Forty years ago, Pierre Bourdieu published “Champ intellectuel et projet créateur” in a special number of Sartre’s *Les Temps Modernes* devoted to ‘the problems of structuralism’. It was the first of his texts to achieve significant currency amongst English readers as a result of its inclusion in *Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education* (Young, M.F.D, ed., 1971) – a collection of essays which Young edited following a discussion after a conference of the British Sociological Association held in Durham in April, 1970. Anna Boschetti was subsequently to write a social history of the production of *Les Temps Modernes* (Boschetti,1988) which enables us to situate Bourdieu’s original French text in the context of the ideological censure posed by the orientation of the journal, and her contribution to this collection indicates more specifically the way in which Bourdieu embarked on his first published account of the field of artistic production against many of the dominant literary critical assumptions of the period and of the French tradition. In opposition to Romantic theories of self-expressive creativity, Bourdieu argued that the ‘public meaning’ of works is ‘necessarily collective’. He continued:

“Thus, the most singular and personal aesthetic judgement has reference to a common meaning already established. The relationship with any work, even one’s own, is always a relationship with a work which has been judged. The *ultimate* truth and value of a work can never be anything but the sum of potential judgements of it which all the members of the intellectual world would formulate by reference in all cases to the social representation of the work as the integration of individual judgements of it. Because the particular meaning must always be defined in relation to the common meaning, it necessarily contributes to the definition of what will be a new version of this common meaning. The judgement of history, which will be the final pronouncement on the work and its author, is already begun by the judgement of the very first reader; posterity will have to take into account the public meaning bequeathed to it by contemporary opinion.”

(Bourdieu, 1971, 173)

The purpose of this introduction is to reflect on that last half sentence. This special number was first proposed back in 2003 and, in the interim, there have been special issues of other journals devoted to the work of Bourdieu. At first, there was a natural tendency to provide extended, surrogate obituaries. By contrast, however, we can now begin to see ourselves as ‘posterity’. Recognizing that the way in which Bourdieu argues that ‘the judgement of history’ should be made is itself a key manifestation of what it is that we now have to judge, the challenge is to decide whether our assessment of the ‘ultimate truth and value’ of his work should involve scientific analysis of the collective conditions of its production (contexts); appreciation of the autonomous validity of his textual statements (texts); or pragmatic application of his conceptual instruments (pretexts). I seize the privilege, as editor, to revisit the issues which I raise in my own contribution to this collection and, in doing so, I also seek to make some introductory remarks about all the contributions to this special number. First of all, I shall continue to draw out some comments from a reading of “intellectual field and creative project”. I shall then digress to look at the way in which Bourdieu used Cassirer’s interpretation of Kant to reconcile ambivalences in the legacy of Durkheim as he sought to institutionalise the scientific study of culture whilst seeking to steer a middle way between positivism and hermeneutics. I shall then look at Bourdieu’s use of Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as a frame of reference for
Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Finally, I shall reflect further on “Intellectual field and creative project” in the light of the subsequent discussion to suggest that this collection of articles reflects Bourdieu’s creative project in as much as it assembles work which represents creative responses to Bourdieu’s work and to social and cultural phenomena rather than responses which are circumscribed by the rules of disciplines or by any reification of his practices. The special number attempts to imitate the creativity of his judgement rather than to consolidate any Bourdieusian orthodoxy.

“Intellectual field and creative project”.

Bourdieu announced his aspiration in the first – typically long - sentence of the article:

“In order that the sociology of intellectual and artistic creation be assigned its proper object and at the same time its limits, the principle must be perceived and stated that the relationship between a creative artist and his work, and therefore his work itself, is affected by the system of social relations within which creation as an act of communication takes place, or to be more precise, by the position of the creative artist in the structure of the intellectual field (which is itself, in part at any rate, a function of his past work and the reception it has met with).” (Bourdieu, 1971, 161)

In short, Bourdieu was announcing the terms on which the study of the products of intellectual and artistic creativity might be subsumed under social science. He proceeded to indicate the ways in which the analysis of cultural production might be mathematicised – how, like in a ‘magnetic field’, artistic and creative production and consumption can be understood as inextricably connected forces in ‘a system of power lines’.

The first sentence of the second paragraph was equally important:

“Obviously this approach can only be justified in so far as the object to which it is applied, that is, the intellectual field (and thus the cultural field) possesses the relative autonomy which authorizes the methodological autonomization operated by the structural method when it treats the intellectual field as a system which is governed by its own laws.” (Bourdieu, 1971, 162)

The possibility of subjecting intellectual and artistic creations to sociological analysis in terms of behaviour within an autonomous field was dependent upon there being an achieved autonomy in intellectual and artistic relations within the objective situation to be analysed. Relying heavily on evidence supplied in L.L. Schücking’s the Sociology of Literary Taste, Bourdieu proceeded to argue that just such autonomy had been achieved in Western Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. The examples cited relate particularly to literary and dramatic production. One corollary of this new independence from aristocratic or ecclesiastical patronage was ‘the exclusion of the public’ and the development of what Schücking called ‘mutual admiration societies, small sects enclosed in their esotericism’ – a self-referential autonomy. Already showing the influence of Bachelard’s historical epistemology, Bourdieu was eager to argue that, methodologically, it was important to recognize that the characteristics of ‘fields’ are historically contingent such that it is never possible to derive ‘essential, transhistoric and transcultural truths’ from these arbitrary autonomies.

For the purposes of this discussion, Bourdieu’s early article failed to confront two problems to which we need to attend. Firstly, he failed to offer any differentiation between ‘intellectual’ and ‘artistic’ creation – using the terms synonymously throughout. Secondly, he failed to deal with
the implications arising from temporal difference – from the difference between reciprocal production and consumption synchronically within a field and extraneous judgements of products, whether historically or trans-culturally extraneous. These are shortcomings which impinge upon our current relation to his work. Both are evident in the second section of “Intellectual Field and Creative Project”, entitled ‘The Birds of Psaphon’, where Bourdieu elaborates the contention that ‘an author writes for a public’. The full implications of this ‘fact’, he says, have ‘never been completely explored’ and, he continues:

“Few social actors depend as much as artists, and intellectuals in general, for what they are and for the image that they have of themselves on the image that other people have of them and of what they are.” (Bourdieu, 1971, 166)

The examples which are then cited relate exclusively to ‘artists’ and, following the thinking of Paul Valéry, Bourdieu posits a differentiation between artists on the basis of differing degrees of dependence on audiences which, to varying extents, constitute the content of what is transmitted to them – suggesting a spectrum between production which expresses the ‘intrinsic necessity of the work of art’ and production which is directed ‘from outside’ by ‘social pressures’. Referring to his earlier methodological argument, Bourdieu states that although the least autonomous artistic products are the most amenable to sociological analysis, nevertheless

“… even the ‘purest’ artistic intention cannot completely escape from sociology, because, as we have seen, for it even to exist depends on certain particular, historical and social conditions and also because it is obliged to make some reference to the objective truth reflected back from the intellectual field.” (Bourdieu, 1971, 167)

‘Artistic’ production, therefore, operates exclusively within an inter-subjectively constructed context. Even though this view is extended to ‘intellectual’ production as well, the first shortcoming of the argument, therefore, is that there is no consideration of whether the logic of other forms of production – such as ‘scientific’ production – might also involve reference to other kinds of objectivity – such as, for instance, the constraints imposed by the observation of natural phenomena.

The second shortcoming relates to an unresolved tension between an understanding of the immanent reciprocity between production and consumption experienced by artists themselves and an understanding of reciprocity fabricated retrospectively and almost vicariously by critics. Flaubert’s production is taken as an example here:

“It is sufficient to think of what Flaubert’s work would have been like (and we can imagine this by comparing the different versions of Madame Bovary) if he had not had to reckon with a censorship which was hardly calculated to make it easier for him to discover the true character of his artistic intention. If, instead of being obliged to refer to an aesthetic theory in which the proper concern of the novel is the psychology of the characters and the successful construction of the plot, he had come into contact, among critics and the public, with the theory of the novel that is available for novelists of our time, in the light of which theory contemporary readers read his work and all that is left unsaid, his whole life’s work would no doubt have been profoundly altered.” (Bourdieu, 1971, 168-9)

The recommended contemporary and a-historical reading of Flaubert’s work seems on the one hand to be leading to an a-temporal autonomizing of texts whilst, on the other hand, it masquerades as an exposure of Flaubert’s true historical ‘intention’, as evidenced by his re-
drafting of *Madame Bovary*. Bourdieu also proceeds to quote Gérard Genette’s analysis of the shifts in the public perceptions of the writing of Alain Robbe-Grillet before and after *Last Year in Marienbad*. Genette defended the right of the author ‘to contradict himself’, but Bourdieu argues that this defence misses the sociological nature of the phenomenon. Robbe-Grillet was internalising in his own self-understanding the public interpretations of his work offered by critics. This extraneously activated re-definition of Robbe-Grillet’s artistic intention became a constituting factor in his subsequent creativity. For Bourdieu, here, this example demonstrates that

“… what a critic says about a work appears to the creator himself not so much a critical judgement on the value of the work as an *objectivation of the creative project* in so far as it can be deduced from the work itself.” (Bourdieu, 1971, 170)

Writing of a contemporary and from within a shared intellectual field of production and consumption, Bourdieu was able to make this argument in relation to Robbe-Grillet, but it is not clear that the responses to Robbe-Grillet and Flaubert are analogous. The analysis of the former is participative whereas of the latter it is in part the product of historical social science.

In referring to Flaubert’s ‘intention’, Bourdieu was trapped linguistically into suggesting a kind of individualism which was contrary to the main thrust of his argument. The essay is a powerful rejection of individualistic intention and it constantly asserts that ‘the intellectual is socially and historically situated’. It is for this reason that

“… the work of art is always elliptical – it leaves unsaid the essential, it implicitly assumes what forms its very foundations, that is the axioms and postulates which it takes for granted, the axiomatics of which should be the study of the science of culture.” (Bourdieu, 1971, 180)

Although the article does not include a Historical consideration of scientific production in relation to the intellectual field, it does however advocate in the present the scientific study of general culture. This was an article written four years after Bourdieu had become secretary to Raymond Aron’s Centre de Sociologie Européenne. After his intellectual formation at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and his ‘fieldwork in philosophy’ in Algeria, the constituting context of Bourdieu’s work in the 1960s required that he should define himself as a sociologist. In accordance with the position expressed in “Intellectual Field and Creative Project”, there was a reciprocal relationship between his self-definition and the objective attempt to establish institutionally a social science research group. Reference to the way in which Durkheim had developed social science at the turn of the century was inevitable. Bourdieu and Passeron positioned themselves in part in relation to Durkheim and Durkheimianism in “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967). *Le métier de sociologue* (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, , & Passeron, 1968) assembled more exemplary extracts from the work of Durkheim than from any other single sociologist. Additionally, T.N. Clark’s *Prophets and Patrons* (Clark, 1973), which analysed the strategies of patronage in professorial appointments which consolidated Durkheim’s university influence after his death in 1917, was published in 1973 and specifically acknowledged the assistance of colleagues in the Centre de Sociologie Européenne. The procedure adopted by Bourdieu and his colleagues in publishing *Le métier de sociologue* in 1968 and then in founding the *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* in 1975 mirrored Durkheim’s actions in publishing *Les règles de la méthode sociologique (The Rules of Sociological Method)* as a book in 1895 (Durkheim,1895, 1982) and then in founding *L’Année sociologique* in 1898, but there were also important differences.
In the conclusion to *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim reiterated his earlier assertion that the defining characteristic of social science is that it considers ‘social facts as things’, but he emphasized that ‘if we consider social facts as things, it is as social things.’ In summarising sociological method, in other words, Durkheim insisted that

“The third feature which is characteristic of our method is that it is exclusively sociological” (Durkheim, 1982, 162)

and he elaborated this point in the following way:

“Thus sociology is not the appendage of any other science; it is itself a distinct and autonomous science. The sense of the specific nature of social reality is even so essential to the sociologist that only a purely sociological culture can prepare him for the understanding of social facts.” (Durkheim, 1982, 162)

It followed that there was a need for ‘sociologists’ to be initiated culturally into procedures which would enable them to practice autonomous sociological research in respect of autonomous social facts:

“We regard this progress of sociological culture as the most important of all the steps that remain to be taken in sociology. Undoubtedly when a science is in the process of being created one is indeed forced, in order to construct it, to refer to the sole models which exist, namely those of sciences already constructed. … However, a science cannot be considered definitively constituted until it has succeeded in establishing its own independent status. For it lacks any justification for existing unless its subject matter is an order of facts which other sciences do not study, since it is impossible for the same notions to fit identically things of a different nature.” (Durkheim, 1982, 162)

This would be the rationale for the initiation process that developed for participants in the production of *L’Année Sociologique*. Durkheim believed that this process of initiation and socialisation was necessary to safeguard the autonomy of social science and he concluded that ‘the time has come for sociology to renounce worldly successes, so to speak, and take on the esoteric character which befits all science’ (Durkheim, 1982, 163).

This was the first of two sentences which were quoted by Bourdieu et al. in the last paragraph of the conclusion – ‘Sociology of knowledge and epistemology’ – of the introduction to *Le métier de sociologue*, 1968 (*The Craft of Sociology*, 1991) in which they argued for the need to establish a ‘scientific city’ and to exercise epistemological vigilance in its defence. They used the quotation from Durkheim to support their sense that ‘the scientific community has to provide itself with specific forms of social interchange, …’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991, 77). Bourdieu’s motivation in the 1960s and 1970s was the same as Durkheim’s in wanting to institutionalise and communicate the methodology of social science rather than to accumulate a body of sociological knowledge or social theory to be transmitted as surrogate doctrine. Apart from the research activity of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne which, as early as 1976, Tom Bottomore (in his Foreword to the English translation of *La Reproduction*) recognized as demonstrating a “long-term involvement in the exploration of a particular broad domain of social life, by a group of researchers who acquire to some extent the qualities of a ‘school’ of thought” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, v), and from establishing the *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, Bourdieu also embarked on an ambitious programme of translations and publications of sociological texts in his capacity as General Editor of the *Le
Bourdieu was the inspiration for the publication, for instance, of the collected works of Durkheim and also of Mauss (both edited by Victor Karady) in order strategically to counteract the interpretations of their works which had hitherto, in the case of Mauss, been mediated by Lévi-Strauss and, in the case of Durkheim, by the selections published in the 1920s under the supervision of Fauconnet, Bouglé and Davy. Bourdieu made a systematic attempt to retrieve Durkheim’s commitment to research method, but there are also indications that his interpretation of Durkheim was coming under the influence of his reading of the work of Ernst Cassirer, much of which was translated in the \textit{Le Sens Commun} series during the 1970s.

The influence of Cassirer is already evident in “Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1968). Citing Cassirer’s “Structuralism in Modern Linguistics” of 1945 and clearly also influenced by Cassirer’s \textit{Substance et fonction} (Cassirer, 1910, 1923, 1977) Bourdieu argues that in order to deal with “cultural systems and systems of social relations” they have to be defined “not by some substantial ‘content’ but only by the laws of combination of their constitutive elements”. He continued:

“… such things as language, culture, or a complex of social relations cannot be dealt with as systems having internal coherence and necessity, except by overruling, as Ernst Cassirer remarks, the clear-cut opposition established by Leibniz and all classical rationalism between truths of reason and truths of fact, between formal eternal truths of logic and mathematics and contingent empirical truths of history. In ceasing to place in opposition to each other that which is formal and that which is real, reason and experience conceived as mere ‘Rhapsodie von Warnehmungen,’ structuralism places its foundation on the postulate that experience is a system.” (Bourdieu, 1968, 683)

In comparison with this philosophy of science, Durkheim stood condemned as a naïve realist. Durkheim’s insistence on the need to autonomise sociological explanation was based on a confidence in the substantive reality of objective social phenomena. At the end of the 1960s, therefore, Bourdieu was in the position where he sought to imitate Durkheim’s discourse-building activities in order to institutionalise a form of sociological research which was, however, not dependent on the limited conception of social science which followed from Durkheim’s substantive philosophy of science. For Bourdieu, it was necessary to consolidate the autonomy of social science enquiry not because, as for Durkheim, social scientific explanation corresponds with a limited, ‘social’ sphere of reality, but because we need to understand relationally the way in which social scientific enquiry constitutes its object and is therefore engaged in a struggle for domination in competition with other ways of conceptualising reality. Another way of putting the difference is to say that Durkheim’s philosophy of social science was empiricist whereas Bourdieu’s developed out of his early study of continental rationalist philosophy, particularly the work of Leibniz, and of his reading of a series of philosophers of science in the French tradition in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century (Duhem, Poincaré, Guéroult, Weill, Vuillemin, Koyré) all of whom were involved in developing a philosophy of science out of the legacy of Kantian critical philosophy. The situation was not, however, as clear-cut as this summary would imply. With the help of Cassirer, I need to digress to suggest that the key to understanding the complexities of Bourdieu’s thinking at this time – and, by extension, the key to understanding the complexity of responding now to his texts – lies in the history of the interpretations of the three great works of Kant of the 1780s: the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, and the \textit{Critique of Judgment} (or, as most recently and most accurately translated, \textit{The Critique of the Power of Judgment}).

\textbf{Cassirer and Kant’s three Critiques.}
In the opening paragraphs both of the ‘first Introduction’ to *The Critique of the Power of Judgment* and of the separate Preface to the first edition, Kant tried to spell out very clearly the boundaries between the concerns of the three *Critiques*. Early in the second section of the ‘first Introduction’, Kant states:

“… if the understanding yields *a priori* laws of nature, reason, on the contrary, laws of freedom, then by analogy one would still expect that the power of judgement, which mediates the connection between the two faculties, would, just like those, add its own special principles *a priori* …” (Kant, ed. Guyer, P. 2000, 8)

Even though Kant differentiated between the definition of the *a priori* laws governing the possibility of knowledge of nature and the definition of empirical scientific laws, in broad terms, the neo-Kantianism of the late part of the 19th Century – notably the interpretations of Kant offered by the Marburg School (Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp) - sought to derive a philosophy of natural science from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. Similarly, even though Kant’s endeavour in the *Critique of Practical Reason* was to define the *a priori* principles governing the function of reason in enabling people in freedom to exercise moral choice, nevertheless the way in which Durkheim sought to integrate the influences of Comte and Kant on his thinking was to develop an empirical science of morals. In his *Emile Durkheim. His Life and work: a historical and critical study* (Lukes, 1973) Steven Lukes highlighted the early influence on Durkheim of the Kantian thinking of Emile Boutroux and Charles Renouvier, and, more recently, Susan Stedman Jones has emphasized the influence of Renouvier, quoting an authority on renouvier to the effect that his phenomenalism ‘derives in a straight line from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*’ (Milhaud, 1927, 69, cited in Stedman Jones, 2001, 66).

Although he was associated with the Marburg School, Cassirer importantly recognized the importance of the role assigned by Kant to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and the way in which a better appreciation of this role would counteract the prevailing tendencies to deduce transcendental principles empirically. Chapter 6 of Cassirer’s *Kant’s Life and Thought* – first published in 1918 – is a sustained attempt to insist on the significance of Kant’s third *Critique*. According to Cassirer, Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*

“… is the critique of experience; its intent is to demonstrate that the lawful order which the understanding only appears to discover in experience is something grounded in the categories and rules of this understanding itself, and to this extent necessary.” (Cassirer, 1981, 290)

For Cassirer, Kant’s first *Critique* demonstrated, against empiricism, that laws of scientific explanation could not simply be derived from observation, but rested on fundamental principles. However, Cassirer suggested that Kant realised that this insistence on the *a priori* fundamentals of scientific knowledge did not achieve any recognition of the structures of scientific explanation. Attempting to revive Kant’s thought processes, Cassirer continued:

“The concrete structure of empirical science … confronts us at the same time with another task, which has not been solved and overcome along with the first one. For here we find not only a lawfulness of events as such, but a connection and interpenetration of particular laws of such a type that the whole of a determinate complex of appearances is progressively combined and dissected for our thought in a fixed sequence, in a progression from the simple to the complex, from the easier to the more difficult.” (Cassirer, 1981, 291)
Cassirer thought that Kant was right in exposing the explanatory inadequacy of empiricism but he also thought that Kant’s account of the *a priori* principles of knowledge was derived from the historically contingent prior state of Newtonian mechanics. Whilst retaining the notion of the *a priori* shaping of knowledge, Cassirer wanted to shift attention towards the ways in which, in freedom, human thought in action manifests principles of organisation. Kant’s thinking in *The Critique of the Power of Judgement* seemed to point towards the development of Cassirer’s own ‘philosophy of symbolic forms’. Cassirer elaborated the significance of the shift in the following way:

“Whereas the pure understanding was revealed to be ‘legislator for nature’ because of the demonstration that it contains the conditions of the possibility of its object, here reason approaches empirical material not as if commanding but as if questioning and inquiring; thus the relation is not constitutive, but regulative, not determinative but reflective. For in this case the particular is not deduced from the universal so as to specify its nature, but the attempt is to discover in the particular itself, by successive considerations of the relations it bears within itself, and the similarities and differences which its individual parts show with respect to one another, a connection that can be expressed in ever more comprehensive concepts and rules.” (Cassirer, 1981, 293)

The logic of the shift from deduction to discovery leads to the contention that we relate to ‘nature’ as ‘art’. ‘Science’ is one of the ‘forms’ of explanatory meaning which we use in responding to nature just as we use categories of aesthetic judgement in relation to art. The three volumes of Cassirer’s *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (Cassirer, 1923-29, 1953-7, 1972) were devoted to Language, Myth, and Science. There was no autonomous consideration of art because the essence of the argument was that all symbolic forms are artistic. Cassirer proceeded to argue that Kant’s aesthetic theory altered the emphasis of preceding theory by focusing on the construction of aesthetic judgements rather than on the attempt to deduce universal rules of objective beauty, and he summarised the implication of this position in the following way:

“Only now do we understand the expression ‘subjective universality’ that Kant coins as the mark of the aesthetic judgement. ‘Subjective universality’ is the assertion and requirement of a universality of subjectivity itself. The designation ‘subjective’ does not act to restrict the claim to validity made by the aesthetic, but just the opposite: it designates an enlargement of the realm of validity, which is here perfected.” (Cassirer, 1981, 318).

**Bourdieu and the ‘vulgar’ critique of ‘pure’ critiques.**

I have tried to suggest that at the end of the 1960s there were at least three interacting aspects of Bourdieu’s situation and thinking. He was seeking to advance a social science of the social genesis of intellectual/artistic creativity. He was seeking to adapt the Durkheimian legacy to give institutional and ideological identity to the practice of a social science which would no longer be tied to Durkheimian epistemology. Partly as a result of translating the work of Panofsky – who was Cassirer’s pupil – and of organising the translations of Cassirer’s texts, Bourdieu was beginning to reflect on his own attitudes towards science and art in ways which related to the neo-Kantian tradition as interpreted by Cassirer. Much of this reflection is apparent in rather cryptic form in Bourdieu’s “On Symbolic Power” which was originally given as a paper in 1973 (Bourdieu, 1977, 1991). The consequence of this juxtaposition of influences was that Bourdieu constructed an epistemic community of researchers, focused on the Centre de Sociologie Européenne and the *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, which was committed to subjecting all social phenomena to social scientific analysis whilst at the same
time insisting that the apparently scientific analysis is a form of aesthetic judgement rather than of cognitive understanding. The differentiation between the objects of research described in the first number of the Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales in “Méthode scientifique et hiérarchie sociale des objets” (Bourdieu, 1975a) is not a differentiation which is thought to be based upon objective differences between cultural forms but a differentiation which recognizes that research is a mode of active cultural judgement. At the start of “Anatomie du goût” of the following year it was openly admitted that ‘scientific discourse on art and on the social uses of works of art is bound to appear to be both vulgar and terrorist’ (Bourdieu & de Saint Martin, 1976, 4). In the context of Cassirer’s explication of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, however, it is clear that the ‘transgression’ is not the attempt to subject art to social scientific analysis as such but the attempt to use judgement presented in the form of science as a contribution itself to the universalising of subjectivity demanded by Kant. When the findings of the article were published as La Distinction: critique sociale du jugement (Bourdieu, 1979), Bourdieu added the Postscript entitled “Towards a ‘vulgar’ critique of ‘pure’ critiques” which is a direct response to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that Bourdieu’s discussion of Kant is fundamentally anti-Kantian. Bourdieu explicitly asserts that the social scientific analysis offered in Distinction of the diversity of social tastes had been presented without reference to ‘aesthetic theory’ and he proceeds to attack the philosophy of aesthetic taste derived from Kant. In particular, Bourdieu offers quotes which suggest that Kant’s a prioristic elevation of the ‘beautiful’ was the consequence of his bourgeois position as a member of the ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’ and was a position which euphemized his ‘disgust’ for the crude, vulgar taste of ordinary people. In language reminiscent of his reflections on ‘the political ontology of Martin Heidegger’ (Bourdieu, 1975b), Bourdieu argues:

“Totally ahistorical, like all philosophical thought that is worthy of the name (every philosophia worth its salt is perennis) - perfectly ethnocentric, since it takes for its sole datum the lived experience of a homo aestheticus who is none other than the subject of aesthetic discourse constituted as the universal subject of aesthetic experience – Kant’s analysis of the judgement of taste finds its real basis in a set of aesthetic principles which are the universalization of the dispositions associated with a particular social and economic condition.” (Bourdieu, 1986, 493)

Nevertheless, aware that his judgement here might appear as ‘ahistorical’ as that of the philosopher, Bourdieu relents. Kant’s theory manifests the ‘double social relationship’ of his social situation:

“What is hidden, that is, the double social relationship – to the court (the site of civilization as opposed to culture) and to the people (the site of nature and sense) – is both present and absent; it presents itself in the text in such a guise that one can in all good faith not see it there and that the naively reductive reading, which would reduce Kant’s text to the social relationship that is disguised and transfigured within it, would be no less false than the ordinary reading which would reduce it to the phenomenal truth in which it appears only in disguise.” (Bourdieu, 1986, 494)

In judging the historical thought of Kant, Bourdieu was prepared to avoid both sociological and philosophical reduction. Given his own sense of his own membership of the ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’, Bourdieu was articulating (in “The three forms of theoretical knowledge”, Bourdieu, 1973) a way of accommodating his own ‘double social relationship’ by advocating a structure for reflexivity which used Bachelard’s conception of ‘epistemological rupture’. Foucault had argued, in his thèse complémentaire to his translation into French of
Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant, 1964) that Kant’s desire in that work to understand man pragmatically in terms of ‘what man has made of man’ through social dialogue rather than in terms of intrinsic ‘natural’ man discovered scientifically had been inhibited by his prior commitment to the concept of the self developed in the Critiques.

Foucault’s solution was to turn to Nietzsche, but Bourdieu’s response to Kant’s social inhibition is best understood to be an application of Kantian judgement which would (as he had written in relation to the experience of Alain Robbe-Grillet quoted earlier) vicariously objectivate the judgements of a whole population in such a way as to contribute towards the enactment of the ‘subjective universality’ described by Cassirer. Bourdieu deployed Kant’s notion of ‘judgment’, as interpreted by Cassirer, to generate a judging engagement with culture rather than a science of culture.

Genius and the rules of art.

The ‘sociology of intellectual and artistic creation’ introduced by Bourdieu at the beginning of “Intellectual field and creative project” was his creative project. He did not differentiate between scientific and artistic intellectual production within the article precisely because he did not himself make that differentiation in his own practice. The character of the production is defined within the intellectual field. Just as in the case of Robbe-Grillet cited in the article, Bourdieu constituted his intellectual identity in relation to the field which he was himself partly instrumental in constituting. The collective activities of the Centre de Sociologie Europenne and of the Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales became, in a continuous process of reciprocity, self-constituting objectivations of his own identity. As, again, in the case of Flaubert cited in the article, the question remains whether that objectivated field can persist in order still to control Bourdieu’s ‘griffe’ posthumously. (See “Le couturier et sa griffe”, Bourdieu & Delsaut, 1975)

Kant made a clear distinction in The Critique of the Power of Judgment between cognition and aesthetic judgment, insisting that cognition, belonging to the understanding, should have no part in the judgment of the beautiful. His elaboration of his view, and Cassirer’s illuminating representation of it, have implications for the ways in which we should now consider Bourdieu’s production and its contemporary transmission. Kant devoted two sections (46 and 47) of The Critique of the Power of Judgment to consideration of the nature of ‘genius’ in respect of artistic and scientific production, beginning with the following definition:

“Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Since the talent, as an inborn productive faculty of the artist, itself belongs to nature, this could also be expressed thus: Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.” (Kant, ed. Guyer, 2000, 186)

Although Kant’s formulation implies that ‘genius’ is an extraordinary possession, his definition is nevertheless transferable to the notion of habitus as a socio-genetically transmitted disposition which is the possession of all. Kant continued:

“For every art presupposes rules which first lay down the foundation by means of which a product that is to be called artistic is first represented as possible. The concept of beautiful art, however, does not allow the judgment concerning the beauty of its product to be derived from any sort of rule that has a concept for its determining ground, and thus has as its ground a concept of how it is possible. Thus beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule in accordance with which it is to bring its product into being. Yet since without a preceding rule a product can never be called art, nature in the subject (and by means of
the disposition of its faculties) must give the rule to art, i.e. beautiful art is possible only as a product of genius.” (Kant, ed. Guyer, 2000, 186)

It is in this respect that art is most clearly distinguished from science. Kant continued:

“Everyone agrees that genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of imitation. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, even the greatest aptitude for learning, facility for learning (capacity) as such, still does not count as genius. But even if one thinks or writes for himself, and does not merely take up what others have thought, indeed even if he invents a great deal for art and science, this is still not a proper reason for calling such a great mind … a genius, since just this sort of thing could also have been learned, and thus still lies on the natural path of inquiry and reflection in accordance with rules, and is not specifically distinct from that which can be acquired with effort by means of imitation.” (Kant, ed. Guyer, 2000, 187)

I am reminded here of Bourdieu’s constant distinction between lectores and auctores, or priests and prophets – between those who transmit existing and those who generate new knowledge. Kant proceeded to emphasize his point by applying it, amazingly, to the work of Newton:

“Thus everything that Newton expounded in his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy, no matter how great a mind it took to discover it, can still be learned; but one cannot learn to write inspired poetry, however exhaustive all the rules for the art of poetry and however excellent the models for it may be.” (Kant, ed., Guyer, 2000, 187)

Since, in Kant’s terms, ‘the gift of nature must give the rule to art’, the next question is what kind of rule this is and how can it be transmitted. Kant offers the following answer:

“It cannot be couched in a formula to serve as a precept, for then the judgment about the beautiful would be determinable in accordance with concepts; rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed, i.e. from the product, against which others may test their own talent, letting it serve them as a model not for copying but for imitation. … The models of beautiful art are thus the only means for transmitting these to posterity, which could not happen through mere descriptions (especially not in the field of the arts of discourse; …” (Kant, ed. Guyer, 2000, 188)

Texts, therefore, should not be routinised or reduced to precepts or abstracted formulae. If they are to be used as pretexts for future creativity, they have to be appreciated for themselves. Nevertheless, Kant did not suggest an absolute rejection of the mechanical in favour exclusively of the creative. He commented:

“Although mechanical and beautiful art, the first as a mere art of diligence and learning, the second as that of genius, are very different from each other, still there is no beautiful art in which something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something academically correct, does not constitute the essential condition of the art. For something in it must be thought of as an end, otherwise one cannot ascribe its product to any art at all; it would be a mere product of chance. … Genius can only provide rich material for products of art; its elaboration and form require a talent that has been academically trained, in order to make a use of it that can stand up to the power of judgment.” (Kant, ed. Guyer, 2000, 188-9)
Texts have to be appreciated in themselves, but that process of intrinsic appreciation requires also a contextual awareness of the presuppositions of the particular forms within which creativity emerges, an awareness, perhaps, of the social conditions of production of the fields of production and consumption within which texts are situated. Cassirer’s commentaries on these Kantian passages helps to effect directly a transition to some final thoughts on the appropriate reception of Bourdieu’s work and on the place of this collection in that reception. Cassirer wrote:

“Genius and its act stand at the point where supreme individuality and supreme universality, freedom and necessity, pure creation and pure lawfulness indissolubly coalesce. In every line of its activity it is thoroughly original but nonetheless thoroughly exemplary. For just where we stand in the true focus of personality, where the latter gives itself purely without any external consideration and expresses itself in the individually necessary law of its creating, all the accidental limitations clinging to the individual in his particular empirical existence and his particular empirical interests fall away. In its immersion in this unadornedly personal sphere genius finds the secret and the power of universal communicability, and each great work of art presents nothing but the objectification of this basic power. … Were genius to try to speak to us elsewhere than in the immediate creation of its work, it would have precisely in that act cut itself off from the soil in which it is rooted. Hence what it is and what it signifies, as a ‘natural gift’, cannot be expressed in a general formula and thus put forward as a prescription; the rule must, so far as it does exist, be abstracted from the act, that is, from the product, which serves as an example not for imitation but for comparable creation.” (Cassirer, 1981, 321-2)

Cassirer also commented specifically on Kant’s differentiation of artistic from scientific productivities:

“Kant’s assertion that there can be no genius in the sciences can only be rightly evaluated if one keeps in mind that in this discussion it is for him always a matter of the systematic difference of meaning of these two cultural realms, not of the psychological difference of individuals. … the decisive difference lies solely in that everything which pretends to be scientific insight, as soon as it is to be communicated and established, possesses no form for this save that of the objective concept and objective deduction. The personality of the creator must be expunged if the accuracy of the result is to be protected. Only in the great artist is this division nonexistent, for everything he gives is endowed with its peculiar and supreme value only through what he is. He does not alienate himself in any work which then continues to exist as an isolated thing of value in itself, but in each particular work he creates a new symbolic expression of that univocal basic relation given in his ‘nature’, in the ‘proportion of his mental powers’” (Cassirer, 1981, 322-3)

Speaking for myself, Cassirer’s summary of the Kantian position encapsulates the necessary attitude to be adopted to the work of Bourdieu and, still speaking for myself, this collection of articles on Bourdieu’s work can be represented as a collective maintenance of his inspirational creativity. What follows are seven responses to Bourdieu’s work which seek to define the nature of his project without extrapolating precepts for imitation or abstract criteria for evaluation. We are, largely, participants in his project who seek to preserve, through explication, the unique qualities of his work. With the exception of Tim Jenkins, we all experienced Bourdieu’s project in action – no one more closely than Remi Lenoir who has been Director of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne since 1997. We are all of a similar generation, born either in 1943 or 1944, with the exception of Staf Callewaert and Tim Jenkins who were
born, respectively, a decade earlier and later. We are of different nationalities and our intellectual formations reflect the diversity of European intellectual traditions and most of us have written quite considerably about Bourdieu’s work. Remi Lenoir was trained in Sociology and Law in Paris and is Professor of Sociology at Paris 1. As well as collaborating with Bourdieu on many research projects, he has recently co-edited Pour une histoire des sciences sociales (Heilbron, Lenoir & Sapiro, 2004) which sustains the orientation of Bourdieu’s work. I was trained in English Literature and, subsequently, Sociology at Cambridge and the London School of Economics and am now Professor of International Social Theory at the University of East London. I have written three books on Bourdieu, most recently On Bourdieu, Education and Society (Robbins, 2006). Anna Boschetti was trained in Literature at the University of Milan. She is now Professor of French Literature at the University of Venice and she has published La Rivoluzione simbolica di Pierre Bourdieu (Boscetti, 2003) as well as many articles on Bourdieu. Staf Callewaert is Danish and was trained in Philosophy and Theology at Louvain and Paris and then gained his PhD in the Sociology of Education at the University of Lund. This has been the main focus of his work on Bourdieu and, in 1992, he published Kultur, Paedagogik og Videnskab. Om Pierre Bourdies habitusbegrep og praktikteori (Culture, Education and Science. The concepts of Habitus and Practice in the writings of Pierre Bourdieu (Callewaert, 1992). He is currently the Scientific Director of the PDP Program at INDE Maputo. Bridget Fowler was trained in Sociology at the University of Leeds and is now Professor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Applied Social Sciences of the University of Glasgow. She published Pierre Bourdieu’s Cultural Theory: Critical Investigations in 1997 (Fowler, 1997) and recently contributed to Feminism after Bourdieu (Adkins & Skeggs, eds., 2004). Beate Krais was trained in Sociology at the University of Tübingen and the Free University of Berlin and is now Professor in the Department of Sociology of Darmstadt University of Technology. She is well known to English readers for her edition of the English translation of Le métier de sociologue which includes her interview with Bourdieu entitled “Meanwhile, I have come to know all the diseases of sociological understanding” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991) and she has contributed most recently to a collection entitled Pierre Bourdieu: Deutsch-französische Perspektiven (Pierre Bourdieu: German-French perspectives) (Colliot-Thélène, François, Gebauer, eds., 2005). Tim Jenkins trained in Zoology and then Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford and undertook social anthropological fieldwork in Paris, Toulouse and Béarn. He is now assistant Director of Research in the Study of Religion at the University of Cambridge and Dean of Jesus College, Cambridge.

I am proud to be the editor of such a richly diverse collection of articles which will enable readers to reflect both directly on the ongoing significance of Bourdieu’s work and indirectly on the competing disciplinary and national sub-fields within which that significance is mediated. In conclusion, I will single out the contribution made by Tim Jenkins which provides us with an independent objectification of Béarn society derived from his own fieldwork which is set alongside Bourdieu’s own reflexive attempt to objectify his own subjective experience of his native region of France. Since this introduction has emphasized the significance of Kant’s The Critique of the Power of Judgment in providing a framework for thinking about Bourdieu’s work, it is only fair to allude to the fact that, following through from Hermann Cohen’s Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (first published in 1871 and translated as La théorie kantiennne de l’expérience (Cohen, 2001) – Kant’s Theory of Experience – to Husserl’s posthumously published Experience and Judgment (Husserl, ed., Landgrabe, 1973) - which Bourdieu cited in ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’ (Bourdieu, 1987) - there is also the constant interest in Bourdieu’s work in the experiential basis of judgment and in phenomenology and ontology. But that is another story.
Bibliography.


