OUT OF THE RUINS

The Emergence of Radical Informal Learning Spaces

Edited by Robert H. Haworth & John M. Elmore
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## CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION**  
Thoughts on Radical Informal Learning Spaces  
*Robert H. Haworth*  

**Section 1  Critiques of Education**

**CHAPTER 1**  
Miseducation and the Authoritarian Mind  
*John M. Elmore*  

**CHAPTER 2**  
Don’t Act, Just Think!  
*David Gabbard*

**Section 2  Constructing Theoretical Frameworks for Educational Praxis**

**CHAPTER 3**  
From the Unlearned Un-man to a Pedagogy without Moulding: Stirner, Consciousness-Raising, and the Production of Difference  
*Rhiannon Firth and Andrew Robinson*  

**CHAPTER 4**  
Creating Transformative Anarchist-Geographic Learning Spaces  
*Farhang Rouhani*  

**CHAPTER 5**  
The Wretched of the Network Society: Techno-Education and Colonization of the Digital  
*Petar Jandrić and Ana Kuzmanić*
Using the theories of Max Stirner and the jointly authored works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this chapter seeks to critique pedagogies of moulding and to map and theorize alternatives. We begin by summarizing “moulding,”—why it is incompatible with post-representational politics, and the ways in which it persists in contemporary pedagogical theory. We then explore Stirner’s anarchism, demonstrating the complicity of moulding pedagogies with political representation. We draw on further sources of inspiration including Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) three stages of schizoanalysis as well as practices of feminist consciousness-raising in the 1970s. Using these diverse sources, we seek to provide a working model of pedagogy without moulding, which can give rise to autonomous, self-valorizing subjects of becoming.

Post-representational politics and autonomous social movements are growing fields of study in radical political theory. Growing trends within poststructuralism, anarchism, and liberation theories reject essentialist accounts of true and false representations, and the Cartesian “knowing subject.” Instead, the ontology of existence is taken to be a non-hierarchical, chaotic field of becoming. This ontology gives rise to ethical positions, which valorize this process of becoming and the resultant difference and uniqueness. So far, the pedagogical implications of postrepresentational politics are underexplored and inadequately theorized. Even radical approaches frequently embrace institutional schooling as a means of producing competencies and literacies deemed desirable by the knowing subject. One reason for this is the prevalence of what we call *pedagogies of moulding*, which we argue are incompatible with political radicalism, and prevalent in existing (even critical) forms of pedagogy.
Education as Moulding

Mainstream education assumes a process in which an empowered “knowing subject” (a teacher, institution, parent, etc.) imparts skills, beliefs or personality attributes to a learner. This process transforms the learner in a direction desired by the knowing subject. The goal is usually either social or moral: conceived as necessary to meet social goals, to produce a particular kind of ethical subject, or to help the learner “succeed” relative to social criteria. Moulding is sometimes portrayed as socialization—the adaptation of individuals to an existing social system. To various degrees, a vertical command relationship is built into the pedagogical situation, generated by the assumption that the ascribed ideal goal is more valuable than the actual existing subject. As Stirner (1845) puts it, “A person of good breeding is one into whom ‘good maxims’ have been instilled and impressed, poured in through a funnel, thrashed in and preached in” (p. 70). For historical reasons, this is unsurprising. The institution of the school has its origins in nationalist projects, which explicitly aimed for moulding. As Spring (2004) argues, “traditional forms of nationalist education attempt to mold loyal and patriotic citizens” (p. ix). Modern schooling emerged as a fundamental part of this process, connected to the eras of integrated national economies and inclusive Fordist/corporatist social infrastructures in order to “Separat[e] children from the community and plac[e] them in a controlled environment [that] provides the opportunity to mold entire generations to serve political and economic interests” (p. 2).

The emergence of neoliberalism at a global level has not undermined the form of moulding institutions, which have been retooled for capitalist goals and connected to new modes of social control. For instance, neoliberal approaches emphasize “key competencies,” which are “needed by everyone across a variety of different life contexts” and must be moulded into everyone through schooling (Brewerton, 2004, p. 3; cf. Barth, Gademann, Rieckmann & Stoltenberg, 2007). It is common for universities to advertise “graduate attributes”—the characteristics into which students will be moulded, providing a reliable “product” for employers. Hence, neoliberal models offer a general code of moulding, providing theories of pedagogical best practice which ignore the institutional context of learning and leave disciplinary institutions in place, “sweeping under the carpet the limitations of obligatory mass schooling” (Simola, 1998, p. 339).

Critical theorists generally reject the cruder forms of moulding that assume students are passive and docile, for instance, consider Freire’s critique of “banking education” (Freire, 1972, p. 58). However, it is our contention that few writers on critical and alternative pedagogies reject the moulding approach entirely. Instead, they either reject the dominant methods of moulding or the desirable model into which students are to be moulded. In short, most critical approaches assume the framework of modern schooling—
mass-scale compulsory institutions in which children are segregated, so as to be exposed to content or activities selected by others, and higher education institutions building on schooling in similarly segregated spaces—but seek to modify either the content of these institutions (e.g., more social critique, media awareness, ecology, ethics, challenging privilege) or the methods used once students are in place (e.g., holistic, dialogical, participatory, or student-centered methods).

Let us examine a few examples. Jonathan Arendt (2008), using Frankfurt School critical theory, argues that the education system is an effective place to instill “deconstructive and analytical abilities” to offset media influence (p. 41). Similarly, Kellner (2008) wants schooling, which “develops skills that will help create good citizens and that will make them more motivated and competent participants in social life” (p. 55). Ecological educator Martin (1996), writing for the World Wildlife Fund, argues that “the education system must . . . prepare all people for their role as well-informed, skilled and experienced participators in determining the quality and structure of the world” (p. 51). Feminist ethicist Nel Noddings (2010), a fierce opponent of character education, nevertheless observes that, “a major responsibility of parents has long been to shape children so that they will be acceptable to the community in which they will live” (p. 390). This is not something she wants to change, but to simply inflect with care ethics instead of traditional moralism. For Henry Giroux (2008), a central figure in contemporary critical pedagogy, “in order for freedom to flourish in the worldly space of the public realm, citizens have to be formed, educated, and socialized” (p. 207).

Major traditions of critical pedagogy do not escape this critique. The Deweyan tradition does not reject moulding. For instance, Rorty (1991) observes that “it never occurred to Dewey that there was something inherently ‘repressive’ about society. . . . He took over . . . the idea that you have to be socialized to be human” (p. 213). Freirean pedagogy is often framed as an alternative to moulding approaches and indeed provides many useful resources. Nevertheless, Marxist scholars have convincingly argued that Freire’s model retains aspects of a directed process of development in which the teacher directs a process of development towards a particular teleological horizon (Au, 2007). Poststructuralists, similarly, tend to pursue transgressions within dominant institutions, rather than against them. Despite the anti-authoritarian tendencies of Foucault, Deleuze, and others, many who draw on their theories in the field of education fail to draw distinctions between moulding and other approaches. For instance, Stephen J. Ball’s policy-relevant Foucauldianism focuses on different regimes within the education system, without any apparent objection to the disciplinary effects of schooling itself (see Ball, 2012). Other, particularly Deleuzian, approaches often talk about general conditions of learning in ways which apply as much
to schools and other spaces (e.g., St. Pierre, 2004; Zembylas, 2002), which emphasize education as affective and bodily self-transformation, with little emphasis on power. Their key task is to show that education (in schools or out) is partly networked, affective, embodied and so on, rather than to challenge the repressive affective regime of moulding. This often leads to a kind of flattening of thought onto reality, when, in the absence of structural contestation, micro-level resistances (which keep authoritarianism in place) constitute the whole of opposition. For example, in an explicitly political story aimed at education students, critical race scholars Green and Dantley (2013) explore a fictional case of a white principal sent into a mainly black inner-city school. After exposing epistemological privilege and structural racism, the modeled solution is simply to facilitate black leadership and better results within this skewed system.

The lack of critical attention to the question of moulding is in some respects, surprising. There is a growing trend towards the critique of current patterns of epistemic privilege and power. For instance, decolonial scholars have called for the rejection of colonial epistemological politics and the resultant ideas of a unified thinking subject, the privileging of mind over body, and the disciplining of subjectivity (Motta & Cole, 2014, p. 14). However, the extent to which this requires revolutionizing or overcoming formal educational institutions—rather than simply changing their methods, contents or curricula—has been neglected. In many respects, a critique of moulding is coextensive with a critique of modern epistemic power. Moulding is fundamentally connected to sovereignty in Agamben’s sense, the split between valueless bare life and politically valued life (Agamben, 1998). If people lack the “key competencies” or “personality traits” (Barth et al., 2007, p. 420) to “live and work successfully in our globalised world” (Clifford & Montgomery, 2011, p. 13), or the “competencies to participate in a democratic culture” (Kellner, 2008:63), or any of the other formulations of political ideas, they are excluded from participation in society. The structure here is fundamentally a structure of abyssal thinking (Santos, 2007), in which certain ways of being are devalued and suppressed—the same style of thinking which is typically criticized in decolonial accounts (Mignolo, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatshemi, 2012). The unlearned and unschooled (or unsuccessfully schooled, or unschoolable) person, including most of the global poor (c.f. Reimer, 1971, pp. 15, 39, 74), is defined, as Stirner would put it, as an un-man—a valueless being to be excluded from the order of recognition, and therefore, quite possibly, from a “life worth living.” This abyssal effect—and the epistemic hierarchy and epistemicide it necessarily implies—is the ineliminable remainder of pedagogies of moulding.

We contend that the rejection of moulding is a necessary part of a comprehensive project of dis-alienation. Critical pedagogues, Marxists, ecologi-
cal educators, poststructuralists, and human rights educators are in their own ways, seeking dis-alienation. The difficulty is that they usually seek it by alienated means, using structures designed for moulding an alienated subject so as to instead mould a dis-alienated subject. This performative contradiction draws them back into reproducing modernist pedagogical power. In the next section, we explore Stirner’s critique of moulding as necessarily alienating, before outlining a potentially dis-alienating pedagogical approach.

**Stirner, Spooks, and Moulding**

Stirner, who worked as a teacher for much of his life, was intimately concerned with questions of education from a post-Hegelian point of view. He was working in an educational context, dominated by the Humboldtian model of self-development through schooling, which was elaborated from theories such as Schiller’s (2006 [1794]), in which education is seen as a means to self-actualization. Stirner rejected the prior Hegelian theories of self-actualization on epistemological grounds, because of their reliance on belief that one’s ideas are objective and substantive aside from the knowing self (Stepelevitch, 1985, p. 613). Instead, Stirner argues that self-actualization emerges from an ‘egoist’ perspective unique to each of us. Like Hegel and Marx, Stirner is concerned with the question of dis-alienation: the achievement of “man’s proper home, in which nothing alien regulates and rules him any longer” (1845, p. 60). Also, in common with his Hegelian heritage, Stirner formulates a series of stages through which societies or individuals are believed to pass, in order to arrive at the desired end-state, effectively, a theory of maturation into autonomous subjectivity. This model continues from Stirner’s earliest, untranslated works in which he treated education as a process of self-development and humanization (de Ridder, 2008, p. 289).

**First Stage: Hedonism**

In Stirner’s (1845) model, children exercise will from their earliest days; they “have no sacred interest and know nothing of a ‘good cause’. They know all the more accurately what they have a fancy for” (p. 265). However, their hedonistic orientation to material objects of desire renders them vulnerable to control strategies based on rewards and punishments (p. 18). Hence, Stirner considers behaviorist strategies of reward and punishment—so central in “control society” in relation to adults as well as children—to be marks of the lowest, least mature phase of will.

**Second Stage: Spook-Ridden**

At a certain point, “the rod is too weak against our obduracy, and ‘courage’ replaces fear” (Stirner, 1845, p. 18). This leads to the second stage, where geist (mind/spirit) allows us to defy physical domination and incentive structures.
While this is progressive in relation to hedonism, it also leads to our being controlled or mastered by particular ideas (p. 55). People have in themselves a “wheel in the head,” a reactive affect, such as fear of a spook, which gives fixed ideas and external hierarchies power over them (p. 163). These wheels function like clockwork, making people follow the “spook’s” will (p. 75). This causes an inner split, as the real self has to be exiled, a “banishment” or “ostracism” of the ego or will (p. 177). Contemporary social forms and moulding pedagogies arise at this level: since the state activates the clockwork of wheels in the head, it destroys the egos it subsumes, alienating them to itself: “for as long as the State is the ego, the individual ego must remain a poor devil, a non-ego” (p. 194); it “does not let me come to my value” and requires “my valuelessness” to exist (p. 195).

As an approach to pedagogy, this reproduces alienation from oneself. Spooks always lead to an exclusion, which produces a sovereign split. For instance, “man” leads to the “un-man,” a man who does not correspond to the concept and therefore is jailed, labeled insane, and so on. Such a split is possible only if “the concept of man can be separated from the existence, the essence from the appearance” (p. 139), i.e., by means of alienation.

**Third Stage: Egoism**

At the third stage, one discovers oneself as a “corporeal self,” a “living flesh-and-blood person,” escaping possession by objects and spooks (Stirner, 1845, p. 21). The second-stage realization that I “need not be the slave of my appetites” is retained in the third stage, “but I want still more” (p. 254). The third-stage egoist is to be immune not only to coercion and bribery, but also to control by spooks and wheels in the head.

The egoist self is self-valorizing: “I give my own self value” (p. 196), by a standard which is not that of a spook. A self-valorizing will seizes, rather than demands, rights (p. 50–51), and uses thoughts and things in *bricolage* (p. 255–256, 260). Language is to be subordinated to the flow of becoming, with Stirner even advocating a state of “thoughtlessness” so as to be free from dominance by ideas (p. 263). In many respects, Stirner’s is a standpoint theory, arguing for a viewpoint on any matter “starting from me,” precluding moral and legal criteria of judgment (p. 185). Every unique self has its own partial philosophical view, and there are no universal theories that apply to all selves. Each person is a “repository of unique experiences and ideas,” which should not be reduced to any representation (Koch, 1997, p. 97). The egoist self is driven by an expressive pursuit of intensity and uniqueness, the imperative to *live life to the fullest* (Stirner, 1845, p. 231) in order to achieve disalienation. In effect, this is a theory of self-actualization: “‘egoism’ calls you to joy over yourselves, to self-enjoyment” (p. 130). Alienation is overcome in a rejection of the “foolish mania to be something else than you are” (p. 131).
Stirnerian selves are constantly changing and learning: “If you are bound to your past hour, if you must babble today because you babbled yesterday, if you cannot transform yourself each instant, you feel yourself fettered in slavery and benumbed” (Stirner, 1845, p. 39). However, this process of self-transformation is a process of becoming and differenciation (difference production), not a process of moulding. Life is not a means to an external calling or destiny; rather, one is to “make any use he likes of his life” (p. 245). Instead of an external calling, one has an imminent becoming: “forces that manifest themselves where they are because their being consists solely in their manifestation” (p. 249). Moulding is condemned as interference with becoming. “No sheep, no dog, exerts itself to become a ‘proper sheep, a proper dog’. . . . It realizes itself in living itself out, in dissolving itself, passing away” (p. 252). A trained dog “is no better for itself than a natural one,” though perhaps more useful for humans (1845, p. 253). As de Acosta (2007) puts it, Stirner sees the state as an “insult,” which makes him “less than what he imagines he could be” (p. 36).

Stirner’s idea of the “ego” needs to be clarified. “Ego” in the Cartesian, psychoanalytic, and decolonial senses is closer to what Stirner refers to as geist (mind or spirit). In fact, a Stirnerian ego seems to be closer to a Jungian or existentialist “authentic self” than to the socially optimizing personas or rational instrumentalists most often designated by the term. The egoist self is expressive and passionate—not a being of rational interests. It is ultimately something, which cannot be thought or conceptualized, since any fixed definition turns it into a representation or spook. As Stirner writes in his reply to critics: “What Stirner says is a word, a thought, a concept; what he means is no word, no thought, no concept. What he says is not what is meant and what he means is unsayable” (Stirner, 1977, p. 67). Egoists resist the use of normativity and social mediation in defining their relations. Instead, a kind of direct connection (“intercourse”) or enmity arises. In essence, the relation to another is not mediated by a “third party,” or a normative regime of rightness (1845, p. 162). Others are to be recognized as “unique beings who bear their law in themselves and live according to it,” and are not subjected to normative judgments which would make them “criminals” instead of “opponents” (1845, p. 158). Each must assert his or her “distinctness or peculiarity” against others: “you need not give way or renounce yourself” (1845, p. 161). Abyssal thought is thus entirely rejected. In a sense, this is a dis-alienated recognition, a subject-subject relation, even the terminology echoes Buber and Levinas (Firth, 2012, p. 144). This I-you relation, however, is possible only between two subjects who reject spooks, which then creates conditions of possibility for the kinds of horizontal relationships that will later be discussed under the rubric of “consciousness-raising.” This relation, however, is possible only between two subjects who
reject spooks and have reached the third level of consciousness (Stirner, 1845, pp. 175, 207).

**Stirner and Critical Pedagogy**

Stirner’s (1845) ideas have much in common with contemporary theories of critical pedagogy. For example, consider the themes of embodiment (e.g., p. 21), anti-essentialism (p. 36), self-transformation (p. 39), a relational or pragmatic view of science (“what is science for but to be consumed?”) (p. 133), and the processual nature of knowledge and subjectivity (p. 249). However, Stirner (1845) goes further in rejecting moulding as a product of spook-ridden moral thought (p. 64). Education as moulding produces only “rigid” characters, and not creative egoists (Stirner, 2009, p. 9). It trains people to dance to another’s tune, rather than to self-actualize and become (p. 248). It provides training suited to the state or spook, not the self (p. 173). Furthermore, even successful moulding never reaches the ideal, but simply professes it with the mouth (p. 253). Formal education singularly fails to produce egoists. “Such thoroughly true men are not supplied by school; if they are nevertheless there, they are there in spite of school” (2009, p. 8).

Hence, Stirner seeks some kind of pedagogy, but rejects the dominant structure of pedagogy as moulding. People are not already Stirnerian egoists. Maturation from the second to the third stage is desirable. For this, some kind of pedagogical process seems necessary. Modern-day Stirnerian Wolfi Landstreicher (2005), argues that

> The anarchist recognition of the primacy of the actual, living individual (as opposed to the collectivized cog and to the abstract concept of the individual) is the recognition that we need to become a certain sort of being, a being capable of acting on our own terms to realize our own desires and dreams in the face of the most fierce and powerful enemy: this entire civilization . . . the transformation of oneself into a spirited, willful being. (pp. 3–4).

In other words, he frames the Stirnerian process of reaching the third stage of an autonomous ego as inherently pedagogical. Yet existing pedagogical institutions are rejected as necessarily entangled with the second stage—the domain of spooks. We need ways to pass from the second (or first) stage to the third stage of self-realization of value, to come to see ourselves as unique, non-representable wills and not as particular attributes, spooks, or abstractions.

**Deleuze and Pedagogy without Moulding**

While Stirner theorizes a process of maturation through which an autonomous, disalienated “ego” emerges, Koch (1997) argues, “Stirner never devel-
oped the language to go into greater depth on the construction, functioning, and consequences of the fixed idea” (p. 102). Part of this gap can be filled by cross-reading Stirner with Deleuze and Guattari, who theorize the transition from second to third stage. While Deleuze (1986) follows the conventional (and unhelpful) analysis of Stirner as a nihilist, he also recognizes him as the ultimate theorist of dis-alienation (pp. 159–161). Despite this apparent lack of direct influence, Stirner and Deleuze are united in their “rejection of the tyranny of ‘labels,’ essential identities, abstractions and ‘fixed ideas’ . . . [i.e.] authoritarian concepts which limit thought” (Newman, 2001, p. 4).

Deleuze and Guattari’s three stages of schizoanalysis offer a practical typology of the tasks of pedagogical transformation from a spook-ridden to a free subjectivity, thus providing an alternative to moulding approaches. Their approach is posited as a way of liberating energies so they can flow freely. In any territorial regime, including the neoliberal “society of control” (Deleuze, 1992), desire becomes caught-up in traps and knots, broadly analogous to the Stirnerian account of wheels in the head, from which it needs to free itself. The process of remaining trapped within (for example) a micro-family drama and its neurotic psychological expressions is a means by which desire is mapped onto rigid schemas and prevented from becoming. As in Stirner, so in Deleuze, this process is linked to fixed ideas such as the naturalization of the family (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, pp. 365–368).

The first task of schizoanalysis or pedagogy is negative and consists of breaking down the traps, knots, or wheels in the head. Hence there is a task of destruction, a “scouring” or “curettage” of the unconscious to clear out Oedipus and its correlates (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 417). The purpose of this process is not to mould the student/analysand into a form already known to the teacher/therapist but rather to create the space for the emergence of flows beyond representation. This requires breaking down the underpinnings of ideas, which, in Stirner’s terms, possess or “own” us, including subjectivities arising from them, and it frees flows at a sub-individual level (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 396). We would argue that the ego, which is deconstructed, is the psychoanalytic, not the Stirnerian ego, and it is largely coextensive with what Stirner terms geist (mind or spirit). Deleuze and Guattari’s “prepersonal singularities” are elements of a unique subject, which is not subordinate to spooks.

Deleuze and Guattari’s first stage loosely corresponds to overcoming the first and second stages of self-becoming in Stirner’s theory—the first stage, purely sensory and hedonistic, and the second stage, representational or spook-ridden. Both theorists begin from the disalienated level of the sensing, experiencing self in order to challenge the closure imposed by spooks. Beginning from identification with spooks and repressive social structures, one progresses to an identification of spooks, an ability to see
and to distance oneself from dominant social constructions which entails decolonization of one’s self-knowledge or sense of self. As Choi and Black (2008) argue, “we can be free from ideologies. We can be without them if we become aware of them” (p. 74).

Along with this negative function, there are two positive functions of analysis/education. The first is to discover the “desiring-machines” within a subject (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 354). This process of reconstruction forms chains of connections, thus performing a process of dis-alienation between the subject and his or her environment or milieu. The second positive function is to reinvest the flows socially, in revolutionary ways (p. 373). This involves reintroducing the “outside” and relating flows of desire to emotional investments in the broader socio-political field; on an experiential level, this is termed a “body without organs”—a difficult concept to interpret, being structurally similar to Buddhist, Gnostic, and New Age models of bodily/spiritual experience, beyond the identity as “self” or “ego.” In many ways, this is similar to Stirner’s third-stage self. When Deleuze and Guattari (2004) argue that “the product of analysis should be a free and joyous person, a carrier of the life flows” (p. 364), they echo Stirner’s language of passion, creativity, and living to the limit. Even more crucially, the process varies with the desiring-machines of each student/analysand, which are always-already differentiated. The resulting subject is not moulded into a fixed image, but instead, he/she is radically unique. These stages involve self-valorization as an autonomous subject, structured through desire and becoming.

In previous sections, we argued for the possibility and indeed, necessity of a pedagogy without moulding, and we have outlined some of the theoretical conditions that might underpin such a pedagogy. But how might such pedagogy, without moulding, culminating in an autonomous, joyful subject of becoming, happen in practice? We feel it is useful to look to feminist consciousness-raising (CR) from the 1970s as a non-exhaustive example of such a process. Like Stirnerian and Deleuzian pedagogies, CR is structured to break down submersion in a dominant regime of spooks, in particular, women’s submersion in and acceptance of patriarchy. While it is aimed mainly for the emergence of autonomous subjectivity on a collective rather than individual level, and it has a stronger emphasis than Stirner or Deleuze on structurally situating oneself (and thus differs somewhat from the Stirnerian/Deleuzian unique standpoint model), it is sufficiently similar to exemplify what a pedagogy without moulding might involve.

**Consciousness-Raising**

Consciousness-raising (CR) groups were a fundamental aspect of the second-wave feminist movement, arising in the late 1960s and becoming popular during the 1970s. They have been interpreted as a pedagogical tool for social
transformation (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999). CR groups were voluntary, usually women-only, regular discussion groups focused on recounting and interpreting the experiences of participants, generally by presenting members’ experiences around a defined topic and then drawing out similarities and structural relations to the oppression of women. We would describe CR as a variant of pedagogy without moulding. It is pedagogical insofar as it seeks to transform existing consciousness so as to escape dominance by (patriarchal) spooks, and it is non-moulding in that there is no transcendent vision towards which participants are transformed. We argue that CR should be revived as a form of anarchist pedagogy, compatible with Deleuzian and Stirnerian approaches. Theorizing CR using Stirnerian-Deleuzian concepts offers the beginnings of a transferable model of pedagogy without moulding. This is an exercise in transversal, horizontal, intellectual, translation between contexts, rather than a vanguardist claim to know the true method. We do not claim that CR is the only possible approach to pedagogy without moulding; practices such as militant inquiry, Theatre of the Oppressed, deschooling, and the more horizontalist varieties of Freirean approaches would be other possible lines of inquiry.

Identifying and Overcoming Spooks
It was suggested above that the first task of transformation is the negative task—decolonizing thought or unlearning spooks. In feminist CR, the main spooks, which acted as barriers to self-actualization, were those that tied women to patriarchy. CR was able to challenge these spooks through a practice of speaking from personal experiences among women, without the mediation of men or dominant institutions. By removing the main mediating spooks, CR created a possibility of subject-subject communication. The process would “emphasize our own feelings and experiences as women” (Sarachild, 1975, p. 145), on the assumption that women’s “own true individual awareness is somehow not really operative” within patriarchy, being “blocked or stymied or repressed or just overloaded with so much shit” (Forer, 1975, p. 151). In addition to the testifying function, there is a function of validation: “that the pain is pain, that it is also one’s own, that women are real” (MacKinnon, 1989, p. 91). This process is taken to break down what Levine (1979) refers to as a “cop in the head” (a moralizing force within each person), analogous to Stirner’s wheels in the head (p. 7).

While CR did not simply leave existing narratives unchanged, it validated the reality of otherwise disavowed experiences of oppression, thus creating a standpoint from outside the dominant regime of spooks from which the unthinkable could be thought. In discovering that the “personal narrative is political,” participants “transform the dominant meaning of experience by bringing a different set of assumptions to bear on it” (Langellier,
1989, p. 269). It changed the criteria of verification, from criteria focused on
dominant spooks to criteria focused on one’s own experience (MacKinnon,
1989, p. 87). By assessing experiences from their embodied and affective
significance for oneself—rather than their meaning in the regime of spooks,
or for dominant others (in this case, men)—the representational power of
spooks to overwrite and judge desire is stripped away, and the wheels in the
head are broken down, or at least suspended for long enough for other ways
of seeing to become possible.

Forming Autonomous Desires

The autonomous standpoint associated with Deleuze’s second task, and with
Stirner’s project of self-valorization, entails beginning from one’s own stand-
point—a disalienated level of sensing, experiencing, and living as an embod-
ied subject, as well as a standpoint of opposition to oppression. This is echoed
in CR. A primary purpose of CR is to “develop ideology and learn to think
autonomously” (Allen, 1970, p. 8). The process of forming an autonomous
standpoint generally occurred through the “summing-up” process, which
followed the accounts of experiences. This process constructed a distinctly
feminist point of view in which everyday experiences are seen differently, as
political, structurally situated experiences (Shreve, 1989, p. 45, 220; Bartky,
derivation consists of relating formerly personalized problems such as indi-
vidual malaise, to sexism and other structural causes, so the problems appear
as a political pattern rather than as diffuse bad luck or individual dysfunction

Prior to the process, participants’ lives are in turmoil, but few under-
stood why (Shreve, 1989, p. 40). The CR process provided particular ways
to articulate experiences in new, feminist ways (Shreve, 1989, p. 30). The
process moves from personal experience towards developing a more
general view of social conditions broader than one’s own position (Shreve,
1989, p. 198). This gives a “vantage point” perspective on daily life (Allen,
1970, pp. 20–21), and bridges politics and one’s own life (Bruley, 1976, p. 21;
c.f. Allen, 1970, p. 15), or objectifies consciousness at a given time (Forer,
1975, p. 151). The construction of an autonomous voice, expressing authentic
desires, is a difficult and time-consuming task as it requires recognizing
and overcoming existing habits of superficial communication (Bruley, 1976,
p. 8). This aspect of CR is based on the premise that women “had been glued
to our men and separated from each other all our lives” (Arnold, 1970, p. 160).
CR enables women to relate directly, instead of through men as a media-
tor (Bruley, 1976, p. 21), whilst problematizing and overcoming feelings of
hatred for the self and other women imbued by patriarchal culture (Allen,
1970, p. 11). In feminist terminology, the moment of attaining autonomy is
termed the “click” (Reger, 2004, p. 211; Allen, 1970, p. 27), a term for the “eye-
popping realization” of how patriarchy structures life experiences (Shreve,
1989, p. 53).

From a Stirnerian-Deleuzian perspective, the reconstruction of affective autonomy is particularly important. In CR, this process was focused on the patriarchal repression of women’s anger. Bruley (1976, p. 13) suggests that consciousness-raising directly challenges the guilt one may feel about the suppression of anger. The group gives each participant “permission” to feel anger, allowing it to become an “energizing force for change, increasing confidence, and enhancing relationships” (Randolph & Ross-Valliere, 1979, p. 924), and to turn anger into “constructive energy” (Levine, 1979, p. 6). This process is not a kind of moulding through which emotions are repressed and forced into new paths. Rather, emotions are channeled expressively into a process of becoming and interacting creatively with the world. Anger is not channeled into resentful feelings of inferiority, but vented in a projectile, affirmative way. Crucially, emotions were expressed, not programmed in the groups (Brownmiller, 1970, p. 152). This parallels Stirner’s and Deleuze’s concerns with pedagogy as a process of becoming, rather than an attempt to mould participants’ subjectivity to some assumed notion of human nature or moral good. There is no knowing subject who tells participants what they are to become, but rather, there is a type of self-transformation.

**Forming Connections**

The third task discussed above is the social recreation of new existential territories from the autonomous standpoint. Levine (n.d.) draws the conclusions of CR in this direction: the small group is not a precursor to large formal organizations but rather an alternative revolutionary approach to political organization and social life. The process of reconceptualizing experiences through a framework that acknowledges and opposes structural oppression creates a transformation in alignments, which sometimes (though not always) leads to politicization. Personal experiences and affects are rearticulated into political connections by being taken as instances of larger, structural issues (Bond & Lieberman, 1980, p. 289). This creates a worldview, an ideology (Allen, 1970, p. 8) or a “theoretical horizon” (Malo, 2004), which rearranges social connections, conceptualizing “where we are in light of where we are not yet” (Bartky, 1977, p. 26).

The emergence of self-expression within the group can have wider social influence, insofar as women may choose to identify and reject roles that are repressive rather than expressive (Randolph & Ross-Valliere, 1979, p. 923). For example, an interviewee in Reger’s (2004) paper stated, “You know, even if it is as one woman said . . . something about nailing her husband’s socks to the floor or something or not picking up his socks. Even if
it is a small act in your life . . . those things can build” (Reger, 2004, p. 216).

Another interviewee refers to sexism in the workplace, suggesting that CR encouraged her to respond with anger, instead of becoming depressed (Shreve, 1989, p. 102). While some groups evolved into political affinity or mutual aid groups (Shreve 1989, p. 199; Allen, 1970, p. 19), or fed into activism in wider networks, “some [participants] were not interested in larger societal change, while others worked to maintain an alternative culture” (Reger, 2004, p. 218). However, we would argue that creating an alternative space and environment for the transformation of consciousness is a form of political change. Forming dis-alienated unions, independent of society is always-already a political act. As MacKinnon (1989) states, “By providing room for women to be close, these groups demonstrated how far women were separated” (p. 87). Reconnection occurs through a sense of closeness derived from intimate communication and similarities of experience (Dreifus, 1973, p. 52). Furthermore, participation in CR helped women to relate within wider politics as it taught women a different way of relating than the dominant style within patriarchal and capitalist structures, which often encourage controlling, manipulative, and competitive communication styles (Arnold, 1970, p. 161). CR provided a new model based on co-operation, non-hierarchy and sharing, which could then be carried out into wider environments (Randolph & Ross-Valliere, 1979, p. 924). From a Stirnerian perspective, the crucial political change is the actualization of an autonomous standpoint. What is most important is that this emergent being is true to its own becoming, not that this becoming takes one or another form.

Given the continuing interest in subaltern standpoints and epistemologies, we would argue that processes of this kind are vitally necessary and need to be revived. Today there are many attempts (by poststructuralists, feminists, autonomists, decolonial scholars, etc.) to elaborate perspectives based on standpoints of marginalized groups or individuals. Yet there is a significant problem with perspectives reconstructed by academics, often based on their own experiences and/or established theories, but which are not coextensive with existing narratives of those for whom they claim to speak (Reynolds, 2002). This creates a dilemma in which one must either accept the (often conservative or conformist) everyday narratives of the oppressed, folding reality onto neoliberalism, or else one must champion intellectual versions of liberationist politics which have lost their grassroots derivation, either adopting a vanguard stance or simply speaking from one’s own (typically privileged) standpoint. Processes such as CR, by creating a standpoint-based perspective, which did not pre-exist them and which is not simply imported by educators, provide a basis for an emancipatory politics which does not succumb to these positions.
Conclusion
This chapter began with the question of whether a pedagogy without moulding—a pedagogy compatible with horizontal relations and the rejection of command—is possible. It has woven an account, from Stirner, Deleuze, and feminist consciousness-raising, which suggests that such a pedagogy is possible as well as necessary. From a Stirnerian position, the pedagogical process of emergence as a unique “ego,” a standpoint of desire in a constant process of becoming and living, is incompatible with pedagogies of moulding. Yet dominant models of education, and even those prevalent in critical pedagogy, retain moulding as a basic assumption. We suggested that Deleuze’s three stages of schizoanalysis provide a structural matrix for a pedagogy without moulding, and further demonstrated that this structural matrix was actualized in the historical practice of consciousness-raising in the feminist movement. We suggest that this provides a way forward for the development of pedagogies without moulding.

We would suggest, therefore, that there is promise in developing consciousness-raising as a specifically anarchist pedagogy. While feminist CR focused mainly on gender oppression—and CR focused on structural oppressions (still a valuable project today)—it would also be possible to develop forms of CR which focus on the self-destroying impact of spooks and the hierarchies they generate. In this way, the “click” is arrival at a Stirnerian unique standpoint, and the structural matrix one comes to see is expanded from a particular type of structural oppression to the entire field of alienation and possession by spooks. Of course, this leaves unanswered the question of how to create such groups in a society of control, in which the act of coming together regularly without mediation is itself a difficult struggle (Bey, 1994, pp. 20–22). We believe, however, that we have established that a pedagogy without moulding is both possible and desirable. The remaining question is how to realize it.

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