of the Data
This research project will assure the anonymity of the participants who wishes to remain unnamed as well as confidentiality of data gathered from the interviews. Unless the participant explicitly gives his/her consent to be name, pseudonyms will be used to safeguard the participant’s anonymity. Interviews will be transcribed and will not contain any personal information or data. All interviews will be coded without revealing your identity or personal data. The voice recording will be safely stored in a digital medium such as a CD or mp3 file and it will be guaranteed that only the researcher and the supervisor of the research will have access to listen to the interviews. Notebooks containing interview codes and other field notes will also be safely stored and the researcher and supervisor of research will be the only people to read the notes and transcriptions. On conclusion of this research, data and notes collected will be kept on a digital medium, such as in the researcher’s personal computer or other CD or mp3 file, which will be safely stored. The documents will have a password known only to the researcher.

Disclaimer

You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time during or after the process of interviews. Should you choose to withdraw from the research, you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to provide the researcher with a reason for doing so.

Consent to Participate in a Research Programme

I have read the information relating to the above programme of research in which I have been asked to participate and have been given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about this information. I understand what is being proposed and the procedures in which I will be involved have been explained to me.

I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, will remain strictly confidential. Only the researchers involved in the study will have access to the data. It has been explained to me what will happen to the data once the research programme has been completed.

I, ____________________, hereby grant permission to the right to record my voice and reveal my views related to questions asked by Celine Cantat the researcher of the PhD project provisionally entitled “Contesting Europeanism: Discourses and praxes of migrants’ organisations in the European Union”.

____________________________  __________________
Signed       Date