

Reloading the Armalite?

Victims and Targets of Violent Dissident Irish Republicanism 2007-2015

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Abstract

The centenary of the 1916 Rising marks a time of peaceful commemoration, across the island of Ireland. However, several violent dissident republican groups wish to seize it as an opportunity to re-organise in an attempt to bolster and legitimise their sustained paramilitary campaign. This study seeks to provide a greater understanding, of how this paramilitary activity has manifested from 2007 to mid-2015. We do this by assessing target selection, through analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) events database. The data suggest that civilian targets are the most regularly attacked. However, when exclusively analysing targets of detonated explosives, the data show that police, security personnel and their infrastructure are more consistently targeted. The target selected can and does have an effect on attack method. These findings can both assist in protecting the potential targets of VDR attacks and contribute to the development of a strong nationalised, and localised, counter VDR narrative.

Keywords: Northern Ireland, Dissident, Republicanism, IRA, Targeting

Introduction

By late 2015 the future of the Northern Irish peace process had once again been called into question. On this occasion the supposed threat to stability and peace came in reaction to the alleged involvement of Provisional IRA (PIRA) members in the murder of their former comrade Kevin McGuigan, in the Short Strand, Belfast on August 12th, 2015.¹ Many believe that McGuigan's life was taken in retribution for the killing two months previously of another former Provisional, Gerard 'Jock' Davison.² The murder, and reactions to it, raised significant concerns about the apparent continued existence of a movement thought inert. This apparent violent return of the 'Provos' to the Northern Irish social and political stage, gave rise to widespread speculation and condemnation in equal measure. However, nothing suggests this is anything more than a settling of old scores. There was no declaration of a resumption of the armed campaign, and no Provisional distancing from the wider political strategy of Sinn Féin (the political wing of the PIRA). In fact, Sinn Féin representatives were quick to condemn the violence.³ Even though, there continue to be allegations of 'Provisional' involvement in fuel smuggling, intimidation and wider criminality⁴ this, it appears, does not herald a permanent return to the paramilitary stage, and instead is simply characterized by the involvement of former figures in that movement, sometimes working together in small groups.⁵

Meanwhile, as the political and media focus rested firmly on allegations of the Provisionals' return, the more persistent threat to Northern Irish security of violent dissident republicanism⁶ (VDR) once again reared its ugly head. On the same day as the murder of McGuigan, a VDR bomb exploded on the Skeoge Road in Derry. Two days later, another, perhaps more significant, bomb exploded this time inside Palace Barracks, the Northern Irish base of both MI5 and The Royal Scots Borderers. The bomb was hidden inside a parcel in a Royal Mail postal van. It is believed that this was detonated remotely. While neither explosion inflicted any injuries or fatalities, both events illustrated the continuing intent of the VDR groupings to perpetuate an armed campaign that has been sporadically on-going since 1994. These two attacks should not be considered as wholly representative of VDR tactics. However, they illustrate the intention of the groups, to simultaneously target the security services of the state while also aiming to disrupt the normalisation of Northern Irish life, through their attacks on civilian targets across the country. The main purpose of this article is

to analyse how this modern day VDR activity has evolved; and in particular, to assess who and what have been the victims and targets of that violence.

The Modern Wave of VDR Activity

For many, the history of VDR activity is defined by the Omagh bombing, the Real IRA (RIRA) attack that took the lives of 29 civilians and injured over 200 others in August 1998. Since then, there has been no VDR atrocity on this scale. However, recent times have shown the ability, and intention, of a variety of groups to retain the utility of paramilitary force. A post St Andrews Agreement⁷ Northern Ireland, has seen each of the dominant VDR groups utilise lethal, or near lethal, force to further their stated aims, of achieving an independent 32 county socialist Ireland. This has seen the rise of several distinct VDR groups, including: RIRA, Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH), the Continuity IRA (CIRA), Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and more recently ‘The IRA/New IRA.’ Each of these groups has engaged in a variety of paramilitary activities, ranging from the lethal targeting of the security services, to punishment attacks and murders of those they deem to be criminals (e.g. alleged drug dealers).

We believe that the violence in present-day Northern Ireland is part of a modern wave of VDR activity, which dates back to January 2007. It was then that the Ard Fheis (the annual party conference) of Sinn Féin made the historical decision to support the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).⁸ This vote provided the cornerstone for sustained peace in the country. For generations, republican distrust in, and dismissal of, the police had played a significant role in holding back the complete normalisation of Northern Irish society. Prior to their full acceptance and support of the PSNI, Sinn Féin had historically told their supporters not to report any crimes or misdemeanours to the police, either the PSNI or their predecessors in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).⁹ This was due to the stated Republican belief that this was a British police force, whose very existence promoted the continued partition of Ireland. Historically for Irish Republican paramilitaries the PSNI, and the RUC, represented an ‘occupying’, British and ‘political’ police force. For the Irish republicans, the police did not represent their community. The RUC especially, was framed as a predominantly Protestant and unionist sympathising police force, whose job it was to maintain the existence of partition.¹⁰

This inherent dismissal of the police provided the Republican Movement with the opportunity to present themselves as the legitimate protectors of the republican and nationalist communities. Resultantly, with the 2007 vote the VDR community took the opportunity to re-launch their semi-dormant campaign of paramilitary violence. To their potential and existing support and membership, they depicted the Sinn Féin leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness as ‘selling a lie,’ to the Northern Irish people. While Sinn Féin were promoting the PSNI as a civic police force, the Real IRA were accusing the ‘RUC/PSNI’ of being a ‘political police force whose primary function is to protect British interests in Ireland.’¹¹ In doing so, they were stating that Sinn Féin had abandoned the Northern Irish republican community.

The re-emergence of the VDR campaign was manifested in the targeting of PSNI officers. With the advent of the Patten Commission,¹² and the origins of the PSNI, one of the central aims was to create a more representative police force, and to enforce a 50-50 recruitment strategy for Protestant and Catholic candidates. If successful, it would become significantly more difficult for the VDR groups to characterise the police as being unrepresentative. Consequently, in addition to targeting the PSNI because of the ‘enemy’ status, the groups have also specifically targeted Catholic and nationalist officers. This has resulted in the murder of officers Stephen Carroll¹³ and Ronan Kerr,¹⁴ by the CIRA and ‘The IRA/New IRA’ respectively. These officers, and their colleagues, have been targeted so as to deter others of a similar background from joining; in doing so, they seek to maintain the status quo of an unrepresentative force. This in turn, allows the groups to sustain and legitimise their own position as community protectors, distinct from the police. Recent figures show that, while more representative than before, that the percentage of Roman Catholic police officers in the force is 30.97% in comparison to 67.02% Protestant officers.¹⁵ At the time of the last census, in 2011, 40.76% of all Northern Irish citizens stated that they were Catholic and 45.14% were brought up in a Roman Catholic household. In contrast 41.56% stated that they were Protestant, or of other Christian religions, and 48.36% were brought up in a Protestant or other Christian religion household.¹⁶ While this disparity in police recruitment remains, it can continue to provide oxygen to the VDR legitimisation narrative.

Alongside the threat posed by the VDR groups to their declared enemy, the British state and their security services, VDR attacks also regularly threaten the wider civilian population. This has included the attempted detonation of explosive devices in residential and shopping areas across Northern Ireland.¹⁷ The main function of these attacks is to disrupt the normalisation of life in post-Troubles Northern Ireland and in turn harm inward social and economic investment in the state. Their aim is to demonstrate that the future of Northern Ireland is unsustainable, if it remains part of the United Kingdom.

These attacks on the police and security services, as well as the targeting of the broader civilian population, have been complimented by a parallel strategy to ‘protect’ the republican and nationalist communities, from drug dealers and other anti-social elements. This stated tactic has seen the murders of individuals such as Andrew Allen¹⁸ and Kevin Kearney,¹⁹ accused by RAAD and ‘The IRA/New IRA’ respectively of dealing drugs in their localities. However, not all of this VDR vigilante violence has been targeting external victims. As has been the norm across Irish Republican history a significant proportion of the violence has been directed inwards, towards current or former comrades within the Irish Republican Movement. Carrying on the tradition of the PIRA’s ‘nutting squad,’²⁰ the VDR leaderships have attempted to maintain control and discipline within their ranks, through the threat and execution of violence for those members deemed to be ‘stepping out of line.’²¹ Internal feuds, organisational splits and alleged misconduct has led to the maiming, and at times murder, of a number of dissident republicans. The names of Kieran Doherty,²² Joe Jones and Eddie Burns²³ may not invoke as much public grief and sympathy as other VDR victims. However, their deaths and the deaths of others like them must also be taken into consideration, if we are to gain an overall understanding of the true extent of, and strategic underpinnings associated with, VDR violence.

Rebranding of Dissidence

The history of Irish Republicanism has for many been defined by infighting, factionalism and splits.²⁴ However, in July 2012 the RIRA and RAAD came together, alongside other previously independent dissidents, in a merger. They joined to form the new VDR group bearing the self-aggrandising moniker of ‘The IRA.’²⁵ By merging, and utilising this title, their intention was clear - to assert themselves as the

dominant VDR group. In doing so, they convey the wish to put aside cross-group grievances for the sake of refocusing on their end-goal: the achievement of a united and independent 32 county socialist Ireland.

Since their emergence they have launched a series of violent attacks, but most notably the murder of prison officer David Black in November 2012, and the development of a letter-bombing campaign targeting security services and politicians both in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As with all acts of terrorism, these were designed to carry an additional message beyond their immediate impacts. With the murder of David Black, the new group wished to use it as a 'direct response' to what they characterised as the 'torture and degradation' of the dissident prisoners in Maghaberry jail and beyond.²⁶

This newly united organisation does not encompass all VDR groups. ONH and CIRA retain their independence. CIRA, in fact, have been involved in organisational changes of their own. In 2010 they were embroiled in yet another split in their paramilitary ranks, as well as within Republican Sinn Féin, their political wing. In much the same vein as others before them, this divide has led to a redefinition of 'enemy.' Resultantly, this has seen both sides of the split immersed in on-going violent feuds, with little recent evidence of either side's ability to sustain a persistent paramilitary campaign against the security forces.²⁷

It has been proposed, that much of this reorganisation of the VDR community is in preparation for the upcoming centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising.²⁸ Across the scope of Irish Republicanism, both violent and political, the events of 1916 are deemed to mark a turning point in the movement's history. Padraig Pearse, James Connolly and others, are seen as the forefathers of the modern day struggle. Contemporary groups employ their names, statements and actions to portray themselves as the heirs to the men and women of 1916. They in turn see Easter 2016 as a historic opportunity to replicate the call to arms of Easter 1916. The security forces both north and south of border are therefore preparing for an upsurge in VDR activity, in the lead-up to these celebrations.²⁹ It is feared that the dissidents will seek to maintain, and potentially expand, the Northern Irish campaign while concurrently targeting high profile sites in Britain.³⁰

Target Selection

As has been illustrated already, there are a range of people and places targeted by VDR groups. But the question remains, how and why do they select these targets? Historically our understanding of terrorist targeting has been ideologically centred, particularly up to and including the end of the Cold War. The belief has been that the ideology of the terrorist will provide the parameters under which a specific target can be selected, and the prism through which they view the world.³¹ Alongside the primacy of ideology, it has been believed that the target selection is also influenced by the internal organisational dynamics, personalities and a variety of other internal and external factors.³² This focus on ideologically and organisationally specific factors has at times resulted in a downplaying of the influence that the nature of the targets themselves can have in the selection process.

However, with the growing inter-disciplinary nature of terrorism studies, as well as the changing nature of the ‘new’ terrorism (largely, but not exclusively associated with the events of 11 September, 2001), there has been a recent reassessment, with the focus of many analysts now shifting to the targets themselves. Clarke and Newman³³ apply the principles of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), to determine the risks posed to potential targets. Their analysis looks at the vulnerability and attractiveness of the target. The, awkwardly contrived, acronym of EVIL DONE specifies that targets are more susceptible to terrorist attacks when they are **e**xposed, **v**ital, **i**conic, **l**egitimate, **d**estructible, **o**ccupied, **n**ear and **e**asy. In the application of their model it has been stipulated that the proximity, or **n**earness, to the target is likely to be the most important in target selection.³⁴ Clarke and Newman are not alone in applying SCP to terrorism. In their analysis of the target-selection by eco-terrorists, Gruenewald and colleagues³⁵ applied SCP and found that the proximity of the targets also played a significant role. They found that local targets were more likely to be attacked than the national symbols. This fits within their finding that the eco-terrorists, in their research, were more likely to choose ‘easy’ and unprotected targets. This localised target selection is also underpinned by the organisational outlook and ideology. There is a noted contrast, which shows that these groups differ from transnational terrorist organisations that target symbols of national and international importance, as a result of their internationally focused aims and ideology.

This understanding, provided by the SCP approach, enables us to place a greater emphasis on the role of the target in the selection process. However, this can at times lead us to a ‘common sense’ approach, to understand what are extremely complex socio-political phenomena.³⁶ It should not blind us from the continued importance of internal factors, and timing, in the decision-making processes. We must take into account an organisation’s capabilities at the time of potential attack, their readiness to engage, their expertise and their ability to survive (or willingness to face) an inevitable counter-terrorism backlash. These factors and more, including ideology, influence the decision-makers in the target selection process. However, as with many other issues across terrorism studies there needs to be a respect for heterogeneity, this time the heterogeneity of attacks. Gruenewald et al³⁷ demonstrate this by showing the difference in target selection, when comparing international and national terrorist groups. However, while this heterogenic respect is often demonstrated like this across groups, it also needs to be more readily shown within groups as well.³⁸

The Present Study

The examination of VDR target selection is carried out here by developing on from where our previous analysis left off. In a 2011 publication, we analysed VDR activity from 1997 to 2010.³⁹ Here we assess event data in relation to all violent VDR activity,⁴⁰ from January 1st 2007 up to and including August 31st 2015, thus encompassing the modern wave of VDR activity. This research is the result of analysis of a database of VDR activity. The development of the database was originally funded by a research contract from the UK Government. However, post-2011, since the period of funding has been completed, the maintenance and updating of the database has continued independently of external funding. The basic structure of this database is described in a previous publication.⁴¹ This describes how the dataset has been compiled through the analysis of exclusively open source data, e.g. media sources, governmental and non-governmental reports. At no stage in the development and maintenance of the database did either author utilise, or have access to, any level of classified information, nor did we seek it.

Each VDR event is coded across 32 variables.⁴² For it to be included in the database, each event must be verified by at least two independent sources of information. As well as adding new information to the database, there are also regular audits on

existing data entries to verify the validity of the coded data. Complementing the events database there is also a VDR personnel database. In this section, information relating to individuals who have been convicted and/or charged of VDR related offences are coded across a total of 62 variables. However, the present article is only relating to analysis of the events based data.⁴³

Across the majority of analysis of VDR activity the assessment of violence is categorised by group.⁴⁴ However, for the purpose of this article we do not offer such a cross-group comparison. The reason for this is that in recent years much of the VDR activity has gone unclaimed, by any group. This is an observation that dates back to previous analysis of the VDR database,⁴⁵ and is still apparent in the latest iteration. This is not a characteristic unique to VDR groups. It has been witnessed across groups and ideologies. Internationally, over half of all terrorist attacks are not credibly claimed.⁴⁶ There is a range of possible reasons for leaving attacks unclaimed. However, the rationale for this in relation to VDR attacks requires analysis, which is outside the scope of the present paper.

In spite of a lack of a cross-group comparison, we account for the heterogeneity of VDR activity. We examine general event data, to assess whether there are any broad patterns apparent, before exploring the data in more detail. We firstly analyse data on victims and targets of detonated explosives and shootings, before examining fatality data from 2007 to mid-2015. In doing so we assess who precisely the victims were, before analysing how they were killed. Therefore, five core research questions are analysed here:

1. Who or what are the targets of VDR activity?
2. Who or what are the targets of VDR detonated explosives?
3. Who or what are the targets of VDR shootings?
4. Who has been fatally targeted by the VDR groups?
5. How have those who have died as a result of VDR activity been murdered?

Overall Trends in VDR Activity

“So long as Britain persists in its denial of national and democratic rights in Ireland the IRA will have to continue.”⁴⁷

The above quote is taken from the origin statement of the newly merged 'The IRA/New IRA'. It contains the central legitimisation for its continued existence, and that of any VDR group. They claim that Britain is denying the people of Ireland their national and democratic rights. Asserting that claim is central to its justification for on-going violence. They present themselves as fighting for the sovereign rights of the people of Ireland. However, their aspirations for a united Ireland are in contrast with the people of Northern Ireland, who see their future as staying part of the United Kingdom. Recent polling data from the Belfast Telegraph/Lucid Talk polls suggests that when given the option of Northern Ireland staying part of the United Kingdom, immediate Irish unity and Irish unity in 20 years that the majority of those Northern Irish citizens polled preferred the option of staying part of the UK. 44% wished to stay part of the UK. This was in contrast to 5.7% who preferred Irish unity and 24% who wished for Irish unity in 20 years time. The remaining 26.3% stated no opinion. Of the Catholics polled only 9.8% wanted Irish unity and a further 39.5% wanted it in 20 years. However, 20.6% of the Catholics polled wanted to stay part of the United Kingdom and the remaining 30.1% had no opinion on the topic.⁴⁸ Therefore the idea that the VDR groups are carrying out the will of the Catholic and nationalist populations of Northern Ireland ceases to be valid. However, this does not prevent them from maintaining their armed campaign.

As can be seen from Figure 1, VDR activity saw a peak in frequency most recently in 2010 after a steady rise from 2007 onwards. However, in the years afterwards there has been a clear drop in frequency of activity, right up to the present day. This is marked by a minor peak in overall violent activity in 2013. The drop in activity from 2010 onwards comes after a significant split in the CIRA; a split that the data shows led to a deterioration in their activity. It is also significant in the fact that this was in the lead up to the merger between the Real IRA, RAAD and others in July 2012. This merger would have necessitated a great deal of restructuring and organisation, and therefore may have led to this combined deterioration in violence. The minor peak of 2013 immediately follows this deterioration. One could assess this as the launch of the new organisation and through their utility of violence they are communicating both inwardly and outwardly that they have both the ability and intention to continue the paramilitary struggle.




Figure 1: Overall VDR Violence from 2007 to August 31 2015




Figure 2: Utility of VDR Explosive Devices from 2007 to August 31 2015

These patterns are reflected when we look at the utility of VDR explosive devices, both detonated and failed. The major and minor peaks in Figure 2 can yet again be seen in 2010 and 2013. However, what is apparent from analysing these data is that while the number of detonated and ‘failed’ attacks are relatively close in number in

2010 (42 detonated; 52 failed) there is much greater discrepancy between the two figures in 2013 (16 detonated; 55 failed). This 2013 discrepancy can be the result of a number of factors. The explosive devices may have been poorly engineered. The police may have had a higher level of intelligence coming from within the groups. Or potentially the groups may not have wished for a large number of devices to detonate in this year, due to their inability to withstand the counter-VDR backlash, as was experienced post-Omagh. The likelihood is that the real reason is a combination of factors.

However, if one is to consider the internal organisational decision making explanation, with the “The IRA/New IRA” now the dominant actor in VDR activity, there may be some logic in this reasoning. While there is nothing within the data to indicate this as fact, there is a possibility that in the immediate aftermath of the dissident merger that the new organisation wished to demonstrate their intention and ability to continue the VDR campaign, and equally to lead the resurgence. This can be reflected in the minor peak witnessed in 2013 and depicted in Figure 1. Similarly in the aftermath of the merger there is the possibility that the new organisation and its leadership did not feel that it was yet organisationally capable of withstanding the security services backlash, in the aftermath of a series of ‘successful’ detonations. In this regard they may have utilised some of these devices as a form of ‘viable hoax.’

When a new organisation or merger is launching itself they must immediately legitimise their new united existence, to their membership and support. They must signal that they have the intention and capacity to launch and, to a certain degree, sustain the VDR campaign. This intention can be reflected in the ‘failed’ attacks, which can demonstrate the engineering capabilities and expertise within the group together with their extensive arsenal, without as much risk. When this is coupled with the high profile nature of some of their targets this can assist in justifying the new existence to the membership and support, while simultaneously demonstrating the threat to the targets of existing and potential attacks. For many these attack ‘failures’ may provide an indication of the organisational incapacities of the groups. However, if sophisticated bombs are intercepted this can widely publicise the engineering capabilities of the new group. In turn it can give the membership faith in the potential of the new organisation.

This deterioration in overall VDR activity is not just a result of internal VDR decision-making, or poor engineering. It is necessary to also recognise the successes of the counter-VDR campaign, which has been led by the PSNI in collaboration with An Garda Síochána (police of the Republic of Ireland) and the intelligence services. However, while the security services have demonstrated their ability to disrupt violent activity, through arrests and counter-VDR activity, there is also an acknowledgement on both sides of the border that the VDR threat has not necessarily gone away. In October 2015 the assistant chief constable of the PSNI Will Kerr acknowledged as much by stating that an attack was ‘highly likely’ in Northern Ireland,⁴⁹ an assertion that is supported by the maintenance of the threat of ‘Northern Ireland related terrorism in Northern Ireland’ at a severe level ever since September 24th 2010.⁵⁰ As the later sections will demonstrate, when there is deterioration in the frequency of overall violent activity this must not lead to complacency in the belief that the threat has gone away. A drop in frequency is not necessarily equivalent to a drop in threat. This may merely mean an organisational, strategic or tactical change resulting in a change of focus and frequency of violence.

Targets/Victims of VDR Activity

What follows is an analysis of the victims and targets of VDR violence. The analysis first looks at the victims and targets of the overall levels of violence, before focusing on differing intentions of shootings and detonated explosives specifically. This serves to assess who and what the primary focus of VDR activity has been in recent years. It aims to move beyond the rhetoric of the groups and to assess who and what their violent activity is actually targeting. Presented in Table 1 is a year-by-year representation of the victims and targets of overall VDR activity.

As is apparent from the data the dominant target of VDR violence has been civilian in nature. Across the 1,007 violent acts, within the eight and a half years under analysis, 63.38% of the victims and targets were coded as being civilian. The next biggest target groups, by frequency, are police and intelligence personnel and facilities at 18.1%, criminals at 4.37% and commercial targets at 3.29%. Civilian targets were consistently the highest frequency of targets across VDR activity, regularly followed in second highest frequency by police and intelligence personnel and facilities. The

only years where there was a discrepancy in this was in 2007 and 2008. In 2007 there was equal targeting of both groups and in 2008 the targeting of police surpassed that of civilians by 12.12%, or four violent events. However, in the years when there was a significantly higher level of violent activity from 2009 onwards the majority of targets each year were classified as civilian.

The category of civilian targets is a broad category, which includes civilian residential, urban and rural areas. With respect to civilian victims these are classified as civilian if and when there is no known, stated or symbolic reason to target them specifically. When there was an indiscriminate attack, in which the intended target was unclear, but those most in danger were civilian this was coded as the targeting of civilians. Therefore these figures may not always reflect the organisational intent of the attack. But they do reflect our perception of the reality, of the targets most in danger. For example there has been a recent surge in VDR bombs being planted within residential areas with the intent to draw in and harm police and security services responding to the incident. However, this intent is not always clear and the people in most direct danger of these attacks are often times the residents, of the areas where the bombs have been planted.

Similarly with respect to punishment attacks the VDR groups target many of the people because the victims are believed to be criminals, anti-social influences in the community or other societal threats. However, the groups do not always publicly verify the rationale behind the choice of target for punishment beating. Therefore in these cases if the individual targeted does not have any criminal record, or any other discerning characteristic to justify their targeting, they were also coded as being 'civilian.' Even with this caveat in place it is clear that those who are most frequently in danger of VDR attacks are not the security forces, prison officers, politicians or criminals. Similar to the victims of Provisional IRA violence,⁵¹ it is the civilian population that is most frequently put at risk due to VDR activity.

| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Overall |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| Civilian | 36.36% | 30.3% | 53.83% | 57.98% | 64.26% | 77.06% | 69.94% | 77.52% | 66.04% | 63.38% |
| Police and Intelligence Personnel and Facilities* | 36.36% | 42.42% | 16.22% | 21.85% | 13.49% | 12.84% | 18.3% | 11.24% | 20.75% | 18.1% |
| Police (Family Members) | | | 2.56% | | 0.52% | 0.92% | | | | 0.5% |
| Army | | | 2.56% | 0.84% | 0.52% | 0.92% | 0.65% | 2.25% | 1.89% | 1.09% |
| Criminal** | | 12.12% | 11.95% | 6.72% | 4.15% | 0.92% | 0.65% | | | 4.37% |
| VDR Actors | 4.55% | 3.03% | 0.85% | 1.68% | | | | 1.12% | | 0.8% |
| Prison Officer | | | | | | 0.92% | | 2.25% | | 0.3% |
| Transport Infrastructure | 9.09% | 3.03% | 1.71% | 3.78% | 1.57% | 0.92% | 4.58% | 1.12% | 3.77% | 2.6% |
| Politician (Nationalist/Republican) | 4.55% | 3.03% | 1.71% | 0.42% | 3.12% | 0.92% | | 1.12% | 1.89% | 1.39% |
| Politician (Unionist) | | | | | 0.52% | 0.92% | | | | 0.2% |
| Politician (Alliance Party) | | | | | 0.52% | | 0.65% | | | 0.2% |
| Politician (British Government Minister) | | | | | | | 0.65% | | | 0.1% |
| Commercial Target | | 6.06% | 2.55% | 3.36% | 6.74% | 1.83% | 2.6% | 1.12% | | 3.29% |
| Orange Order Hall | | | 1.71% | 0.84% | 1.04% | 1.83% | 1.31% | 2.25% | 3.77% | 1.39% |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|
| Civil Servant | 9.09% | | 0.85% | 0.42% | 1.04% | | 0.65% | | 1.89% | 0.8% |
| Court | | | 3.41% | 0.84% | 1.04% | | | | | 0.8% |
| Loyalist Paramilitary | | | | 0.42% | 0.52% | | | | | 0.2% |
| Journalist/Publisher | | | | | 1.04% | | | | | 0.2% |
| Protestant Church | | | | 0.42% | | | | | | 0.1% |
| <i>n=</i> | 22 | 33 | 117 | 238 | 193 | 109 | 153 | 89 | 53 | <i>N=1007</i> |

*=This includes both current and retired/former police officers

**=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups

Table 1: Victims and Targets of Overall VDR Violence

While the targeting of police, military, criminals and internal members may come as no surprise one of the most illuminating results is that 3.29% of VDR targets are commercial in nature. When this category of target is analysed further it provides more insight into the target selection, by the various organisations. It appears that the groups' target selection may at times be susceptible to societal trends and moral panics. This is illustrated specifically in the opening months of 2010. During this period there was a growing debate across the island of Ireland about the legality and safety of 'head-shops,' stores that were selling legal alternatives to banned narcotics. This was brought about due to the growing number of teenagers reporting to accident and emergency departments of hospitals, due to adverse reactions caused by consuming substances bought in the shops. As a result in June 2010 the Irish government successfully banned these 'new psychoactive substances,' and resultantly brought about the end of the vast majority of the stores.⁵²

Against a backdrop of moral panic, the Real IRA and other VDR groups started to violently target the owners and premises of these stores. This included, amongst a number of other attacks, the Real IRA claiming responsibility for throwing a grenade into the home of Dublin-based 'head-shop' owner, Jim Bellamy, in mid-2010.⁵³ Many understandably report these attacks as a reaction, to the competition posed by the 'head-shops' to the dissident involvement in illegal drug dealing.⁵⁴ However, it could similarly be interpreted as an attempt from the VDR groups to bolster support, within the communities they claim to represent. This may explain why a significant proportion of this targeting took place in and close to the republican areas of Derry city.⁵⁵ In a similar vein as their targeting of drug dealers, the VDR groups have justified these attacks as their attempts to protect the community from the dangers posed by these shops.⁵⁶ The example of these attacks demonstrates that an individual attack can, and often does, have a dual purpose. These attacks can equally be interpreted as attempts to drive out the competition to their drug-based criminality, and contrastingly could be an attempt to gain greater trust from within the communities.

Detonated Explosives

While the frequency relating to all VDR activity gives us an introductory insight into who and what the VDR groups are targeting, it is only when we focus on specific forms of violence that we can achieve a more in-depth understanding of the intentions of the groups. When the data were analysed to focus solely on the victims and targets of detonated explosives the frequency levels change significantly. As can be seen when comparing Tables 1 and 2 the percentile frequency of targeting police and intelligence personnel and facilities is significantly higher when only detonated explosives are considered than it is across the general violent activity data. In the general data 18.1% of the VDR attacks target police and intelligences personnel and facilities and 0.5% of all attacks target family members of serving police officers. In comparison 40.5% and 2.48% respectively of all detonated VDR explosives have targeted these two groups. When combined this is higher than any other individual victim/target type, including civilian targets.

| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Overall |
|--|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| Civilian | 33.33% | 12.5% | 27.27% | 41.47% | 35.29% | 50% | 56.25% | 58.34% | 33.33% | 40.5% |
| Police and Intelligence Personnel and Facilities* | 33.33% | 75.0% | 36.36% | 39.03% | 47.05% | 50% | 31.25% | 25% | 50% | 40.5% |
| Police (Family Members) | | | 27.27% | | | | | | | 2.48% |
| Army | | | 9.09% | 2.44% | | | | | | 1.66% |
| Criminal** | | | | 9.76% | | | | | | 3.31% |
| Transport Infrastructure | 33.33% | | | | | | | | | 1.65% |
| Politician (Unionist) | | | | | 5.88% | | | | | 0.83% |
| Politician (Alliance Party) | | | | | | | 6.25% | | | 0.83% |
| Orange Order Hall | | | | | | | | 8.33% | | 0.83% |
| Commercial Target | | 12.5% | | 2.44% | 11.76% | | 6.25% | 8.33% | | 4.97% |
| Civil Servant | | | | | | | | | 16.67% | 0.83% |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------|
| Court | | | | 4.88% | | | | | | 1.65% |
| n= | 6 | 8 | 11 | 41 | 17 | 4 | 16 | 12 | 6 | N=121 |

*=This includes both current and retired/former police officers

**=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups

Table 2: Victims and Targets of Detonated VDR Explosives

These data, unsurprisingly, suggests that the VDR groups aim to cause the most significant harm to the police and intelligence forces, above all other potential targets or victims within the Northern Irish state. If it was purely intent which taken into consideration, when coding these event data, it would be likely to show that the targeting of police and intelligence personnel and facilities would have been even higher. However, without a subsequent statement of intent and purpose after each attack it is impossible to reliably code for intent in relation to all activity.

Shootings

The VDR groups, alongside their targeting of the security services and institutions of the state, have also persisted in targeting those they classify as criminal actors. This has mainly included local drug dealers, from the republican and nationalist areas of Northern Ireland. However, as can be seen from the data in Table 2 these criminals are not generally targeted using explosive devices. There are of course exceptions to this, as can be seen with the utility of pipe bombs by RAAD in 2010 to target people they claimed to be drug dealers.⁵⁷ These attacks account for 9.76% of all detonated explosives in 2010. However, it is more common for perceived criminals to be targeted by shootings. Table 3 shows that 17.13% of all shootings target individuals who are known to be, or perceived to be, criminals. This is in comparison to a 3.31% targeting with detonated explosives. The true figure of criminal and anti-social targeting will be supplemented from the 59.99% targeting of civilian, many of whom may be perceived to be criminals or anti-social entities by the violent dissidents. However, this is not readily communicated through a claim of responsibility or explanation of attack. Resultantly they have been coded as being ‘civilian.’

In contrast to the 40.5% of detonated explosives that target police and intelligence personnel and facilities, only 15.42% of all shootings have been directed at them. However, while the frequency of the act is low the 2009 murders of Constable Stephen Carroll and British soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar have demonstrated the potential, and intended, lethality of some of these attacks.

VDR Fatalities

The VDR groups promote themselves as a paramilitaries fighting against the forces of the British state. However, this is not abundantly apparent, when their shooting and

fatality figures are analysed. The majority of their victims can more readily be classified, or externally promoted as, criminals. In total there have been 21 confirmed VDR related fatalities since 2007. Close to half (10) of these have been classified as being criminal. Following that almost a quarter (5) were either internal members or rival VDR actors. When the figures of fatalities of police officers, British soldiers and prison officers are combined it only then equals the number of internal or rival VDR actors who have been murdered by these groups, since 2007. With the exception of Ronan Kerr each of those individuals who have been murdered in a VDR attack since 2007 has been shot.

| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Overall |
|--|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------------|
| Civilian | 42.87% | 75% | 63.26% | 58.07% | 71.43% | 42.86% | 25% | 50% | 100% | 59.99% |
| Police and Intelligence Personnel* | 28.57% | | 8.16% | 17.74% | 7.14% | 28.57% | 62.5% | 25% | | 15.42% |
| Police (Family Members) | | | 2.04% | | | | | | | 0.57% |
| Prison Officer | | | | | | 14.29% | | | | 0.57% |
| Army | | | 2.04% | | | | | | | 0.57% |
| Criminal** | | 12.5% | 22.44% | 17.74% | 17.85% | 14.29% | 12.5% | | | 17.13% |
| Politician (Nationalist/Republican) | 14.29% | | | | | | | | | 0.57% |
| Commercial Target | | | | 1.61% | | | | | | 0.57% |
| Court | | | 2.04% | | | | | | | 0.57% |
| VDR Actors | 14.29% | 12.5% | | 4.83% | | | | 25% | | 3.42% |
| Journalist/Publisher | | | | | 3.57% | | | | | 0.57% |
| n= | 7 | 8 | 49 | 62 | 28 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 2 | N=175 |

*=This includes both current and retired/former police officers

**=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups

Table 3: Victims and Targets of VDR Shootings

The perception of power and control is clearly important to the VDR groups. For them to be able to survive, a pre-requisite to achieving any degree of ‘success’,⁵⁸ they believe that they must first of all gain the support from, and control of, their own communities. There are two core reasons as to why fellow VDR actors are targeted. They are perceived to be either an internal or an external threat. These threats may be towards the leadership, individual members or the organisation as a whole. In a post-split environment the perception of enemy often changes. Those who were once regarded as comrades and allies are now perceived to be an organisational and strategic threat. This not only accounts for the VDR actors being targeted but also for the 1.39% of all VDR activity that was directed towards republican or nationalist politicians.

| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Overall |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Civilian | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Police | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 2 |
| Prison Officer | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Army | | | 2 | | | | | | | 2 |
| Criminal* | | | 1 | 5 | | 2 | 2 | | | 10 |
| VDR Actors | 2 | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 5 |
| n= | 2 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 21 |

*=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups

Table 4: Known VDR Fatalities

Target Decision-Making: Bombings versus Shootings

In assessing these data we must question why there is such a difference between the targets of shootings and detonated explosives? The terrorist actor must decide, and assess, who or what they are targeting, why they are targeting this, what message they are aiming to portray, who the broader audience to this attack are and what are the chances of them being apprehended. These, and many other, factors contribute to their

decision-making, and can therefore impinge on the choices made in relation to violent methodology.

When targeting the police and security forces, they must consider a range of issues. The message that is intended as being portrayed through the targeting of the police is a national one. It aims to portray the groups as having the capacity to challenge the supremacy of an ‘occupying force.’ This is a message directed both externally and internally. The police and their facilities are among the most highly protected targets available. By targeting a police officer or their facilities it poses the greatest risk of arrest. Under the EVIL DONE model⁵⁹ the targets are vital, iconic and legitimate. However, they are not easy. Therefore, it is proposed that these factors lead the decision-makers to more regularly decide that an explosive device is the best tactic to use, when targeting police. A ‘successful’ bomb can send a message both to the police and to internal members that the organisation has the intent and capability to threaten the police.

One of the most important factors for the perpetrators to consider is the possibility of arrest. The contrast here is clear, a shooter needs to be in closer proximity to his or her target than someone who plants a bomb. This therefore provides greater possibility of a shooter being arrested at the scene of a crime. They will always need to be there, at the time of attack. In contrast the person who plants the bomb will not always be in the proximity at the point of detonation. They may not even be within the same town, county or country. The targeting of police officers and facilities requires police officers to be present at the point of attack. This resultantly brings with it a higher risk of arrest.

Reducing the possibility of detection or arrest may in turn be an integral part of the decision-making process, which has led to the proliferation of the utility of both letter and proxy bombs in the recent past. Both of these have seen a recent return to the streets of Northern Ireland. As can be seen from data presented in Table 5 from 2012 onwards there has been a gradual return of the letter and parcel bomb, as a tactic of choice. This has been especially utilised when the groups have aimed to target high profile individuals. These targets have included, among others, the then Chief Constable of the PSNI Matt Baggott and the Secretary for State for Northern Ireland

Theresa Villiers both in 2013, and, as was mentioned at the beginning of this article, the parcel bomb targeting Palace Barracks in 2015. This has also seen Irish terrorism return to Great Britain, with the targeting of seven separate Army recruitment offices in England with letter bombs in early 2014. In parallel to this, there has been the re-emergence of the proxy bombs where innocent civilians have been forced to drive bombs to the intended targets. This tactic saw a return in 2013 and 2014. The primary target for the proxies has been the Strand Road Police Station in Derry, a station that has consistently been targeted across this current wave of violence. Recent years has seen the tactic of choice for attacking this station, attempted mortar bombings, complemented by the utility of proxy attacks.

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Overall |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| Civilian | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 3 |
| Prison Officer | | | 2 | | 2 |
| Police and Intelligence Personnel and Facilities | | 3 | | 2 | 5 |
| Politician (British Government Minister) | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Army (Recruitment Offices) | | | 7 | | 7 |
| Civil Servant | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Overall | 1 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 19 |

Table 5: Targets of Letter Bombs (Detonated and Undetonated)

By using both letter and proxy bombings, the groups place a further barrier between themselves and the risk of arrest. By forcing innocent civilians to deliver the bombs, they are providing themselves with an extra layer of protection. Unlike a bomb that they plant themselves, they do not even have to attend the scene of attack when the explosive is delivered. Due to high risk in attacking these prominent targets the traditional form of attack may have been deemed to require adjustment. The continued use of the proxy bombing to target the Strand Road Station may also indicate a localisation of tactics. It may demonstrate that the choices of targets and methods are more readily made at a local brigade level, rather than at national leadership. This would in turn also reflect the importance of the proximity of attackers

to target, as is emphasised by Newman and Hsu.⁶⁰ This requires further analysis that focuses more on the locality of violence. However, it does emphasise the necessity of local as well as national counter-VDR strategies.

The rationalisation as to why detonated explosives more readily target the security forces provides us with a generalizable understanding of the decision-making process. However, when we bring the factors of timing and organisational change into consideration this can periodically alter the process. As has already been seen the re-launch of the VDR campaign saw a steady rise in activity from 2007 to 2010. We also witnessed a minor peak in activity in the aftermath of the development of the 'The IRA/New IRA.' It is important that we don't just look at the frequency of events but also the nature and intent of the attacks.

In March 2009 as the reigniting of the VDR campaign was gaining momentum within two days of each other the RIRA murdered soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar and the CIRA killed PSNI officer Stephen Carroll.⁶¹ In November 2012, just over three months after the 'The IRA/New IRA' announced their establishment; they murdered prison officer David Black. Each of these men was shot. While targeting members of the security services was not extraordinary the choice of weapons in each of these murders went against the norm, for these forms of victims. It is proposed here that this was a deliberate choice. Both the VDR operatives of 2009 and the newly merged group of 2012 needed to make a statement of intent. They needed to show their membership and support, as well as their enemies, that their new campaigns were worth following and fearing. Through these attacks they were saying that they were going to do things differently, and bring the fight directly to the 'British oppressor.' At times like these the risk of arrest was being outweighed by the potential to 'successfully' launch a new campaign.⁶²

When the targeting of high profile state actors is compared to the decision-making process in targeting criminals, the results are notably different. In contrast to the intended national message of the targeting of police, when attacking criminals the groups' intended messages are much more locally directed. This is the dichotomy that Gruenewald et al⁶³ witnessed across groups. However, it is observed here within groups. The groups wish to illustrate the power and control, which they have over

specific communities in which they are operating. Each of the criminal targets operated within republican areas. This in turn demonstrates the localisation of the groups' message. The localised message incentivises the perpetrators to have their organisational identity, and at times their individual identity, known to the criminals and affiliates. By revealing this identity this allows the perpetrators to portray the message that they are in control. It shows the criminals who the threat is coming from. By having the reduced risk of arrest, it enables them to produce a more personalised threat to the criminals.

This desire for identification of responsibility is not only observed in the choice of shooting as a method, but can also be seen during the supremacy of RAAD in Derry and Donegal between 2009 and 2011. The pattern within VDR activity at this time was to leave the majority of attacks unclaimed. However, RAAD provided an anomaly. They not only let their identity be known to their immediate victims, but they regularly acknowledged their responsibility for attacks, and posed threats of future attacks, within the local *Derry Journal* newspaper.⁶⁴ Alongside the attacks themselves, this was their way of promoting their desired control and power of the local Republican areas.

The targeting of criminals provides a reduced risk of arrest. Due to the very nature of the chosen targets, they are less inclined to report the crime due to the rationale for their targeting. By reporting to the police that you were a victim of such an attack, one is not only identifying themselves as a perceived criminal but they are also placing themselves, their family and affiliates at risk of future attacks. Overall this sends an intended message of local power and control. This is in contrast to their message when targeting the security and symbols of the state. In those actions they are portraying themselves as the 'put-upon' minority intent on gaining national power.

Conclusions

The centenary of the 1916 Rising will represent a time of celebration for the Irish people. It provides an opportunity to reflect, on the evolution of the country and the island as a whole. However, while the majority will be utilising this centenary to promote positivity, there are a small few who will attempt to manipulate it to legitimise their retention of some of the darker aspects of Irish life; namely

paramilitary and terrorist activity. The organisational changes, threatening statements and, most importantly, paramilitary activity demonstrates that these violent dissident republicans are intent on sustaining and increasing the terrorist threat they pose across the island of Ireland and Great Britain.

Their rhetoric speaks of retaining a military presence against a British ‘occupying force.’ This has manifested in the terrorist targeting of the police, intelligence services and the British Army, primarily through the use of explosive devices. However, theirs is a multi-layered strategy. Alongside their targeting to the auspices of the state, the VDR groups provide a more persistent threat to the civilian population of Northern Ireland. Civilian targets have been the ones most commonly attacked in recent years. This is further compounded with the terrorists’ attempts to forcefully acquire power and control, within republican areas of Belfast and Derry, through their at times lethal form of vigilante ‘justice,’ against those they have personally defined as ‘criminals.’

What our analysis has aimed to show are the results of the VDR decision-making process, not just in relation to target selection but also in the choice of method of attack. The study has shown that there are contrasting methods used, dependent on the victim or target selected. Even though the majority of general VDR attacks are directed against civilian targets, distantly followed by the police and intelligence services, when we focus purely on detonated explosives the result is quite different. When utilising this method of attack security related targets are more likely to be the focus. However, when the concentration is on shootings, civilian and criminal targets are both more likely than the security services to be the intended victim.

Central to this is the disparity of the aims in targeting both sets of victims. The targeting of the security services forms part of the national organisational strategy of the groups. The intent of this target selection is to provide both internal members and external audiences with the impression that the groups are posing a threat to the security apparatus of an ‘occupying regime.’ However, the targeting of civilians and perceived criminals derives from the local organisational strategies of achieving power and control in the Republican areas of Northern Ireland. The chosen modus operandi to attack these targets reflects the rationale behind the target selection, but also the opportunities provided by the targets themselves. With this considered it is

believed that the SCP approach, as well as an ideology centric view, working in parallel can assist in our understanding of the target selection.

The understanding gained from this analysis, can provide the information necessary for greater preparedness to withstand potential future attacks. However, the information should also be utilised by those engaging in any form of counter-narrative against the VDR groups. These groups are continuously attempting to portray themselves as victims, and their ‘struggle’ as legitimate. In doing so they attempt to depict the PSNI and security services as being central to an oppressive regime. It is a continuous strategy to try and assign blame to the police for anyone who may be a casualty of their attacks. To their supporters they wish to lay blame at the door of the police tactics, claiming that they, the police, continuously put the civilians in harm’s way in order to protect themselves.

"This tactic by the PSNI is very deliberate and we take this opportunity to advise all members of our community, including community workers, to refuse in any and all circumstances any requests from the PSNI or local politicians to do the bidding of the PSNI in this or any other way... We state categorically that any injury or death caused by the PSNI tactics will be solely their responsibility."⁶⁵

This is an attempt to simultaneously gain support for their legitimacy and discourage any trust in the police. Perhaps, the most effective way of countering this message is through the demonstration of data, which show that it is the VDR groups, rather than the police, who are putting civilians in harm’s way. This is both through the direct targeting of civilians with their attacks and the forced use of civilians to deliver their bombs to the intended target.

For this wider analysis to have further significance for those wishing to counter the VDR threat, it is important that any devised strategy must incorporate appropriately tailored national and local strategies. There needs to be an appreciation of the diversity of tactics, targets and rationale. Further analysis is therefore required to assess the influence of regional factors on the choice of victims, targets and methods. This regional appreciation, coupled with the analysis presented here can and will

assist in the preparedness for countering the genuine VDR threat. Future research needs to also take the timing of attacks into greater consideration, when assessing target selection. This could potentially affect the exposure, occupation and ease of targeting and therefore influence the target selection if one is to apply the EVIL DONE model.⁶⁶

¹ “Kevin McGuigan Murder: Ex-IRA Man Shot Dead in East Belfast.” *BBC*, August 13, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-33896234>

² Ibid

³ “Sinn Fein Condemns Davison ‘Revenge’ Killing.” *Irish Republican News*, August 15, 2015. Accessed October 1, 2015. http://republican-news.org/current/news/2015/08/sinn_fein_condemns_davison_rev.html#.ViuZIdZYalI

⁴ Jim Cusack, “Kevin McGuigan Murder Shows that the IRA is Intact, Armed and Killing” *Belfast Telegraph* August 23, 2015., Accessed October 1, 2015 <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/kevin-mcguigan-murder-shows-that-the-ira-is-intact-armed-and-killing-writes-jim-cusack-31471347.html>

⁵ PSNI and MI5 *Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland*, October 19th, 2015. Accessed October 20, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/469548/Paramilitary_Groups_in_Northern_Ireland_-_20_Oct_2015.pdf

⁶ Ibid

⁷ *Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006*, November 22, 2006. Accessed October 18th, 2015. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/53/pdfs/ukpga_20060053_en.pdf

⁸ Sophie A. Whiting, *Spoiling the Peace? The Threat of Dissident Republicans to Peace in Northern Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 173-175

⁹ An example of the remnants of this can be seen in the case of the murder of Robert McCartney in 2015 where Gerry Adams called on those with ‘reservations about assisting the PSNI’ to give their information to the McCartney ‘family, a solicitor, or any other reputable person or body. Catherine McCartney, *Walls of Silence*, (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 2007), 24

¹⁰ Sinn Féin. *Freedom*, (Dublin: Sinn Féin Education Publication, May 1991)

¹¹ “‘Attacks on Police Will go on in New Year’-Real IRA,” *Derry Journal*, January 8, 2008. Accessed October 2, 2015 <http://www.derryjournal.com/news/attacks-on-police-will-go-on-in-new-year-real-ira-1-2118801>

¹² The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland*, September 1999. Accessed October 26, 2015 <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf>

¹³ “The Story of the Stephen Carroll Murder Trial,” *BBC*, March 30, 2012. Accessed October 9, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-17220730>

¹⁴ Suzanne Breen “Former Provos Claim Kerr Murder and Vow More Attacks,” *Belfast Telegraph*, April 22, 2011. Accessed October 2, 2015 <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/former-provos-claim-kerr-murder-and-vow-more-attacks-28610456.html>

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- ¹⁵ Police Service of Northern Ireland, *Workforce Composition Figures*, August 1, 2015. Accessed September 8, 2015 http://www.psn.police.uk/updates_workforce_composition_figures
- ¹⁶ Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, *Northern Ireland Census 2011 Key Statistics Summary Report*, September 2014, Accessed October 20 2015 <http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/census/2011/results/key-statistics/summary-report.pdf>
- ¹⁷ Henry McDonald, "Belfast Shopping Mall Bomb Plot: Police Arrest Two Men," *The Guardian*, December 18, 2013. Accessed October 14, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/18/belfast-shopping-mall-bomb-plot-police-arrest>
- ¹⁸ Andrew Allen was murdered on February 9th 2012 in Co. Donegal. His murder was claimed by RAAD. They justified this by stating that he was a 'career criminal.' "RAAD Behind Andrew Allen Shooting in Buncrana." *BBC*, February 22, 2012, Accessed October 1, 2015 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-17125572>
- ¹⁹ Kevin Kearney was found dead from an IRA claimed shooting on October 9th 2013. He was murdered due to his apparent drug dealing in Belfast. Henry McDonald, "New IRA' Claims it Killed Belfast Father of Four," *The Guardian*, October 10, 2013. Accessed October 2, 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/10/new-ira-claims-killed-belfast-father>
- ²⁰ For an in-depth description of the internal workings of the Provisional IRA's internal security group the 'nutting squad' see Eamon Collins and Mick McGovern, *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books, 1998), 233-244
- ²¹ For an in-depth discussion of the role of vigilantism within Irish Republicanism see Heather Hamill, *The Hoods: Crime and Punishment in Belfast*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011)
- ²² Kieran Doherty, a member of the Real IRA, was murder by members of his own group. The official reason given was that Doherty had been running a 'drugs factory.' "Real IRA: Kieran Doherty Admitted Drugs Link," *Belfast Telegraph*, March, 2, 2010. Accessed October 2, 2015 <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/real-ira-kieran-doherty-admitted-drugs-link-28520896.html>
- ²³ Joe Jones and Eddie Burns were murdered as part of an ongoing dissident feud in March 2007 after they left the CIRA to form a new group. Suzanne Breen "Republican Community Appalled by Gruesome Murders." *Sunday Tribune*, March 18, 2007. Accessed October 2, 2015 http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/Sunday_Tribune/arts2007/mar18_Republicans_apalled_murders_SBreen.php
- ²⁴ John F. Morrison. *The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and impact of Organizational Splits*. (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014)
- ²⁵ This group is often referred to as 'The New IRA'
- ²⁶ "The IRA' Claim Responsibility for the Murder of David Black," *The Journal.ie*, November 12, 2012. Accessed October 4, 2015 <http://www.thejournal.ie/the-ira-claim-responsibility-murder-david-black-671949-Nov2012/>
- ²⁷ For an in-depth analysis of these splits and mergers see Morrison (see note 23 above), 175-202.
- ²⁸ Ibid
- ²⁹ Henry McDonald, "Dissident Republican Terror Attack Highly Likely, say Northern Ireland Police," *The Guardian*, October 1, 2015, Accessed October 5, 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/01/dissident-republican-terror-attack-likely-police>

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- ³⁰ Jonathan Owen, "IRA plans 'big show' to Mark Easter Rising," *The Independent*, February 17, 2013. Accessed October 26, 2015
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/ira-plans-big-show-to-mark-easter-rising-8498150.html>
- ³¹ C.J.M Drake, "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10, no.2, (1998) 53-85.
- ³² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) 229
- ³³ Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, *Outsmarting the Terrorists* (Westports, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006)
- ³⁴ Graeme R. Newman and Henda Y. Hsu, "Rational Choice and Terrorist Target Selection," in Updesh Kumar and Manas K. Mandal, eds., *Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies*. (New Delhi: Sage India, 2012), 227-249
- ³⁵ Jeff Gruenewald, Kayla Allison-Gruenewald and Brent R. Klein (2015). "Assessing the Attractiveness and Vulnerability of Eco-Terrorism Targets: A Situational Crime Prevention Approach." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38, no.6, (2015) 433-455
- ³⁶ *Ibid*
- ³⁷ *Ibid*
- ³⁸ See for example Petter Nesser, "Toward an Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat: A Chronology of Jihadist Terrorism in Europe 2008-2013," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 37, no.5, (2014) 440-456
- ³⁹ John Horgan and John F. Morrison, "Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23, no.4, (2011), 642-669.
- ⁴⁰ This includes all VDR events not just those that could traditionally defined as 'terrorist' in nature.
- ⁴¹ John Horgan and Paul Gill . "Who are the Dissidents? An Introduction to the ICST Violent Dissident Republican Project." P.M Currie and Max Taylor, eds. *Dissident Irish Republicanism*. (New York: Continuum, 2011), 43-64
- ⁴² There have been five new variables added since the publication of Horgan and Morrison (2011) (see note 39 above)
- ⁴³ For an in-depth analysis of the personnel data see John Horgan, *Divided We Stand: The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland's Dissident Terrorists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Horgan and Morrison (2011) (see note 39 above)
- ⁴⁴ See Martyn Frampton, *Legion of the Rearguard*. (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2010); Horgan (2012); Morrison (2014) (see note 23 above); Horgan and Morrison (2011) (see note 39 above); Whiting (2015) (see note 8 above)
- ⁴⁵ See Horgan and Morrison (2011); Horgan (2012)
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