Beside-the-mind: An unsettling, reparative reading of paranoia

Having undertaken a critical analysis of a transnational program of research to identify and intervene on the prodrome, a pre-psychotic state, here I experiment with an unsettling, reparative reading of its affective coils – paranoia. Etymologically joining para (beside) with nous (mind), “paranoia” denotes an experience beside-the-mind. I attempt to follow these roots, meeting a non-human figure – Coatlicue – as introduced through Chicana philosopher and poet, Gloria Anzaldúa. In the arms of this goddess, the prodrome points to the vitality and the milieu of paranoia, re-turning it as a capacity, calling for modes of attunement and apprenticeship, and perhaps protecting our psychological and political practices against yet another operation of colonialist capture. Challenging the subject, interlocutors, and form typically adopted by not just Psychology but Affect Studies too, I hope in this performative essay to also lift up the problems and possibilities of “border thinking” as a means to open the potential decoloniality, and thus response-ability, of these fields within the present political moment.

Coatlicue, Decolonization, Imagination, Paranoia, Reparative,
Come, little green snake. Let the wound caused by the serpent be cured by the serpent.  
(Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 68)

Unsettling

Since the turn of the century, Western scholarship has been giving increasing attention to the circulation of paranoia within its cultural milieu. Like Dave Harper (2008), in this essay I want to challenge the conceptual resources that are usually invited to understand this circulation. For him, the problem lies in a binary structuring the scholarship: effectively, paranoia is depicted as either coming from ‘the inside’ or ‘the outside’, from the individual or society. While initially offering discursive analyses as a means to trouble this divide, Harper later joins with John Cromby to do so via embodied analyses (Cromby & Harper, 2012), thereby also joining a slow turn to affect within Psychology. Continuing this trajectory, I wonder if we might further conceive of paranoia as what Lisa Blackman (2012) calls “threshold phenomena” – those that “suggest some kind of transport between the self and other, inside and outside, and material and immaterial” (p. 20). Drawing on Karen Barad (2007), by “phenomenon” Blackman (2010) signals that these experiences are not pre-existing entities, discoverable through measurement, so much as emerging through the intra-action of a variety of entangled agencies. This relational ontology allows voice-hearing, telepathy, and (perhaps, as I shall sketch) paranoia, to question the individual subject of Psychology, opening up a more “trans-subjective sense of the psychic or psychological as a shared, collective encounter or event” (p. 11-12).

Importantly, when taking this trans-subjective stance, Blackman (2014) rejects temptations to designate ‘the affective turn’ – and the ontologies it invites – as in some way ‘new’. For such not only assumes a shift from one episteme to another, thereby “reproducing the very progressivist and linear narratives that have been reworked over and over in our critical thinking” (p. 2), but ignores the continuation of discontinuities, of that which is “transmitted
through silences, gaps, omissions, echoes, and murmurs” (p. 2). In turn, Blackman (2010, 2012, 2014) tunes into nineteenth century tales of Western psychological experimentation to hear from threshold phenomena. I have also been called by discontinuities, however my listening has taken a different direction; one that is in part inspired by Steve Brown and Paul Stenner’s (2009) introduction to their recent book. Likewise dedicated to reimagining models of subjectivity in Psychology through an assembling of alternative theoretical resources, Brown and Stenner use the story of *Moby Dick* to push Psychology away from taking an ‘Ahab-function’ that aims to “find and have done with the whale” and toward an ‘Ishmael-function’ that aims instead to “follow the whale, wherever it takes us, endlessly” (p. 5). The ‘whale’, in this case, being the psyche; one that is otherwise hunted, captured, killed by our Western psychological trappings. To prepare for this Ishmael-function, Brown and Stenner draw on six “key thinkers” (Luhmann, Artaud, Spinoza, Bergson, Foucault, Deleuze), with Whitehead and Serres as overall guides; a tactic that comes with a somewhat surprising acknowledgment:

> We are uncomfortably aware of the fact that our thinkers are all white, European males… This selection rather obviously reflects our peculiar intellectual paths and our particular interests and desires. Equally obviously it should not be taken as suggesting that these are the only thinkers worth engaging with… (p. 6-7)

In her phenomenology of whiteness, Sara Ahmed (2007) documents how discomfort signals a usual comfort, of being “so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins” (p. 158). This environment is one that is ‘white’ – ready for certain kinds of bodies, perpetually shaped by their habits, and inherited from colonization; Brown and Stenner’s discomfort echoes with another connection between Psychology and whaling. Pursuing not just any whale but a prized white one embroiled in the currents of nineteenth century capitalist expansion, *Moby Dick* isn’t simply “an exemplary demonstration of human endeavor” (p. 1, my emphasis), it is a colonial one. With this
soundscape their intellectual path does not seem so peculiar, nor does it seem so obvious that non-white, -European -male thinkers are worthy of engagement. Especially given that predominantly thinking with white, European males appears to remain the norm if not the demand when taking an affective turn – despite over a decade of critique of these knowledge practices for doing so (e.g., Hemmings, 2005). Not only does this prolong an erroneous sense of newness within such scholarship (Khoo, 2015), it both presumes and erases settler colonial epistemologies, “unwittingly reifying the normatively White Enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed” (Rowe & Tuck, 2016, p. 5). To habitually cite the thought of white, European males contributes to the epistemologies of ignorance (Alcoff, 2007) haunting both Psychology and Affect Studies – productions that have been crucial to the ascent of whiteness (Mills, 2007).

It might seem crude to ‘bring this up, again’, but its important to not rest easy with our knowledge that colonization was, as Aime Cesaire (1955) first described, a violent hypocrisy of barbaric ‘civilization’. Instead, Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers (2011) recommend that we feel the fright that such an acknowledgment may arouse. That is, “that it is not so easy to stop taking ourselves for the brains of humanity, and that with all the best intentions in the world, we may well continue to do so” (p. 63). Indeed, for Pignarre and Stengers, naming colonization can arouse a fright that invites us to pause and look more closely at what holds us, to see the notion that ‘we know’ as a ‘we must’ or a ‘we are obliged to’. Whether implied or enforced, an insistence that we predominantly draw on the categorical figures of the affective turn may thus be protecting us from recognizing the fallacy that to think is to be the West. This protection is particularly germane when studying the psyche, whereby “we have a psychiatrist, a psychoanalyst, an ethnographer feeling at home everywhere he (or she) goes”, translating
experiences into “ready-made theoretical tokens” (Nathan, 1999, n.p). To *not* do this, Tobie Nathan (1999) continues, is to partake in projects of not just theoretical but political experimentation, addressing as it would the question of the place we attribute to ‘otherworldly’ thought systems. Indeed, to recognizing that other worlds are possible. Brown and Stenner’s (2009) discomfort, then, offers a generous, generative site for those of us who, like them, yearn for a more responsive Psychology in these contemporary times of urgency and unrest.

Times that themselves ‘bring this up, again’. The past year has witnessed the increasing visibility of fascist rhetoric and movements in the global North – whether the rise of the far Right, militarized police, xenophobia, or a violent and ignorant whiteness. With it, the affects, discourses, and tactics of colonization become louder; a repetition of the past, albeit with a different tone (Cesaire, 1955). A decolonial orientation becomes all the more relevant – if not necessary (Maldonado-Torres, 2006; Stewart-Harawira, 2005) – for thinking through Psychology’s ability to respond, our response-ability in this political moment. To do so is to join somewhat with recent postcolonial contributions to *Subjectivity* (e.g. Frosh, 2016; Hook, 2013; Truscott, 2016), whose analyses reveal what remains “implicitly present” in work that follows European genealogies of subjectivity (Blackman et al., 2008). However, if this presence answers to “colonization” it may also be revealed in postcolonial authors’ own use of universalizing psychoanalytic concepts (Gunew, 2009). Thus, in this essay I experiment with an *unsettling* reading of paranoia as a threshold phenomenon, troubling an additional binary. Hamid Dabashi and Walter Mignolo (2015) write how the condition of coloniality that has made one unable to think has also made the other, locked into their worldview, unable to read a changing world. Like Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2006), they thus recommend that we choose interlocutors who do not perpetuate ‘the West’ as better thinkers than ‘the rest’, purposefully breaking the habits of
institutional whiteness (Ahmed, 2007) and thus settler-colonialism (Smith, 2012). With practice, such dialogue may open us to readings that lie beside a colonial episteme, a kind of “border thinking” that aims to “change the terms, not just the content of the conversation” (Mignolo, 2012, p. 69-70).

Here, then, I shall sketch paranoia by staging an encounter between supposedly opposite interlocutors – not just non-European and European, but also non-human and human – not to assimilate the formers into the latters but to disrupt the dichotomy by being the dichotomy, “thinking from dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world in dichotomies” (Mignolo, 2012, p. 85). To poke at their borders, to make things stir. A flagrantly lively affair, this ‘re-turn’ is not a romantic application of a dead past onto a dead present so much as a spiraling around of earlier thought to create something else here-now, breathing new life into paranoia (Barad, 2014). My overarching hope is to lift up the de/colonial potential of threshold phenomena and, therefore, the de/colonial potential of taking an affective turn in Psychology².

Reparative

While typically addressed as a “conspiracy culture” (Harper, 2008) or “surveillance society” (Frosh, 2016) awash with street cameras, e/mail snooping, data storage, and government secrets, this depiction of our Western paranoid milieu does not attend to the state stalking, attacking, and murdering of brown and black bodies simultaneously happening under the same regime. Paranoia is circulating within a post-9/11 context that explicitly incants suspicion for both the making of ‘good’ citizens and the quarantining, if not exterminating, of ‘bad’ ones (Puar & Rai, 2002). Keeping these politics of terror nearby obliges an analysis that involves race, capital, and nation, including how experiences of paranoia are happening in lives lived on or off stolen
Indigenous land, thereby interrupting the “universalized subject of emotion, unmarked by geography or even social location—and ‘innocent’ of any complicity to settlement” otherwise lurking in affect studies (Rowe & Tuck, 2016, p. 6). Ghassan Hage (2003), for example, documents a paranoiac colonial sensibility in settler colonies that is based on a fear of losing, or never attaining, the superiority promised by whiteness; one that was enflamed by 9/11. Similarly, Sanjay Sharma & Ashwani Sharma (2003) and Ashwani Sharma (2009) document how 9/11 transgressed colonial boundaries between the West and the rest, threatening the universality of whiteness, producing a paranoid subjectivity. The increasing circulation of paranoia is thus considered directly related to the West’s geopolitical precarity; notably an idea that echoes in responses to the recent election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the US. Situated in this political context, elsewhere I too have offered an image of paranoia as a dis-ease of white supremacy, one that can be traced through colonization whereby a desire-to-know entangles with a fear of ‘regressing’. However, colonization requires ignorance (of colonial violence, of Indigenous capacities), meaning such paranoia may be a threat to colonial projects; psycurity is the name that I gave to the force that organizes these unnerving coils. Directing paranoia to hide as reasonable suspicion, predict the future, brand threatening bodies, and grow through fear, psycurity assemblages channel paranoia in ways that animate a neocolonial security state (Author, 2016; forthcoming).

This project emerged out of my ethnography of the self-proclaimed prodromal ‘revolution’ – a transnational program of research and “radical reform” (McGorry, 2015) to identify and intervene on young people who may become psychotic, including being pathologically paranoid, in order to “save lives, restore and safeguard futures, and strengthen the global economy” (p. 310). While initial talk of an identifiable pre-psychotic phase can be traced
to the beginning of the twentieth century, it was at the turn of the twenty-first century that there was a “strong resurgent interest” in this idea (Woods, Miller, McGlashan, 2001), with a 100-fold “explosion” in pre-psychotic research between 1991 and 2011 (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013). Catalyzed by a 1999 program announcement from the US National Institute of Mental Health, this explosive interest was led by the North American Prodrome Longitudinal Study (NAPLS) – a multisite project explicitly aiming to generate the largest and most powerful prodromal sample in the world (Addington et al., 2015). This global mission gained fuel in December 2012 when a shooting at Sandy Hook elementary school in the white middle-class suburb of Connecticut triggered large-scale federal investment to identify and intervene on ‘early warning signs’ of madness. Described on National Public Radio as, “to schools like 9/11 was to airports,” the Sandy Hook shooting led to public pleas that, as Dr. Oz on CNN’s Piers Morgan Tonight Show put it at the time, “We need a Homeland Security approach to mental illness”.

My analysis considered how, driven by its own paranoia, this nascent, contested, and accelerating prodromal “movement” (Candilis, 2003) animates a neocolonial security state. However, I have since come to wonder if there might be more to this psycurity assemblage than met my critical eye. Michel Foucault (1983) argues that the concept of assemblage offers a number of principles for “the art of living counter to all forms of fascism” (p. xiii, my emphasis). The first of these principles is, “Free political action from all unifying and totalizing paranoia” (p. xiii). Albeit explicitly witnessing paranoia’s stifling effects, Foucault’s adjectives imply that there may be more than one kind of paranoia, one that is neither unifying nor totalizing. And, moreover, that this potential may come from psycurity assemblages themselves; his sentence structure hints at Eve Sedgwick’s (2003) “unintentionally stultifying side effect” of critical scholarship – the privileging of paranoia. Drawing on Melanie Klein, Sedgwick sees paranoia as
a relational stance that works to anticipate, generalize, and expose in order to avoid surprises and humiliation, and thus the affective drive of scholarship that seeks to do the same. And yet, “for someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” (p. 127, her emphasis). To the contrary, paranoia has a mode of selective scanning and a mushrooming, self-confirming strength that “circumscribes its potential as a medium of political or cultural struggle” (p. 130). Concerned that these days, “to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naïve, pious, or complaisant” (p. 125), Sedgwick thus calls for positioning paranoid readings as not a mandatory injunction but a possibility among other possibilities.

Resonating with decolonial warnings about an epistemic violence that strips away diversity and agency (Mohanty, 2003; Spivak, 1988), Sedgwick’s analysis gifts another kind of response-ability for the affects-cum-effects of Psychology in the present political moment. As opposed to the ‘strong theory’ of paranoid readings, so weighty it can't be moved, she suggests experimenting with ‘weak theory’, with making multiple, localized, unstable knowledges that – welcoming surprise and organized with hope – do justice to a wide affective range. Thus, in this essay I re-enter the prodromal movement to experiment with a reparative reading of paranoia itself, looking for a “space of disjunct” within the coils of psycurity (McManus, 2011).

Etymologically joining para (beside) with nous (mind), ‘paranoia’ denotes an experience beside-the-mind. I attempt to follow these roots, to meet their non-human figure (Miller, 1977), as introduced through Chicana philosopher and poet, Gloria Anzaldúa (1987)³ – seeing if a cause of our cultural and scholarly wounds might (also) be a cure.
Cliff

*If you can tell me all on your own that it's not real, it's a four. If I need to throw you a line that it might be a part of your imagination, it's a five.*

I jotted down this quote on December 9\(^{th}\), 2014, when I was sitting around a table with seven other people in a very small, very hot room in the basement of a mental health hospital on the East Coast of the US. We were participating in a one-day Rater Training Workshop to learn how to use the Structured Interview for Psychosis Risk Syndromes, or SIPS – an instrument designed to capture the abovementioned prodrome. Usually two days long, I was invited to this one-off one-day SIPS training after it was pulled together by special request for three participants from Santiago who had been funded by the Chilean government to establish the first prodromal clinic in their country. They bought a gift (chocolate, I think), thrilled for the opportunity to be trained by our trainer – a clinician and research director at the center of this increasingly global enterprise. Designed to “define, diagnose, and measure change systematically in individuals who may be in a pre-psychotic state” (Miller *et al.*, 1999, p. 275), the SIPS originated to support a double blind clinical trial on the ability of anti-psychotic drugs to prevent psychosis and, now used by NAPLS, has since become pivotal to the worldwide movement for the collection of prospective data on the prodrome.

And so, over seven hours of rapid-fire training we were shown how the SIPS – woven together with nearly 40 pages of questions – throws its think-net over ‘unusual thought content’, ‘suspiciousness’, ‘grandiose ideas’, ‘perceptual abnormalities’ and ‘disorganized communication’. Collectively called ‘attenuated psychotic symptoms’, these experiences are illustrated by Tandy Miller and colleagues’ with the following:

Patients experiencing such symptoms can report hearing odd noises, such as banging or clicking or ringing; dogs barking when there is no animal present; or their name being called when no one has called them. More severe but still attenuated symptoms have been
described as hearing sounds or voices that seem far away or mumbled. People also report experiencing vague perceptual changes such as seeing colors differently, seeing flashes of light, or seeing geometric shapes. People have also frequently reported seeing shadows out of the corner of their eyes or vague ghostlike figures (p. 706).

The SIPS extracts these kind of experiences with a battery of yes/no questions and allocates a rating between zero and six – zero meaning the symptom is “absent”, six meaning it is “floridly psychotic”, and three, four, or five meaning that it is “at-risk”, that the young person experiencing it is prodromal. During the training we were offered a “cheat sheet” to differentiate between these seven scores – the difference that mattered most was that between five and six, that gate between prodromal and psychotic, potential and actual. This rating hinged “most importantly” on whether or not someone could “self-disclose their doubt”. If they could not – if you “let people talk and talk and talk” about their experience and they “never say its not real” – then they cross the border into madness.

Except that we were taught another, unofficial, “trick”. Conceptualizing an individual as at this point “hanging over a cliff”, our trainer directed us to “throw them a line” by asking a question: “Did you ever consider the possibility that this was part of your imagination?” If the young person “grabs the line” – saying “Yes” to this question – we are to give them a five; if they don’t grab the line – saying “No, it was real” or “It felt real” – we are to give them a six, watching as they tumble over the edge into Psychotic Disorder. Curled through with what Alfred North Whitehead (1920) named the “bifurcation of nature”, this trick presumes that perception is divided into two sets of things, effectively: ‘nature’ + ‘psychic additions’:

For example, what is given in perception is the green grass. This is an object which we know as an ingredient in nature. The theory of psychic additions would treat the greenness as a psychic addition furnished by the perceiving mind, and would leave to nature merely the molecules and the radiant energy which influence the mind towards that perception. (p. 29)

The SIPS patrols for those psychic additions gone awry. Developed through a review of
existing retrospective and prospective assessments of pre-psychosis, it is the descendant of an influential manual of perceptual disturbances in college students who were “probably at high-risk for psychosis” as per their responses to true/false tests of “traits of the schizophrenia prone” (Chapman & Chapman, 1980, p. 48). One such scale was the Perceptual Aberration scale (Chapman et al, 1978), based on a psychoanalytic conceptualization of schizophrenia as ultimately being disturbances in one’s ability to establish and maintain boundaries – particularly those relating to the body (Item 1: “Sometimes I have had the feeling that I am united with an object near me”). Through a series of interviews with these students, Chapman and Chapman (1980) organized 80 types of “deviant” experiences into six categories of symptoms, becoming the first to put forth an argument for, and manual of, “attenuated psychosis”. Large disclaimer included:

We believe that the rating values given in this scale are suitable for most white persons from the United States and the general Western cultural tradition. We do not know if these values are suitable for blacks or for members of other minority subcultures. (p. 479)

This concession of cross-cultural invalidity has carried through the prodromal field. The same research group went on to develop a series of individual scales based on this manual to identify “psychosis-prone” young adults. One such scale is Magical Ideation (Item 19: “I have sometimes sensed an evil presence around me, although I could not see it”), or the “belief, quasi-belief, or semi-serious entertainment of the possibility that events which, according to the causal concepts of this culture, cannot have a causal relation with each other, might somehow nevertheless do so” (Meehl, 1964, p. 54, as cited in Eckblad and Chapman, 1983, my emphasis). Left unnamed, the “this” of this definition floats quietly by, at once ignoring and incising a familiar standard: “the general Western cultural tradition”. As with their previous work, these authors emphasize that it is not what people experience so much as how they interpret them that requires assessment. What
matters is their degree of conviction that something ‘really’ happened. The idea that people might accurately be sensing these seemingly impossible bodily and causal relations appears to not even warrant a passing thought.

The SIPS, then, has inherited an (award-winning\(^4\)) legacy that separates the act of perceiving from that which is perceived, enabling the former to be assessed, judged, fixed. Whitehead ultimately responds to this birfurcation of nature by invoking his own “strange God” (Latour, 2011; Stengers, 2011); in the remainder of this essay I likewise respond. But by thinking with a different strange god(dess).

**Coatlicue**\(^5\)

It is her reluctance to cross over, to make a hole on the fence and walk across, to cross the river, to take that flying leap into the dark, that drives her to escape, that forces her into the fecund cave of her imagination where she is cradled in the arms of Coatlicue, who will never let her go. If she doesn’t change her ways, she will remain a stone forever. No hay mas que cambiar. (p. 71)

Here, Anzaldúa (1987) invokes Coatlicue, the earliest of the Mexica fertility and Earth goddesses. Known also as the Lady of the Serpent Skirt, ‘Coatlicue’ comes from *coatl*, the Nahuatl word for serpent, the most notable symbol for pre-Columbian America, associated with the womb “from which all things were born and to which all things returned” (p. 56). Indeed, with *coatl* also meaning twin, Coatlicue represents duality, its synthesis, and something more:

After each of my four bouts with death I’d catch glimpses of an otherworld Serpent. Once, in my bedroom, I saw a cobra the size of the room, her hood expanding over me. When I blinked she was gone. I realized she was, in my psyche, the mental picture and symbol of the instinctual in its collective impersonal, pre-human. She, the symbol of the dark sexual drive, the chthonic (underworld), the feminine, the serpentine movement of sexuality, of creativity, the basis of all energy and life. (p. 57)
For Anzaldúa, this “instinctual in its collective impersonal, pre-human” is a conflicted desire – a creative “fusion of opposites” (p. 69), an ancient fleshed knowing emerging from a painful assimilation to being animal:

Snakes, viboras: since that day I’ve sought and shunned them. Always when they cross my path, fear and elation flood my body. I know things older than Freud, older than gender. She – that’s how I think of la Vibora, Snake Woman. Like the ancient Olmec, I know Earth is a coiled Serpent. Forty years it’s taken me to enter into the Serpent, to acknowledge that I have a body, that I am a body and to assimilate the animal body, the animal soul. (p. 48)

Containing and balancing the dualities of male and female, light and dark, life and death, Anzaldúa documents how Coatlicue was divided, darkened, and disempowered through colonization. Pushed underground, this burying of “balanced oppositions” fertilized the growth of a militaristic, bureaucratic, predatory state (a description with haunting familiarity in the present-day US).

And yet to be buried is to be planted. An entrance into the Serpent, into living with Coatlicue, brings forth ‘la facultad’, a “capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of deeper realities”:

It is an instant “sensing”, a quick perception arrived at without conscious reasoning. It is an acute awareness mediated by the part of the psyche that does not speak, that communicates in images and symbols which are the faces of feelings, that is, behind which feelings reside/hide. The one possessing this sensitivity is excruciatingly alive to the world. (p. 60)

“Latent in all of us”, la facultad takes shape under pressure and from the margins; more highly tuned within people who do not feel psychologically or physically safe – “the females, the homosexuals of all races, the darkskinned, the outcast, the persecuted, the marginalized, the foreign” (p. 60). A “kind of survival tactic that people, caught between worlds, unknowingly cultivate” (p. 61), la facultad is how one listens to and heeds the world.

I walk into a house and I know whether it is empty or occupied. I feel the lingering
charge in the air of a recent fight or love-making or depression. I sense the emotions someone near is emitting – whether friendly or threatening. Hate and fear – the more intense the emotion, the greater my reception of it. I feel a tingling on my skin when someone is staring at me or thinking about me. I can tell how others feel by the way they smell, where others are by the air pressure on my skin. I can spot the love or greed or generosity lodged in the tissues of another. Often I sense the direction of and my distance from people or objects – in the dark, or with my eyes closed, without looking. It must be a vestige of a proximity sense, a sixth sense that’s lain dormant from long-ago times (p. 61).

I am struck by the resemblance between Anzaldúa’s description of la facultad and Miller and colleagues’ (1999) description above of attenuated psychotic symptoms, the assumed precursors of pathological paranoia. The former seen as a capacity, the latter as a deficit, their phenomenological overlap points to the ways that we in the sciences can camp on our examples, staking a territory (Stengers, 2011). For Stengers (2011) this is a trap. Empirical projects would better demonstrate ‘adequacy’ by not invoking anything that will allow an element of experience to be “eliminated, forgotten, treated as an exception or disqualified”, and ‘applicability’ by “demanding that some elements lend themselves to an ‘imaginative leap’” (p. 246). For prodromal research to be a Stengersian success, then, it must be put into conversation with those voices typically not allowed through psycurity, those that one might encounter outside the gates. Coatlicue is one such voice. An encounter that involves choosing not to grab the line offered by the SIPS, jumping off the cliff and into believing that attenuated psychotic symptoms are real, flying “far from the solid-ground of evidence” (p. 233), risking a fall into (professional?) madness…

**Borderland**

In attending to this first darkness I am led back to the mystery of the Origin. The one who watches, the one who whispers in a slither of serpents. Something is trying to tell me. That voice at the edge of things. But I know what I want and I stamp ahead, arrogance edging my face. I tremble before the animal, the alien, the sub- or supra-human, the me
that has something in common with the wind and the trees and the rocks, that possess a
demon determination and ruthlessness beyond human. (p. 72)

Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue, “the one who watches, the one who whispers in a slither of serpents”,
moves through Stengers’ (2011) thinking with Whitehead about experience:

There are other elements in our experience, on the fringe of consciousness, and yet
massively qualifying our experience. In regard to these other facts, it is our consciousness
that flickers, not the facts themselves. They are always securely there, barely
discriminated, and yet inescapable. (p. 349)

Enacting one of Whitehead’s ontological principles that “There is nothing which floats into this
world from nowhere” (p. 262), these “barely discriminated, and yet inescapable” facts are
central to his philosophy of ‘prehension’ – an underlying activity marking the universal way that
experience participates in the world. Loosely meaning ‘taking into account’, a prehensive event
can be thought of as a unifying grasp, a gathering of unknown things into a togetherness that can
then be known, a “what I will say ‘is’” (p. 297). This unification in turn becomes public,
available for objectivation, making it "an ingredient for new becomings” (p. 297).

Prehension thus makes “the operation and the production of reality coincide” (p. 147).
Yet this does not mean that things “owe their reality to that perception” (p. 146). Rather, as
Whitehead writes/Stengers cites, prehension “is the perspective of the castle over there from the
standpoint of the unification here” (p. 148). Experience, then, is a mode of articulation,
 testifying to “what is other than it, about other places and other times” (p. 147). It follows that,

If I feel something, this thing certainly enters into the definition of my experience: it
belongs to my experience, and it is not forged by my experience. I sense it insofar as it
testifies to something else. I produce myself qua feeling that which is not me. (p. 295)

This articulation does not require a subject or cognitive process – any thing can prehend any
thing. Indeed, prehension was coined to exhibit, “the common feature of all situations in which
something makes a difference to something else, including the least ‘psychological’ ones” (p.
In doing so Whitehead takes experience beyond the human, filling a gap in Western thought long taunted by Coatlicue, by Anzaldúa’s “me that has something in common with the wind and the trees and the rocks”, that unsettles any idea of individuals that are separate from each other and all else that makes up the world. Further, as a process, prehension also witnesses the elements that an actual entity has denied in order to become – a *negative prehension* that is not exclusion so much as “indistinction, or reduction to insignificant noise” (p. 304). That “voice at the edge of things”, that flicker. Dormant but not extinct, these whispering potentialities are what Whitehead calls the scars of our feelings:

A feeling bears on itself the scars of its birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its struggle for existence; it retains the impress of what it might have been, but is not. It is for this reason that what an actual entity has avoided as a datum for feeling may yet be an important part of its equipment. The actual cannot be reduced to mere matter of fact in divorce from the potential. (p. 309)\textsuperscript{10}

The ‘unknown’, then, what could have been, is an important part of ‘knowing’, of what is. Whiteheadian philosophy is doing something similar to Anzaldúa, who “pokes a hole in the colonizer’s story of how darkness is the other of light, how it sits on the not-light side of the darkness/light binary, about how this story figures darkness as absence, lack, negativity” (Barad, 2014, p. 171). Symbolizing the fertility of the contradictory, Anzaldúa’s invocation of Coatlicue shows us this potential in the actual, this imagination in the real. In the arms of this strange goddess, the prodrome no longer faces a cliff-edge so much as a borderland:

Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them. A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. (p. 25)

Unsettled, unrealized, unwanted, prodrome-the-borderland is first and foremost a space of potential, an emotional residue from negative prehension, wedged between ‘normal’ and
‘psychotic’. Patrolling these borders, the abovementioned SIPS seeks and surveils our experiences as they inhabit this in-between space.

Anzaldúa inscribes borderland inhabitants with ‘la mestiza consciousness’, a psychic restlessness caused by the coming together of “habitually incompatible frames of reference”, creating “a struggle of the flesh, a struggle of borders, an inner war” (p. 100). For Barad (2014), the subsequent underground work, performed by the soul, is a form of diffraction such that, “there is no moving beyond, no leaving the ‘old’ behind. There is no absolute boundary between here-now and there-then. There is nothing that is new; there is nothing that is not new” (p. 168). As a borderland with no clear dividing lines, just “traces of what might yet (have) happen(ed)” (p. 168), the prodrome is a place where elements are gathering, undetermined as to which will become datum and which will be denied. A hot mess of prehension, it is a lively substrate activity radiating a spectrum of possibilities, where “each bit of matter, each moment of time, each position in space is a multiplicity, a superposition/entanglement of (seemingly) disparate parts” (p. 176).

For Whitehead, such multiplicity is the stuff of cosmology. For Anzaldúa, such cosmology is the stuff of Coatlicue, that “consuming internal whirlwind, the symbol of the underground aspects of the psyche”:

Coatlicue is the mountain, the Earth Mother who conceived all celestial beings out of her cavernous womb. Goddess of birth and death, Coatlicue gives and takes away life; she is the incarnation of cosmic process. (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 68)

Coatlicue, she who eats the sun and spits out the moon, who makes a circle by eating her own tail, enacts a discontinuous continuity, destroying to create; an eternal possibility emerging from the cracks, alive with those ancient non-known elements of knowing that always have the potential to unite with something else, to make something else, to annihilate something else.
Coatlicue, the borderland goddess, stands with la mestiza, the borderland psyche, as she participates in,

the creation of yet another culture, a new story to explain the world and our participation in it, a new value system with images and symbols that connect us to each other and to the planet. Soy un amasamiento, I am an act of kneading, of uniting and joining that not only has produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a creature that questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new meanings. (p. 103)

Prodrome-the-borderland, then, implies an Anzaldúaian place of alchemical happenings, transmuting the prodromal movement into a site of “(r)evolution” (Anzaldúa, 1987) (not revolution [cf. McGorry, 2015]). In turn this diffracting terrain beckons attention to “its unique material historicities and how they come to matter” (Barad, 2014, p. 176). For Stengers (2011), this mattering depends on the milieu; prehensive events oblige particular milieu in order for what has been refused to be revealed. With Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue and Stenger’s Whitehead, the problem of the prodrome moves away from the individual and toward the colonial world in which she was (and is) buried alive by psycurity’s his-tory.

**Abyss**

Like many Indians and Mexicans, I did not deem my psychic experiences real. I denied their occurrences and let my inner senses atrophy. I allowed white rationality to tell me that the existence of the “other world” was mere pagan superstition. I accepted their reality, the “official” reality of the rational, reasoning mode which is connected with external reality, the upper world, and is considered the most developed consciousness – the consciousness of duality.

The other mode of consciousness facilitates images from the soul and the unconscious through dreams and the imagination. Its work is labeled as “fiction”, make-believe, wish-fulfillment. White anthropologists claim that Indians have “primitive” and therefore deficient minds, that we cannot think in the higher mode of consciousness – rationality. They are fascinated by what they call the “magical” mind, the “savage” mind, the participation mystique of the mind that says the world of the imagination – the world of the soul – and of the spirit is just as real as physical reality. In trying to become “objective”, Western culture made “objects” of things and people when it distanced itself from them, thereby losing “touch” with them. This dichotomy is the root of all violence.
Not only was the brain split into two functions, but so was reality. (p. 58-9, Anzaldúa, 1987, her emphasis)

Here, Anzaldúa writes of a violence moving through ‘participation mystique’, a concept first put forth by anthropologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl in his 1910 book, *How Natives Think*. Republished by Princeton University Press in 1985, Levy-Bruhl describes two distinctive elements of ‘primitive’ (as compared to ‘modern’) thinking. First, that it is ‘mystical’, that all phenomena are one with each other and thus that human beings are inextricably participating with the world. And second, that it is ‘prelogical’, that things are able to simultaneously be both themselves and something else – a thinking that, in his words, “does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding contradictions” (p. 78). Levy-Bruhl understood this participation mystique to be a consequence of incorrect representations shaping people’s conceptions and perceptions of the world and thus *coming between* them and reality, creating outright false beliefs, delusional experiences, and irrationality. In contrast, modern representations shape only people’s conceptions and not their perceptions, thereby *conveying* reality. This is because, over time, these representations have ‘managed to’ filter out the emotionality that otherwise colors thinking, evolving a more rational mind (Segal, 2007).

Robert Segal (2007) documents how Carl Jung used Levy-Bruhl’s writing on the participation mystique as data to develop his own ideas about the psyche. While carrying forth the mystical elements, Jung left behind the prelogical in favor of psychologizing people’s experiences. Participation mystique came to be seen as one’s unconscious projecting itself onto the world, making us feel (but not really be) connected. This redirection toward the individual lurks in the abovementioned development of the SIPS, based as it is on people having *perceptual* disturbances in their bodily boundaries and causal attributions. Moreover, given that these disturbances are testifying to a wrong psyche *or* a wrong representation (prodromal experiences
inside “the general Western cultural tradition” suggest potential psychopathology whilst prodromal experiences outside of this context suggest some kind of ‘non-Western’ cultural belief), the SIPS also sets up a dynamic that maps the contours of modern versus primitive thinking established through the participation mystique. This suggests that the prodromal movement sanctions an enduring colonial encounter; one that positions ‘the West’ as having come beyond ‘the non-West’ to directly access the truth of the world. Indeed to experience anything other than this truth is to potentially be psychotic.

Further, such ‘primitive thinking’ confers a psychology to nature that needs to be overcome “in order to dominate her”:

As we know, great minds have wrestled with the problem whether it is the glorious sun that illuminates the world, or the sunlike human eye. Archaic man believes it to be the sun, and civilized man believes it to be the eye… He must de-psychize nature in order to dominate her; and in order to see his world objectively he must take back all his archaic projections. (Jung, 1970, para. 135)

Protecting the borders of a manmade world, Jung (1970) writes of how becoming a “great mind” requires that one does not see the world as an extension of their selves. Instead, “Progress comes from seeing the world as it is. The external world is really natural rather than supernatural, impersonal rather than personal. Science properly replaces myth and religion as the explanation of the world. There is no turning back” (Segal, 2007, p. 649, my emphasis). Sylvia Wynter (2003) has documented how the present-day coloniality of power rests on these sorts of beginnings, which illustrate “the first gradual de-supernaturalizing of our modes of being human” (p. 264); one that required “the systematic stigmatization of the Earth in terms of it being made of a ‘vile and base matter’”, “at the center of the universe as its dregs” (p. 367). Indeed, for Trinh Minh-ha (1989), the “supposedly universal tension between Nature and Culture is, in reality, a non-universal human dis-ease” (p. 67, her emphasis); any supposed conflict
comes from a patriarchal and fearful framing of them as opposite to (rather than different from) one another, exiling the creative potential of matter (Trinh, 1989), preparing the ground for capitalist expansion (Federici, 2014). These readings illustrate how we – those of us from a colonial lineage – “presume to be the ones who have accepted the hard truth that we are alone in a mute, blind, yet knowable world- one that it is our task to appropriate” (Stengers, 2012, p. 1). Causing a desire-to-know, a “positivist yearning for transparency with respect to reality” (Trinh, 1989, p. 64), that blocks, refuses, ignores other worlds. A sort of (En)light(ened) pollution that stops us from seeing the stars.

This “scientific conquering ‘view of the world’” is what Stengers (2012) affiliates with a ‘Science’ that, “when taken in the singular and with a big $S$, may indeed be described as a general conquest bent on translating everything that exists into objective, rational knowledge” (p. 2). It is this Science that, as Anzaldúa writes above, “made ‘objects’ of things and people when it distanced itself from them, thereby losing ‘touch’ with them”. Connecting this sort of objectification to the exile of the participation mystique “that says the world of the imagination – the world of the soul – and of the spirit is just as real as physical reality”, Anzaldúa’s description of how colonization splits reality into two depicts, predicts, politicizes the splitting of imagination and reality – the bifurcating of nature – carried out by the SIPS. Showing us that instruments of psycuritized inquiry perhaps say more about colonization than the madness we think they are investigating. For example, wafting through my own Pākehā heritage at the same time that Levy-Bruhl was making his observations is the 1907 New Zealand Tohunga Suppression Act (TSA) to criminalize tohunga – Indigenous healers rooted in relational ontologies that do not separate the world of matter from the world of spirit (Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Despite a liberal ruse of protecting Māori wellbeing, popular and judicial reports at the
time made the colonial intentions of the TSA explicit: to dismember the mobilizing capacities of tohunga, often leaders in their communities and wielding substantive social and spiritual power (Voyce, 1989).

Of particular threat were the actions of Rua Kenana – a Tūhoe tohunga foretelling a gift of four million pounds from King Edward VII for Māori to buy back stolen land, thereby foretelling the millennial return of Indigenous sovereignty. British settlers feared a land war; using English witch-hunting laws and the support of Māori elite who had been ‘educated’ through the colonial system, the TSA was passed to “check the trouble” (Voyce, 1989). Of particular note, however, is that what was threatening to colonial rule was not what emancipated future Kenana was foretelling (within the settler worldview, this was patently impossible) so much as that he was foretelling one. It was the feeling of potential emancipation, imagining that another world was possible, to which the TSA was targeted. State-sanctioned cosmological violence was part of a war on imagination necessary for colonization. And, as Tūhoe psychologist Wiremu Woodard (2014) has documented, this violence continues to operate in contemporary mental health services. Indeed, critical psychologists from around the world name the destruction of imagination as central to the colonization of the psyche and the land, such that imagining itself has become a present-day decolonial praxis (e.g., Segalo, Manoff, & Fine, 2015; Martin-Baro, 1994).

The participation mystique and the TSA suggest that this praxis – imagining – may be about reclaiming an otherworldly correspondence. If so, then this requires “smelling the smoke in our nostrils…” (Stengers, 2012, p. 6). Hearing neo-pagan activist, Starhawk, Stengers is referring here to the smoke coming from the wall that was and is built between truth and illusion, that billows in the parentheses – the (true) and (false) at the end of each item in the Perceptual
Aberration and Magical Ideation scales – telling us the ‘right’ answer. A divide that, Stengers continues, is filled with fears that we might, and thus moral imperatives that we shall not, ‘regrass’ to soft, illusory beliefs shamefully lying far from the hard truth of progress – for the colonizer-Scientist is “he who knows how to distinguish the real from the false…” (Trinh, 1989, p. 56, her emphasis). Such “setting of an absolute boundary, a clear dividing line, a geometry of exclusion that positions the self on one side, and the other – the not-self – on the other side” exemplifies a colonial logic (Barad, 2014, p. 169), that abyss carved into the stranger’s face that Anzaldúa (1987) saw in the black, obsidian mirror of the Nahuas.

The gaping mouth slit heart from mind. Between the two eyes in her head, the tongueless magical eye and the loquacious rational eye, was la raijada, the abyss that no bridge could span. Separated, they could not visit each other and each was too far away to hear what the other was saying. Silence rose like a river and could not be held back. It flooded and drowned everything. (p. 66-7)

A drowning silence that echoes in the experience of “‘solitary consciousness,’ and its mute, disenchanted world”, that, as per Stengers (2011), “the bifurcation of nature turned into the only rational starting point for inquiry” (p. 353). Prodrome-the-borderland suggests that this colonial interference may not have only displaced our participation with the world, but diffraacted it too – producing not the same elsewhere, so much as something else (Barad, 2007). Living in the borderland, Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue whispers these forgotten relations in our ears. Yet, heard in a neocolonial security state awash with fear, her murmurs become cryptic, shameful, overwhelming, growing as paranoia like a “crystal in a hypersaturated solution” (Sedgwick, 2003). Standing at the gates of psycurity, they are only allowed entry to reality when stamped by the SIPS with ‘psychotic disorder’; detained in our individualized psyches, blocked at the border, “That writhing serpent movement, the very movement of life, swifter than lightening, frozen” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 42). Within the prodromal movement our imagination encounters not just
what Miranda Fricker (2008) calls an ‘epistemic injustice’, but some sort of ontologic one too – repeating an obliteration central to the colonial project (Bhaba, 2004).

Yet again, the prodrome is potentially more than this. For Stengers (2012), everything requires a specific milieu in order for it to exist and, on the flipside, not everything may accept the milieu that is offered to it. Experiences that might be explained (away) as “superstition, belief, or symbolic efficacy” – such as those checked by psycurity through the prodromal movement – might be better seen as requiring a milieu that “does not answer to scientific demands” (p. 3). Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue shows us that our questioning of the prodrome could move towards, “kicking a hole out of the old boundaries of the self and slipping under or over, dragging the old skin along, stumbling over it” (p. 71). This strange goddess suggests that there is something else right here, right now; that “slightly alien guest” within paranoia’s own (linguistic) ancestry (Miller, 1977).

**Beside-the-mind**

I see oposicion e insurrection. I see the crack growing on the rock. I see the fine frenzy building. I see the heat of anger or rebellion or hope split open that rock, releasing la Coatlicue. And someone in me takes matters into our own hands, and eventually, takes dominion over serpents – over my body, my sexual activity, my soul, my mind, my weaknesses and strengths. Mine. Ours. Not the heterosexual white man’s or the colored man’s or the state’s or the culture’s or the religion’s or the parents’ – just ours, mine. And suddenly I feel everything rushing to a center, a nucleus. All the lost pieces of myself come flying from the deserts and the mountains and the valleys, magnetized toward that center. Complerta.

Something pulsates in my body, a luminous thin thing that grows thicker every day. Its presence never leaves me. I am never alone. That which abides: my vigilance, my thousand sleepless serpent eyes blinking in the night, forever open. And I am not afraid. (p. 73)

Choosing not to take the line offered by the SIPS, plunging vertically through the border between imagination and reality, is not anti-empiricism, quite the opposite: it calls for a more extreme
kind. It means refusing to privilege mechanisms that are “otherwise used to judge or measure according to a norm, differentiating between experiences whose objects are legitimate or illusory” (Stengers, 2011, p. 234). Withholding eliminative judgment, instruments like the SIPS can be invited instead to identify the very experiences that will be, as Anzaldúa (1987) writes in her poetry, “the green shoot that cracks the rock” (p. 105). Far from the bifurcation of nature, it is to this splitting – of Psychology’s episteme – that we might attend. Cradled in the arms of Coatlicue, the prodrome points to the vitality and the milieu of paranoia, changing the shape of this problem from cliff-edge to borderland, from individual to abyss. An unsettling, reparative reading that suggests existing prodromal tools may not necessarily “bring in psychological individualism through the back door” (Blackman et al., 2008, p. 10). Indeed that with certain interlocutors they may even hold a decolonial potential to re-turn paranoia’s etymological roots.

Aimee Carillo Rowe and Eve Tuck (2016) define decolonial projects as “push[ing] back against the linearity of history and the future, against teleological narratives of human development, and argu[ing] for renderings of time and place which exceed coloniality and conquest” (p. 2). This definition synchs with Sedgwick’s (2003) call for reparative alongside paranoid readings, which emerged out of her broader project to explore how, unlike ‘beneath’ and ‘beyond’, beside invites critical scholars to resist thinking in terms of origin and telos. Instead, beside permits a “spacious agnosticism” around linear logics that may otherwise enforce dualist, colonial thinking, thereby allowing for a wide range of relations, of “desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivaling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (p. 8). To read paranoia as beside-the-mind, then, is not to simply replace one think-net with another, capturing thought in abstractions. To the contrary, as a kind of “spatial confrontation” between concepts –
European and non-European, non-human and human, reparative and paranoid, imagination and real – it potentially overcomes the limits of territorial thinking (Mignolo, 2012).

Speaking from dichotomies, beside-the-mind calls for attunement, for seeing threshold phenomenon as capacities that shape-shift across different situations – perhaps colonizing, perhaps decolonizing, perhaps something else. In doing so it not only takes us to the abyss, to paranoia’s space of encounter and the objects and operations that make this up, joining with Harper and Cromby’s (2009) attention to distressing contexts; it takes us to the borderland, to paranoia’s unruliness, encouraging an ethological approach. In some ways similar to Brown and Stenner’s (2009) suggestion that we watch and learn how the whale-cum-psyché behaves in different circumstances, an ethological approach also understands that what we follow is not indifferent to how we engage with it, indeed that it may actively prevent us from getting a hold (Pignarre & Stengers, 2011). Beside-the-mind takes the whale’s agency into account, too. Itself slippery, perhaps enacting and obliging the creative and reflexive foundationalism put forth by Brown and Stenner (2009), it further assumes the indifference of Trinh (1989) to colonial theorizing, “of piercing, as he often claims, through the sediments of psychological and epistemological ‘depths’. I may stubbornly turn around a foreign thing or turn it around to play with it, but I respect its realm of opaqueness” (p. 48). Beside-the-mind obliges a praxis of humility and trial-and-error, an accountable uncertainty that is open to surprises, “my thousand sleepless serpent eyes blinking in the night, forever open”.

Indeed, perhaps most of all, beside-the-mind suggests that paranoia may be looking back at Psychology. Far from hunting or even just following this experience, then, we might pursue an apprenticeship with it, “creating new means of grasping a situation, leading to the production of new ways of acting, of connecting, of being efficacious…” (Pignarre & Stengers, 2011, p. 77).
And this may include the direction of our attention to the ‘supernatural’ otherwise grabbed by the tight grip of routine practice, derealized in the name of Psychology’s own transcendent truth. For Pignarre and Stengers (2011), the non-integration of ‘soul’ into scientific vocabulary – despite the *psykhe* staring Psychology in the face, and the resonance of spiritual readings for paranoid people (May, 2016) – is indicative of practitioners being trapped in shrunken categories of thought. They urge us to turn toward knowledges that we have disqualified. For them, and for Nathan (1999), this includes following service-users’ example of not opposing two worlds. That is, people who do not experience threshold phenomena as merely belief, but who are learning how to live in-between. The UK Paranoia Network, for example, has been experimenting with making spaces that welcome diverse readings of paranoia, attend to the local hold that these experiences have on a person, and listen to what they may tell us about the contemporary landscape. As Rufus May (2016) writes:

> If we are able to achieve some detachment from our beliefs in the knowledge they are just one way of seeing the world, we become more aware that ‘the map’ (i.e. our beliefs) is not the territory; and that different maps tell us about different aspects of the territory. (n.p.)

More broadly, by naming beside-the-mind, I am trying to show that paranoia does not have to choke us, trying to protect us – whether colonized, colonizer, or both\(^1\) – against another operation of colonialist capture. That while paranoia may “make sense” within contemporary conditions it does not have to be “the normal state of affairs” (Frosh, 2016). To the contrary, as beside-the-mind paranoia is reclaimed as a capacity, and thus perhaps also as a potential medium of political or cultural struggle. Unlike the paranoia outlined by Sedgwick (2003), beside-the-mind entices a *mystified* view of systemic oppressions, opening a wide range of possibilities, requiring an endlessly iterative and collective participation. So often used to weaken the potency of protest (“You’re just being paranoid!”) yet, with Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue, we are reminded that
this sense is telling us that something else lies nearby. And, whispering from the fecund cave of our imagination, beside-the-mind includes that magic(al ideation) in the air, encouraging us to “perceive and accept what we know to be impossible” (Stengers, 2012, p. 8). Within poisoned times of swelling white supremacy, where another world slips in and out of being possible, this desire-to-know – “released by the heat of anger, rebellion, hope” – seems so incredibly important. Beside-the-mind allows paranoia to be a little green snake, hissing both cause and cure, soliciting a different kind of response-ability for Psychology within the present political moment: no longer, What is the matter with paranoia? What should we do about it?, so much as What is the matter of paranoia? What else could it do?

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Notes

1. I realize that in using this “we” I am further incising categories of “the colonizers” and “the colonized”. However, given that forgetting is a necessary step in colonization (Cesaire, 1955), I choose to do so in order to both provoke a re-membering for those readers who share my settler legacy and respect Tuck and Yang’s (2012) call to avoid “moves to innocence” within commitments to decolonization.

2. To be clear, I am not using decolonization as a metaphor here (Tuck and Yang, 2012). I see threshold phenomena and taking an affective turn in Psychology as having the potential to directly respond to the epistemic, ontological, and cosmological violence that came with the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land.
3. Describing herself as “a third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings”, Anzaldúa preferred to position herself on thresholds and to foreground her spirit-inflected politics and texts (Keating, 2009). While typically seen as rich and relevant for critical race and queer studies, Anzaldúa’s writing has been somewhat overlooked in terms of its potential contribution to disability studies, even though her theorizing was very much informed by her own disability (McMaster, 2005; Keating, 2009). I chose her as my interlocutor because her theory is rich and relevant in content and in form for Psychology, particularly with regard to threshold phenomena. Moreover, she embodies the efficacy of both the “border thinking” that I attempt to do in this essay (Mignolo, 2012), and the “mystified approach” that I come to argue for towards its end (Lara, 2005).

4. Based on this trajectory of research, Chapman and Chapman received the 1997 American Psychological Association (APA) Award for Distinguished Scientific Applications of Psychology; Patrick McGorry, who helped to establish the first prodromal clinic in 1994, received Australian of the Year Award in 2010 for his contribution to youth mental health.

5. Unlike her writing on la mestiza consciousness, Anzaldúa’s writing on Coatlicue is rarely excerpted or examined yet “these issues were crucial to Anzaldúa herself and represent some of the most innovative, visionary dimensions of her work” (Keating, 2009, p. 5). Anzaldúa explicitly wrote how her words did not ‘belong’ to her; that once they came though her body and onto the page they were there for people to pick up and use, to think and fly with. At the same time with regard to Indigenous spiritualities, while “some things are worth borrowing”, we “often misuse what we’ve borrowed by using it out of context” and thus “need to scrutinize the purpose and accountability for one’s ‘borrowing’” (Anzaldúa, 2003, p. 289). In this essay I risk isolating Coatlicue, disconnecting her from Mexica culture and land, forcing her into a Western context – effectively treating her, as Anzaldúa (2003) continues, in a manner akin to how colonial museums exhibit Indigenous objects. By committing to decolonial content and politics and experimenting with an unsettling form and practice, I hope that I have been able to host Coatlicue in a respectful way (Miller, 1977; Trinh, 1989). Nonetheless I am walking a dangerous line of ‘inclusion’. This footnote, then, is to witness and enter – without resolving/dissolving – the complexity of this project. Instead, I offer this as an experiment for Psychology and affect studies in the possibilities of opening subjectivity to “new theoretical horizons” (Blackman et al., 2008) while committing to decolonization by uprooting the colonizing space in which our intellectual ancestors came to act like they knew better, evoking Minh-ha’s (1989) cry: “In sight of every reader-by, let him run naked” (p. 47). Following Stengers (2012), this reveal includes taking care to not verify Science’s authority – by, for example, feeling authorized to write about Indigenous, colonized knowledges and experiences; to rationalize, rescue, re-colonize Coatlicue, ‘welcoming’ her into the European canon – but rather to excavate that which “served to justify colonization and the divide across which some felt free to study and categorize others” (p. 1).

6. I am reminded here of an article in the Psychiatric Times on November 14th, 2014, about Dr John Mack, a Harvard Professor who came to accept that his patients’ reports of alien abductions were accurate recounts of real events, inciting “decidedly negative reactions” from his colleagues for “going native”.

11. While Sandoval (2006) suggests that Coatlicue can be useful for working with Latinas and Chicanas, I am suggesting that this goddess invites an ethical praxis that Western psychological and political practices can learn from.

References


Author (2016; forthcoming)


