Resourcing a Viable Digital Journalism

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Much academic enquiry into financing journalism looks to the precarious prospects for sustaining commercial models. In contrast, this chapter explores arguments which suggest that a viable journalism requires alternatives to commercial funding. Mainstream debate across industry and the academy accepts, often as a premise, that journalism can only flourish as a commercially delivered product operating in highly volatile and adverse market conditions (Grueskin, Seaves and Graves 2011). Various radical perspectives respond that the commercial model is broken, is the agency of crisis for news media and cannot serve as the basis for sustaining a diverse public journalism. These differ in how far mainstream, market media are repudiated but common to the critical perspectives explored in this chapter is their contribution to serious debate about the qualities of journalism that need to be sustained and fostered, and about the ways in which this may be achieved.

Diagnosing problems in news journalism

Since the debate on the digital phase of the ‘crisis’ of news media intensified around the mid 2000s, several aspects are clearer. First, conditions vary between media systems and consequently both diagnosis and remedy need to be situated. A survey of ten countries (Newman and Levy, 2014), for example, found weekly newspaper purchases relatively stable at 49 per cent, but economic disruption was greatest in countries where the majority of sales were from newsstands or shops (UK, Spain, Italy, Brazil) compared to home delivery via subscription (Japan, Denmark, Finland, Germany). Second, even in the advanced economies where the epithet of crisis is most pertinent, the general trend has been decline rather than collapse, with important differentiation between news sectors and competing enterprises (Franklin, 2009: 1-13). Third, the debate tends to conflate print and broadcasting based media, which makes some sense in examining trends across the convergent, commercial media of
the United States but far less so when addressing the mixed systems of Europe with relatively strong public service media alongside commercial publishers. Fourth, the Euro-American literature has tended to ignore the growth of paid newspaper markets across fast-growing economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Franklin 2009). Nevertheless, the common feature across media systems whose newspaper market was larger before digitalisation, has been an irreversible decline in print revenue, accompanied by cost cutting to manage that decline. In the UK, circulation fell by 25 per cent between 2005-2010 in the ‘quality’ press, and by 17 per cent in the popular press (Enders Analysis 2011). Digital revenue growth has failed to compensate for print decline, while adding to costs (PEW 2015).

Making what viable?

When considering how to resource journalism, it is important to identify what should be resourced? There is a rich literature on normative models of journalism (Christians et al, 2009) and a burgeoning literature on the expansion and transformations of ‘journalistic activities’ from citizen journalism and professional-amateur (pro-am) hybridisations to self-mass communication. Both Western liberal and radical perspectives espouse a monitorial journalism that is ‘committed to public enlightenment and sufficiently independent and capable of holding agencies of power in society to account – economic, political, and military’ (Christians et al, 2009: 240). The differences are best understood if, following Baker (2002) we identify how various models of democracy privilege different media jobs. Radical democratic perspectives extend liberal norms to argue for media to enhance the material conditions and voice of those lacking power. Media should facilitate processes of deliberation and exchange but also aid self-constitution and mobilisation by social movements and interest groups (Curran, 2002: 217-247). Radical democrats have proposed that this can be achieved by having a combination of media sectors, differentially organised and financed, generating different communication spaces, forms and styles. Curran (2002) provides the best exposition of such a normative model, proposing a core public service sector encircled by private, social market, professional and civil media sectors. This seeks to ensure that the media system is not controlled by either the state or market, but has mutually influencing parts that strengthen media independence, enhance diversity and promote quality. Such
normative models were constructed to address problems in Anglo-American media systems in the mass media era, yet they can serve as guides for considering suitably pluralistic arrangements today.

**Critiques of commercial models**

Critiques of commercial journalism stretch from the early growth of commercial systems in the nineteenth century (McChesney and Scott 2004) to the rise of ‘market-driven’ media and hypercommercialism from the 1970s (McManus, 1994; McChesney, 2013). Waves of corporate consolidation, aided by liberalisation of ownership regulations, left commercial news production in the hands of debt-laden, financialized corporations with decreasing tolerance to subsidise loss-making reporting and whose corporate logics undermine journalistic independence and investigative capacity alike (Almiron, 2010). As profitability declined, capital began to abandon news journalism, shifting to more profitable activities, including classified ad websites (McChesney, 2013). The crisis has laid bare the fundamental tensions between capitalism and democracy, between ‘communication groups subject to financial logics and who can, and indeed do, exercise political action, and…the need that democracy and society have for an independent, rigorous and professional journalistic practice’ (Almiron, 2010: 158).

The problematic tendencies of commercial media may be expected to increase on current trajectories. Studies show reductions in the resources for paid journalism, more reliance on public relations materials, more dependence on established sources and less resources to investigate independently, leading to dangerous levels of ‘churnalism’ (Davies 2008). Joining established critiques of the ways commercialisation undermines news values (Bennett, 2011) are those that concern the dynamics of monetizing digital journalism. One report (Silverman, 2015: 144) finds ‘The business models and analytics programs of many large news websites create an incentive for them to jump on, and point to, unverified claims and suspect viral stories. This approach is receiving some pushback and is by no means universal, but the sites pursuing this strategy are large and drive a significant number of social shares for their content’.
One of the most salient areas of critique concerns advertising. The deal, whereby advertising paid for journalism to attract readers who would see their ads, has been unravelling since the early 1990s as marketers have found more direct, information-rich and cost effective ways to track and target consumers online. Efforts to make good the loss of advertising by more effective retailing, through paywalls, micropayments and subscription have so far largely failed (Myllylahti 2014). Successful monetization online is mostly restricted to products serving elite or specialist audiences, where there are attributes of high value content (relatively non-reproducible and/or fast), scarcity in supply, valued user interface and enhanced cross-platform availability. In the absence of significant growth in subscriptions, ‘news organisations are focusing on maximizing revenue from those who are prepared to pay’ (Newman and Levy 2015: 12). For general, public-facing journalism cultures of ‘free’ prevail (Chyi and Lee 2013) and are expected to continue. ‘[T]here is no evidence that large numbers of consumers will ever pay for commoditized news that is freely available elsewhere’ (Kaye and Quinn, 2010: 177). A survey by the Internet Advertising Bureau (Jackson, 2015) found UK adults were prepared to pay only 92p a month to access news websites, less than they were prepared to spend on email, search engines or online video. A 10-country survey (Newman and Levy, 2015) found only 11 per cent reported they had paid for digital news in the last 12 months. Pay models have tended to stall after reaching a small segment of their total consumer market willing to pay for content.

The failure to raise revenue from consumers has meant even greater dependence on advertising. Digital journalism is at the apex of two key trends in media –advertising relationships: towards the disaggregation of advertising and media and towards the greater integration of advertising within media. The characteristic relationship of media and advertising in the mid-20th century was integration with separation: advertising was physically integrated with the media product but separated from editorial content. That separation principle was generally upheld by news journalists, supported by managers, underpinned by self-regulatory codes across media and advertising, and subject to stronger statutory regulation in sectors like European broadcasting.
Media and advertising integration is not new but the digital environment has brought increased pressures from marketers, met with increased accommodation (Turow, 2011; McChesney, 2013: 155). The emergent forms are integration without separation, which extends from branded entertainment and product placement to advergames and sponsored social media, but this coexists with trends towards disaggregation of media and advertising. Marketers are less dependent on the intermediary role of media, can track and target consumers directly and demand to reduce their subsidy to media by paying only the costs of delivering an advert onto a selected platform (Turow, 2011; Hardy, 2014). Both integration and disaggregation reflect a strengthening shift towards marketer power in an era of increased media dependence on advertising finance.

For digital journalism the fastest-growing form of ad-integration is ‘native advertising’, a form of branded content that is produced by or on behalf of a marketer and appears within or alongside publishers’ own content offering. Ads mimic the editorial content surrounding them and follow the form and user experience associated with the context in which they are placed. In the UK content and native advertising grew to £509m in 2014 to account for 22% of all display ad spend, part of the 14% increase in total digital advertising spending to a record £7.2bn (Jackson, 2015). Billed as the saviour for newspapers losing traditional ad revenue, marketers were expected to spend $4.3 billion in 2015, with publishers from the New York Times to the Guardian, Daily Mail, Mashable and Refinery29 deploying editorial staff to create native ads (Sebastian, 2014). For US news brands, digital advertising and marketing services were two areas of modest growth while revenue from traditional advertising continued to fall (NAA, 2014). The growth of native advertising reflects new pressures and opportunities, shifts in governing values across established media and the spreading influence of formats and business models from the inaptly named ‘pure players’, digital-only publishers like Buzzfeed and Huffington Post who attract a younger audience via social media and mobile (Newman and Levy, 2014).

There are longstanding critiques of the influence of advertising finance on media, source dependency and intensifying PRisation of media (Davies, 2008; Jackson and Moloney, 2015). What is euphemistically called native advertising blends and
amplifies all these concerns. The most pertinent charge is that there is a powerful imbalance in the resources to fund effective public communications. Professional journalism promised to ameliorate that imbalance by producing communications according to values that serve democratic and cultural life—accuracy, balance and editorial independence - from vested interests amongst them. The expansion of native advertising is symptomatic of the erosion of that communications space. Is sponsored content an acceptable trade-off in order to finance high-cost newsgathering and reporting? What is evident is that sponsored content itself favours resource-rich, commercial sources, advertiser-friendly coverage, ‘best-selling’ stories and soft news. As this model becomes more prevalent it increases resource imbalances, undermines news values, and threatens a cure worse than the disease. Neither the safeguards of new professional ‘norms and practices’ (Picard 2015: 280), more distributed, investigative capabilities confronting brands, nor sponsor identification regulations, redress the erosion of journalistic channels when marketers can command editorial forms and merge ‘earned’, ‘owned’ and ‘paid’ media. Market entrants like Demand Media are amongst the leading proponents of integrated advertising and content farming, while the absence of alternative finance drives social enterprise journalism down the same road.

Other critiques shape the debate on alternatives, the most prominent of which have addressed corporate media ownership and control, reinforced by fine-grained studies of working conditions, job losses and eroding workplace security (see Hardy, 2014). Opinions divide over the extent to which established institutions, journalistic tasks and paid jobs should be protected, but there are sharp criticisms of the way more celebratory accounts of network journalism (Beckett, 2008) fail to deal adequately with resource inequalities and their on-going structuring effects. The optimistic view of a new social journalism tends to downplay the impact of resource cuts on commercial journalism, the limited social make-up of active bloggers and citizen journalism, problems of exposure diversity and the dependence of new journalism on professional newsgathering. The alternative media models draw on resources that define and can in part sustain them: voluntary labour; networking and network effects (Benkler, 2006). But these are under-resourced and precarious, and Critical Political Economy (CPE) scholars make a powerful case against overestimating their reach,
impact and transforming potential while huge disparities between these and dominant commercial communications remain (McChesney, 2013).

Together these are reasons why the radical CPE tradition seeks solutions for a viable journalism beyond the commercial model. It is important to stress, though, that context matters. Commercial enterprises may be privately owned, publicly traded but also take forms like *The Guardian*, a loss-making liberal publication, cross-subsidised by profitable businesses and owned by a charitable trust. Commercialism must also be investigated within a wider field of influences that include institutional, legal-regulatory and governance arrangements, the cultures and values shaping professional (and pro-am) practices, market dynamics and user behaviour.

**Funding public journalism**

The radical tradition contests commercial funding and seeks alternatives, but is not alone in arguing that the commercial model is not sustaining journalism. The private companies on which democracies have relied for the provision of public goods, such as public affairs journalism, are widely regarded as being in crisis. Even when the focus is on saving journalistic activity rather than industries or platforms, other ways of funding journalism will have to be found.

The following section outlines various proposals to draw on public, private and civil society resources to fund journalism. Some focus on supporting entirely non-profit organisations that do not disburse profits to private interests, others countenance support for private media where these are subject to public oversight. The main sources of private sector funding have been consumers, marketers, investors, corporate finance or debt. The main alternative source has been public funding, including direct and indirect subsidies for news publishers and funding for public service media (by combinations of licence fees, state funding or commercial revenues). Another source has been civil society, including funding from foundations and charitable trusts, funding from trade unions, NGOs, charities and other ‘third sector’ organisations. (Picard 2015). There are also sources that extend engagements beyond identifications of consumer, citizen or member, such as crowdfunding (Carvajal, García-Avilés, González 2012) although much hailed initiatives
like www.spot.us have been short-lived, failing to attract sustainable funding (Johnson, 2015). In all cases there can be cross-subsidy, with funds or resources derived from one area financing activities in another.

**Industry levies and taxes**

If there is ‘market failure’ to provide a public good in sufficient qualities, there are grounds for regulatory interventions to tax the profits of communication service providers to fund journalism. The main levy proposals advanced have been aimed at a) digital content providers (search engines; content aggregators); b) digital service providers (mobile and broadband ISPs) c) commercial publishers. Most prominent has been the so-called ‘Google tax’ in France (Zelnick et al, 2010), a proposed tax of one to two per cent on revenue generated from online display ads to fund the press, although controversially not new online ventures. This led to Google establishing a €60m fund to finance digital innovation, following fraught negotiations in which Google threatened to stop indexing European news sites (The Guardian, 2013). However, there are greater challenges in collecting revenues from search and aggregators than for alternative proposals to tax internet service providers, whose revenues are derived from peoples’ willingness to pay for broadband services to access content, even if not for the content itself. Leigh (2012) proposed a £2 levy on the monthly bills of UK broadband subscribers, although one of the strongest objections was to his suggestion that this be distributed to newspapers in proportion to their online readership.

Even modest levies can generate significant resources. A one per cent levy on the total revenue of UK telecoms, according to 2010 data, would generate £405 million argues the Media Reform Coalition [MRC] (2011: 7). Moreover, “Far from being ‘stealth taxes’, these would be open and transparent mechanisms applied to a range of operators—which could include ISPs, broadcasters, mobile phone operators and hardware companies—in order to raise much needed revenue to fill news ‘gaps’” (MRC 2011:7). The proceeds of such levies could fund non-profit online journalism, or local news hubs, disbursed by accountable grantmaking agencies.

**Indirect public funding**
Other proposals draw on traditions of indirect state support. This has particular resonance in the US where free-market orthodoxies sought to eclipse not only contemporary proposals for public subsidy but their historical presence. In a politically charged excavation, McChesney and Nichols (2010) uncover the early Republic’s support for printing and postal subsidies for newspapers, that applied regardless of viewpoint and flourished up to the mid-19th century, and estimate their equivalent contemporary value at around $30 billion a year, far greater than the $400 million federal subsidy for public broadcasting. Despite the promoted image of US press freedom as derived from solidly free market foundations, the level of actual indirect support has been calculated as $1.2 billion a year (Cowan and Westphal, 2010).

Indirect support is common across Western Europe, including reduced costs for postal carriage, favourable rates for public utilities such as telecommunications, and reductions in business taxes. This indirect support is worth hundreds of millions of Euros per year representing ‘a much more significant form of public support for the media than is commonly realised’; as a total proportion of public spending, it ranges from around 7 per cent in Germany, where 90 per cent of support is to PSM, up to 45 per cent in Finland (Nielsen and Linnebank, 2011: 5). Such public subsidy is taken by firms that are often the fiercest critics of ‘state’ funded PSM. Indirect support also goes overwhelmingly to incumbent, private sector organisations. A few countries give direct aid to news brands although indirect aid remains the larger share; direct subsidies make up 0.1 per cent in Finland, 1 per cent in France and 13 per cent in Italy (Nielsen and Linnebank, 2011: 18). These subsidies are generally popular too. In November 2013 when a newly elected right-wing government in Norway tried to remove the country’s press subsidies the proposals were roundly rejected by parliament. Norway’s subsidies are mostly directed at papers with low advertising revenues and have helped to sustain far greater diversity than a fully market system would support, including meeting around a third of the revenue for the left-wing daily Klassekampen (Class Struggle) (McChesney, 2014). In 2014 147 newspapers received direct subsidies worth NOK 345 million, most of which was production grants, awarded in proportion to papers’ circulation and market position; indirect support,
notably exception from sales tax, amounts to nearly six times that figure (Mathisen, 2013).

The main forms of indirect subsidy, however, relief from VAT/sales taxes on print sales and print advertising, are declining in value as ad sales and paid circulation fall, prompting calls for digital subsidies. The European Newspaper Publishers Association (2015) calls on the EU ‘to provide Member States with the possibility of applying zero, super-reduced and reduced VAT rates for digital press, while maintaining the existing rates for printed press’. There has been no substantial public funding dedicated to digital-only news media, except in France which provides support for ventures that employ at least one professional journalist regularly (Nielsen and Linnebank, 2011). However, innovative subsidies for entry-level journalism jobs have been introduced in the Netherlands. UK reformers have recommended direct subsidy to fund a single, entry-level reporter for local news organisations dedicated to coverage of local politics in the town hall and in the community (MRC 2011). These various social market approaches advocate market intervention to address systemic market failure.

For advocates of public subsidy a key debate is whether any share should be directed to commercial news providers. Some favour direct over indirect subsidies as ways of targeting aid and intervening ‘in more precise and cost-efficient ways to support specific parts of what private sector media companies do’ (Nielsen and Linnebank, 2011: 24). By contrast, McChesney argues against any form of ‘corporate welfare’ for US commercial media which ‘makes decreasing sense as capitalists abandon the field’ and instead argues public subsidy should support the establishment of a ‘nonprofit, noncommercial, competitive, uncensored, and independent press system, embracing digital technologies’ (McChesney, 2014). McChesney and Nichols (2010) build on Dean Baker’s proposal to grant every American over 18 up to $200 of government money annually to direct to any non-profit medium they selected, subject to conditions: the recipient must be a recognized non-profit, take no commercial advertising and any content produced by the subsidy must enter the public domain freely, with no copyright protection. This would ‘amount to a $30 billion public investment with no government control over who gets the money’ and would ‘promote all sorts of competition as well, as entities would be competing for the
monies’ (McChesney, 2014). A milder variant proposes to encourage tax-deductible citizen-donations (Downie and Schudson 2009), but this source of income currently remains small and would be less dependable.

Other approaches seek to support alternatives to commercial enterprises and derive direct and indirect benefits from that status in respect of taxation, business and related costs. In the UK there are proposals to allow more newspapers to become charitable trusts, governed by charitable purposes and trading as non-profit distributing entities. Another proposal is for local newspapers to be given the status of community assets. Here the emphasis shifts from the economic benefits of status toward safeguards against the closure or sale of enterprises regarded as providing important services for the community. A third proposed structure is that of co-operative ownership. Co-operative ventures must serve to benefit members as their principal purpose rather that to generate profits *per se*, and being funded by readers and members protects against dependency on sources ‘that may not have the same interests (or longevity) as the outlet’s reader community’ (MRC 2011: 11). In the US the non-profit news sector ranges from the national ProPublica and Consumer Reports to the community-based Voice of San Diego and MinnPost and employed 1,300 by 2010, yet is underfunded and lacks sustainable business models (McChesney, 2013: 196-202).

*Public duties for commercial providers*

Another route is based on revitalised regulation to place public service obligations on commercial providers. UK reformers have proposed that commercial firms with significant market share should help to ensure media plurality by adhering to agreed standards, such as protecting journalistic independence and editorial output, in tandem with upper limits on ownership in the total media market, and national and regional news markets, so that no single voice can control more that 20 or 30 per cent (CPBF 2015):

*Any publisher with a 15 per cent share in a designated market should be subject to a Public Interest test… Ownership concentration above the 15 per cent threshold may be permitted if publishers meet certain obligations, such as*
investment in newsgathering or original programming, upholding codes of practice, and protecting editorial independence.

Such proposals have gained support from social democratic and socialist parties, trade unions and others. By contrast, most commercial news enterprises oppose new regulatory or financial obligations, yet their calls for subsidy and support open up space for negotiation.

**Civil Society resources**

Can funding from foundations and charitable trusts rescue public interest journalism? Some innovative online ventures have been nurtured. However, the sums involved are miniscule set against the wider problem of post-news industry viability and even small ventures can burn through large grants rapidly, a critical issue when most grant funding is time-limited; *openDemocracy* spent £4.35 million between 2001-8 from grants and donations, even though based principally on volunteer journalistic labour (Curran, 2011: 95-6). A Knight Foundation (2015:4) report on 20 non-profits it supported found most depended on grant funding and ‘few appear to be rapidly approaching a sustainable business model’. While predominantly beneficial, Foundation support is also relatively unaccountable and influenced to varying degrees by its source in corporate profits or the family behests of aristocrats and plutocrats. Proposals to tap civil society resources include developing community radio and media hubs for pro-am collaborations. Some of these require state resources and public subsidy but others seek to connect professional journalists, civil society organisations and citizen journalists in news hubs, for sustainable hyperlocal and local journalism (MRC 2011).

**Public service media and plurality**

The use of grants and civil society resources can support innovative models of journalism and contribute to pluralism. Yet they do not provide sufficient resources to finance sustained public interest news journalism (McChesney and Nichols, 2010). With the commercial system failing, resourcing a viable journalism that includes a sizeable body of salaried journalists will require building on public service media
The internet offers tremendous possibilities to refresh PSM’s mandate, from accessible, location-based news and entertainment services for all, to digital public spaces for debate (Curran 2011; BBC 2015a). Most public service broadcasters have expanded into online news publishing, though some have been restricted. In the UK, the main BBC TV channel remains the top news source used by 53 per cent of adults, with the BBC website app the third most used news source (24 per cent) (Ofcom 2014: 3). With sufficient funding, PSMs can provide high-quality news and information, subject to regulation to support professionalism, impartiality and internal pluralism.

Will financing public service media undermine commercial operators and hasten their decline, eroding pluralism? According to some commercial media associations, public subsidy undermines the viability of market-based media by ‘crowding out’ commercial players and constraining private enterprise (European Newspaper Publishers Association, 2015). Yet, the evidence of press subsidies shows that this need not be the case. Targeted public subsidies in Finland, Italy and France have helped ‘the press increase its reach, helped smaller publications survive, and helped bigger ones increase both their profits and their potential to do public good’ (Nielsen and Linnebank, 2011: 9). A report by KPMG likewise found that the BBC does not crowd out local newspapers, concluding that adoption of the internet had a larger effect on these businesses than any attributable to BBC online provision (BBC Trust 2015: 12); BBC investment in online decreased between 2010 and 2015 when it remained less than six percent of licence fee spending (£201m of £3.62bn). Instead of crowding out private media, PSMs can create valuable incentives for them to innovate. However, the use of public money must be accountable, transparent and supported by on-going studies into what balance of incentives and obligations can best sustain news plurality across markets.

PSM resources will need to be better integrated with non-profits, social enterprises and even commercial providers (subject to public interest regulation) to support the kind of plural media system outlined earlier. In 2015 the BBC piloted Local Live streams that incorporate local press and ‘hyperlocal’ links and direct users to BBC and external content. Identifying local journalism as ‘one of the biggest market failures in news’ the BBC proposed more ‘open’ partnerships with publishers, sharing
content and links, alongside increased investment in local online news (BBC 2015:21)
In response the News Media Association (2015: 58) opposed BBC ‘encroachment’
into local news markets and called for greater access to BBC content, funding, and
promotion to direct users to commercial news brands’ ad-funded sites. Others too
want the licence fee ‘top sliced’ to fund public journalism but this putatively
progressive proposal overlaps with neoliberal agendas to shrink PSM. It also clashes
with efforts to sustain PSM jobs and conditions as integral to the goals of robust
journalism, better training, access and workplace diversity (Hardy, 2015).

Resourcing a viable journalism will need public subsidy, support for social enterprise,
and public interest obligations on large communication providers in a system of
incentives and controls that include ownership regulation and levies. There needs to
be well-funded digital journalism committed to professional norms, insulated from
political or commercial pressures, internally pluralist and organised around serving
publics. That requires accountable public institutions but journalism also needs a
dynamic, pluralistic environment. Radical democrats are right to argue for diversified
media systems that capture the benefits of different arrangements and sectors. The
case for public service media at the core remains strong. But there must be diversity
and competition within PSM, and greater interlinking with a flourishing sector of non-
profits that draw on individual creativity, community voice, and civil society
resources. There is also greater scope to pool resources between PSMs and
commercial media, in areas such as local journalism, subject to public interest
governance. A mixed system has other merits. No single source of support meets all
objections to its impact on building a sustainable and stable financial model. Public
subsidy will remain politically contested, opposed by powerful industry voices,
susceptible to poor governance and sensitive to volatile economic and political
conditions. Any proposals for reform must also be rooted in understanding the
histories, institutional cultures and political economies of the media systems they are
recommended for. All these proposals emanate from the argument that journalism is a
public good, required by society but which the market left to itself will not provide in
sufficient quality and quantity; ‘Like other public goods, if society wants it, it will
require public policy and public spending. There is no other way’ (McChesney,
2014).
Further Reading

Bibliography
All weblinks were last accessed on 30 October 2015


