ETHNIC-NATIONALISM, WARS AND THE PATTERNS OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE CASE OF POST-YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES

NOTE: This paper is an earlier version of the article ‘Ethnic Nationalism, Wars and the Patterns of Social, Political and Sexual Violence against Women: the Case of Post Yugoslav Countries’. Published in 1998 in Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, Vol. 5, No. 2 (p. 153-181).

MAJA KORAC

ABSTRACT

The paper takes the recent conflict and wars in the region of post-Yugoslav states and their impact on women as the point of departure. In this empirical context, I explore the patterns of violence against women, arguing that ethnic nationalism as a social phenomenon engenders a kind of “structural violence” with gender specific implications. Women are exposed to various forms of sexual, physical, and non-physical violence in their relation to ethnic-national movements and their respective states-in-the-making. Therefore the paper examines the ways in which gendered militarization of ethnic nationalism is used to justify different forms of abuse of women, from abuse of women's reproductive rights to domestic violence. Furthermore, it addresses the issue of political exploitation of militarized violence against women, wherein abused women are used by their nation-states to gain more power in the struggle for nationalistic expansion.

KEYWORDS: women, violence, victimization, ethnic-conflict, nation-state.
Public attention regarding women and war in some post-Yugoslav countries has been almost exclusively concerned with mass rape in the conflict, thus contributing to an equation of violence against women with a single form of abuse, while all other and equally intolerable forms of violence remain hidden. Rape is indeed one of the most brutal violations of women's rights and freedoms. In the context of war, rape becomes a symbol of the clash between power and powerlessness based on rather fixed traditional notions of masculinity and femininity. Furthermore, when rape is systematic and massive, and affects predominately women from a particular ethnic-national group, as is the case in the wars in the post-Yugoslav region, it becomes a tool of genocide. Yet violence against women in a context of ethnic-national conflicts has many patterns, some being subtle and veiled, thus hardly recognizable. Consequently, many forms of violence to which women are exposed remain unidentified, both among society at large and women themselves.

This paper addresses the above issues through an exploration of the patterns of violence against women in the context of recent violent ethnic-national struggles and wars in the post-Yugoslav region. I argue that ethnic-nationalism as a social phenomenon engenders a kind of “structural violence” with gender specific implications. Consequently, women are exposed to different forms of sexual and non-sexual violence in their relation to ethnic-national movements and their respective states-in-the-making. In this respect, the paper examines the ways in which gendered militarization of ethnic-nationalism is used to justify different forms of abuse of women, i.e., from abuse of women's reproductive rights to domestic violence. Further, the paper addresses the issue of political exploitation of militarized violence against women, wherein abused women are used by their nation-states to gain more power for nationalistic expansion.

Exploration of violent ethnic-national struggles and their impact on women in the region is based on data collected during my research in Serbia, as well as on existing studies regarding
the situation of women in post-Yugoslav countries. My sources include: observations made during fieldwork, in-depth interview data with 18 refugee women from various ethnic-nationalities as well as five representatives of women's groups, newspaper articles, papers, newsletters, and journals. The field work was conducted in the Summers of 1994, 1995, 1996.²

In this respect, the perspective is partial because it arises primarily from an analysis of the recent situation in Serbia and applies to lesser extent to the conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The analysis can also be considered partial because of my own situation, i.e., ethnic-national and personal identity. Thus, for those who may want to question not just the message but the messenger, I will try to place myself. I was born, brought up, and educated in Belgrade, Serbia, where I lived until my “voluntary” exile five years ago, when I went to England and later to Canada in search of “a minimal condition for some kind of democracy of selves” (Cockburn 1997). I am a Serb by ethnic origin and have chosen to be a Yugoslav. Most of my memories, experiences, and values, as well as my life politics, arise from the notion of a shared identity with all peoples of a once common country. My relationship to them was not just symbolic. I knew and shared experiences with so many of them. This shared experience determined the sense of difference, which is not pure “otherness”. The revival of ethnic-nationalism and the disintegration of a familiar social space disrupted my own sense of belonging and radically displaced me. It left me, I feel, without the option of being either Yugoslav or Serb. On the one hand, the geographical space that is still officially called Yugoslavia is without the essential cultural, political, and social markers with which I identified. On the other, from my own sense of self, it is impossible for me to identify as a Serb, because that would now imply acceptance of the values of “purification”, “cleansing” of differences, and the process of exclusion. Thus, the place I am speaking from now, is somewhere in transition. It is a transition to a space where a new identity and new subjectivity can be articulated.³
Thus, analysis of the impact of the revival of ethnic-nationalism on women in these particular geographical locations acknowledges that there is no “nationalism in general” (Parker, Summer, and Yaeger 1992: 3). However, the analysis recognizes also "the extraordinary similarities in the ways that very different nationalisms construct ‘women,’ and their construction of the nation as female" (Pettman 1996: 48). These similarities in the construction of nation and nationalism through gender are central for the analysis of patterns of violence against women in the various contexts of ethnic-national divisions that have involved or are involving war. In this respect, the paper does not explore the relationship between Serbian aggressive ethnic-nationalist ideology versus more or less defensive ethnic-national identities of other post-Yugoslav nation-states. Nor does it focus on a critique of solely Serbian nationalism as the nationalism of “my own people”. Rather, it inquires as to how these highly politicized forms of identity formation manipulate and abuse women.

THE PROBLEM WITH VISIBILITY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

As noted in the introduction, the primary focus on mass rape of predominantly Bosnian Muslim women in this conflict contributed to an equation of rape with violence against women in these wars. This equation tends to shape the belief, even among abused women, that the violence against them in these wars is solely sexual or physical. Research on “Women, Violence, and War”, conducted by Nikolic-Ristanovic, Mrvic-Petrovic, Konstantinovic-Vilic, and Stevanovic (1995) in Serbia, Montenegro, and the territory of the so-called “Republic Srpska” during 1994 supports my argument. Among 150 interviewed refugee women, a majority denied any personal experience with violence in the war. Yet, later in the interviews, it became clear that this initial response means only that the interviewed women were not the victims of rape in this war. The authors emphasize that women's initial reaction to the topic of violence against
women in the war is two-fold (18-19). On the one hand, as is generally common among women who are victims of rape, the denial of personal experience of sexual violence in war was an attempt to protect themselves from further victimization. In the case of the interviewed refugee women, this applies even more so, since the social stigma that women victims of rape generally face is more powerful in a context of a deeply patriarchal culture. Yet, on the other hand, Nikolic-Ristanovic, et al.’s interviews revealed that the way many women defined their experience with violence in this war reflected to a great extent the media coverage of the situation of women in the conflict. Both the local and the international media campaigns covering this war, by focusing almost exclusively on rape of women, have contributed to how individual women have negotiated the meanings and definitions of violence against them.

The individual negotiation of women's experiences of violence facilitates the continuum of “structural violence” by transforming the victimized into easily controlled “state subjects”. Feminist critique of the state (Pateman 1988; Pettman 1996), reveal that all states constitute the “state subject” in a gendered way, and thus citizenship is essentially a male project. Ethnic-nationalism, militarization, and the various forms of gendered violence they evolve are the ways of maintaining and perpetrating this essential gender inequality within the state project. These issues have theoretical and political implications for both feminist scholarship and women's movements in their efforts to uncover “gendered workings of power” that are commonly transformed into violence against women (Enloe 1993: 246). By articulating their personal experiences with violence, in their own ways, women can make an effort to avoid male terminology, hence deconstructing man as the center of a discourse (Lerner 1986). Lerner argues that it is women who change, re-produce, and transform beliefs and practice in order to create a new, shared, and gender free language, and thereby, I would add, a society. If women are to gain agency and control over their lives, then a matrix of their social space needs to be one where the
“state subject” is constituted in the image of both woman and man. This transformation is particularly important in an historic moment when struggles over seemingly unambiguous ethnic-national divisions, or between competing religious movements, are becoming increasingly important. If women are to stand up and speak for themselves as women and as representatives of their ethnic-nations and their respective states-in-the-making, then the patterns of “structural violence” that are embedded in these processes have to be named, defined, and theorized.

POLITICAL CONTEXT: ETHNIC-NATIONALISM AND WOMEN IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION

A comprehensive analysis of the origins and history of the recent conflict in the post-Yugoslav countries is not within the scope of this paper, yet it is important to note briefly the main characteristics of their recent political context. This will allow an analysis of the effects of ethnic nationalism on women in the region within a broader economic, social, and political context.

Violent conflict in the region has been described to a large extent as a struggle caused by historical animosities and hatred among peoples in the region. However, recent studies (Denitch 1994; Woodward 1995) on the historical, social, and political context of Yugoslavia that led to its violent disintegration demonstrate that the conflict is “the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy” (Woodward 1995: 15). This process of transition to democracy has failed as a result of political action that, according to Woodward,

[D]id not focus on transforming the rights of the socialist system to rights associated with private property, free enterprise, civil rights, and competitive political regimes, but on national sovereignty (336).
A crucial point in this failure “was economic decline, caused largely by a program intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis” (15). The result of the failure has been ethnic-national pluralization, which has taken on an extreme nationalistic and chauvinistic form in almost all of the former republics within the region. The society faced a plurality of nationalistic ideologies and projects, rather than ethnic or national pluralism, and the resulting conflict of ethnic-national identities has overshadowed all kinds of problems and conflict in the society, such as: economic crisis, social instability caused by regionally uneven development, and underdeveloped and/or non-existent elements of civil society.

The political and social events of the late 1980s that brought state socialism to its end were characterized by the complete rejection of the state socialist experience and implied both a loss of societal identity and a certain degree of disorientation with regard to the future. The conjunction of these processes with a deep economic crisis resulted in growing social unease. The economic crisis showed its alarming signs during the 1980s, as a result of the cumulative effect of hidden errors in the system. Incompetent and radical structural economic reforms produced a drastic fall of the GNP in 1989 (three years prior to the beginning of the war) at an average yearly rate of 18.7 percent.6

Due to the ongoing economic crisis and restructuring, women's employment rates were declining. Even before the “transition to democracy” and the war in post-Yugoslav countries, employed women accounted for only a minority of the adult female population, around one-third in most areas, and nowhere greater than 40 percent. Consequently, the majority of women, the remaining other two-thirds, had to be content with a marginal and dependent status (Milic 1994). Thus, increasingly scarce resources in the changing economy and scarcer paid labor opportunities made women more dependent on family ties. Whatever their actual nationality - Bosnian-Muslim, Croat, or Serb - women were now regarded as “caretakers”, and guardians of
their children, men, and hearths. Although women from all regions, ethnic-national groups, and classes have been affected by the current economic crisis, those from underdeveloped regions, rural areas, and lower classes or ethnic-national groups where the traditional, male-centered system of power has remained strongest, have suffered the most. For example, in 1993, less than 3% of Albanian women in the autonomous province of Kosova, the republic of Serbia, were employed, according to Ahmeti’s report on Albanian Women in Kosova to the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (Ahmeti, n.d.).

The scope of the economic crisis tangibly affected people's lives, and the trends were visible and demoralizing. Because ethnic nationalism, deeply concerned with an idealized past, had the power to give millions of people a sense of security, it was a supremely effective response to the difficulties a society had to face in a time of political, economic, and social turmoil. The ideology of ethnic nationalism proffered a traditional set of “natural” values - religion, tradition, “common blood” and kin - which could serve as a source of social stability. Nationalistic (male)leadership claimed that only something as “unnatural” as a socialist, communist regime would have dared to destroy these values.

The predominant concern of ethnic-national ideologies with a struggle for cultural and religious “authenticity” involves assigning to women the roles and responsibilities for the reproduction of the group and for the custody of cultural values and cultural identity. In this respect, contemporary ethnic-national projects and their struggles in post-Yugoslav countries represent a revival and celebration of traditional gender codes and male power. These roles become the role models for a “new” nationalist family. Any notions of women's emancipation developed during the state socialist regime (e.g., better access to education, equal opportunities in employment, the legal right to equal pay, liberal abortion rights, etc.) were, thus, demonized.

A particularly telling example of the strategy and discourse deployed by ethnic-
nationalists is a statement by the leader of the Christian Orthodox church in Bosnia & Herzegovina:

Alija Izetbegovic has stated recently that every Bosnian Muslim woman has to give birth to five children, and to prepare two for war. And what will we do? We don't have enough children even to simply reproduce our nation. The satanic ideology of communism has destroyed the Serbian family. The laws of nature have been inverted. Woman has become, in the negative sense, superior to man and this is a big mistake. As Bishop Njegos said, man is the defender of women and children (author's translation).\footnote{10}

In Croatia, in yet another example, the Government has published a “Concept of Demographic Restoration”, with the intent of transforming the present family into the “family of the Croatian future” (Kesic 1995). Its pro-life orientation is justified by a similar anti-communist discourse:

(for the) struggle against the anti-life mentality it is necessary to immediately purge all the misconceptions and propaganda...from the laws of the times of communist single-mindedness (37).

Ethnic-nationalism, thus, has transformed women into “honored” relics in the collective act of social or ethnic-national “rescue”.

The outcomes of this social reconstruction were the roles of the “patriotic father” and the “patriotic mother” of the ethnic-nation. These opposing yet complementary roles erased virtually all other conceivable social identifiers, and became the roles in which “masculine” men and “feminine” women were expected to act.\footnote{11}
PATRIOTIC MOTHERS: REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION-STATE

The “masculine” men are to destroy or kill the opposing ethnic-nation in order to “protect” “their” women, children, land, and the “honourable histories” of their “patriotic fathers”. The “feminine” women are to reproduce/give-birth to children, the followers of their “patriotic” fathers in the name of “sacred” ethnic-national collectives. Consequently, through the mechanism of a nation-state, policies are developed that encourage the population growth of the “right kind” in the name of “national security”. The birth rate became a question of national military defense.

A concern for the “national security” of “endangered” ethnic-nations has its ideological and practical consequences for women and their status in post-Yugoslav countries. In October 1992, for example, a document on demographic problems in Serbia was published. Entitled “Warning” and signed by several important public and “national institutions”, this document called for the foundation of a State Council for Population Dynamics which, according to its authors (nine men), should be chaired by President Milosevic himself.

The authors' primary concern is “a lack of balance” in the growth rates of certain nations, minorities, and ethnic groups in Serbia, with an emphasis on how the Serbian nation is “endangered” by high birth rates among Albanians, Muslims and Gypsies “which deviates from rational and human procreation” (sic) (Cetkovic 1993: 84). The problem with this document, as Papic (1995) notes, is not that it imposes the dual principle of stimulation/suppression of birth rate differences between the ethnic-national groups, but that the document explains these differences in a vary dangerous way. The differences are seen not as a consequence of social and economic conditions (i.e., the region of Kosova is one of the most underdeveloped parts of the region; 95 percent of Albanian women are unemployed), but rather as being political or
naturalist in character (i.e., the high birth rate in Kosova is the long term political strategy of Albanians to outgrow the Serbian nation, and/or they are “so primitive” because of their “natural” and unchangeable ethnic mentality) (Papic 1995: 41).

The logical next step in redressing these population concerns was to tighten the rights to abortion. After calls, in early 1993 and early 1994, by the Serbian Orthodox Church for the prohibition of abortion, in May 1995, the Serbian Parliament passed a new, restrictive law on family planning. The law does not allow personal, family, or social reasons for an abortion between the tenth and twentieth weeks of pregnancy.

In Croatia, in June 1993, following the pro-natal spirit of the Concept of Demographic Restoration, the Croatian Population Movement was founded. Its participants, males mostly over 60, accepted a program that recommends, among other goals: 1) the need to emphasize that the father of a Croatian family is the fundamental linchpin of the demographic restoration of Croatia, and therefore is responsible for the prosperity and happiness of the family; and 2) the stopping of the quiet exodus of young Croatian women (Kesic 1995: 37).

These events clearly demonstrate an alarming sign of states' intention to control women. They became a prologue to a strategy of militarization in politics and everyday life. When women are seen predominantly as the means for renewing the nation, they become crucial for “national security”, and their bodies are defined by its militarized strategies. Thus, women's task is to use their bodies as “incubators for descendants in a war against the bodies of other women”, namely, women of a different ethnic-national background (Papic 1995: 41).
NATIONALISTIC POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND 'ETHNIC CLEANSING' - GENDER IMPLICATIONS

Current ethnic-national projects in the region are based on politics and practices of exclusion. Leadership in the new nation-states has insisted on struggles around an ideology of ethnic-national identity that seeks purification and ethnic-national “sameness” because these struggles are an effective means of maintaining political power.14

All those who cannot or do not want to state their “appropriate” ethnic-national background and/or loyalty to the obsessed local nationalists have been defined as a threat to nation-states and their ruling regimes. When turned into practice, an ideology of ethnic-national purification victimizes people who have crossed “demarcation lines” through friendship, love affairs, or marriage. Since there is no longer an accepted political expression for their needs, language, and experiences, apparently they are simply expected to vanish. To illustrate this type of crisis, I refer to the words of a Bosnian Muslim refugee woman who is married to a Serb from Bosnia:

...both I and my husband grew up in the same atmosphere; he too declared himself as a Yugoslav all his life; we have actually been left without a homeland, a citizenship and without the possibility to declare ourselves as what we are....

Thus, their existence is violently denied.

In the Yugoslav context, where most communities were ethnically mixed (Petrovic 1985: 29-61; Woodward 1995: 33-35), the politics of exclusion was critical for ethnic-national elites and their claim to power. Multi-ethnic communities were not just the sites of peaceful multi-ethnic co-existence but also of cohesion. Mixed marriages were one of the significant demographic and cultural characteristics of the Yugoslav society. They were both a prerequisite and a consequence of a quite considerable history of peaceful multi-ethnic relationships.
Approximately two million people in the region are either parents in or children of ethnically mixed marriages. At the time of the 1981 census, they outnumbered Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims, and Slovenes, and were themselves outnumbered only by Croats and Serbs (Petrovic 1985). Yet, nationalist propaganda in Serbia today calls mixed marriages “bastard factories” that are polluting “the biological national source of family.”15 In Bosnia & Herzegovina, nationalists have parallel views on mixed marriages. Dzemaludin Latic (1994: 40), an editor of the Bosnian newspaper Ljiljan writes:

> Mixed marriages, a kind of flag for false understanding of multi-ethnic co-existance, are predominantly failed marriages, full of internal conflict, and children born into these marriages are frustrated with their backgrounds. Thus, this kind of disgusting recommendation [to marry inter-ethnically] should end once and for all. Differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are so enormous that it will be easier to develop a society without trauma, if we recommend to the new generations to take a different path, namely, to choose as their spouses persons who think as they do (author’s translation).

The mobilization of the ideology of biological, spiritual, and cultural “cleansing” was a precursor to war. Nationalistic oligarchies actively worked to spread hatred and fear of an “other,” creating a base for an ethnic-national identity that would be suitable for their projects of ethnically singular and fundamentalist states.16 History and language were to be altered and purified of any notion of peaceful co-existence. The names of streets and cities were to be stripped of every reminder that a given ethnic-nation lived with “others.”

The most radical version of the ideologies of purification has become “ethnic cleansing.”17 Even those who doubted in 1991, at the beginning of the war in Croatia, that
“ethnic cleansing” was planned now perceive after the war in the region that this was its main goal. The heaviest fighting took place in areas with the most mixed populations: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Territorial cleansing in war-zones was followed by cleansing in those areas unaffected by the war. As a result of that practice (read: “politics”) of the ethnic-nationalists, 4.5 to 5 million people in the region had been “cleansed” by August 1995. The data include refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as approximately 700,000 people who left the country in the last couple of years seeking political asylum in European countries. When we note that the total population before the war was 22 million, these figures mean that every fourth or fifth citizen of what once was Yugoslavia has been “ethnically cleansed.” A large majority - over 70 percent in some post-Yugoslav states - were women (USCR, 1993a).

Instances of women becoming “special targets” in conflict and war zones are not new. However, in the context of the new nation-state building in the region of the former Yugoslavia, it has a specific meaning. This massive gendered population transfer within the region has operated as a crucial symbolic as well as material element in (re)constructing boundaries between ethnic-national collectives.

Within a situation of violent conflict over ethnically homogeneous territories and states, as discussed elsewhere, uprooted women have become symbolically and strategically important for the destruction of the community of the opposed ethnic-national collective (Korac in press-a). The role women play in this process is intrinsically related to the women's roles in producing and reproducing ethnic-national collectives and their ideologies. As several studies have already pointed out, the roles of women include their activities as biological and cultural reproducers of their ethnic-national collective; as cultural embodiments of collectives and their boundaries; and as participants in ethnic-national struggles (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Walby 1992; Brah 1993; Yuval-Davis 1993). Moreover, as Copelon (1994: 207) argues, women traditionally seen
as caretakers and guardians of their children, men, and homes, stood as pillars of society in a
time called peace. They have occupied this role even more importantly in a time of war. Thus,
forced migration of women in the context of ethnic-national conflict and war is the most
pertinent way of (re)shaping boundaries of ethnic-national collectives. This massive forced
population transfer results in women and children's exposure to various forms of violence, i.e.
physical, psychological, and economic, as well as political.20

EXPERIENCES OF WAR, FLIGHT AND EXILE: RADICAL CHANGES THROUGH
GENDERED VIOLENCE

The research on “Women, Violence, and War” by Nikolic-Ristanovic et al. (1995), as
well as my own research on refugee women in Serbia, clearly indicates that almost all
interviewed refugee women confront constant fear for their own lives and futures, as well as for
members of their families. A fear for deceased and missing family members contributes to the
psychological trauma refugee women suffer. A great majority of these women face radical life
transformations on becoming the sole providers and protectors of their families and households,
as spouses, fathers, and brothers have been absorbed into wars, mobilized in different armies,
exiled or killed.

Some of these women, whose husbands have joined the army or paramilitary forces, face
the tremendous problems of negotiating between their love, care, and fear for their spouses and
the terrifying fact of their lonely and economically, socially, and politically insecure personal
lives. They must also face the even more horrifying reality of life with men who have become
psychologically destroyed after their experience at the front. This often involves the
development of political consciousness on the part of the women. Yet this seldom becomes a
“way out” of women's problems, since most women are predominantly concerned with survival,
and have always been responsible for the private sphere of their own lives and the lives of their families. In these circumstances their individual choices are profoundly restricted. Consequently, only their personal strength and emotional stability can help them to survive. The experience of a refugee woman I interviewed, reveals the kinds of problems these women face.

...I quarrelled with him. I told him that if he died I wouldn't know where his bones were. Don't go. But he said that he must go, that his comrades were in danger. He was obsessed by the war, because those who have been to the front can't stand silence anymore. He left .... ...When children say that their daddy is a soldier, they are proud of the fact, even though it never meant anything to me. To this very day I can't accept some things, I mean with regard to the army ....

...You know, I was fed up, up to here, with his Serbian cause. Because as soon as the war started, he just kept saying: We Serbs. It starts getting on one's nerves. Because you're not used to someone being singled out. Be a man, no matter who you are and what you are....

...When he returned, he was practically unrecognizable. But all that aside, he'd flipped psychologically .... Now he is not going to the front. He's a 60% invalid, but he works for the army, God knows. To tell you the truth, I'm not interested anymore. I've had enough of the army and everything. Up to here .... As far as he is concerned, he's here now....

The excerpt above also clearly indicates that men are made victims as well. Men are co-victims in the process of ethnic-national struggles, and consequently, they are also affected by different forms of violence (i.e., they are killed, tortured, their bodies are mutilated, they become psychologically destroyed as a result of their experiences at the front, etc.). Nonetheless, there is
a difference between women's and men's experience of violence in a situation of ethnic-national upheaval and social turmoil. This difference is based on the fact that the processes of militarization and war represent a struggle for power in which women and men participate differently, since they have structurally different access to power in society. This problem and difference is illustrated by the words of a refugee woman from Bosnia & Herzegovina:

... You know what, there is a difference. In war, a man leaves. I mean he knows he's going, but he doesn't know if he'll return. None of the fighters, after three years, it's all the same to them, if he'll be killed, if he'll be wounded. He'd prefer to get killed than live without a leg and an arm. But a woman, a mother for example, she worries, for her husband and children. She doesn't have to do any particular work. She doesn't even have to be politically committed. But she has a hard time. She's torn apart, by everything....

As I have stated elsewhere, most men are practically pushed and made to become violent (Korac 1993: 110). Due to such pressures they have started to kill each other on the battlefield. They have started to rape and kill their enemies - wives, daughters, sisters and mothers. Yet behind the comprehensibly brutal images of war and its male perpetrators, inhumanity and destruction rage as a plague throughout post-Yugoslav countries. There are many thousands of tragic examples of men psychologically destroyed by having to take part in this war, and to give themselves up to violence and hate, to prove themselves as “good” representatives of their people and nation, patriots, and above all, “real men”, men with “guts.”

Militarization of ethnic-national collectives is the central point for an aggressive ethnic-national project. Thus, it is crucial for its leadership to create a “real warrior” who is capable of fighting “sacred” ethnic-national wars. The centrality of this issue for nationalistic propaganda is a paradoxical one. As Papic (1994: 14) explains, during fifty years of peace, the traditional/patriarchal masculine identity has changed, under the influence of urbanizing
transformations.\textsuperscript{21} It has become more complex, tolerant, urban-like, and “softer”, as well as less eager or even not interested to seek revenge for all the past tragic losses. It takes time, a lot of manipulation, and war propaganda to (re)create “national enemies” and a paranoia within ethnic-national collectives.\textsuperscript{22} This was necessary in order to create a “real man,” a “patriot” who would fight back in “defence” against “the eternal enemy” of his ethnic-national collective.

In this respect, it can be argued that ethnic-national mobilization of a collective is a process crucially related to both women's and men's boundness to their traditionally defined gender roles. The critical element of a chauvinistic ethnic-national ideology is violence embodied in militant masculinity. Violence oriented masculinity has become the main means of recruiting individuals who are capable of committing war-related atrocities because their militant collective is the ultimate judge of what is good and evil. The counter-balance for such a violence oriented masculinity has been emotional, committed, supportive but passive, femininity.

These two roles and the notions related to them have overwhelmed women with fear and uncertainty, under the burden of sole responsibility for their families and with no imaginable future or vision. This may not be readily visible violence, yet, it is still all-encompassing and devastating.

PLACE OF EXILE AS A WAR ZONE

Conflicts and wars induced by an ethnic-nationalism that insists on an ideology of “sameness” and hatred for an “other,” as in the case of the region that once was Yugoslavia, produce an additional set of individual, social and political problems for the region's population, and especially for those who are displaced and in exile. Millions of refugees and internally displaced persons now confront the problem of reconciling their own conception of belonging and identity with the new realities of their lives. Once they had the fortune to escape immediate
life threatening dangers, refugees found themselves in familiar places of refuge, where their friends, colleagues, lovers, and family might have lived. However, even though the refugees knew the local language and customs, they became “foreigners in a country which until recently was their homeland” (Nikolic-Ristanovic et. al. 1995: 13). They are perceived, in a word, as strangers.

Refugees from war-torn zones live in ethnically mixed refugee camps in newly recognized states, where their ethnic-national group differs from the majority of the population. These refugees are frequently perceived as “enemies.” The experience of a Bosnian Muslim refugee woman whom I interviewed demonstrates a continuum of stress and fear she has to deal with while in exile.

And then I went to the Red Cross, because I didn't dare go and register with the High Commissioner's office; I was afraid that they'd put me, a Muslim, in collective accommodation. I was afraid for my children.... I'm in an environment [a collective accommodation for women and children with special needs] where the women are traumatized, they have lost their husbands, children, their husbands are at the front. They take sides, they are nationally oriented, committed; when they listen to the news they comment, they support these stands .... One of the women said to me: But you're in Serbia, you must support this here. In other words I have to support this politics, such as it is. I don't support it, not any one of them....

The experience of a second Bosnian Muslim refugee woman reveals an individual strategy that refugee women from non-Serbian ethnic-national backgrounds commonly use in their struggle to survive in a hostile environment:

I only had some minor problems with a woman here (she moved out recently)
over the national issue. She kept on raising it, although I never raise it in my
conversation. She provoked me a little, she even told some people here I hated
Serbs, Milosevic [president of Serbia] and other things. Which is completely
untrue: I don't hate Serbs and Serbia. I don't hate them, but I don't like
Milosevic....I don't agree with his politics.

Women refugees from minority nationalities tend not to initiate discussion on sensitive political
issues. Given the context of their flight, as stated elsewhere (Korac, in press-a), their very
presence represents a “grave breach” of the aggressive Serbian nationalist cause for war. They
have to be silent and suppress their political views and beliefs, unless absolutely necessary, and
they tend to make themselves “invisible.” This “strategy of silence” is a common strategy of
women's resistance to “gendered workings of power” (Enloe 1993: 246) in “a time called peace.”

However, as social and political power shifts radically, this strategy becomes a central form of
resistance both between and within genders. When it is deployed as a form of resistance within
genders, the “strategy of silence” engenders further restrictions regarding the “social space”
women are permitted. Consequently, fear endures and a real problem remains in dealing with a
collective to which these women represent a demonized ethnic-national group. In this respect,
the place of exile carries the characteristics of a war zone.

Additionally, as a result of war, the economic crisis worsened. This transformed all
refugees, regardless of their ethnicity, into “others” perceived as a heavy and unbearable
imposition by host governments. A Serbian refugee woman from Bosnia & Herzegovina
explains this experience:

…it seemed like the refugees had eaten everything, taken everything. As if it was
our fault the war started over there....

Deterioration of the economy, nationalistic propaganda fueling hatred toward the “other,”
militarization, and war, have together contributed to a situation where boundaries blurred. But who is the “other?”

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE AGAINST AN ETERNAL “OTHER”

Local women's groups report (Mladjenovic 1993a: 54-56; Mladjenovic 1993b: 94; Stanojevic 1994: 51-52) a significant increase in domestic violence as a result of wars and conflicts in the region. Hotlines in both Belgrade and Zagreb have reported that in the winter of 1991-92, about fifteen percent of the calls were related to post-war violence (Mladjenovic 1993a). Men who have returned from the frontlines continue to be violent in their homes. As Mladjenovic (1995: 6) argues, “woman constitutes a 'minority group' in the family, and thus becomes the Other who has to be controlled.”

Ethnic-national ideologies and projects justify violence as the “defence” of the “endangered” ethnic-national collective. This strategy gives “freedom” to the suppressed need for violence, and once Pandora's box is open, violence is everywhere, on the battlefield, in politics, on the street, at home, in the bedroom (Korac 1993: 110). The nationalist hatred generated in the process of ethnic-national revival requires a target on which to act out those feelings. As Mrsevic and Hughes point out in their analysis of the situation in Serbia:

In the autumn of 1991, the SOS Hotline started receiving calls from women who were battered after men watched the TV news (or special broadcasts) in which pictures of dead bodies were shown. The narratives were filled with hatred for "the enemy." Women reported that men became enraged after watching the nationalist propaganda and they beat women as a way to avenge their wounded national pride. Some women reported that they were beaten for the first time in their lives after the men watched one of the nationalist reports on Serbian victims of war (1997: 120).
Women in ethnically mixed marriages confront an additional kind of victimization and horror at home. According to reports of the local women's groups working with women and children victims of violence, there is an increase in domestic violence within ethnically-mixed households as a result of the war and ethnic-national tensions (Stanojevic 1993). As one woman, whose husband physically abused her reveals: “He beats me up because I am Albanian, and my parents do not want to see me because I married a Serb” (Zajovic 1994: 65). Thus, ethnic hatred becomes yet another argument for men to justify physical violence against women. This type of violence is often accompanied by rejection on the part of the woman's family, creating a situation where victimized women suffer even more. The ideology of ethnic-national purification and “cleansing” extends easily, and with disquieting internal logic, to “one's own woman” as well as to women's bodies in general.

RAPE IN WAR: A TOOL IN (MEN'S) CONSTRUCTION OF THE ETHNIC-NATIONAL CAUSE

As women are seen as precious property of the “enemy”, their bodies become territories to be seized and conquered. Rape in war, and in ethnic-national war in particular, becomes a powerful symbolic weapon against the “enemy.” In addition, rape is an effective implement of territorial “cleansing,” for men will not return to the places where they have been “humiliated” by the rape of “their” women.

The very logic of rape as a tool in the strategy of “ethnic-cleansing,” as Meznaric (1994: 79) explains, rests upon “the use of gender as a means to control communication and to sharpen the boundaries between two opposed ethnicities.” The rape of women of the opposed ethnic collective carries an important symbolic message from men to men. As Seifert (1994: 58) points out, it communicates to men that they have been unable to protect “their” women. The symbolic
outcome of sexual aggression towards women in war is that men are wounded in their masculinity and marked as “incompetent” (ibid.: 58). This in turn, I would add, functions as an important mobilizing element in further militarizing ethnic-national collectives.

Furthermore, when a woman has been raped in this war, her womb and body are considered as an “occupied” territory. This becomes an important feature in the political propaganda of nationalists as local governments and politicians, supported by local and international media, provide incomplete, one-sided information about wartime rape. Reports focus almost exclusively on the crimes of the “other” side, so that the ethnic-national membership of the rapist and of a possibly foetus become the focal point, dismissing both the raped woman and the crime committed against her.

THE NATION-STATE, RAPE, AND FEMINISM(S)

As Benderly (1997: 65) argues, “[j]ust as the Yugoslav war is the continuation of politics by other means, so rape is the continuation of the control of women's reproduction - by more violent means.” I would add, it also represents the extension of state control over women's lives and rights in a more general sense. Consequently, one has to question whether current nation-states can represent women's interests. Furthermore, what is the actual meaning of the protection of victimized women by the nation-state? If one looks back to some historic examples, they clearly demonstrate a pattern in the way states have dealt with mass sexual assault on women in wars. As Harris (1993: 171-172) has pointed out in her analysis on mass rape of Belgian women in World War I:

...the idea of France as a woman raped became part of the repertoire of propagandists....The evolution of imagery to fit the war's development and triumphant end explains in part the virtual amnesia which later consigned the
whole story of rape and the child of the barbarian to oblivion....

If we look at a more recent historic example of mass sexual victimization of women in Bangladesh, it becomes clear that part of the reason assaulted women received international attention was “[t]he desperate need of Sheik Mujibur Rahman's government for international sympathy and financial aid.” (Brownmiller 1975: 86).

In the case of mass rape in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the state representatives has sued Serbia at the International court of Justice for genocide, including rape. This move of the Bosnian government is regarded by some feminists as an outstanding gesture on the part of a state. These feminists argue that Bosnian state stood up for women's rights “in a way that no state ever has” (MacKinnon 1994: 194), claiming that this event has a potential to restructure “international rules of war” and human rights conventions.

I would argue, however, that it would be hard to expect that the rights of victimized women in these wars can be protected by the “shield” of the new nation-states in the region. The ways in which ethnic-nationalist ideologies construct women, and the centrality of control of women for the sake the nation-states' projects, as presented in this article, reveal, I believe, how these ideologies and their respective nation-states-in-the-making have capitalized on traditionally defined gender roles and relations of power. These roles, as previously argued, are central for the militarization of the ethnic-national collective, and are implicit in nation-state politics and policies. They are central to the ways in which nation-states manipulate and abuse “their” women.

Local women's group are currently divided according to their agreement or disagreement with their governments and their respective ethnic-national projects. At this point of the discussion it is important to note briefly the main characteristics of the recent history of feminism in Yugoslavia (from the end of 1970s to its disintegration). At the end of 1970s, a
new generation of urban, educated women emerged challenging the socialist state and the assumption that women's struggle is synonymous with class struggle. This was one of the first signs of the emergence of elements of civil society that continued through the 1980s. These groups initially started as discussion or consciousness-rising groups, but by the end of the 1980s lesbian groups and SOS hotlines for victims of violence against women and linked through a cross-regional network. These groups were the seeds of later women's lobbies, women's parliaments, and umbrella organizations that were established and active in 1990, and were part of the feminist political reaction and resistance to the politics of ethnic nationalism in the region. Between the end of 1980s and the beginning of the war, in 1991, as Benderly (1997: 61) describes,

...feminists gave increasing attention to opposing nationalism (whether present among Communists, such as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, or their opponents, such as the HDZ in Croatia or Demos in Slovenia). Feminists asserted that the construction of any nation, be it Yugoslavia or one of the republics, manipulates women.

As a result of these politics, "women's groups from various republics built up a long-term cooperative relationship that endured longer than the Yugoslav federation." (ibid.: 70). However, the network of women across the region did not remain untouched. Nationalism brought about internal tensions, crisis, and separation within and among some local women's groups, because some women felt they could not engage in anti-nationalist and anti-war politics while their nation was “endangered.” Nevertheless, the anti-nationalist politics of the remaining local women's groups did help thousands of refugees, and refugee women in particular, through multi-ethnic self help groups and other programs they organized. This form of activism created a basis for the reconciliation process, so important in war and post-war situations. It also produced,
gradually over the course of war, a social space for women of various ethnic-nationalities and politics to communicate with each other, exchanging experiences of their work with refugee women and women survivors of war violence. And finally, this activism significantly helped establish elements of a democratic, non-violent political culture, where conflicts can be discussed, differences can be negotiated and thus potentially reconciled. This important contribution to non-violent political culture is a result of women's continuous engagement in negotiations with “others” across divisions. These negotiations were not always without problems and misunderstandings, but women's groups kept communicating and finding ways for, at least, minimal cooperation. All these efforts represent a unique struggle to reaffirm the process of social inclusion and a way of social integration in the context of a violently disintegrated country.25

Women's groups that felt they should support their endangered ethnic-nations and their respective states-in-making were the groups that Benderly (1997: 71) describes as "[t]hose who conflated 'women as victim' and 'nation as victim,'" and who “moved toward a sort of feminist nationalism, the patriotism of the victimized.” Women feminists themselves, as my research reveals, refer to this divide as to a division between “patriotic” and “disloyal” women. The crucial question in their dispute is, I would argue, whether ethnic-national membership could be a demarcation line between women and their struggle for their rights.

If we look closely at the kind of “protection” that has already been given to women survivors of massive sexual atrocities in these wars, such “protection” actually turns out to be further victimization of women. Their experiences are manipulated for political purposes in order to aggravate ethnic-national hatred. First and foremost, this manipulation is perpetuated by local governments, politicians, and nationalists. But local and international journalists have also contributed. As Belic, an activist in Zagreb's Centre for Women War Victims (CWWV),26
explains:

Sexual abuses against women were used to manipulate Western populations according to the needs of daily politics, to spread war propaganda, to justify ethnic hatred and to raise readership and viewing rates. So women came to be abused again. One fax received by the CWWV is entering into legend: 'A journalist...wants to interview a woman in the ex-Yugoslavia about the rape camps in Bosnia/Croatia. Preferably a survivor and someone who can speak English. Do you know someone who can do this by phone? Please let me know quickly'(1995: 33).

“Disloyal” local women's groups reacted quite rapidly to the danger of further victimization of women survivors of rape in these wars. The CWWV from Zagreb, for example, stated in a Letter of Intentions forwarded to women's and peace organizations worldwide:

We are writing this letter because we fear that the process of helping raped women is turning in a strange direction, being taken over by governmental institutions. Ministry of Health of Croatia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and male gynaecologists in particular (sic). We fear that the raped women could be used in political propaganda with the aim of spreading hatred and revenge, thus leading to further violence against women and to further victimization of survivors.27

Women's organizations worldwide have responded by gathering humanitarian aid, sending money, by lobbying their governments to set up an international war crimes tribunal and working to change international conventions. Although this response showed a certain solidarity, it was not without its internal tensions. Some U.S. feminists (U.S. feminist attorney C. MacKinnon, for example), argue “that rape is a distinctly Serbian weapon for which all Serbs - even feminists who oppose war - are culpable”(Benderly 1997: 67).28 Consequently the support given to the “disloyal” local women's groups was not entirely unambiguous.
Nor was the process of attaining an effective prosecution of gender-based crimes in the former Yugoslavia problem-free. Copelon, Gaer, and Green (1995) argue that despite the profound success of feminist advocacy efforts for an effective prosecution of gender-based crimes, additional advocacy is crucial to implement protective measures and build a meaningful Victim and Witness Unit at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the support and lobbying is best described as a pale light in an endless tunnel of victimization and violence against women.

CONCLUSION

The analysis in this paper reveals the patterns of gendered violence in a social and political context of militarization, conflict, and war over ethnic-national “purity” and “sameness” in the areas of the former Yugoslavia. The analysis reveals a number of ways in which women are affected by violence in ethnic-national conflicts. The types of violence they face include those more readily visible (i.e., sexual and physical violence) with the potential to become socially recognized and treated as intolerable. But even when violence against women is socially recognized, the social and/or state intolerance of the violations of women's rights is profoundly motivated by reasons that are part of a larger nation-state politics based on male-centered interests and struggles for power.

Moreover, there are many forms of violence with gender specific implications that are a result of ethnic-national ideology and practice. Forced displacements of populations have specific gender implications, where displacing women becomes symbolically and materially important for (re)shaping boundaries between ethnic-national collectives. The process of (re)shaping boundaries continues in the place of women's exile which bears the characteristics of a war zone, particularly for women of ethnic minorities. Forced displacement of women also
implies a radical change of gender roles and responsibilities and, in conjunction with constant fear for family members, contributes to a crisis in developing appropriate and successful survival strategies. Demonization of ethnically mixed marriages and offspring becomes a tool in furthering “ethnic cleansing” where women suffer emotionally and physically as a result of increased domestic violence in ethnically mixed marriages. “Naturalization” of women (i.e., women as biological reproducers of the ethnic-nation) leads to limited gender roles and social identifiers. This “naturalization” translates into unequal life chances as well as into its institutionalization, which means control over women's bodies and restricted reproductive rights. And finally, the media exploitation of women survivors of sexual violence in war becomes a tool of nation-states to victimize further the abused women. This misuse of women's experiences, through almost exclusive focus on the ethnicity of the rapist and a possible foetus, is strengthening states' male-centered power relations. These forms of violence are much harder to detect and name as violence. The potential for social recognition of these forms of violence can be realized only through women's efforts to articulate their experiences of violence and to express their needs in their own ways.

This discussion is not, by any means, to be understood as an approach that neglects men's experience of violence in war or their victimization by ethnic-national discourses and politics. Nonetheless, as argued in this paper, there is a difference between women's and men's experience of violence in war. Men predominantly control economic and military resources. Consequently, men have a more active role in war and as a rule most often enter history as victors.

This analysis of patterns of violence against women in the wars in some post-Yugoslav countries has attempted to synthesize the usually fragmented analyses of the situation of women in the region. The discussion has argued for a feminist effort, both theoretically and politically, to uncover “gendered workings of power” (Enloe 1993) within a post-communist process of
nation-state building. Furthermore, if the wars in post-Yugoslav countries are to be taken as a terrifying but fundamental lesson on violence and crimes against women, we must bring to the surface the different patterns of violence against women within the context of ethnic-national strategies. Only the success of that effort will acknowledge violence against women in a fundamental way.

NOTES

Maja Korac
Center for Feminist Research
York University
York Lanes
4700 Keele Street, Toronto
Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada

Maja Korac has a B.A. and an M.A. from Belgrade University, former Yugoslavia, where she taught for several years. Currently, she is a Doctoral Candidate in the Graduate Programme in Sociology at York University, Canada. Since the Spring of 1996 she has also worked as a consultant to the Women in Conflict Zones Network Project, initiated and hosted at York University.

1. The usage of “structural violence” here is that defined by Galtung, who refers to “structural violence” as the type of violence that is “built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life choices....” (Galtung 1969:171-172).

2. The first phase of the research was funded by the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada. The support is gratefully acknowledged.
3. For detailed discussion on my ethnic-national identity see Korac (1996).

4. For more on this particular topic see Korac (1993a).

5. For discussion on history and meaning of the patriarchal culture in the region see Denich (1974).

6. These data are taken from a study by Posarac, Bogosavljevic, and Kovacevic at the Economic Institute in Belgrade. The study was requested and financed by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Vreme 1994b).


8. In the Parliaments, when the revival of nationalism was well under way, after the first so-called “free” elections in 1991 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2.9 percent of members were women; in Croatia 4.5 percent; in Macedonia 3.3 percent; in Montenegro 4 percent; in Serbia 1.6 percent; and in Slovenia 13 percent (Kajosevic 1995).

9. Women's experiences with the “socialist” system were not problem free. Socialist claims for “women's emancipation” as a part of a principal claim for “social equality” was strongly male-dominated. Nonetheless, the aforementioned elements of women's experience under state socialism could have provided stepping stones to identifying women's needs in the radical economic, political and social transformation. For more discussion on this issue see Einhorn (1993).

10. Metropolitan Nikolaj's statement was originally given to the Serbian nationalistic magazine Pogledi, reprinted in the Belgrade independent weekly magazine Vreme (1994a).

11. It should be noted here that although the main focus of the paper is the situation of women within ethnic-national projects, conflict, and wars, the reciprocal relationship of the effects of “structural violence” on men is acknowledged and will be addressed in the discussion relevant to the analysis.

12. For more on the importance of the role of women as biological reproducers of national collectives see Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989).

13. According to 1994 statistics, the birth rate was -2.93 per 1,000 in Central Serbia (an area with a homogenous Serbian population). In Vojvodina it was -3.11 (Serbian minority), and in Kosova (Albanian majority) it was +17.38 (Papic, 1995: 41).

14. For more discussion of this issue see Korac (1993a) and Denitch (1994).


16. Current ethnic-national projects in the region insist on territorial sovereignty, which leads to absolutism and fundamentalism when it is grounded, as in this case, on a concept of citizenship that promotes divisiveness rather than diversity. For more on the character of the new nationalism in post-communist states see Kaldor (1993).
17. Mazowiecki defines “ethnic-cleansing” as “the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over given territory of members of other groups.” (Kaldor, 1993: 108). The methods range from various forms of economic and social pressure and discrimination to killing, raping, and other forms of horrific crimes committed in these wars.

18. The data derive from UNHCR report, July 1995, as well as the latest instances of “ethnic cleansing” in Srebrenica and Zepa (Bosnia & Herzegovina) and in the region of Krajina (Croatia) (Nasa Borba, 1995).

19. It is important to note that the distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons is critical for the situation and wellbeing of those who are forcefully displaced. Refugees are persons who cross internationally recognized borders, and as such they are protected by the international convention. Internally displaced persons are those who flee their homes but are still within their country of origin. The UNHCR’s mandate formally does not allow their protection.

20. The USCR reports (1993b: 20-21; 1995: 131, 173) indicate that the policies of the governments of Croatia and Serbia towards refugees were colored by events in the war zones. For more information on the forms of political violation of refugee rights by local governments in the region see Korac (1994; in press-a).


22. For more information on the process of creating the “enemy” in this conflict see Parin (1994).


24. For more information on various forms of work with refugee women see Korac (1994).

25. For more on differences among women's groups in post-Yugoslav countries, as well as on their bridge building activities see Korac (in press-b).


27. December 21, 1992, unpublished, distributed through the network of women's groups in the former Yugoslavia.

28. The scope of these tensions toward “disloyal” feminists is best illustrated by an event at the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna, June 1993, where MacKinnon made the following comment in response to a question posed by Belgrade feminist activist Nadezda Cetkovic: “If you are in opposition to the regime in Serbia, why aren't you already dead?” (Benderly 1997: 67).
REFERENCES

Ahmeti, Sevdie  

Belic, Martina  

Benderly, Jill  

Bozinovic, Nada  

Brah, Avtar  

Brownmiller, Susan  

Centre for Women War Victims  

Cetkovic, Nadezda  

Cockburn, Cynthia  

Copelon, Rhonda  

Copelon, Rhonda, Felice Gear, and Jenifer Green  
Denich, Bette  

Denitch, Bogdan  

Einhorn, Barbara  

Enloe, Cynthia  


Galtung, Johan  

Harris, Ruth  

Kajosevic, Indira  

Kaldor, Mary  

Kesic, Vesna  

Korace, Maja  


Lerner, Gerda

MacKinnon, Catharine

Meznaric, Silva

Milic, Andjelka

Mitic, Dragomir

Mladjenovic, Lepa


Mrsevic, Zorica and Donna Hughes

Nasa Borba (Belgrade daily newspaper)
1995, August 10, p. 5.

Nikolic-Ristanovic, Vesna, Natasa Mrvic-Petrovic, Slobpodanka Konstantinovic-Vilic and Ivana Stevanovic
Papic, Zarana  

1995a How to Become a 'Real' Serbian Woman? Warreport 36: 40-43.


Parker, Andrew, Mary Russo, Doris Summer, and Patricia Yaeger  

Parin, Paul  

Pateman, Carol  

Petrovic, Ruza  

Pettman, Jan Jindy  

Seifert, Ruth  

Stanojevic, Vesna  
1993 Sta cujemo...sta vidimo...sta radimo (What We Hear...What We See...What We Do). In S.O.S. bilten (S.O.S. Bulletin). N. Cetkovic, ed. Belgrade: S.O.S. Hotline for Women and Children Victims of Violence.


U.S. Committee for Refugees.  


Vreme (Belgrade weekly magazine)
1994a  October 31.

1994b  November 7.

Walby, Sylvia

Woodward, Susan

Yuval-Davis, Nira and Floya Anthias, eds.

Yuval-Davis, Nira

Zajovic, Stasa.